VOTING

The Mathematics of Elections

IN-PERSPECTIVE
• Focus of this lesson is neither politics nor the concept of voting
or election as a democratic process.

• “It’s not the voting that’s democracy; it’s the counting.”

- Tom Stoppard
• How do we analyze individual votes to come up with a
collective choice?

• How does the analysis process work?

• Is this process always fair?

ELEMENTS OF AN ELECTION
• The purpose of an election is to choose from a set of
candidates.
• The voters are the people who get a say in the outcome of the
election.
• A ballot is a device by means of which a voter gets to express
his or her opinion of the candidates.
- single-choice ballot (‘pick the best’)
- preference ballot (‘rank candidates’)
- truncated preference ballot (‘rank some candidates’)
 SAMPLE BALLOTS
Single-Choice Ballot Preference Ballot Truncated Preference Ballot
Choose one candidate: Rank all candidates in List the top 3 candidates in
order of preference order of preference:
__ Candidate A
Candidate A 4th 1st Candidate A
__ Candidate B
Candidate B 2nd 2nd Candidate C
__ Candidate C
Candidate C 1st 3rd Candidate E
__ Candidate D
Candidate D 3rd
Preference Ballot
List candidates in order of
preference:
1st Candidate C
2nd Candidate B
3rd Candidate D
4th Candidate A
ELEMENTS OF AN ELECTION
• The purpose of an election is to use information from ballots
to produce an outcome.
- winner-only outcome
- partial ranking
- full ranking
• The voting method is the method to be used in tabulating the
ballots and in producing outcomes.
PREFERENCE SCHEDULE
• It summarizes the number of votes that the different orders of
preference got.

• Example: Consider an election with 4 candidates A, B, C, and D.

Number of
votes
14 10 8 4 1

1st A C D B C
2nd B B C D D
3rd C D B C B
4th D A A A A
ALTERNATIVE PREFERENCE SCHEDULE
• A preference schedule where the first column contains the list
of candidates instead of the possible rankings. The entries in
the table are the possible rankings.

• In the previous slide, an alternative preference schedule would

be
Number of 14 10 8 4 1
votes
A 1 4 4 4 4
B 2 2 3 1 3
C 3 1 2 3 1
D 4 3 1 2 2
Exercise
Write the preference schedule for the given alternative
preference schedule below.

Number of 37 36 24 13 5
votes
A 3 1 2 4 3
B 1 2 1 2 5
C 4 4 5 3 1
D 5 3 3 5 4
E 2 5 4 1 2
Exercise
Construct the alternative preference schedule for the given
preference schedule below.

Number of 14 10 8 7 4
votes
1st B B A D E
2nd A D B C B
3rd E A E B A
4th D E D E C
5th C C C A D
TIES
• It is possible to have ties and the tie must be settled.
• In some elections, ties are allowed to stand and need not to be
broken
• In other situations, especially in elections for political office
(president, senator, mayor, city council, etc.), ties cannot be
allowed, and then a tie-breaking rule must be specified.
 \\

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22551218

“By law, an election tie will have to be broken by

drawing of lots. And that could be done either through
coin toss, drawing of straws or cards from a pack, or
bingo balls”
The Plurality Method
• Most commonly used and simplest method
• Comparing first-place votes each candidate gets
• The candidate with the most number of votes is declared the
winner
• Disadvantages:
- majority sometimes is not achieved
- problem of insincere voters
- candidates preferred by voters over all other
candidates (Condorcet candidate) may not win
Example (Plurality Method)
Determine the winner using Plurality Method from the given
preference schedule below.

Number of voters 49 48 3
1st R H F
2nd H S H
3rd F O S
4th O F O
5th S R R
Example (Problems in Plurality Method)
From the previous example,

Note that the winner (candidate R) did not get the majority
(50% + 1) of the total votes

Note that by making pairwise comparisons, candidate H beats

all the others, i.e., H is a Condorcet candidate.
The Borda Count Method
• Second most commonly used method for determining the
winner of an election
• Named after Frenchman Jean-Charles de Borda
• Each place or rank is assigned a point; 1 point for the last
place, 2 points for the second to the last, and so on.
• Points are tallied for each candidate
• Candidate with the highest tallied point is the winner
Example (Borda Count Method)
•Find the winner in the given preference schedule below by
using the Borda Count Method.
Number of 14 10 8 4 1
votes
1st A C D B C
2nd B B C D D
3rd C D B C B
4th D A A A A

•Is the winner the same if Plurality Method is used instead?

Exercise (Borda Count)
Determine the winner in the given preference schedule below
using Borda Count Method.

Number of voters 49 48 3
1st R H F
2nd H S H
3rd F O S
4th O F O
5th S R R

•Is the winner the same if Plurality Method is used instead?

