r Academy of Management Perspectives

2019, Vol. 33, No. 1, 3–11.

https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2018.0043

S Y M P O S I U M
ETHICS IN NEGOTIATION: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
BRIAN C. GUNIA
Johns Hopkins University

Why do negotiators act ethically or unethically? What happens after they do? Despite
accumulating evidence on the causes and consequences of ethical and unethical be-
havior in non-negotiation situations, surprisingly few attempts have been made to ex-
amine these issues systematically within the negotiation context. This is problematic
because it contributes to the somewhat stale viewpoint that unethical negotiation be-
havior is both inevitable and uniformly harmful. It also impedes progress in both the
negotiation and the behavioral ethics literatures and limits our field’s ability to train
ethical negotiators. As a step toward refreshing the field’s perspective on the causes and
consequences of ethical and unethical negotiation behavior, the current symposium
assembles four papers by leading scholars of ethics and negotiation. Collectively, they
aim to provide a bird’s-eye view on the numerous causes (e.g., moral character, ethical
fading, environmental cues) and surprisingly diverse consequences attending ethical
and unethical negotiation, both reviewing current knowledge and looking to the future.
Overall, we suggest that unethical behavior is not inevitable in negotiation nor neces-
sarily detrimental for either negotiator. Rather, science can reliably anticipate negoti-
ators’ ethical choices and the consequences that attend them—and urgently should.

Why do negotiators act ethically or unethically? 2005), deception is seen as quite detrimental overall.
Despite a vast trove of psychological research on the As just a few of the many examples, deception reduces
drivers of ethical and unethical behavior in non- trust (e.g., Rogers et al., 2016), prompts retaliation
negotiation situations (for summaries, see Moore & (e.g., Boles et al., 2000), and harms the deceiver’s eco-
Gino, 2015; Zhang, Gino, & Bazerman, 2014), surpris- nomic outcomes (Croson, Boles, & Murnighan, 2003).
ingly few attempts have been made to catalog and The near consensus is illusory, however, as the
theoretically ground the set of reasons why negotiators great majority of the just-mentioned papers study a
adopt ethical or unethical approaches at the bargaining very specific unethical behavior: self-interested de-
table. This is problematic because it contributes to the ception in which an individual overtly provides in-
stale yet prevalent view that, in negotiation, ethical accurate information. We know much less about the
behavior is impossible and unethical behavior is in- many other types of unethical behavior documented
evitable. In addition to conflicting with the available in psychological studies of non-negotiation situa-
evidence, this view impedes progress in both the ne- tions, and virtually nothing about the consequences
gotiation and the behavioral ethics literatures and of overt ethicality in negotiation. This too is prob-
limits our ability to train ethical negotiators. lematic, as it contributes to the equally stale view-
And what are the consequences of ethical or un- point that deception in negotiation is necessarily
ethical negotiating? In terms of unethical negotiating, harmful, at least for the deceived and probably for the
the answer appears relatively obvious, as many stud- deceiver. In addition to conflicting with some of the
ies have documented the numerous negative conse- available evidence and impeding theoretical prog-
quences of deception for both the deceiver and the ress, this view leaves us with few explanations for
deceived. Although deceptive negotiators may extract the proliferation of deception in real negotiations
some short-term benefits (e.g., Boles, Croson, & (Schweitzer, 2001).
