www.transparency.

org

www.cmi.no

Influence of interest groups on policy-making

Query
Please provide an overview on the state of research on negative influence of interest groups on
decision-making - including state capture – as well as their potential benefits, based on publicly
available information and papers. Particular reference should be given to South East Asia and East
Asia including China. Identify factors which control and prevent interest groups from having a
negative influence on the governance and policy decisions in a country (e.g. transparency, media,
removal of discretion, ways of separating and ensuring conflicts of interest are avoided), providing
examples/lessons learned from countries in the region which have curbed corruption/illegal influence
by interest groups whilst maintaining the (potential) benefits.

Purpose Caveat
There is very little research on interest group influence
There is increasing recognition of the emergence of
on policy-making and its potential benefits in Asian
new and pernicious interest groups which have
countries. Examples of best practices and lessons
influence on policy making in Vietnam and distortions in
learned from these countries are also scarce.
the market. We would like to help the Government
understand better the nature and scenarios under
which interest groups emerge and capture the state. Summary
They are also aware that there are some benefits and Interest groups are associations of individuals or
want to see if they can disentangle these. Regional organisations that on the basis of one or more shared
evidence would be especially helpful. concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its
favour usually by lobbying members of the government.
Content Interest groups influence on policy making is not a
corrupt or illegitimate activity per se, but a key element
1. Interest group influence on policy-making of the decision-making process. However,
2. Pros and cons of interest group influence disproportionate and opaque interest group influence
may lead to administrative corruption, undue influence,
3. Regulating interest group influence and state capture, favouring particular interest groups
4. Best practice examples at the expense of public interest. Transparency is thus
5. References key to ensure that policy-makers do not give
preferential treatment for specific interest groups.
Regulations on lobbying, conflict of interest, asset
Author(s): Maira Martini, Transparency International, [email protected]
Reviewed by: Tinatin Ninua, Transparency International, [email protected] and Robin Hodess Ph.D, Transparency
International, [email protected]
Date: 12 June 2012 Number: 335
U4 is a web-based resource centre for development practitioners who wish to effectively address corruption challenges in their work.
Expert Answers are produced by the U4 Helpdesk – operated by Transparency International – as quick responses to operational and
policy questions from U4 Partner Agency staff.
 Interest groups influence on policy-making

disclosure, competition, as well as, on freedom of Such groups may also have different type of resources
information are among the wide range of rules adopted to influence policy-making, such as campaign funding,
by countries across the world to increase transparency expertise on policy issues, information on the opinion of
and accountability in decision making. This answer thus other policy-makers (Dur; Bievre, 2007).
provides for examples on measures taken by East and
South-East Asian countries to increase transparency
and accountability and avoid undue influence and other 2 Pros and cons of interest
forms of corruption, and best examples on regulating group influence
lobbying, focusing on the United States, Canada, and
the European Union. Interest groups’ influence on policy making is not a
corrupt or illegitimate activity per se, but a key element
of the decision-making process (Zinnbauer, 2009).
1 Interest group influence on However, the advantages and disadvantages of
interest group influence will depend on how much
policy-making power such interest groups have as well as on how
power is distributed among them (Dur; Bievre, 2007) A
Defining interest groups disproportionate influence of business groups, for
example, can lead to undue influence or even state
Interest groups or special interest groups are any
capture. In this context, the relationship between policy-
association of individual or organisations that on the
makers and interest groups walk a fine ethical line that
basis of one or more shared concerns, attempt to
separates participatory democracy from undue
influence public policy in its favour usually by lobbying1
influence.
members of the government.

Interest groups may be classified according to their Pros: potential benefits

motivation: (i) economic, including individual
There is little evidence of the concrete benefits that
corporations and business organisations; (ii)
could be brought by interest groups influence on
professional, including professional groups such as
decision making. In general, interest groups may
trade unions and farmers; (iii) public interest, including
improve policy-making by providing valuable knowledge
human rights groups, environmental groups, among
and insight data on specific issues. They also represent
others (Chari; Hogan; Murphy, 2010). For the purposes
interests which may be negatively and involuntarily
of this query, we will focus on the influence of economic
impacted by a poorly deliberated public policy (OECD,
interest groups.
2009). Moreover, as such groups keep track of
legislative and regulatory processes, they also have an
Interest groups’ strategies and important role in holding government accountable
tactics (OECD, 2009).
Interest groups may directly, or indirectly through In addition, Campos and Giovannoni (2008) have
consultants/lawyers (the so-called professional shown that in transition countries, interest group
lobbyists) seek to affect legislative action. These influence through lobbying is found to be an alternative
attempts to influence policy-making may take place instrument of political influence vis-à-vis corruption. In
through different mechanisms, including direct this context, their findings are that lobbying, if
communication with government officials, participation adequately regulated, is a much more effective
in public hearings, drafting reports to member of the instrument than corruption for exerting political
government on specific policy issues, as well as influence and that lobbying is also a much stronger
through media comment (Chari, Hogan; Murphy, 2010). explanatory factor than corruption for firm performance.

