Second Term
Second Term
Second term
In 1969, Marcos ran for a second term (allowable under the 1935 constitution then in effect [4]), and
won against 11 other candidates.
Marcos' second term was marked by economic turmoil brought about by factors both external and
internal, a restless student body who demanded educational reforms, a rising crime rate, and a
growing Communist insurgency, among other things.
At one point, student activists took over the Diliman campus of the University of the Philippines and
declared it a free commune, which lasted for a while before the government dissolved it. Violent
protesting continued over the next few years until the declaration of martial law in 1972. The event
was popularly known as the First Quarter Storm.
During the First Quarter Storm in 1970, the line between leftist activists and communists became
increasingly blurred, as a significant number of Kabataang Makabayan ('KM') advanced activists
joined the party of the Communist Party also founded by Jose Maria Sison.[5] KM members protested
in front of Congress, throwing a coffin, a stuffed alligator, and stones at Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos after his State of the Nation Address. On the presidential palace, activists rammed the gate
with a fire truck and once the gate broke and gave way, the activists charged into the Palace
grounds tossing rocks, pillboxes and Molotov cocktails. In front of the US embassy, protesters
vandalized, burned, and damaged the embassy lobby resulting in a strong protest from the U.S.
Ambassador.[5][6][7] The KM protests ranged from 50,000 to 100,000 in number per weekly mass
action.[5] In the aftermath of the January 1970 riots, at least two activists were confirmed dead and
several were injured by the police. The mayor of Manila at the time, Antonio Villegas, commended
the Manila Police District for their "exemplary behavior and courage" and protecting the First Couple
long after they have left. The death of the activists was seized by the Lopez controlled Manila Times
and Manila Chronicle, blaming Marcos and added fire to the weekly protests. [8] Students declared a
week-long boycott of classes and instead met to organize protest rallies. [6]
Rumors of a coup d'état were also brewing. A report of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee said that shortly after the 1969 Philippine presidential election, a group composed mostly
of retired colonels and generals organized a revolutionary junta to first discredit President Marcos
and then kill him. As described in a document given to the committee by Philippine Government
official, key figures in the plot were Vice President Fernando Lopez and Sergio Osmeña Jr., whom
Marcos defeated in the 1969 election. [9] Marcos even went to the U.S. embassy to dispel rumors that
the U.S. embassy is supporting a coup d'état which the opposition liberal party was spreading.
[8]
While the report obtained by the NY Times speculated saying that story could be used by Marcos
to justify Martial Law, as early as December 1969 in a message from the U.S. Ambassador to the
U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador said that most of the talk about revolution
and even assassination has been coming from the defeated opposition, of which Adevoso (of the
Liberal Party) is a leading activist. He also said that the information he has on the assassination
plans are 'hard' or well-sourced and he has to make sure that it reached President Marcos. [10][11]
In light of the crisis, Marcos wrote an entry in his diary in January 1970: [8] "I have several options.
One of them is to abort the subversive plan now by the sudden arrest of the plotters. But this would
not be accepted by the people. Nor could we get the Huks (Communists), their legal cadres and
support. Nor the MIM (Maoist International Movement) and other subversive [or front] organizations,
nor those underground. We could allow the situation to develop naturally then after massive
terrorism, wanton killings and an attempt at my assassination and a coup d’etat, then declare martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus – and arrest all including the legal cadres.
Right now I am inclined towards the latter."
— Ferdinand Marcos[28]
Though it was claimed that Martial law was no military take-over of the government, the immediate
reaction of some sectors of the nation was of astonishment and dismay, for even though it was
claimed that the gravity of the disorder, lawlessness, social injustice, youth and student activism, and
other disturbing movements had reached a point of peril, they felt that martial law over the whole
country was not yet warranted. Worse, political motivations were ascribed to be behind the
proclamation, since the then constitutionally non-extendable term of President Marcos was about to
expire. This suspicion became more credible when opposition leaders and outspoken anti-
government media people were immediately placed under indefinite detention in military camps and
other unusual restrictions were imposed on travel, communication, freedom of speech and the press,
etc. In a word, the martial law regime was anathema to no small portion of the populace. [29]
It was in the light of the above circumstances and as a means of solving the dilemma
aforementioned that the concept embodied in Amendment No. 6 [clarification needed] was born in the
Constitution of 1973. In brief, the central idea that emerged was that martial law might be earlier
lifted, but to safeguard the Philippines and its people against any abrupt dangerous situation which
would warrant the some exercise of totalitarian powers, the latter must be constitutionally allowed,
thereby eliminating the need to proclaim martial law and its concomitants, principally the assertion by
the military of prerogatives that made them appear superior to the civilian authorities below the
President. In other words, the problem was what may be needed for national survival or the
restoration of normalcy in the face of a crisis or an emergency should be reconciled with the popular
mentality and attitude of the people against martial law. [30]
In a speech before his fellow alumni of the University of the Philippines College of Law, President
Marcos declared his intention to lift martial law by the end of January 1981. [31]
The reassuring words for the skeptic came on the occasion of the University of the Philippines law
alumni reunion on December 12, 1980 when the President declared: "We must erase once and for
all from the public mind any doubts as to our resolve to bring martial law to an end and to minister to
an orderly transition to parliamentary government." The apparent forthright irrevocable commitment
was cast at the 45th anniversary celebration of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on December
22, 1980 when the President proclaimed: "A few days ago, following extensive consultations with a
broad representation of various sectors of the nation and in keeping with the pledge made a year
ago during the seventh anniversary of the New Society, I came to the firm decision that martial law
should be lifted before the end of January, 1981, and that only in a few areas where grave problems
of public order and national security continue to exist will martial law continue to remain in force." [32]
After the lifting of martial law, power remained concentrated with Marcos. [33] One scholar noted how
Marcos retained "all martial law decrees, orders, and law-making powers," including powers that
allowed him to jail political opponents. [33]