historia

scribble 12 (2020)

Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of

Independence

Moritz Oberhollenzer

Core area: contemporary history

submitted to: Ass.-Prof. Mag. Dr. Eric Burton submitted in:

SoSe 2019

Rubric: Proseminar work

Abstract

Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence

This paper is about the involvement of Winfried “Mustapha” Müller in the Algerian War of Independence from
1954 to 1962. It will focus on how his work for the FLN ( Front de Liberation Nationale) helped in the struggle
for Algerian independence from the French motherland. In this context it incorporates a transnational
perspective on how the war could be won not only by the fighters of the FLN, but also by people fueling the
international discussion talking about the war.

1. introduction

In November 1954 the Algerian War of Independence broke out. 1 It would be eight years before Algeria finally achieved
political independence from the French mother country. 2 Depending on the source, between 150,000 came in this war

1 Daniel Panagiotopoulos, Life in the Foreign Legion after 1945. An oral history project with ex-legionaries from North Tyrol, South Tyrol and
Vorarlberg, Dipl. Innsbruck 2012, p. 43; Hartmut Elsenhans, France's Algerian War 1954–1962. Attempt to decolonize a capitalist metropolis. On
the collapse of the colonial empires, Munich 1974, p. 1; Andreas Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence. Aspects of the
discussion on “National Liberation” in Austria in the 1950s, Diss. Innsbruck 1988, p. 67; Mathias Günther Ritzi, Richard Christmann. Intelligence
dispute between Germany and France from 1936 to 1961, Diss. Innsbruck 2010, p. 239.

2 Ritzi, Richard Christmann, p. 235; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 67.

2020 I. innsbruck university press, innsbruck

OPEN ACCESS
historia.scribere I ISSN 2073-8927 I http://historia.scribere.at/ No. 12, 2020 I
DOI 10.15203 / historia.scribere.12.607
108 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

and 1 million people died, the majority of the losses being suffered by the Algerian population. 3

One of the Algerian liberation fighters from 1956 was Winfried "Mustapha" Müller. 4th He had been the FLN since 1955 ( Front
de LiberationNationale) went to hand in Paris. 5

Through the "repatriation service" he devised and directed, Müller helped around 4,000 Foreign Legionnaires stationed
in Algeria to desert between 1956 and 1962, and often also to return to their countries of origin. 6th

Much and in detail has already been written about the Algerian war itself. As an example, the two-part work by Hartmut
Elsenhans should be cited here, which deals in detail with the social, economic and political situation in Algeria, with the
importance of Algeria for the French fatherland, with the individual fighting during the war, with French means to restore
peace, with the negotiations that ultimately led to the independence of Algeria, and with the effects of this war on
internal France. 7th Comparatively little was written about the role of Winfried “Mustapha” Müller in this war, so he is not
even mentioned in Hartmut Elsenhans' work. Nevertheless, the number of lines written about Winfried Müller has
increased to a respectable level over the years, although here the emphasis is on the word "lines"; because he is often
only mentioned as a minor actor - as in Andreas Feichter's and Mathias Ritzi's dissertations, 8th in the book "Hoch die
international Solidarität" by Werner Balsen and Karl Rössel, 9 in "West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian
War" by Mathilde von Bülow 10 and in Claus Leggewie's essay "Luggage carrier" 11.

Nevertheless, there are also writings that focus on Winfried Müller, for example the essay by Klaus Polkehn "The
Mission of Si Mustapha - a German fights for Algeria", 12th on the other hand, Fritz Keller's biography, published in 2018,
entitled "A Life on the Edge of Probability", 13th in which Keller deals with the detailed exploration of the opaque life of
Winfried Müller.

3 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, p. 534; Douglas Boyd, The French Foreign Legion, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn 2006, p. 73.

4th Fritz Keller, A Life on the Edge of Probability. Si Mustapha alias Winfried Müller. From the armed forces deserter to the hero of the Algerian
liberation struggle, Vienna 2017, p. 45; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 85.

