Family Code (FC) Art.

256
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW ABS-CBN v. Court of Tax Appeals L-52306 12 October 1981
Lorenzo v. Posadas 64 Phil 353
Persons and Family Relations Simon v. Chan, GR 157547, Feb. 23, 2011

ATTY. GIDEON D.V. MORTEL, LLM., DCL.

Professor

I. Introduction to the Civil Code and Preliminary Title

Introduction and Effect and Application of Laws

1 Effect and Application of Laws (Art. 1-18, NCC),

Date of Effectivity Art. 2, NCC

Executive Order No. 200, 18 June 1987

Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, GR 63915 29 December 1986

Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres et.al., GR 10279
6 August 1992
Umali v. Estanislao, GR 104037, May 29, 1992
La Bugal B’laan Tribal Assn. v. Ramos, GR 127882, Jan. 27, 2004

Fuentes v. Roca, GR 178902, April 21, 2010

Commissioner v. Hypermix, GR 179579, February 1, 2012
Acaac v. Azcuna, Jr., GR 187378, Sept. 30, 2013

2 Laws and Rules covered by the Rule on Publication

Tayug Rural Bank v. CB, GR 46158, 28 November 1986

Roy v. Court of Appeals, GR 80718, Jan. 29, 1988
Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, GR 211833, April 7, 2015

Secs. 59 and 188, LGC (RA 7160)

3 Principles on the Application of Laws

a. Presumption of Knowledge of the Law, Art. 3, NCC

In Re: Filart 40 Phil 205

Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 Phil 217
Elegado v. Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 285
Fajardo v. Atty. Danilo Dela Torre, AC 6295, April 14, 2004

Art. 526(3), 1334, 2155, NCC

b. Prospective & Retroactive Effect of Laws, Art. 4 NCC

Revised Penal Code (RPC) Arts. 22, 62

 title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase “married to” preceding “Teresita
Francisco” is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco.
Francisco v. CA, GR 102330, Nov. 25, 1998
seeks to reverse respondent appellate court’s decision Pesca (w) v. Pesca (h), GR 136921, April 17, 2001
petition for review of CA’s decision; doctrinie of stare decisis
FACTS: Petitioner is the legal wife of private respondent Francisco (Eusebio) by his second
marriage. PR are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Petitioner alleges that since their marriage FACTS: Petitioner and respondent got married in 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live
in 1962 she and Eusebio have acquired sari-sair store and a house and lot. These properties were together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the
administered by Eusebio until he was invalidated on account several diseases, thereby, rendering him country. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in QC. In 1988, petitioner
unfit to administer them. noticed that respondent showed signs of “psychological incapacity” to perform his marital covenant,
being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband. He was cruel and violent, a habitual
Petitioner also claims that PR succeeded in convincing their father to sign a GPA which authorized drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 pm – 1 am. When cautioned, respondent would beat,
one PR to administer the properties. Petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said slap and kick her. He threatened petitioner in the presence of the children who were not spared from
general power of attorney, and thereby enjoining its enforcement. Petitioner also sought to be physical violence. Petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister
declared as the administratrix of the properties in dispute. The trial court ruled in favor of private in QC. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent and returned home.
respondents - petitioner failed to adduce proof that said properties were acquired during the existence
of the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. The court In 1994, respondent assaulted petitioner in the presence of the children and submitted herself to
ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to administer medical examination. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay and a case for slight physical
them. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition. injuries. He was convicted. Petitioner filed for the declaration of nullity of their marriage for
psychological incapacity and sought the custody of her minor children and sought support.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the Respondent denied the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated. Trial court declared
capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. marriage to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of
respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. CA reversed.
RULING: Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision in Molina could be applied retroactively.
The repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the NCC does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect
rights which have become vested or accrued while the said provisions were in force.—Indeed, RULING: The petition is DENIED. Psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of
Articles 158 and 160 of the NCC have been repealed by the FC which took effect on August 3, 1988. nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the FC, has been explained by the Court in Santos and
The aforecited articles fall under Title VI, Book I of the NCC which was expressly repealed by reiterated in Molina.
Article 254 (not Article 253 as alleged by petitioner in her petition and reply) of the FC. Nonetheless,
we cannot invoke the new law in this case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article The “doctrine of stare decisis,” in Article 8 of the CC, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
256 in relation to Article 105 (second paragraph) of the FC. Hence, the rights accrued and vested interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled
while the cited articles were in effect survive their repeal. legal maxim “legis interpretado legis vim obtinet”, that the interpretation placed upon the written law
by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts
Petitioner contends that the subject properties are conjugal, thus, she should administer these on establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and
account of the incapacity of her husband. PR maintain that the assets in controversy claimed by construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when
petitioner as “conjugal” are capital properties of Eusebio acquired by the latter either through a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new
inheritance or through his industry prior to his second marriage. doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine
and have acted in good faith under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.”
Article 160 of the NCC provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The phrase “psychological incapacity,” borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in
The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has
acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to
for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. The party who asserts this the term. Molina, that followed, has additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts
presumption must first prove said time element. The presumption refers only to the property acquired and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.
during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos.
conjugal was acquired. This presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing evidence; there must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of the At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her
spouses. evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the
time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage.
It must be stressed that the certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim is inadequate. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.
The fact that the land was registered in the name of “Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco,” is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation
title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer of the family that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commiserates with petitioner in
her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may six months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in finding
should we. probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.
David v. Agbay, GR 199113, March 18, 2015 Albino Co v. CA, GR 100776, Oct. 28, 1993

