EN BANC

[A.C. No. 9226. June 14, 2016.]

(Formerly CBD 06-1749)

MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C. ADVINCULA , complainant, vs. ATTY.

LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA , respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN , J : p

This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment dated
June 16, 2006 brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty.
Leonardo C. Advincula (Atty. Advincula) by no less than his wife, Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa
C. Advincula (Dr. Advincula).
In her complaint, 1 Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed
unlawful and immoral acts; 2 that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had
extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); 3 that the
extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula
(Alexandria); n 4 that Atty. Advincula failed to give nancial support to their own
children, namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite
his having suf cient nancial resources; 5 that he admitted in the af davit of late
registration of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga; 6 that even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the af davit of
late registration of birth was motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly
entered into a subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a declaration
was in itself still unlawful; 7 that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife
was conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer; 8 that
contracting a subsequent marriage while the rst marriage had not been dissolved was
also an unlawful conduct; 9 that making a false declaration before a notary public was
an unlawful conduct punishable under the Revised Penal Code; 10 and that the failure of
Atty. Advincula to provide proper support to his children showed his moral character to
be below the standards set by law for every lawyer. 11 Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty.
Advincula be disbarred. 12
In his answer, 13 Atty. Advincula denied the accusations. He asserted that during
the subsistence of his marriage with Dr. Advincula but prior to the birth of their
youngest Jose Leandro, their marital relationship had deteriorated; that they could not
agree on various matters concerning their family, religion, friends, and respective
careers; that Dr. Advincula abandoned the rented family home with the two children to
live with her parents; that despite their separation, he regularly gave nancial support to
Dr. Advincula and their children; that during their separation, he got into a brief
relationship with Ms. Gonzaga; and that he did not contract a second marriage with Ms.
Gonzaga. 14
Atty. Advincula further acknowledged that as a result of the relationship with Ms.
Gonzaga, a child was born and named Alexandra; 15 that in consideration of his moral
obligation as a father, he gave support to Alexandra; 16 that he only learned that the
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 birth of Alexandra had been subsequently registered after the child was already
enrolled in school; 17 that it was Ms. Gonzaga who informed him that she had the birth
certi cate of Alexandria altered by a xer in order to enroll the child; 18 that he strived
to reunite his legitimate family, resulting in a reconciliation that begot their third child,
Jose Leandro; that Dr. Advincula once again decided to live with her parents, bringing all
of their children along; that nevertheless, he continued to provide nancial support to
his family and visited the children regularly; that Dr. Advincula intimated to him that she
had planned to take up nursing in order to work as a nurse abroad because her medical
practice here was not lucrative; that he supported his wife's nursing school expenses;
19 that Dr. Advincula left for the United States of America (USA) to work as a nurse; 20
that the custody of their children was not entrusted to him but he agreed to such
arrangement to avoid further division of the family; 21 that during the same period he
was also busy with his law studies; 22 that Dr. Advincula proposed that he and their
children migrate to the USA but he opposed the proposal because he would not be able
to practice his profession there; 23 that Dr. Advincula stated that if he did not want to
join her, then she would just get the children to live with her; 24 that when Dr. Advincula
came home for a vacation he was not able to accompany her due to his extremely busy
schedule as Chief Legal Staff of the General Prosecution Division of the National Bureau
of Investigation; 25 and that when they nally met arguments ared out, during which
she threatened to le a disbarment suit against him in order to force him to allow her to
bring their children to the USA. 26 Atty. Advincula prayed that the disbarment case be
dismissed for utter lack of merit. 27 CAIHTE