5 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 41; Claus Leggewie, porter. The Algeria project in the 50s and 60s and the origins of "internationalism" in
the Federal Republic, in: Political quarterly 25 (1984), No. 2, pp. 169-187, here p. 179; Klaus Polkehn, The Mission of Si Mustapha. A German
fights for Algeria, in: COMPARATIVE 16 (2006), No. 2, pp. 30-45, here p. 33; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 85.

6th Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 42; Leggewie, porter. The Algeria Project in the 1950s and 1960s, pp. 179–180; Feichter, Austria and
the Algerian War of Independence, p. 110.
7th Elsenhans, France's Algerian War.
8th Ritzi, Richard Christmann; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence.
9 Werner Balsen / Karl Rössel, cheers for international solidarity. On the history of the Third World movements in the Federal Republic, Cologne 1986.

10 Mathilde von Bülow, West Germany, ColdWar Europe and the AlgerianWar, Cambridge 2016. Leggewie, Kofferträger.
11 The Algeria project in the 50s and 60s.
12th Polkehn, The Mission of Si Mustapha.
13th Basement, living on the verge of probability.
historia.scribere 12 (2020) Maurizio 109

This work should join the list of writings on Winfried Müller, as it deals with the question of how far Müller's work in his
repatriation service served the Algerian striving for independence. The thesis of this work is that it not only had military
benefits, but also supported the newly emerging nation on a political and mental level; Furthermore, that the use on the
political level was far more important for the achievement of Algerian independence than on the military one. A
transnational perspective is thrown on the Algerian war of liberation, which was tied into a complex system of
international relations and through which it finally came to an end. In this work it should be shown in the context of the
transnational perspective,

2. Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the FLN

Winfried Müller was born in Wiesbaden in 1926 as the son of Curt Willi Ernst Müller and Friederike Katherine Neelsons
and spent his childhood in Oberstdorf near the German-Austrian border. 14th Andreas Feichter writes in his dissertation
that Müller was sent to relatives in Götzens in Tyrol as early as 1932. 15th In contrast, Keller and Polkehn claim that
WinfriedMüller and his mother, who left his father shortly after Hitler came to power, only moved to Götzens in 1941. 16

In 1943 Müller was arrested by the Gestapo, 17th probably because he was listening to anti-Nazi radio stations. 18th However,
the offense varies depending on the source, so Keller also speaks of a different version of the story in which Müller was
arrested for "Austrian patriotic slogans in public places". 19th Feichter even tells of Müller's "activities in the Austrian
resistance" 20th The different versions also speak of different punishments: In the latter two depictions, Müller was sent to
a concentration camp. 21 From this he was able to flee to the Soviet Union either after six months in captivity 22nd or he was
sent to a punitive battalion on the Eastern Front by an SS man. 23 From there he was later able to desert into Russian
ranks. 24 In the former version (more likely due to more recent research)

14th Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 9.

15th Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 83.
16 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability pp. 9 and 11; Polkehn, The Mission of Si Mustapha, p. 31.
17th Ibid., P. 17; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 84; Polkehn, The Mission of Si Mustapha, p. 31.

18th Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 17; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 31. Keller, Leben am Rande der
19th Demokratie, p. 15.
20th Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 84. Ibid .; Keller, Life on the
21 Edge of Probability, p. 15.
22nd Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 84. Keller, Life on the Edge
23 of Probability, p. 16.
24 Claus Leggewie, porter. The Algeria project of the left in Adenauer-Deutschland, Berlin 1984, p. 89, quoted in Polkehn, Die Mission des Si
Mustapha, p. 31.
110 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

he volunteered for military service and was first put into a punishment battalion
- from which he was later able to desert again into Russian ranks when he showed "increasing, open opposition [...] to
the military machine". 25th

After the desertion, Müller worked for the National Committee Free Germany (NKFD). 26th It was a group of German
prisoners of war with communist sentiments who tried to convince German soldiers to defend themselves on the
Russian side through propaganda work. 27 It was here that he probably first came into contact with the concept that was
later to be followed by his repatriation service during the Algerian War of Independence.

