1

Technical rules applicable to Judicial proceedings are not strictly adhered to

in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

Norlina Sibayan vs. ELIZABETH Alda ( The Court has consistently held that
technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings are not exact replicas of
those in administrative investigations.30 Recourse to discovery procedures as
sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for the OGCLS-BSP )
G.R. No. 233395, January 17, 2018
VELASCO JR., J. 3rd Div.

Facts:

Elizabeth charged Norlina, who was then the Assistant Manager of BDO San
Fernando, La Union Branch,

● with unauthorized deduction of her BDO Savings Account with Account 875

● as well as for failure to post certain check deposits to the said account.

with the Office of Special Investigation of BSP . The complaint

alleged that while Elizabeth did not make any withdrawals from her BDO savings
account from 2008-2009, its balance of

● P1.7M as of July 22, 2008

● was reduced to only P334.47 by October 31, 2008.

Further, Elizabeth claimed that two crossed manager's checks were not posted on
her BDO savings account despite the fact that the said checks were deposited on
October 27, 2008.

As for Norlina's defense, she argued that the charges were only meant to
harass her and BDO as the latter previously filed a criminal case
against Elizabeth, Ruby, and their cohorts,

1. for theft,
2. estafa, and
3. violation of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devise
Regulation Act of 1998.
 2

BDO conducted an investigation and discovered that

Ruby learned of the erroneous crediting of funds as early as

November 2007

and utilized BDO's system error to successfully launder money by transferring funds
withdrawn from Ruby's Fastcard Account to various bank accounts in the Philippines
under the names of Elizabeth, Ruby and their friends and relatives .

BDO debited
Pursuant to the foregoing documents executed by Ruby,
Elizabeth's savings account and the proceeds thereof
were applied to Ruby's outstanding obligation to BDO.
Thereafter, Ferdinand and Jovelyn, who are relatives of Elizabeth and Ruby, went to
BDO San Fernando, La Union branch and presented to Norlina the above-
mentioned UCPB and BPI manager's checks, the proceeds of which
were also purportedly applied as payment by Ruby to BDO.

finding a prima facie

OSI-BSP issued a Resolution15 dated June 13, 2012
case against Norlina for Conducting Business in an
Unsafe or Unsound Manner
The OGCLS-BSP then directed Norlina to submit her sworn answer to the formal
charge filed by the OSI-BSP.
 3

Norlina filed a Request

to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to

Elizabeth, Jovelyn, and Ferdinand.

Norlina also filed a Motion for Production of

Documents praying that
● UCPB and BPI be ordered to produce and allow the inspection and
copying or photographing of the Statements of Account pertaining to
UCPB Account 157 and BPI Account 923, respectively,

alleging that Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of both accounts.

Elizabeth, through Ruby, and Ferdinand filed their

respective Objections to Norlina's request, while Jovelyn's
counsel filed a Manifestation stating that the former could not submit her answer
since she is working overseas.

OGCLS-BSP denied Norlina's motions

Motion for Production of Bank Documents filed by the respondent is DENIED.

Request to Answer Written Interrogatories, denied

Norlina’s MR denied. CA upheld the OGCLS-BSP's rulings and MR denied. CA held

that

OGCLS-BSP did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied

Norlina's motion for the production of bank documents and requests to
answer written interrogatories.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether BSP committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s

request in availing of Modes of discovery provided for under RoC in an
administrative proceedings?
 4

Held: NO!

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are

not strictly adhered to in
administrative investigations
Throughout the petition, Norlina persistently relies and quotes the
provisions of the Rules of Court on modes of discovery and argues her
right to utilize the same. To her eyes,

● the denial of her requests to answer written interrogatories and motion for
production of bank documents

deprived her of availing of the rightful remedies which shall bring to the
fore material and relevant facts for the OGCLS-BSP's consideration.

Thus, Norlina postulates that the OGCLS-BSP would now be forced to resolve the
case against her in an arbitrary manner.29

We disagree.

in the
At the outset, it bears stressing that the proceeding involved

present case is administrative in

nature. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules on evidence,

the same does not hold true for

administrative bodies.
 5

The Court has consistently held

that technical rules applicable to judicial

proceedings

are not exact replicas of those in administrative

investigations.
Recourse to discovery procedures as sanctioned by the Rules of Court
is then not mandatory for the OGCLS-BSP.

Hence, We cannot subscribe to Norlina's tenacious

insistence for the OGCLS-BSP to strictly adhere to
the Rules of Court so as not to purportedly defeat her
rights.

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the nature of the

proceedings before the OGCLS-BSP is summary
in nature. Section 3, Rule 1 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on
Administrative Cases.

The rationale and purpose of the summary nature of administrative proceedings is to

achieve an expeditious and inexpensive

determination of cases without regard to
technical rules.
 6

As such,
in proceedings before administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies, like the OGCLS-BSP,

decisions may be reached on the basis of

position papers or other documentary evidence
only.

They are not bound by technical rules of procedure

and evidence.
To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the proceedings which
could defeat its very purpose.

In this light,
OGCLS-BSP did not gravely abuse its
discretion in denying Norlina's request for written
interrogatories
as the allowance of the same would not practically hasten, as it would in fact delay,
the early disposition of the instant case. We agree with the CA's discussion on this
matter,
 7

Naturalization; Formal Offer of Evidence

ONG CHIA vs. Republic & CA ( Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal
offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not
applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization )
G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000
MENDOZA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old
boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then,

● he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually

started his own business,

● married a Filipina, with whom he had four children.

On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted

as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, as amended.

Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the
disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and

presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony.

So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero Moran with the

testimony of petitioner

that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any
witness present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is
rather surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major
portion of the history of the Philippines,
 8

so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this
we do not wish to present any evidence to
reason,
counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, as
well as the petitioner himself.

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship.

The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,

appealed

● all the names by which he is or had been known;

● (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473,
§7;

● (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his
entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2;

● (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have
been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and

● (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence

CA reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that

due to the importance naturalization cases, the State

is not precluded

from raising questions not presented in the

lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.
 9

Hence the case at bar.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court

erred in considering

the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its
appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial
court's decision.

Not having been presented and formally offered

as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of
any evidentiary value,"

so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered.

Issue: Whether CA GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION in admitting

DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT
FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE?

Held: NO!!

The contention has no merit.

Petitioner failed to note Rule 1, §4 which provides that —

These rules shall not apply to

1. land registration,
2. cadastral and
3. election cases,
4. naturalization and
5. insolvency proceedings,
6. And other cases not herein provided for,

except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and

convenient.
 10

Prescinding from the rule on formal offer of

the above,
evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is

clearly not applicable to the present case

involving a petition for naturalization.
The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such
cases is when it is "practicable and convenient."

That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact,

appears to be the more practical and convenient

course of action

considering decisions
that in naturalization
proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.

Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not

preclude the State from later on moving for a
revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
of the same documents.
 11

Petitioner claims that

as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally
offer its documentary evidence before the trial court,

he was denied the right to object against their authenticity,

effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to
procedural due process.

We are not persuaded.

Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence
is to afford the opposite
which has not been formally offered
party the chance to object to their admissibility.

Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the

right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State.
He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals. Thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 12

Labor Cases; Administrative

ROLANDO SASAN et al vs. NLRC et al ( Technical rules of evidence are not

binding in labor cases. Labor officials should use every reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to
technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process )
G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008
CHICO-NAZARIO, J. 3rd Decision

Facts:

E-PCIBank entered into a Contract for Services with HI, HelpMate, primarily
engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services.
Pursuant to their contract, HI shall hire and assign workers to E-PCIBank to perform
janitorial/messengerial and maintenance services. The contract was impliedly
renewed year after year.

Petitioners Rolando Sasan, Sr et al were among those employed and assigned to E-

PCIBank at its Cebu City Branch. 2001, petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch
of the NLRC in Cebu City separate complaints14 against E-PCIBank and
HI for illegal dismissal.

Several conciliation hearings failed. LA ordered that they submit their respective
position papers. In their position papers, petitioners claimed
● that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with respect to the
activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered
janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for more than one year

● that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and
methods by which they were to perform their jobs

● and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no
power to do so since they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank.
 13

For its part, E-PCIBank averred that

● it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an independent job
contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform
janitorial and messengerial services thereat.

● It was HI that paid petitioners’ wages, monitored petitioners’ daily

time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and
supervision over the petitioners and

● that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services legally.

● E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had

committed against its employees.

HI, on the other hand, asserted that

● it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank
was one of its clients.

● Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-

PCIBank no longer renewed said contract with HI and, instead, bidded out its
janitorial requirements to two other job contractors, Able Services and Puritan.

● HI designated petitioners to new work assignments, but the latter refused to

comply with the same. Petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually
or constructively, thus, petitioners’ complaints before the NLRC were without
basis.
 14

LA on the basis of the parties’ position papers and documentary evidence,

rendered that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that

it did not possess the required substantial capital or investment to actually

perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as
required under the Labor Code.

HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of

petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners.

E-PCIBank and HI appealed decision before NLRC. HI submitted before the

NLRCseveral documents which it did not

present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez
NLRC promulgated it decicions modifying ruling of LA. NLRC took into consideration
the

documentary evidence presented by HI for the

first time on appeal
and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with
sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only
contracting."

On the charge of illegal dismissal, the NLRC ruled that

The charge of illegal dismissal was prematurely filed. The record shows that
barely eight (8) days from 15 July 2001 when the complainants were placed
on a temporary "off-detail,"

they filed their complaints on 23 July 2001 and amended their complaints on
22 August 2001 against the respondents on the presumption that their
services were already terminated.

Temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal.

Petitioner’s MR denied by NLRC. CA affirmed NLRC HI was a legitimate job

contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners:
 15

Hence the case at bar.