Findings and Recommendations of the IBP-CBD

After exhaustive hearings, Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) rendered the following ndings and observations,
and recommended the following sanctions, to wit:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Based on Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility for
Lawyers comes this provisions (sic) : "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
This means that members of the bar ought to possess good moral
character. Remember we must (sic) that the practice of law is a mere privilege.
The moment that a lawyer no longer has the required quali cations foremost of
which is the presence of that character earlier mentioned, the Honorable
Supreme Court may revoke the said practice.
No doubt, Respondent Leanardo (sic) C. Advincula, probably due to the
weakness of the esh, had a romance outside of marriage (sic) with Ma. Judith
Ortiz Gonzaga. This he admitted.
From such affair came a child named Ma. Alexandria. He supported her
as a moral obligation.
How, then, must we categorize his acts? It cannot be denied that he had
committed an adulterous and immoral act.
Was his conduct grossly immoral?
Before answering that, let us recall what the highest Court of the Land
de ned as immoral conduct: "that conduct which is willful, agrant or
shameless and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good
and respectable members of the community." 28

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 xxx xxx xxx
It is the Commissioner's view that what he did pales when compared to
Respondent Leo Palma's case earlier cited.
In that case, the Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Atty. Palma had
made a mockery of marriage, a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity.
The highest Court of the Land intoned in the same case: "But what
respondent forgot is that he has also duties to his wife. As a husband, he is
obliged to live with her; observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and render help
and support."
Deemed favorable to Respondent's cause were the various exhibits he
presented evidencing the fact that he supported their children nancially. Such
conduct could not illustrate him as having championed a grossly immoral
conduct.
Another factor to consider is this: Complainant should share part of the
blame why their marriage soured. Their constant quarrels while together would
indicate that harmony between them was out of the question.
The possibility appears great that she might have displayed a temper
that ignited the flame of discord between them.
Just the same, however, while this Commissioner would not recommend
the supreme penalty of disbarment for to deprive him of such honored station in
life would result in irreparable injury and must require proof of the highest
degree pursuant to the Honorable Supreme Court's ruling in Angeles vs.
Figueroa, 470 SCRA 186 (2005), he must be sanctioned.
And the proof adduced is not of the highest degree.
VI. RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, having, in effect, Respondent's
own admission of having committed an extra-marital affair and fathering a
child, it is respectfully recommended that he be suspended from the practice of
law for at least one month with the additional admonition that should he repeat
the same, a more severe penalty would be imposed.
It would be unjust to impose upon him the extreme penalty of
disbarment. What he did was not grossly immoral. 29
The IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted the ndings and
recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner with slight modi cation of the
penalty, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modi cation , the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and nding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondent's admission of engaging in a simple
immorality and also taking into account the condonation of his extra-marital
affair by his wife, Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) months. 30
Atty. Advincula accepted the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as nal
and executory, and manifested in his compliance dated February 26, 2013, as follows:
DETACa

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 1. That on 28 November 2011 this Honorable Court issued a resolution
suspending the undersigned Attorney from the practice of law for two (2)
months under "A.C. No. 9226 (formerly CBD Case No. 06-1749) (Ma. Cecilia
Clarissa C. Advincula vs. Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula) . . .
2. That on 30 October 2012 in faithful compliance with the above order, the
undersigned attorney applied for Leave for two (2) months starting
November up to December thereby refraining himself from the practice of
law as Legal Officer on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) . . .
3. That the undersigned Attorney would like to notify this Honorable Court of
his compliance with the above resolution/order so that he may be able to
practice his law profession again. 31
Ruling of the Court
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time
of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement
from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
xxx xxx xxx
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely re ects on his
tness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in
a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an of cer of the Court, must
not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More speci cally, a member of the Bar and of cer of the Court is required
not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to
conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
outing those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing delity
to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. 32
Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, agrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of
decency. 33
On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality
based on the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro, 34 the extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who
had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise,
disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a
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 married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void,
while he himself was also married. 35 In another case we have suspended for two years,
a married attorney who had sired a child with a former client. 36 In Samaniego v. Ferrer ,
37 suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the philandering
lawyer.
Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring
the child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he
committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his
immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when
already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative
liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court
considers suspension from the practice of law for three months to be condign and
appropriate.
As a last note, Atty. Advincula manifested in his compliance dated February 26,
2013 that he had immediately accepted the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
suspending him from the practice of law for two months as nal and executory; that he
had then gone on leave from work in the NBI for two months starting in November and
lasting until the end of December, 2012; and that such leave from work involved
refraining from performing his duties as a Legal Officer of the NBI.
The manifestation of compliance is unacceptable. A lawyer like him ought to
know that it is only the Court that wields the power to discipline lawyers. The IBP Board
of Governors did not possess such power, rendering its recommendation against him
incapable of nality. It is the Court's nal determination of his liability as a lawyer that is
the reckoning point for the service of sanctions and penalties. As such, his supposed
compliance with the recommended two-month suspension could not be satis ed by
his going on leave from his work at the NBI. Moreover, his being a government
employee necessitates that his suspension from the practice of law should include his
suspension from of ce. A leave of absence will not suf ce. This is so considering that
his position mandated him to be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing . The
suspension from the practice of law will not be a penalty if it does not negate his
continuance in of ce for the period of the suspension. If the rule is different, this
exercise of reprobation of an erring lawyer by the Court is rendered inutile and becomes
a mockery because he can continue to receive his salaries and other bene ts by simply
going on leave for the duration of his suspension from the practice of law. aDSIHc

