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UNIT - I

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statute.

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MEANING OF STATUTE AND INTERPRETATION

What is A Statute: The legislative, as the representative of the people of a nation or the people of a
state expresses its will and such expression of the will in accordance with constitutional provisions is a

Statute popularly known as Act of parliament.

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·Halsbury's Laws of England - "A Statute is a declaration of the law as it exists or it shall be from the
time at which such statute is to take effect."
·It expresses the collective will of legislature.
·Allen - "A Statute is the highest constitutional formulation of law, the means by which "Law in the
making" the supreme legislative, after the fullest deliberation, expresses its final will."

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·According to Wilberforce: "Statute law may be properly defined as the will of the nation,
expressed by the legislature, expounded by courts of justice. The Legislature, as the representative
of the nation, expresses the national will by means of statute. Those statutes are expounded by the
courts so as to form the body of statute law."

2.

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In a democracy, there is a legislature which makes laws, an Executive which implements the law
and the judiciary which interprets and determines the scope of the laws in the event of a dispute about
such scope between one citizen and another, or between a citizen and the government.

In a federal polity like India, there are legislatures both at the centre and for each state, and the matters on
which each can legislate, i.e. make laws, are set out in a constitution accepted by the people. Generally, the
government (Central or State) in order to combat some evil or make some benefits available to the people,
directs the law secretary of the state or at the centre to prepare a set of rules for that purpose. He does so
with the aid of the law minister, the chief law officer (either the Attorney General or the Advocate-General in
a State) the department concerned and the law commission.

In the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. vs. Asher (1949)2KB481-Denning LJ remarked "Whenever a
statute comes up for consideration, it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the
manifold sets of facts which may arise, and that, even if it were it is not possible to provide for them in terms
free from all ambiguity."

The rules prepared by the law secretary are suitably modified according to those recommendations of the
committee which the Government accepts, and the rules are put in a form called a Bill. The Bill is then

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placed before the legislature. It is there discussed rule by rule, clause by clause and scrutinized carefully by
members of the legislative body supporting the Government, and those who are in the position. It is then
voted upon with or without modifications. The final result is sent to the President if e legislative is the Central
Legislative, i.e., parliament, to the Governor if it is a state Legislative. When e President or Governor signs
the Bill, it becomes an enactment or the Law and it is binding on everyone in India. The law is said to have
been passed. Ordinarily the date of passing of the law and the date of enforcement may be postponed for
the entire enactment or some sections of it, to a data to be notified in the official Gazette.

Statute is today the principal source of law. According to Austin, in regard to any law (whether it proceeds
from a subordinate, or from a sovereign source) which is made directly, or in the way of proper legislation,
the direct and proper purpose of legislation is the establishment of the rule. It is not the instrument or means
of deciding a specific case but is intended solely to serve as a rule of conduct, and therefore to guide the

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courts in their decisions upon classes of cases1

Advantages of Statute Law :

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1. Abrogative Power: Statute is not only a source of law, but is equally effective in increasing,
amending or annulling the existing law.

2. Efficiency: Legislation allows an advantageous division of Labour by dividing the two functions of

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making the law and administering it. This results in increased efficiency.

3. Declaration: Justice demands that laws should be known before they are applied and enforced by
the Law Court. Law must be known before the case is decided. Legislation satisfies the requirement of
natural justice in this respect.

4.

5.

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Provision for Future Cases: Legislation can make rules in anticipation of cases that have not yet
arisen, whereas precedent must wait for the occurrence of some dispute before the court can create
any definite rule of law. Legislation can fill up a vacancy or settle a doubt in leg31 system as soon as the
defect is brought to the notice of the legislative. This is not possible in the case of precedent.

Form: Legislation is superior in form - brief, clear, easily accessible and understandable. According
to Salmond, case law is gold in mine - a few grains of precious metal to the ton of useless matter- while

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statute law is coin of the realm, ready for immediate use.

According to Dicey, the morality of the Courts is higher than the morality of politicians. Legislation is the
product of the will of politicians, who are affected by the popular feelings and passions. That is why the
Judiciary often denounces statutes as wrong, tyrannical, unjust or contrary to fundamental principles laid
down in the written constitution.

Statutes may be classified as general, local or public and private. A general statute applies to the whole
community, a local is limited in respect of area and personal, limited in respect of individuals. A public
statute is one of which judicial notice is taken, while a private statute is required to be pleaded and proved by
the party seeking to take the advantage of it.

Interpretation is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain the meaning of a particular legislation,
what the legislature has actually said and what the legislature intended to have said.
In ancient Hindu Law, provision has been made for solving conflicts between sruti and smriti. Jaimini's

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'MIMANSA' is the most important collection of rules of interpretation. Certain rules of interpretation from
'Mimansa' are amazingly reminiscent of morden rules of interpretation, for example: Mimansa Modern rule

i) Sarthakya: Every word should have a purposeful meaning.

ii) Arthaikatwa: Same words should have the same meaning.
iii) Gunapradhana: Reconciliation of all ideas with the principal one.
iv) Samanjasya: Contradiction should not be presumed and on the contrary reconciliation should be
attempted.
v) Vikalpa: Choice between two meanings is permitted.
vi) Anarthakeya: An interpretation which makes a word or phrase meaningless should be avoided.

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The principles of interpretation have been enunciated in various shlokas. One such sloka is:

"upkarmop sanhard abhyaso uppwwatta fa/am,

arlhwadoppatti ch Ungam tatparya nirnaye"

"This means that when one has to draw the conclusion from a writing he has to read it from beginning till
end, as without doing it, it is difficult to understand the purpose. If there is any repetition or emphasis, its
meaning must be understood. If there is any curiosity or a curious problem tackled, it should be noticed and

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the result thereof must be understood. If there is any innovation or something new, it should be taken note
of. Then one must notice the result of such innovation. Then it is necessary to find out what the author
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intends to convey and in what context."

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Keeton has observed

"The function of the judges in interpreting statutes is two fold. In the first place, they must decide upon the
exact meaning of what the legislature has actually said, and, in the second place, they must consider what

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the legislature intended to have said, or ought to have said, but did not, either because it never visualized
such a set of circumstances arising as that before the court, or because of some other reason.

Interpretation Distinguished from. Construction: According to Cooley5 "Interpretation differs from

construction. Interpretation is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; construction, on the

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other hand, is the drawing of conclusions respecting subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the
text; conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter of the law."

Interpretation is the act of making intelligible what was before, not understood, ambiguous, or not obvious.
It is the method by which the meaning of the language is ascertained. Construction means to determine
from its known elements its true meaning or the interest of its framers and the people who have adopted it;
construction of a statute is an effort to draw conclusions.

When the court goes beyond the language of the statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order
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to determine whether a given case falls within the statute, it resorts to construction.

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Construction is the means of interpretation and interpretation is the end.

The distinction, however, between the two processes is of no great consequence, as the dominant purpose
in each case is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. In all cases, the object is to see what is the intention

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expressed by the words used.8

According to Eugene Wambaugh9, "Some authors have attempted to introduce a distinction between
interpretation' and 'construction'. The distinction, however, has not been accepted by the profession, and
the two expressions are in practice, synonymous. The more common term is 'construction'."

According to Sutherland, the distinction is erroneous. By passage of time and in view of the case law
evolved, the distinction has been largely relegated to the realm of academic discussion.

The words 'interpretation' and 'construction' are used interchangeably.

Interpretation according to Legislative Practice: The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to

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seek the intention of its makers10 and apply it to the facts of the case at hand.

An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats the intent and purpose for which the statute was
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enacted should be avoided.

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In the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti V. Pillibhit Pantnagar Beej Ltd., Sinha J. observed that
construction of statute will depend upon the purport and object of the statute, and different provisions will
have to be interpreted differently. For example, a provision to levy a market to benefit products will have to

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be interpreted differently from one that mandates obtaining a license in order to regulate trade.

It is often contended that if the courts have made a mistake in construing the legislative intention, the
legislative can always amend the law to clarify matters.

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In our country law is not so advanced as in UK and USA, and the legislative is not yet keeping a vigilant
standing committee to watch all judicial decisions and bring about amendments of the law at once where
the decisions given are contrary to the intention of the legislature.

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In the end, we can say that the. Interpretation may be defined as process of reducing the statute applicable
to a single sensible meaning - "the making of a choice from several possible meanings".

AIDS OF INTERPRETATION – INTERNAL & EXTERNAL

2.
3.
4.
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Internal Aids: The intrinsic or internal aids in the construction of statutes are derived from context,
preamble, headings, title, marginal notes etc.

1. Context
Preamble
Title
Headings
5. Marginal notes
6. Punctuation marks
7. Illustrations
8. Definitions

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9. Interpretation clause
10. Proviso
11. Exception & Saving Clauses
12. Explanation
13. Schedule
14. Fictions
15. Conjunctive and Disjunctive words,
16. Include
17. Enabling and Disabling Statutes

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18. Non-obstante clause
19. Subsection
20. Modification of the language to meet the Intention.