FACTS: Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. In FACTS: A criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed by the salvage company against
retirement, petitioner and wife returned to the Philippines, purchased a lot and constructed a house. Albino Co with the RTC. Co was convicted of the crime charged sentenced for imprisonment and
They came to know that a portion of their lot is public land. Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease payment of damages to the salvage company. Co appealed to the CA where he sought exoneration
Application with the DENR and CENRO and indicated that he is a Filipino citizen. Private upon the theory that it was reversible error for the RTC to have relied, on the ruling rendered on
respondent Editha A. Agbay opposed the application as petitioner is a Canadian citizen, disqualified September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, that a check issued merely to guarantee the
to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents. Meanwhile, performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. This was because at the time of
petitioner reacquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of RA 9225. the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the
judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a “rubber” or “bouncing” check as
In his defense, petitioner averred that at the time he filed his application, he had intended to reacquire guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made
Philippine citizenship and that he had been assured by a CENRO officer that he could declare in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice. The circular was reversed a year after Co issued the bounced
himself as a Filipino. He further alleged that he bought the property from the Agbays who check. CA affirmed the conviction and opined that the Que doctrine did not amount to the passage of
misrepresented to him that the subject property was titled land and they have the right and authority new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a pre-existing one.
to convey the same. The OPP issued its Resolution finding probable cause. Petitioner filed a petition
for review with the DOJ. CENRO issued an order rejecting petitioner’s MLA. It ruled that ISSUE: Whether the subsequent circular may be given retroactive effect.
petitioner’s subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA.
DOJ deniend the petition and a criminal case was filed MTC and a warrant of arrest was issued. RULING: The decisions of CA and RTC reversed. Criminal case DISMISSED. Prospectivity
principle has been made to apply to administrative rulings and circular. Principle of prospectivity
Petitioner filed a motion for re-determination of probable cause in the MTC. MTC denied the has also been applied to judicial decisions.
motion. Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed before he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that petitioner “Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
was at that time still a Canadian citizen. MR denied. RTC denied the petition as well. system of the Philippines,” according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. “Laws shall have no retroactive
  effect, unless the contrary is provided,” declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is
ISSUE: Whether nor not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code: “Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as
Filipino despite his subsequent reacquisition of Philippine citizenship (RA 9225). they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal. The principle of prospectivity
of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB,
RULING: The petition is DENIED. Decisio of RTC AFFIRMED and UPHELD. 961, 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which divested the Philippine
National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an
Under the first paragraph are those natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et. al., 5 SCRA 522 (June
naturalization in a foreign country who shall reacquire their Philippine citizenship upon taking the 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090.
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. The second paragraph covers those natural-born
Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, who shall retain their Philippine It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the
citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories Court’s decision of September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987)14—i.e., that a
of natural-born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country, but the terminology used check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P.
is different, “reacquired” for the first group, and “retain” for the second group. Blg. 22—should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice of the petitioner and other persons
similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did
The law thus makes a distinction between those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
before and after the effectivity of the law. The authors of the law employed the terms “reacquire”
and “retain” to describe the legal effect of taking the oath of allegiance to the RP. For those who In the present case, on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on the opinion of a
were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to have reacquired their Philippine private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of no less than the attorney of the Government,
citizenship lost pursuant to CA 63. R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in the Secretary of Justice, whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on which
the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become reliance may be placed by private individuals as reflective of the correct interpretation of a
naturalized citizens of another country. Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian constitutional or statutory provision; this, particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature
citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9225, he belongs to the first category of natural-born Filipinos. and scope of the authority that resides in his office as regards prosecutions for their violation.17
He was able to reacquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the required oath of allegiance. Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the respondent Court of Appeals is crucially
different in that in said case, as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation antedated
Petitioner made the untruthful statement in a public document, that he is a Filipino citizen at the time the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law invoked.
of the filing of said application. Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as
Canadian citizen, naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine,
citizen loses his Philippine citizenship. While he reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling
reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear [No, 10712, August 10, 1916.] ANSELMO FERRAZZINI, plaintiff and appellee, vs.
implications as hereinabove set out and discussed, negativing criminal liability. CARLOS GSELL, defendant and appellant,

