Belgica v.

Executive Secretary

* FACTS: 

HISTORY

In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly referred to
as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork Barrel”). However,
it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced
from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the
Marcos period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the
Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to

the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference
shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified under the
MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority
list, standard or design within ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary legislative
district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for infrastructure
projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1;
and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed under
Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed under Item B,
the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the use and
release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester
and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to approve
realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this Fund, subject to
the following: (i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing unit and same
project category as the original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM
must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof:
PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same classification of soft or
hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of
realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned
shall certify that the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the
BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the
DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and
the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the implementing
agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and the limits prescribed under Special
Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12,
Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular
budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.

* ISSUES:

A. Procedural Issues

1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable
controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to judicial review

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez  (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on  Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
v.  Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of
the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res judicata  and stare decisis

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:

(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and

(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund,

are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:

A. Procedural Issues

No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and
decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very  lis mota of the case.

1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The

requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties
on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these consolidated cases
are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization –
such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.

As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot
and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no
more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the
2014 budget, and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally
effective and existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.

Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and

academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of

petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the
principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.

ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved: This is
also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality of the very system within
which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to be utilized and
expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of paramount
public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws
have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and the government’s own recognition that reforms are
needed “to address the reported abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern
of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter.

It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the
constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the purpose of validating the
existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under
the CoA Report to be sufficient.

iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive
ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to formulate controlling
principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public,
not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so
that the government may be guided on how public funds should be utilized in accordance
with constitutional principles.

iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are spent, if not
resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the Constitution itself
has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along constitutional
lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it is
an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the
Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith
(Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).

3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come before the
Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that they “dutifully
contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the requisite standing to
question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay have been
and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if
the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.

Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues
they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA Chairperson’s statement during the
Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure” but a “complete
breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than
the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered
by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second
actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. This required
identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa  and LAMP involved constitutional challenges against
the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a
dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res
judicata  cannot apply.

On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated
as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa  was a limited response to
a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment
identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more
holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with each
other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-
enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related
to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment.
The complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.

In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis.  Since
the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially
abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification
authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory.

Again, since LAMP  was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling
doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases, stare decisis would
not apply.

B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”

1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify

the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed
from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4. Legislators have
also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under
the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF
Article).

Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various

operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual
activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle.
That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of
the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court
also points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.

In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement
of the budget, the Court also declared that informal practices, through which legislators have
effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.

2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in
Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the
Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular  Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a certain
sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also
determine. Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described
in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does
not, however, allow.

3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective

allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would
then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate
PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are made by
legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of
PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As
petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79
Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be
consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all
other legislators with legitimate projects.

Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere
funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control,
etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the
appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.

The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of
said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are
vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they
themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of
Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his
pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.

The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the
individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed,
while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest,
the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular
facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation, may
affect the process of  impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not
strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of
judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to the
qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by and of
itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative
or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on
political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it
has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political
dynasties.

6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the avowed
intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa,  1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF
allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative
of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district representative of a far-
flung rural province which would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork
Barrel as well.

The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts
with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated
to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development,
and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are
instrumentalities whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund:  The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it
reads, the said phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.

That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and exploitation
programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the
general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or
of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from
which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and,
third, the Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited only to
“energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”

However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance
energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains
legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding  the Presidential Social Fund:  Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that
the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.”

The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated
purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure
project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the
priority infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since –
similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the
delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.

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 GR No. 42821, Jan 18, 1936 ]

JUAN BENGZON v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE +

MALCOLM, J.:
This case  was brought by  a former justice of the peace to test the validity of
the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act  No. 4051, the
Retirement Gratuity Law. In the trial court the  petition  for a writ of 
mandamus directed to the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor was 
dismissed.   Thereupon the losing party appealed.

The facts, as  stipulated disclose  the  following:  Juan Bengzon, the
petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912.  Having reached the age of sixty-
five, he ceased to hold this position on January 14, 1933, by reason of  the
provisions  of Act No. 3899. On that date, acting pursuant to instructions 
received from the Judge of First Instance for the district, he turned over 
the office of justice of  the peace to the auxiliary  justice of  the peace of the
municipality.  Subsequently  the petitioner  addressed communications to
the Secretary of Justice, the Governor-General, and  the Insular Auditor
applying for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but all of  these officials  advised
him that he was not entitled to the  benefits of the Act.  Accordingly, on
March 7, 1934, the instant complaint  was filed with  the Court of First
Instance of Manila.

