Question No. 01: Provide 3 case digests illustrative of a "clear legal right" in injunction proceedings.

G.R. No. 214073 October 4, 2017

BICOL MEDICAL CENTER, represented by Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva, and the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
represented by HEALTH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA
vs.
NOE B. BOTOR, CELJUN F. YAP, ISMAEL A. ALBAO, AUGUSTO S. QUILON, EDGAR F. ESPLANA
II, and JOSEFINA F. ESPLANA
FACTS The Camarines Sur Provincial Government eventually subsidized the operations of a private hospital
and transferred the Provincial Hospital there. The Provincial Hospital was eventually converted to the
Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital (Training and Teaching Hospital). The Training and
Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC). Eventually, BMC constructed a steel gate to
control the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital premises. BMC Chief I, issued a
hospital memorandum which ordered the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC Compound. This rerouting
scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians along J. Miranda Avenue, relocating it from the
eastern side of the hospital to the western side. The relocation of this gate was implemented for security
reasons and to make way for "massive development within the Complex." Atty. Noe Botor (Atty. Botor)
wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat, asking for the reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a
public nuisance. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing Mayor Bongat
to dismantle the gate. However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed a Verified Petition with
Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC. The RTC denied Naga City's application for
injunctive relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to the writ prayed for.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition and emphasized that only prima facie showing of an applicant's
right to the writ is required in an application for writ of injunctive relief.

Petitioners likewise underscore that the intervenors, now respondents, failed to support their claim that
Road Lot No. 3 was a public road41 or that they had a clear right to the injunctive relief prayed for.42
Furthermore, respondents also allegedly "failed to prove that the invasion of the [ir] right sought to be
protected was material and substantial" and that there was an urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ
to prevent serious damage.
ISSUE Whether or not the CA erred in directing the RTC to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the
closure of Road Lot No. 3.
HELD The Petition is meritorious.

A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result of an

impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the judge to assess whether
the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot simply as a result of the parties' having to
go through the full requirements of a case being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is
given a latitude of discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right
materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of the complainant.
Even if this is present, the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to be suffered is irreparable.

To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before the trial
court the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map which both
identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the Province of Camarines Sur. Witnesses' testimonies
were also presented to corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3. A careful
reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to establish prima facie proof of their
clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever right they sought to establish by proving the public
nature of Road Lot No. 3 was rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of title and the City
Engineer's categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of
[BJ\1C] was not included in the list" of city roads under Naga City's control. Instead of merely relying on
a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or respondents should have presented a clear legal right
to support their claim over Road Lot No. 3.

Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. explained that a clear legal right which
would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a right 'clearly founded in or granted by
law.' Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive
relief." Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over Road Lot No.
3, the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound must prevail over the unsubstantiated claims
of Naga City and respondents. Department of Health's ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the
concomitant right to use and enjoy this property, must be respected. Respondents likewise cannot rely on
the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by the public to support their claimed right of unfettered
access to the road because customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation;79 hence, it does
not ripen into a right.

1|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. No. 182944 November 9, 2016
DPWH (DPWH), represented by SEC. HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR, and METROPOLITAN
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, represented by CHAIRMAN BAYANI F. FERNANDO
vs.
CITY ADVERTISING VENTURES CORPORATION, represented by DEXTER Y. LIM
FACTS City Advertising Ventures Corporation entered into a lease agreement with the MERALCO Financing
Services Corporation for the use of 5,000 of Manila Electric Company's lampposts to display advertising
banners. Under this contract, respondent obtained sign permits. It obtained similar permits for the cities of
Pasay and. Makati.16 City Advertising Ventures Corporation likewise obtained permits for setting up
pedestrian overpass banners in Quezon City. Several billboards in Metro Manila were blown by strong
winds and fell. Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, through Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita, issued A.O. No. 16018 “directing the DPWH to conduct field investigations, evaluations and
assessments of all billboards and determine those that are hazardous and pose imminent danger to life,
health, safety and property of the general public and to abate and dismantle the same." Six (6) days later,
A.O. No. 160-A20 was issued, supplementing A.O. No. 160 and "specifying the legal grounds and
procedures for the prohibition and abatement of billboards and signboards constituting public nuisance or
other violations of law." The DPWH announced that they would start dismantling billboards. During its
operations, it was able to remove 250 of City Advertising Ventures Corporation's lamppost banners and
frames, 12 pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps. Respondent
then filed before the RTC its Complaint for "Violation of [Administrative Order No.] 160, Tort, [and]
Injunction with Prayer for [Temporary Restraining Order], Preliminary Injunction, and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction".
ISSUE Whether the Regional Trial Court's issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
HELD The requisites of preliminary injunction whether mandatory or prohibitory are the following":
(1) the applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right, that is a right in esse;
(2) there is a material and substantial invasion of such right;
(3) there is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.

It is crystal clear that at the hearing for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, mere prima facie
evidence is needed to establish the applicant's rights or interests in the subject matter of the main action.
It is not required that the applicant should conclusively show that there was a violation of his rights as this
issue will still be fully litigated in the main case. Thus, an applicant for a writ is required only to show that
he has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in his complaint.

The Court finds that respondent adequately averred and showed a material and substantial invasion of its
ostensible right, for which the writ or preliminary injunction was necessary lest that invasion persist and
it be made to suffer irreparable injury. As respondent pointed out, the filing of its Complaint was
precipitated by the removal of no less than 250 of its lamppost banners and frames, as well as 12 of its
pedestrian overpass banners, 17 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps. All these were done
in the span of less than two (2) weeks. Petitioners do not dispute this. Moreover, nowhere does it appear
that petitioners intended to restrict themselves to these 250 lamppost banners and frames, 12 pedestrian
overpass banners, 1 7 pedestrian overpass frames, and 36 halogen lamps. On the contrary, their incessant
attempts at having the Regional Trial Court's writ of preliminary injunction lifted-first, on reconsideration
at the Regional Trial Court itself; next, on certiorari and prohibition, and later, on reconsideration at the
Court of Appeals; then, on appeal before this Court; and still later, Motion before this Court-are indicative
of their sheer resolve to dismantle more. Respondent was left with no justifiable recourse but to seek relief
from our courts.

Petitioners' admitted and pronounced course of action directly obstructed respondent's ability to avail itself
of its rights under its lease agreement and the permits it secured from local government units. What
petitioners sought to restrict was the very essence of respondent's activity as a business engaged in
advertising via banners and signages. As the Regional Trial Court explained in its April 11, 2007 Order:

It bears stressing that the lifeblood of a business rests on effective advertising strategies. One of which is
the posting of billboards and signages at strategic places. The manner of posting may be regulated by the
government but must comply with certain requirements, and should not result in taking of property without
due process or in wanton disregard of existing laws. It stands to reason that [petitioners] are not vested
with blanket authority to confiscate billboards without warning and in violation of existing laws.

