Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No.

63915, December 29, 1986

DOCTRINE:

1. Issuances internal in nature need not be published.

2. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers not to the requirement of
publication but for the length of time of publication. Publication is
indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
3. Publication of laws is an element of due process.
4. Interpretative regulations need not be published.
5. All statutes must be published, including those which are local or private in
application.
6. Administrative rules and regulations enforcing existing laws must be
published.
7. Charters of cities must be published.
8. Circulars intended to fill in details of acts passed by Congress must be
published.
9. Publication must be full or there is no publication at all.
10. All issuances punitive in nature must be published.

FACTS:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a

number of presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as
required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. 

In the decision of this case, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of
some of these decrees and ordered the respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances of general application, and unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The Solicitor General claimed that the motion was a request for an advisory
opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case
the subject decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not
binding. This elicited a Reply refuting these arguments. 

The February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court. In response, the latter submitted that issuances intended only for
the interval administration of a government agency or for particular persons did
not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
the Official Gazette; and that the decision under reconsideration was not binding
because it was not supported by eight members of the Court. 

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication."crcr

ISSUE: Whether or not publication affects the validity of the executive issuances

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish the Executive
Issuances of general application, and further stated that failure of publication
would render the issuances of no binding force and effect.

Such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as

ignorantia legis non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would create injustice as
would it would punish the citizen for transgression of the law which he had no
notice of.

The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without
publication would be inoperative and null and void. However, some justices in
their concurring opinions made a qualification stating that publication is not an
absolute requirement. As Justice Fernando stated, publication is needed but it
must not only be confined to the Official Gazette because it would make those
other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft of any binding force or
effect.

Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp, G.R. No. 173918 : April 8,

2008

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: The Office of Energy Affairs (OEA) informed Pilipinas Shell that the
latter’s contributions to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) were insufficient.
As a consequence, a surcharge was imposed upon Pilipinas Shell. The surcharge
was imposed pursuant to  a Department of Finance circular. Pilipinas Shell
challenged this and refused to pay the surcharges, claiming the payments it made
were based on a valid interpretation of a Department of Finance Order and
Department of Energy Circular. However, the DOE only reiterated its demand for
Pilipinas Shell to settle the surcharges due. The Office of the President affirmed
the DOE; however, CA reversed the decision, ruling that the Department of
Finance circular was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file
with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR). SC affirmed CA.

ISSUE: W/N the Department of Finance circular complied with the requirements
for publication and filing

RULING: CA affirmed. The Department of Finance Circular is ineffective.

Tañada v. Tuvera – All statutes shall be published as a condition for their

effectivity. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever
delegated by the legislature/ Constitution. Administrative regulations must also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also
to a valid delegation. 

Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7, Administrative Code of 1987 –  Rules in force on the

date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three months from the
date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.

As per the Tañada ruling, the Department of Finance Circular is one of those
issuances which should have been published before becoming effective since it is
intended to enforce PD 1956. The circular should also comply with the
requirement under Sec. 3, Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code –  filing
with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center – for rules that are
already in force at the time the Administrative Code became effective. These
requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against
abuses on the part of lawmakers, and as guarantees to the constitutional right to
due process and information on matters of public concerns, and therefore, require
strict compliance. 

Here, the Certifications prove that the Department of Finance Circular and its
amendatory rule have not been filed before said office. Moreover, the Department
of Energy was unable to controvert Pilipinas Shell’s allegation that neither of the
circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing
render the Department of Finance Circular ineffective. 

National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy v. Energy

Regulatory Board –  Both the requirements of publication and filing of
administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for the
effectivity of and for the effectivity of said issuances. The Department of Energy
insists that the registration of the Department of Finance Circular with the ONAR
is no longer necessary since Pilipinas Shell knew of its existence, despite its non-
registration. However, strict compliance with the requirements of publication
cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the
existence of the implementing rules. In National Association of Electricity
Consumers for Reforms, the Court ruled that the fact that the parties participated
in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not
compliance with the rule. 