Act No. 4051  is  entitled, "An Act to provide for  the payment of retirement 
gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular  Government retired
from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel
thereof, including the  justices of the  peace who must relinquish office in
accordance  with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred
and  ninety-nine, and for other purposes."  The body of the Act provides in
several sections for the officers and employees who may be granted
gratuities thereunder, the rates of gratuities to be paid, and  other matters.  
Among these sections, as the bill passed the Philippine Legislature, was
section  7, reading:  "The justices of the peace who must relinquish office
during the year nineteen  hundred and thirty-three in accordance with  the
provisions of Act  Numbered  Thirty-eight  hundred  and ninety-nine, shall
also be entitled to the gratuities provided for  in this  Act."  Following this 
is section  10, reading: "The necessary sum to carry out the purposes of this
Act is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not
otherwise appropriated/'  and section 12 reading: "If, for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act is  disapproved by the Governor-General  or
is challenged  in a  competent court and is held  to be unconstitutional  or
invalid, none of the other sections or provisions  hereof  shall  be affected
thereby and such  other sections  and provisions shall continue to  govern
as if the section  or  provision  so disapproved or held invalid had never
been incorporated in this  Act."  The Act was "approved"  by  the Governor-
General,  "section 7  excepted, February 21, 1933."   The Philippine
Legislature accepted the veto.

Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29,
1916, established the practice for the enactment  of a  law, including the
sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General.  Specifically it 
provided: "The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any
particular item  or  items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object"  The Constitution of
the Philippines, article  VI, section 11 (2) contains an exactly similar
provision, except that the words  "The President" are substituted for  the
words "The Governor-General," and except that succeeding sentences in the
Constitution prescribed the procedure for vetoing one  or  more  items of an
appropriation bill in a more explicit manner.

The first thought  that occurs to one  in resolving  the appeal of  the
petitioner is that, within the meaning of section  7 of Act No.  4051, on the
assumption that it be restored to the law by the judiciary, he has not shown
himself to  be  a justice of the peace who was forced to relinquish  office
during the year 1933.   At least, he did  not take steps to vindicate an alleged
right as did the justices of the peace of the municipality of Malinao, Albay,
and the municipality of Alabat, Tayabas.   (Regalado vs. Yulo [1935], 61
Phil.,  173;  Tanada  vs. Yulo [1935],  61 Phil., 515.)  However,  this  point 
has not  been advanced by the  Government either in the  lower  court or on
appeal, and so it would seem to be inappropriate to manufacture a  defense
for the respondents.

Something might also be made of the proposition on which the trial judge
relied for dismissal and which is brought info view by the first assigned
error.  In other words, since the  duty which the petitioner  claims is
enjoined by law upon the respondents not only does not exist but would
require the intervention of the Governor-General, who is not a party, to
exist, no cause of action is made out.  This, however, merely results in
hiding behind a technicality to keep the parties from securing the opinion
of the courts on the  main issue.  We prefer  to satisfy the petitioner by
ruling on the  question  suggested by the first sentence of this decision and 
which is raised squarely by the. second assigned error.

The Governor-General purported to act pursuant to the portion of section

19 of the  Organic  Act which  is above quoted.  The  key  words of that
sentence are  "appropriation bill" and  "item  or items."  An appropriation is
the setting apart by law of  a certain sum from the public revenue for a
specified purpose.  An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and
severable parts of the  appropriation  or of the bill.  No  set form of words is
needed to make out an appropriation or  an item.   (State vs. Moore [1896],
50 Neb., 88; Callaghan vs. Boyce [1915], 17 Ariz., 433.)

Within the  meaning of these  words, is Act No.  4051 an appropriation bill? 
Are there particular items in  that bill which the  Governor-General could 
constitutionally veto? We are led to answer both questions in the 
affirmative.

The former  Organic  Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines
make the  Chief Executive  an  integral part of the law-making power.  His
disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a  legislative
act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are
precisely the same as those the legislature must deter- mine  in  passing a
bill, except that his will be a broader point of  view.