2|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. No. 167434 February 19, 2007
SPOUSES RAMON M. NISCE and A. NATIVIDAD PARAS-NISCE
vs.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC.
FACTS Equitable PCI Bank1 (Bank) as creditor-mortgagee filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure before the
RTC of Makati City. It sought to foreclose the following real estate mortgage contracts executed by the
spouses Ramon and Natividad Nisce over two parcels of land covered by "Additional Real Estate
Mortgage" and an "Amendment to Real Estate Mortgage". The mortgage contracts were executed by the
spouses Nisce to secure their obligation under Promissory Note Nos. 1042793 and BD-150369, including
a Suretyship Agreement executed by Natividad. To support their plea for a writ of preliminary and
prohibitory injunction, the spouses Nisce alleged that the amount for which their property was being sold
at public auction (₱34,087,725.76) was grossly excessive; the US dollar deposit of Natividad with PCI
Capital Asia Ltd. (Hong Kong), and the obligation covered by the suretyship agreement had not been
deducted. They insisted that their property rights would be violated if the sale at public auction would push
through.
ISSUE Whether the RTC erred in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of the petitioner spouses.
HELD Petitioners Are Not Entitled to a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction.

The grant of a preliminary injunction in a case rests on the sound discretion of the court with the caveat
that it should be made with great caution. The exercise of sound judicial discretion by the lower court
should not be interfered with except in cases of manifest abuse. Injunction is a preservative remedy for the
protection of the parties’ substantive rights and interests. The sole aim of a preliminary injunction is to
preserve the status quo within the last actual status that preceded the pending controversy until the merits
of the case can be heard fully. Moreover, a petition for a preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy,
and one who comes to claim for equity must do so with clean hands. It is to be resorted to by a litigant to
prevent or preserve a right or interest where there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences
which cannot be remedied under any standard of compensation. A petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction rests upon an alleged existence of an emergency or of a special reason for such a writ before the
case can be regularly tried. By issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, the court can thereby prevent a
threatened or continued irreparable injury to the plaintiff before a judgment can be rendered on the claim.

To establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the evidence to be submitted by the
plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The plaintiffs are only required to show that they have an
ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint. A writ of preliminary injunction is
generally based solely on initial or incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended
merely to give the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on
the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be decided.

The Court agrees with respondent’s contention that as creditor-mortgagee, it has the right under the real
estate mortgage contract and the amendment thereto to foreclose extrajudicially, the real estate mortgage
and sell the property at public auction, considering that petitioners had failed to pay their loans, plus
interests and other incremental amounts as provided for in the deeds. Petitioners contend, however, that if
respondent bank extrajudicially forecloses the real estate mortgage and has petitioners’ property sold at
public auction for an amount in excess of the balance of their loan account, petitioner’s contractual and
substantive rights under the real estate mortgage would be violated; in such a case, the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale may be enjoined by a writ of preliminary injunction.

3|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 Question No. 02: Provide 3 case digests illustrative of improper issuance of a writ of attachment and 3 case
digests illustrative of irregular issuance thereof.
G.R. No. 219345 January 30, 2017
SECURITY BANK CORPORATION
vs.
GREAT WALL COMMERCIAL PRESS COMPANY, INC., ALFREDO BURIEL ATIENZA, FREDINO
CHENG ATIENZA and SPS. FREDERICK CHENG ATIENZA and MONICA CU ATIENZA
FACTS Security Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money (with Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Attachment) against respondents Great Wall and its sureties before the RTC. The complaint sought to
recover from respondents their unpaid obligations under a credit facility covered by several trust receipts
and surety agreements, as well as interests, attorney's fees and costs. Security Bank argued that in spite of
the lapse of the maturity date of the obligations, respondents failed to pay their obligations. The total
principal amount sought was ₱10,000,000.00. After due hearing, the RTC granted the application for a
writ of preliminary attachment of Security Bank, which then posted a bond in the amount of
₱10,000,000.00. Respondents filed their Motion to Lift Writ of Preliminary Attachment Ad Cautelam,
claiming that the writ was issued with grave abuse of discretion based on the following grounds: (1)
Security Bank's allegations in its application did not show a prima facie basis therefor; (2) the application
and the accompanying affidavits failed to allege at least one circumstance which would show fraudulent
intent on their part; and (3) the general imputation of fraud was contradicted by their efforts to secure an
approval for a loan restructure.

RTC: Denied respondents’ motion to lift the Writ of Preliminary Attachment.

CA: Lifted the writ of preliminary attachment. The appellate court explained that the allegations of
Security Bank were insufficient to warrant the provisional remedy of preliminary attachment. It pointed
out that fraudulent intent could not be inferred from a debtor's inability to pay or comply with its
obligations. The CA opined that the non-return of the proceeds of the sale and/or the goods subject of the
trust receipts did not, by itself, constitute fraud and that, at most, these were only averments for the award
of damages once substantiated by competent evidence. It also stressed that respondents' act of offering a
repayment proposal negated the allegation of fraud. The CA held that fraud must be present at the time of
contracting the obligation, not thereafter, and that the rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment must
be construed strictly against the applicant.
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in nullifying the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the trial court.
HELD A writ of preliminary attachment is a provisional remedy issued upon the order of the court where an action
is pending. Through the writ, the property or properties of the defendant may be levied upon and held
thereafter by the sheriff as security for the satisfaction of whatever judgment might be secured by the
attaching creditor against the defendant. The provisional remedy of attachment is available in order that
the defendant may not dispose of the property attached, and thus prevent the satisfaction of any judgment
that may be secured by the plaintiff from the former. For a writ of preliminary attachment to issue under
the above-quoted rule, the applicant must sufficiently show the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.
It is settled that fraudulent intent cannot be inferred from the debtor's mere non-payment of the debt or
failure to comply with his obligation.

The Court finds that Security Bank was able to substantiate its factual allegation of fraud, particularly, the
violation of the trust receipt agreements, to warrant the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment.
While the Court agrees that mere violations of the warranties and representations contained in the credit
agreement and the continuing suretyship agreement do not constitute fraud under Section 1(d) of Rule 57
of the Rules of Court, the same cannot be said with respect to the violation of the trust receipts agreements.
Failure of the entrustee to tum over the proceeds of the sale of the goods, covered by the trust receipt to
the entruster or to return said goods if they were not disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust
receipt shall be punishable as es ta fa under Article 315 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, without need of
proving intent to defraud. The offense punished under P.D. No. 115 is in the nature of malum prohibitum.
Mere failure to deliver the proceeds of the sale or the goods, if not sold, constitutes a criminal offense that
causes prejudice not only to another, but more to the public interest. The present case, however, only deals
with the civil fraud in the noncompliance with the trust receipts to warrant the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attached. A fortiori, in a civil case involving a trust receipt, the entrustee's failure to comply
with its obligations under the trust receipt constitute as civil fraud provided that it is alleged, and
substantiated with specificity, in the complaint, its attachments and supporting evidence.

While the Court finds that Security Bank has substantiated its allegation of fraud against respondents to
warrant the issuance of writ or preliminary attachment, this finding should not in any manner affect the
merits of the principal case. The writ of preliminary attachment is only a provisional remedy, which is not
a cause of action in itself but is merely adjunct to a main suit.