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1. Context: It is one of the cardinalt5nnciples of the interpretation of statute that, where the language
is plain and unambiguous, and admits of but one meaning, the courts must give effect to it according to
its plain meaning.

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It is well-settled that the meaning of the words used in any portion of the statute must depend upon the
context in which they are placed. In interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together
as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one
section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the statute.

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The words may be given a wider or more restricted meaning than they ordinarily bear, if the context
requires it,13 widest possible interpretation unless context otherwise directs; (occupant includes a
muafidar).

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In construing a particular section of an Act, one must look at the whole Act, and it is necessary to
consider the context in which such section occurs, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of
the whole statute.14

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General words of a particular provision of a statute may be given a restrictive meaning if the context
requires it. By 'Context' is meant not only the textual context arising out of the other provisions of statute,
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but also factual context including the mischief to be remedied, and the circumstances under which the
statute was passed.

Context refers to the statute as a whole, the previous state of law, other statutes in pari materia, the
general scope of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy . But for such restriction, a
compelling reason must be found. It is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used
in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meaning of words and expressions used in an
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Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear.

The ordinary rule of grammar cannot be treated as an invariable rule which must be accepted in every
case without regard to the context. If the context definitely suggests that the relevant rule of grammar is
inapplicable, then the requirement of the context must prevail over the rule of grammar.

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It is well settled that the language of a statute constitutes the depository or reservoir of the legislative
intent, and in order to grasp its true meaning it is necessary to consider a sentence in its entirety.

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The general rule of construction is not to look at the words but to look at the context.

Every clause of a statute should be constructed with reference to the context, and the a her clauses of
the Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. The ultimate result must be determined.

Every statute must be construed "ex visceribus actus" within four comers of e Act. When construing the
terms of any provision found in a statute, the court is bound to consider other parts of the statute which
throw light on the intention of the legislature. No part of a statute should be construed in isolation, for the
intention of the law - maker is to be found not in one part of the statute or another, but in the entire

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enactment and that intention can best be gathered by viewing a particular part of the statute not
detached from its context in the statute but in connection with its whole context.

The ordinary rule of construction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. The subject

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of legislation and the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure from
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the rule or literal construction.

Words do not always retain their abstract or primary definitions and their meaning varies in accordance

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with the contextual use. It is often the secondary meaning which acquires more extensive recognition
and receives ready comprehension.

Normally, the words used in a statute have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, but in many cases,
Judicial approach finds that the simple device of adopting the ordinary meaning of words does not meet

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the ends of a fair and reasonable construction. Exclusive reliance on the bare dictionary meaning of
words may not necessarily assist a proper construction of the statutory provision. In interpreting
statutory provisions, it becomes necessary to have regard to the subject - matter of the statute and the
object which it is intend to achieve. That is why in deciding the true scope and effect of the relevant

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words in any statutory provisions, the context in which the words occur, the object of the statute in which
the provision is included, and the policy underlying the statute assumes relevance and becomes
material.

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Halsbury has observed, the words "should be construed in the light of their context rather than what
may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning apart from the context."

2. Preamble: The preamble of a statute is a prefactory statement at its beginning, following the title
and preceding the enacting clause, explaining or declaring the policy and purpose, the reasons and
motives for, and the objects sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute.

Although the enacting words of a statute are not necessarily to be limited or controlled by the words of
the preamble but in many instances go beyond it, yet, on a sound construction of every Act of
parliament, the words in the enacting part must be confined to that which was the plain object and
general intention of the legislature in passing the Act, and the preamble affords a good clue for
discovering what that object was.

The object and purpose of a preamble to a statute is well settled. A preamble is a key to open the mind of
the legislature but it cannot be used to control or qualify precise and unambiguous language of the

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enactment. It is only when there is a doubt as to the meaning of a provision that recourse may be had to
the preamble to ascertain the reasons for the enactment and hence, the intention of Parliament. If the
language of the enactment is capable of more than one meaning then that one is to be preferred which
comes nearest to the purpose and scope of the preamble. Preamble may assist in ascertaining the
meaning but it does not affect clear words in a statute.

A preamble though a key to open the mind of the legislature, cannot be used to control or qualify the
precise and unambiguous language of the enactment. It is only in case of doubt or ambiguity that
recourse may be had to the preamble to ascertain the reason for the enactment in order to discover the
true legislative intendment19.

The significance of the preamble in gathering the legislative intent was stated in Arnit Das V. State of

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Bihar.20 "The preamble suggests what the Act was intendent to deal with. If the language used by
parliament is ambiguous the court is permitted to look into the preamble for construing the provisions of
an Act. The Preamble is a key to unlock the legislative intent. If the words employed in an enactment
may spell a doubt as to their meaning it would be useful to so interpret the enactment as to harmonise it

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with the object which the legislature had in its view."

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In the case of West Bengal vs. Anwar Ali Sankar , it was contendent that Sec.5 of the West Bengal
Special Courts Act, 1950, was unconstitutional and void as it contravened Art. 14 of the constitution.

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That section provided that a special court shall try such offences or class of offences, or cases or
classes of cases, as the state Government may direct. It was contended on behalf of the state that the
preamble should be read as part of the section, (The Preamble read, 'whereas it is expedient to provide
for the speedier trial of certain offences') and that the proper interpretation to be put upon the section
was that only those cases and offences which in the opinion of the State Government required speedier

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trial could be assigned to the special court and hence there was no scope for any discrimination. It was
held:

"The express provision of an enactment, if it is clear and unambiguous, cannot be curtailed or extended

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with the aid of the preamble to the Act. It is only when the object or meaning of the enactment is not clear
that recourse can be had to the preamble to explain it. In this case, the language of Sec. 5(1) is perfectly
clear and free from any ambiguity. It vests an unrestricted discretion in the state Government to direct
any cases to be tried by the special court.

3.

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Title: Strictly speaking, a title is not a part of an enactment. It cannot legitimately be used to restrict
the plain terms of an enactment. All the same, titles have often afforded additional evidence in support
of a theory of interpretation. In some cases title may supply key to the meaning with the exception of
private and local laws. Title does not play any significant part in the interpretative process and may not
be looked at to modify the interpretation of plain language.

The title does not even receive the same attention of the legislators as does the main body of the Act,
and therefore it may not disclose the legislative intent with exactitude. In private and local laws,
however, the title is of greater value as an aid in construction, as a result of the constitutional
requirement that the subject of such laws must find expression in the titles.

It is permissible to use the long or full title of an Act to throw light on a doubtful meaning, no weight
should be attached to the short title. It is only a 'Statutory nickname' to obviate the necessity of always
referring to the Act under its full and descriptive title, and nowadays in every statute, there is a section

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containing the short title by which the statute may be cited.

4. Headings: Where the language of the section of an Act is plain, it is not necessary to have recourse
to the general heading under which the section comes. The head notes and sections cannot cut down
the express meanings of the words occurring in the section. The headings of different portions of a
statute can be referred to determine the sense of any doubtful expression in a section ranged under any
particular heading. To control the plain meaning of the words of the enactment though they may, in
some cases, be looked at in the light of preambles if there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the
sections on which they can throw light.

The headings prefixed to a section or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as
preamble to those sections. They cannot control the plain words of statutes, but they may explain

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ambiguous words. If there is any doubt in the interpretation of the words of section, the headings
certainly help the court to resolve that doubt. 23

It is permissible to assign the heading or title of a section a limited role to play in the construction of

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statutes. They may be taken as very broad and general indicators of the nature of the subject - matter
dealt with thereunder. The heading or title may also be taken as a condensed name assigned to indicate
collectively the characteristics of the subject - matter dealt with by the' enactment underneath, though
the name would always be brief having its own limitations. In case of conflict between the plain

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language of the provision and the meaning of the Heading or Title, the Heading or Title would not control
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the meaning which is clearly and plainly discernible from the language of the provision thereunder.

In the case of Union of India V. Raman Iron Foundary,25 it was held that a heading cannot control the
interpretation of a clause if its meaning is otherwise plain and unambiguous, but it can certainly be

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referred to as indicating the general drift of the clause and affording a key to a better understanding of its
meaning.

5. Marginal Notes: Marginal notes of the sections are not to be referred to for the purpose of

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construction; unless they have been inserted with the assent of the legislature.

The marginal heading to the section cannot control the interpretation of the words of the section
particularly, where the meaning of the section is clear and unambiguous. But where the section is

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unambiguous the marginal note may not be used as aid to its interpretation.

If there is any ambiguity in the meaning of the provisions in the body of the statute, the marginal note
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may be looked into as an aid to construction.

In the case of Indian constitution, the marginal notes were enacted by the Constituent Assembly and
hence they may be referred to for interpreting Articles of the constitution.

In State of Bombay V. Bombay Education Society,27 it was contended that Art-29(2) did not confer any
fundamental right on all citizens generally but guaranteed the rights of citizens of minority groups by
referring to the marginal note to Art.19 which states : "Protection of interests of minorities". This
contention was rejected by the Supreme Court and it was held that Article 29(2) applies to all citizens.

In I.C. Golaknath V. State of Punjab28 Justice Subba Rao relied on the marginal note to Art. 368 and held
that it only prescribes the procedure to amend the constitution.