Murnighan, 2000; Rogers, Zeckhauser, Gino, Norton, We assembled the current symposium in hopes of
& Schweitzer, 2016; Schweitzer, DeChurch, & Gibson, refreshing the field’s perspective on the causes and
3
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4 Academy of Management Perspectives February

consequences of ethical and unethical negotiation. that ethical negotiation is possible even though unethical
In so doing, our goals were to 1) identify insights from negotiation can be surprisingly beneficial. Additionally,
other fields (particularly psychology) that could ad- we hope these scholars find connections to their own
vance research on ethics in negotiation, 2) iden- work, particularly on topics related to ethics (e.g., value-
tify insights from negotiation that could advance based decisions such as corporate social responsibility,
research in other fields (particularly macro-level consumer relations, and crisis management) or negotia-
management areas), and 3) promote ethical negotia- tion (e.g., interdependent decisions such as top man-
tion in the real world. The four symposium papers, agement team interactions, strategic alliances, and
each written by authors with expertise in both ethics CEO–board relations). Of course, we also hope the sym-
and negotiation, briefly summarize the state of the art posium benefits scholars of negotiation and/or behav-
on a particular aspect of ethics in negotiation. More ioral ethics, for whom it maps out the landscape of causes
important, each also offers a unique perspective and consequences in current research as well as the nu-
that challenges and advances our understanding of merous opportunities for future work. Finally, we hope
the topic. Finally, each at least implicitly draws out the symposium interests negotiation teachers and prac-
the implications for related research areas, building titioners who wish to elicit ethical negotiation in the real
missing bridges and highlighting pressing and often world, or at least understand the consequences of ethical
intriguing areas for future research. and unethical negotiating.
Three symposium papers consider causes of ethi- Having summarized our collective aims and the
cal and unethical negotiation, drawing from the papers’ basic messages, the rest of this introduction
psychological and organizational behavior work on will discuss but not seek to rehash the individual
behavioral ethics to discuss causes rarely studied in papers. Each speaks clearly on its own. Instead, I aim
the negotiation literature: moral character (Morse & to draw out the key contributions and themes that
Cohen), ethical fading (Rees, Tenbrunsel, & Bazer- emerge when considering the papers in gestalt, not-
man), and environmental cues (Gunia). As a group, ing novel connections and intriguing implications
these papers apply the psychological insight that for future research. In the process of detailing con-
personal and situational factors interact to shape tributions arising specifically from the causes or con-
behavior in many situations (Ross & Nisbett, 2011) to sequences sections, I will build up to a discussion of
ethics in negotiation. The final symposium paper themes that emerge from the whole symposium. The
(Gaspar, Methasani, & Schweitzer) develops an in- introduction concludes with a discussion of implica-
tegrative model detailing the surprising diversity of tions for future research.
consequences that attend negotiators’ choice to de- A final note before proceeding: Like most people
ceive. We include only one paper on consequences who read the academic discourse on ethical and
by design, as this paper assumes a higher level of unethical behavior, you may be wondering what
analysis, presenting a model that seeks to cover those terms mean. The short answer is that the
the current evidentiary base in total. Collectively, the symposium does not offer a unified definition. That
symposium aims to offer a bird’s-eye view of the is, these papers, like many in the literature, adopt
causes and consequences of ethics in negotiation, differing definitions. Two symposium papers (Gunia’s
both as we see them today and as the contributors and Gaspar et al.’s) focus on one of the most socially
believe we should see them tomorrow. agreed upon forms of unethical behavior: deception.
In sum, this symposium seeks to move the scholarly While few behavioral ethics scholars would dis-
conversation beyond the view that unethical behavior pute the operationalization of unethical behavior
is inevitable and uniformly harmful in negotiation. as deception, this operationalization is also rela-
Instead, these papers advance the innovative per- tively narrow. The other two papers take a broader
spective that unethical as well as overtly ethical be- view, focusing on a variety of stable tendencies
haviors arise among certain scientifically predictable (Morse & Cohen) or observable behaviors (Rees
individuals, because of certain predictable situational et al.). This diversity of definition is consistent with
factors, with certain predictable costs and benefits. much of the behavioral ethics literature. Addition-
We hope these ideas will interest an array of scholars ally, we consider it a distinct strength, as it allows us
from across academic management. to pose provocative questions such as “Can we really
In particular, we hope management scholars who define universally beneficial behaviors as un-