The Department of Energy avers that Energy avers that the Department of the
Department of Finance Finance Circular gains its vitality from the subsequent
enactment of an Executive Order which reiterates the power of the Secretary of
Finance to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the
Executive Order. However, the power of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate
rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue is the infectivity of his
administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and
filing.

Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes, 518 Phil. 668 (2006)

DOCTRINE: A public office is defined as the right, authority and duty, created
and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some portion
of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the benefit of
the public.

FACTS:
    The Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a corporate body organized
under Republic Act No. 2640 and duly registered with the SEC.  In 2002, the
Department of National Defense (DND) Undersecretary for Civil Relations and
Administration Edgardo Batenga was tasked by DND Secretary Angelo Reyes to
conduct an extensive management audit of the records of VFP.
    The Secretary General of the VFP sent a letter complaining about the alleged
broadness of the scope of the management audit and requesting the suspension
thereof until specific areas of the audit have been agreed upon. The request was
denied by Batenga on the ground that a specific time frame had already been set
for the activity. Thus, the VFP filed this petition for certiorari, its main claim being
that it is a non-government corporation and its funds are not public funds.

ISSUE: 

    W/N VFP is a private non-government corporation

RULING:
    No. The court ruled that VFP is, in fact, a public corporation, pointing out the
following facts:

1. Rep. Act No. 2640 is titled "An Act to Create a Public Corporation to be
 Known as the Veterans Federation of the Philippines, Defining its Powers,
and for Other Purposes."
2. The VFP is required to submit annual reports of its proceedings for the past
year, including a full, complete and itemized report of receipts and
expenditures of whatever kind, to the President of the Philippines or to the
Secretary of National Defense.
3. Under Executive Order No. 37, the VFP was listed among the GOCCs that
will not be privatized.
4. In Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC, the SC held that
the "VFP is an adjunct of the government, as it is merely an incarnation of
the Veterans Federation of the Philippines.

     In Laurel v. Desierto, a public office is defined as the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised for the
benefit of the public.
In this case, the functions of VFP – the protection of the interests of war
veterans which promotes social justice and reward patriotism – certainly fall
within the category of sovereign functions.  The fact that VFP has no budgetary
appropriation is only a product of erroneous application of the law by public
officers in the Department of Budget and Management which will not bar
subsequent correct application. Hence, placing it under the control and
supervision of DND is proper.

Manila Public School Teachers’ Association (MPSTA) v. Garcia, et al., G.R.

192708, October 2, 2017
DOCTRINE:

 All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders

promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations
must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published.
 How do we know whether an administrative regulation is no longer a mere
innocuous “interpretative regulation” or “merely internal in nature” that will
not require any publication?
 When an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means
that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the
law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance
to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance
is given the force and effect of law.
 
Facts:
 In 1936 - a government service insurance system was created by virtue of
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186 in order to promote the efficiency and
welfare of the employees of the government of the Philippines
 In 1977 - President Marcos approved Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1146
amending, expanding, increasing, and integrating the social security and
insurance benefits of government employees and facilitating the payment
thereof under C.A. 186.
 More than 20 years later, P.D. 1146 was amended, and R.A. 8291, or the
"The GSIS Act of 1997," took effect. Under this Act, the employee-member
and the employer-agency are required by law to pay monthly contributions
to the system.
 One of the changes made in R.A. 8291 was the increase in the employer's
contribution from 9.5% to 12%. However, there was no concomitant
increase in the budget appropriation. As a result, DepEd was unable to pay
GSIS the equivalent of the 2.5% increase in the employer's share.
 DepEd incurred premium deficiencies totalling P6,923,369,633.15 from 1
July 1997 to 31 December 2010
 GSIS issued the assailed Resolutions:
1. Resolution No. 238 - In 2002, the GSIS Board introduced CLIP, by
which the arrears incurred by members from their overdue loans are
deducted from the proceeds of their new loan or retirement benefits.
2. Resolution No. 90 - In 2003, the GSIS Board adopted the PBP
whereby for the purpose of computing GSIS benefits, the creditable
service of a member is determined by the corresponding monthly
premium contributions that were timely and correctly remitted or
paid to GSIS.
3.  Resolution No. 179 - In 2007, the GSIS Board approved the APL,
which is "a feature of a GSIS life insurance policy that keeps the
policy in force in case of nonpayment of premiums by taking out a
loan amount against the unrestricted portion of the policy's
accumulated cash value (CV) or the termination value (TV)” until the
total APL and policy loan balances exceed the CV of the Life
Endowment Policy or the TV of the Enhanced Life Policy.
 