WHEREFORE , the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. LEONARDO C.

ADVINCULA GUILTY of immorality; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for
a period of THREE MONTHS EFFECTIVE UPON NOTICE HEREOF , with a STERN
WARNING that a more severe penalty shall be imposed should he commit the same
offense or a similar offense; DIRECTS ATTY. ADVINCULA to report the date of his
receipt of the Decision to this Court; and ORDERS the Chief of the Personnel Division of
the National Bureau of Investigation to implement the suspension from of ce of ATTY.
ADVINCULA and to report on his compliance in order to determine the date of
commencement of his suspension from the practice of law.
Let a copy of this Decision be made part of the records of the respondent in the
Of ce of the Bar Con dant; and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Civil Service Commission for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED .
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Perez, Mendoza, Reyes,
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 Perlas-Bernabe and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Brion, * Peralta ** and Jardeleza, **** JJ., are on official leave.
Del Castillo, *** J., is on wellness leave.
Leonen, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
LEONEN , J., concurring :

Before his admission to the bar, respondent Atty. Leonardo C. Advincula — who
was married to complainant Dr. Ma. Cecilia Clarissa C. Advincula — entered into a brief
extra-marital relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga, with whom he had a child. 1
The standard of morality and the rules of conduct under the Code of Professional
Responsibility are applicable only to lawyers. These are not enforced against persons
who have not taken the lawyer's oath.
A lawyer's commitment to the lawyer's oath or any standard of morality and
conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility starts only upon taking that
oath.
Oaths are not senseless utterances. Lawyers who take their oath consent to this
Court's administrative jurisdiction over their actions. The oath is essentially a promise
to act consistently with the value-expectations of this Court.
The signi cance of the oath rests on many assumptions. Taking the oath implies
notice to the person of the standards he or she is expected to abide by. It not only
implies consent to, but also assumes consciousness of those standards. The person
allowed to take the oath is assumed to have the capacity to consider and control his or
her actions accordingly.
For these reasons, violation of the oath or of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is deemed to merit this Court's imposition of a penalty.
When a lawyer takes the oath, any action inconsistent with the oath or with the
Code of Professional Responsibility may be interpreted as a willful disregard of the
standards embodied in the oath or the Code of Professional Responsibility. As
expressed in our Rules of Evidence, a person is presumed to know and intend "the
ordinary consequences of his [or her] voluntary act." 2 The oath places "penalty" under
the great scope of "ordinary consequence" of a lawyer's actions.
On the other hand, without the taking the oath, we cannot presume a person's
conscious and careful consideration of his or her acts in conforming with this Court's
moral and behavioral standards. Without the taking the oath, administrative penalties
do not rise to the level of ordinary consequence of a person's actions.
This Court, as guardian of constitutional rights, should lead other institutions by
exemplifying through its processes the import of the principle of due process. 3 A
person cannot adjust his or her past actions now to conform to the standards imposed
by an oath he or she takes after. It is unreasonable to expect a person to abide by
standards that he or she cannot be presumed to know and apply to actions he or she
can no longer control.
Respondent cannot be expected to abide by the standards imposed by the
lawyer's oath or by the Code of Professional Responsibility. At that time, this Court had
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 no administrative jurisdiction over his actions. He was not yet a lawyer when he entered
into a relationship with Ma. Judith Gonzaga during his marriage with complainant.
Imposing a penalty for respondent's actions before he took the lawyer's oath
reduces the oath to nothing but a frivolous ceremony. We undermine the signi cance of
the oath if, on that basis, we penalize a person for his or her actions, whether or not he
or she subscribed to that oath.
While possession of good morals is required before and during one's
membership to the bar, 4 the bases and effects of the nding that one meets or does
not meet the standard of morality are different in these instances.
For admission to the bar, good morals are solely based on a person's actions
before his or her admission. A person found to be lacking of the required good morals
is disqualified from membership in the bar. A person's actions, on which the finding that
a person has met the required good morals is based, are looked into for purposes of
admission — not penalty.
On the other hand, for retaining membership in the bar, the lawyer's actions while
he or she is a member are looked into. These acts may be the bases of administrative
penalty. ETHIDa