The war was followed by troubled years: first he stayed briefly in Austria. 28
He then moved to Kleinmachnow in the Soviet occupation zone in 1947, became a member of the SED in January 1948
and studied "Sociology and Behavioral Theory" at the "Karl Marx" party college in Hakeburg near Kleinmachnow. 29

Perhaps this study came to his aid later in his work as head of the repatriation service. In 1951 he was expelled from
the party. There is a possibility that he worked for American secret services as early as 1948; when he was expelled
from the party, he was accused of being an “agent and provocateur”. He was accused of having obtained a list of
members of the FDJ Wiesbaden through him to the American secret service. 30th Subsequently, Müller made contacts
with the Independent Workers' Party of Germany. 31

Then he went to Paris. According to Keller, he was sent there by US intelligence. 32 Again, according to Keller, he had the
idea for his later repatriation service even before he began his contacts with the FLN in Paris - more precisely: after he
had learned about the Algerian war from "US sources" in a villa in Nikolassee (Berlin). 33 As early as 1955 in Paris, Müller
set about persuading the Foreign Legionnaires to desert. 34 Along with this, he probably transported weapons for the
FLN. 35 The French secret services were soon denounced. 36 By order of the police, Müller had to leave France by the end
of 1956. 37 So he drove, probably after consultation with the FLN, to Morocco, where he possibly went to an ALN
training camp ( Armée de liberation na-

25th Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 17–19.

26th Ibid., Pp. 19-20; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 31; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 84.

27 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 21. Ibid., P. 22.

28
29 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, S, 84; Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 24.

30th Ibid., Pp. 26-28; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 32. Polkehn, Die
31 Mission des Si Mustapha, pp. 32–33. Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability,
32 p. 39. Ibid., Pp. 37–38.
33
34 Ibid., P. 41.
35 Ibid .; Polkehn, The Mission of Si Mustapha, p. 33.
36 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 85. Keller, Life on the Edge
37 of Probability, p. 41.
historia.scribere 12 (2020) Moritz Oberhollenzer 111

national; military arm of the FLN) came. 38 In any case, he maintained contact with this. 39 Probably because of his political
convictions Müller got involved in the cooperation with the FLN and in October 1956 he wrote to his wife that he had
"found the direction for the first time since the collapse of the false communist sky" 40 How enthusiastic he was about the
fight of the FLN is also shown by the fact that when he arrived in Algeria, he converted to Islam and took on the name
"Mustapha". 41 Polkehn writes about this: "He committed himself to the goal of 'becoming an Algerian and remaining an
Algerian'." 42

At first, the FLN did not really know how Müller should serve their struggle for independence. 43 It was not until the fall of
1956 that he found work when he was supposed to act as an interpreter for a group of captured German Foreign
Legionnaires. 44 On this occasion, Müller spoke of his idea of founding a repatriation service for deserted Foreign
Legionnaires. The National Council of the Algerian Independence Movement (CNRA) approved this in October of the
same year. 45 Its main task was to convince the Foreign Legionnaires of the desertion and then to bring them back safely
by contacting the embassies of their respective home countries. 46 Its aim was firstly to “raise public awareness”,
secondly to “transform an elite unit into a factor of uncertainty for the enemy”, and thirdly to be “a means of recognizing
the revolution on an international level”. 47 How these goals were achieved will be shown in the following chapters.

The FLN, in whose service Müller was now, was at the beginning of the war in November 1954 from the CRUA ( Comité
Revolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action) emerged. 48

This in turn was established as a military association to combat French colonial rule at the beginning of the same year
by members of the OS ( Organization Secréte) founded. 49 The OS was founded after World War II to prepare for the
"armed uprising". 50 The FLN and the ALN had started the Algerian War of Independence on November 1, 1954 with a
wave of attacks on civilian and military targets that extended across Algeria. 51 Since then everyone has left

38 Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 33; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 85. Keller, Life on the Edge of
39 Probability, p. 44.
40 Ibid., P. 46; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 34.
41 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 46; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 34. Polkehn, Die Mission des Si
42 Mustapha, p. 34.
43 Ibid., P. 33.
44 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 45. Ibid .; Polkehn, Die
45 Mission des Si Mustapha, pp. 34–35. Keller, Life on the Edge of
46 Probability, p. 48.
47 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, pp. 90–91; Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 45–46.