PITC v. CoA, GR 205837, Nov. 21, 2017 FACTS: The defendant discharged the plaintiff without giving the "written advice of six months in
advance" provided by the contract. The plaintiff at times had charge of important departments of a
FACTS: factory employing four hundred workers, and at other times lie was foreman. He often violated the
express order of the defendant not to leave the factory during working hours to drink. He sought to
ISSUE: create discontentment among the employees by suggesting that the defendant treated them
suspiciously and unfairly. The plaintiff sued to recover damages for an alleged wrongful discharge of
RULING: the former who had been employed by the defendant for an indefinite time to work in the latter's
Narzoles v. NLRC, GR 141959, Sept. 29, 2000 industrial enterprises in the city of Manila.

FACTS: The defendant admitted that he discharged the plaintiff without giving him the "written advice of six
months in advance" as provided in the contract, but alleged that the discharge was lawful on account
ISSUE: of absence, unfaithfulness, and disobedience of orders. The defendant sought affirmative relief for a
further alleged breach of the contract by the plaintiff after his discharge. From a judgment in favor of
RULING: the plaintiff the defendant appealed.

The defendant filed a counterclaim and alleged that the employment contract entered into stated that
c. Mandatory and Directory Laws Art. 5, NCC during the term of the contract and for a period of 5 years after termination or sooner termination, the
plaintiff shall not engage in any similar enterprise similar to the business of defendant, assist any
d. Waiver of Rights and Exceptions Art 6, NCC enterprise or be employed in any enterprises in the Philippines, without the permission of the
plaintiff.
Art. 2035, NCC
ISSUE: Whether or not the provision on restriction in the employment contract is valid and binding
upon the plaintiff.

RULING: The petition is DENIED.

"ART. 1091, Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting parties, and
must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations." "ART. 1255. The contracting parties may
make the agreement and establish the clauses and conditions which they may deem advisable,
provided they are not in contravention of law, morals, or public order." Hence, the policy of the law
requires that the freedom of persons to enter into contracts shall not be lightly interfered with, but if a
contract be not founded upon a legal consideration (causa) or if it conflicts with the morals of the
times or contravenes some established interest of society, the courts will not aid in its enforcement.

In passing upon the validity of the cited provision, the court touched on public policy. Public policy
is the principle under which freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good
of the public. (Id., Id.) In determining whether a contract is contrary to public policy the nature of the
subject matter determines the source from which such question is to be solved. In the United States
it is well settled that contracts in undue or unreasonable restraint of trade are unenforceable because
they are repugnant to the established public policy in that country. Such contracts are illegal in the
sense that the law will not enforce them.