do not specialize in negotiation will walk away with a ethical?” (implicit in Gaspar et al.) and “Is ethical
refined appreciation of the ethical choices and conse- negotiating necessarily desirable?” (implicit in Rees
quences that real negotiators face, perhaps concluding et al.). So we acknowledge the diversity but do not
2019 Gunia 5

attempt to apologize for it, trusting our readers So what do they say? Morse and Cohen’s paper
to judge the adequacy of our definitions and un- speaks to the first issue, suggesting that individuals
derstand the diversity of our viewpoints. In closing, high in moral character are naturally prone to ethical
thank you for your interest. We hope you find our negotiating, resisting the sway of unethical behavior
perspectives useful. despite the distinct possibility that it might literally
pay. The other two papers on causes speak to the
CONTRIBUTIONS OF CAUSES PAPERS:
second issue: Rees and colleagues suggest that cer-
ETHICAL Þ IMPOSSIBLE AND
tain predictable features of the negotiation situation
UNETHICAL Þ INEVITABLE
(e.g., incentives, competition) can contribute to
Negotiation practitioners and scholars have long ethical fading, which leads negotiators to display
assumed, at least implicitly, that unethical behavior bounded ethicality. Gunia, in turn, suggests that
and negotiation go hand in hand. Put differently, certain predictable features of the physical and
many people with varying perspectives on negotia- temporal environment surrounding the negotiators
tion assume that ethical behavior is nearly impossible (e.g., money, time of day) can elicit both distributive
in negotiation situations or, equivalently, that un- and deceptive negotiating. Although several of the
ethical behavior is nearly inevitable. For example, a papers mention interactions between personal and
prominent practitioner-oriented article indicated that situational factors (e.g., Morse and Cohen’s discus-
“when it comes to negotiation, the process is often sion of moral character in intergroup contexts), none
strewn with falsehoods and deception” (Adler, 2007, focuses directly on this interaction—an important
p. 69). Likewise, scholars have noted the ubiquity of direction for future research discussed below.
deception in negotiations, sometimes finding that Collectively, these papers call the inevitability of un-
deception occurs in the majority or even great ma- ethical behavior into question, moving toward a com-
jority of negotiation situations (e.g., Aquino, 1998). prehensive, scholarly view of the factors that cause
These claims are striking for several reasons, one ethical and unethical negotiating. In the process, they
of which is the high degree of consensus both within provide a powerful set of theoretical frameworks
the scholarly community and across the scholarly– for applying the many and varied findings from the
practitioner divide. Few aspects of human behavior behavioral ethics literature to negotiation. Rees and
would seem to attract such widespread social con- colleagues’ focus on bounded ethicality and fading,
sensus. The assumption that negotiation 5 unethical for example, provides a lens for understanding how
behavior is also striking for its contrast with the re- and why the psychological finding that groups
lated but distinct behavioral ethics literature, which lie more readily than individuals (Cohen, Gunia,
assumes that the causes of deception are worthy of Kim, & Murnighan, 2009) may apply to group
scientific study. In particular, this literature pre- negotiations.
sumes that science can reliably predict which people In addition to questioning the inevitability of un-
will act unethically and when they will do so. If all ethical negotiating, these papers also question its
negotiators in all negotiations deceive, the topic is intentionality—the assumption that self-interested
not particularly interesting. negotiators overtly choose to check their ethics at the
Luckily, the three symposium papers focusing on door (Adler, 2007; Carson, Wokutch, & Murrmann,
the causes of ethical and unethical negotiating cast 1982). Indeed, none of the papers focuses on the
doubt on this conclusion, suggesting that unethical intentional choice to deceive. Each focuses on a
behavior arises among certain scientifically predict- factor—moral character, ethical fading, or environ-
able negotiators, because of certain predictable fea- mental cues—that presumably influences ethical or
tures of the negotiation situation. In other words, the unethical negotiation at least partially outside of the
papers suggest that not all negotiators act unethically, negotiator’s awareness. This too brings the negotia-
and not all negotiation situations call for unethical tion literature into closer alignment with the behav-
behavior. One of the symposium’s key contribu- ioral ethics literature. It also provides an important
tions, then, is to cast doubt on the widespread as- corrective to the devious and plotting portrait often
sumptions that ethical 5 impossible and unethical 5 painted of the negotiator. Finally, it highlights how
inevitable in negotiation. Another is to identify many seemingly benign features of the situation—
who the routinely ethical and unethical negotiators a negotiation room’s messiness (Gunia), for
might be, as well as what the ethically supportive example—might lead to unexpected unethicality.