However, this is not to say that a lawyer's actions before his or her admission
cannot be the bases of his or her removal from the bar. After all, a person who has not
met the moral standards before admission should not even be admitted to the bar.
Thus, if for some reason, grossly immoral acts not considered by this Court during
application are later made known and proved to this Court, this Court may choose to
remove him or her without disregarding evidence of any possible moral transformation
that could have taken place later. 5
However, this Court should not be too quick to judge a person's actions as
grossly immoral so as to constitute unfitness to become a member of the bar.
In Reyes v. Wong , 6 this Court has ruled that for an act to be administratively
punishable for gross immorality, "it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 7 Further:
[T]he same must be established by clear and convincing proof, disclosing a
case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its
disciplinary power. . . . Likewise, the dubious character of the act done as well
as the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. 8
There are different aspects of morality. Morality may be religious or secular. In
Perfecto v. Esidera: 9
Morality refers to what is good or right conduct at a given circumstance.
In Estrada v. Escritor, this court described morality as "'how we ought to live' and
why."
Morality may be religious, in which case what is good depends on the
moral prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular
religion. Religion, as this court de ned in Aglipay v. Ruiz , is "a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator." A conduct
is religiously moral if it is consistent with and is carried out in light of the divine
set of beliefs and obligations imposed by the active power.
Morality may also be secular, in which case it is independent of any
divine moral prescriptions. What is good or right at a given circumstance does
not derive its basis from any religious doctrine but from the independent moral
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 sense shared as humans. 10 (Citations omitted)
In the same case, this Court stated that the rule against immorality should have a
secular basis. Our jurisdiction to determine what is moral or immoral should only be
limited to conduct that affects public interest. Immoral conduct, if made the basis for
imposing administrative penalty, should refer to conduct as of cers of the court. It
must be of such depravity as to reduce the public's con dence in our laws and in our
judicial system, 11 thus:
The non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through
laws and rules, moral standards according to a speci c religion. Prohibitions
against immorality should be based on a purpose that is independent of
religious beliefs. When it forms part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality
must be secular. Laws and rules of conduct must be based on a secular
purpose.
In the same way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of
morality, is bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on
secular moral standards. When laws or rules refer to morals or immorality,
courts should be careful not to overlook the distinction between secular and
religious morality if it is to keep its part in upholding constitutionally guaranteed
rights.
There is the danger of "compelled religion" and, therefore, of negating the
very idea of freedom of belief and non-establishment of religion when religious
morality is incorporated in government regulations and policies. As explained in
Estrada v. Escritor:
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore
be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion" anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious
beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby
also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views
that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it
appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class
citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore requires that
government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental
reliance upon religious justi cation is inconsistent with this policy
of neutrality.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . We have jurisdiction over matters of morality only insofar as it
involves conduct that affects the public or its interest. cSEDTC

Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of lawyers and

judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as of cers of the court.
To be guilty of "immorality" under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer's conduct must be so depraved as to reduce the public's con dence in
the Rule of Law. Religious morality is not binding whenever this court decides
the administrative liability of lawyers and persons under this court's supervision.
At best, religious morality weighs only persuasively on us. 12 (Citations omitted)

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 Respondent had a relationship with another woman during his marriage with
complainant. Out of that extra-marital relationship, a child was born. All these had
happened before he became a lawyer.
Indeed, some may nd respondent's actions before becoming a lawyer immoral.
However, these do not constitute grossly immoral conduct that is so corrupt and
reprehensible for this Court to consider him unfit to be a member of the bar.
The dubious character of respondent's actions and his ill-motive were not clearly
demonstrated. Respondent's extra-marital relationship happened during his and
complainant's temporary separation. At the time of respondent's application for bar
admission, his relationship with his alleged mistress, whom he claimed he did not
marry, had already ended. He was already reunited with complainant, his wife. As a
result of their reconciliation, they even had their third child, Jose Leandro.
In light of respondent's reconciliation with complainant prior to becoming a
lawyer, his actions cannot be described as so depraved as to possibly reduce the
public's confidence in our laws and judicial system.
ACCORDINGLY , I concur in the result.
Footnotes
* On official leave.
** On official leave.
*** On wellness leave.

**** On official leave.

1. Rollo, pp. 1-5.
2. Id. at 1.
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id.

5. Id. at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at 14-22.

14. Id.
15. Id.

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 16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.

25. Id. at 19.

26. Id.
27. Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 252.

29. Id. at 253-254.

30. Id. at 244.
31. Rollo, unpaginated.
32. Dantes v. Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 582, 588-589.
33. Narag v. Narag, A.C. No. 3405, June 29, 1998, 291 SCRA 451, 464.

34. A.C. No. 4256, February 13, 2004, 422 SCRA 527, 533.
35. Guevarra v. Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007, 529 SCRA 1, 4.
36. Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, A.C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 1, 17.
37. A.C. No. 7022, June 18, 2008, 555 SCRA 1, 7.
LEONEN, J., concurring:

1. Ponencia, p. 2.
2. RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, sec. 3 (c).
3. CONST., art. III, sec. 1 provides:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
4. See Cordova v. Cordova , 259 Phil. 278, 281 (1989) [Per Curiam, En Banc]. See also
Montagne v. Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577, 589 (1904) [Per J. McDonough, En Banc].
5. See Vitug v. Atty. Rongcal, 532 Phil. 615, 633 (2006) [Per J. Tinga, Third Division].
6. 159 Phil. 171 (1975) [Per J. Makasiar, First Division].

7. Id. at 177, citing RULES OF COURT (1964), Rule 138, sec. 27; Soberano v. Villanueva , 116
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 Phil. 1208, 1212 (1962) [Per J. Concepcion, En Banc]; Mortel v. Aspiras , 100 Phil. 587,
591-593 (1956) [Per J. Bengzon, En Banc]; Royong v. Oblena , 117 Phil. 865, 874
(1963) [Per J. Barrera, En Banc]; Bolivar v. Simbol, 123 Phil. 450, 457-458 (1966) [Per
J. Sanchez, En Banc]; and Quingwa v. Puno , 125 Phil. 831, 838 (1967) [Per J. Regala,
En Banc].

8. Id. at 178, citing Go v. Candoy , 128 Phil. 461, 465 (1967) [Per J. Castro, En Banc].
9. A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015 <http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?
le=/jurisprudence/2015/july2015/RTJ-15-2417.pdf> [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].

10. Id. at 7-8.

11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 8-9.
n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the of cial copy. Also spelled as "Alexandra"
in some portions of the decision.

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