Petitioners object to the acceptance and consideration by the NLRC of the

evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal.

Issue: Whether NLRC erred in admitting documentary evidence presented by HI for

the first time on appeal?

Held: NO!

This is not a novel procedural issue, and our jurisprudence is already replete with
cases

allowing the NLRC to admit evidence, not presented

before the Labor Arbiter,

and submitted to the NLRC for the first time on

appeal.

Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor

cases.
Labor officials should use every reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively,

without regard to technicalities of law or

procedure, all in the interest of due process.
 16

The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is

not prohibited by NLRC’s New Rules of Procedure. After
all,

rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are

not controlling in labor cases.
The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and
all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively,

without regard to technicalities of law and

procedure all in the interest of substantial
justice.

In keeping with this directive, it has been held that

the NLRC may consider evidence, such as

documents and affidavits, submitted by the
parties

for the first time on appeal.

The submission of additional evidence on appeal does

not prejudice the other party for the latter could
submit counter-evidence.
 17

Photocopied Documents Before NLRC

We cannot find merit in

For the same reasons,

petitioners’ protestations
documentary evidence submitted by HI because they
against the
were mere photocopies.
Evidently, petitioners are invoking the best evidence rule, espoused
in Section 3, Rule130 of RoC. It provides that:

Section 3. – Original document must be produced; exceptions. –

When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall

be admissible other than the original document itself

The above provision explicitly mandates that

when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a

document,

● no evidence shall be admissible

other than the original document
itself.
Notably, certified true copies of these documents, acceptable under the
Rules of Court were furnished to the petitioners.
 18

Even assuming that petitioners were given mere

photocopies, again, we stress that

proceedings before the NLRC

Are not covered by the technical rules of

evidence and procedure as observed in the
regular courts.

Technical rules of evidence do not

apply if the decision to grant the petition
proceeds from an examination of its sufficiency

as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and
other documents.
 19

PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO et al vs. COCA-COLA Bottlers ( administrative bodies

like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in courts of law )
G. R. No. 153660 - June 10, 2003
BELLOSILLO, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:

10 employees of respondent Coca-Cola and its officers filed a complaint against

respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, before NRLC. LA De
Vera

conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten

(10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein)

relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm.

In substance, the complainants averred that

● in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and
others, they were employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc.

● They further maintained that when respondent company replaced them and
prevented them from entering the company premises, they were
deemed to have been illegally dismissed.

In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss

complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of action, there being no employer-
employee relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola.

LA rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate

complainants to their former positions. NLRC affirmed LA and denied MR of
Coke.
 20

CA nonetheless agreed with respondent that the

affidavits of some of the complainants, namely,

Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver
Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas,

should not have been given probative value

● for their failure to affirm the contents

thereof

● and to undergo cross-examination.

As a consequence, the CA dismissed there complaints for lack of sufficient
evidence. CA Held:

(T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory

hearings to ferret out the truth between the opposing claims of the
parties thereto.

He did not submit the case based on

position papers and their accompanying documentary
evidence as a full-blown trial was imperative to establish the parties'
claims.

As their allegations were poles apart, it was necessary to give them ample
opportunity to rebut each other's statements through cross-
examination.

In fact, private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected to

rigid cross-examination by petitioner's counsel.
 21

However, the testimonies of private respondents Romero, Espina, and

Bantolino were not subjected to cross-examination, as should
have been the case, and no explanation was offered by them or by the
labor arbiter as to why this was dispensed with.

Since they were represented by counsel, the latter should have taken steps
so as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their
counsel to that effect.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether CA erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground that

estimonies of private respondents Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not
subjected to cross-examination, as should have been the case?

Held: YES!

The oft-cited case of Rabago v. NLRC squarely grapples a similar challenge

involving the propriety of

theuse of affidavits without the presentation of

affiants for cross-examination.
In that case, we held that

"the argument that the affidavit is hearsay

because the affiants were not presented for
cross-examination

is not persuasive rules of because the

evidence are not strictly observed in

proceedings before administrative bodies like
the NLRC
where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only."
 22

In Rase v. NLRC, this Court

not
likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was
necessary for the affiants to appear and testify
and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party.
To require otherwise would be to negate the rationale and purpose of the
summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make
mandatory the application of the technical rules of evidence.

To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the
technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in
courts of law. Indeed,

the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only
stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.

The submission by respondent,

citing People v. Sorrel, that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere

hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value,

cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal

prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of
an administrative proceeding.

Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to
determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not
even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with
supporting documents and their affidavits.
 23

Collateral Matters

Motive

People vs. ARIEL MANABAT et al ( the pieces of circumstantial evidence of the

prosecution fails to prove indubitably the appellants' authorship of the crime
of Rape with Homicide. The conviction of the appellants cannot stand on the
basis of sketchy and doubtful circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court
must uphold the primacy of the presumption of innocence in favor of Cadenas
and Martije )
G.R. No. 233199, November 05, 2018
PERALTA, J. 3rd Div. Decision

Facts:

Castillo testified that AAA, the victim, was his live-in partner. On February
12, 2012, from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m., he was at the copra drier with

● Escribando and

● AAA but she left at 8 a.m.

9 p.m., Castillo asked Escribano to get the food, which [AAA] prepared, at their
house. But Escribano returned to the copra drier and

informed Castillo that he saw accused-appellants Cadenas and

Martije going out of their house running away.

Castillo and Escribano then went back to the house and upon arrival thereat,
they saw [AAA] already dead.

Escribano corroborated Castillo's testimony.

Chief Barangay Tanod, BAcus arrested Cadenas and Cadenas voluntarily admitted
to Bacus that he, together with Martije, were the ones who killed the victim. Bacus
then turned over Cadenas to the police.
 24

RTC finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable of the crime charged.

RTC ruled:

Testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible and

sufficient.
It ruled that the circumstantial evidence proffered by the
prosecution have amply established the commission of the
crime of rape with homicide

andhave pointed to Cadenas and Martije as the

perpetrators of the dastardly act.
CA affirmed conviction of Cadenas and Martije. prosecution had duly established all
the elements of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. CA ruled
Horrid state of the lifeless body of AAA when she was found - her body was
found in the supine position with her pants and underwear pulled down to her
knees, exposing her vagina, and her shirt pulled up, exposing her breasts –

clearly showed that she was raped.

Further, the appellate court held that the

● prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial

evidence that,

when analyzed and taken together, would lead to the inescapable and
reasonable conclusion

that Cadenas and Martije were the authors of the crime.

It debunked appellants' respective denials and alibis declaring that the same
were not adequately proven by strong and competent evidence, and not at all
persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing identification of
them by prosecution witness Dindo Escribano
 25

Hence the case at bar.

Encapsulated, the issue herein focuses on the sufficiency of the prosecution

evidence to prove the commission of Rape with Homicide and the
identity of the culprits thereof.

Issue: Whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to convict the accused-

appellants?

Held: NO!

After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
Court is not convinced with moral certainty
parties, the
that Cadenas and Martije committed the crime
charged.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things:

(1) the fact of the crime,

● i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the
accused stands charged, and

(2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.

When a crime is committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove

theidentity of the perpetrator of the crime

beyond reasonable doubt
for there can be no conviction even if the commission of the crime is
established. Apart from showing the existence and commission of a crime, the
State has the burden to correctly identify the author of such crime.

Both facts must be proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt on.the strength of its
evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.
 26

As every crime must be established beyond reasonable doubt, it is also

paramount to prove, with the same quantum of evidence, the identity
of the culprit.

In the case at bench, there is

● no direct evidence that could link appellants to the

commission of the crime.

● As observed by the RTC, "nobody

witnessed the actual
rape and killing of the victim."

The RTC was, thus, compelled to resort solely on circumstantial

evidence. The trial court enumerated the pieces of circumstantial evidence that
justified its finding of guilt:

1. First; Cadenas and Martije were seen leaving the house of the victim;

2. Second: Cadenas and Martije left the house in in (sic) a hasty manner, they
ran away;

3. Third: when Castillo and Escrebano went to the house, they discovered the
victim already dead;

4. Fourth, the victim's pants and panty were pulled down up to her knee level,
her t-shirt was pulled up, her breast and vagina were exposed and she was
lying on her back, indicating she was sexually assaulted;

5. Fifth, the victim has a wound on her cheek and her head was broken; and

6. Sixth, the post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Guiritan confirmed that

the the (sic) immediate cause of death (of the) victim is brain haemorrhage
due to skull fracture secondary to traumatic injury of the head.

The probable weapon used was a hard blunt object. The victim was probably
bitten causing multiple abraded wounds at the mons pubis, an area outside
the vagina, and also multiple abraded wounds at the left nipple area.
 27

Inasmuch as the case for the prosecution is largely based on circumstantial

evidence, a short discussion on the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence
to convict an accused is in order.

Circumstancial Evidence
True,conviction is not always based on direct
evidence

for it may likewise rest on purely circumstantial

evidence.
A rule of ancient respectability now sculpted into tradition is that conviction may
be warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence only if the
following requisites concur:

1st, there is more than one circumstance;

2nd, the facts from which the inferences are

derived are proved; and

3rd, the combination of all the circumstances is

such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
 28

Jurisprudence teaches us that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to

support a conviction,

● all circumstances must be consistent with each other,

● consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,

● and at the same time inconsistent with the

hypothesis that he is innocent.
The circumstances proven should constitute an

unbroken chain which leads to one fair and

reasonable conclusion

that points to the accused, to the exclusion 'of

others, as the guilty person.

We do not subscribe, however, with the RTC and the CA that the
foregoing circumstantial evidence inexorably lead to the conclusion that Cadenas
and Martije raped and killed AAA.