4|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. No. 212025 July 1, 2015
EXCELLENT QUALITY APPAREL, INC.
vs.
VISAYAN SURETY & INSURANCE CORPORATION, and FAR EASTERN SURETY & INSURANCE
CO., INC.
FACTS Petitioner Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. entered into a contract with Multi-Rich Builders, a single
proprietorship, for the construction of a garment factory within the Cavite Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (CPEZA). The duration of the project was for a maximum period of 150 consecutive calendar
days. Included in the contract was an Arbitration Clause in case of dispute. Win Multi-Rich filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages against petitioner and Ying before the RTC. It also prayed for
the issuance of a writ of attachment, claiming that Ying was about to abscond and that petitioner had an
impending closure. Win Multi-Rich then secured the necessary bond in the amount of P8,634,448.20 from
respondent Visayan Surety. In the Order, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in favor of Win
Multi-Rich. Petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion, seeking to discharge the attachment. The motion,
however, was denied by the RTC in its Order because the issues of the case could be resolved after a full-
blown trial. The CA rendered a decision, annulling the April 12 2004 and April 29, 2004 Orders of the
RTC.
ISSUE The assailed decision and the assailed resolution of the CA should be reversed and set aside for being
contrary to law and jurisprudence considering that to allow the execution against the two surety companies
would give full effect to the terms of the judgment.
HELD By its nature, preliminary attachment, under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, "is an ancillary remedy applied
for not for its own sake but to enable the attaching party to realize upon relief sought and expected to be
granted in the main or principal action; it is a measure auxiliary or incidental to the main action. As such,
it is available during the pendency of the action which may be resorted to by a litigant to preserve and
protect certain rights and interests therein pending rendition and for purposes of the ultimate effects, of a
final judgment in the case. In addition, attachment is also availed of in order to acquire jurisdiction over
the action by actual or constructive seizure of the property in those instances where personal or substituted
service of summons on the defendant cannot be effected." The party applying for the order of attachment
must thereafter give a bond executed to the adverse party in the amount fixed by the court in its order
granting the issuance of the writ. The purpose of an attachment bond is to answer for all costs and damages
which the adverse party may sustain by reason of the attachment if the court finally rules that the applicant
is not entitled to the writ.

In this case, the attachment bond was issued by Visayan Surety in order for Win Multi-Rich to secure the
issuance of the writ of attachment. Hence, any application for damages arising from the improper, irregular
or excessive attachment shall be governed by Section 20, Rule 57. An application for damages on account
of improper, irregular or excessive attachment must be filed before the trial or before appeal is perfected
or before the judgment becomes executory, with due notice to the attaching party and his surety or sureties,
setting forth the facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof. Such damages may be awarded
only after proper hearing and shall be included in the judgment on the main case. If the judgment of the
appellate court be favorable to the party against whom the attachment was issued, he must claim damages
sustained during the pendency of the appeal by filing an application in the appellate court, with notice to
the party in whose favor the attachment was issued or his surety or sureties, before the judgment of the
appellate court becomes executory. The appellate court may allow the application to be heard and decided
by the trial court. Nothing herein contained shall prevent the party against whom the attachment was issued
from recovering in the same action the damages awarded to him from any property of the attaching party
not exempt from execution should the bond or deposit given by the latter be insufficient or fail to fully
satisfy the award.

In the present case, petitioner’s answer with compulsory counterclaim, which contained the application
for damages, was not served on Visayan Surety. Also, a perusal of the records60 revealed that Visayan
Surety was not furnished any copies of the pleadings, motions, processes, and judgments concerned with
the application for damages against the surety bond. Visayan Surety was only notified of the application
when the motion for execution was filed by petitioner on June 29, 2009, after the judgment in G.R. No.
175048 had become final and executory on June 2, 2009.

Clearly, petitioner failed to comply with the requisites under Section 20, Rule 57 because Visayan Surety
was not given due notice on the application for damages before the finality of judgment. The subsequent
motion for execution, which sought to implicate Visayan Surety, cannot alter the immutable judgment
anymore.

5|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. No. 102448 August 5, 1992
RICARDO CUARTERO
v.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO EVANGELISTA and FELICIA EVANGELISTA
FACTS Petitioner Ricardo Cuartero filed a complaint before the RTC of Quezon City against the private
respondents, Evangelista spouses, for a sum of money plus damages with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. The lower court issued an order granting ex-parte the petitioner’s prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The writ of preliminary attachment was issued
pursuant to the trial court’s order. On the same day, the summons for the spouses Evangelista was likewise
prepared. A copy of the writ of preliminary attachment, the order, the summons and the complaint were
all simultaneously served upon the private respondents at their residence. Immediately thereafter, Deputy
Sheriff Ernesto L. Sula levied, attached and pulled out the properties in compliance with the court’s
directive to attach all the properties of private respondents not exempt from execution, or so much thereof
as may be sufficient to satisfy the petitioner’s principal claim in the amount of P2,171,794.91. The spouses
Evangelista filed a motion to set aside the order and discharge the writ of preliminary attachment for
having been, irregularly and improperly issued. The lower court denied the motion for lack of merit.
ISSUE The CA erred and acted with grave abuse of discretion when it held that the RTC could not validly issue
the subject writ of preliminary attachment which is an ancillary remedy.
HELD Under section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the only requisites for the issuance of the writ are the
affidavit and bond of the applicant. No notice to the adverse party or hearing of the application is required
inasmuch as the time which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property before a writ of attachment issues. In such a case, a hearing would render nugatory
the purpose of this provisional remedy. The ruling remains good law. There is, thus, no merit in the private
respondents’ claim of violation of their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process. The writ of
preliminary attachment can be applied for and granted at the commencement of the action or at any time
thereafter.

It is clear from our pronouncements that a writ of preliminary attachment may issue even before summons
is served upon the defendant. However, we have likewise ruled that the writ cannot bind and affect the
defendant until jurisdiction over his person is eventually obtained. Therefore, it is required that when the
proper officer commences implementation of the writ of attachment, service of summons should be
simultaneously made. It must be emphasized that the grant of the provisional remedy of attachment
practically involves three stages: first, the court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ
of attachment issues pursuant to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented. For the
initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant should first be
obtained. However, once the implementation commences, it is required that the court must have acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant for without such jurisdiction, the court has no power and authority to act in
any manner against the defendant. Any order issuing from the Court will not bind the defendant.

The question as to whether a proper ground existed for the issuance of the writ is a question of fact the
determination of which can only be had in appropriate proceedings conducted for the purpose. It must be
noted that the spouses Evangelista’s motion to discharge the writ of preliminary attachment was denied by
the lower court for lack of merit. There is no showing that there was an abuse of discretion on the part of
the lower court in denying the motion.

Moreover, an attachment may not be dissolved by a showing of its irregular or improper issuance if it is
upon a ground which is at the same time the applicant’s cause of action in the main case since an anomalous
situation would result if the issues of the main case would be ventilated and resolved in a mere hearing of
a motion.