Previous studies have also shown that the extent of

1 The OECD (2008) describes lobbying as the ‘existence of
lobbying increases with income, and that firms
belonging to a lobby group are significantly less likely to
powerful interests – corporate, private or other jurisdiction
such as sub-national governments – that makes efforts to pay bribes. On the other hand, in politically less stable
influence government decisions, in particular policy making, countries, firms are more likely to bribe and less likely
legislation or the award of contracts’. to join a lobby group (Campos, Giovannoni, 2006).

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 Interest groups influence on policy-making

Cons: undue influence and state corporate undue influence is prevented and
transparency and accountability enhanced. In this
capture context, in order to avoid the negative impacts of
interest group influence on policy measures, full
Interest group influence, if opaque and transparency is essential. Therefore, a broad range of
disproportionate, may lead to administrative bribery, regulations should be established depending on the
political corruption, undue influence and state capture. country’s political environment and state of
development (Zinnbauer, 2009). These include lobbying
Differently from bribery and political corruption, which registration and disclosure, prevention of conflict of
are more obvious forms of corruption, undue influence interest, regulation of the revolving door,
is more subtle and not necessarily illegal (OECD, comprehensive asset and interest disclosure by public
2009), meaning that interest groups might exercise officials, as well as anti-trust regulations and freedom of
influence on policy-making without resorting to illegal information laws.
payments (Kaufmann et al., 2000). In this context,
interest groups will attempt to create a ‘sense of Countries in East and South East Asia have recently
reciprocity’ with a public official, for example by legally approved laws which directly or indirectly help
making campaign donations, hosting receptions, preventing potential negative consequences of interest
providing research, among other favours (OECD, group influence, and increase transparency and
2009). accountability in decision making.

Undue influence may also be achieved by promising

public officials well-paid future jobs in the private sector Lobbying regulation
in exchange for support in shaping regulations, or by Mandatory lobbying registries are fundamental to
placing former ministers, parliamentarians in lobbying ensure interest group activities are more transparent
firms (OECD, 2009). and accountable. Ideally, registration systems should
allow for public disclosure of lobbyists’ names, their
Disproportionate and unregulated influence by interest clients, issue areas, targets, techniques, as well as
groups may also lead to state capture, which occurs financial information. Effective implementation will also
when firms shape and affect the formulation of laws and require robust mechanisms of oversight and
regulations through illicit private payments to public enforcement (Zinnbauer, 2009).
officials and politicians; for instance by illicit
contributions paid by private interests to political parties Taiwan is the only country in the East and South East
and election campaigns; the sale of parliamentary votes Asian region that regulates lobbying (Chari; Hogan;
on laws to private interests, among others (Kaufmann Murphy, 2010). The legislation passed in 2007, took
et al., 2000). effect in 2008. The Act defines lobbying as ‘any oral or
written communication to legislative and executive
Examples from transition economies show that the branch officials with regards to the formulation,
ownership and origin of a firm may play a role on how modification or annulment of policies or legislation’.
they attempt to exercise influence. For instance, state Officials covered by the act include the President, Vice-
owned or privatised enterprises are expected to retain President, and high-ranking officials in central and local
considerable access to and ties with public officials, government. According to the law, lobbyists are
enhancing their influence on the state without resorting required to register their lobbying activities, and declare
to illegal payments. New firms, on the contrary, are their lobbying expenditures to the concerned agencies.
less likely to be influential but more likely, on the other Officials must also report on their communication with
hand, to resort to state capture or administrative lobbyists within seven days. In addition, the law also
corruption to compensate their lack of influence regulates post-public employment. The President, Vice-
(Kaufmann et al., 2000). president, political appointees, and heads of local
government are banned from lobbying in person or on
3 Regulating interest group
influence
As mentioned, interest group influence on policy-
making might bring potential benefits for the society if