and ethically treacherous negotiation situations Conversely, it highlights how otherwise dubious
might be. features of the situation—a negotiator’s complete,
6 Academy of Management Perspectives February

consolidated power (Rees et al.), for example—could den Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014). And they
lead to unexpected ethicality. have often documented the ubiquitous consequences
Finally, the three papers on causes (and particularly of unethical negotiation behavior and especially de-
the two on situational causes) point toward inter- ception, showing, for example, that deception often
ventions that could encourage more ethical negotiation harms deceivers by reducing their perceived trust-
in the real world. Rees and colleagues’ paper, for ex- worthiness (e.g., Rogers et al., 2016), motivating their
ample, suggests that slight differences in the words counterparts to retaliate (e.g., Boles et al., 2000), and
used to frame a negotiation can lead to entirely different hampering their economic outcomes (Croson et al.,
sets of ethical assumptions. Gunia’s highlights a wide 2003). Likewise, deceived negotiators often perform
variety of ways that knowing negotiators could alter worse (Rogers et al., 2016; Schweitzer et al., 2005),
the physical or temporal environment in which the ne- even when they detect the deception (and choose to
gotiation unfolds (e.g., by wearing particular colors). spend economic resources punishing the deceiver;
While these perspectives raise new ethical questions of Boles et al., 2000).
their own (covered in the future research section below), Again, these claims are striking, both for the high
suffice it to say here that the papers afford resourceful degree of social consensus and for the contrast with
negotiators with an array of ideas for stimulating their behavioral ethics research, which increasingly as-
own and their counterparts’ ethical compasses. sumes that the consequences of deception are worthy
Overall, the three papers covering the causes of of scientific study. Although research in this area is less
ethical and unethical negotiating suggest that nego- voluminous than research on antecedents, accumu-
tiation should not be confused with an ethical free- lating evidence focusing specifically on deception
for-all. Instead, science offers substantial guidance clearly suggests that deception is not necessarily
about the negotiators among whom—and negotia- harmful for either party. Rather, this work indicates
tion situations in which—ethical and unethical be- that deception is a multidimensional construct, the
havior is likely. In this sense, the papers portray unpacking of which reveals its multifaceted and
negotiations as much more akin to everyday situa- sometimes neutral or even beneficial effects for all
tions (studied by the behavioral ethics literature) concerned (Gaspar, Levine, & Schweitzer, 2015;
than commonly assumed. Yet the papers also suggest Levine & Schweitzer, 2014, 2015). In contrast to these
that negotiations—and especially their socially in- papers’ implication that the consequences of unethical
teractive features—introduce interesting wrinkles of behavior merit scientific study, the common assump-
their own. As described below, the papers collec- tion that deception in negotiation is primarily harmful
tively seek to avoid a trade deficit with the behavioral suggests little need to inquire further.
ethics literature by exporting this idea and others, Gaspar and colleagues’ symposium paper on the
even as they import decades of useful findings. consequences of deception calls this assumption,
too, into question. By highlighting the literature’s
relatively narrow focus on “self-interested, in-
CONTRIBUTIONS OF CONSEQUENCES PAPER:
formational lies of commission” (p. 62) and
ETHICAL Þ DESIRABLE AND
unpacking the multidimensional features of de-
UNETHICAL Þ HARMFUL
ception in negotiation, Gaspar and colleagues
Negotiation practitioners and scholars have also as- suggest that deception in negotiation is not neces-
sumed, at least implicitly, that unethical behavior in sarily harmful for the deceiver or even the deceived.