48 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 63; Ritzi, Richard Christmann, p. 239. Ritzi, Richard Christmann, p.
49 238.
50 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 62.
51 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, p. 150; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 63; Panagiotopoulos, Life in the Foreign
Legion after 1945, p. 43.
112 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

other nationalist movements - with the exception of parts of the MNA that were to follow in 1957 - joined it or were
liquidated. 52

At the beginning of the war, the guerrilla war waged by the ALN was still concentrated on the Aurés Mountains and the
Kabylia, but in August 1955 it had spread to the northern urban landscape. 53 In September 1956, the ALN already
controlled four fifths of the Algerian country. 54 In May 1955, French military units were attacked directly by the ALN for
the first time. 55 While the ALN only had around 3,000 fighting members at the beginning of the war, by the end of 1956 it
was already around 20,000. 56 At the same time it was supported by large parts of the non-French population. 57 In terms
of armament, the ALN had also built a solid base by 1957: Elsenhans speaks of "700 - 800 modern weapons" that were
delivered every month for the Algerian struggle for independence, and he assumes that the ALN is "already in the
middle 1956 had its own air defense " 58.

At the time the repatriation service was founded, Müller found himself in a politically and militarily stable revolution.

3. The military benefit

At the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence, the French position in Algeria was severely weakened by the
Indochina War, which had just ended. The professional army could not be relied on, as it had shrunk considerably due
to the losses suffered and, for the most part, was not stationed in Algeria. 59 On November 1, 1954, the French troops in
Algeria numbered only 62,000, although a large part of the French elite troops were not in Algeria. 60 From the Foreign
Legion only the 1 e REI (régiment étranger d'infanterie) operational. 61 By the autumn of 1956, however, the military
situation was to change drastically. Due to some changes in the area of compulsory military service (seniority was
reduced, the length of service was extended) and the relocation of regiments, the French army in Algeria reached a
troop strength of 360,000 at this time, which should not increase significantly by the end of the war. 62 The Foreign
Legion had reached its peak of 27,500 men in 1956. 63 Together with the paratrooper units of the regular French army,
the Foreign Legion was of particular importance, as it was newly drafted conscripts until 1957

52 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, pp. 152–153. Ritzi, Richard

53 Christmann, p. 240.
54 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, p. 379. Ibid.
55
56 Ibid, p. 380.
57 Ibid., Pp. 380-381; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 70. Elsenhans, France's
58 Algerian War, p. 381.
59 Ibid., Pp. 391-392.
60 Ibid.
61 Boyd, French Foreign Legion, p. 53.
62 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, pp. 393–395; Ritzi, Richard Christmann, p. 240. Panagiotopoulos, Life
63 in the Foreign Legion after 1945, p. 47.
historia.scribere 12 (2020) Moritz Oberhollenzer 113

received special training as the only troop unit trained for guerrilla warfare in Algeria. 64 In addition, it had the status of an
elite unit in the French army, which was deployed "where the regular army refused to intervene [...] or the risk (for them)
was too great" 65.

Müller's repatriation service found its home in Tetuan in the former Spanish Morocco. 66 There, the Algerian liberation
movement was given a villa by the Moroccan liberation army as a base for Müller's work. 67 The deserted Foreign
Legionnaires found shelter in this villa until they could (mostly) be brought back to their respective home countries. 68 In
order to convince the Foreign Legionnaires of the desertion, Müller had posters and leaflets made, the inscription of
which usually said something like “Either live in the home country or die in the legion” and on which pictures of foreign
legionnaires who had already fled in their home countries could be seen. 69 But there were also personal requests to
Foreign Legionnaires by FLN agents to say goodbye to the Legion. 70

In addition, personal letters were sent to various Foreign Legionnaires by the repatriation service itself or by helping
hands. For example, after meeting a “young woman” who showed interest in meeting a legionnaire by letter, the Foreign
Legionnaires found a member of the repatriation service at the agreed meeting point. 71 From the spring of 1957, the
GDR even provided the repatriation service with its own radio station to convince the foreign legionaries of the
desertion. 72

One point that led the legionaries to desert was their low chance of survival in Algeria. Some of the legionaries were
also demoralized by the defeats and hardships of the Indochina War. 73 Also, not all of them had voluntarily joined the
Legion; some had been recruited under false pretenses or had been confused about all of the consequences of their
decision when they joined. 74 However, some "deserters" were also forcibly overpowered and then brought across the
border to Tetuan, where they were unable to return. The Legion was naturally suspicious of them after they
disappeared. 75

64 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, pp. 401–403.