 These Resolutions were not published in a newspaper of general
circulation and were enforced before they were even filed with the
Office of the National Administrative Register.
 Petitioners seek to nullify the resolutions for being "intrinsically
unconstitutional, illegal, unjust, oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory,
immoral, ultra vires, and unconscionable."
 In response to the alleged "chronic" non-remittance of premium
contributions resulting in premium deficiencies based on the GSIS records
of creditable service, the DBM, DepEd, and the GSIS executed a MOA on 11
September 2012.  The following terms and conditions were agreed upon:
a.    The DBM will settle the government share in the premium
arrearages of DepEd
b.    The GSIS will condone, in its entirety, the interests due on the
aforesaid premium deficiencies
c.    Upon release of the advance payment, the GSIS will lift the
suspension of loan privileges and other benefits applicable to the
covered DepEd personnel and make the proportionate adjustment in
their records of creditable service.
 Petitioners asserted that regardless of the execution of the MOA, the
Resolutions must still be nullified, because "most of the initiatives
described in the GSIS Manifestation appeared to be merely operational
which do not amend, modify, or reverse any of the GSIS policies, and
which are thus still in place. Moreover, the MOA refers only to the DepEd,
one of the many agency-employers in the government, without "similar
reported endeavours to address the internal arrangements between the
GSIS and the rest of the agency-employers in the Government."
 Aside from seeking the nullification of the Resolutions, petitioners are also
praying that this Court order respondent GSIS to 1) restore the creditable
service of all GSIS members (not just teachers), reckoned simply from the
date of their respective original appointments or elections; 2) compute and
grant the creditable service, benefits, and claims of GSIS members based
on their periods of service and regardless of any deficiency in the GS; 3)
account the automatic deduction of the PS from their salaries as conclusive
compliance with their obligation of premium share payments, and thus
entitle them to their full benefits and claims, regardless of the remittance
thereof by the agency-employer to the GSIS; and 4) accept as proof of
employee premium share payment and loan repayment the pay slips of the
employees and/or remittance lists or certifications from the agency
employer, or other proof of payment as may be provided by the employee
and/or the agency; and to update the employee's service records using
these documents. Petitioners are also asking to order the refund to GSIS
members of those amounts that were deducted from their claims and
benefits arising from the implementation of the PBP, APL, and CLIP, with
interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum from the time of withholding of
each of those amounts
 GSIS filed the copies of the resolutions with the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar (ONAR) only after the affected government
employees began lodging their claims. These resolutions were not
published in either the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
 circulation.
 GSIS claimed the publication of the resolutions was not necessary because
the policies were “just a mere reiteration of the time-honored principles of
insurance law,” including Republic Act (RA) Number 8291.
ISSUE: W/n the policies are invalid due to lack of publication.
RULING: Yes
 Tañada v. Tuvera already laid down a definitive interpretation of Article
2[38] of the Civil Code. We hold therefore that all statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
 Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that
is. regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and
not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
 

 After Tañada, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section
3(1) of Chapter 2, Book VII, specifically providing that:

Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in
force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.

 In Republic v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., this Court held that the
requirements of publication and filing must be strictly complied with, as
these were designed to safeguard against abuses on the part of
lawmakers and to guarantee the constitutional right to due process
and to information on matters of public concern. Even in cases where
the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their
respective comments, strict compliance with the requirement of publication
cannot be dispensed with.
 
