G.R. No.

82318 May 18, 1989

GILBERTO M. DUAVIT, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Acting through the Third Division, as Public Respondent, and
ANTONIO SARMIENTO, SR. & VIRGILIO CATUAR respondents.

Rodolfo d. Dela Cruz for petitioner.

Bito, Lozada, Ortega & Castillo for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition raises the sole issue of whether or not the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident
can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code when the said vehicle was neither driven by an
employee of the owner nor taken with the consent of the latter.

The facts are summarized in the contested decision, as follows:

From the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs, consisting of the testimonies of witnesses Virgilio
Catuar, Antonio Sarmiento, Jr., Ruperto Catuar, Jr. and Norberto Bernarte it appears that on July 28,
1971 plaintiffs Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. and Virgilio Catuar were aboard a jeep with plate number 77-
99-F-I Manila, 1971, owned by plaintiff, Ruperto Catuar was driving the said jeep on Ortigas
Avenue, San Juan, Rizal; that plaintiff's jeep, at the time, was running moderately at 20 to 35
kilometers per hour and while approaching Roosevelt Avenue, Virgilio Catuar slowed down; that
suddenly, another jeep with plate number 99-97-F-J Manila 1971 driven by defendant Oscar
Sabiniano hit and bumped plaintiff's jeep on the portion near the left rear wheel, and as a result of the
impact plaintiff's jeep fell on its right and skidded by about 30 yards; that as a result plaintiffs jeep
was damaged, particularly the windshield, the differential, the part near the left rear wheel and the
top cover of the jeep; that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar was thrown to the middle of the road; his wrist
was broken and he sustained contusions on the head; that likewise plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr.
was trapped inside the fallen jeep, and one of his legs was fractured.

Evidence also shows that the plaintiff Virgilio Catuar spent a total of P2,464.00 for repairs of the
jeep, as shown by the receipts of payment of labor and spare parts (Exhs. H to H-7 Plaintiffs likewise
tried to prove that plaintiff Virgilio Catuar, immediately after the accident was taken to Immaculate
Concepcion Hospital, and then was transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital; that while
plaintiff Catuar was not confined in the hospital, his wrist was in a plaster cast for a period of one
month, and the contusions on his head were under treatment for about two (2) weeks; that for
hospitalization, medicine and allied expenses, plaintiff Catuar spent P5,000.00.

Evidence also shows that as a result of the incident, plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. sustained
injuries on his leg; that at first, he was taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital (Exh. K but later he
was confined at the Makati Medical Center from July 29, to August 29, 1971 and then from
September 15 to 25, 1971; that his leg was in a plaster cast for a period of eight (8) months; and that
for hospitalization and medical attendance, plaintiff Antonio Sarmiento, Sr. spent no less than
P13,785.25 as evidenced by receipts in his possession. (Exhs. N to N-1).

Proofs were adduced also to show that plaintiff Antonio sarmiento Sr. is employed as Assistant
Accountant of the Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P1,200.00 a month; that as sideline he
also works as accountant of United Haulers Inc. with a salary of P500.00 a month; and that as a
result of this incident, plaintiff Sarmiento was unable to perform his normal work for a period of at
least 8 months. On the other hand, evidence shows that the other plaintiff Virgilio Catuar is a Chief
Clerk in Canlubang Sugar Estate with a salary of P500.00 a month, and as a result of the incident, he
was incapacitated to work for a period of one (1) month.

The plaintiffs have filed this case both against Oscar Sabiniano as driver, and against Gualberto
Duavit as owner of the jeep.

Defendant Gualberto Duavit, while admitting ownership of the other jeep (Plate No. 99-07-F-J
Manila, 1971), denied that the other defendant (Oscar Sabiniano) was his employee. Duavit claimed
that he has not been an employer of defendant Oscar Sabiniano at any time up to the present.
 On the other hand documentary and testimonial evidence show that defendant Oscar Sabiniano was
an employee of the Board of Liquidators from November 14, 1966 up to January 4, 1973 (Annex A
of Answer).

Defendant Sabiniano, in his testimony, categorically admitted that he took the jeep from the garage
of defendant Duavit without the consent or authority of the latter (TSN, September 7, 1978, p. 8). He
testified further, that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which Duavit
did not push through as his (Sabiniano's) parents apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

Defendant Oscar Sabiniano, on the other hand in an attempt to exculpate himself from liability,
makes it appear that he was taking all necessary precaution while driving and the accident occurred
due to the negligence of Virgilio Catuar. Sabiniano claims that it was plaintiffs vehicle which hit and
bumped their jeep. (Reno, pp. 21-23)

The trial court found Oscar Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but found no employer-employee
relationship between him and the petitioner because the latter was then a government employee and he took the
vehicle without the authority and consent of the owner. The petitioner was, thus, absolved from liability under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

The private respondents appealed the case.