65 MustaphaMüller, in: Ministere de la Culture et duTourisme (ed.), Conference Protocol "Le Service de Rapatriement des legionnaires Etrangers",
Algiers 1986, quoted in Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence,
P. 83.
66 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 48–49; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 34. Keller, Life on the Edge of
67 Probability, pp. 48–49.
68 Ibid., P. 55.
69 Ibid., Pp. 50-54; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 37; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, pp. 94–96.

70 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 51–52.

71 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, pp. 92–93. Ibid., P. 71; Polkehn,
72 Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 40.
73 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 52–53. Ibid., Pp. 61-62; Polkehn,
74 Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 39. Keller, Leben am Rande der
75 Demokratie, p. 52.
114 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

The repatriation service managed to remove half of the number 4 stationed in Fort Tachtouf on the Algerian-Moroccan
border within a very short time e To persuade REI to desert. The French army was forced to abandon this important base
before more of its soldiers disappeared there. 76 According to his own statement, by the end of the war, Müller's
repatriation service is said to have persuaded around 4,000 French Foreign Legionnaires to desertion; 77 Since both
statements about the number of deserted legionnaires were only made after the end of the Algerian War of
Independence, they are probably not deliberately falsified, as the repatriation service had already completed its task by
that time. Considering the slightly more than 360,000 soldiers stationed in Algeria, that may not seem like a lot;
however, it has already been mentioned above that the Foreign Legion was of particular importance in the Algerian war.
And during 1956 still those mentioned

27,500 Foreign Legionnaires were stationed in Algeria, their number had shrunk to 21,000 between 1958 and 1961. 78 Thus,
on the one hand, the repatriation service was successful at the operational level and achieved its goal of turning the
Foreign Legion into an "element of uncertainty for the enemy" 79 to transform, as the case of Fort Tachtouf shows. On the
other hand, it was also a success on a higher level by doing its part in reducing the number of troops stationed in
Algeria.

Winfried Müller's work as head of the repatriation service did not end with its administration, however, he was also
involved in purchasing weapons for the ALN. 80

This was of the utmost importance to them. The ALN did not lack potential recruits, but they had to be supplied with
weapons in order to be able to accept them as combat-capable soldiers in the ALN. Elsenhans writes on this: "A
numerical increase in the Liberation Army [was] less due to difficulties in recruiting than to the shortage of weapons." 81

The exact extent of Müller's involvement in the arms deals has not yet been researched, but according to Keller he was
"one of the four main clients of the FLN in arms deals". 82 Polkehn claims that Müller later told him angrily that the GDR
had agreed to deliver old Wehrmacht weapons to the ALN, but demanded "exorbitant prices in hard currency" for them. 83
At least the anger about it makes a personal involvement of Müller in the arms deals appear likely. These arms deals
with the GDR were carried out during Müller's trip to the GDR in 1960,

76 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 52–53; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, pp. 110–111.

77 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 110; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 42; Leggewie, porter. The Algeria
Project in the 1950s and 1960s, pp. 179–180.
78 Panagiotopoulos, Life in the Foreign Legion after 1945, p. 47.
79 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 46; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 91.

80 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 80; Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 41. Elsenhans, France's Algerian War,
81 p. 380.
82 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 80. Polkehn, Die Mission
83 des Si Mustapha, pp. 41–42.
historia.scribere 12 (2020) Moritz Oberhollenzer 115

when he wanted to extend the cooperation between the repatriation service and GDR, among other things. 84 Müller's
help for the FLN as an actor in the arms trade cannot be reconstructed in detail, but it can at least be identified as part
of his activity.