The circumstantial evidence invoked by the RTC, particularly as to the

identification of the perpetrators,

raises doubt rather than moral certainty as to the guilt of

the appellants for the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide. To the
mind of the Court, these circumstances, harnessed to establish the criminal liability
are miserably inadequate in weight
of Cadenas and Martije,
and anemic in value to affirm their conviction.
 29

To begin with, the RTC gave much weight on the testimony of

prosecution witness Escribano that
● he had seen Cadenas and Martije running away from the house of Michael
Castillo (Castillo)

● and AAA where the latter's lifeless body was found,

● and ergo, the suspicion that they were the authors of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Escribano testified in this wise:

The RTC, as well as the CA, immediately rushed to the conclusion that

the presence of the appellants at the crime

scene (they were seen running away from the
house of Castillo and AAA)
as sufficient to incriminate them to the commission of the crime charged.

Admittedly, this circumstance may raise a

speculation,

➢ as, in fact, inevitably made Cadenas and Martije the

prime suspects,

but it is far too inadequate to support a conviction. It is a

mere conjecture that can be refuted by other

equally conceivable and rational inferences.
 30

The testimony of Escribano does not conclusively

connect Cadenas and Martije to the rape-slay of AAA,

but merely arouse suspicion against them.

The Court has consistently stressed that mere

suspicions and speculations can never be the bases
of conviction in a criminal case.

at the locus criminis,

The alleged presence of Cadenas and Martije
scene of the crime, does not necessarily mean
that they authored the crime.

such presence at the crime scene merely

At best,
debunks appellants' alibi that they were in their
respective houses at around 9 o'clock in the evening on February 12,
2012.

Moreover, the prosecution has not completely ruled out the probability that
another person/s may have committed the crime.

● Indeed, it was not established that the appellants were with the victim inside
the subject house at the time the crime was committed, if at all.

The proof against Cadenas and Martije must pass the crucible of reasonable doubt;

suspicion alone, no matter how strong it may be, is

inadequate to sustain a conviction.

Truly, the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the

court that embarks upon it is without rudder or
compass.
 31

For sure, we can only speculate at this stage on who

perpetrated the crime as there is nothing on the records to provide us with any better
clue than what has heretofore been surmised.

However, the Court is not called upon to speculate on who committed the crime and
how it was committed.

For sure, we can only speculate at this stage on who perpetrated the crime as
there is nothing on the records to provide us with any better clue than what
has heretofore been surmised.

However, the Court is not called upon to speculate

on who committed the crime and how it was
committed.
A nexus of related circumstances, however, rendered the above testimony of
Escribano as highly suspect.

First, the condition of visibility at the time Escribano allegedly saw Cadenas
and Martije running away from the house, did not favor said witness, a factor
that failed to lend credence to his testimony.

The incident happened at 9 o'clock in the evening outside the house of AAA,
in a remote barangay located at a mountainous area covered with big trees,
and there is no electric lighting from the surroundings and even in the said
house.

No shred of evidence is on record that could show the existence of a source

of light then which may have provided Escribano with enough illumination that
enabled him to recognize who the two persons were.

Secondly, Escribano's story, that after seeing the two persons run away, he
did not enter the house (although he was already at the terrace thereof) but
instead, he opted to take a long walk back to Castillo at the copra dryer just to
tell the latter of what he saw, simply does not make sense.
 32

Thirdly, the Court finds it disturbing how Barangay Captain Gerald Arquiza
(Arquiza) of Barangay xxxxxxxxxxxx , was able to identify Cadenas and
Martije as the sexual ravishers and killers of AAA. Nowhere in the prosecution
evidence does it show that Castillo and/or Escribano reported the incident
and identified (or at least described), the perpetrator/s to Arquiza at any time
after the discovery of the body of the victim.

Finally,
there is a paucity of evidence to show that
appellants have motive to rape or kill the victim.
The gruesome attack on AAA, who sustained a traumatic injury to the head which
fractured her skull causing brain hemorrhage, clearly manifested the intention
of the perpetrator/s to bring death upon the victim.

There was no evidence, however, that

● Cadenas and Martije carried a grudge or had an
axe to grind against the victim or her live-in
partner,
Castillo. Cadenas categorically declared that he knew AAA to be 30 years of
age, but did not find her attractive.

We are aware that the motive of the accused in a

criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not
being an element of the offense.
 33

However, motive assumes importance when, as in this

case,

● the evidence on the commission of the crime

● and the identity of the perpetrator

is purely circumstantial.
As held in Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan:28

Motive is generally held to be immaterial because it is not an element of the

crime.

However, motive becomes important when the evidence on the commission

of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.
Motive is, thus, vital in this case.

In the face of the deficiency in the proof submitted by the

prosecution anent the identity of the offenders,

the respective alibis of Cadenas and Martije

assume credence and importance.

While the defense of alibi is by nature a weak one,

it assumes commensurate significance and

strength where the evidence for the prosecution is
also intrinsically weak.
 34

even if the defense of the appellants may be

At any rate,
weak, the same is inconsequential if,

in the first place, the prosecution failed to

discharge the onus of their identity and
culpability.

underscored that conviction must

Let it be

be based on the strength of the

prosecution evidence

and not on the weakness of the evidence for the

defense,
it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
and not the accused to prove his innocence

the pieces of circumstantial evidence of the prosecution fails to prove indubitably the
appellants' authorship of the crime of Rape with Homicide. The conviction of the
appellants cannot stand on the basis of sketchy and doubtful circumstantial
evidence. Accordingly, the Court must uphold the primacy of the presumption of
innocence in favor of Cadenas and Martije.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The June 22, 2017 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01525-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellants Ariel Manabat Cadenas and Gaudioso Martije are ACQUITTED
of the crime of Rape with Homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
 35

Judicial Notice; Mandatory or Discretionary

STATE PROSECUTORS vs. Judge Manuel Muro ( Respondent judge, in the

guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account
which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took
judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter
which was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of general
notoriety )
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
PER CURIAM: En Banc

Facts:
In a letter-complaint respondent Judge Manuel Muro RTC Manila was charged by
State Prosecutors with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of

● Rules 2.01,
● 3.01 and
● 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,

respondent judge issued an Order dismissing 11 cases filed by the undersigned

against the accused Mrs. Imelda
complainant prosecutors
Romualdez Marcos,

for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange

Restrictions
as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to the penal provisions of Sec. 34
of R.A. 265, as amended

Respondent Judge issued his Order solely on

the basis of newspaper reports (August 11, 1992 issues of the

● Philippine Daily Inquirer and

● the Daily Globe)

concerning the announcement by the President of the

 36

lifting by the government of all foreign exchange

restrictions and the arrival at such decision by the Monetary Board as
per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;

That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive

Department on the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers
which are reputable and of national circulation

had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular

No. 960, as allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions
the Court contended that it was deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases aforementioned "for not to do so
opens this Court to charges of trying cases over which it has no more
jurisdiction;"

That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of

● a Central Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date

hereof, has not even been officially issued,

● and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper

account of the advance announcement made by the President of the
said fact of lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge
acted prematurely and in indecent haste,

That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier

posture
in taking judicial notice purportedly as a matter of public
knowledge a mere newspaper account that the President had
announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for his assailed
order of dismissal

is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced.

 37

For the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before
it is officially released by the Central Bank and its full text
published as required by law to be effective shows

his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept of due

process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross
ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary.

How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which
has not yet come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of
which have not yet been published and ascertained to be the basis of
judicial action?

The Honorable Judge had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
constituting Grave Misconduct

Issue: Whether the statement of Pres. Cory can be taken as judicial notice despite
not CB circular issued and published?

HEld: NO!

The doctrine of judicial notice rests

on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.

The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must
every reasonable doubt
be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and
on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
 38

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material

requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;

(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled

and not doubtful or uncertain; and

(3) it must be known to bewithin the limits of the

jurisdiction of the court.

The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially

of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
known is that
notice is limited to

1. facts evidenced by public records

2. and facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying
that the

usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired.

This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious

that it will not be disputed.
 39

But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge.

The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the

judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take

judicial notice, may be

matters coming to the knowledge of

men generally in the course of the ordinary
experiences of life,

or they may be matters which are generally

accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration.
 40

Thus,

● facts which are universally known,

● and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications,

are judicially noticed,

provided they are of such universal notoriety

and so generally understood that they may be regarded

as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person.

Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis

of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as

hearsay evidence twice removed,

took judicial notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls,

a matter which was not and cannot be considered of

common knowledge or of general notoriety.
Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation which was not yet in force
when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice
cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A
law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common
knowledge capable of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the
requirements before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.

Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for
him, to have taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet
in force at the time the improvident order of dismissal was issued.
 41

People vs. Tomas Tundag ( judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper,
despite the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecution’s motion; need for independent proof of the age of the victim,
aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. )
G.R. Nos. 135695-96 October 12, 2000
QUISUMBING, J. En Banc

Facts:
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on
the merits clearly shows that

● private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl

● who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a
very low general mental ability

● and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound,
Mandaue City.

Sept. 5 1997, at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening,

she was in the house together with her father.

But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat
while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily
beside him.

However, when she was already sleeping,

she noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and
was embracing her.

Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used
a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that,

he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or
tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made
her vagina bleed and was very painful.

That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina,
 42

her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : ‘Does it feel good?’ And at
the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman who does
not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she
contradicted his statement.

That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over
her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede
and in fact, said: ‘Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)’

That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not
go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued
smoking while she cried.

That in the evening of November 7, 1997, 2nd time

she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just smoking and
squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to
sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did
to her, she placed a stool between them

but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was
able to take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which
he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made
her afraid.

That in the early morning of the following day, she left her father’s place and
went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what
had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the police,

which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands
Hospital where she was examined and after her medical examination, she was
brought back by the police and was investigated by them."

Trial court sentence accused to death. Hence the case at bar.

Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659,
 43

of a minor daughter by her father as

penalizes rape
qualified rape and a heinous crime.
In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape:

(1) sexual congress;

(2) with woman;

(3) by force or without her consent

and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements
that:

(4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape
and

(5) the offender is a parent of the victim.

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the
victim’s father.

But the victim’s age was not properly

and sufficiently proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time
of the rapes.

she admitted that she did not know exactly

However,
when she was born because her mother did not tell
her.
Issue: Whether the qualifying circumstance of under 18 years of age at the time of
the rape was duly proven?

Held: NO!
 44

She further said that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In
her own words, the victim testified:

COURT TO WITNESS

Q: When were you born?

A: I do not know.

Q: You do not know your birthday?

A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.

COURT: Proceed.

FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor,

may we just request for judicial notice that

the victim here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted
 45

Judicial Notice is the

● cognizance of certain facts

● which judges may properly take and act on

● without proof because they already know them.

Under the Rules judicial notice may either be

of Court,
mandatory or discretionary.
Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall take
mandatory judicial notice of facts

SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. -

A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence,

1. of the existence and territorial extent of states,

2. their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
3. the law of nations,
4. the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
5. the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
6. the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines,
7. the laws of nature,
8. the measure of time,
9. and the geographical divisions.
 46

Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary
judicial notice of facts -

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. -

A court may take judicial notice

1. of matters which are of public knowledge, or

2. are capable of unquestionable demonstration

3. or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.

Thus, it can be considered

of public knowledge and judicially
noticed
that the

scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily

isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of
time or place.

The offense of rape can and has been committed in

places where people congregate,
● e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room
with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is
sharing with the accused’s sister.
 47

The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the

● Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness

● and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which

blemish her honor and virtue.

On the matters which are capable of

other hand,
unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of

● professional Knowledge

● and scientific knowledge.

For example, in People v. Alicante, the trial court took judicial

notice of the
clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby
boys as "premature"

since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.

which ought to be known to judges

As to matters
because of their judicial functions, an example would

● be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court

proceedings,

e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.

 48

With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary
court can take judicial notice of a fact
judicial notice, the
pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court which requires that

SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing

necessary. -

During the trial, the court, on its own

initiative,

may announce its intention to take judicial

notice of any matter

and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

During the trial, the court, on request of a party,

may announce its intention to take judicial

notice of any matter

and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

 49

● After the trial,

● and before judgment

● or on appeal,
the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party,

may take judicial notice of any matter and allow

the parties to be heard thereon

if such matter is decisive of a material issue

in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is

improper, despite the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecution’s motion.

As required by Section 3 of Rule 129,

as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is

required before courts can take judicial notice
of such fact.
Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or
destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
 50

Thus, in People v. Rebancos,,

the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was
statutory rape.

The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so
was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984.

Although no birth certificate was presented because the victim’s birth

had allegedly not been registered,

her baptismal certificate was duly presented.

Hence, we ruled that the mother’s testimony coupled with the presentation of
the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below
12 at the time of the rape.

However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that

appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape,
because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim,
who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape.

The prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal

certificate of the victim.

Also there was no showing that the said documents were lost or
destroyed to justify their non-presentation.

We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay,
and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age
of the victim by her appearance.

In several recent cases, we have emphasized

the need for independent proof of the age of the

victim, aside from testimonial evidence from the
victim or her relatives.
 51

In People v. Javier, we stressed that the

prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the

victim, even though it is not contested by the defense.

The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself.

In People v. Cula, we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with
certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order
to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

Since the record of the case was bereft of any

independent evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly certified
Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s age, appellant
could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form.

In People v. Veloso,

the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the
rape.

It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed
to prove the victim’s age other than through the testimony of her father and
herself.

Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has
held in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age
by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the
words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes
vital and essential so as to remove an ‘iota of doubt’

that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the imposition of the
death penalty set by the law.
 52

FERNANDO Juan vs. ROBERTO Juan, Subs by Son JEFFREY et al( In

connection therewith, the RTC's basis or source, an article appearing in a
website,17 in ruling that the song entitled "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a
copyright, cannot be considered a subject of judicial notice that does
not need further authentication or verification )
G.R. No. 221732, August 23, 2017
PERALTA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
Respondent Roberto U. Juan claimed that he began using the name and mark
"Lavandera Ko" in his laundry business on July 4, 1994. National Library issued to
him a certificate of copyright over said name and mark.

Petitioner Fernando was able to register the name and mark "Lavandera Ko" with
IPO. It was found out by respondent Roberto that petitioner Fernando had been
selling his own franchises.

Thus, respondent Roberto filed a petition for injunction, unfair competition,

infringement of copyright, cancellation of trademark and name with/and prayer for
TRO and Preliminary Injunction with RTC against Fernando

RTC dismissed Petition neither of the parties had a right to the exclusive
use or appropriation of the mark "Lavandera Ko" because the

same was the original mark and work of a

certain Santiago S. Suarez (Santiago).

According to the RTC, the mark in question was created by

Suarez in 1942 in his musical composition called, "Lavandera
Ko"

and both parties of the present case failed to prove that they were
the originators of the same mark.
 53

Before CA, petitioner Fernando argued that the RTC erred

in giving credence to the article of information it

obtained from the internet stating that the Filipino folk song
"Lavandera Ko" was a composition of Suarez in 1942

rather than the actual pieces of evidence presented by the parties.

As such, according to petitioner, such information acquired by the RTC

is hearsay because no one was presented to testify on the
veracity of such article.

CA dismissed Appeal. HEnce the case at bar..

The RTC, in dismissing the petition, ruled that neither of the parties are entitled to
use the trade name "Lavandera Ko"

because the copyright of "Lavandera Ko", a song composed in 1942 by

Santiago S. Suarez belongs to the latter.

The following are the RTC's reasons for such ruling:

The resolution of this Court - NO ONE OF THE HEREIN PARTIES HAS THE
RIGHT TO USE AND ENJOY "LAVANDERA KO"!

Based on the date taken from the internet -

References: CCP encyclopedia of Philippine art, vol. 6
http://www.himig.coin.ph (http://kahimyang.info /
kauswagan/articles/1420/today - in - philippine -history this information
was gathered: "

In 1948, Cecil Lloyd established the first Filipino owned record company, the
Philippine Recording System, which featured his rendition of Filipino folk
songs among them the "Lavandera ko" (1942) which is a composition of
Santiago S. Suarez".
 54

Issue: Whether the article of information it obtained from the internet can be taken by
the court as Judicial Notice?

Held: NO!!

In connection therewith, the RTC's basis or source, an article appearing in a

website,17 in ruling that the song entitled "Lavandera Ko" is protected by a
copyright,

cannot be considered a subject of judicial

notice that does not need further authentication
or verification.

Judicial notice is the

● cognizance of certain facts

● that judges may properly take and act on

● without proof because these facts are already known to them.

Put differently,

it is the assumption by a court of a fact without

need of further traditional evidentiary support.

The principle is based on

convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence
on matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute

and are not bona fide disputed.

 55

In Spouses Latip v. Chua, this Court expounded on the nature of judicial notice,
thus:

Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of
judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:

State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:

I. The doctrine of judicial notice

rests on the wisdom and discretion of the

courts.
The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution;
care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists;

and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly

resolved in the negative.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material

requisites:

(1) the matter must be one of common and general

knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and

known to be within the limits of the

(3) it must be
jurisdiction of the court.
 56

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to

be judicially known

is that of notoriety.

Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited

to

1. facts evidenced by public records

and

2. facts of general notoriety.

To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact

is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will
be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired.

court assumes that the matter is so

This is because the
notorious that it will not be disputed.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial

notice,

may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the

course of the ordinary experiences of life,

or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as

true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration.
 57

Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that
they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person.

But judicial notice is not judicial

knowledge.
The mere personal knowledge of the judge

is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and

he is not authorized to make his individual

knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action.
Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are
"commonly" known.

Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a

reasonable dispute in that it is either:
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or

(2)capable of accurate and ready determination by

resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questionable
 58

The article in the website cited by the RTC patently lacks a requisite for it
to be of judicial notice to the court

because such article is not well and authoritatively

settled and is doubtful or uncertain.

It must be remembered that some

articles appearing in the internet or on websites are easily
edited

and sources are unverifiable, thus, sole

their
reliance on those articles is greatly
discouraged.
Considering, therefore, the above premise, this Court deems it proper to
remand the case to the RTC for its proper disposition

since this Court cannot, based on the records and some of the issues raised
by both parties such as the cancellation of petitioner's certificate of registration
issued by the Intellectual Property Office,

make a factual determination as to who has the better right to use the
trade/business/service name, "Lavandera Ko."
 59

Maria Clara Doctrine: Judicial Notice

People vs. Amarela & Racho

G.R. NOS. 225642-43 17 Jan 2018
MARTIRES, J.

Facts:
Victim at around 6pm was watching a beauty contest with her aunt contest was
being held at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up.

She went to the comfort room to urinate but She was not able to reach the
comfort room because Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the day
care center.

He placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina and
made a push and pull movement.

She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to her rescue Amarela
fled.

(3) persons brought her to a hut But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with
her. So she fled and hid in a neighboring house. She was transferred to
Rancho’s house and the latter took her her aunty’s house.

Racho brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. And had carnal
knowledge with her. After consummating the act, [Racho] left her. So AAA
went home alone.

Amarela and Rancho were arrested.

 60

Amarela] who confirmed the fact that he attended the fiesta

celebrations in Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City.

He said he met private complainant, [AAA], at the cooperative building at

around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon [AAA] asked him if he knew a person by
the name of Eric Dumandan who was allegedly her boyfriend. After a while,
Eric Dumandan passed by and so he told him that [AAA] was looking for him.
Then he left.

Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez.
While drinking, he felt dizzy and fell down from the bench. So Sanchez
brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in Tawan-tawan. He did
not know what happened next because he slept and woke up at six
o'clock in the morning

Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping
her:

Racho was instructed by [his] mother to accompany [AAA] in going to her

aunt's house.

When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's
house because she knows the latter would just scold her. Instead, she
wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura. Since Ventura was far,
Racho did not go with her and instead went back home.

RTC found accused guilty of Rape. CA affirmed RTC decision. Hence the case at
bar.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Wether accused are guilty of raping AAA?

Held: NO!
 61

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual·
depredation,

rape cases are solely decided based on the

credibility of the testimony of the private
complainant.

In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that

no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly

admit that she has been sexually abused, unless
that is the truth,

for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.

However, this misconception, particularly in this day

and age,

● not only puts the accused at an unfair

disadvantage,

● but creates a travesty of justice.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in
1960.
 62

In the case of People v. Tana, the Court affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed
robbers who took turns raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The Court,
speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that
they have been abused unless that abuse had actually happened. This is due
to their natural instinct to protect their honor.

We cannot believe that the offended party would have positively stated that
intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor.

And while the factual setting back then would have been
appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in
disclosing a sexual assault;

today, we simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara

stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman.
● We, should stay away from such mindset and

● accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today;

into a strong and

● she who has over the years transformed
confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing
to fight for her rights.

In this way, we testimony of a private

can evaluate the
complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception.
 63

It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions

because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim,

provided of course, that the

● testimony is credible,
● natural,
● convincing, and
● consistent

● with human nature and the normal course of

things.

Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond
reasonable doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down,
to the credibility and story of the victim
almost invariably,
and eyewitnesses
Although we put a premium on the factual findings of the trial court, especially when
they are affirmed by the appellate court,

this rule is not absolute and admits exceptions,

such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have
been overlooked, misapprehended, and misinterpreted

After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony,
reasonable doubt lingers as we are not fully
convinced that AAA was telling the truth.
 64

The following circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of her
testimony:

(1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs

materially from her testimony in court;

(2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the
crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the first time;

(3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the
stage against her will; and

(4) the medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are
inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.

It has often been noted that

if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a

witness,

the TESTIMONY should be given more weight since affidavits being

taken ex parte are usually incomplete and inadequate.

We usually brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and do not impair
the credibility of the rape victim.

In this case, however,

the version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court
testimony.

At the first instance,

1. AAA claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage;

2. later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest room when she
was grabbed.

By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction because it goes into
whether it was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.
 65

Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able

to identify Amarela considering that the whole
incident allegedly happened in a dark place. In fact, she
had testified that the place was not illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's
face:

From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given
the lighting conditions in the crime scene.

In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela

while she was being pulled to the day care center.

the prosecution failed to clarify as to how she

Even so,
was able to do so when, according to AAA herself,
the way to the day care center was dark and covered by
trees.

Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again

draw reservations from AAA's testimony.
Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary
responsibility.

The identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to
prove the crime

but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the

commission of the crime can be established,

there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond

reasonable doubt.
 66

Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped
naked, and then raped seems unrealistic and beyond human experience. She said:

From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself
and AAA, and place himself on top of her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage.

It is physically impossible for two human beings to

move freely under a stage, much more when the
other person is trying to resist sexual advances.
Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly Amarela pulled her to the makeshift
stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against
her will, AAA could have easily called for help or simply run away.

Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical

findings of the medico-legal officer.

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held

that

amedico-legal report is not indispensable to the

prosecution of a rape case, it being merely
corroborative in nature.
In convicting rapists based entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that
a medico-legal report is by no means controlling. Thus, since it is merely
corroborative in character, a medico-legal report could even be
dispensed with.32

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere

opinions that can only infer possibilities

and not absolute necessities.

 67

cannot testify on
A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual incident,
what exactly happened as his testimony would not
be based on personal knowledge or derived from
his own perception.
Consequently, a medico-legal's testimony cannot establish a certain fact as it
can only suggest what most likely happened.

medico-legal's findings can raise

In the same way, a
serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged
rape victim. Based on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who
conducted the medical examination on AAA,

she diagnosed that the ano-genital findings were caused by a blunt force or
penetrating trauma.

However, in a similar study comparing injuries

● from consensual and

● non-consensual intercourse, t

he authors discovered that the statistical results of the locations of

vaginal laceration are almost the same. Their findings suggest that the
injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual intercourse

From all this, we observe that

a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual from

non-consensual sex.

Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of

lacerations and whether they are located in different positions) to determine
whether the sexual act was consensual or not.
 68

If the frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the

vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was
sexual abuse.

are found in a specific area, it

On the other hand, if the lacerations
could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest
consensual intercourse.
In the instant case,

● the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the
hymen.

Considering the locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out

the probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night .

● Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-

when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may
have had consensual intercourse.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against
the will of the female.

It is also committed without force or intimidation when carnal

knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her
consent.

Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is

not rape,

provided she is above the age of consent or is

capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent.
 69

The female must not at any time consent;

● her consent, given at any time prior to

penetration, however reluctantly given,

● or if accompanied with mere verbal protests

and refusals,

prevents the act from being rape, provided the

consent is willing and free of initial coercion.40

We
Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense,
must bear in mind that the burden of proof is never
shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits.
Whether the accused's defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It is
fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.41

As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal
cases.

This means that both Amarela and Racho were convicted based on her lone
testimony. When we rely on the testimony of the private complainant in rape cases,
we require her testimony be entirely credible,
that
trustworthy, and realistic.
 70

For when certain parts would seem unbelievable, especially when it concerns one of
the elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not pass the test of
credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we
have to consider her testimony against Racho under the same light.

In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's
house, but instead forced her to go inside a house along the way.

While inside the house, Racho supposedly boxed AAA's abdomen, undressed
himself, placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina.
Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go home by herself.
 71

Rule 128 Sec.4 Judicial Admission

Confession vs. Admission

US. vs. JOSE CORRALES ( no provision of law which prescribes that either
confessions or admissions are not competent evidence unless made under
oath ) Not under custodial investigation
G.R. No. L-9230 November 10, 1914
CARSON, J. En Banc

Facts:
accused, who at that time was clerk of the CFI Misamis, received the
sum of P321 fine from a chinaman named Melliza that instead of giving Melliza the
prescribed official receipt, the accused handed him a copy of the judgment of
conviction with a note at the foot showing "Multa

Accused also did not submit books and accounts to the auditor. an information was
filed charging the accused with the misappropriation of this money; that a few hours
later the accused went to the house of the auditor, and told him that

the amount in question was in the office safe, in

the drawer in which he kept his personal funds.

The accused substantially admitted the facts above set but,

but claimed that

● when he received the money from Melliza he was busy, and not having time
to enter the receipt of the money in his books,
● he put it in the drawer of the safe in which he kept his personal funds,
intending to make the proper entry at his convenience;
● that thereafter he forgot all about the incident until after the auditor had closed
his examination;
● that the money continued in the safe in the drawer with his personal funds,
and was never withdrawn by him;
● and that when he recalled the transaction after the inspection, he prepared an
official receipt for the money and sent it to Melliza, and then went to the house
of the auditor and told him what had occurred.
 72

RTC convicted accused hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether accused is guilty of misappropriation due to his confession?

Held: YES!

If this story could be believed it would be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to

the existence of any criminal intent to misappropriate these funds in the mind of the
accused.

ButWe agree with the trial judge that the evidence of

record conclusively establishes the falsity of the
account of what occurred as given by the accused.
The auditor testified that

when the accused came to him on June 14 to tell him that the money was
in safe,

he asked the accused when he had put it there, and that he accused then and
there admitted that he had put the money in the safe at about half past 5 of
the afternoon of the day before (June 13) after the inspection had been
completed.

Counsel for appellant does not question the fact that this admission was
made to the auditor,

evidence as to this
though he does contend that the
admission should be disregarded,

on the ground that it was incompetent and

inadmissible.
 73

We are of opinion that the evidence fully sustains the trial judge in refusing
to accept as true the story told by the accused on the witness stand,

and especially his claim that, through an oversight, the money in question had not
been placed with the other government funds in his safe,

but the remained untouched in the safe in his office, together with his personal
funds, from the time it was received until the day after the inspection, when he
informed the auditor that it was in the safe.

1. The failure of the accused to make any note of the receipt of the money in the
books and accounts of his office;
2. his substitution of a non-official receipt in lieu of the prescribed official receipt
which it was his duty to give the person from whom he received the money;
3. the fact that this money was not turned over by him at the time of the
inspection of his office by the auditor, and that he made no reference to it until
a criminal prosecution had been instituted against him the day after the
inspection;
4. and finally his admission to the auditor that he had returned the money to the
safe a few hours after the inspection,

all conclusively establish the fact that he misappropriated these

funds,

and leave no room for doubt the receipt of this substantial sum of money until after
the inspection, and that it had been lying in the drawer with his personal funds from
the time when it was received until the day after the inspection when he reported the
matter to the auditor.

Counsel for the accused does not attempt to question the truth of the testimony of
the auditor as to the admission of the accused that he had put the money in the safe
on the afternoon of the day of the inspection of his property and accounts.
 74

evidence was incompetent and

Counsel contends, however, that this
should not be taken in to consideration, because as
counsel contends:

First, it was not first made to appear that it was

freely and voluntarily made, without compulsion
or inducement;

and second, it was not made under oath.

These contentions of counsel cannot be maintained.

Counsel relies chiefly on the statutory provisions

which forbid the introduction of testimony as to
extrajudicial confessions
unless it is first made to appear that the alleged confession was
made
● freely and
● voluntarily and
● without inducement or compulsion.

But a distinction must be made between

confessions and admissions.
 75

A confession, as distinguished from an admission,

1. is a declaration made at any time by a person,

2. voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement,

3. stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the

commission of a crime.