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In one case privy council has ruled that the marginal notes to the sections of an enactment cannot be
referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. There is no justification for restricting the contents of a
section by its marginal notes. They are not part of the Act. A marginal note is merely an abstract of the
clause intended to catch the eye. Although a marginal not cannot control the clear language of the
section, or overside the provisions of the enactment, the court can consider it for the purpose of arriving
at a conclusion as to what according to the legislature was the purpose of enacting the section. The
marginal note cannot, however, affect, the construction of the language used in the body of the section if
it is otherwise clear and unambiguous.

6. Punctuation Marks: Punctuation marks cannot control, vary or modify the plain and simple
meaning of the language of the statute. At the most they can aid in the construction of ambiguous

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statutes. Such assistance is also subject to the condition that the punctuation marks have been inserted
with accuracy and they were present at their places at the time of enactment.

Punctuation of law, generally speaking, does not control or affect the intention of the legislature in its

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enactment. The intention is generally gathered from the context to which the words relate. Even where
punctuations sometimes lend assistance in the construction of sentences, they are always subordinate
to the requirement of the context.

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When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should undoubtedly
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be given to the punctuation.

The punctuation may have its uses in some cases, but it cannot certainly be regarded as a controlling
element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the text. .

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In Maharaja of Burdwan V. Murtunjoy Singh30, it was observed by privy council that it was an error to rely
on punctuation in construing the Act of the legislature.

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In Ashwini Kumar V. Arbinda Bose31 their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that punctuation is
after all a minor element in the construction of statute and very little attention is paid to it by English
courts. When a statute is carefully punctuated and there is doubt about its meaning, weight should
undoubtedly be given to the punctuation. Punctuation may have its uses in some cases but it cannot

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certainly be regarded as a controlling element and cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of
text.

In conclusion, we can say that

a. Punctuation is not a part of the statute, but where it is clear that the punctuation is correctly placed,
there is no reason why the punctuation should not be considered as a proper guide for
understanding the sense of the section.

b. In construing a statute the court should first read it without the punctuation.

c. If the section as punctuated leads to a conflict the punctuation must be ignored.

In Gopalan V. State of Madras,32 the provisions of the Preventive Detention Act were challenged on the
ground that they contravened Art.22 of the constitution. Sec. 12 of the impugned Act was challenged on the

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ground that it did not conform to the provisions of Art. 22(7). It was argued that the Art. permits preventive
detention beyond three months, when parliament prescribes the circumstances under which, and the class
or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than 3 months and that both
these conditions had to be fulfilled.

It was held that the use of the word 'which' twice in the first part of the sub-clause, read with the comma put
after each, shows that the legislative wanted them to be read as disjunctive and not conjunctive. The
legislature intended that the power of preventive detention beyond 3 months may be exercised either if the
circumstances in which or the class or classes in which, a person is suspected to be doing the objectionable
things mentioned in the section.

7. Illustrations: Illustrations in enactments provided by the legislature are valuable aid~ in

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understanding the real scope of the text thereof. They are part of the statute. The illustrations, however,
make nothing law, which would not be law without them. They only exhibit the law in full action.

An illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates and equally it can

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neither curtail nor expand its ambit.

If the text is clear and an illustration is beyond it, the illustration cannot be taken as extending or limiting
the scope of the text. But in all other cases the illustration shall be taken as explanatory of the section.

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The illustrations merely exemplify the application of the rule contained in the section and do not control
the meaning of the section itself, they are not to be regarded as exhaustive, but are only intended as a
guide to the working and application of the section. It is always open to a court to go back to the main
section and consider whether the section as it stands, is applicable to any given set of facts as to enable

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the court to draw inference from these facts; they do not restrict presumptions regarding the existence
of facts into the acts covered by the illustrations.

Illustrations are deliberately introduced in certain enactments by the legislature to guide the courts in

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interpreting the words of the statute and they are almost on the same level as the words of the statute. It
is impossible to imagine that a statute can be interpreted in conflict with the illustration given in the
statute itself.

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An illustration does not limit the generality of the section to which it is appended. It dose not exhaust the
full content of the section. It only examplifies the section and cannot be taken to enlarge, restrict or
modify the section.

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Shambhu Nath V. State of Ajmer, in this case the appellant was convicted of the offence of cheating
and under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, clause 7 -A in that he did not either make a particular
Journey or pay the claim for fare. On appeal to the Supreme Court it was contended by the respondent
that under Sec.106 of the Evidence Act and illustration (b) to the section, the facts were especially within
the knowledge of the accused and that the burden lay on him to prove that he had made the journey and
paid the fare. Rejecting the contention and allowing the appeal, the court held:

"We recognise that the illustration does not exhaust the full content of the section which it illustrates but
equally it can neither curtail nor expand its ambit.

The great usefulness of the illustrations, which have, although not part of the sections, been expressly

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furnished by the legislature as helpful in the working and application of the statute, should not be thus
impaired.

8. Definitions: The definition must ordinarily determine the application of the word or phrase defined,
but the definition must itself be interpreted first before it is applied.

When the definition of a word gives it an extended meaning, the word is not to be interpreted by its
extended meaning every time it is used for the meaning ultimately depends on the context, and a
definition clause does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of an Act.

A court should not lay down a rigid definition and crystallize the law, when the legislature in its wisdom
has not done so.

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It is ordinarily unsafe to seek the meaning of words used in an Act, in the definition clause of other
statutes even when enacted by the same legislature.
Definitions in an Act are to be applied only when there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context, and
this is so even if such a qualifying provision is not expressly stated by the legislature.

Where the definition of a word has been given it must be construed in its popular sense if it is a word of
every day use. Popular sense means that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with

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which the statute is dealing, would attribute to it.

It is a principle of interpretation of statutes that even a definition clause is always subject to the context
in which the word is used. If the context so requires, a word or expression may be given a meaning not
covered by the definition clause.

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Where in a definition section of a statute a word is defined to mean a certain thing, whenever that word is
used in that statute, it shall mean what is stated in the definition unless the context otherwise requires.
But where the definition is an inclusive definition, the word not only bear its ordinary, popular and natural
sense whenever that would be applicable but it also bears its extended statutory meaning.

If the statute is with reference to a particular trade, business or transaction, then the words used there
which every body conversant with that trade, business or transaction knows and understands to have a

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particular meaning of it, then those words should be construed as having that particular meaning of it,
then those words should be construed as having that particular meaning which may differ from the
ordinary or popular meaning.

The same expression may be used in different places in a statute. Generally, they bear the same
meaning depending on the context. Particular expression has to be interpreted in the light of the section
itself and the Act as a whole.

If a special definition of a word or phrase is set out in an Act, the meaning of this word or phrase as given
in such definition should normally be adopted in the interpretation of the statute. In the absence of such
a definition, General Clauses Act of the particular legislature which enacted the statute should be
referred to. If the word is not defined there also, the rules of interpretation would come into play.

In Indira Nehru Gandhi V. Raj Narain,34 Khanna J., observed: "A definition clause in a statute is a
legislative device with a view to avoid making different provisions of the statute cumbersome. Where a

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word is defined in the statute and that word is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable,
the effect is that whereever the word defined is used in a provision to which that definition is applicable,
the definition of the word gets substituted. Where, however, the definition is preceded by the words
"unless the context otherwise requires", the connotation is that normally it is the definition given in the
section which should be applied and given effect to. This normal rule may, however, be departed from, if
there be something in the context to show that the definition should not be applied.
In State of Bombay V. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha,35 the question was whether the JJ group of Hospitals
was an 'industry' within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The Supreme Court held that it
was an industry and in doing so observed : "Section 2(i) does not define "industry" in the usual manner
by prescribing what it means; the first clause of e definition gives the statutory meaning of 'industry' and
the second clause deliberately ra ers to several other items of industry and brings in the definition in an
inclusive way. It is obvious that the words used in an inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be

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treated as restricted in any sense. Where we are dealing with an inclusive definition it would be
inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon terms of wider denotation."

9. Proviso: The main function of a proviso is to take out of a section a part of the category to which the

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section applies. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.

A proviso to a section in a statute is not an independent section calling for a construction entirely
removed and detached from the construction to be placed on the main section. A proviso is subsidiary to

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the main section and has to be construed in the light of the section itself.

A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself, a proviso never destroys the section as a
whole. The proper function of a proviso is that it qualifies the generality of the main enactment by
providing an exception and taking out, as it were, from the main enactment a portion which, but for the

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proviso, would fall within the mF.lin enactment.

In construing a section full and natural meaning should be given to a proviso, if any. The proper function
of a proviso is to except and deal with a case which would otherwise fall within the general language, the

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main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. The section must be construed as a whole, each
portion throwing light on the rest.

A proviso should never be construed in a manner which would nullify the effect of the main section to

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which it is merely a proviso. In construing a proviso one has to harmoniously construe the proviso with
the main section and to see that the proviso does not cut down the obligations cast by the section itself.