The statements made so far have shown to what extent Müller's work in the repatriation service was useful in the
fighting of the FLN in Algeria. When looking at the course of the war, however, it can be seen that the latter could not
win the war on a military level alone. By autumn 1956, the ALN increased its number to around 20,000 fighters. 85 The
strength of the French army grew to the aforementioned 360,000 and was to reach its peak of 396,000 in the summer of
1957. 86 This large number of soldiers made it possible to set up a dense network of military bases that were supposed to
defend their respective surrounding areas, which caused the losses of the ALN to skyrocket. 87 However, the ALN was
able to maintain its troop size and even increase it to 25,000 fighters by 1958, 88 However, the number and size of the
attacks by the FLN fell sharply during 1957, at the beginning of which they had reached their peak. 89

1958 can be seen as the key year of the war. In 1956 and 1957, border fortifications were built on the borders with
Morocco and Tunisia. 90 These showed their effect from the turn of the year 1957/58: 91

While according to French estimates in January 1958 only fifty percent of the weapons delivered to the FLN could be
intercepted, in March it was already ninety percent. 92 Also at the end of 1958 was General Salan 93 by General Challe 94 exchanged,
whereby a change in the tactics of the French army took place. 95 This turned out to be extremely successful militarily. 96 The
number of fighters in the ALN had fallen to 2,000 to 3,000 men by the end of the war. 97 Elsenhans therefore speaks of
the "defeat of the guerrillas on military territory in Algeria" 98 Feichter, however, believes that the war "could not be won
by the French army at this point in time, the year 1956" 99 The victory of the liberation fighters could not be achieved on a
military level, but (only) on a political level. To support the struggle on this level,

84 Ibid., P. 41 .; Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 79. Elsenhans, France's

85 Algerian War, p. 380.
86 Ibid., Pp. 395-396.
87 Ibid., P. 522.
88 Ibid., P. 380.
89 Ibid., Pp. 532-533.
90 Ibid., France's Algerian War, pp. 412-413; Boyd, French Foreign Legion, p. 57.
91 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, pp. 531–532; Panagiotopoulos, Life in the Foreign Legion after 1945, p. 48. Elsenhans, France's Algerian War,
92 p. 382.
93 Born in 1899, he fought in both world wars and was promoted to general in 1944. He then fought in the Indochina War before taking command in
Algeria in 1956.
94 Born in 1905, he fought in World War II. Only after the war was he promoted to general, which enabled him to take command in Algeria from
General Salan in 1958.
95 Elsenhans, France's Algerian War, p. 525. Ibid., Pp.
96 525-530.
97 Ibid., P. 380.
98 Ibid., P. 383.
99 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 69.
116 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

Müller also used his repatriation service for propaganda purposes.

4th The political benefit

To this end, the repatriated Foreign Legionnaires should make public in their home countries which "reprisals and
tortures" they themselves had committed on behalf of the French army, or which they had observed. 100

Leggewie writes about this:

"Müller and his contacts informed the press when a group of repatriated legionaries returned from Madrid to
Rhein-Main, where they stepped down the gangway with their hair still short, ties and checked jackets like
guests of state in a hail of flashlight." 101

Deserted Hungarian Foreign Legionnaires who had fled to France after the defeat of the Hungarian popular uprising in
1956 were able to report on how they had signed a contract with the Foreign Legion to find employment as workers in
Algeria. The fact that they were actually recruited to fight in the theater of war in Algeria had been kept from them. 102 Müller
managed to make the story of the Hungarian refugees public both in the international press and in UN diplomatic
circles, which earned France little sympathy, on the contrary. 103

In the press, Müller was mainly present in German-speaking countries, probably also because most of the Foreign
Legionnaires fighting in Algeria were German-speaking. 104 From 1957 he himself supplied the material to the journalists
Klaus Polkehn and Hans Otten. 105 They then reported in the "Wochenpost" in the GDR about the Algerian war. 106 As
early as February 1957, the “Bild” newspaper reported on a “secret power that liberated thousands of Foreign
Legionnaires from their North African barracks within eight weeks”. 107 In 1959, Müller himself spoke in an interview with
the “Spiegel” (title: “Whoever deserted, must shout 'Alemani'”) of the repatriation service's actions. 108 In the autumn of
the same year, Müller even traveled through Germany on an advertising campaign about which "well over fifty German
newspapers" wrote. 109 Feichter and von Bülow write about Müller's presence in the press that he had invited journalists
to Morocco “in order to quickly disseminate the statements of the refugee legionnaires and thus the reputation of France

100 Leggewie, porter. The Algeria Project of the Left, p. 95, quoted in Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 101. During the War
of Independence, the French army also used torture to obtain information: Panagiotopoulos, Life in the Foreign Legion after 1945, p. 45 -46. Ibid.