The Constitution is a limitation upon the power  of the legislative

department of the government, put in this respect  it is a grant of power to
the executive  department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to 
enact laws; the Chief Executive  has the negative  power  by the 
constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature.  It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. 
But in exercising  that authority he may not be  confined to rules of strict 
construction or hampered  by the  unwise  interference of the judiciary. 
The courts  will indulge  every intendment in favor of the constitutionality
of a veto the same as  they will presume the constitutionality of an  act as
originally passed by the  Legislature.  (Commonwealth  vs. Barnett [1901],
199 Pa., 161; 55 L. R. A., 882; People vs. Board of Councilmen  [1892], 20 N.
Y. S., 52; Fulmore vs. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. vs. State [1927],
53 A. L. R., 258.)

In  determining whether or not  the Governor-General stepped outside the

boundaries of his legislative functions, when he attempted to veto one
section of Act No. 4051, while approving the rest of the bill,  we are not
without the aid of the construction placed on his .action by both legislative
and executive departments.  That the  Philippine Legislature intended Act
No. 4051 to be an appropriation measure with various items is apparent
from a reading of section 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the
possibility  of a  partial veto of the bill by  the  Chief Executive. Not only
this, but  after the Chief Executive took action, the Legislature made  no
attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being  the
section which the Governor-General had eliminated.  Then the same
question came  again before the executive department, and all of its officials
united in sustaining the validity  of the Governor-General's veto.

While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet

where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative
department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive
department, it is entitled to great respect. It is our understanding that it has
been the practice of the Chief Executive in the interpretation of his
constitutional powers to  veto separate items  in  bills analogous to that
before us, and that this  practice has been acquiesced in previously without
objection, so that it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality for
the courts to declare against  it.  Since, therefore,  legislative intent and
executive purpose is evident, it devolves  upon the judiciary to give
deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of
the Government.

Viewed from another direction, there  can  be no doubt that Act No. 4051 is 
an appropriation bill.  That is manifest from its provisions, and particularly
from section 10 by  which the  necessary sum to carry out the purposes of
the Act was "hereby  appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury
not otherwise appropriated."   It has, how- ever,  been faintly suggested that
by an appropriation bill is meant a general  appropriation  bill.   We are
shown nothing  substantial to  support  this allegation.  Unlike in other
constitutions, the word "general" was omitted, and we presume 
intentionally, from the  Organic Act  and  the Constitution.  Under such
conditions, the courts would not be authorized to insert a word and by so
doing amend the law.
The same considerations hold true with regard to the question of whether 
or not there was a particular  item which the Governor-General could
validly veto.   No further action by  the  Legislature  was contemplated.  The 
accounting officers would have experienced  no difficulty in setting up the
different items provided for under Act No. 4051.  It would have been a facile
matter to eliminate the money needed  to make section  7 thereof effective. 
The Chief Executive had the right to object to the expenditure of money for
a specified purpose and amount without being under the necessity of at the
same time refusing to agree to other expenditures which met with his entire
approval, and that intention was unequivocably expressed.

We have gone to the trouble to examine all of the authorities cited by the
parties and other authorities not brought to our attention by them.  It will
be found that in practically all of these cases there was a conflict between
the legislative and executive departments which the judiciary had to
decide.   Here there is no such  conflict, but unison between the two.  Here
on  the  contrary  the  judiciary is asked to take the initiative and to restore
a section to a law against the explicit confirmation of executive authority by
the Legislature and against explicit action taken by the Chief Executive.  In
our opinion, it was never intended by a mere process of reasoning,  however
plausible,  for the courts to breathe life into a portion  of an Act which has
not been given life by the other departments of the government acting  in
conformity with the Constitution.

Deciding, therefore, the  main  issue as  requested by the petitioner and
appellant, we are constrained to rule against him and to hold that the veto
by the Governor-General of section  7 of Act No. 4051  was in  conformity
with the legislative purpose and the provisions of  the Organic  Act. For this
reason, the judgment brought on appeal will be affirmed, without special
pronouncement as to the costs in either instance.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING OPINION
VILLA-REAL, J., :

The phrase  "any particular item or  items of an appropriation bill" used in
section 19 of the Jones Law refers to an appropriation bill which is
composed of several items of appropriation and not to one. which contains
only an item of appropriation.

