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Michael Perrick Kant and Kripke On Necessary Empirical Truths

Kant and Kripke on Necessary Empirical Truths Author(s): Michael Perrick Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 94, No. 376 (Oct., 1985), pp. 596-598 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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104 views4 pages

Michael Perrick Kant and Kripke On Necessary Empirical Truths

Kant and Kripke on Necessary Empirical Truths Author(s): Michael Perrick Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 94, No. 376 (Oct., 1985), pp. 596-598 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association

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Tirso Medellín Barquín
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Mind Association

Kant and Kripke on Necessary Empirical Truths


Author(s): Michael Perrick
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 94, No. 376 (Oct., 1985), pp. 596-598
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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Kant and Kripkeon NecessaryEmpiricalTruths
MICHAEL PERRICK

Accordingto Kripke'sview in 'Naming and Necessity'1generaltermslike 'water',


'gold', etc. haveno connotation.When expoundinghis conceptionof generalterms
Kripke mocks an incidentalremarkin Kant's Prolegomenawhere Kant says that
'Gold is a yellow metal' is analytic;the latter implying, of course, that 'being a
yellow metal' belongs to the connotationof 'gold'.
Ironicallyenough, Kant, however,holds a view on generalterms which, in my
opinion, bears a ratherclose resemblanceto that of Kripke. For Kant says that
empiricalconcepts (he mentions 'gold' and 'water') cannot be defined and that
therefore,strictlyspeaking,they cannothave a meaningor connotation.Kant:
. . . anempiricalconceptcannotbe definedat all,butonlymadeexplicit.Forsincewe find
in it onlya fewcharacteristics
of a certainspeciesof sensibleobject,it is nevercertainthat
we arenot usingthe word,in denotingoneandthe sameobject,sometimesso as to stand
for more,andsometimesso as to standfor fewercharacteristics. Thus in the conceptof
goldone manmaythink,in additionto its weight,colour,malleability, alsoits property
of resistingrust,whileanotherwillperhapsknownothingof thisquality.We makeuse of
certaincharacteristicsonly so long as they are adequatefor the purposeof making
distinctions;newobservationsremovesomeproperties and-addothers;andthusthe limits
of theconceptareneverassured.2
In Kripke's terminologyKant's statement could be renderedas follows: the
referenceof an empiricalconcept is fixed by certaincharacteristics.Accordingto
both Kant and Kripke this can be done in differentways. New observationscan
induce us to give up some of those characteristicsby which we fixed the reference
initially, and, if need be, to replacethem by others (Kripkewould here speak of
contingentpropertiesknown a priori).The characteristicsby which the reference
of an empiricalconcept is initiallyfixed need not hold of the object once and for
all. Kant continues:
Andindeedwhatusefulpurposecouldbeservedbydefininganempirical concept,such,for
instance,asthatof water?Whenwespeakof waterandits properties, wedonotstopshortat
whatis thoughtin the word,water,but proceedto experiments. The word,withthe few
characteristics
whichweattachto it, is moreproperly to beregardedasmerelya designation
thanas a conceptof the thing;the so-calleddefinitionis nothingmorethana determining
of the word.3
From this it is clear that these characteristicsdo not form part of the connota-
tion of the empiricalconcept at issue. If we want to know what wateris like, what
its propertiesare, we have to proceedto empiricalenquiry.As Kripkeputs it, the
essenceof things like wateris to be discoveredempirically.We think the foregoing
1 In D. Davidson and G. Harman,eds., Semanticsof Natural Language,Dordrecht,Reidel, 1972,
pp. 253-355, 763-9.
2 Critiqueof PureReason,trans.N. Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan,1929, B 755-6.
3 Critiqueof PureReason,B 756.

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Kant and Kripke on Necessary Empirical Truths 597

makes clear that there is a striking resemblance between the views of Kant and
Kripke in respect of what Kripke calls general names.
Kripke's theoretical identifications, i.e. the judgements of physical science (for
instance, 'water is H20'), would undoubtedly be classified by Kant as synthetical
judgements a posteriori. In respect of these synthetical a posteriori judgements
Kant makes a distinction between the so-called Erfahrungsurteile (judgements
of experience) and Wahrnehmungsurteile(judgements of perception).4 The former
are the objectively valid judgements of physical science (Kripke's theoretical
identifications) and are according to Kant, unlike the Wahrnehmungsurteilewhich
are contingent, characterized by necessity. And here there is a second point of
resemblance between both their views. For Kripke holds that his theoretical
identifications are necessary truths a posteriori. Thus we see that according to both
philosophers the judgements of physical science are a posteriori as well as necessary.
Both try to do justice to the necessity of the statements of science without tampering
with their status of a posteriori judgements, which would have to be called in
question if the only acknowledged kind of necessity were logical or analytical
necessity.
Now that we have seen the agreement between Kant and Kripke on the necessity
of scientific statements we must point out some difficulties.
Although Kant classifies his Erfahrungsurteileas necessary truths a posteriori we
must not forget that Kant's conception of necessity is inextricably tied up with his
transcendental idealism, one of the consequences of this being that his notions
'a priori' and 'necessary' are at least coextensive. How then can an empirical (and
therefore a posteriori) truth be necessary or, to put it paradoxically, be a priori as
well? This question was asked as well as answered by Kant himself:

But how cfoesthe propositionthat judgmentsof experiencecontain necessity in the syn-


thesis of perceptionsagree with my statement so often before inculcatedthat experience
as cognition a posteriorican afford contingent judgmentsonly? When I say that experi-
ence teaches me something, I mean only the perception that lies in experience-for
example, that heat always follows the shining of the sun on a stone; consequently the
propositionof experience is always so far accidental. That this heat necessarilyfollows
the shining of the sun is contained indeed in the judgment of experience (by means
of the concept of cause), yet is a fact not learnedby experience;for conversely,experience
is first of all generatedby this addition of the concept of the understanding(of cause) to
perception.5

From this it is evident that the judgement of experience is necessary precisely in so


far as it contains an a priori element, to wit a concept of the understanding or
category. As far as only the perception, which lies in experience, is concerned, this
judgement is a posteriori and contingent. Whether one finds Kant's answer
acceptable or not will depend, we suspect, on the stance one takes to his
transcendental idealism. Kant's answer also makes it clear that Kripke's reproach
that often the metaphysical and the epistemological are not distinguished attaches
to Kant as well.6
4 Cf. Kant, Prolegomena, par. I8-22.
5 Prolegomena, par. 22 n.
6 Quite anotherquestionis whether, from an idealist standpoint,there is room for a non-epistemic
notion of necessity. Cf. M. Dummett, Frege,London, Duckworth,I973, pp. I I7 ff.

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598 MichaelPerrick
Finally, whether one shares Kripke's view on necessity will depend on one's
positionon essentialism;however,as this is a well-knownissue, I will not enlarge
upon it here.
UniversityofN#megen MICHAEL PERRICK
Netherlands

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