Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
,
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996
Digest by Jenny Marie B. Alapan
Facts:
In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez ran for Governor of Quezon Province.
Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground that there is a charge pending against him at
the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft, etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme Court ("Marquez, Jr. vs. COMELEC"' promulgated on April 18, 1995) it
was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but also those who after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor. Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on the same
ground that he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA
Court and of the felony complaint.
Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed him.
Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified the proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.” - NO
Ruling:
To reiterate in Marquez decision, a "fugitive from justice":
. . . includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction. And
obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
In the case at bar, Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US on
June 25, 1985, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 273 and June 26 of 1995,4 preceded the filing of
the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the arrest warrant by the
same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony complaint and
arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of yet
at such time.
The very essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just nowhere to be found in the
circumstances of Rodriguez.
To summarize,the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any
elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given in the
MARQUEZ Decision, to wit:
A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a
charge has already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied
the Quezon Province gubernatorial post.