The term admission, on the other had,

1. is usually applied in criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused

2. which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused

or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged.

The statutory provision excluding evidence as to

confessions until and unless the prescribed
foundation is laid

Not applicable to admissions, which do not

amount to confessions

although they may be sufficient, when taken

together with other evidence of surrounding
circumstances to sustain an inference of the guilt
of the accused.
 76

The reason for the rule excluding evidence as to confessions unless it is first made
to appear that they are made voluntarily does not apply in cases of
admissions,

although, of course,
evidence of the fact that a
particular statement was made under duress
would tend very strongly to destroy its
evidentiary value.

It is very clear from all the evidence, and from the circumstances under which the
that it was not made
statement was made by the accused to the auditor,
under duress, and we are of opinion that the trial judge
properly took it under consideration as evidence against
the accused.

no provision of law which prescribes that either

There is
confessions or admissions are not competent
evidence unless made under oath.

It is the fact that they are made by the accused and

against his own interest which gives to them their
evidentiary value,

and provided the fact is established it does not

matter whether they are made under oath or not.
The judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed, with the costs of this
instance against the appellant. So ordered.
 77

People vs. ALDRIN LICAYAN ( accused’s spontaneous and voluntary verbal

confession made in a private meeting with the municipal mayor was admitted
in evidence ) Not under custodial investigation
G.R. No. 144422 February 28, 2002
PER CURIAM: En Banc

Facts:

appellant went to Agcopra who had a machine shop in Barangay Inobulan, Salay,
Misamis Oriental, to apply for work as a grinder of engine valves. On this occasion,
they drank rum to celebrate their reunion.

Agcopra did not stay long and did not drink beer anymore. He went with Romeo to
the barangay captain leaving appellant in Romeo’s house. When Romeo returned to
appellant Aldren was embracing and kissing
his house,
Rowena, justifying it by saying that he missed his
daughter.
Romeo told Rey Oriente to fetch Rowena. When the boy reached Dorbit’s house, he
saw appellant there with Rowena. Appellant told Rowena: "Day, come here
because your father asked you to go home so you can eat your supper."

Appellant then held the hand of Rowena and dragged her into
a dark area.

The following morning, the dead and naked body of Rowena was found at the
swamps, where appellant told Rogelio Dahilan, Jr., one of the searchers, she
would be. Photographs were taken of the girl.

A postmortem examination of the girl revealed that she had hematomas,

lacerations, abrasions all over her body, as well as a deep incomplete
hymenal laceration at the 6:00 o’clock position.

The cause of death was asphyxia by submersion in water. Rowena died a

painful death

For the brutal rape-slay of 5yr odl Rowena, herein accused Aldrin Licaya was
charged with Rape with Homicide.
 78

Counsel for the defense submitted the case for decision without presenting evidence
in behalf of the accused. Thereafter, the court a quo rendered judgment imposing
upon the accused the extreme penalty of death thus:

Since accused is at large after he escaped detention while the case was still pending
but after the prosecution had presented its evidence, let a warrant for his arrest, or
alias warrant of his arrest issue.

The fact of escape made accused-appellant’s failure to attend unjustified because he

has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale and protection of the law. This
being so, the trial against the fugitive should be brought to the ultimate conclusion.

Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the

evidence presented by the prosecution against the
accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the
fugitive’s appearance or re-arrest,9 for the State as much as the accused has an
interest in and is entitled to a speedy trial and disposition of the case.

Hence the case at bar

Issue: Whether accuised is guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide?

Held: YES!

Circumstancial Evidence

accused-appellant was convicted on the

In the case at bar,
basis of circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not the only
matrix wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of
guilt.
 79

The rules on evidence and case law sustain the conviction of the accused through
circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur:

1.] there must be more than one circumstance;

2.] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

3.] the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. 12

Inassaying the probative value of circumstantial

evidence, four basic guidelines must be observed:
1) it should be acted upon with caution;

2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt;

3) the facts must exclude every other theory but that of guilt; and

4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused as to

convince the judgment beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the one
who committed the offense.

The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused

cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of
evidence.

It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals a convincing picture
pointing towards the conclusion the accused is the author of the crime.
 80

Thefollowing circumstances pointed out by the trial court

lead to the inevitable conclusion that the accused-
appellant perpetrated the crime:
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the claim of

prosecution witnesses that Jun-jun Dahilan told them where Rowena’s

body could be found based on accused-appellant’s admission is
hearsay; ‘

7.] granting that accused-appellant revealed where Rowena’s lifeless

body could be found,

he never admitted having raped and killed her;

8.] the admission made by accused-appellant to Dahilan, Jr. is

inadmissible;

We disagree.

The series of events pointing to the commission of a

felony is appreciated not singly but together.
Like strands which create a pattern when interwoven,

a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld if the

circumstances

unbroken chain which leads to one

proved constitute an
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty
person.
 81

Accused-appellant cannot validly claim that

the statement made by Rogelio "Jun-jun" Dahilan, Jr. as to the location of the
victim’s body is hearsay.

Any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature

not based on the personal

if its probative value is
knowledge of the witnesses

but on the knowledge of some other person who

was never presented on the witness stand,

because it is the opportunity to cross-examine which

negates the claim that the matters testified to by a
witness are hearsay.
In the instant case,

● Rogelio Dahilan, Jr. testified that accused-appellant indeed told

him where the victim’s body can be found.

● What is more, the victim’s body was actually recovered at the

location pointed by accused-appellant.
 82

Accused-appellant’s objection to the admissibility of his statement as to where

he dumped the body of the victim, which allegedly partakes of an extra-judicial
confession,

is just as tenuous.
The impugned extra-judicial statement, as testified to by Dahilan, is as follows:

Q While you were there and Aldrin Licayan was also there did you have a
chance to talk to him?

A Yes, Ma’am.

Q What did you talk about?

A I asked him Brod, as if I was guessing, where did you leave the
child?

Q What was his answer to your question?

A He told me "Did you remember the place where we were drinking?"

Q What was your answer?

A I told him, Yes, at the place of Wennie Rajal.

Q What more?

A He said, "Yes in the place of Wennie Rajal. From his place there
was a curve[d] road or junction.

And in that junction the side of it is a ricefield. After the ricefield there is
a nipa swamp. Try to see there maybe I left the child there!"

The foregoing is not an extra-judicial confession,

but merely an extra-judicial admission.

 83

Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly delineates their
distinction.

In People v. Agustin we elucidated on the difference between the two in this wise:

A confession is an acknowledgment in express

terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime
charged,

while an admission is a statement by the accused,

direct or implied, of facts pertinent to issue, and tending, in

connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt.

an admission is something less

In other words,
than a confession

and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or

circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt.

The records show that

Rogelio "Jun-jun" Dahilan was
neither a law enforcement nor a public officer
conducting a custodial interrogation of accused-
appellant.
He was merely a jeepney driver and an acquaintance of accused-appellant who
asked the whereabouts of the missing child of his kumpadre because the victim was
last seen with the latter.
 84

In fact, there is

● no showing that Dahilan colluded with the police

authorities to elicit inculpatory evidence against
accused-appellant.
● Neither was he instructed by the police to extract information from accused-
appellant on the details of the crime.

In People v. Andan,

the accused’s spontaneous and voluntary verbal confession made

in a private meeting with the municipal mayor

was admitted in evidence

same was not covered by the requisites of

because the
Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution.

Constitutional procedure on custodial investigation

do not apply to a spontaneous

statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities,

but given in an ordinary manner whereby the

accused orally admitted having committed the
crime
 85

Even assuming arguendo that accused-appellant’s

admissions indeed partake of an extra-judicial
confession,
the same would still be admissible not only on account of the foregoing
considerations

butalso because it is corroborated by evidence

of corpus delicti.
Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court,

an extra-judicial confession shall not be sufficient

ground for conviction,
unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti ,

which is defined as the body of the crime

and, in its primary sense, means a crime has actually been

committed.

Applied to a particular offense, it is the actual commission by someone of the

particular crime charged.35 In this case, aside from the admission made by accused-
appellant, the bruised and battered body of the victim herself recovered at
the exact spot described by accused-appellant

conclusively established the corroborating

evidence of corpus delicti.
Furthermore, the admission is replete with details on the whereabouts of the victim
who at that time had not yet been found, thereby ruling out the probability that it was
involuntarily made.
 86

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from

its language such that if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no
suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its it integrity, it being replete
with details - which could only be supplied by the accused - reflecting spontaneity
and coherence, it may be considered voluntary

In sum, the foregoing circumstances when viewed in their entirety are as convincing
as direct evidence and, as such, negate the innocence of the accused-appellant.39
In other words, the circumstantial evidence against accused-appellant fully justifies
the finding of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the felony committed.
 87

People vs. HERMINIANO SATORRE ( We cannot affirm appellant’s conviction

on mere testimonial evidence, considering that the voluntariness of said
confession cannot be conclusively established because of appellant’s
personal circumstances and the failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral
confession into writing. The doubts surrounding the alleged oral confession,
the conduct of the investigation as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential
precedents cited by the trial court do not lead to the same moral certainty of
appellant’s guilt )
G.R. No. 133858 August 12, 2003
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: 1st Div.

Facts:

Gliceria Saraum, wife of the victim Romero Pantilgan, testified e she found her dead
husband lying on the ground. Blood oozed out of a gunshot wound on his head. Brgy
Kagawad Rufino Abayata testified upon confirming the incident, they reported the
matter to the Carcar Police.

Rufino further narrated that appellant’s father, Abraham Satorre, informed them that
it was appellant who shot Pantilgan. Nevertheless, appellant’s
brothers, Margarito and Rosalio Satorre, went to Rufino’s house and
surrendered the gun which was allegedly used in killing Pantilgan.