The contract under consideration, tested by the law, rules and principles above set forth, is clearly
one in undue or unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore against public policy. It is limited as to
time and space but not as to trade. It is not necessary for the protection of the defendant, as this is
provided for in another part of the clause. It would force the plaintiff to leave the Philippine Islands
in order to obtain a livelihood in case the defendant declined to give him the written permission to
work elsewhere in this country.
 No. L-15127. May 30, 1961. EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant, vs. ARELLANO G.R. No. 79269. June 5, 1991. * PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.
UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee. HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner took up a preparatory law course in the respondent university and subsequently a
law degree until the first semester of his 4 th year. The defendant university refunded the tuition paid FACTS: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged with rebellion and held in military
by the plaintiff for scholastic merit. The scholarship agreement provides that plaintiff has waived his custody following their arrest. A day before the filing of the information, a petition for habeas corpus
rights to transfer to another school without refund the amount given to him. He transferred to Abad for private responded and his co-accused was filed in court but which was subsequently dismissed.
Santos University on the last semester of his 4 th year where he eventually finished his law degree. The Motion to Quash the Information filed by the private respondent was opposed by the State citing
When petitioner applied to take the bar, he needed to secure the Transcript of Records (TOR) at that former conceded in the Joint Manifestation and Motion that x x x Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will
responded university. Respondent refused to issue the TOR until the petitioner paid back the amount remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person.” The public
of his scholarship. Plaintiff paid back the scholarship amount under protest so he can take the bar. respondent denied the motion but granted the motion for bail.
Plaintiff then filed a case for recovery. The Bureau of Private Schools released a memo which
reiterated that scholarship grant should not hinder the transfer of students to other school without ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent has expressly waived his right to bail when he agreed
making the refund. to remain in legal custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between the plaintiff and defendant whereby the former has RULING: The decision of the public responded is SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED.
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his
scholarship in cash, is valid. The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Accordingly, the
RULING: prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where
bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process
It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail.
which in its object, operation, or tendency, is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to
sound morality, or to civic honesty. Having agreed in to remain in legal custody, private respondent had unequivocally waived his right
to bail. But, is such waiver valid? Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides: “Art. 6. Rights may
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.” Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and
of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim
open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment
to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right
Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: ‘In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with
interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine claiming it.”
the security of individual rights.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
to increase the business potential of an educational institution. Thus conceived it is not only law. The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the
inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals? Manresa has this private respondent.
definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality which have received
some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract
students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and
practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University.
 Agreement. Instead, FFCCI proceeded to conduct its own verification of the works actually
G.R. No. 187521. March 14, 2012.* F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HR completed by HRCC and, on separate dates, made the following payments to HRCC.
CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent.
Mindoro Lumber and Hardware v. Bacay, et al., GR 158753, June 8, 2005
FACTS: FFCCI entered into a contract with the DPWH for the construction of the Magsaysay
Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan Development Project. FFCCI entered into a Subcontract FACTS: Private respondents are employees of petitioner Mindoro Lumber. PR, through then union
Agreement with HRCC for the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the president Eduardo Bacay, filed a Complaint against Mindoro Lumber before the Region IV DOLE
construction of a portion of the said project called the East Bank Levee and Cut-Off Channel in for money claims. Pursuant to the said complaint, the DOLE conducted an inspection It was
accordance with the specifications of the main contract. HRCC would submit to FFCCI a monthly determined that Mindoro Lumber committed several violations on general labor standards and OSH.
progress billing which the latter would then pay, subject to stipulated deductions. The parties agreed
that the requests of HRCC for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completed Meanwhile, PR executed several Affidavits (Sinumpaang Salaysay), that since they each started
works as approved by FFCCI. They agreed to conduct a joint measurement of the completed works working with Mindoro, they were made to work for 7 days a week. They further declared that their