 While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions with the Office of the
 National Administrative Register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of
the retirees and beneficiaries had already been lodged. The resolutions
were not published in either the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation in the country.
 
 According to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes,
interpretative regulations that do not add anything to the law or affect
substantial rights of any person do not entail publication. This is because
"they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed." However, "when xxx an administrative rule goes
beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render
least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially
adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the
agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be
heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new
issuance is given the force and effect of law.”
 
 In this case, the resolutions additionally obligate member-employees to
ensure that their employer-agency includes the GS in the budget, deducts
the PS, as well as loan amortizations, and timely remits them; and that the
GSIS receives, processes, and posts the payments. These processes are
beyond the control of the employees; yet they are being made to bear the
consequences of any misstep or delay by either their agency or GSIS.
 
 In the present case, the resolutions effectively diminish, and in some
instances, even absolutely deprive retirees of their retirement benefits -
albeit "momentarily," as GSIS claims - when these were meant as their
reward for giving the best years of their lives in the service of their
country.
Issues: W/N the court can intrude into the operational processes of
respondents.
Ruling:
NO, the Court is not in a position to intrude into the operational processes of
respondents, which are under the control of the executive department. We are
constrained to refrain from intruding upon purely executive and administrative
matters, which are properly within the purview of other branches of government.
The prayer to order the department to procure the appropriation in the national
budget of the amounts needed to keep the employer's premium share
contributions current must be denied on the ground of mootness. Petitioners do
not dispute that DepEd executed a MOA with the DBM on 11 September 2012 for
the settlement of premium deficiencies pertaining to the government share
On a last note, we forward the concerns of petitioners to Congress, which holds
the power of the purse, for its consideration to fund the payment of premium
deficiencies pertaining to the PS for the same period, July 1997 to 31 December
2010. We refer to those amounts that had been deducted from the salaries of the
employees but remain unremitted by their respective agencies.
We likewise forward a copy of this Decision to the Ombudsman for consideration
to file the appropriate cases against the officials and persons responsible for the
non-remittance or delayed remittance of premiums and loan repayment.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. GSIS Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179,
which respectively embody the Claims and Loans Interdependency
Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic Policy Loan and Policy
Lapse, are declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.

Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v. Secretary of Labor and

Employment, GR 103144, 4 April 2001, 356 SCRA 174

DOCTRINE:

1. Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own
initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the
suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement
agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. As such, even
without a written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can
initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency
and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the
corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the
POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee relationship
case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions
if, in the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment
regulations are uncovered It is thus clear that even if recruitment
violations were not included in a complaint for money claims
initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may
still take cognizance of the same and impose administrative
sanctions if the evidence so warrants.
2. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations,
those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
3. The validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld
despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a
particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also
the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. As
such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the
exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing
 with instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate
regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which
does not obtain in the case at bench.

FACTS:

Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation

(hereinafter referred to as "Philsa") is a domestic corporation engaged in
the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in
January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the
amount of P5,000.00 for private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and
P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P.
Leyson.

After the execution of their respective work contracts, private

respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began
work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.

While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a

second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed some of the
provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of
their benefits and privileges. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer
allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work
hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week without any corresponding
increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this
third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by
Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines.

Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from

petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for the payment
of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When
petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner
Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan. 

ISSUE:

I.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE
CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.

II.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN PENALIZING
PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN THE PREMISES, THE
CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND
CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' EMPLOYMENT

III.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF
SALARIES. FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY ABSOLVED
PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.

RULING:

The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents

placement fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of
fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine.
As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported
by substantial evidence. 

Court have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that
the ruling of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal
exaction is supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial
evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized
representative of petitioner which show the payment of amounts in
excess of those allowed by the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not
present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private
respondents despite the many opportunities for them to do so.

POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be

declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the
National Administrative Register.

POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the

applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for private
employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the
maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino
overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued
in compliance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Labor Code which
provides, as follows:
"Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. - Any person applying with a
private fee-charging employment agency for employment assistance
shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through
its efforts or has actually commenced employment. Such fee shall be
always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount
paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable
fees." (italics supplied)

It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one

of those issuances which should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of
administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) of the Labor
Code.

The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were
never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of
the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said
Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioner's violation of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the
imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore,
even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said provisions
of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes
the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor
and Employment. Considering that, as previously discussed,
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule
of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the
administrative sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI,
Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, "(r)ules in force
on the date of the effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three
(3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party or persons." Considering that POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the National
Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as basis for the
imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.

The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned
administrative circular is not among those requiring publication
contemplated by Tañada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific
group of persons and not to the general public.

Again, there is no merit in this argument.

The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group,
namely private employment agencies or authority holders, does not take
it away from the ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case of
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres the administrative
circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group,
namely Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of
workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of
proper publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.

Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical.

Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is
to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The
only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these
exceptions.

In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs.
Commissioner of Customs is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of
certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of
publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons, the
customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly
fall under one of the exceptions to the publication requirement, namely
those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior to a
subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance
which does not obtain in the case at bench.

II. petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA
regarding the two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a
question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by
substantial evidence. A reading of the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA
shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2) counts
of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial evidence.
Thus:

"2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of

substitution in the first count. The first contract was duly approved by
the Administration and, therefore, the parties are bound by the terms
and condition thereof until its expiration. The mere intention of
respondents to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a
corresponding increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as
approved by the Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the
amendment is evidently contrary to law, morals, good customs and
public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of the
Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the proposed
salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus
may just have been a ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid
at the increased rate.

As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was

emphatically intended by respondent to be signed by complainants
which, however, was not consummated due to the adamant refusal of
complainants to sign thereon. Mere intention of the respondent to
commit contract substitution for a second time should not be left
unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts by teaching
agencies a lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation." 

III.

Petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of

discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding
of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already
absolved petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its argument on
the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving it from
private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already
attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents'
petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by the Supreme Court.

Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the
NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only
with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-
employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the
payment of the said money claims that petitioner is absolved. The
administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money
claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the
POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with
the money claims of private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office
precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is
without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment
violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate Order." 

The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent

de Mesa's claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the
said money claim was not raised in the complaint. While there may be
questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the said
NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But
the fact that the claim for salary deduction was not raised by private
respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding
petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a
ground for the suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license.

Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative,
may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation
of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds
mentioned therein. As such, even without a written complaint from an
aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring
private placement agency and, if the result of its investigation so
warrants, impose the corresponding administrative sanction thereof.
Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee
relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative
sanctions if, in the course of its investigation, violations of recruitment
regulations are uncovered It is thus clear that even if recruitment
violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by
a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take
cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the
evidence so warrants.

As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for
the payment of the money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not
mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which
may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or withholding of
private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of
discretion in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of
unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.

To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of

illegal exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for
lack of publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA and the
Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held
administratively liable for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one
(1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.

Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the

penalty for each count of contract substitution is suspension of license
for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for
withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for
two (2) months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than
P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both instances Applying the
said schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner should be
suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to
pay fine in the amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the
amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as
restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.
Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc., 373 SCRA 316, Jan. 15, 2002

DOCTRINE:

In the regulatory telecommunications industry, the National

Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to issue
Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN) for the
installation operation, and maintenance of communications facilities and
services, radio communications systems, telephone and telegraph
systems.