Flavio Gelle narrated that

he accompanied appellant and his father, Abraham, to the Barangay

Captain of Can-asohan, Carcar, Cebu

where appellant admitted killing Pantilgan. Thereafter, appellant was

detained.

Brgy Captain, testified that Abraham Satorre and

Corroborating Gelle’s story
Gelle brought appellant to her residence where he confessed
having killed Pantilgan. Appellant allegedly informed her that
Appelant killed Pantilgan because the latter struck him with a piece of wood.

That same evening, she went to the Carcar Police Station with appellant
where she executed an affidavit. She further averred that appellant
voluntarily narrated that he killed Pantilgan with the use of a handgun
which he wrestled from his possession.
 88

Medicolo legal certified that the cause of Pantilgan’s death was gunshot
wound.

Denying the charges against him, appellant claimed he denied having

confessed to the killing of Pantilgan.

Appellant Herminiano Satorre was charged with Murder. After trial, the court a quo
gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and rendered a decision convicting
appellant of Murder

trial court erred: (1)

Appellant interposed this appeal, contending that the
in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses;
Hence the case at bar.

Appellant claims that

his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by the
Barangay Captain, is inadmissible in evidence
● for being hearsay and

● for being obtained without a competent and independent counsel of his

choice.

In effect, the quantum of evidence adduced by the prosecution was not

sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The bare
allegation that he confessed or admitted killing Romero Pantilgan is not proof
of guilt.

Issue: Whether his alleged confession or admission, which was concocted by the
Barangay Captain, is admissible?

Held: NO! Accused Acquitted

 89

Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court defines an admission

as an "act,
declaration or omission of a party as to
a relevant fact."

A confession, on the other hand, under Section 33 of the same Rule is

the "

declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or

of any offense necessarily included therein."

Both may be given in evidence against the person

admitting or confessing.

On the whole, a confession, as distinguished from an

admission, is

1. a declaration
2. made at any time by a person,
3. voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement,
4. stating or acknowledging that he had committed or participated in the
commission of a crime.

Evidently, appellant’s alleged declaration owning up to the killing before the

Barangay Captain was a confession. Since the
● declaration was not put in writing

● and made out of court,

it is an oral extrajudicial confession.

 90

The nexus that connects appellant to the killing was his

alleged oral extrajudicial confession given to

Barangay Captain Cynthia Castañares and two
barangay kagawads.
According to the trial court, their testimonies were positive and convincing.

Appellant’s retraction of his oral extrajudicial

confession should not be given much credence
in the assessment of evidence.
However, appellant disputes the admissibility and sufficiency of the
testimonial evidence offered to prove the alleged oral extrajudicial confession.

There is no question as to the admissibility

of appellant’s alleged oral extrajudicial confession.
Indeed, as far as admissibility is concerned, Rule 130, Section 33 of the Rules of
Court makes no distinction whether the confession
is judicial or extrajudicial.
 91

The rationale for the admissibility of a confession is that

if it is made freely and voluntarily,

a confession constitutes evidence of a high

order
since it is supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of
normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted by truth and conscience.

Accordingly, the basic test for the validity of a confession is –

was it voluntarily and freely made.

The term "voluntary" means that the

● accused speaks of his free will and accord,

● without inducement of any kind,
● and with a full and complete knowledge of the nature and consequences of
the confession,

and when the speaking is so free from influences affecting the will of the
accused, at the time the confession was made, that it renders it admissible in
evidence against him.

Plainly, the admissibility of a confession in evidence

hinges on its voluntariness.
 92

The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that
if, upon its face, the confession exhibits no suspicious circumstances
tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details –

which could only be supplied by the accused – reflecting spontaneity and

coherence, it may be considered voluntary.

when the
The problem with appraising voluntariness occurs
confession is an oral extrajudicial confession

because the proof of voluntariness cannot be

inferred from the testimony of a witness who
allegedly heard the confessant since there is no written
proof that such confession was voluntarily made.

Neither can the confessant be appraised by the court since, precisely, it was
made outside the judicial proceeding. The problem posed therefore by an oral
extrajudicial confession is

● not only the admissibility of the testimony asserting or certifying that such
confession was indeed made,

● but more significantly whether it was made voluntarily.

On the question of whether a confession is made

voluntarily,
● the age,
● character, and
● circumstances

prevailing at the time it was made must be considered.

Much depends upon the situation and surroundings of the accused. This is the
position taken by the courts, whatever the theory of exclusion of incriminating
statements may be. The intelligence of the accused or want of it must also be taken
into account. It must be shown that the defendant realized the import of his act
 93

appellant was a 19-year old farmer who

In the case at bar,
did not even finish first grade.
Granting that he made the confession in the presence of Barangay Captain
he may not have realized the full import of his
Castañares,
confession and its consequences. This is not to say that he is not
capable of making the confession out of a desire to tell the truth if prompted by his
conscience.

due to the aforesaid personal

What we are saying is that
circumstances of appellant, the voluntariness of his
alleged oral confession may not be definitively appraised
and evaluated.
At any rate, an extrajudicial confession forms but a prima facie case
against the party by whom it is made. Such confessions are not conclusive
proof of that which they state; it may be proved that they were uttered in ignorance,
or levity, or mistake;

and hence, they are, at best, to be regarded as only cumulative proof which affords
but a precarious support and on which, when uncorroborated, a verdict cannot be
permitted to rest.

Main prosecution witness Castañares testified that

after appellant’s alleged oral confession, she brought the latter to the office of
the police at the Municipal Hall of Carcar, Cebu.

At the police station, Castañares was investigated, after which she executed
her sworn statement. Also at the police station, appellant allegedly admitted
before policemen that he killed Pantilgan.

His statement was not taken nor was his confession reduced into
writing. This circumstance alone casts some doubt on the prosecution’s
account that appellant freely and voluntarily confessed killing Pantilgan.
 94

not only as to the voluntariness of the

It raises questions
alleged confession, but also on whether appellant
indeed made an oral confession.

a confession is not required to be in any

To be sure,

particular form. It may be oral or written, formal or

informal in character. It may be recorded on video tape, sound motion
pictures, or tape.

However, while not required to be in writing to be admissible in evidence,

it is advisable, if not otherwise recorded by video

tape or other means, to reduce the confession to
writing.

Thisadds weight to the confession and helps

convince the court that it was freely and voluntarily
made.

If possible the confession, after being reduced to writing, should be read

to the defendant, have it read by defendant, have him sign it, and have it
attested by witnesses.

The trial court gave credence to appellant’s oral extrajudicial confession relying on
jurisprudence which we find are not applicable. I

In the cases cited by the trial court the convictions were based
on circumstantial evidence in addition to the appellants’ confessions, or the
extrajudicial confessions were reduced to writing and were replete with details which
only appellants could have supplied.

In the case at bar, however, there was no circumstantial evidence to

corroborate the extrajudicial confession of appellant. More importantly, the said
confession does not contain details which could have only been known to appellant.
 95

Furthermore, the events alleged in the confession are inconsistent with the physical
evidence.

Indeed, an extrajudicial confession will not support

a conviction where it is uncorroborated. There must be
such corroboration that, when considered in connection with confession, will show
the guilt of accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient corroboration of a confession. It is not

necessary that the supplementary evidence be entirely free from variance with the
extrajudicial confession, or that it show the place of offense or the defendant’s
identity or criminal agency.

All facts and circumstances attending the particular offense charged are admissible
to corroborate extrajudicial confession.

Nonetheless, the fatal gun and the slug extracted from Pantilgan’s brain
can not be considered as corroborative evidence.
While the slug embedded in Pantilgan’s brain came from the fatal gun, the
prosecution was not able to conclusively establish the ownership of the gun other
than the bare testimony of prosecution witnesses that appellant’s brothers
surrendered the gun to them.

This was denied by appellant and his brothers and there was no other proof linking
the gun to him.

On the whole, it appears that the trial court simply based appellant’s conviction on
the testimonial evidence of prosecution witnesses that appellant orally owned up to
the killing.
 96

We cannot affirm appellant’s conviction

on mere testimonial evidence,

considering that the voluntariness of said confession cannot be conclusively

established because of appellant’s personal circumstances and the
failure of the police to reduce the alleged oral confession into
writing.

The doubts surrounding the alleged oral confession, the conduct of the investigation
by the trial court
as well as the inapplicable jurisprudential precedents cited
do not lead to the same moral certainty of appellant’s
guilt.
To conclude, it must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding
consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused, but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Where there is no moral
certainty as to their guilt, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be
questionable.

The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be

overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.19 In fact, unless the prosecution
discharges the burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt,
the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf.
 97

People vs. DOMINGO Muleta ( Flagrantly violated in the present case were the
appellant's right to be informed of his rights under custodial investigation, his
right to counsel, as well as his right to have said counsel present during the
waiver of his rights under custodial investigation )
G.R. No. 130189 June 25, 1999
PANGANIBAN, J. 3rd Div. Decision Under Custodial investigation

Facts:
Charito's lifeless body was found naked in Mojon, Malolos, Bulacan, tied to a post
with the use of a pair of pants and both her hands were tied with a bra. bore five (5)
stab wounds,

Tolentino went to appellant's house in Oriental Mindoro and requested appellant to

go with him to the NBI, Manila for investigation. Appellant readily obliged. Danilo
Delgado, Charito's paternal uncle, accompanied Tolentino and appellant to Manila.

During his custodial investigation appellant was assisted by

counsel, Atty. Deborah [D]aquis with address

There, he admitted having raped and later killed Charito

Delgado.

Another prosecution witness, Danilo Delgado, testified that during the wake of
Charito Delgado on May 13, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, appellant became
hysterical, crying, shaking his head and muttering: "Patawarin mo ako Charito, ikaw
kasi lumaban pa, nakakahiya, mabuti pang mamatay na".