negotiation is inherently and necessarily bad for the Indeed, although it is easy to see how deception
deceived and probably for the deceiver. For example, could benefit the deceiver in the short term, this
Shell (1991, p. 99) concluded an article on the legality paper highlights several contexts in which deception
and ethicality of lying in negotiation by saying: “In may benefit the deceived too—or at least serve the
negotiation, people who rely on the letter of legal rules deceiver without substantially harming the de-
as a strategy for plotting unethical conduct are likely to ceived. In particular, the paper suggests that the ef-
get in deep trouble. But people who rely on a cultivated fects of deception in negotiation depend on three
sense of right and wrong to guide them in legal matters scientifically predictable dimensions of the decep-
are likely to do well.” Likewise, authors such as Adler tion itself: intentionality (whether the deception is
(2007) and Carson et al. (1982) clearly suggested that self-interested or prosocial), content (whether it in-
deceived negotiators tend to suffer serious harm. Fi- volves information or emotions), and activity
nally, scholars have long argued that deception in (whether it takes the form of commission, omission,
negotiation is immoral (e.g., Aquino, 1998; Treviño, or paltering). These dimensions form the basis of a
2019 Gunia 7

deception consequence model (DCM) that suggests and colleagues’ paper come through clearly: Ethi-
that deception is not necessarily harmful for either cality is not always desirable, and unethicality not
negotiator and can sometimes benefit both (e.g., in always harmful for either negotiator.
cases of prosocial deception). This also implies the
reverse: that, at least in negotiations, ethical behavior
OVERALL THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
may not always be desirable.
This model and its implications afford a much more This symposium represents the first known attempt
comprehensive view of deception’s consequences in to collect a set of papers that consider the causes and
negotiation as well as a corrective to the clichéd view consequences of ethical and unethical negotiating in
that deception is necessarily and uniformly bad. In- tandem. Doing so is critical for several reasons. First, it
deed, the model problematizes the use of the word provides a bird’s-eye view of ethical and unethical
“bad,” as it implicates a behavior—deception—that negotiating both before and after it happens, cataloging
moral philosophers (e.g., Kant, 1785/1983) and ne- both what we know and what we need to know at both
gotiation scholars (e.g., Aquino, 1998) have equated stages. Second, a concurrent consideration of causes
with “unethical.” But if the behavior benefits every- and consequences helps us see why and how the
one, can we reasonably call it “bad”? And what about causes might matter. Considering the costs and bene-
“unethical”? Or does negotiation offer a setting in fits of deception in negotiation, for example, helps us
which “unethical” behaviors can sometimes be con- understand why we should care about a negotiation
sidered “good”? These are intriguing questions for room’s lighting conditions (Gunia), as well as the pos-
both philosophers and scholars of negotiation— itive and negative consequences of a poorly lit room.
topics reminiscent of Rees and colleagues’ call for Finally, considering both causes and consequences
a scholarly consensus about the meaning and de- helps to highlight specific, interesting, and previously
sirability of ethical behavior in negotiation. unconsidered research questions. To highlight just
More concretely, the DCM helps to pull back the one, a reader of these papers might wonder whether
curtain on the reasons why we observe deception in a low- or high-character negotiator (Morse & Cohen)
real-world negotiations. If deception is inherently might find it easier to engage in mutually beneficial
“bad” for both negotiators, then a social scientist forms of prosocial deception (Gaspar et al.).
could reasonably expect to detect little in the real On a theoretical level, the papers collectively
world, or at least among experienced negotiators. As highlight a disconnect between the behavioral ethics
discussed in the section above, however, scientists literature and negotiation research. They paint the
and practitioners make no such assumption: They disconnect as puzzling, in that the two literatures
tend to concur that deception in negotiation is ram- have much in common. But they also paint it as
pant, with few exceptions for experience. Without the surmountable and build numerous theoretical
DCM, we have few tools to explain this conclusion. bridges, highlighting specific ways in which the two
With the DCM, we know that at least some of the de- literatures could productively engage. Morse and
ception that emerges probably emerges for a scien- Cohen, for example, provide an outline for applying
tifically predictable reason: because it potentially psychological work on interindividual–intergroup
benefits both negotiators, or at least one without discontinuity (e.g., Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006)
harming the other (much like a logrolling trade-off). to negotiations. Overall, the papers import the basic
Indeed, the model suggests that negotiators who de- psychological insight that the person, situation, and
ceive do not necessarily act irrationally or even self- interaction between them can explain many aspects
interestedly; in some circumstances, their deception of human behavior (Ross & Nisbett, 2011), including
may reflect rationality or even benevolence. deception (Treviño & Youngblood, 1990). At the
Finally, and similarly to the section above, Gaspar same time, they export the negotiation literature’s
and colleagues implicitly highlight many inter- insight that true, immersive social interactions with
ventions that could minimize deception’s costs in the real individuals have fundamentally different qual-
real world. Negotiators inclined to deceive, for ex- ities than interactions with briefly encountered or
ample, could at least direct their deception toward imagined others. Because the behavioral ethics lit-
prosocial lies, emotional forms of misleading, or erature has tended to focus on the latter (albeit not
omission rather than commission. These implica- exclusively), it may benefit from the insights in some
tions, again, raise ethical questions of their own, some of these papers (e.g., Morse & Cohen, Gunia) about
of which I discuss below. Nevertheless, both the the ways in which true social interactions can alter
practical and the theoretical implications of Gaspar basic psychological effects.