101
102 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 61–64; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, pp. 103-104.

103 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 63.

104 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 89.
105 Polkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 30; Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 71–72. Feichter, Austria and the Algerian
106 War of Independence, p. 101; Von Bülow, West Germany, p. 118.
107 Image, February 10, 1957, quoted in Keller, Leben am Rande der Demokratie, pp. 52–53.
108 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 95; Von Bülow, West Germany, p. 237. Ibid.
109
historia.scribere 12 (2020) Moritz Oberhollenzer 117

to weaken internationally ”. 110 Von Bülow also reports on Müller's contacts not only with the aforementioned
“Wochenpost”, but also with the “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, “Welt” and “Spiegel”. 111

However, information about the Algerian war was not spread through the press alone. Müller founded the North African
Club together with journalists Hans-Peter Rullmann and Hans Karl Lindemann, which printed various brochures
informing about the Algerian war. 112 At a press conference of the same, Müller met the German activist Klaus Vack. 113

He had already campaigned for Algerian independence through leaflet campaigns. 114 Subsequently, he directly
supported Müller's repatriation service and its propaganda work. 115 Through its public relations work, Müller's
repatriation service led to a "sensitization of foreign public opinion" 116. This had achieved another of his goals. 117

Finally, it must be noted once again that the foreign legionnaires could only be returned to their respective home
countries after contacting the embassies of the same. 118 They lost their citizenship while serving in a foreign army. 119 This
enabled the FLN to be active on an international level and to show that it was "able to point out all political, diplomatic
and humanitarian aspects of the revolution and to solve the problems that arose from it". 120 Thus the repatriation service
could be "a means of recognizing the revolution on an international level". 121

Müller was thus able to achieve his third goal.

In the end, the French government had to find a solution to its colonial war in Algeria under international pressure. 122 Panagiotopoulos
writes: “The goal [of the FLN] was achieved without achieving a military victory. […] On July 3, 1962, France recognized
Algeria's independence. " 123 With that, Müller's repatriation service ceased to exist. 124

110 Ibid., P. 118; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 90. Von Bülow, West
111 Germany, p. 118.
112 Ibid., Pp. 117-118.
113 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 76.
114 Klaus Vack, Si Mustafa, die Rote Hand and 4000 German deserters, in: Werner Balsen / Karl Rössel (ed.), Hoch die international Solidarität,
Cologne 1986, pp. 75–78, here p. 76.
115 Ibid., Pp. 76-77; Von Bülow, West Germany, pp. 237-238.
116 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 45–46; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 90.

117 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, p. 111. Keller, Life on the Edge
118 of Probability, p. 55.
119 Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence, pp. 98–99. Ibid., P. 91.
120
121 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 46; Feichter, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence,
P. 91.
122 Panagiotopoulos, Life in the Foreign Legion after 1945, p. 48. Ibid., P. 50.
123
124 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, p. 90.
118 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

5. Enough

It can be said that Müller's work in the return service of the FLN was helpful at the military level, as he was able to
convince parts of the French Foreign Legion to desert through his return service, which firstly led to a decline in the
number of French elite forces in Algeria and secondly the foreign legion, which had been so reliable up to now became
a "factor of uncertainty for the French army". As an actor in the arms trade, Müller was also able to support the
maintenance and expansion of the ALN.

However, it can subsequently be argued that when the French army recovered from the defeat in Indochina, they were
too powerful to be defeated by the Algerian guerrillas. Thus the independence of Algeria had to be achieved on a
political level. Müller's work in his repatriation service was able to support Algeria's path to independence at this level as
well.