In Mohan Kumar Singhania V. UOI (1992 SPP (1) see 594), the expression "provided further" spells out
that the first proviso cannot be read in isolation or independent for the second proviso but it must be
read in conjunction with the second proviso.

In S. Sundaram Pillai Vs. v.R. Pallabiraman ((1985) 1 see 591), it was held:

"A proviso may serve four different purposes :

a) it may qualify or except certain .provisions from the main enactment,

b) it may entirely change the very concept of the intendment of the enactment by insisting on certain
mandatory conditions to be fulfilled in order to make the enactment workable.

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c) it may be so embedded in the Act itself as to become an integral part of the enactment and thus
acquire the tenor and colour of the substantive enactment itself, and
d) it may be used merely to act as an optional addenda to the enactment with the sole object of
explaining the real intendment of the statutory provision"

10. Exception and Saving Clauses :

A saving clause or exception being a later passage in an enactment prevails over the substantive
portion it follows.

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Exception exempts something which would otherwise fall within the purview of the general words of a
statute. The substantial distinction between a proviso and an exception is that the former follows an
enacting clause, and qualifies it in certain specified cases, while the latter is part of the enacting clause,
and is of general application.36

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Exception exempts something which would otherwise fall within the general words of the statute. A
proviso, on the other hand is a clause added to an enactment for the purpose of acting as restraint upon,
or as a qualification of the generality of the language which it follows37. The practical effect of the
distinction is that plaintiff or prosecutor must prove that the particular case was not within the exception,

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whereas a proviso is a matter for the defence.

Exceptions must be construed strictly and strongly against the party trying to take the benefit. The
38
mention of certain exceptions to the general rule implies that no other exceptions were cqntemplated.
Saving clauses are generally inserted where a statute is repealed and re-enacted. The effect is that the

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repealed statute remains in force as regards the rights the party previously had; but it does not create
new rights in its favour.

A saving clause is generally introduced into the repealing Act, in order to safeguard rights which, but for

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such saving, would be lost.

A saving clause which is repugnant to the body of the Act is void.

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A saving clause would not give any further right that a party already had.

11. Explanation: The object of an explanation is to understand the Act in the light of the explanation. It
does not ordinarily enlarge the scope of the original section which it explains, but only makes the
meaning clear beyond dispute.

In S. Sundaram Pillai Vs. V. R. Pattaliraman39, The Supreme Court explained the objects of an
Explanation Provision as follows :

a. to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself;

b. where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make
it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve;
c. to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and
purposeful;
d. an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but

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where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the
mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the court in interpreting the true
purport and intendment of the enactment; and it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with
which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by
becoming a hindrance in the interpretation of the same.

Explanation to a section is not a substantives provision by itself. It is entitled to explain the meaning of the
words contained in the section to clarify certain ambiguities or clear them Up.40 It becomes a part and parcel
of the enactment. Its meaning must depend upon its terms. Sometimes it would be added to include
something within it or to exclude from the ambit of the main provision or some condition or words occurring
in it. Therefore, the explanation normally should be so read as to harmonise with and to clean up any
ambiguity in the same section.

of a provision.

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An 'Explanation', generally speaking, is intended to explain the meaning of certain phrases and
expressions contained in a statutory provision. There is no general theory as to the effect and intendment of
an explanation except that the purpose and intendment of the 'Explanation' are determined by its own
words. An explanation, depending on its language, might supply or take away something from the contents

Merely because a particular provision in a Statute is labeled as an Explanation it does not mean that it is

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inserted merely with a- view to explain the meaning of words contained in the section of which it forms a
part. The true scope and effect of an explanation can only be Judged by its express language and not
merely by the lable given to it. The language of an explanation may show that it intends to create a legal
fiction.41

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An explanation should be read with a view to harmonise and clear up the ambiguity in the main provisions of
the section. The explanation should be interpreted according to its own terms having regard to its' context
and not so as to widen the ambit of the section. Where two interpretations are sought to be put upon a
provision that which fits the description which the legislature has chosen to apply to it, according to sound

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canons of constructions, to be adopted provided it is consistent with the language employed in preference
to the one which attributes to the provision a different effect from what it should have according to its
description by the legislature.42

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Explanation is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in a statutory
provision. In DG. Mahajan V. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1977 SC 915) it was stated that it is well settled that
an explanation added to a statutory provision is not a substantive provision but has the plain meaning of the
word and itself shows that it is merely meant to explain or clarify certain ambiguities which may have crept in
a statutory provision. But it is the intention of the legislature which is paramount and the court can look into
the purpose for which the Explanation was added to the section.

12. Schedule: Schedules form part of the statute. They are catalogued towards the end and contain
minute details for working out the provisions of the Act. The expressions in the schedule cannot override
the provisions of the express enactment. Where the enacting part and the schedule cannot be made to
correspond, the latter must yield to the former.

The code of civil procedure (V of 1908) consists of two parts, the first containing section called the body
of the code and the second containing orders in the schedule, called the rules. The body of the code
contains provisions of a substantive nature and lays down the general principles and creates

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jurisdiction, while the Orders contained in the schedule relate to procedure and indicate the mode in
which jurisdiction created by the body of the code has to be exercised. The body of the code is
fundamental and being expressed in general terms has to be read in conjunction with the rules
prescribing the details. To ascertain the jurisdiction of the court in a particular manner not only the code
but also the rules which may have set limits to the exercise of it have to be looked. The sections lay down
the general principles, while the rules provide the means by which they can be applied. If, however, the
rules are inconsistent with the body are inconsistent with the body of the code, the latter would prevail.
The schedule may be used in construing provisions in the body of the Act. It is as much an act of
legislature as the Act itself and it must be read together with the Act for all purposes of construction.
Expressions in the schedule cannot control or prevail against the express enactment and in case of any
inconsistency between the schedule and the enactment, the enactment is to prevail and if any part of
the schedule cannot be made to correspond it must yield to the Act.

prevails.

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The basic principle is that in case of a conflict between the body of the Act and the schedule, the former

The forms in the schedule being intended to suit the generality of cases rather than all cases should not
be regarded as a guide to the meaning of a statute. They should yield to the clear provision of an
enactment. Where however, the enactment is ambiguous, a schedule form may be of assistance in
interpreting its meaning.

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43
In Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. V. State of Maharashtra, it was helds:

"A Schedule in an Act of Parliament is a mere question of drafting. The schedule may be used in
construing provisions in the body of the Act. It is as much an act of legislature as the Act itself and it must

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be read together with the Act for all purposes of construction. Expressions in the schedule cannot
control or prevail against the express enactment and in care of any inconsistency between the schedule
and the enactment the enactment is to prevail and if any part of the schedule cannot be made to
correspond must yield to the Act. It is the legislative intent that is material"

13.

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Fictions: A fiction is a legal assumption that the thing is true which is either not true or which is
probably as false as true.

The effect of a deeming clause is that when legislature introduces a statutory fiction and courts have to
proceed on the assumption that such state of affairs exists on the relevant date.

When a person is 'deemed to be' something the only meaning possible is that whereas he is not in
reality that something the Act of parliament requires him to be treated as if he were.

44
In Avtar Singh V. State of Punjab , it was held: "If a provision says that something which is not an
offence within the meaning of another statute is to be deemed to be such, the offence is created by the
statute which raises the fiction and not by the statute within which it is to be deemed by that fiction to be
included.

It was held in so many cases by supreme court that legal fictions are created only for a definite purpose
and should not be extended beyond the legitimate field. It is well settled that a deeming provision is an
admission of the non-existence of the fact deemed. The legislature is competent to enact a deeming
provision for the purpose of assuming the existence of a fact which does not even exist. It means that

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the courts must assume that such a state of affairs exists as real, and should imagine as real and
consequences and incidents which inevitably flow therefrom, and give effect to the same.

The deeming provision may be intended to enlarge the meaning of a particular word or to include
matters which otherwise mayor may not fall within the main provision.

The legal fiction created under para 6(2) of the X (Tenth) Schedule to the constitution was interpreted by
the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohon V. Zachillhu45. Sub-para (2) of para 6 of the Tenth Schedule
deems the proceedings that must be followed so as to arrive at decision 0 disqualification under para
6(1) as proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Art 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in
the legislature of a state within the meaning of Art. 122. The deeming provision implies that the
proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the House, but only before the speaker as a

S
specially designated authority, the decision under the House, nor is it subject to the approval by the
House. The decision operates independently of the House. A deeming provision cannot by its creation
transcend its own power. There is therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial
scrutiny of the decision of the speaker or chairman exercising power under paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth

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Schedule.
14. Interpretation Clause: The interpretation clause and definitions do not take away the ordinary and
natural meaning of words, but are used: (1) to extend the meaning of a word to include or cover-
something, which would not normally be covered or included, and (ii) to interpret ambiguous words

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which are not plain or clear.

The legislature can lay down legal definitions of its own language. If such definition is embodied in the
statute itself, it becomes binding on the courts. When the Act itself provides a dictionary for the words
used, the court must look Into that dictionary first for an interpretation of the words used in the statute.

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Where a term is defined in the enactment, the court has to look into' the definition and not to its ordinary
meaning..