FACTS:

International Communication Corporation (Bayantel) filed an application

with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN)
to install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone
System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a Provisional Authority (PA).
Shortly thereafter the NTC issued directing all interested applicants for
nationwide or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before
the Commission and prior to the issuance of any notice of hearing by the
NTC with respect to Bayantel’s original application, Bayantel filed an
urgent ex-parte motion to admit an amended application. the notice of
hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended application was
published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the
notice of hearing were mailed to all affected parties. 

Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But

before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC
grant of two (2) separate Provisional which resulted in the closing out of
all available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein
applicant, and in order that this case may not remain pending for an
indefinite period of time, ordered ARCHIVED without prejudice to its
reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available.
NTC issued Memorandum re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the
radio frequency spectrum for the expansion of CMTS networks. Bayantel
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new
frequency bands for CMTS operators, the NTC granted BayanTel’s motion
to revive the latter’s application and set the case for hearings. Extelcom
filed an Opposition praying for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application
which was denied for lack of merit. Extelcom filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,which was granted.
Petitioner filed MR but subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, the NTC
filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:

WON the 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC is operative and should be applied
to the Respondent even with the absence of Publication Requirement

RULING:

No, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose

is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under
consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant
to a valid delegation, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can
take effect.

The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC fall squarely within the
scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. which
is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely
internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

 Hence, the 1993 Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can take effect. Even the 1993
Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such
publication, therefore, it is the 1978 Rules that governs

The Hon. Secretary Vincent S. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the

Philippines, G.R. No. 159149, 26 June 2006

DOCTRINE:
For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following
must  concur:

1.) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and

2.) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.
FACTS:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding,

overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products,
as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of
underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinder. The said law sets the monetary
penalty for violators to a minimum of P 20,000 and a maximum of P 50,000.
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the DOE to set aside
the Circular for being contrary to law but to no avail, hence they filed an action
before the RTC to nullify the circular.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the circular is valid

RULING:

For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following
must  concur:

1.) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the
delegating statute itself; and

2.) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.

As to the first requirement, BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes
by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display
board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no
authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number,
no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling
LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG
cylinders.The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes
contemplated by the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious practices of
LPG dealers.

As for the second requirement, the statute provides a minimum and maximum
amount as penalties. The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is
P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. While the circular is silent
as to the max penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does not amount
to violation of the statutory maximum limit.

The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not
in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the
minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. Nothing in the Circular
contravenes the law.

Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically
intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures
with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as
other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. To
nullify the Circular in this case would be to render inutile government efforts to
protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some
unscrupulous LPG traders.

Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, GR L-19337, 30

September 1969

DOCTRINE: If a statute has not yet been previously interpreted by the Supreme
Court, the construction given to it by the administrative agency mandated by law
to implement and enforce said law, should be given great weight.

FACTS: Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. was engaged in the production and
milling of centrifugal sugar for export, the produced sugar was being
placed in containers known as jute bags which were not locally made. 

       Thus, in 1957, it made two importations of jute bags. There were

44,800 jute bags in the first importation, and 75,200 in the second
importation. These importations were made free of customs duties and
special import tax upon the petitioner’s filing of Re-exportation and
Special Import Tax Bond conditioned upon the exportation of jute bags
within one year from date of importation. 

        The first was imported on January 8, 1957 and the second on

February 8, 1957. But it only exported 33,647 out of 120,000 jute bags
that it imported. The remaining 86,353 jute bags were exported after the
expiration of the one-year period but within three years from their
importation contrary to the Administrative Order 66 and 389 issued by
the Bureau of Customs. Due to the petitioner’s failure to show proof of
the exportation of the balance of 86,353 jute bags within one year from
their importation, the collector of Customs of Iloilo required it to pay the
amount of 28,629.42 representing the customs duties and special import
tax due thereon, which amount paid under protest. 

        The petitioner demanded the refund of the amount it had paid, on

the ground that its request for extension of the period of one year was
filed on time, and that its failure to export the jute bags within the
required one-year period was due to delay in the arrival of the vessel on
which they were to be loaded and to the picketing of the Central railroad
line. 