8 Academy of Management Perspectives February

In addition to the negotiation literature’s relevance IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON

for behavioral ethics, these papers highlight its rel- ETHICS IN NEGOTIATION
evance for other areas of management research,
This introduction concludes with a discussion of
particularly those involving value-based and/or in-
some intriguing research directions arising from the
terdependent decision making. In other words,
symposium papers. Each paper offers many specific
they suggest that negotiations offer a lens for un-
and compelling ideas, which I will not reiterate. In-
derstanding a broader swath of the organizational
stead, I will again seek to abstract from the four
world. Gunia, for example, provides a long list of
papers as a whole, identifying high-level research
organizational decision-making contexts in which
priorities emerging from the papers in gestalt. At that
environmental cues could influence interdependent
level, the symposium papers suggest that the nego-
individuals’ deception. He then offers mergers and
tiation literature has already learned a great deal
acquisitions as an extended example, discussing the
about ethical and unethical negotiation. They also
possible influence of environmental factors such as
suggest, however, that taking our understanding of
office cleanliness, the consolidated organization’s
ethics in negotiation to the next level will require
logo, and disparate time zones on the decision
some methodological and topical changes.
makers’ ethical choices. Likewise, Rees and col-
Starting with methodology, the papers suggest
leagues draw out the implications of ethical fading
that research on ethics in negotiation is ready to
and bounded ethicality for research in areas that rely
move beyond main effect to moderator studies. That
on related theories of conflict and/or social exchange
is, they urge future research to consider not just how
(e.g., human resource management, corporate strat-
particular causes influence ethics in negotiation,
egy, and corporate reputation).
nor how ethical and unethical behaviors produce
Collectively, these discussions point out that
particular consequences. Rather, they suggest that
assumptions and findings about ethics in negotia-
future research should consider the conditions un-
tion matter for a wider array of organizational
der which particular causes operate or particular
situations—and the scholars who study them. For
consequences obtain. Morse and Cohen, for exam-
example, if the negotiation literature concludes
ple, caution scholars that basic predictions about
that unethical behavior is inevitable and uniformly
moral character may reverse in the intergroup con-
harmful, then scholars in other areas risk applying
text. Rees and colleagues emphasize the potential
those conclusions with unintended consequences.
moderating role of time—particularly the point in
Scholars of human resource management who
the negotiation process when an individual con-
draw from the negotiation literature, for example,
templates unethical behavior. Gaspar and col-
might overestimate the likelihood of employees’
leagues suggest that interactions among the three
deception and also assume that employees hold
dimensions of deception could produce complex
overly self-interested motives. We hope that man-
patterns of consequences.
agement scholars who are not negotiation spe-
Despite the great potential associated with
cialists walk away from this symposium with the
importing findings from behavioral ethics, the sym-
sense that deception is not inevitable nor neces-
posium papers also suggest that future studies of
sarily harmful—that both the causes and conse-
ethics in negotiation need to supplement and possi-
quences of ethics in negotiation and related settings
bly move beyond the experimental paradigm often
are worthy of consideration and careful scientific
used and the WEIRD1 cultures often studied
study.