Act No. 4051, as its title indicates, is "An Act to provide for the payment of
retirement gratuities to officers  and employees  of the Insular Government 
retired from the service as  a result of the reorganization or reduction of
personnel thereof, including the justices of  the  peace who must relinquish
office  in accordance with  the  provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight
hundred and ninety-nine, and  for other purposes."  In other words, said
Act is a gratuity law, appropriating in  its section 10 the necessary sum to
pay the gratuities therein granted.

Outside of section 10 there is no other provision or item appropriating any

other sum of money which may be considered an  item of an appropriation.

Paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of section 1 classify the officers and employees
who shall be entitled to gratuity and establish the rate thereon according to
salary and years of service.

Section 2 establishes the preference in the  separation and retirement of

employees.

Section 3 determines the salary  on which the  gratuity should be based.

Section  4 gives the  separated or retired employee  and officer the  choice 
between the present gratuity law  and other gratuity laws  under which they
may be  entitled to gratuity.

Section 5 designates the person to whom  payment of gratuity shall be made

in case of death.

Section 6 establishes the conditions under which a separated or retired

officer or employee under the law may be reappointed.
Section 7 extends the benefit  of the law to justices of the peace under
certain  conditions.

Section 8 provides that the offices and  positions created shall be 
considered abolished ipso  facto,  with certain exceptions.

Section 9 excludes from the benefit of the law officers and employees who
have voluntarily retired.

Section 10 appropriates the necessary sum for the payment of the

gratuities.

Section 11 fixes the  date on which the law shall take effect.

Section 12 provides that the disapproval by the Governor-General of any

section or provision of the Act,  or the declaration of unconstitutionality of
the same shall not affect the other sections.

It will  be seen that none of the  sections above enumerated, except section
10, contains any appropriation of money.

All the twelve sections of Act No. 4051, with the exception of section 10,
contain only  conditions under  which the money appropriated in  said
section  10  may be paid. If this is true, the vetoing by the  Governor-
General  of section 7 which extends the gratuity payment in said law to
justices of the peace is unauthorized by the Constitution because,  as stated
above, it contains  no  appropriation of money but a mere designation of the
officers to whom the money appropriated may be paid.

In the  case of State vs.  Holder  (76 Miss., 168; 28 So. Rep., 643), the
question was whether the following endorsement and qualified approval of
"An act to appropriate money for the  support and  maintenance of the
Industrial Institute and College for the years 1898 and  1899," was
constitutional or not:

" 'I approve that part of this bill preceding the word "provided," in the first
section; and approve the suggestion in said section that by-laws provide for
equal dormitory privileges to  all pupils, whether taking industrial or
academic courses,  single  or together; and I approve that  part of said
section providing for the expenditures of said money under the direction or 
approval of the trustees,  and for report thereof to the legislature; and I
approve section 2. The  other parts, by authority of section 73 of the  state
constitution, I disapprove.   *  *  *"

Section 73 of the Constitution of the State of Mississippi provides as

follows:

"Sec. 73. The  governor  may veto parts of  any appropriation bill,  and 
approve  parts  of the  same and the portions approved shall  be law."

The law in question reads as follows:

"An act to appropriate money for the support and maintenance of the
Industrial Institute and College for the years 1898 and 1899.

"Section U Be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Mississippi, that

the following sums of money be and the same are hereby appropriated out
of any money in the treasury not otherwise  appropriated, for the support
and maintenance of the Industrial Institute & College:     

"For salaries of teachers and officers:  

   
For the year 1898 120,490.00
For the year 1899 20,490.00
For extending sewer 1,600.00
For painting building and repairs 1,600.00
Trustees' meetings, commencement exercises, printing,
800.00
etc.