On January 7, 1988, the Court of Appeals rendered the questioned decision holding the petitioner jointly and
severally liable with Sabiniano. The appellate court in part ruled:

We cannot go along with appellee's argument. It will be seen that in Vargas v. Langcay, supra, it was
held that it is immaterial whether or not the driver was actually employed by the operator of record
or registered owner, and it is even not necessary to prove who the actual owner of the vehicle and
who the employer of the driver is. When the Supreme Court ruled, thus: 'We must hold and consider
such owner-operator of record (registered owner) as the employer in contemplation of law, of the
driver,' it cannot be construed other than that the registered owner is the employer of the driver in
contemplation of law. It is a conclusive presumption of fact and law, and is not subject to rebuttal of
proof to the contrary. Otherwise, as stated in the decision, we quote:

The purpose of the principles evolved by the decisions in these matters will be defeated and thwarted
if we entertain the argument of petitioner that she is not liable because the actual owner and
employer was established by the evidence. . . .

Along the same vein, the defendant-appellee Gualberto Duavit cannot be allowed to prove that the driver
Sabiniano was not his employee at the time of the vehicular accident.

The ruling laid down in Amar V. Soberano (1966), 63 O.G. 6850, by this Court to the effect that the
burden of proving the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship is upon the defendant
and this he must do by a satisfactory preponderance of evidence, has to defer to the doctrines
evolved by the Supreme Court in cases of damages arising from vehicular mishaps involving
registered motor vehicle. (See Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226, 230). (Rollo, pp. 26-27)

The appellate court also denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner contends that the respondent appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in holding him
jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano in spite of the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between them and despite the fact that the petitioner's jeep was taken out of his garage and was driven by
Sabiniano without his consent.

As early as in 1939, we have ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident involving the
said vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not employed by him.
Thus, in Duquillo v. Bayot (67 Phil. 131-133-134) [1939] we said:

Under the facts established, the defendant cannot be held liable for anything. At the time of the
accident, James McGurk was driving the truck, and he was not an employee of the defendant, nor
did he have anything to do with the latter's business; neither the defendant nor Father Ayson, who
was in charge of her business, consented to have any of her trucks driven on the day of the accident,
as it was a holy day, and much less by a chauffeur who was not in charge of driving it; the use of the
defendant's truck in the circumstances indicated was done without her consent or knowledge; it may,
therefore, be said, that there was not the remotest contractual relation between the deceased Pio
 Duquillo and the defendant. It necessarily follows from all this that articles 1101 and following of
the Civil Code, cited by the appellant, have no application in this case, and, therefore, the errors
attributed to the inferior court are without basis.

The Court upholds the above ruling as still relevant and better applicable to present day circumstances.

The respondent court's misplaced reliance on the cases of Erezo v. Jepte (102 Phil. 103 [1957] and Vargas v.
Langcay (6 SCRA 174 [1962]) cannot be sustained. In the Erezo case, Jepte, the registered owner of the truck
which collided with a taxicab, and which resulted in the killing of Erezo, claimed that at the time of the
accident, the truck belonged to the Port Brokerage in an arrangement with the corporation but the same was not
known to the Motor Vehicles Office. This Court sustained the trial court's ruling that since Jepte represented
himself to be the owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicles Office, relying on his representation, registered the
vehicle in his name, the Government and all persons affected by the representation had the right to rely on his
declaration of ownership and registration. Thus, even if Jepte were not the owner of the truck at the time of the
accident, he was still held liable for the death of Erezo significantly, the driver of the truck was fully authorized
to drive it.

Likewise, in the Vargas case, just before the accident occurred Vargas had sold her jeepney to a third person, so
that at the time of the accident she was no longer the owner of the jeepney. This court, nevertheless, affirmed
Vargas' liability since she failed to surrender to the Motor Vehicles Office the corresponding AC plates in
violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law and Commonwealth Act No. 146. We further ruled that the
operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle in contemplation of law, as regards the public and
third persons, and as such is responsible for the consequences incident to its operator. The vehicle involved was
a public utility jeepney for hire. In such cases, the law does not only require the surrender of the AC plates but
orders the vendor operator to stop the operation of the jeepney as a form of public transportation until the matter
is reported to the authorities.

As can be seen, the circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case. Herein
petitioner does not deny ownership of the vehicle involved in tire mishap but completely denies having
employed the driver Sabiniano or even having authorized the latter to drive his jeep. The jeep was virtually
stolen from the petitioner's garage. To hold, therefore, the petitioner liable for the accident caused by the
negligence of Sabiniano who was neither his driver nor employee would be absurd as it would be like holding
liable the owner of a stolen vehicle for an accident caused by the person who stole such vehicle. In this regard,
we cannot ignore the many cases of vehicles forcibly taken from their owners at gunpoint or stolen from
garages and parking areas and the instances of service station attendants or mechanics of auto repair shops
using, without the owner's consent, vehicles entrusted to them for servicing or repair.

We cannot blindly apply absolute rules based on precedents whose facts do not jibe four square with pending
cases. Every case must be determined on its own peculiar factual circumstances. Where, as in this case, the
records of the petition fail to indicate the slightest indicia of an employer-employee relationship between the
owner and the erring driver or any consent given by the owner for the vehicle's use, we cannot hold the owner
liable.

We, therefore, find that the respondent appellate court committed reversible error in holding the petitioner
jointly and severally liable with Sabiniano to the private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision and resolution appealed from are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Laguna, 8th Judicial District, Branch 6, dated July 30, 1981 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.