      Alternatively, it asked for refund of the same amount in the form of a

draw back under section 106(b) in relation to section 105(x) of the Tariff
and Custom Code. On June 21, 1960, the collector of Customs of Iloilo,
after hearing, rendered judgment denying the claim for refund. Because
of this judgment the petitioner appealed to the Commissioner of Customs
who upheld the decision of the Collector. Eventually, a petition for review
was filed with the Court of Tax Appeals which affirmed the decision of
the Commissioner of Customs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs as an administrative body

is allowed to resolve questions of law in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
function as an incident to its power of regulation.

RULING: According to the Supreme Court “Considering that the Bureau of

Customs is the office charged with implementing and enforcing the
provisions of our Tariff and Customs Code, the construction placed by it
thereon should be given controlling weight. In applying the doctrine or
principle of respect for administrative or practical construction, the
courts often refer to several factors which may be regarded as bases of
the principle, as factors leading the courts to give the principle
controlling weight in particular instances, or as independent rules in
themselves. 

     These factors are the respect due the governmental agencies charged
with administration, their competence, expertness, experience, and
informed judgment and the fact that they frequently are the drafters of
the law they interpret; that the agency is the one on which the
legislature must rely to advise it as to the practical working out of the
statute, and practical application of the statute presents the agency with
unique opportunity and experiences, or improvements in the statute.”
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Nestle Philippines Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 86738, 13 November 1991

DOCTRINE:

The construction given to a statute by an administrative agency charged

with the interpretation and application of that statute is entitled to great
respect and should be accorded great weight by the courts unless such
construction is clearly shown to be in sharp conflict with the governing
statute or the Constitution and other laws.

FACTS:

San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. are the two major stockholders of
Nestle. Nestle increased its authorized capital stock and was approved by
SEC. Thereafter, some unissued stocks were sold to San Miguel and
Nestle. Nestle filed a complaint with the SEC, seeking to exempt the firm
from the registration requirement of Section 4 of the Revised Securities
Act and from payment of the fee referred to in Section 6(c). The
provision states that a corporation may be exempted from the
requirement of registration if it issues additional capital stock among its
own stockholders exclusively. Nestle argued that the issuance of
additional capital stock means the issuance of increased authorized
capital stock. SEC held that for purposes of granting a general or
particular exemption from the registration requirements, a request for
exemption and a fee equivalent to 0.1% of the issued value of securities
or stocks are required.

ISSUE:

WON SEC is correct in construing “increased capital stock” to refer as

issuance of capital stock as part of and in the course of increasing capital
stock?

RULING:

Yes.

Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals resolved the ambiguity by
construing Section 6 (a) (4) as referring only to the issuance of shares of
stock as part of and in the course of increasing the authorized capital
stock of Nestlé. In the case at bar, since the 344,500 shares of Nestlé
capital stock are proposed to be issued from already authorized but still
unissued capital stock and since the present authorized capital stock of
6,000,000 shares with a par value of P100.00 per share is not proposed
to be further increased, the SEC and the Court of Appeals rejected
Nestlé’s petition.

In the first place, it is a principle too well established to require

extensive documentation that the construction given to a statute by an
administrative agency charged with the interpretation and application of
that statute is entitled to great respect and should be accorded great
weight by the courts unless such construction is clearly shown to be in
sharp conflict with the governing statute or the Constitution and other
laws.

The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of the
multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the
establishment of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and
satisfying those needs; it also relates to the accumulation of experience
and growth of specialized capabilities by the administrative agency
charged with implementing a particular statute.

The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, et al. v. POEA, GR 114714, 21

April 1995

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an

incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its
co-petitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit
Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-
principals, urge us to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the
Governing Board of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05
which increases the compensation and benefits of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract to Seafarers specifically death benefits will now
equivalent to $50,000 and an additional $7,000 for each child under 21
but not exceeding four children.

Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to
fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of
Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; and only Congress can. 

ISSUE: WON the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of

legislative power.