together with DPWH and consultants to arrive at a common quantity. Thereafter, HRCC commenced wages were below the rates prescribed by the applicable wage orders, and that they were not paid
the construction. overtime pay, holiday pay or premium pay. PR stated that the total amount each of them were entitled
to, aside from what they were actually receiving by way of salary and other emoluments, ranged
As agreed, HRCC submitted progress reports which FFCCI paid. In one instance, the latter did not from P6,744.20 to P242,626.90. They further averred that their wages were made compliant with the
pay HRCC since the former has not evaluated the completed works. HRCC sent to FFCCI a demand prevailing regional minimum wages. The counsel for the PR filed a Manifestation before the RO
for payment and completely halted all constructions. HRCC filed a complaint with the Construction DOLE to direct Mindoro Lumber to pay the amounts due to them.
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC). CIAC decided in favor of HRCC elaborating that FFCCI
had already waived its right under the Subcontract Agreement to require a joint measurement Private respondents executed a Joint Affidavit of Withdrawal of Complaint since they have received
of HRCC’s completed works as a condition precedent to the payment of the latter’s progress the amount from Mindoro. Their counsel then filed a motion to dismiss. Then, claiming that the
billings. Such repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by [FFCCI] of its amount was small to their entitlement, they filed a motion to declare the Joint Affidavit null and void.
contractual right to require compliance of said condition. CA agreed with the CIAC that FFCCI had RO DOLE dismissed the motion and declared the Affidavit valid. On appeal, DOLE Secretary
waived its right under the Agreement to require a joint quantification of HRCC’s completed works remanded the case to the RO DOLE for further proceedings. On appeal, CA denied the petition of
Mindoro Lumber, hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the FFCCI’s non-compliance with the stipulation in the Subcontract
Agreement requiring a joint quantification of the works completed by HRCC constitute a waiver. ISSUE: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement constitute waiver to claim for the proportionate
entitlement.
RULING: The decision if CA is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
RULING: The petition is DISMISSED.
Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party
The assistance of the BLR or the regional office of the DOLE in the execution of a compromise
would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known
settlement is a basic requirement; without it, there can be no valid compromise settlement. In this
by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived
case, the petitioner admits that the purported compromise settlement was executed by the private
of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the
respondents without such required assistance. The closest form of assistance adverted to by the
intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.
petitioner in this case was that of Bacay’s counsel when the latter appeared before the Office of the
Regional Director to file the following: the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal
It is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable
executed by the private respondents; a Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Bacay withdrawing the
right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled,
complaint; and the Motion to Dismiss. Such assistance, however, is not the “assistance” required by
whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such
Article 227. As such, the Sama-samang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sakdal executed by the
rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the
respondents cannot qualify as a valid compromise settlement.
rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and
does not contravene public policy.
The petitioner is correct in saying that there are legitimate waivers that represent a voluntary and
It bears stressing that the joint measurement contemplated under the Subcontract Agreement should reasonable settlement of a worker’s claim which should be respected by the courts as the law
be conducted by the parties herein together with the representative of the DPWH and the consultants. between the parties. Indeed, not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1)
FFCCI, being the main contractor of DPWH, has the responsibility to request the representative of where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or
DPWH to conduct the said joint measurement. (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their faces; in these cases, the law will step
in to annul the questionable transactions. Such quitclaims are regarded as ineffective to bar the
Here, it is undisputed that the joint measurement of HRCC’s completed works contemplated by the workers from claiming the full measure of their legal rights. In this case, however, it cannot be
parties in the Subcontract Agreement never materialized. Indeed, HRCC, on separate occasions, argued that there is no gross disparity between the amount actually received by each private
submitted its monthly progress billings indicating the extent of the works it had completed sans prior respondent as compared to the amount owing him or her. The amount of the settlement is
joint measurement. FFCCI did not contest the said progress billings submitted by HRCC despite the indubitably unconscionable; hence, ineffective to bar the workers from claiming the full measure of
lack of a joint measurement of the latter’s completed works as required under the Subcontract their legal rights.
 pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Case No. Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
LSED-RO400- 9807-CI-001 is hereby REMANDED to the Region IV Office of the Department of
Labor and Employment for appropriate proceedings. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137873. April 20, 2001. * D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT G.R. No. 193484. January 18, 2012.* HYPTE R. AUJERO, petitioner, vs.
OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, respondent.

FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. FACTS: Petitioner started working for respondent Philcomsat as an accountant in the latter’s
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Finance Department in 1967. After 34 years of service, petitioner applied for early retirement. His
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed a complaint for damages at the RTC of Pasig against the deceased’s application for retirement was approved entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate
employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior equivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service. At that time, the
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner was Philcomsat’s Senior Vice-President with a monthly salary of Two Hundred Seventy-
widow Maria Juego. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Four Thousand Eight Hundred Five Pesos (P274,805.00). In 2001, petitioner executed a Deed of
Release and Quitclaim in Philcomsat’s favor, following his receipt from the latter of a check in the
ISSUE: Whether the claim of death benefit under the Labor Code is a waiver for a subsequent claim amount of P9,439,327.91. ). Almost 3 years after petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement
from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code. benefits, claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is P14,015,055.00.

RULING: The decision of CA is AFFIRMED. Petitioner said he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need thereof and was
all set to return to his hometown and he signed the quitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the no single centavo would be released to him if he did not execute a quitclaim. The Labor Arbiter
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered Philcomsat to pay the balance. NLRC granted the appeal and
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. Equitable in nature, the reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. The CA affirmed the decision of NRLC, hence, this appeal.
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on
the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the ISSUE: Whether or not the quitclaim executed by the petitioner in Philcomsat’s favor is valid,
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single thereby foreclosing his right to institute any claim against Philcomsat
wrong. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Hence, the rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor RULING: The quitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver.
Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice
of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other. In Goodrich Manufacturing Corporation, v. Ativo, this Court reiterated the standards that must be
observed in determining whether a waiver and quitclaim has been validly executed: “Not all waivers
and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael
represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino, Vda. de Severo vs. Feliciano-Go and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from
Abeleda. n the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act
an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the
could still sue under the Civil Code.
law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
A legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer’s claims should be respected by
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to
the courts as the law between the parties. While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and
burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who
quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into signing them by unscrupulous
ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; otherwise, the defense is waived.
employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary
It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
settlement of a laborer’s claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the parties.
the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
The petitioner’s educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
pressured, intimidated or inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. The petitioner’s educational
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
inveigled into signing the subject quitclaim. This Court cannot permit the petitioner to relieve
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990. There is also no showing
himself from the consequences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is
that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was
expected. Also, the period of time that the petitioner allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to
filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware of her rights.
recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his motives, leading to the reasonable
conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by
While the law looks with disfavor upon releases and quitclaims by employees who are inveigled or
the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent
pressured into signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities,
a legitimate waiver representing a voluntary settlement of a laborer’s claims should be respected by parties, their assigns and heirs x x x.”. Clearly, the waiver of confidentiality of petitioner’s bank
the courts as the law between the parties. deposits in the BPI-TIDCORP Joint Motion to Approve Agreement lacks the required written
consent of petitioner and conformity of the receiver.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decisions of CA
are hereby AFFIRMED. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The 2 nd paragraph the
Decision of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED.
G.R. No. 201931. February 11, 2015.* DOÑA ADELA** EXPORT
INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs. TIDCORP, and the BPI, respondents. e. Repeal of Laws Art 7, NCC

FACTS: On August 23, 2006, petitioner Doña Adela Export International, Inc., (petitioner, for Lichauco v Apostol, 44 Phil 138
brevity) filed a Petition for Voluntary Insolvency. The RTC, after finding the petition sufficient in U.S. v Palacio, 33 Phil 208
form and substance, issued an order declaring petitioner as insolvent and staying all civil proceedings Iloilo Palay Corn Planters Assn., Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377
against petitioner. Thereafter, Atty. Arlene Gonzales was appointed as receiver. After taking her oath, Thornton v. Thornton, Aug. 16, 2004
Atty. Gonzales proceeded to make the necessary report, engaged appraisers and required the creditors CIR v. Primetown Property Group, Inc., GR 162155, August 28, 2007
to submit proof of their respective claims. On October 22, 2010, Atty. Gonzales filed a Motion for Kida v. Senate, GR 196271, Feb. 28, 2012
Parties to Enter Into Compromise Agreement incorporating therein her proposed terms of Yinlu Bicol v. Trans-Asia, GR 207942, Jan. 12, 2015
compromise.