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 Interest groups influence on policy-making

behalf of others during the three years after they leave receive any concession from the State, a state agency,
office2. or state enterprise, or become a party to a contract of
the nature of an economic monopoly with the State, a
state agency, or state enterprise, or become a partner
Conflict of interest or shareholder in a partnership or company receiving
Conflict of interest can be defined as a “situation where such concession, or become a party to a contract of
and individual or the entity for which they work, whether that nature; (iii) receive any special money or benefit
a government, business, media outlet or civil society from any state agency or state enterprise apart from
organisation, is confronted with choosing between the that given by a state agency or state enterprise to other
duties and demands of their position and their own persons in the ordinary course of business
private interests” (Transparency International, 2009),. (OECD/ADB, 2008).
For instance, companies may face accusations of
improper influence if they employ parliamentarians as While the legal framework is assessed as fairly
consultants or have them on their board. comprehensive, implementation of the law remains a
great challenge in the country, in particular because the
Conflict of interest, thus, may arise ‘when an individual anti-corruption agency (NCCC) mandated to enforce
with a formal responsibility to serve the public the law suffers from a backlog of corruption and
participates in an activity that jeopardizes his or her malfeasance cases, making it almost impossible to
professional judgement, objectivity, and independence’ focus on conflict of interest issues (OECD/ADB, 2008).
(U4 Resources Centre, webpage).

In this context, preventing conflict of interest is also Asset declaration

important for enhancing transparency and Asset declaration regimes have been introduced in
accountability in public decision making. Regulations many countries as a way to enhance transparency and
may take a number of forms, including laws, codes of integrity as well as the trust of citizens in public
conduct and internal rules or management guidelines. administration. They aim at preventing conflicts of
They should also cover post-public employment and interest among public officials and members of the
establish mandatory ‘cooling-off’ period to avoid the government and avoiding illicit enrichment or other
revolving door, as enterprises and their consultants illegal activities by monitoring wealth variations of
often use former public officials for lobbying purposes individual politicians and civil servants (Djankov et al.,
(Transparency International, 2010). 2010).

Three main types of conflict of interest regulation can While conflict of interest is still regulated through
be identified: prohibitions on activities, declarations of scattered laws, asset declaration rules in Indonesia are
interests, and exclusion from decision-making established in specific legislations. Members of the
processes (Reed, 2008) government are thus required to declare their assets,
income and liabilities before taking up office, after two
Thailand’s new constitution regulates conflict of years in office, when exiting, as well as when requested
interest. Specific provisions require government officials by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), the
to be politically impartial (Section 70, Chapter IV) and agency responsible for overseeing such declarations. In
prohibit members of the House of Representatives from 2009, 116,451 public officials filled declarations, which
placing themselves in situations where conflicts of are all formally scrutinized by the Commission.
interest might arise. In this context, a member of the Accuracy verification takes place in 1-5% of the
House of Representatives is prohibited to (i) hold any declarations (World Bank, 2011).
position or have any duty in any state agency or state
enterprise, or hold the position of member of a local The Commission has been investing in technology and
assembly, local administrator, or local government in qualifying its personal. A special unit was created for
official or other political official other than minister; (ii) competitive recruitment of new staff members, and
annual employee reviews to monitor performance and
individualised training were established. In addition, the
2Lobbying regulation in Taiwan, please see: Commission introduced enhanced analysis and
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/national/national- reporting using data warehouse and business
news/2008/08/04/168456/p2/Taiwan’s-Lobbying.htm

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 Interest groups influence on policy-making