RULING: Yes. Under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, The State
shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.

The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based

on impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly
contented by the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.

The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the

necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the
adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).

To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the

legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct
and efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be
experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains

exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally
delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the
legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate
situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is
required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and
purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in
conformity with the standards prescribed by the law.

That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely

further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly
conform to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable
employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No.797 can no longer be
disputed.

Republic v. Drugmaker’s Laboratories, G.R. No. 190837 (March 05, 2014)

DOCTRINE:

FACTS: The FDA was created pursuant to Republic Act No. (RA) 3720, otherwise
known as the "Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act," primarily in order to establish
safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for foods, drugs and devices,
and cosmetic products. On March 15, 1989, DOH issued Administrative Order No.
67 entitled Revised Rules and Regulations of Pharmaceutical Products. It required
drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine with the FDA before
they may be released to the market for sale. It also required a bioavailability/
bioequivalence (BA/BE) test for a manufacturer to secure a Certificate of Product
Registration (CPR) for its products. The implementation of the BA/BE test
however was put on hold because there was no facility capable of conducting the
same. FDA then issued Circular 1 which resumed the implementation of the
BA/BE test. Thereafter, FDA issued Circular 8 which provided for additional details
concerning the test requirement.

Respondent is a drug manufacturer of a drug brand named Refam for the

treatment of persons suffering from pulmonary and extra- pulmonary
tuberculosis. When Refam was subjected to the required test, it resulted that the
product was not a bioequivalent with the reference drug. FDA warned respondent
that is CPR will never be renewed unless it submit satisfactory results of BA/BE
test.

Instead of submitting satisfactory BA/BE test results for Refam, respondents filed
a petition for prohibition and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before
the RTC, alleging that it is the DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the
authority to issue and implement rules concerning RA 3720. As such, the issuance
of the aforesaid circulars and the manner of their promulgation contravened the
law and the Constitution. They further averred that that the non-renewal of the
CPR due to failure to submit satisfactory BA/BE test results would not only affect
Refam, but their other products as well.

ISSUE: Whether or not the FDA may validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1
and 8, s. 1997

RULING:: Yes

Political Law- An administrative regulation that is merely an

interpretative rule needs nothing further than its issuance

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an

interpretative rule, or a contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of
subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing
general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by
Congressand effect a change in existing law or policy which affects individual
rights and obligations.

Meanwhile, interpretative rules are intended to interpret, clarify or explain

existing statutory regulations under which the administrative body operates. Their
purpose or objective is merely to construe the statute being administered and
purport to do no more than interpret the statute. Simply, they try to say what the
statute means and refer to no single person or party in particular but concern all
those belonging to the same class which may be covered by the said rules.Finally,
contingent rules are those issued by an administrative authority based on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law
depends.

In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements

laid down by Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing, and publication in order
to be valid and binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule.
This is because when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its
applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real
consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoing issuances would reveal that AO 67, s. 1989 is
actually the rule that originally introduced the BA/BE testing requirement as a
component of applications for the issuance of CPRs covering certain
pharmaceutical products. As such, it is considered an administrative regulation a
legislative rule to be exact issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with
the express authority granted to him by RA 3720 to implement the statutory
mandate that all drugs and devices should first be registered with the FDA prior
to their manufacture and sale. Considering that neither party contested the
validity of its issuance, the Court deems that AO 67, s. 1989 complied with the
requirements of prior hearing, notice, and publication pursuant to the
presumption of regularity accorded to the government in the exercise of its
official duties.

The FDA then issued Circular No. 8, s. 1997 to supplement Circular No. 1, s. 1997
in that it reiterates the importance of the BA/BE testing requirement originally
provided for by AO 67, s. 1989. Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be
considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or
explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c)
ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of
RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to
administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s. 1989,
including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and
pursuant to RA 3720. Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said
circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that
they seek to govern as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations
in the first place no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for
their validity.