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) in that litera-
In sum, the symposium paints a new, nuanced
ture. With respect to culture, our current conclusions
picture of the causes and consequences of ethical
may be limited to the specific cultural contexts in
and unethical negotiating. Drawing from psycho-
which the underlying studies were conducted. For
logical and organizational behavior research on be-
example, Gaspar and colleagues note that emotional
havioral ethics, it suggests that predictable people
deception may send very different signals in Eastern
deceive, in predictable situations, with predictable
versus Western cultures, but that the relative dearth
costs and benefits. These conclusions push the ne-
of studies limits our ability to say much more. With
gotiation literature forward and generate important
respect to paradigm, the papers suggest that the
implications for the behavioral ethics literature as
well as numerous macro-level management research
literatures. We hope they also contribute to ethical 1
Western, educated, and from industrialized, rich, and
negotiating in the real world. democratic countries.
2019 Gunia 9

experimental method—for all of its true benefits— snapshot of the decision phase—the point at which
may mask some important aspects of ethical negoti- individuals are actually deciding whether to act
ation in the real world. In particular, the experiments ethically or unethically. Less research in either lit-
in the behavioral ethics literature tend to focus on erature considers the pre- or post-decision phases in
short-term interactions between strangers (who may which individuals are anticipating their decision or
not meet or even exist). They do not tend to focus on reflecting on and implementing it. Future research
true and immersive social interactions, the develop- may want to carefully consider the phases of the
ment of relationships, or the passage of time. Each of negotiation (Weingart & Olekalns, 2004), particularly
these areas seeds important topics for future research. by considering the implementation phase (Mislin,
Although negotiations are true social inter- Campagna, & Bottom, 2011). This work could ad-
actions, the symposium papers ironically suggest dress a particularly yawning gap: the lack of em-
that the literature needs to think more critically pirical research that studies the causes and
about the effects of true social interaction on ethics consequences of ethical or unethical negotiation in
in negotiation. Particularly if the negotiation liter- tandem.
ature imports findings from behavioral ethics, as These implications are fairly general, but the
the papers advise, it may need to pay special at- symposium papers also highlight a variety of more
tention to the effects of the back-and-forth dialogue specific implications. With respect to the causes of
that constitutes negotiation. Morse and Cohen, for ethical and unethical negotiation, they suggest that
example, urge negotiation scholars to study the more work on person x situation causes is urgently
specific negotiation processes that arise when ne- needed. Many social psychologists have suggested
gotiators with different levels of moral character that the most complete and compelling psycho-
interact. Gunia suggests that the social features of logical theories consider both individual differ-
negotiation may amplify the documented effects of ences and situational factors in tandem (Mischel
environmental cues, affording several pathways by & Shoda, 1998). Yet few studies of ethical or un-
which these cues could heighten deception. These ethical negotiation consider the interaction be-
papers imply that future negotiation research may tween the person and the situation. Morse and
want to use methodologies capable of capturing Cohen offer some concrete ideas about how to do
social interactions in more richness (e.g., case so, and readers of this symposium could easily
studies; observation; coding of behaviors, words, or come up with others. For example, do negotiators
nonverbals). with strong moral character (Morse & Cohen) dis-
The symposium papers also urge future negotia- play less ethical fading when endowed with power
tion research to consider the interrelated issues of (Rees et al.)?
relationships and time. Many real-world negotia- Future research on antecedents of ethical negotia-
tions take place between individuals with a preex- tion may also wish to probe the nonconscious nature of
isting relationship. At a minimum, the negotiators the antecedents described here. How do nonconscious
may know something about each other’s reputation impulses to act unethically, driven by factors such as
or may enter into a relationship after the negotia- environmental cues (Gunia) or ethical fading (Rees
tion. If the negotiation literature imports findings et al.), inform and interact with conscious decisions to
from behavioral ethics, several symposium papers deceive? If decisions about unethical action in negoti-
caution scholars to consider the potentially mod- ation trace mainly to nonconscious factors, how do
erating role of relationships. Deception seen as rel- individuals with high moral character (Morse & Cohen)
atively minor or even expected in a lab study of counteract such factors? Such questions could seed
strangers, for example, may strike the members of intriguing research.