"All of said amounts to  be drawn by draft of the  president of the college,
approved  by the governor  and the auditor  of public accounts, and  the
auditor shall issue his warrant on the state treasurer for the said several
sums: provided that no part of the money hereby appropriated for wages 
or  salaries shall be available unless the board of trustees shall first adopt
and  enact rules and by-laws to the following effect: First.  Conferring upon
the president of the college the  power to recommend  to the board of
trustees all  the teachers who may  hereafter be employed, and to select  and
remove other  employees  who  are not teachers, and giving the president
the authority  for sufficient cause in his discretion to remove or suspend
any member of the faculty subject to the approval of the trustees.   Second.
Conferring upon the president of the college subject to the approval of the
trustees to arrange and specify the course of study and to fix the schedules
of studies and classes and to establish rules  of discipline for the
government of the pupils.  Third.  By-laws providing for equal  dormitory
privileges to all pupils whether taking industrial or academic courses, singly
or together, and by-laws  to enforce the faithful discharge of  duties of all
officers, professors or employees, and before the auditor shall issue any
warrant under this act, the board of trustees shall file with the auditor a
certified  copy of their action  complying with the above conditions.  All of
said money  to be expended  under the direction or approval of the trustees
of the college, and a report  of  the  expenditures  made to the legislature."

In deciding the case the Supreme  Court of  Mississippi said in part the
following:

"Section 73 of the Constitution relates to general appropriation bills, or

those containing several items of distinct appropriations; that is to say,
special appropriation  bills, with distinct items of appropriations.  It 
applies to such as are made up of parts, and consist of portions separable
from each other as appropriations.   It was not designed to  enable the 
governor  to veto objectionable legislation in appropriation bills, for that is 
provided for in section 69.  *  *  *"

The same court, in another portion of the decision, said the following:

"*   *  *   The signing of  the bill by the governor was qualified in  the act
and  on the  enrolled bill, and did not become law in part, because it was
not an approval of  parts and disapproval  of parts of  such a bill, as is in
view in section 73 of the constitution; the bill in this case, in the parts
vetoed, not being an  appropriation  bill, within  its meaning,  and not being
a veto of parts of distinct and separable appropriations.   To hold that the
bill became law as a whole would be to make it so without the governor's
approval, and in the face of his disapproval, of the conditions.  Both
legislative declaration and executive approval are essential prerequisites  to
the enactment of any law.

"The action of the governor having been unconstitutional, and therefore

void, his action in dealing with the bill was a nullity; but the legislature
having  adjourned within five days  after the  presentation of the  bill to the 
governor, the bill,  in legal contemplation, must be held to be yet in the
hands of the governor,  and may become law, unless sent back by him
within  three days after the  beginning of the next session of the legislature. 
*  *  *"

On the same principle and for the same  reason the veto of the Governor-
General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 which is not an item of appropriation is
null and void as in excess of the power granted to him by section 19 of  the
Jones Law.

The fact that section 12 of Act No. 4051 has provided that "If,  for any
reason, any  section or provision of this Act is disapproved by the Governor-
General or is challenged in a competent  court and is  held to be
unconstitutional or invalid, none of  the other sections or provisions hereof
shall be affected thereby and such other sections and provisions shall
continue to govern as  if the section  or provision so disapproved or held
invalid had never been incorporated in this Act," could not have rendered
valid and constitutional the disapproval  by the Governor-General of said
section 7; for the only power which the legislature has in case a bill is vetoed
by the Governor-General is to override  said veto by  a two-third vote of its
members and  it cannot ratify or validate  an invalid veto because of its
unconstitutionality.

It is suggested in the majority opinion that the Governor-General  having 

vetoed section 7 of Act No. 4051 and the Legislature not having overriden
said veto the presumption is that the act of the Governor-General was
constitutional and this court must respect said implied approval.  If such
doctrine  should  prevail, then the  executive may encroach upon the powers
of the legislature, and if the latter should acquiesce in said encroachment
either by sanctioning it in the bill which is the subject of encroachment or
by failing to override  said veto,  and the courts must  respect such
encroachment when the constitutionality of said bill is put in question,
then  the  judicial branch  of the  government Instead of being the guardian 
of the Constitution  will  become an  accomplice to its  violation, and the
rights of the people will have no protection.
For  the foregoing reasons, I am  of the opinion:  First, that while Act No.
4051 contains an appropriation to give it effect,  it is not an "appropriation
bill" containing itemized appropriations  and therefore  is not one which the
Governor-General  can veto  under the last paragraph of section 19 of the
Jones Law; second, that section 7 of Act No. 4051, which extends to justices
of the peace the gratuity granted in said Act, is a condition for the payment
of the money appropriated in section 10 thereof and  not an "item" of
appropriation, and,  therefore, the  disapproval of the same by the
Governor-General is unconstitutional and as such null and void; and
third,.that  the  proviso contained in section 12 of Act No. 4051 to the effect
that the disapproval of any of its  sections by the Governor- General shall 
not affect the rest  of the bill, did not and could not validate an
unconstitutional exercise of the veto power.