An interpretation clause may use the verb 'includes' or 'means' or 'means and includes', or denotes or
'deemed to be'.

The-word 'means' or 'means and includes' are used it affords an exhaustive explanation of the meaning

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which, for the purposes of the Act, must inevitably be attached to those words or expressions.

15. Conjunctive and Disjunctive words: The word 'and' used in a statute may be read 'or' and vice
versa, if such alteration is necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature. In criminal or
penallegislation, however, conjunctive words should never be construed as disjunctive and vice versa,
if the effect would aggravate the offence or increase the punishment. It has to be assumed that the
le3islature has chosen the correct words to express its purposes. Hence, the literal meaning of the
expressions should be accepted unless the context points to some other interpretation.

It is legitimate to read the conjunctive and disjunctive words 'and' and 'or' one for the other literal
interpretation would defeat the intention of the legislature or the object of the Act.

The word "or" and the word "and" are often used interchangeably. As a result of this common and
careless case of the two words in legislation, there are occasions when the court, through construction,
may change one to the other. This cannot be done if the statute meaning is clear or if the alteration

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operates to change the meaning of the law.

A departure from the natural and plain meaning of the word "or" can be made whenever the context
justifies it or makes it necessary so to do; but the departure ought not to be made, except for good and
sufficient reasons.

The word "or" can be read as "and" the word "and" can be read as "or" where it is necessary to do so to
give effect to the intention of the legislature.

16. Include: The word "include" is generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the
meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute and when it is used, those words or
phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their

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natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.

17. Enabling and Disabling Statutes: Enabling statutes amplify the scope of the common law where it is
too much restricted or limited. Disabling statutes do just the opposite, they confine or delimit the

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common law. A statute which legalises some act which under the common law would be illegal to
perform is called an enabling Act.

Wherever the legislative enacts a statute it should also give the details of the method for carrying out the

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purpose of the statute. Where the legislature fails to do so the courts may assume that the statute
impliedly authorises the carrying out of the details.

An enabling provision in a particular statute should be construed so as to subserve the purpose for
which it was enacted. It implies power to do everything indispensable for carrying out the purpose.

18.

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Non-Obstante Clause: The expression "non obstante" means "notwithstanding". Sometimes, a
section commences with the clauses stating that "notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any
la for the time being in force". And, in case of conflict, the idea is to give the enacting or operative part of

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the section an overriding effect over provisions of the Act found in the non obstante clause. The
enacting part of a statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non obstante clause where both
cannot be read harmoniously.

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46
In the case of Dominion of India V. Shrinbai A. Irani, it was observed by their loardships of the Supreme
Court, "Although ordinarily there should be a close approximation between the non- obstante clause
and the operative part of the section, the non obstante clause need not necessarily and always be co-
extensive with the operative part, so as to have the effect of cutting down the clear terms of the
enactment. If the words of the enactment are clear and are capable of only one interpretation on a plain
and grammatical construction of the words thereof, a non-obstante clause cannot cut down the
construction and restrict the scope of its operation. In such cases the non-obstante clause has to be
read as clarifying the whole position and must be understood to have been in corporated in the
enactment by the legislature by way of abundant caution and not by way of limiting the ambit and scope
of the operative part of the enactment."

The very purpose of non-obstante clause is that the provision shall prevail over any other provision and
that other provisions shall not be of any consequence. In case there is any inconsistency or a departure
between a non-obstante clause and other provisions, one of the objects of such a clause is to indicate
that it is the non-obstante clause that would prevail over the other clauses. Even by the dictionary

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sense, the expression 'notwith standing' implies that other provisions shall not prevail over the main
provisions. The ambit of the word 'notwith standing' or in other words, of the non-obstante clause must
remain confined to the provisions specified thereunder and should not be enlarged.
Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. One may well say if the text is the texture,
context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. The interpretation is best
which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know
why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by
section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at in the context of
its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the
sections, clauses, phrases are looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these
glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase
and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a

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statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that
every word has a place and everything is in its place.

There is a distinction between proviso, exception, provision, saving clause, non-obstante clause,

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explanation, etc. The better rule appears to be not to give undue weight to the aforesaid distinctions,
which are somewhat obscure and to direct one's attention to the substance rather than to the form
adopted by the legislature. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction, which is
that the provision must be construed as a whole, each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest.

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There is no other rule even in the case of a proviso or non-obstanta clause in the strict and narrowest
sense. When language is quite clear and no alternative view is possible, it is futile to go into the question
whether it operates as a substantive provision or only by way of an exception. The non-obstante clause
need not necessarily and always be co-extensive with the operative part so as to have the effect of
cutting down the clear terms of the enactment. If the words of the enactment are clear and are capable

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of only one interpretation on a plain and grammatical construction of the words thereof, a non-obstante
clause cannot cut down the construction and restrict the scope of its operation. The enacting part of the
statute must, where it is clear, be taken to control the non-obstante clause where both cannot be read
harmoniously.

19.

20.
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Sub Section: The words used in a section must be given their plain grammatical meaning.
Where the court is dealing with two sub-sections of a section, it is necessary that the two sub section
must be construed as a whole, "each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest. The two sub-sections

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must be read as parts of an integral whole and as being inter-dependent; an attempt should be made in
construing them to reconcile them, if it is reasonably possible to do so, to avoid repugnancy. ~f
repugnancy cannot possibly be avoided, then a question may arise as to which of the two should
prevail. But that question can arise only if repugnancy cannot be avoided.

Modification of the language to meet the intention: Where the language of the statute, in its
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent
purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity which can hardly have been
intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the
structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an
unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the legislature
could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the modifications made are mere
corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention
of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the drafts man's unskilful or ignorance of the
law, except in the cases of necessity.

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External Aids of Interpretation : External aids or Extrinsic aids may be employed in the construction of
statutes if the words and language employed are not free from ambiguity and which cannot be cleared even
by resort to internal aids. External aids in the construction of statutes are permitted to explain the state of the
law at the time it was passed, but not to interpret the Act.

There is one principle on which complete unanimity of all the courts in the world is that where the words or
the language used in a statute are clear and cloudless, plain, simple and explicit. unclouded and
unobscured, intelligible and pointed so as to admit of no ambiguity, vagueness, uncertainty or equivocation,
there is absolutely no room for deriving support from external aids.

It is equally well settled that it is not the duty of the court to import words which have been omitted

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deliberately or intentionally in order to fill up a gap or supply omissions to fit in with the ideology or concept of
the Judge concerned. The words and the language used must be given their natural meaning and
interpreted in their ordinary and popular series.

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1. Parliamentary History of the Enactment: History of the Act, Parliamentary debates, are materials
forming part of preliminary discussions of legislation which can support any interpretation.

Legislative records may provide a clue to the circumstances leading to the enactment of the statute.

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Reports of relevant legislative committees may also be consulted. The history of the legislation,
even though employed in interpreting the meaning of a statute, is, however not conclusive. But it is
unquestionably a rule of interpretation that the Parliamentary history of an enactment is not
admissible to explain its meaning.

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To find out the meaning of a law, recourse may legitimately be had to the prior state of law, the evil
sought to be removed and the process by which the law was evolved. In interpreting a statute,
although if is useful to keep in mind the historical background, it does not necessarily help to
determine the true meaning to be attached to the language employed in the statute.

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The legislative history of another Act does not afford any aid to the construction of a statute.
Legislative history plus within circumspect limits may be consulted by courts to resolve ambiguities.
According to Sutherland the history of events transpiring during the process of enacting an Act has

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generally been the first extrinsic aid to which Courts have turned in attempting to construe an
ambiguous act.
A statute may be enlarged or restricted in order to harmonize it with the legislative intent of the entire
statute. It is the spirit of the statute which should govern over the literal meaning.

The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of parliament and it must be deduced from
the language used. It is well accepted that the beliefs and assumption of those who frame Acts of
47
Parliament cannot make the law .

According to Lord Halsbury in Powell V. Kemplon Park Racecourse Co.48 , such topics as the history
of the legislation and the facts which give rise to the enactment may usefully be employed to
interpret the meaning of the statute, though they do not afford conclusive argument.

In Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri V. UOI,49 the question was whether a law relating to a single individual
could be treated as a law relating to a class or if it was discriminatory. It was held:

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"It is the accepted doctrine of the American Courts, which I consider to be well-founded on principle,
that the presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is
upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional
Principles. The petitioner has made no attempt to discharge the burden of proof and we are merely
asked to presume that there must necessarily be other companies also which would be open to the
charge of mismanagement and negligence. The question cannot, in my opinion, be treated so
lightly. On the other hand, how important the doctrine of burden of proof is and how much harm can
be caused by ignoring it or tampering with it, will be fully illustrated, by refering to the proceedings in
Parliament in connection with the enactment of the Act, where the circumstances which
necessitated it are clearly set out. I am aware that legislative proceedings cannot be referred to for
the purpose of construing Act or any of its provisions, but I believe that they are relevant for the

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proper understanding of the circumstances under which it was passed and the reasons which
necessitated it."