6|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. NO. 166759 November 25, 2009
SOFIA TORRES, FRUCTOSA TORRES, HEIRS OF MARIO TORRES and SOLAR RESOURCES, INC.
v.
NICANOR SATSATIN, EMILINDA AUSTRIA SATSATIN, NIKKI NORMEL SATSATIN and NIKKI
NORLIN SATSATIN
FACTS Nicanor Satsatin asked petitioners' mother, Agripina Aledia, if she wanted to sell their lands. After
consultation with her daughters, daughter-in-law, and grandchildren, Agripina agreed to sell the properties.
Petitioners, thus, authorized Nicanor, through a Special Power of Attorney, to negotiate for the sale of the
properties. Nicanor offered to sell the properties to Solar Resources, Inc. (Solar). Solar allegedly agreed to
purchase the three parcels of land for P35,000,000.00. Petitioners alleged that Nicanor was supposed to
remit to them P9,333,333.00 each to Sofia, Fructosa, and the heirs of Mario. Nicanor only remitted the
total amount of P9,000,000.00, leaving an unremitted balance of P19,000,000.00. Despite repeated verbal
and written demands, Nicanor failed to remit to them the balance. Petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
the Issuance of a Writ of Attachment, alleging among other things: that respondents are about to depart
the Philippines; that they have properties, real and personal in Metro Manila and in the nearby provinces;
that the amount due them is P19,000,000.00 above all other claims; that there is no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced; and that they are willing to post a bond fixed by the court to answer
for all costs which may be adjudged to the respondents and all damages which respondents may sustain
by reason of the attachment prayed for, if it shall be finally adjudged that petitioners are not entitled thereto.

The trial court issued an Order directing the petitioners to post a bond in the amount of P7,000,000.00
before the court issues the writ of attachment. The RTC granted the motion and deputized the sheriff,
together with police security assistance, to serve the writ of attachment. Respondents filed their answer,
they also filed a Motion to Discharge Writ of Attachment anchored on the following grounds: the bond
was issued before the issuance of the writ of attachment; the writ of attachment was issued before the
summons was received by the respondents; the sheriff did not serve copies of the application for
attachment, order of attachment, plaintiffs' affidavit, and attachment bond, to the respondents; the sheriff
did not submit a sheriff's return in violation of the Rules; and the grounds cited for the issuance of the writ
are baseless and devoid of merit. In the alternative, respondents offered to post a counter-bond for the
lifting of the writ of attachment. Respondents argued that the subject writ was improper and irregular
having been issued and enforced without the lower court acquiring jurisdiction over the persons of the
respondents. They maintained that the writ of attachment was implemented without serving upon them
the summons together with the complaint. They also argued that the bond issued in favor of the petitioners
was defective, because the bonding company failed to obtain the proper clearance that it
ISSUE Whether the CA erred in not dismissing the petition by reason of estoppel, laches and prescription and in
holding that the writ of attachment was improperly and irregularly enforced.
HELD In the case at bar, the CA correctly found that there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or
in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court in approving the bond posted by petitioners despite
the fact that not all the requisites for its approval were complied with. In accepting a surety bond, it is
necessary that all the requisites for its approval are met; otherwise, the bond should be rejected.

Every bond should be accompanied by a clearance from the Supreme Court showing that the company
concerned is qualified to transact business which is valid only for thirty (30) days from the date of its
issuance. However, it is apparent that the Certification issued by the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) at the time the bond was issued would clearly show that the bonds offered by Western Guaranty
Corporation may be accepted only in the RTCs of the cities of Makati, Pasay, and Pasig. Therefore, the
surety bond issued by the bonding company should not have been accepted by the RTC of Dasmariñas,
Branch 90, since the certification secured by the bonding company from the OCA at the time of the
issuance of the bond certified that it may only be accepted in the above-mentioned cities. Thus, the trial
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction when it issued
the writ of attachment founded on the said bond.

Moreover, in provisional remedies, particularly that of preliminary attachment, the distinction between the
issuance and the implementation of the writ of attachment is of utmost importance to the validity of the
writ. The distinction is indispensably necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant should be acquired in order to validly implement the writ of attachment upon his person.

7|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. No. 193572 April 04, 2018
TSUNEISHI HEAVY INDUSTRIES (CEBU), INC. VS. MIS MARITIME CORPORATION
FACTS Respondent MIS Maritime Corporation (MIS) contracted Tsuneishi to dry dock and repair its vessel M/T
MIS-1 through an Agreement. The vessel drydocked in Tsuneishi's shipyard. Tsuneishi rendered the
required services. However, about a month later and while the vessel was still dry docked, Tsuneishi
conducted an engine test on M/T MIS-1. The vessel's engine emitted smoke. The parties eventually
discovered that this was caused by a burnt crank journal. The crankpin also showed hairline cracks due to
defective lubrication or deterioration. Tsuneishi insists that the damage was not its fault while MIS insists
on the contrary. Nevertheless, as an act of good will, Tsuneishi paid for the vessel's new engine crankshaft,
crankpin, and main bearings. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary attachment in an Order without hearing.
Consequently, MIS' condominium units located in the financial district of Makati, cash deposits with
various banks, charter hire receivables from Shell amounting to P26.6 Million and MT MIS-1 were
attached. MIS filed a motion to discharge the attachment. The RTC denied this motion in an Order. MIS
filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC also denied in an Order. The CA ruled in favor of MIS.
It reversed the three assailed Orders after finding that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the writ of preliminary attachment.
ISSUE Whether a maritime lien under Section 21 of the Ship Mortgage Decree may be enforced through a writ of
preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
HELD To be clear, we repeat that when a lien already exists, this is already equivalent to an attachment. This is
where Tsuneishi's argument fails. Clearly, because it claims a maritime lien in accordance with the Ship
Mortgage Decree, all Tsuneishi had to do is to file a proper action in court for its enforcement. The issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment on the pretext that it is the only means to enforce a maritime lien is
superfluous. The reason that the Ship Mortgage Decree does not provide for a detailed procedure for the
enforcement of a maritime lien is because it is not necessary. Section 21 already provides for the simple
procedure—file an action in rem before the court.

In accordance with consistent jurisprudence, we must thus affirm the ruling of the CA that the RTC, in
issuing a writ of preliminary attachment when the requisites under the Rules of Court were clearly not
present, acted with grave abuse of discretion. We also agree with the CA's factual finding that MIS did not
act with fraud in refusing to pay the obligation. We emphasize that when fraud is invoked as a ground for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment under Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, there must be
evidence clearly showing the factual circumstances of the alleged fraud.[49] Fraud cannot be presumed
from a party's mere failure to comply with his or her obligation. Moreover, the Rules of Court require that
in all averments of fraud, the circumstances constituting it must be stated with particularity.

The record clearly shows that the Bitera Affidavit does not state that MIS has no other sufficient security
for the claim sought to be enforced. This is a requirement under Section 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
We cannot agree with Tsuneishi's insistence that this allegation need not be stated in the affidavit since it
was already found in the complaint. The rules are clear and unequivocal. There is no basis for Tsuneishi's
position. Nor is it entitled to the liberal application of the rules. Not only has Tsuneishi failed to justify its
omission to include this allegation, the facts also do not warrant the setting aside of technical rules. Further,
rules governing the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment are strictly construed.