a long-term relationship as egregious (Lewicki & Additionally, future research on the antecedents of
Wiethoff, 2000). Thus, future studies of ethics in ethical negotiation could take a cue from Gaspar and
negotiation may want to track negotiation dyads colleagues by adopting the DCM and treating de-
over time, as ethical temptations arise and the re- ception as a multidimensional construct. At present,
lationship develops or dissolves. most research on antecedents appears to treat decep-
Relatedly, future studies may want to account for tion in negotiation as a dichotomous variable. Allow-
the passage of time, if only by studying the various ing for multiple types and forms of deception, as the
phases of the negotiation process. As several sym- DCM does, might lead to intriguing new insights about
posium papers suggest, both behavioral ethics re- the influence of particular antecedents. As just one
search and negotiation research tend to take a example, do overt symbols of wealth (Gunia)
10 Academy of Management Perspectives February

prompt the negotiator who observes them to display undesirable in negotiations. Without answers to these
more informational or emotional deception in re- questions, they suggest, descriptive research on ethics in
sponse? More generally, the DCM would seem to negotiation is confusing at best and devoid of meaning at
provide the behavioral ethics literature with a use- worst. This tension is apparent in several other sympo-
ful framework for organizing its findings. sium papers, particularly Gaspar and colleagues’ article,
Finally, the antecedent papers in this symposium where the same sorts of behaviors could reasonably be
could seed an intriguing new direction in lie-detection labeled “deceptive” and “unethical” but also “proso-
research. Past research on this topic has suggested that cial” and “beneficial.” Through no fault of these authors,
most people find it hard to detect deception from facial the moral status of certain negotiation behaviors re-
expressions or other overt indicators, rendering many mains ambiguous. As Rees and colleagues suggest, the
commonly accepted methods of lie detection unreliable field will eventually need to grapple with basic ques-
(Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991). Even if individuals cannot tions of definition and normative ethicality. The SINS
detect liars in action, though, the current symposium scale may offer a useful point of departure for explor-
papers suggest that they may be able to detect the types ing these issues (Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000).
of people or situations conducive to deception. In that The second normative question suggested by the
vein, could negotiation research identify more reliable symposium arises if and when negotiation instructors
personal or situational “tells” that alert astute negotia- and negotiators consider what to do with its findings.
tors to the likelihood that their counterparts will lie? As noted, astute readers might walk away from these
In addition to these implications for research on papers with a sophisticated set of nudges to stimulate
causes, the symposium papers hold some interesting their counterparts’ conscience—or even reduce the
implications for research on the consequences of ethical costs of their own intended deception. But is a keen
and unethical negotiating. In particular, many papers sense of how to manipulate another person for per-
reviewed by Gaspar and colleagues document the con- sonal advantage, outside of their awareness, really an
sequences of conscious, intentional deception (whether “ethical” takeaway? The problem is hardly confined
self-interested or prosocial). As noted, though, this to this symposium, as many of the core lessons in a
symposium tends to focus on nonconscious and rela- negotiation course may involve benefiting from other
tively unintentional causes. Future research that ex- people’s biases (e.g., by making an aggressive first offer;
amines whether and how the consequences vary when e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). But scholars of
the deception originates outside of conscious awareness negotiation and ethics, in particular, may have to
could be especially informative. Indeed, scholars might confront the question of whether and how to ethically
eventually build from such research to update the teach negotiators about other negotiators’ ethical blind
DCM, amending the intentionality dimension or adding spots.
a fourth dimension to account for unintentional de- Much remains to be done. Yet we hope this sympo-
ception. Additionally, Gaspar and colleagues’ paper sium reveals that much has been done already—that
focuses on one type of unethical negotiation behavior— much is already known about ethics and negotiation, in
deception—and does not consider the consequences of the negotiation literature but also in the related litera-
ethical negotiation. This focus is consistent with the ture on behavioral ethics. We sincerely hope that the
literature but also suggests that more research is needed symposium moves the field forward—and the world
on the consequences of other types of unethical nego- toward ethical negotiating.
tiating, as well as the consequences (potentially both
positive and negative) of overtly ethical negotiating (as
well as what that looks like in practice).
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Brian C. Gunia ([email protected]) is an associate pro-
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