Plurality-with-Elimination
Each person votes for his or her favorite candidate (or choice). If
a candidate receives a majority of votes, that candidate is
declared the winner. If no candidate receives a majority, then the
candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated and a new election
is held. This process continues until a candidate receives a
majority of the votes.
A B C D

FREQUENCY 90 85 100 125

PERCENTAGE 22.5% 21.25% 25% 31.25%

A C D

FREQUENCY 90 95 215

PERCENTAGE 22.5% 23.75% 53.75%

Plurality-with-Elimination Method ( or
IRV)
Also known as ‘instant runoff voting’ (IRV), ranked choice voting
(RCV)

Used to cure the problem in Plurality Method where a

candidate who received non-majority votes wins

Preferred method over runoff or re-election since runoff/re-

election is more expensive
Steps in Plurality-with-Elimination (or IRV)
•Round 1: Count the first-place votes for each candidate. If a
candidate has a majority first-place votes, then this candidate is
the winner. Otherwise, eliminate the candidate/s with the least
first-place votes.
•Round 2: Cross out the eliminated candidate from the
preference schedule and transfer those votes to the next
eligible candidates on those ballots. Recount the votes. If a
candidate has a majority then declare that candidate the
winner. Otherwise, eliminate the candidate with the fewest
votes.
•Round 3, 4,…: Repeat the process until a candidate receives a
majority vote.
 Example (Plurality-with-Elimination or
IRV)
Implement the steps in the Plurality-with-Elimination Method to
determine the winner from the given preference schedule
below.

Number of 93 44 10 30 42 81
voters
1st A B C C D E
2nd B D A E C D
3rd C E E B E C
4th D C B A A D
5th E A D D B A
Method of Pairwise Comparisons
For each possible comparison between candidates, give 1 point
to the winner, 0 points to the loser
If pairwise comparison ends up with a tie, each candidate
receives ½ point
Candidate with the most points is the winner
Condorcet candidates can also be determined right away
Pairwise comparison Votes Winner
Example (Pairwise Comparison)
Determine the winner in the given preference schedule by using
Pairwise Comparison Method.

Number of 14 10 8 4 1
votes
1st A C D B C
2nd B B C D D
3rd C D B C B
4th D A A A A
Exercise

Percent of 25 21 15 12 10 9 8
voters
1st C E B A C C C
2nd E D D D D B E
3rd D B E B E A D
4th A A C E A E B
5th B C A C B D A
ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
• American Economist Kenneth Arrow
• What would it take for a voting method to at least be a fair
voting method?

1. MAJORITY CRITERION – A candidate should be declared a

winner if that the candidate obtains the majority of the
votes.

2. CONDORCET CRITERION – If there is a choice that is

preferred in every one-to-one comparison with the other
choices, that choice should be declared as the winner.
(Condorcet winner/candidate)
ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
3. MONOTONICITY CRITERION - If voters change their votes to
increase the preference of a candidate, it should not harm
that candidate’s chances of winning.

4. INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES (IIA)

CRITERION – If a non-winning candidate is removed from the
ballot (or a new candidate is introduced), it should not
change the winner of the election.
ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
NUMBER OF
6 2 3
VOTERS
1ST A B C
2ND B C D
3RD C D B
4TH D A A

THE BORDA COUNT VIOLATES THE MAJORITY CRITERION!

ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Number of voters 49 48 3
1st R H F
2nd H S H
3rd F O S
4th O F O
5th S R R

THE PLURALITY METHOD VIOLATES THE CONDORCET CRITERION!

ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Number of votes 7 8 10 2
1st A B C A
2nd B C A C
3rd C A B B

Number of votes 7 8 10 2
1st A B C C
2nd B C A A
3rd C A B B

THE PLURALITY-WITH-ELIMINATION VIOLATES THE

MONOTONICITY CRITERION!
ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Number 2 6 4 1 1 4 4
of voters
1st A B B C C D E
2nd D A A B D A C
3rd C C D A A E D
4th B D E D B C B
5th E E C E E B A
ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
Number 2 6 4 1 1 4 4
of voters
1st A B B B D D E
2nd D A A A A A D
3rd B D D D B E B
4th E E E E E B A

PAIRWISE COMPARISON VOLATES IIA!

ARROW’S FAIRNESS CRITERIA
CRITERION Plurality Borda Count PWE Pairwise
Majority ✓  ✓ ✓
Condorcet    ✓
Monotonicity ✓ ✓  ✓
IIA    

ARROW’S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM

“It is impossible to create any system of voting (involving 3 or
more candidates) that satisfy all the four fairness criteria”
IMPORTANT GENERAL THEMES
• Elections are ubiquitous.

• There are many different voting methods.

• Different voting methods can produce different outcomes.

• Fairness in voting is elusive.