8|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 G.R. No. 92813 July 31, 1991
PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, EASTMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., EDMUNDO
O. MAPUA and ROSE U. MAPUA
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
FACTS Private respondent BPI sued herein petitioners in a civil case of then CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila for the
collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound themselves to be
solidarily liable. Upon the filing of said action, the trial court, then presided over by Judge Gregorio G.
Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment after BPI filed an attachment bond in the
amount of P32,700,000.00. Petitioners' properties were accordingly attached by the sheriff. Eastman and
the Mapuas moved to lift the attachment, which motion was set for hearing. On said date and on motion
of BPI, it was granted to file a written opposition to the motion to lift the writ of attachment. BPI also filed
a motion to set for hearing the said motion to lift attachment and its opposition thereto. Judge Reyes issued
an order with an explicit finding that the attachment against the properties of Eastman and the Mapuas was
proper on the ground that they had disposed of their properties in fraud of BPI. It also directed the sheriff
to implement the writ of attachment upon the finality of said order.
ISSUE Whether the Writ of Preliminary Attachment is valid.
HELD As correctly formulated by respondent court, the threshold issue is the validity of the attachment of the
properties of Eastman and the Mapuas, from which arises the correlative question of whether or not the
disputed cash dividends on the garnished shares of stock are likewise subject thereto. Necessarily involved
is the matter of the continuing validity of the writ or whether or not the same was validly lifted and
suspended by the lower court's orders dated January 17, 1983 and May 29, 1986, respectively. Respondent
court was, therefore, correct in holding that, on the above-stated premises, the attachment of the properties
of Eastman and the Mapuas remained valid from its issuance since the judgment had not been satisfied,
nor has the writ been validly discharged either by the filing of a counterbond or for improper or irregular
issuance.

We likewise affirm the findings and conclusion of respondent court that the order of Judge Acosta, dated
May 29, 1986, suspending the writ of attachment was in essence a lifting of said writ which order, having
likewise been issued ex parte and without notice and hearing in disregard of Section 13 of Rule 57, could
not have resulted in the discharge of the attachment. Said attachment continued unaffected by the so-called
order or suspension and could not have been deemed inefficacious until and only by reason of its supposed
restoration in the order of December 16, 1987 of Judge Gerona. Under the facts of this case, the ex parte
discharge or suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly administration of justice and
nullifies the underlying role and purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the parties
pendente lite as an ancillary remedy.

We reject petitioners' theory that the preliminary attachment is not applicable to Eastman and the Mapuas.
The writ was issued in Civil Case No. 48849 against the properties of all the petitioners herein. Eastman
and the Mapuas moved for the discharge of the attachment on the ground that they were not disposing of
their properties in fraud of creditors, but they did not raise the issue of their liabilities as being allegedly
those of mere guarantors. They did so only when this Court resolved on October 27, 1986 that the writ of
preliminary attachment was issued in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence.

9|SANTIAGO, SARA ANDREA NINA P. | CIVIL PROCEDURE

 Question No. 03: Provide 3 case digests illustrative of instances warranting the appointment of a receiver.
G.R. No. L-24508 April 25, 1969
CENTRAL SAWMILLS, INC. vs. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., ET AL., ALTO SURETY &
INSURANCE CO.
FACTS This appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated October 4, 1960 in its Civil Case
No. 27374, entitled Central Sawmills, Inc. vs. Alto Surety & Insurance Co., et al., ordering the appointment
of a receiver of the properties of defendant-appellant Alto Surety & Insurance Company as well as from
the order denying the motion for reconsideration thereof was certified to this Court by the CA in a
resolution. That a decision was rendered in the above-entitled case in favor of plaintiff and against the
defendants, jointly and solidarily, one of which is the defendant Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.; that a
writ of execution was issued to enforce said judgment; that said writ of execution was returned by the
Sheriff of Manila unsatisfied. In view of the precarious financial condition of the company, it is required
that the stockholders of the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., put up within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of this letter, the amount of P747,709.04 in order to cover the impairment or deficit of an equal amount,
and to comply immediately with all the other requirements mentioned in the foregoing.
ISSUE Whether or not, in an action for the collection of a debt, where there is already a final and executory
judgment, the Court has the authority to appoint a receiver of the properties of the judgment debtor which
are not involved in the action, in aid of the execution of said judgement.
HELD The Court is also of the opinion that upon the facts shown in this record, it was the duty of the court to
appoint a receiver for the F. M Yaptico & Co., Ltd., to protect and preserve its property and assets for the
use and benefit of its creditors and, in particular, this petitioner, under the provisions of section 483 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The very fact that the judgments in question were rendered on October 19, 1927,
and that no part of them has yet been paid, and that F. M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd., has so far been able to
defeat the petitioner in the collection of its judgments, in a very strong and cogent reason why a receiver
should be appointed. It is the order of the court that a writ of mandamus be forthwith issued as prayed for
in the petition, and that the lower court at once appoint a receiver of all the property and assets of F. M.
Yaptico & Co., Ltd., and that petitioner have judgments for costs. With this precedent, it is obvious that
the order of receivership appealed from should be affirmed.

This specific citation naturally gave defendant-appellant cause to oppose the petition on the ground that
underline provision thus cited, the receivership contemplated is only that "of the property, real or personal,
which is the subject of the action." It was only in its memorandum, which is not included in the record on
appeal but mentioned only in the opposition to the motion for reconsideration of the order granting the
receivership (p. 50, Record on Appeal), that plaintiff-appellant must have referred the court a quo to other
provisions of the Rules, particularly, Section 2 of Rule 61 and Section 39 of Rule 39. Thus, as may be seen
from the above-quoted portions of its order of receivership, the said court, made reference to all the three
provisions which it said were "offered" or cited by the plaintiff-appellee, namely: Section 1 (d), Rule 61,
Section 2, Rule 61 and Section 39, Rule 39. Seemingly, the court a quo was uncertain as to which particular
one of these provisions was the proper basis of authority because it simply ruled that "after considering
the evidence and the argument adduced by the parties in relation to plaintiff's petition for receivership and
further considering the outstanding obligations of defendant corporation, the Court is of the opinion that
plaintiff's motion for receivership is well-taken and made no commitment as to which rule or provision it
was relying upon for its action.

It will be noted that in that case of Philippine Trust Co. vs. Santamaria, above-referred to, this Court cited
Section 483 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) in holding that "it was the duty of the court to appoint
a receiver for the F.M. Yaptico & Co., Ltd. to protect and preserve its property and assets for the use and
benefit of its creditors and, in particular, this petitioner."

10 | S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
 G.R. No. 111357 June 17, 1997
TRADERS ROYAL BANK
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and HEIRS OF THE LATE JOSE C. TAYENGCO
FACTS The factual aspects of this case have already been resolved by this Court in G.R. No. 63855,1 wherein we
ruled the deceased spouses Jose and Salvacion Tayengco to be the lawful owners of the properties under
receivership, and G.R. No. 60076,2 where we affirmed the validity of the appointment of petitioner Traders
Royal Bank (TRB) as receiver pendente lite. In view of these rulings, the receivership proceeding was duly
terminated. Thus, TRB rendered its final accounting of the funds under receivership wherein it retained
the amount of P219,016.24 as its receiver's fee, instead of turning over the entire fund to the Tayengcos.
The RTC of Iloilo, in an order dated July 5, 1988, approved the final accounting submitted by TRB,
including the deduction of its fee from the fund under receivership.