50
In S.C. Parashar, ITO V. Vasantsen Dwarkadas, S.K. Das, J. observed. "The statement of objects

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and reasons for introducing a particular piece of legislation cannot be used for interpreting the
legislation if the words used therein are clear enough. But the statement can be referred to for the
purposes of ascertaining the circumstances which led to the legislation in order to find out what was
the mischief which the legislation aimed at."

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51
In special reference NO.1 of 2002 in re, (Gujrat Assembly Election matter) The debates in the
constituent Assembly on Art. 85 and 174 were looked into. Justice Khare referred to Keshvanand
Bharti case in support of the proposition that the Constituent Assembly Debates are permissible
aids in construction to ascertain the intention of the constitution. The learned Judge observed that

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"One of the known methods to discern the intention behind enacting a provision of the constitution
and also to interpret the same is to look into the historical legislative developments, Constitutent
Assembly Debates or any enactment preceding the enactment of the constitutional provision."

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In Keshvananda Bharti V. State of Kerala52 it was held that constituent Assembly Debates although
not conclusive, yet show the intention of the framers of the constitution enacting provisions of the
constitution and the Constituent Assembly Debates can throw light in ascertaining the intention
behind such provision.

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2. Legislative Debates: Statement of legislators at the time of discussion of an Act are admissible as
an aid to interpretation.

53
In Golaknath V. State of Punjab the Supreme Court referred to the speeches of two legislators
made in the Constituent Assembly not with a view to interpret the provisions of the Article in
question, which the court did on its own terms, but only to notice the transcen-dental character given
to the fundamental rights by two of the important architects of the constitution.

A statute, as passed by Parliament, is the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as
a whole and any statement made by an individual, or a Minister, of the intention and objects of the
Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute 54.

In the case of p.v. Narsinmha Rao V. State (C.B.1. (S.P.E.),55 Supreme court said that the statement
of the Minister who had moved the Bill in Parliament can be looked at to ascertain mischief sought to

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be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. The
statement of the minister is not taken into account for the purpose of interpreting the provisions of
the enactment.

Interpretation of a statutory provision is always a question of law on which the reasons stated by the
mover of the amendment can only be used as an aid in interpretation if it helps considerably in
understanding the meaning of the amendment law.
.
3. Proceedings of Legislative Council : Reference to proceedings of the Legislative Council is not
permissible. The proceedings of the Legislature cannot be called in aid for construing a section. The
intention of the Legislature must be taken for what it has enacted and not from what the legislaters
said while discussing the bill.

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It is true that the speeches made by the members of the legislature on the floor of the House when a
bill for enacting a statutory provision is being debated are inadmissible for the purpose of
interpreting the statutory provision but the speech made by the mover of the bill explaining the
reason for the introduction of the bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the
mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the
legislation is enacted. This is in accord with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in western
countries but also in India that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of

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meaning, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible.

56
In the case of Sub-Committee of Judicial Accountability V. UOI & others it was said that where
internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to external aids to discover the
object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a well settled principle of modern

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statutory construction.

4. Statement of Objects and Reasons not admissible in construing statute: The statement of
objects and reasons is not admissible in evidence for construing a statute.

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The history of a legislation would be admissible for ascertaining the legislative intent when the
question is one of severability. But the statement of objects and reasons is not a part of the history of
legislation. It is merely an expression of what according to the mover of the bill are the scope and

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purpose of the legislation. But the question of severability has to be judged on the intention of the
legislature as expressed in the bill as passed and to ascertain if the statement of the mover of the bill
is no more admissible than a speech made on the floor of the House.

The statement of objects and reasons might be admissible not for construing the Act but for
ascertaining the conditions which prevailed when the legislation was enacted.
57

58
It has been said in the case of Aswini Kumar Ghose V. Arabinda Bose that although the statement
of objects and reasons appended to a bill is not admissible as an aid to the construction of the Act as
passed, yet it may be referred to only for the limited purpose of ascertaining the conditions
prevailing at the time which necessitated the making of the law. It can also be referred to for the
limited purpose of ascertaining the precise extent and urgency of the evil or the mischief which was
sought to be remedied by introducing the amendment, as it often called the Surrounding
circumstances' of a statute.

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Courts always lean towards a construction which would help in giving effect to the object underlying
a statute. But if the language used by the statute is clear, a court cannot construe the ct differently
because of what it thinks was the object of Parliament.

It is well settled that the statement of objects and reasons accompanying a bill when introduced.
Parliament can be used to determine the true meaning and effect of substantive provisions of e
statute. They cannot be used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and
the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. A statute, as passed by parliament, is the
expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and statement made by an
individual, a Minister of the intention and objects of the Act, cannot be used to cut down the
generality of the words used in the statute.
A reference to statement of objects and reasons may be permissible in the case of ambiguity of a

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statutory provision. But it cannot be allowed to overside the plain provisions of law which are clear
and free of ambiguity.

The statement of objects and Reasons can be referred to ascertain the mischief sought to be

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remedied by the statute.

5. Motive and object of Legislation: Although the Court is not at liberty to construe an Act of
Parliament by the motives which influenced the Legislate, yet when the history of law and legislation

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tells the courts, and prior judgments tell this present court, what the object of the legislative was, the
court is to see whether the terms of the section are such as fairly to carry out that object and no other,
and to read the section with a view to finding out what it means, and not with a view to extending it to
something that was not intended.

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The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense
in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the Legislature
has in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of
language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used,

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and the object to be attained. (Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition)

6. Contemporaneous Events and Historical Setting: Contemporaneous events form an important

extraneous aid to the construction of a statute. A consideration of history of the period of enactment

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including the history of the law itself, the nature of the preceding law and the mischief that was
sought to be removed by the law is called for.

In the case of ambiguity of different articles of the constitution, the reports of the Drafting Committee
of the Constituent Assembly may be consulted but not with a view to controlling the meaning of the
article in question. In order to find out the precise evil that the legislators tried to remedy, it is useful
to scan the opinions and statements of the legislators expressed at the time of the discussion of the
law and ascertain the relevant condition at the time of the enactment.

Historical works and public official documents may be referred to in order to ascertain ancient facts
of a public nature.

7. Public Policy: Legislation is intended to accord with and give shape to the established principles of
public policy, and not to transgress them. If the statute lends itself to double interpretation, the
interpretation that achieves this object should be preferred. The effect and consequences of the

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proposed constructions of the enactment have also to be examined, and if the examination reveals
that one of the proposed constructions goes against the spirit of public policy, and the other does
not, the reasonable and beneficial interpretation is to be accepted.
In one case Supreme Court of the United States observed that "if a policy exists, we may grant that it
may be used to resolve the uncertainty of a law, but it cannot be a substitute for a law.

The Supreme Court of Massuchusets held that "The natural import of the words of any legislative
act, according to the common use of them, when applied to the subject-matter of the act, is to be
considered as expressing the intention of the legislature unless the intention so resulting from the
ordinary import of the word, be repugnant to sound acknowledged principles of national policy."

For although it is not to be presumed that the legislature will violate principles of public policy, yet an

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intention of the legislature repugnant to those principles, clearly, manifestly and constitutionally
expressed, must have the force of law.

Judicial observations on this point do not show that the Courts are in favour of enlarging or

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restraining the literal sense of the legislation, but rather their anxiety that the interpretation
consistent with the public policy should be selected.

In an English case of Egerton V. Brownlow, in 1953 Park B., observed that "Public Policy" is a

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vague and unsatisfactory term and calculated to lead to uncertainty and error when applied to the
decision of legal rights. It is capable of being understood in different sense. There may be variety of
opinion according to the education, habit, talents and disposition of each person who is to decide
whether an Act is against public policy or not. To allow this to be a ground of judicial decision would
lead to the greatest uncertainty and confusion. It is the province of the statesman and not the lawyer

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to discuss, and of the legislature to determine, what is the best for the public good and to provide for
it by proper enactments. It is the province of the Judge to expound the law and not to speculate upon
what is the best, in his opinion, for the advantage of the community.

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The above view, however, does not take into consideration the fact that in many cases
determination of public policy would be helpful in assigning the proper meaning to a particular
statute. Where the public policy is clearly defined, there is no case of dismissing it as an aid in the
construction of statutes.

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In the case of Bayonne Textile Corp. V. American ,Federation of Silk Workers, the New Jersey Court
held: "It is well established rule that, for the purpose of determining the meaning, but not the validity
of a statute, recourse may be had to consideration of public policy."

In one case of Jamunadas Devaibhai Bhati V. The Commissioner, Nagpur Division, Nagpur
Bombay High Court observed that the scope of the expression 'public purpose is obviously not
static and must change with varying concept, time, state of society and its needs. A rigid or fixed
meaning if given to the words 'public purpose' might defeat the very object with which the legislature
made it only an illustrative definition.