intelligence tools that provide targeted verification Enhancing competition and

options (World Bank, 2011).
improving corporate governance
A shortcoming of the law relates to sanctions for non- Concentration of capital may lead to an inevitable
compliance, which are not well defined. There are concentration of political influence. Therefore,
administrative sanctions for late or non-filling increasing competition, particularly in sectors
prescribed, but the law does not mention penalties for dominated by monopolies or powerful conglomerates is
inaccuracy (World Bank, 2011). also important to enhance competition over policy
influence. Measures to promote competition include
restructuring key monopolies; removing entry-barriers;
Transparency in decision making removing anti-competitive advantages; improving
processes and access to investment climate; promoting different forms of interest
information representation among existing firms, and strengthening
anti-monopoly agencies, among others (Hellman,
Interest group influence may also depend on the 2011).
salience of an issue – ‘the more attention the public
pays to a specific decision; the more difficult it should In South Korea, where business have long maintained
be for a special interest group to influence the outcome’ controversial relations with politics (Transparency
(Dur; Bievre, 2007:8). In this context, governments International, 2006), the government has undergone
should encourage citizens’ participation, facilitating (or important reforms to reduce the power and influence of
making mandatory) open hearings on policies and the Chaebol, which are large conglomerate family-
consultative decision-making processes (Transparency controlled firms characterised by having strong ties with
International, 2009). government agencies. After the Korean Business
Association (KFI) successfully lobbied the government
Other measures which may enhance transparency and to bail out the Chaebol in three different cases (1974,
accountability in policy-making, and help to identify any 1987, and 1997), labour unions, international investors,
suspicious relationship between special interest group small shareholders, as well as other civil society
and politicians include: freedom of information organisations have advocated for more regulations on
legislation to allow access to government documents the Chaebol (Lee, 2008). An Anti-trust law was
related to the policy-making process; E-government approved in the 1980s (Petersen, 2011) and several
mechanisms to encourage consultations and public reforms were implemented in the late 1990s aiming at
comment on draft laws and regulations; and public holding Chaebol leaders more accountable, eliminating
disclosure of Parliamentary votes, among others loan guarantees among affiliates, and enhancing
(Hellman, 2011). managerial transparency (Yanagimachi, 2004). The
government also empowered the existing anti-trust
In Indonesia, the Public Information Disclosure Act that
office (Fair Trade Commission) with quasi-judicial power.
entered into effect in 2010 specifically encourages civil
society’s participation during the policy process. The It is yet to be analysed whether the above mentioned
acts aims at: (i) securing the right of the citizens to reforms have diminished the negative influence of such
know the plan to make public policies, public policy conglomerates on South Korea policy-making.
programs, and the process to make public decisions, as
well as the reason of making a public decision; (ii)
encouraging the participation of the society in the Media and CSOs
process of making a public policy; (iii) increasing the Civil society and media organisations should monitor
active role of the people in making public policies and to corporate political engagement (Transparency
manage the Public Agencies properly; (iv) materialising International, 2009), for instance by tracking lobbying
good governance, i.e., transparent, effective and activity or campaign finance (e.g. the US Open Secrets,
efficient, accountable and responsible; (v) knowing the Center for Responsive Politics, which is a research
rationale of a public policy that affects the life of the group tracking money in US politics and its effect on
people; (vi) enhancing the information management elections and public policy). Civil society may also help
and service at Public Agency circles, so as to produce holding politicians and other members of the
good quality information service (Art. 3, Public government accountable by engaging in the policy
Information Disclosure Act). process. In Bangladesh, for example, the non-
governmental organisation – Jagoree – provides for a

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 Interest groups influence on policy-making

platform for youth to get informed and participate in The reports must contain information on sources and
politics and policy-making. They also have an active amounts of income, assets, liabilities, gifts,
role in informing their communities about policies which reimbursements and fiduciary and employment
could affect their lives and advocate for change. positions held outside the government, agreements and
arrangements regarding future employments, and the
names of major clients (persons or organisations) for
4 Best practice examples whom personal services were performed for
Countries have adopted different regulations which help compensation in excess of a specified threshold
preventing the negative influence of interest group on amount.
policy-making, ranging from lobbying and conflict of
interest regulations to access to information laws. They are first reviewed by the agency where the official
hold – or used to hold - a post, and the OGE (Office for
Interest group influence has been long regulated in the Government Ethics) acts like a secondary review
United States and in Canada, where disclosure agency for Presidential appointees. Sanctions may
requirements for lobbyists and broader regulations to involve a filing fee of $200 if a financial disclosure
enhance integrity in the public sector have been in report is more than 30 days late, and a civil monetary
place since many years. More recently, the European penalty of up to $11,000 if false information is
Union has also improved its regulations aimed at submitted3.
avoiding undue influence on policy-making.
Civil society and the media can also help monitoring the
declarations, since public access to financial
United States disclosures is available upon request.
The Lobbying Disclosure Act (1995) requires the
mandatory registry of lobbyists or any organisation Canada
employing a lobbyist with the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of the Representatives. Canada provides for a fairly strict lobbying regulation.
Lobbyists must disclose a wide range of information, Under the Lobbying Law, members of the government
such as their identities and of their organisations, are not allowed to engage in lobbying activities with the
identities and business addresses of clients, issues Federal Government for a period of five years after they
lobbied on (with specifics on pieces of legislation), as leave office. Moreover, the registration of entities and
well as their income (per client) and total lobbying individuals defined as lobbyists4 is mandatory and the
expenditures every three months. The law also requires information registered in public.
that all registrations and reports are made available for
A Lobbyist Code of Conduct was also developed in order
public inspection over the Internet as soon as
to ensure that “lobbying is done ethically and with the
technically practicable after the report is filed.
highest standards with a view to conserving and
In terms of preventing conflict of interest, the US enhancing public confidence and trust in the integrity,
establishes a separate system for persons occupying objectivity and impartiality of government decision-
high level positions. In the Executive branch, the Office making”. The Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying
of Government Ethics (OGE) is responsible for the
various Codes of Conduct and statutory restrictions,
and at the federal level, the Ethics in Government Act 3More information on the US´ public financial disclosure can
requires that candidates for elected offices, elected be found at:
officials and high-level appointed officials submit a  http://www.usoge.gov/forms/sf278_pdf/rf278guide_04.
publicly available personal financial report (OECD,  pdf#xml=http://www.dmssearch.gpoaccess.gov/PdfHi
2011). The Act establishes three types of reports: (i)  ghlighter.aspx?DocId=457&Index=D%3a%5cwebsites
new entrant/nominee: due within 30 days after  %5cUseIndex%5cOGE&HitCount=2&hits=c48e+c48f
assuming; (ii) incumbent: due annually, no later than 4 The Canadian Lobbying Act identifies three types of
the May 15th following the covered calendar year, and; lobbyists: (i) consultant lobbyist (a person hired to
(iii) termination: due on or before the 30th day after communicate on behalf of a client); (ii) in-house lobbyists
leaving a covered position. who work for compensation in a for-profit entity; (iii) in-house
lobbyists who works for compensation in a non-profit entity.
Please see: http://laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/L-12.4/