The Tayengcos assailed said order before the CA, contending that TRB's compensation should have been
charged against the losing party and not from the funds under receivership. In resolving this issue, the CA,
in its decision, ruled that TRB cannot deduct its fee from the funds under its receivership since this must
be shouldered by the losing party or equally apportioned among the parties-litigants. Consequently, TRB
was ordered to return the P219,016.24 to the Tayengcos, and the losing parties, Cu Bie, et al., were held
solely liable for TRB's compensation. TRB filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the
appellate court in its resolution.
ISSUE Whether the Court of Appeals decision is barred by res judicata by virtue of our ruling in G.R. No. 60076
recognizing the propriety of TRB's appointment as receiver.
HELD The elements of res judicata are: (1) The previous judgment has become final; (2) the prior judgment was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the matter and parties; (3) the first judgment was made on the
merits; and (4) there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action, as between the
prior and subsequent actions.8

The difference between the two causes of action is unmistakable. In G.R. No. 60076, the petition was for
the annulment of the trial court's order requiring Tayengco to render and submit an accounting of the rental
of the buildings and apartments, while C.A. G.R. CV No. 21423 was an appeal questioning the order of
the trial court authorizing the deduction by TRB of its compensation from the receivership funds. There is
clearly no identity of causes of action here. Clearly, the last element of res judicata is absent in the case at
bar.

Procedural obstacles aside, we now answer the principal query posed in the instant petition. Nobody
questions the right of TRB to receive compensation. Section 8, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court, however,
explicitly provides for the manner in which it shall be paid for its services, to wit:

Sec. 8. Termination of receivership; compensation of receiver.— Whenever the court, of its own motion
or on that of either party, shall determine that the necessity for a receiver no longer exists, it shall, after
due notice to all interested parties and hearing, settle the accounts of the receiver, direct the delivery of
the funds and other property in his hands to the persons adjudged entitled to receive them, and order
the discharge of the receiver from further duty as such. The court shall allow the receiver such
reasonable compensation as the circumstances of the case warrant, to be taxed as costs against the
defeated party, or apportioned, as justice requires.

It is, therefore, clear that when the services of a receiver who has been properly appointed terminates, his
compensation is to be charged against the defeated party, or the prevailing litigant may be made to share
the expense, as justice requires. Consequently, the trial court's order approving TRB's compensation to be
charged solely against the funds under its receivership is without legal justification; hence, it was correctly
reversed by the Court of Appeals.

11 | S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
 G.R. No. 45606 September 4, 1937
PHILIPPINE MOTOR ALCOHOL CORPORATION and CARLOS PALANCA
v.
EMILIO MAPA, Judge of First Instance of Manila, C. M. HUDSON and J. E. BERKENKOTTER
FACTS Immediately after the presentation and filing of said complaint, the respondent Judge Emilio Mapa, without
notice to the defendants, issued ex parte an order appointing the respondent J. E. Berkenkotter receiver of
the property of the petitioner Philippine Motor Alcohol Corporation; that said order appointing J. E.
Berkenkotter receiver was served on the petitioners on the afternoon of June 15, 1937 and that on the
following day, they filed a motion for the suspension and dissolution of said order; that the said motion to
suspend and dissolve the order of June 14, 1937 was denied by the respondent judge, Emilio Mapa. The
validity of the order is challenged by the petitioners on the following grounds: (1) That the said order was
issued without notice to the defendants in civil case No. 51448 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
who are petitioners herein, and without alleging any reason for summary ex parte action; (2) that the
complaint upon which the order was issued states no ground for the appointment of a receiver, either with
or without notice; (3) that the complaint alleges that the payment of the claim of the plaintiff Hudson
against the petitioner, Philippine Motor Alcohol Corporation, is guaranteed by the petitioner Carlos
Palanca and thereby shows on its face that the said Hudson has another safe, speedy and adequate remedy
for the collection of said claim; (4) that the complaint upon which the order appointing a receiver was
issued does not show that the plaintiff therein had any interest in the property to be placed under
receivership.
ISSUE Whether the appointment of the trial court for a receiver is warranted.
HELD Authority, however, for the issuance of said order seems clear from the provisions of section 177 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to wit: "If a receiver be appointed upon an ex parte application, the court,
before making the order, may require from the plaintiff or person filing the application for such
appointment, an obligation with sufficient sureties, to be approved by the court, in an amount to be fixed
by the court, to the effect that the applicant will pay to the defendant in the application all damages he
may sustain by reason of the appointment of such receiver and the entry by him upon his duties, in case
the applicant shall have procured such appointment without sufficient cause; and the court may, in its
discretion, at any time after the appointment, require an additional obligation as further security fir
such damages, if any, shall be ascertained by the court and, in its final judgment in the action, shall be
decreed against the plaintiff and the sureties on the obligation." It is necessary and legitimate inference
from the opening statement of this section that an order of receivership may be issued by the court ex parte
upon proper showing in appropriate cases.

We agree with the suggestions of counsel for the petitioners that the appointment of a receiver, because of
its drastic nature and of its character as a special remedy under our Code of Civil Procedure, is a power
which should be exercised with great caution. But this does not argue against the existence of the power
of the court to appoint a receiver where the necessity therefor has arisen. In such a case, the appointment
of a receiver is a matter resting largely in the discretion of the trial court. Upon the other hand, it is not
disputed that after the appointment ex parte of the receiver in the present case arguments both written and
oral were presented and the defendants in civil case No. 51448 who are petitioners herein made a credible
effort to set aside the order issued by the trial court appointing a receiver. These arguments appear to have
been carefully weighed by the respondent judge who thereafter, in an order of June 28, 1937, virtually
reaffirmed his order of receivership. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the trial judge acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or that the order of June 13, 1937 issued by him is otherwise illegal for
lack of notice to or hearing of the parties.

12 | S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
 Question No. 04: Provide case digests illustrative of instances when the writ of replevin was denied issuance.
G.R. No. 205998 April 24, 2017
WILLIAM ANGIDAN SIY vs. ALVIN TOMLIN
FACTS Petitioner William Anghian Siy filed before the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with Prayer
for Replevin against Ong, Centeno, Chua, and herein respondent Alvin Tomlin. Petitioner alleged that he
is the owner of a 2007 model Range Rover with Plate Number ZMG 272 which he purchased from Lopez
on July 22, 2009; that in 2010, he entrusted the said vehicle to Ong, a businessman who owned a second-
hand car sales showroom, after the latter claimed that he had a prospective buyer therefor; that Ong failed
to remit the proceeds of the purported sale nor return the vehicle; that petitioner later found out that the
vehicle had been transferred to Chua; that in December, 2010, petitioner filed a complaint before the
Quezon City Police District's Anti-Carnapping Section; that Ong, upon learning of the complaint, met with
petitioner to arrange the return of the vehicle; that Ong still failed to surrender the vehicle; that petitioner
learned that the vehicle was being transferred to respondent; and that the vehicle was later impounded and
taken into custody by the PNP-Highway Patrol Group (HPG) at Camp Crame, Quezon City after
respondent attempted to process a PNP clearance of the vehicle with a view to transferring ownership
thereof. Petitioner thus prayed that a writ of replevin be issued for the return of the vehicle to him, and that
the defendants be ordered to pay him ₱100,000.00 atton1ey's fees and the costs of suit.

