Screening Level Risk: Analysis (SLRA)
Screening Level Risk: Analysis (SLRA)
CHAPTER 10
Purpose
Identification of hazards - provide ranking of hazards
SLRA Methodology
This methodology can be used for new designs at the conceptual stage in order to assist with
layouts, etc. and for existing facilities where some level of prioritization is needed prior to more
detailed hazards analysis. The SLRA methodology may include:
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-2
1. A list all substances that are both stored as well as processed at the facility together
with hazardous properties of those materials including:
Toxicities
Flash points
Upper and lower explosive limits
Vapor pressures
Corrosive nature
Interactive properties with other substances
Auto-ignition temperatures
Any tendencies for auto decomposition
Any other harlnful properties: refer to MSDS sheets (if available)
4. List vulnerable locations, such as adjacent office blocks, housing, main highways.
6. Estimate consequences in broad tenns, from minor to severe and describe the nature of
the consequences and qualitatively estimate their severity in terms of impact on
employees, environment, capital equipment, and production.
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-3
9. List existing safeguards that are present which can prevent or control the potential
hazardous events. These should include:
a. Safeguards against the cause or failure in the first place, e.g., interlocks and trips
b. Detection and remedial action, e.g., pressure safety valves, instrumentation
c. Mitigation of the consequences, e.g., flammable gas detectors, fire suppressions
systems
d. Post-incident response, e.g., emergency response plans, evacuation equipment and
procedures
10. If existing safeguards are found to be inadequate, develop recommendations for further
measures to prevent or control potential hazardous events
11. If there are areas of vulnerability identified, how best can these be handled so that risk
is minimized?
12. All the hazardous events will be risk ranked using a risk matrix, which assigns risk
levels, from highest to lowest
Results
Ranking of hazards on a plant by plant basis
Allows identification and resolution of high risk events
Consequence and frequency
Quantitative
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-4
rawing: A - 135
I
Design ConditionsiPara~neters:Chlorine stored as a liquefied gas under 1
pressure in 1 ton containers 'c
Hazards &
Source
i Consequences 1
I
Existing Safeguards 1 S ' L ; RR
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Recoln~nendatlon
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1. Accident I. I. Release of I. I. High wall plus dltch i I. Provide an enclosed offloading area
during toxic chlorlne I would trap chlorine vapors, for t r ~ ~ c supplying
ks 1 ton chlor~ne
delivery and vapor cloud 1 especially under "F" contamers Both offloadng and storage
offloading of from 1 ton
1 ton chlorine container
stab~lltycondltlons. Some
niltigation under other, I area should be connected to a proposed
new chlorlne scrubb~ngsystem .
containers. more turbulent, weather
conditions.
_ __ I - -. - --
L2. ~ n s n &e If
~%~ah,%~&:~;)d k m m ~ bw~%&",
A -st.:: % * 2 k
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-5
i
3.2. Onsite & SCBA (Self Contained inspection procedures in place when
offsite toxic gas Breathing Apparatus). connecting up chlorine containers.
cloud hazard -- ----
3.3. High wall plus ditch 5. The lighting in the chlorine and drum
would trap chlorine vapors, handling areas must be adequate at all
especially under "F" times for unloading and hooking up of
stability conditions. Some chlorine containers and other chemicals
mitigation under other, (so as to minimize the potential for
more turbulent, weather human error).
conditions.
---
4. Fractured 4.1. Release of 4.1. Onsite personnel have 4 2. Provide a wet scrubbing system that
manifold leads toxic chlorine SCBA (Self Contained 2 2 can absorb a major chlorine release and
to release of vapor cloud Breathing Apparatus). neutralize using caustic soda solution.
'
' chlorine. from one or
4.2. High wall plus ditch
The scrubbing system should be
more 1 ton switched on prior to offloading of
section across rail track
containers chlorine and also scrubber to be
section would trap chlorine interlocked with chlorine detectors to
through
vapors, especially under
manifold switch on with chlorine release.
"F" stability conditions.
Some mitigation under
other, more turbulent,
weather conditions.
- -
Chemical: 1.2. 100 drums of 98% red fuming nitric acid / Drawing: A - 136
Type: 100 drums of 98% red fuming nitric acid
I
Design ConditionsIParameters:Fuming 98% red nitric acid stored under
atmos~heric~ressure/temueratureconditions I
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-6
-" - - -- --
2 . - V e h i a e r - 1 2.1TReleaseoT 2.1. High wall plils ditch 5. The lighting in the chlorine and drum
truck impacts 1 nitrogen dioxide section woi~ldtrap NO2 handling areas inust be adequate at all
a stack of and nitric oxide and NO vapors, especially times for unloading and hook~ngup of
drums (e.g., fumes. Both under "F" stability chlorine containers and other chemicals
nitric acid. /
on pallets) of NO2 and NO are
very tonic and
NO can
conditions. Some
mitigation under other,
more turbulent, weather
(so as to ininiinize the potential for
himan error).
!!
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7. Provide bollards, curbing etc. to
(Release is SCBA (Self Contained
I
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-7
-- -
Chemical: 1.3. 40 drums of 50% caustic soda solution. Drawing: A - 137
I------
---
Type: 40 drums of 50% caustic soda solution.
r-
Design Conditions/Parameters:50% caustic soda stored in warm
environment to prevent freezing
Recommendation
-
1.1. High wall plus ditc 5. The lighting in the chlorine and drum
section would trap NO2 and handling areas must be adequate at all
NO vapors released as a times for unloading and hooking up of
secondary effect of boil-off chlorine containers and other chemicals
through caustic contacting (so as to minimize the potential for
nitric acid, especially under human error).
"F" stability conditions.
Some mitigation under
other, more turbulent,
weather conditions.
11. Store the 50% caustic away from the
SCBA (Self Contained fuming nitric acid and also from any
Breathing Apparatus). flammable solvents or other combustible
substances.
-
Drawing: A - 138
Recommendation
------
15. Provide segregation of hydrochloric
acid storagelhandling from caustic soda
storagelhandling.
I caustic. hydrogen
chloride.
SCBA (Self Contained
I 1 Breathing Apparatus). / I /
pressure
Hazards & , Conseqi~ences j Existing Safeguards
i
Source
.. -
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-" ,
. - j ... - . - .- .. .- . .. . -.- "..-" ---, - 1 . .. - . -. -
I . Propane 1.1. Potential 1 1.1. Regular predictive 2 2 14 i 16. Provide flammable gas
leakage inside explosion within maintenance schedule : inside building with automated file1
I
gasoline or
-- -- -
! in possible
----
?2. If there is a 2.1. Could result 12.1.
--
one- I 1
I located on a sloped concrete pad (so that 1;
brush fire this / BLEVE spills of flammables will not pond
coilld serioi~sly' explosion of
impact the ' propane bullet
integrity of the and missile
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beneath bullet). Surroi~ndshould be
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' propane bullet. generation.
, I i ' 13. Fence propane billlet in compound, @
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w ~ t hvideo surveillance, that provides Ci'ri
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I j security and limits access. /$
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Screening Level Risk Analysis (SLRA) 10-9
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