People vs. Glino, G.R. No.

173793, December 4, 2007

FACTS: Spouses Domingo and Virginia hailed a jeepney and sat on vacant seats on two (2) opposing
sides. When the woman seated next to Virginia alighted, Glino took her place and was reeking of
liquor. Virginia noticed Glino inching closer to her and asked him to sit properly. Glino made snide
remarks. Glino persisted in violating Virginia’s personal space. Domingo decided to tell Glino to sit
properly. Baloes, Glino’s equally drunk companion, cursed Domingo. After the heated verbal tussle,
Glino and Baloes appeared to have calmed down. When Baloes and Glino told the driver that they
were about to alight, Baloes unexpectedly drew an improvised knife and stabbed Domingo in the chest.

Glino joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo. Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack, Domingo failed
to offer any form of resistance to the duo’s vicious assault and sustained nine stab wounds. Virginia
tried vainly to shield Domingo from his assailants but was all for naught. Glino and Baloes attempted
to flee the scene of the crime. The two (2) were indicated for murder and attempted murder which was
established by the trial court. Glino filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not Glino is only guilty of homicide and attempted homicide only, not murder and
attempted murder, due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

RULING: Appealed judgment MODIFIED. Glino is charged with MURDER and LESS SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on
direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of accused indicating a common understanding
among them with respect to the commission of the offense.

It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit
agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to
be carried out. Proof that accused acted in concert suffice to support a conviction. In conspiracy, it
matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. The act of one is the act of all; hence, it
is not necessary that all the participants deliver the fatal blow. Each of the accused will be deemed
equally guilty of the crime committed.

The acts of Glino and Baloes before, during and after the killing of Domingo are indicative of a joint
purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiment. Virginia narrated that while Baloes was
stabbing Domingo, Glino was blocking her path, preventing her from rendering aid to her husband.
Glino later joined Baloes in stabbing Domingo with a knife.

The essence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the
assailant on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. It is
employed to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Treachery may still be
appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of danger to his person. What is decisive is that the
attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate.

Domingo was caught unaware that an attack was forthcoming. Although he had a verbal exchange with
Glino and Baloes, the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected. All of the passengers inside the
jeepney, including Domingo, thought all along that the tension had ceased and that Glino and Baloes
were about to alight. Domingo was overpowered by Glino and Baloes, who took turns in stabbing the
hapless victim. Domingo was without opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
 People vs. Baldogo, G.R. Nos. 128106 07 January 24, 2003
(treachery, quasi-recidivism)

FACTS: Julio Sr. and his wife, Heather, had four children, namely: Julio, Jr., Jorge, who was fourteen
years old; Julie, who was 12 years old and a grade six elementary pupil and Jasper, who was eight years
old. Julio, Sr. was employed as a security guard in the Iwahig Prison. Edgardo Bermas. an inmate of
the penal colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho spouses. Accused-appellant also
an inmate of the colony, was assigned as a domestic helper of the Camacho family. Both helpers
resided in a hut located about ten meters away from the house of the Camacho family.

On February 22, 1996, Bermas served dinner in the house of the Camachos. Afterwhich, Julio, Sr. left
the house to attend a bible study. Only Jorge and his sister Julie were left in the house. Bermas called
Julie from the kitchen After five minutes, Bermas called her again but Julie again ignored him. Julie
heard a loud sound coming from the kitchen. She saw Jorge sprawled on the ground face down and
bloodied. Standing over Jorge were accused-appellant and Bermas each armed with a bolo. Accused-
appellant overtook Julie, tied her hands at her back with a torn t-shirt and placed a piece of cloth in her
mouth to prevent her from shouting for help from their neighbors. Julie was then brought by the accuse
in the mountain but was later on left to herself. The trial court ruled that the accused committed muder,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

ISSUE: Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of treachery and quasi-recidivism were present.

RULING: The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

The killing of minor children who by reason of their tender years could not be expected to put up a
defense is attended by treachery. It is clear that the killing of Jorge was qualified by treachery. When
Jorge was killed by Baldogo and Bermas, he was barely years old. Since treachery attended the
killing, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by said circumstance.

Quasi-recidivism under Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code is alleged in both Informations. Accused-
appellant is alleged to have committed murder and kidnapping while serving sentence in the penal
colony by final judgment for the crime of homicide. The prosecution is burdened to prove it by the
same quantum of evidence as the crime itself.

In the present case, to prove quasi-recidivism, the prosecution was burdened to adduce in evidence a
certified copy of the judgment convicting accused-appellant of homicide and to prove that the said
judgment had become final and executory. Since the accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to
such information, there was a joinder of issues not only as to his guilt or innocence, but also as to the
presence or absence of the modifying circumstances so alleged. The prosecution was thus burdened to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the existence of the modifying
circumstances. It was then grave error for the trial court to appreciate against the accused-appellant the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism simply because of his failure to object to the prosecution’s
omission as mentioned earlier.”

In this case, the prosecution adduced in evidence merely the excerpt of the prison record of accused-
appellant showing that he was convicted of homicide by the Regional Trial Court of Baguio (Branch 6)
with a penalty of from six years and one day as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day
as maximum and that the sentence of accused-appellant commenced on November 19, 1992 and that
the minimum term of the penalty was to expire on August 16, 1997.
 People vs. Real, G.R. No. 93436, March 24, 1995
(recidivism)

FACTS: At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant
and Edgardo Corpuz, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market table
to display their fish. Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the public
market, tried to pacify them, saying that they were arguing over trivial matters. The two protagonists
momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpuz raised his voice again and said something to
appellant. The latter, in a soft voice, “You are being too oppressive”. When Corpus kept on walking to
and from near the disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself.
Once Corpus turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The
blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic but died two days later.

Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation and anger when the
victim threw his fish in the presence of so many people. The trial convicted appellant and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00
and costs.

ISSUE: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of recidivism was present.

RULING: The ruling of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.

In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]).
In reiteracion, the offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]). Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime
different in kind from that for which he was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences
and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).

Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight)
and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the
instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-
treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is
recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.

Reiteracion requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal
or greater penalty than the one for which the accused has been convicted.

There is no reiteracion because that circumstances requires that the previous offenses should not be
embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall in a title (Title Nine) different from
homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating circumstance
requires that if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater
penalty than the one for which the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove
that the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the
prosecution to that effect.

Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
 People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, March 13, 2017
(abuse of superior strength)

FACTS: At around past 5:00 a.m. of January 1, 2012, Arnie Bañaga (Bañaga) was selling tapsilog to a
group of persons playing cara y cruz at the corner of an alley in Muntinlupa City. Thereupon, Bañaga
saw the accused-appellants and Valencia arrive and ask the group if they know Enrico Enriquez
(Enrico), to which they answered in the negative. Thereupon, the accused-appellants and Valencia went
to the tricycle terminal, which was about 10 to 15 meters away, where they saw Enrico. They then
simultaneously attacked Enrico. Villanueva punched Enrico on the face twice while Sayson hit the
latter at the back of the head with a stone wrapped in a t-shirt. Valencia then stabbed Enrico on the left
side of his armpit twice. The assailants thereafter fled.

Barangay Police Djohann Gonzales was on duty in their office at the Barangay Hall of Putatan,
Muntinlupa City. Gonzales then received a call requesting their assistance on a stabbing incident at the
tricycle terminal. Gonzales saw a bloodied man, identified as Villanueva, being held by the tricycle
drivers. Gonzales brought Villanueva to the Barangay Hall where the stabbing incident was recorded in
the barangay police blotter. Villanueva was brought to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) office
of the Muntinlupa City Police Station where Villanueva’s sister arrived and informed the authorities
that Sayson was still in their house in Purok 1, Bayanan, Muntinlupa City. Antonio Enriquez, Enrico’s
brother, was also at the police station when Villanueva was brought there. Enrico was brought to the
Muntinlupa Medical Center, but he was declared dead on arrival. The trial court rule the crim of
MURDER and AFFIRMED the decision of Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present.

RULING: Decison of Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The

The fact that the accused-appellants and Valencia, armed with a knife and a stone, ganged up on Enrico
does not automatically merit the conclusion that the latter’s killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of abuse of superior strength. In People v. Beduya, et al., brothers Ric and Elizer Beduya
were charged for the death of Dominador Acope, Sr.; it was shown that Ric slapped the victim while
Elizer stabbed the latter. The Court, elucidating on the proper appreciation of the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength, ruled that: Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se
establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants
purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take
advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means
of defense available to the person attacked.

Mere superiority in numbers does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. In this case, the
prosecution failed to present evidence as regards the relative disparity in age, size, strength or force
between the accused-appellants and Valencia, on one hand, and Enrico, on the other. Indeed, the lower
courts merely inferred the existence of qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength on the
facts that Enrico was attacked by three assailants, the accused-appellants and Valencia, who were
armed with a knife and a stone.
 People vs. Macaspac, G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017
(evident premeditation)

FACTS: At around 8:00 in the evening of July 7, 1988, Macaspac was having drinks with Ricardo
Surban, Dionisio Barcomo alias Boy, Jimmy Reyes, and Jebulan on Pangako Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In the course of their drinking, an argument ensued between Macaspac and Jebulan. It
became so heated. After around three minutes Macaspac returned wielding a kitchen knife. He
confronted and taunted Jebulan. At that point, Macaspac suddenly stabbed Jebulan on the lower right
area of his chest, and ran away. Surban and the others witnessed the stabbing of Jebulan. The badly
wounded Jebulan was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. Macaspac initially
invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession of the knife, and
that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he seized control of the knife.

Macaspac initially invoked self-defense, testifying that he and Jebulan had scuffled for the possession
of the knife, and that he had then stabbed Jebulan once he seized control of the knife,

ISSUE: Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was present.

RULING: The accused is guilty of HOMICIDE.

Was the lapse of time between the determination and execution — a matter of three (3) minutes, based
on the records — sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act? By quickly
returning to the group with the knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his
resolve to carry out his criminal intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to
commit the crime. As such, the third requisite was absent. The requisites for the appreciation of
evident premeditation are: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3) the
lapse of sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.

Macaspac’s having suddenly left the group and his utterance of Hintayin n’yo ako d’yan, wawalisin ko
kayo marked the time of his resolve to commit the crime. His returning to the group with the knife
manifested his clinging to his resolve to inflict lethal harm on the others. The first and second elements
of evident premeditation were thereby established. But it is the essence of this circumstance that the
execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolve to carry out
the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at calm judgment. Was the lapse of time
between the determination and execution — matter of three minutes, based on the records — sufficient
to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act? By quickly returning to the group with the
knife, he let no appreciable time pass to allow him to reflect upon his resolve to carry out his criminal
intent. It was as if the execution immediately followed the resolve to commit the crime. As such, the
third requisite was absent.