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 Interest groups influence on policy-making

is responsible for the implementation and enforcement members of the European Parliament was approved in
of both the lobbying law and the code of conduct. The December 2011.
Commissioner is an independent agent of Parliament,
appointed by both houses of Parliament for a seven The Code of Conduct for Members of the European
years term. Parliament (MEPs) establishes detailed disclosure
requirements of financial interests as well as an explicit
As to conflict of interest, according to the Conflict of ban on receiving payments or any kind of reward in
Interest Act, all public officials, including high-ranking exchange for influencing parliamentary decisions. The
members of the government, have the duty to identify code also provides for clear rules on the acceptance of
and avoid possible conflicts of interest. gifts (gifts worth more than 150 Euros are not allowed)
and on the possibility of former MEPs working as
The Act requires public officials to provide a confidential lobbyists7.
report on assets and liabilities, containing their former
and current activities as well as those of their spouse While the code is assessed as strong and
and dependent children. It outlines rules regarding comprehensive, the text still has some weaknesses,
which assets may or may not continue to be directly particularly with regards to interest group influence
managed, and gives direction on how to divest of (Transparency International, 2011). For example, the
assets. It also sets limitations on outside activities, Code does not include a “cooling off” provision to
acceptance of gifts, invitations to special events and prevent MEPs from moving straight into lobbying jobs
hospitality, as well as post-employment activities, and after the end of their term, and does not require MEPs
sets out a recusal mechanism to assist Ministers in to keep a record of all significant meetings with
avoiding conflicts of interest in the performance of their representatives of interest groups in connection with
official duties and functions. In addition, more specific their work (‘Legislative footprint’).
guidelines covering important issues, such best
practices in dealing with lobbyists and political
fundraising activities is provided in the guide for
Ministers and Ministers of State5.

European Union
Since June 2001, a joint ‘Transparency Register’ to
cover lobbying activity in both the European
Commission and the European Parliament has been in
place. All lobbyists who register are required to declare
who their clients are, and the income generated from
lobbying activities. While the register is not mandatory,
the European Parliament is maintaining its own system
for issuing access passes, and lobbyists who do not
register are not eligible for the pass (Office for
Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy, 2011).

Nevertheless, growing concerns over unethical and

illegal negotiations between Members of the European
Parliament and special interest groups made the
European Parliament strengthening its internal ethics
regime6. In this context, a new code of conduct for negotiating tabling amendments in exchange from payments
Please see: http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/journalistic-
spoof-traps-meps-br-news-503281

5The full text of the code Accountable Government: 7 The Code is available at:
A Guide for Ministers and Ministers of State is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
http://pm.gc.ca/grfx/docs/guidemin_e.pdf //EP//NONSGML+RULES-
EP+20120110+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN&language=EN (annex
6In March 2011, an undercover investigation of the Sunday I, p.128)
Times showed Members of the European Parliament

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 Interest groups influence on policy-making

Kennedy, 2009. Comparing Formal and Informal Lobbying

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