The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the legislative must be found in the
words used by the Legislature itself. If the words used are capable of one construction only, then it
would not be open to the court to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such
hypothetical construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the

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Act. The words used in the material provisions of the statute must be interpreted in their
grammatical meaning and it is only when such words are capable of two constructions that the
question of giving effect to the policy or object of the Act can legitimately arise. When the material
words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or impair the policy of the Act
whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of the said policy, then the courts
would prefer to adopt the latter construction. It is only in such cases that it becomes relevant to
consider the mischief and defeat which the Act purports to remedy and correct.

8. Previous Legislation: Where a code consolidates the statute's law on a particular subject or
reduces the whole law, the rules of construction lay down that the express statutory enactment
alone should be looked at and should govern the rights of the parties. The language employed in the

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statute, uninfluenced by any considerations derived from previous law, should regulate the
relations of the parties.

But there is a slight departure in the case of a consolidation Act where the courts are inclined to

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presume that it is not intended to alter the law, and in case of doubt, it is reasonable to infer that the
legislature intended the law to stand. In such cases the history of the previous Act may be looked at
to determine the construction to be put on the same word in different section.

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In construing a statute the general rule is that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words used
is to be adhered to. This is essential in the case of statutes codifying the law. But where a statute is
only modifying the form of any previous law and to determine whether it is retrospective in
operation, it may be necessary to refer to the prior state of law.

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9. Dictionaries: In the absence of any judicial guidance or authority, dictionaries can be consulted to
find out the meaning of a particular word or a phrase. In the absence of there being anything
contrary to the context the language of a statute should be interpreted according to the plain
dictionary meaning of the terms used therein.

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It is true that "dictionaries are not to be taken as authoritative exponents of the meaning of words
used in Acts of Parliament, but it is a well-known rule of courts of law that words should be taken to
be used in their ordinary sense."

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In the case of R.S. Nayak Vs. A.R. Antualay, held that while it may be permissible to refer to
dictionaries to find out the meaning in which a word is capable of being used or understood in
common parlance, the unrestricted reference to the dictionaries should be avoided and the well
known canon of construction that the meaning of the words and expressions used in a statute
ordinarily take their colour from the context in which they appear, should be kept in mind.

Reference to dictionaries is hardly of any avail, particularly in the case of words of ordinary parlance
with a variety of well-known meanings, such as the word 'import'. Such words take colour from the
context.

Dictionary meaning of a word cannot be looked into in case that word has been statutorily or
judicially defined. But in case there is no definition, the court takes aid of dictionaries to ascertain the
meaning of the particular word. Dictionaries are for consultation in the absence of any judicial
guidance or authority.

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10. Rules of Grammar: If the context definitely suggests that the relevant rule of grammar is
inapplicable, then the requirement of the context must prevail over the rule of grammar.

11. Value of English Decisions Resembling Indian Statute: When Legislature in this country enact
statutes which closely resemble statutes in England and have the settle purpose and object in view,
then unless the expressions used in the Indian statutes are defined, Courts of law cannot go wrong
in interpreting them in the way English Judges have done.

The decisions on the English Statutes, when held to be pari-materia60 with the Indian statutes can be
referred to for the purpose of construction of the Indian Act. They are not compelling decisions, but
they are certainly persuasive decisions.

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It is dangerous to apply the decision of an English court construing an English Act of parliament not
in pari materia with the Indian statutes and over Indian decisions, interpreting very similar
enactments.

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In the case of Commissioner of Income-tax and Excess Profits Tax, Madras V. South Indian Pictures
61
Ltd. Karaikud, it is held by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act
are not in pari materia with those of the English income tax statutes so that the decisions of the
English Acts are in general of no assistance in construing the Indian Act.

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In interpreting a statute, the Court is not so much concerned with the meaning which any expression
has acquired in another country. It is rather concerned with the intention of the legislature that
enacted it. To ascertain the intention in the absence of any indication to the contrary in the statute
itself, it is but proper to consider the notions which the legislature had, when it employed the

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particular words in the statute. The language in any Indian Act, like the Indian Income-Tax Act, has
to be construed in accordance with the concept prevalent in India and not by following the
construction of the English statutes. The legislative enactments have not to be construed in a
manner similar to deeds, in the sense that both of them have got to be understood in the light of the

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surrounding circumstances attending the enactment or the document, as the case may be. The
rule, does not, however, prevent the court from resorting to English decisions for interpretation of
statutes in appropriate cases.

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The English common law does not apply to India when there is statutory law covering the point, but
when there is no rule of statute, the common law of England is applied suo motu having regard to the
condition of the society and the customs and manners of the people of India. When, however, the
principles of common law in England are themselves in a state of uncertainty, there is nothing to
preclude a judge in adopting that rule of English common law which is in accordance with justice
and equity.

In India, there are definite statutes and the courts have to follow the same. The rules of the common
law of England or the legal maxims embodying certain judicial principles, however wholesome they
may be, cannot be engrafted upon the Indian Acts.

12. Special Meaning of words in a statute: Special meaning may be given to a word because of the
collection of words in which it figures. Maxwell in "Interpretation of statutes" gives numerous
examples of the application of this principle. The words 'places of public resort' assume a very
different meaning when coupled with roads and streets from that which the same words would have

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if they were coupled with 'houses'. In the same way the word 'posting' cannot be understood in the
sense of 'transfer' when the idea of appointment and promotion is involved in the combination.

13. Use of Technical Words: Common words have to be accorded their plain and normal meaning.
Technical terms should be construed according to their customary significance.

The first and most elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words and
phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning, if they have acquired one, and
otherwise in their ordinary meaning.

14. Use of legal terms: It is well settled that where the Legislative uses a legal term which has received
Judicial interpretation, the courts must assume that the term has been used in the sense in which it

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has been judicially interpreted.

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15. Legal Rule: In the case of National Textile Workers Union Vs. P.R. Ramkrishnan Justice Bhagwati
said that the courts in India will have to build their own jurisprudence and though they may receive

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light from whatever source it comes, they cannot surrender their judgment and accept as valid in
India whatever has been decided in England.
Justice Chinnappa Reddy also said in the above mentioned case that there is no sanctity attached
to the age of a judgment or to the circumstances that the decision is that of an English court from

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where most of our company law has been borrowed. A line of distinction is drawn between the
British and the Indian Jurisprudence as our needs, our social, political and economic bases,
aspirations, our systems, our development, all are different.

As per Venkataramiah J. in the above said case the practice of relying on foreign decisions what

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ever may be their age only when they are in conformity with what the courts in India wish to hold and
of condemning them only on the ground that they are ancient foreign decisions when they do not
accord with our views is not correct. A foreign decision (ever though it may not be binding) is
depending upon the reasons contained in it and not on its origin or age. There is no reason why a

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well reasoned foreign decision should not be followed unless it is opposed to our ethics, tradition
and jurisprudence or otherwise unsuited to Indian conditions.

16. Terms of Trade and Commerce: Terms of trade and commerce, when they occur in a legislation

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concerning those subjects, should be deemed to have been used in their trade or commercial
meaning, unless of course a contrary legislative intent is evident.
17. Use of Specific Words: General expressions in a statute may be restricted by the use of specific
words associated with them. Specific words, on the other hand, may be enlarged in their scope on
the ground that the intention of the legislation is general.

Where there are two provisions in an Act, one of which is specific or of a special character and the
other of a general character, the specific or special provision qualifies the general one and ought to
be applied in preference to and unaffected by the general one.

In Venkateshwar Rao V. Government of Andhra Pradesh63 and C.I.T. Patiala V. Shahzada & Sons64
the supreme court has held that if a special provision is made on a certain matter, that matter is
excluded from the general provision.

The settled rule of interpretation of statutes is that if there is a specific provision dealing with a

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particular matter, the same will override the general. The provision is said to be specific when it is
precise or exact in respect of fulfillment of a particular object.

18. Use of Adjective: Explanatory expressions, qualifying words etc. cannot be allowed to cloud the
meaning of the actual words or expressions used in the statute. Courts must caution against
adjectives getting the better of the nouns. Adjectives are attractive aids but in matters of
interpretation they are diverting intruders (Sanjeev Coke Mfg. Co. V. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.65
19. Text Books: The exposition of statute by a text-writer of repute, the work of a jurist or commentator
may help elucidate the meaning of an enactment which is either ambiguous or obscure.

A commetary in a text-book is not binding on the court, but when it is to be found in a learned treatise
on a relevant law, it can and does have persuasive value in so much as it demonstrates that the view

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of the jurist and that of the court coincide.

20. Statutes in Pari Materia: These are statutes dealing with the same subject-matter, relating to the
same person or thing or the same class of persons or things, or forming part of the same system.

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Each word, phrase and sentence is to be construed in the light of general purpose of the Act itself.
The text of the statute taken as a whole is, no doubt, the most important material for ascertaining the
intention of the legislature, but the external aids by having recourse to statutes in pari materia are
also admissible. These external aids widen the concept of 'context' as including not only other

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enacting provisions of the same statute, but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes
in pari materia, and the mischief which the statute as intended to remedy.