RTC: Issued a Writ of Replevin in favor of plaintiff.

CA: Reversed RTC decision.
ISSUE Whether the trial court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the coiv1plaint for recovery of
possession with prayer for replevin.
HELD In a complaint for replevin, the claimant must convincingly show that he is either the owner or clearly
entitled to the possession of the object sought to be recovered, and that the defendant, who is in actual or
legal possession thereof, wrongfully detains the same. Rule 60 allows a plaintiff, in an action for the
recovery of possession of personal property, to apply for a writ of replevin if it can be shown that he is 'the
owner of the property claimed ... or is entitled to the possession thereof.’ The plaintiff need not be the
owner so long as he is able to specify his right to the possession of the property and his legal basis therefor.

Considering that he was no longer the owner or rightful possessor of the subject vehicle at the time he filed
Civil Case No. Q-11-69644 in July, 2011, petitioner may not seek a return of the same through replevin.
Quite the contrary, respondent, who obtained the vehicle from Chua and registered the transfer with the
Land Transportation Office, is the rightful owner thereof, and as such, he is entitled to its possession. For
this reason, the CA was correct in decreeing the dismissal of Civil Case No. Q-11-69644, although it e1red
in ordering the return of the vehicle to the PNP-HPG, which had no further right to hold the vehicle in its
custody. As the registered and rightful owner of the subject vehicle, the trial court must return the same to
respondent.

In many cases as well, busy vehicle owners selling their vehicles actually leave them, together with all the
documents of title, spare keys, and deeds of sale signed in blank, with second-hand car traders they know
and trust, in order for the latter to display these vehicles for actual viewing and inspection by prospective
buyers at their lots, warehouses, garages, or showrooms, and to enable the traders to facilitate sales on-
the-spot, as-is-where-is, without having to inconvenience the owners with random viewings and
inspections of their vehicles. For this kind of arrangement, an agency relationship is created between the
vehicle owners, as principals, and the car traders, as agents. The situation is akin to an owner of jewelry
who sells the same through an agent, who receives the jewelry in trust and offers it for sale to his/her
regular clients; if a sale is made, the agent takes payment under the obligation to remit the same to the
jewelry owner, minus the agreed commission or other compensation.

13 | S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
 G.R. No. 182963 June 3, 2013
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
FACTS Petitioner spouses Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel Mortgage in
favor of Citimotors, Inc. Citimotors, Inc. assigned all its rights, title and interests in the Promissory Note
with Chattel Mortgage to ABN AMRO Savings Bank, Inc., which likewise assigned the same to
respondent BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. Respondent sent to petitioners a demand letter declaring the
entire obligation as due and demandable and requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender the mortgaged
vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. As the demand was left unheeded, respondent filed an action
for Replevin and Damages before the Manila RTC. A writ of replevin was issued. Despite this, the subject
vehicle was not seized. Trial on the merits ensued. Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals
(CA), but the CA affirmed the lower court’s decision and, subsequently, denied the motion for
reconsideration; hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection of sum of money is
contrary to the provision of Article 1484.
HELD Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never recovered and delivered to
respondent despite the issuance of a writ of replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be
said that petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged vehicle or that respondent
pursued, commenced or concluded its actual foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the
alternative prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting fulfillment of the
obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or unjust enrichment to speak of.

The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The exercise of one bars the
exercise of the others. This limitation applies to contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with
option to buy by virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of possession or
enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485 was fulfilled in this case by the filing by
petitioner of the complaint for replevin to recover possession of movable property. By virtue of the writ of
seizure issued by the trial court, the deputy sheriff seized the vehicle on August 6, 1986 and thereby
deprived private respondents of its use. The car was not returned to private respondent until April 16, 1989,
after two (2) years and eight (8) months, upon issuance by the Court of Appeals of a writ of execution.

Petitioner prayed that private respondents be made to pay the sum of ₱39,054.86, the amount that they
were supposed to pay as of May 1986, plus interest at the legal rate. At the same time, it prayed for the
issuance of a writ of replevin or the delivery to it of the motor vehicle "complete

with accessories and equipment." In the event the car could not be delivered to petitioner, it was prayed
that private respondent Rolando Lantan be made to pay petitioner the amount of ₱60,000.00, the "estimated
actual value" of the car, "plus accrued monthly rentals thereof with interests at the rate of fourteen percent
(14%) per annum until fully paid." This prayer of course cannot be granted, even assuming that private
respondents have defaulted in the payment of their obligation. This led the trial court to say that petitioner
wanted to eat its cake and have it too.

14 | S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
Question No. 05: Discuss fully and illustrate thru 3 case digests, the last ground for the issuance of a writ
of attachment (subsection f) and its relation to accions en personam, accions quasi in rem and
extraterritorial service of summons.
RULE 57
PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT
Section 1. Grounds upon which attachment may issue. – At the commencement of the action or at any
time before entry of judgment, a plaintiff or any proper party may have the property of the adverse party attached
as security for the satisfaction of any judgment that may be recovered in the following cases:
(f) In an action against a party who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or on whom summons
may be served by publication. (1a)
Discussion:
By its nature, preliminary attachment is an ancillary remedy applied for, not for its own sake, but to enable the
attaching party to realize upon the relief sought and expected to be granted in the main or principal action.
Requisites for a Preliminary Attachment to issue:
1. The case must be any of those where preliminary attachment is proper;
2. The applicant must file a motion whether ex parte or with notice and hearing;
3. The applicant must show by affidavit that there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced
and that the amount claimed in the action is as much as the sum of which the order is granted above all
counterclaims;
a. A sufficient cause of action exists;
b. The cause is one of those mentioned in Section 1;
c. There is no other sufficient security for the claim sought to be enforced by the action; and
d. Th amount due the applicant, or the value of the property the possession of which he is entitled to
recover, is as much as the sum for which the order is granted above all legal consequences.
4. The applicant must post a bond executed to the adverse party.
Whether in rem or quasi in rem, the legal effects are identical because in both cases, jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant is not required as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. It does not affect the decision
on the merits; the right to recover judgement on the alleged indebtedness and the right to attach the property of
the debtor are entirely separate and distinct. As a rule, the judgment in the main action neither changes the nature
nor determines the validity of the attachment.
In actions against non-residents not found in the Philippines, or on whom Summons is served by the
publication, ROC, Rule 14, Sec. 14 expressly states that it applies in any action where the defendant is
designated as an unknown owner, or the like, whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, with leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation: thus, the present rule now applies to any action, whether in personam, in
rem or quasi in rem.
Here, the attachment is intended to enable the court to acquire in jurisdiction over the res by converting the action
in personam to an action quasi in rem; and thus, justifying the summons by publication. Thus, in case the
whereabouts of the defendant in an action for recovery of sum of money, which is an action in personam, cannot
be ascertained with diligent inquiry, service of summons may, with leave of court, be effected upon him by
publication, by publication of the summons, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant and may proceed with hearing the case whether or not the defendant makes an appearance by filing an
answer or a motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the court may render judgment and execution may issue against all the
properties of the defendant situated in the Philippines.
An action in personam is converted to an action in rem or quasi in rem with the issuance of a writ of attachment
where the defendant does not appear, the action is converted back to in personam where he appears.