Firstly, through press work - with the support of activists - he was able to “raise public opinion”, especially in
German-speaking countries. It should be noted here that the time of the Algerian War can by no means be said to be as
committed as it was later to be recorded for the time of the Vietnam War. However, Leggewie speaks of an "Algeria
solidarity" as the "prehistoric and early historical layer of the internationalism of the West German left" 125. Feichter writes
in relation to Austria: "[The] engagement and solidarity of broader strata in other conflicts had their origin in support for
the Algerian revolution." 126 Secondly, through its work on the international diplomatic level for the purpose of repatriating
the deserted Foreign Legionnaires, the repatriation service also served to “recognize the revolution on an international
level”.

Ultimately, it should be noted that Winfried “Mustapha” Müller was of course just a wheel in a much larger clockwork; it
was through their interaction alone that the Algerian nation could finally become independent. And some questions
remain unanswered both in relation to Winfried Müller's curriculum vitae - many of which will probably never be clearly
answered - and in relation to the activities of his repatriation service. As a suggestion for future work, only two of them
should be mentioned here: How exactly was the repatriation service able to bring the deserted Foreign Legionnaires
through the border fortifications on the Algerian-Moroccan border? And how did Winfried Müller's involvement in the
ALN's weapons purchasing look like in detail?

After the termination of his repatriation service at the end of the war, Müller stayed in Algeria and tried to help build the
now independent country. However, he became more and more disappointed by the direction in which the country was
moving and eventually retired to the mountainous region of Kabylia, where he settled down for the green

125 Leggewie, luggage carrier. The Algeria Project in the 1950s and 1960s, p. 170. 126 Feichter, Austria and
the Algerian War of Independence, p. 142.
historia.scribere 12 (2020) Moritz Oberhollenzer 119

in some national parks and spent his twilight years. 127 He suffered a heart attack while filming a documentary about the
Ahaggar Mountains. He died on October 9, 1993 in the southern Algerian oasis of Tamanrasset and was buried in the
Tassilin National Park, which he founded. 128

6th literature

Balsen, Werner / Rössel, Karl, high international solidarity. On the history of the Third World Movement in the Federal
Republic, Cologne 1986.

Boyd, Douglas, The French Foreign Legion, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn 2009.

Bülow, Mathilde von, West Germany, Cold War Europe and the Algerian War, Cambridge 2016.

Elsenhans, Hartmut, France's Algerian War 1954–1962, Munich 1974.

Feichter, Andreas, Austria and the Algerian War of Independence. Aspects of the discussion on “National Liberation” in
Austria in the 1950s, Diss. Innsbruck
1988.

Keller, Fritz, A Life on the Edge of Probability. Si Mustapha alias Winfried Müller. From armed forces deserter to hero of
the Algerian liberation struggle, Vienna 2017.

Leggewie, Klaus, porter. The Algeria project in the 50s and 60s and the origins of "internationalism" in the Federal
Republic, in: Political quarterly 25 (1984), No. 2, pp. 169-187.

Ministere de la Culture et du Tourisme (ed.), Conference Protocol “Le Service de Rapatriement des Legionnaires
Etrangers”, Algiers 1986.

Panagiotopoulos, Daniel, Life in the Foreign Legion after 1945. An oral history project with ex-legionnaires from North
Tyrol, South Tyrol and Vorarlberg, Dipl. Innsbruck 2012.

Polkehn, Klaus, The Mission of Si Mustapha. A German fights for Algeria, in:
COMPARATIVE 16 (2006), No. 2, pp. 30-45.

Ritzi, Mathias Günther, Richard Christmann. Intelligence disputes between Germany and France from 1936 to 1961,
Diss. Innsbruck 2010.

Vack, Klaus, Si Mustafa, the Red Hand and 4,000 German deserters, in: Werner Balsen / Karl Rössel (eds.), Hoch die

international Solidarität, Cologne 1986, pp. 75–78.

Moritz Oberhollenzer is a student of history in the 7th semester at the University of Innsbruck.
[email protected]

127 Pohlkehn, Die Mission des Si Mustapha, p. 45.

128 Keller, Life on the Edge of Probability, pp. 108–110.
120 Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence historia.scribere 12 (2020)

Citation of this post

Moritz Oberhollenzer, Winfried "Mustapha" Müller and the Algerian War of Independence, in: historia.scribere 12
(2020), pp. 107–120, [http://historia.scribere.at], viewed
June 15, 2020 (= current date).

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