Petitioner, through its President Epifanio C. Ramos, Jr., and TRC entered into a Dacion En Pago by
4 Judicial Decisions & Duty of the Courts to Decide Art 8-10 NCC
Compromise Agreement wherein petitioner agreed to transfer a parcel of land with existing
a. Stare Decisis; Obiter Dictum (Art. 8)
improvements, in favor of TRC in full payment of petitioner’s obligation. The agreement bears the
conformity of Atty. Gonzales as receiver. TRC filed a motion to Approve Dacion En Pago by
Floresca v Philex Mining GR 30642 30 April 1985
Compromise Agreement. TIDCORP and BPI also filed a Joint Motion to Approve Agreement.
Pesca v. Pesca, GR 136921, April 17, 2001
Ting v. Velez-Ting, GR 166562, March 31, 2009
Petitioner filed a MPR and claimed that TIDCORP and BPI’s agreement imposes on it several
De Castro v. JBC, GR 191002, April 20, 2010
obligations, including waiver of confidentiality of its bank deposits but it is not a party and signatory
Virtucio v. Alegarbes, GR 187451, August 29, 2012
to the said agreement. RTC denied the motion and held that petitioner’s silence and acquiescence to
Republic v. Rehman Enterprises, GR 199310, Feb. 19, 2014
the joint motion to approve compromise agreement while it was set for hearing by creditors BPI and
UCPB v. Uy, GR 204039, Jan. 10, 2018
TIDCORP is tantamount to admission and acquiescence thereto.
b. Duty to render judgment- Arts. 9-10
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is bound by the provision in the Joint Motion to Approve
Agreement that petitioner shall waive its rights to confidentiality of its bank deposits.
Art. 5, RPC
RULING: We, thus, hold that petitioner is not bound by the said provision.
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690
Alonzo v. Padua, 150 SCRA 379
The provision on the waiver of the confidentiality of petitioner’s bank deposits was merely inserted
Barcellano v. Barza, GR 165287, Sept. 14, 2011
in the agreement. It is clear therefore that petitioner is not bound by the said provision since it was
Karen Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, GR 94723, August 21, 1997
without the express consent of petitioner who was not a party and signatory to the said agreement.—
In this case, the Joint Motion to Approve Agreement was executed by BPI and TIDCORP only. There
was no written consent given by petitioner or its representative, Epifanio Ramos, Jr., that petitioner is
(5) Applicability of Customs –Arts. 11-12 NCC
waiving the confidentiality of its bank deposits.
Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79
Neither can petitioner be deemed to have given its permission by failure to interpose its objection
In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name “Ozaeta,
during the proceedings. It is an elementary rule that the existence of a waiver must be positively
Romulo, etc., 92 SCRA 1
demonstrated since a waiver by implication is not normally countenanced. The norm is that a waiver
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, GR 148311, March 31,
must not only be voluntary, but must have been made knowingly, intelligently, and with sufficient
2005
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences. There must be persuasive evidence
to show an actual intention to relinquish the right. Mere silence on the part of the holder of the right
(6) Legal Periods, Art. 13, NCC
should not be construed as a surrender thereof; the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption
against the existence and validity of such waiver.
a Computation of Time, Art. 13, NCC
It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the
compromise, and not upon nonparties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts. The rule is based Firestone Tire and Rubber Co v. Lariosa, L-70479 27 February 1987
on Article 1311(1) of the Civil Code which provides that “contracts take effect only between the Gonzaga v. de David, L-14858 29 December 1960
 Rural Bank v. Court of Appeals, L-32116 21 April 1981 Amonoy vs. Gutierrez, 351 SCRA 731
Comr. v. Aichi Forging, GR 184823, October 6, 2010 Spouses Custodio vs Court of Appeals, GR No 116100, February 9, 1996
National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, 29 SCRA 70 Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et al. vs. Roberto Reyes, aka Amay Bisaya, G.R. No. 154259,
CIR v. Primetown Property Group, GR 162155, August 28, 2007 February 28, 2005

b Meaning of Weeks and Months Art.13, NCC (4) Rule on Breach of Promise to Marry, Not Actionable, Exception

Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, September 30, 1960

People v. del Rosario, L-7234, 21 May 1955
Wassmer vs. Velez, L-20089, December 26, 1964
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, 219 SCRA 115
Buñag, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101749, July 10, 1992
(7) Application of Laws, Arts. 14- 18, NCC
(5) Principle of Unjust Enrichment Arts. 22-23
a. Application of Penal Laws, and Laws on Public Security and Safety Art.14, NCC
Tamio vs. Ticson, 443 SCRA 44
b. Application of Laws on Family Rights and Duties; Status Condition and Legal
Loria vs Muñoz, G.R. No. 187240, 15 October 2014
Capacity of Persons Art.15, NCC
(i) Accion In Rem Verso vs. Solutio Indebiti
Del Socorro v. Van Wilsem, GR 193707, Dec. 10, 2014
Republic vs. Lacap, GR No. 158253, March 2, 2007
Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355
University of the Philippines vs Philab Industries, GR No. 152411, Sept. 29, 2004
Board of Commissioners v. Dela Rosa, 197 SCRA 853
Willem Beumer vs. Avelina Amores, GR No. 195670, December 3, 2012
Yao Kee v. Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736
(6) Court’s duty to be vigilant for the protection of the disadvantaged Art. 24, NCC
c. Law on Property Art. 16, NCC
Valenzuela vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-56168, December 22, 1988
Aznar v. Garcia, 7 SCRA 95
Amos v. Bellis, 20 SCRA 358
(7) Enjoining thoughtless extravagance Art. 25, NCC
Tayag v. Benguet Consolidated, GR L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968
(8) Respect of rights of others; civil actions for violation Art. 26, NCC
d. Forms, Solemnities of Contracts and Wills Art. 17, NCC
Concepcion vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 120706, January 31, 2000.
Raytheon v. Rouzie, GR 162894, Feb. 26, 2008
Spouses Hing vs Choachuy, GR No. 179736, June 26, 2013
e. Suppletory Effect of the Civil Code Art.18, NCC
(9) Relief against public officials Art. 27, NCC
Llave v. Republic, GR 169766, March 30, 2011
Zulueta vs Nicolas, GR No. 8252, Jan. 31, 1958
Zamoramos v. People, GR 193902, June 1, 2011
Ledesma vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-54598, April 15, 1988
Villagracia v. Sharia, GR 188832, April 23, 2014
(10) Unfair competition Art. 28, NCC