15 | S A N T I A G O , S A R A A N D R E A N I N A P . | C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
 G.R. No. 161417 February 8, 2007
MA. TERESA CHAVES BIACO vs. PHILIPPINE COUNTRYSIDE RURAL BANK
FACTS Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager, Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent
bank. As security for the payment of the said loans, Ernesto executed a real estate mortgage in favor of the
bank covering the parcel of land which the real estate mortgages bore the signatures of the spouses Biaco.
When Ernesto failed to settle the above-mentioned loans on its due date, respondent bank through counsel
sent him a written demand, however, proved futile.

Respondent bank filed a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage against the spouses Ernesto and Teresa
Biaco before the RTC of Misamis Oriental. Summons was served to the spouses Biaco through Ernesto at
his office (Export and Industry Bank). The RTC ruled against them; a writ of execution was served on the
spouses. Petitioner sought the annulment of the Regional Trial Court decision contending, among others,
that the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction because summons were served on her through her husband
without any explanation as to why personal service could not be made. The CA affirmed RTC decision
invoking that judicial foreclosure proceedings are actions quasi in rem. As such, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential as long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.
ISSUE Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner.
HELD No. The Court ruled that validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the
court acquires jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (1) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (2) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective.

In this case, the judicial foreclosure proceeding instituted by respondent PCRB undoubtedly vested the
trial court with jurisdiction over the res. A judicial foreclosure proceeding is an action quasi in rem. As
such, jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is not required, it being sufficient that the trial court is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.

A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case, must be
personally served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If she cannot be
personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (1) by
leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
then residing therein, or (2) by leaving the copies at defendant’s office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action in rem
is an action against the thing itself instead of against the person. An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property.

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 G.R. No. 170943 September 23, 2008
PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. vs. PNOC EXPLORATION CORPORATION
FACTS PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against petitioner Pedro
Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the petitioner’s unpaid balance of
the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors. Personal
service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be located in his last
known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on respondent’s motion, the trial court
allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate,
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of
publication and the affidavit of service of respondent’s employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the
summons by registered mail to petitioner’s last known address. Petitioner still failed to answer within the
prescribed period despite the publication of summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception
of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and
formal offer of its evidence.

Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging that the
affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules
did not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioner’s answer
because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition
for certiorari contending that the court committed grave abuse of discretion since it has no jurisdiction due
to improper service of summons, failure to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes and
upholding technicality over equity and justice.
ISSUE Whether or not there was a failure on the part of the trial court to furnish Petitioner with copies of orders
and processes issued in the course of the proceedings.
HELD No, Santos failed to file an answer in time, which is why he had to file an Omnibus Motion to Admit
Attached Answer. The disputed order of September 11, 2003 was a finding that the Santos was in default
for failure to file an answer or pleading within the period fixed. It is illogical to notify him of the order
simply on account of the reality that he was no longer residing and/or found on his last known address and
his whereabouts unknown thus the publication of summons. Santos could not reasonably demand that
copies of orders and processes be furnished him. His residence or whereabouts is not known and he cannot
be located. In the case at bar, there is obviously no way notice can be sent to him and the notice requirement
cannot apply to him. The law does not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossible.
The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be interpreted in a way that they
are in accordance with logic, common sense, reason and practicability. Be that as it may, a copy of the
September 11, 2003 order was still mailed to him at his last known address but it was unclaimed.

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 G.R. No. 92813 July 31, 1991
PEROXIDE PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, EASTMAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES, INC., EDMUNDO
O. MAPUA and ROSE U. MAPUA
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
FACTS Private respondent BPI sued herein petitioners in a civil case of then CFI of Pasig, Metro Manila for the
collection of an indebtedness of Peroxide wherein Eastman and the Mapuas bound themselves to be
solidarily liable. Upon the filing of said action, the trial court, then presided over by Judge Gregorio G.
Pineda, ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment after BPI filed an attachment bond in the
amount of P32,700,000.00. Petitioners' properties were accordingly attached by the sheriff. Eastman and
the Mapuas moved to lift the attachment, which motion was set for hearing. On said date and on motion
of BPI, it was granted to file a written opposition to the motion to lift the writ of attachment. BPI also filed
a motion to set for hearing the said motion to lift attachment and its opposition thereto. Judge Reyes issued
an order with an explicit finding that the attachment against the properties of Eastman and the Mapuas was
proper on the ground that they had disposed of their properties in fraud of BPI. It also directed the sheriff
to implement the writ of attachment upon the finality of said order.
ISSUE Whether the Writ of Preliminary Attachment is valid.
HELD As correctly formulated by respondent court, the threshold issue is the validity of the attachment of the
properties of Eastman and the Mapuas, from which arises the correlative question of whether or not the
disputed cash dividends on the garnished shares of stock are likewise subject thereto. Necessarily involved
is the matter of the continuing validity of the writ or whether or not the same was validly lifted and
suspended by the lower court's orders dated January 17, 1983 and May 29, 1986, respectively. Respondent
court was, therefore, correct in holding that, on the above-stated premises, the attachment of the properties
of Eastman and the Mapuas remained valid from its issuance since the judgment had not been satisfied,
nor has the writ been validly discharged either by the filing of a counterbond or for improper or irregular
issuance.

We likewise affirm the findings and conclusion of respondent court that the order of Judge Acosta, dated
May 29, 1986, suspending the writ of attachment was in essence a lifting of said writ which order, having
likewise been issued ex parte and without notice and hearing in disregard of Section 13 of Rule 57, could
not have resulted in the discharge of the attachment. Said attachment continued unaffected by the so-called
order or suspension and could not have been deemed inefficacious until and only by reason of its supposed
restoration in the order of December 16, 1987 of Judge Gerona. Under the facts of this case, the ex parte
discharge or suspension of the attachment is a disservice to the orderly administration of justice and
nullifies the underlying role and purpose of preliminary attachment in preserving the rights of the parties
pendente lite as an ancillary remedy.

We reject petitioners' theory that the preliminary attachment is not applicable to Eastman and the Mapuas.
The writ was issued in Civil Case No. 48849 against the properties of all the petitioners herein. Eastman
and the Mapuas moved for the discharge of the attachment on the ground that they were not disposing of
their properties in fraud of creditors, but they did not raise the issue of their liabilities as being allegedly
those of mere guarantors. They did so only when this Court resolved on October 27, 1986 that the writ of
preliminary attachment was issued in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence.

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