21. Verbal or Clerical Error: A verbal or clerical error may be corrected by the court if it thinks that such
correction is necessary to give effect to the intention of the legislature. It is within the province of the

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courts to correct a merely clerical error, even in an act assembly, when as it is written it involves a
manifest absurdity, and the error is plain and obvious. The power is undoubted but it can only be
exercised when the error is so manifest, upon an inspection of the Act, as to perclude all manner of
doubt, and when the correction will relieve the sense of the statute from an actual absurdity and

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carry out the clear purpose of the legislature.

22. Provisions of General Clauses Act :

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a) Gender and Number: Sec. 13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, lays down that in all
central Acts and Regulation unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context:
i) words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females;
ii) words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa.

The word 'person' includes members both of the male and female sex.

b) Meaning of Expressions: Words or expressions are defined in statutes by employing the

words "means", "includes", "denotes" and "deemed to be". When the word "means" is employed
it shows that the definition is a hard and fast definition and that no other meaning can be
assigned to the word or expression defined than is put down in the definition.

The use of the word "denotes" shows that the legislature did not intend to put down a cast-iron
definition of the word but only sought to describe which word might mean.

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When a thing "is deemed to be" something, the only meaning possible is that whereas it is not in
reality that something, the Act directs that it should be treated as if it were that thing.

The expression "include" or "shall be deemed to include" is very generally used in the
interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in

the body of the statute. When these words are used, then the term defined must be considered
as comprehending not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also
those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include.

The expression "including" is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge
the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute, and when it is so used

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these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such things as they
signify according to their natural import but also those things which the interpretation clause
declares that they shall include. The word "including",. therefore, is a term of extension. It
imports addition. It adds to the subject-matter already comprised in the definition.

c)

d)

KU Power to Appoint: Sec. 16 of the General clauses Act also lays down that where, by any
central Act or Regulation, a power to make any appointment is conferred, then, unless a
different intention appears the authority having for the time being power to make the
appointment shall also have power to suspend or dismiss any person appointed whether by it
self or any other authority in exercise of that power.

Implied Ancillary Power: It is a well recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that

where a statute confers a power on an authority, such ancillary or incidental power must be

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implied as is necessary for the effective and complete exercise of that power.

The Kerala High Court acted upon this principle in the case of M.K. Mohammad Kunhi V. Income
Tax officer66 and held that the Income - Tax Tribunal has the power to stay recovery of tax

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pending the disposal of an appeal before it, and, although such power is not expressly provided
under the Act, it is ancillary and incidental to the appellate powers of the Tribunal. The decision
of the Kerala High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal.

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23. Welfare Legislation: In the case of a legislation which has labour welfare for its object the
legislative purpose should not be unduly cut down or curtailed by the court, but, at the same time, it
must not be forgotten that when the legislative draws a line between various industries for the
purpose of determining the field of operation of such welfare legislation, then legislative intent, as
discrenible from the language employed by the law-giver which is the dominant or controlling factor
must be upheld and it is not open to the courts to strain the language for either extending or
restricting its scope.

Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to
give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological
excursions.

The provisions of the Act which is a welfare legislation are meant to ensure the employees the
continuance of the benefits of the provident fund. They should be interpreted in such a way so that
the purpose of the legislation is allowed to be achieved.

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24. Beneficial Legislation: Beneficial Legislation should have liberal construction with a view to
implementing the legislative intent. The Employees Provident Funds Act is a beneficent piece of
social welfare legislation aimed at promoting and securing the wellbeing of the employees and the
court will not adopt a narrow interpretation which will have the effect of defeating the very object and
purpose of the Act.

In Industrial Jurisprudence a dispute should be determined liberally in the context of social Justice.

The maxim "Salus populi supremea lex" that is "the welfare of the people is the supreme law"
adequately enunciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered
lawfully, judicially, without fear or favour and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot

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be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained.

25. Fiscal Statute: It is not the nomenclature but the pith and substance of a tax which has got to be
seen.

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Either the Statute applies "proprio vigore" or it does not. There is no question of applying a fiscal
statute by intendment, if the expressed words do not apply.

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IMPORTANT QUESTIONS

Q.1. What is a Statute? How does it differ from Precedent? "Interpretation is the process of which the
courts seek to ascertain the true meaning of a particular legislation". Discuss.

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Q.2. Discuss the importance of "Legislative Debates",

Q.3. Explain the term "Internal Aids".

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Q.4. Distinguish between 'Judicial Review' and Interpretation of statutes. Is the power of court same in
both the process?

Q.6. Can an explanation clause enlarge the scope of original section?

Q.8.

Q.9.
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Q.7. What are the different internal aids to construction? Of all the internal aids Preamble is s
be the most important aid. Is the preamble a part of the Act?

discuss the importance of “Text Book” in the interpretation of statutes.

What does a “provision” do in an enactment clause?

Q.10. Is punctuation in the construction of statutes relevant or irrelevant?

aid to

Q.11. What is statutory law and what is the interpretation? Discuss the importance and utility of the work of
interpretation undertaken by judiciary?

Q.12. What are the internal aids to construction? Write a short note on each of the following as an aid to
the interpretation of statutes :

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i) Title
ii) Interpretation Clauses
iii) Preamble
iv) Headings
v) Marginal Notes, and
vi) Schedules

Q.13 Discuss the importance of “Interpretation Clauses” of an Act?

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Q. 14. The Statute must be read as a whole”. Explain.

References:

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1. Jus dicere - to interpret law; Jus dare - to make law
2. K.L. Sarkar : Mimansa Rules of Interpretation.
3. UP Bhoodan Ygna Samiti V. Braj Kishore (1988) 4SCC 274
4. Jurisprudence (1949 p. 89)

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5. Constitutional Limitation, P70
6. Re Sea customs Act AI R 1963 SC 1760
7. Kocourek, An Introduction to the Science of Law, art 41, p.1919

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8. Lord Blackburn referred to by Earl of Halsbury in Eastman Cov. comptroller 1899
9. How to use Decision and Statutes
10. Bhatia International vs Bulk Trading SA & Another (2002) 4SC905

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11. State of Kerala & ors vs. Dr. SG Sarvothama (2001) ISCC 673
12. (2004) ISCC 391) SB
13. Kushilal V Board of Revenue AIR 1967 MP 201
14. Punjab Beverages Pvt. Ltd., Chandigarh V. Suresh Chand (1978) 2SCC144

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15 This word is often used as signifying the object or purpose of statute (Wharton, Law Lexicon)
16. Ram Narain V State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1957 SC13
17. Jagir V. State of Bihar AIR 1976 SC 997 (The above sentence said by supreme court while
interpreting the word owner' in a transport legislation in Bihar)
18. Jogender Pal V. Nava! Kishor Behal (2002) 5 SCC1
19. (YA Mamarde V. Authority under the minimum v,'age5 Act, (1972) 2SEC 108.)
20. (2000) 5SCC 488
21. (AIR 1952 SC 75)
22. Sec. 28 of the General Clauses Act.
23. Bhinka V. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960
24. Raichur matham Prabhakar V. Rawatmal Dugar AIR 2004 SC 3625

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25. (1974) 2 SCC 231

26. S.P. Gupta & ors V. The Union of India & ors, (!AIR 1982 SC 139. 610
27. AIR 1958 SC 561
28. AIR 1967 SC 1643
29. Crawfords on statutory construction.
30. 1887 14 Ind APP. 30
31. AIR 1952 SC 369
32. AIR 1950 SC 27
33. AIR 1956 SC 404

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34. 1975 SCC1
35. AIR 1960 SC 610;
36. Wilberfore : 'Statute Law' , 1881 Edn. p.304

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37. Crawford : 'Statutory Construction Art.91.
38. Kehar Singh V. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3SCC 609
39. (1985) 1SCC 591

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40. Sulochana Amma V. Narayan Nair, (1994) 2 SCC 14
41. V raj Lal Manilal & Co. V State of M.P. 1986 54 PP SCC 201
42. State of Bombay V The United Motors, AIR. 1953 SC 252
43. (1989) 4 SCC 378

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44. AIR 1965 -SC 666
45. 1992 SUPP (2) SCC 651
46. 1955 SCR 296

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47. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes
48. (1899)AC 143
49. AIR 1951 SC 41

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50. Air 1963 SC 1356
51. (2002) 8 sce 237
52. (1973) 4 SCC 225
53. 1967 AU 813
54. State of West Bengal V. UOI (1964) 1 SCR 371
55. AIR 1998 SC 2120
56. (AIR 1992 SC 320
57. Jai Lal V. Delhi Admn. AIR 1962 SC 1781
58. AIR 1954 SC 92
59. [(1984) 2SCC 183] SC
60. 'In Pari materia - upon the some matter subject. Statutes "in pari materia" are those relating to the
same person or this or having a common purpose. This rule of statutory construction, that statutes

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which relate to the same subject should be read, construed and applied together so that the
legislature's intent, on can be gathered from the whole of enactments, applied only when the
particular statute is ambiguous. Statutes are in pari materia which relate to the same person or
thing, or to the same class of persons or thing.
61. AIR. 1956 SC. 49
62. (1983) ISCC 228
63. AIR 1966 SC 828
64. AIR 1966 SC 1342
65. (1983) ISCC 147

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66. (1965) LTR 171

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