Pascual vs. CA
Pascual vs. CA
Court of Appeals
The four-year prescriptive period only if the fraud does not give rise to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a
voidable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code.
[OVERVIEW]
Petitioner is the niece of deceased, while respondent is the granddaughter. The deceased sold his share of Lot 2 to
petitioner through a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan. This was assailed by respondent, as the area embodied in the
TCT thus issued was twice the size of the deceased’s actual share.
Petitioner sought to dismiss the case on prescription. RTC dismissed for being filed beyond the 4 year period for
fraud. CA overturned, stating the complaint was timely filed within the 10 year prescriptive period for implied trust. SC
ruled that the prescriptive period that applies is the 10 year for implied trust, but it has already prescribed. Dismissed.
FACTS:
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson is the niece and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino is the granddaughter,
respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson. Canuto and his siblings were co-owners of a parcel of land known as Lot 2 in
Metro Manila.
Canuto had the land surveyed and subdivided into eight lots. Lot No. 2-A and 2-E were placed under CANUTO’s
name.
Canuto and petitioner executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan where Canuto sold his share in Lot 2 in favor of
petitioner. In addition, the surviving children of Canuto executed a joint affidavit affirming the Kasulatan in favor of
petitioner. Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued to petitioner a Transfer Certificate of Title.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for Annulment of the TCT. Respondent claimed that she is the owner
of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E because Catulo’s sister Catalina, in her last will, devised these lots to her. And the area
covered by TCT is twice the size of Canuto’s share in Lot 2.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. The basis of the action is fraud, thus,
respondent should have filed the action within four years from the registration of her title and not some 19 years later.
Respondent opposed the motion, claiming that she became aware of Petitioner’s adverse title a year ago.
RTC- In favor of petitioner. Respondent is estopped, as she knew of petitioners’ adverse title in 1982 when she
testified against petitioners in an ejectment suit petitioners had filed against their tenants in Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E.
CA- Reversed RTC. What respondent filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly created in her favor when
petitioner fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing
the complaint is ten years, not four. Thus respondent seasonably filed her complaint because she allegedly
discovered petitioners’ adverse title only in 1982.
ISSUE:
HELD:
YES, the action prescribed (based on the 10 year period for implied trust).
The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise to an
implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. In such a case, the
four-year prescriptive period begins to run from the time of discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
Respondent action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of the additional
area in the TCT was without basis. In effect, petitioner should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the
benefit of the rightful owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten years under
Article 1144 and not four years under Articles 1389 and 1391.
HOWEVER, Respondent filed her complaint more than 19 years after petitioner registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A
and 2-E. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the complaint late thus warranting its dismissal.
Side Note: The CA attempted to invoke the ruling of Adille vs. CA, where the the ten-year prescriptive period for
enforcing implied trusts was reckoned not from registration of the adverse title but from actual notice of the adverse
title by the cestui que trust. However, this is an exception rather than the general rule. This shall only apply when
there is a specific fraudulent. Other than asserting that petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to Lot
Nos. 2-A and 2-E with an area twice bigger than what Canuta allegedly sold, Respondent did not present any other
proof of petitioners’ fraudulent conduct akin to the case of Adille.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit. If one who is not a real
party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of action
Respondent anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E the devise of these lots to her under Catalina’s will
However, the trial court found that the probate court did not issue any order admitting the said last will to probate.
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that "[N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Thus, since the probate court has not admitted Catalina’s Last Will, respondent has not acquired any right under the
last will. Respondent is without any cause of action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce
an implied trust over these lots.