Willaware Products Corp vs Jusichris Manufacturing Corp, GR No. 195549,

A Human Relations (Art.19-36, NCC) Sept. 3, 2014

(1) Concept of Human Relations (11) Effect of acquittal of the accused in the criminal case on the civil action, Art. 29

(2) Principle of Abuse of Rights Art. 100, Revised Penal Code

Section 1(a), paragraph 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court
Albenson Enterprises vs Court of Appeals, GR No. 88694, January 11, 1993
California Clothing, Inc. vs. Quinones, GR No. 175822, October 23, 2013 Banal vs Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 225
Uypitching vs. Quiamco, 510 SCRA 172 Lumantas vs Calapiz, GR No. 163753, January 15, 2014
Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Pacilan, Jr., 465 SCRA 372
(12) Quantum of proof required in civil actions arising from crimes, Art. 30, NCC
(3) Damnum Absque Injuria
(13) Independent civil actions Arts. 31 to 35, NCC
 See Section 12
Art. 2176, NCC Republic Act 9225, Dual Citizenship Law, 2003
See Sections 2-3, Rule 111, Rules of Court Political and Public Life (Article 7), Nationality, (Article 9) CEDAW
General Recommendation No. 23 (1997); General Recommendation No. 21, 9-10
Manliclic vs Calaunan, GR No. 150157, January 25, 2007 CEDAW
Aberca vs Ver, April 15, 1988, GR No. L-69866
Vinzonz-Chato vs Fortune Tobacco Corporation, GR No. 141309, Dec. 23, 2008 (Motion Romualdez-Marcos vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300
for Reconsideration) David vs SET, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, GR No. 221538, Sept. 20, 2016
Madeja vs Caro, GR L-51183, December 21, 1983

(14) Prejudicial question, Art. 36, NCC

Zapanta vs Mendoza, L-14534, February 28, 1962

Landicho vs Relova, GR No. L-22579, February 23, 1968
Pimentel vs Pimentel, GR 172060, September 13, 2010
Apa vs. Fernandez, 242 SCRA 509
Magestrado vs. People, 527 SCRA 125

II. Persons, Civil Personality & Citizenship and Domicile, Arts. 37-51, NCC

A Persons, Civil Personality, Natural & Juridical Persons, Arts. 37-47

(1) Capacity (Juridical Capacity & Capacity to Act), Art. 37, NCC

Catalan v. Basa, GR 159567, July 31, 2007

(2) Restrictions on capacity to act, Art.38-39, NCC

(3) Natural Persons Art.40-42, NCC; Survivorship Art 43, NCC

See Arts. 742, 760, 854, Civil Code

Geluz vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 134
De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil 866
Continental Steel v. Montano, GR 182836, Oct. 13, 2009

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, 70 SCRA 472
Eugenio v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425
Marcos v. Manglapus, GR 88211, Oct. 27, 1989
Berot v. Siapno, GR 188944, July 9, 2014
Valino v. Adriano, GR 182894, April 22, 2014
Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil 257

(4) Juridical Persons Art.44-47, NCC

B. Citizenship & Domicile

Tolentino, pp.187-214
1973 & 1987 Constitution on Citizenship; Article 4, Sec. 1-5 1987 Constitution
Article 2, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution
Republic Act 8171 (1995)
Republic Act 9139, Administrative Naturalization Law, 2000