It is, therefore, the  opinion of the undersigned that the decision of the
lower court should be reversed and the writ granted.

Vickers, Butte, and  Goddard, JJ.:

We concur in the dissenting opinion of Justice Villa-Real.

PANGASINAN TRANSPO VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

FACTS: 
PANTRANCO, a holder of an existing Certificate of Public Convenience is applying to operate
additional buses with the Public Service Commission (PSC) has been engaged in transporting
passengers in certain provinces by means of public transportation utility. Patranc applied for
authorization to operate 10 additional trucks. The PSC granted the application but added several
conditions for PANTRANCO’s compliance. One is that the service can be acquired by
government upon payment of the cost price less depreciation, and that the certificate shall be
valid only for a definite period of time.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not PSC can impose said conditions. If so, wouldn’t this power of the PSC constitute
undue delegation of powers?

RULING:  

The Supreme Court held that there was valid delegation of powers.

The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action at the same
time forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers and
thereby obtain efficiency and prevent deposition. But due to the growing complexity of modern
life, the multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of
administering laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater
powers by the legislature, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of
“subordinate legislation.”

All that has been delegated to the Commission is the administrative function, involving the use
of discretion to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addition, the
promotion of public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
CASE NAME: BENGZON VS. THE SEC. OF JUSTICE
 
GR Number/ Case Date:
 L-42821 / January 18, 1936
Ponente:
 Malcolm, J.
Petitioners:
 Juan Bengzon
Respondents:
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor
Subject:
 Consti 1

Topic:
 Legislative Process

Rule of Law:
 
● Act No. 4051, Section 7
. "The justices of the peace who must relinquish office during the yearnineteen hundred and
thirty-three in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eighthundred and ninety-
nine, shall also be entitled to the gratuities provided for in this Act."
 
●Section 19 of the Organic Act and Article VI, Section 11 (2) of the 1935 Constitution
. "TheGovernor-
General (or President, in the ’35 Consti) shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items of an appropriation bill, but the object."
 
Doctrine:
 
●“The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as
theywill presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature.”
 
Facts:
●Petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for Lingayen, Pangasinan.
 
●Act No. 3899 compelled him to cease holding such position upon reaching the age of 65 on Jan
14,1933.
 
●He applied for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but was told that he wasn’t entitled thereto.
 
●Act No. 4051 (An Act to Provide for the Payment of Retirement Gratuities to Officers and
Employees
of the Insular Government…) was approved by the Governor 
-General, exercising his veto powers onsection 7. The Philippine Legislature accepted the veto.
 
Issues and Holding
:
Is Act No. 4051 an appropriation bill on which the Gov. Gen. or President can exercise his
right to veto?
YES.
It is with regard to the appropriation of funds in the Insular Treasury. Moreover, a section of the
Act provides for the qualif 
ication that the President’s veto of one portion thereof should not affect the rest of the un
-
vetoed sections. Such anticipation of the President’s veto implies the existence of such power to
veto.
 The legislature, by not opposing such veto, expressed acquiescence thereto.

Ruling:
 The veto of section 7 of Act No. 40151 was VALID.

Separate Opinions:Villa-Real, J.,

dissenting 
 
●An appropriation bill is composed of several items of appropriation and not one which only
containsone item.
 
●Act No. 4051 is a gratuity law, appropriating only the necessary sum to pay the granted
gratuities. None but one section of the Act contains anything about appropriation of funds.
 
oThe Chief Executive then has no veto powers over Act No. 4051, it not being an
appropriation bill.
 
●The section with regard to the disapproval of the Chief Executive of one section not affecting
theothers cannot validate such unconstitutional exercise of the veto power.

 
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G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects"
using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging
five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints
are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3)
implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas
project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking
that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which
provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya
Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist
order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary
Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress
 ISSUES:

1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of
powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political
dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are
unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:

1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of
project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional
oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the
sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be
confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of
the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers
guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the
budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a
sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the
Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT
INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖.
VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE
TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.