Delgado saw appellant drink a bottle of "chlorux", after which he fell to the ground.
Appellant was brought to the Fatima Hospital.

RTC, Despite the absence of an eyewitness, held that the circumstantial

evidence in this case was enough to establish the guilt of the appellant. In
upholding the validity of the extrajudicial confession,

The contention of the accused that his extra-judicial confession [was]

inadmissible because it was obtained through force and without the
assistance of counsel is untenable.

Well-settled is the rule that a confession is presumed to be voluntary until the

contrary is proved. In th[is] case, the presumption has not been overcome.

Hence the case at bar.

 98

Issue: whether the extrajudicial confession of the appellant is admissible in

evidence?

HEld; NO!!

The extrajudicial confession of appellant is

inadmissible, and the remaining circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution is sorely insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

First Issue:

Validity of Extrajudicial Confession

The appellant claims that "it is not true that [he] had executed an extra-judicial
confession". As correctly pointed out by the solicitor general, however, the appellant
actually admits to the execution of the said confession,

albeit without the assistance of counsel.

But unlike the solicitor general, we are not ready to declare that such "ambivalence
only indicates the unreliability of [appellant's] claim."

confessions extracted without the assistance

Indeed,
of counsel are taboo and useless in a court of law.

To be acceptable, extrajudicial confessions must

conform to constitutional requirements under custodial
investigation.
 99

A confession is not valid and not admissible in evidence

when it is obtained in violation of any of the

following rights of persons under custodial
investigation:
1. to remain silent,
2. to have independent and competent counsel preferably of their own
choice,
3. to be provided with counsel if they are unable to secure one,
4. to be assisted by such counsel during the investigation,
5. to have such counsel present when they decide to waive these rights,
6. and to be informed of all these rights and of the fact that anything they say
can and will be used against them in court.

In People v. Santos 283 SCRA 443, we held:

A confession is not admissible unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows

that it was obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution.
Section 12, Article III thereof, provides:

(1)Any person under investigation for the

commission of an offense shall have the
1. right to be informed of his right to remain silent
2. and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice.
3. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one.
4. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence
of counsel.

3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 17

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
 100

If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is

subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely — without
coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and credibility, i.e., if it
was consistent with the normal experience of mankind.

A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes evidence of a

high order because no person of normal mind will knowingly and deliberately
confess to be the perpetrator of a crime unless prompted by truth and
conscience. Otherwise, it is disregarded in accordance with the cold
objectivity of the exclusionary rule.

Flagrantly violated in the present case were

● the appellant's right to be informed of his rights

under custodial investigation,
● his right to counsel,

● as well as his right to have said counsel present during the waiver of his rights
under custodial investigation.

An extra-judicial confession extracted in violation of constitutionally

enshrined rights is inadmissible in evidence.

The Right to Be Apprised

of Constitutional Rights

The right to be informed of one's constitutional rights during custodial investigation

refers

to an effective communication between the

investigating officer and the suspected individual,

with the purpose of making the latter understand

these rights.
 101

Understanding would mean that the information

transmitted was effectively received and comprehended.
Hence, the Constitution does not merely require the investigating officers to "inform"
the person under investigation; rather, it requires that the latter be "informed."

Thequestions propounded to the appellant did not satisfy

the strict requirements mandated by the Constitution.
Such "terse and perfunctory statements" implied a superficial reading of the rights of
the accused, without the slightest consideration of whether he understood what was
read to him.

This Court will not subscribe to such manner of "informing" the accused of his
constitutional rights.

The Right to Counsel

The prosecution contends that this constitutional requirement was satisfied because
appellant executed the confession with the assistance and in the presence of Atty.
Deborah Daquiz. The participation of the counsel was described in the confession in
this manner:

However, the testimony of Tolentino, the investigating NBI agent, clearly contradicts
the claim of the prosecution.

Despite Agent Tolentino's claim that the confession of the accused started to be
taken on September 19, 1993 and continued the next day,

the sworn statement itself clearly showed that what began on the 19th
of September ended on the same day.

the extrajudicial confession was

According to the jurat,
subscribed and sworn to on September 19, 1993. The
importance of the jurat must be stressed
 102

We note that the heading of the sworn statement refers to the same date: September
19, 1993.

It is thus daylight clear that the purported sworn

statement of the appellant was prepared prior to the
arrival of his NBI-procured counsel.
Thus, when the appellant executed and completed his purported extrajudicial
confession on September 19, 1993, he was not assisted by counsel.

No Valid Waiver
The illegality of the alleged confession is further demonstrated by the fact that
appellant exercised no satisfactory waiver of his rights. As stated in our earlier
discussions,

since he was not assisted by a lawyer when the

waiver was made, there was no valid waiver to
speak of.
Furthermore, even if we were to assume that the appellant was
assisted by counsel when he waived his rights , the waiver itself was
lamentably insufficient.

After Atty. Daquiz was allegedly called to assist the appellant, she posited this
question:

"Gusto mo bang talikdan ang iyong mga karapatan na ibinibigay sa iyo ng

ating Konstitusyon?"

To this appellant replied: "Tinatalikdan ko na po iyon dahil gusto ko

nang ipagtapat ang pangyayari kay CHARITO DELGADO na pamangkin ko."
 103

To the this was not the waiver that the

Court,
Constitution clearly and strictly required.
Such waiver failed to show his understanding of his rights, his waiver of those rights,
and the implications of his waiver.

The waiver, in order to be valid, should have been in a language

that clearly manifested his desire to do so.

The part of the sworn statement in which the accused "waived" his rights referred to
them as

"mga karapatan na ibinigay sa iyo ng ating Konstitusyon" and "iyon" —

words that were utterly vague and insufficient to satisfy

the Constitutional requirements.

As presented, the prosecution would have us refer to the first part of the sworn
statement for guidance, as if it were a footnote saying "Please see first part." Such
stratagem is woefully insufficient to constitute a waiver of rights cherished and
enshrined in our basic law.

Moreover, Atty. Daquiz raised only one question: whether appellant would
like to waive his rights.

This was odd, because she had been called to

assist appellant in making his confession, not his
waiver.
Atty. Daquiz made no effort to determine whether the accused was treated well, or
the understood his rights. Such perfunctory, even cavalier, attempt falls short of
constitutional requirements.
 104

Exhibit "J" can be

BP OIL vs. TOTAL DISTRIBUTION ( Thus,

considered as an admission against

interest )
G.R. No. 214406 February 6, 2017
PERALTA, J. 2nd Div.

Facts:
A Complaint for Sum of Money was filed by petitioner BP Oil against respondent
Total dist seeking to recover the sum of ₱36M representing the total value of

the moneys, stock and accounts receivables that TDLSI has allegedly
refused to return to BP Oil.

defendant entered into

According to the allegations in the complaint, the
an Agency Agreement (the Agreement) with BP
Singapore on whereby
it was given the right to act as the exclusive agent of the latter for the
sales and distribution of its industrial lubricants in the Philippines.

The agency was for a period of five years from 1997

to 2002.
In return, the

● defendant was supposed to meet the target sales

volume set by BP Singapore for each year of the
Agreement.

●defendant was supposed to deposit the proceeds of the sales it made to a

depositary account that the defendant will open for the purpose.
When the defendant did not meet its target sales volume for the first year of
the Agreement, the plaintiff informed the defendant that it was
 105

going to appoint other distributors to sell the BP's

industrial lubricant products in the Philippines.

The defendant did not object to the plan of the plaintiff but asked for
₱10M as compensation for the expenses. The plaintiff did not agree to the
demand made by the defendant.

defendant through its lawyer, wrote the plaintiff a letter where it

demanded that it be paid damages in the amount of ₱40M

and announced that it was withholding remittance

of the sales until it was paid by the plaintiff.
plaintiff wrote the defendant back to give notice that it was terminating the
Agreement unless the defendant rectified the breaches it committed within a period
of 30 days. The plaintiff also demanded that the defendant pay the plaintiff
its outstanding obligations and return the unsold stock in its possession.

Defendant, through De Asis CFO, wrote the plaintiff a letter admitting that as of the
said date, it had in its possession

● collections against sales in the amount of ₱27M,

● receivables in the amount of ₱8,7M and

● stocks valued at ₱1,1M.

law firm of Siguion Reyna sent the defendant a formal demand letter for the payment
of

₱36M representing the total amount of the collections, receivables

and stocks that defendant should have returned to the plaintiff
 106

plaintiff filed the instant complaint for collection against the defendant. The
defendant initially filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground for
[sic] lack of cause of action because of the existence of an arbitration agreement, as
well as a previously filed arbitration proceeding between the parties.

RTC denied Motion to Dismiss. RTC ruled in favor of Petitioner ranting the claim of
the plaintiff and directing the defendant to pay the plaintif

● P36M for the value of the stocks and the moneys received and retained by the
defendant

CA reversed RTC. CA ruled, among others, that

the admission made by respondent in Exhibit "J ," that it

was withholding moneys, receivables and stocks respectively valued at
₱27,261,305.75, ₱8,767,656.26 and ₱1,155,000.00 from petitioner,

has no evidentiary weight, thus, petitioner was not able to

preponderantly establish its claim.

Hence the case at bar.

According to petitioner, Exhibit "J" qualifies as an actionable document

whose authenticity and due execution were deemed admitted
by respondent or TDLSI following its failure to specifically deny the
same under oath. Petitioner insists that it has met the quantum of proof required by
law.

Issue: Whether admission made by respondent has evidentiary weight, thus,

petitioner was able to preponderantly establish its claim?

Held:
 107

On the issue of whether Exhibit "J" is an actionable document, the CA ruled:

Here, plaintiff-appellee relies heavily on its Exhibit "J", defendant-appellant's
purported letter dated April 30, 2001, which it alleged to be an "actionable
document"

whichdefendant-appellant failed to deny

under oath.

It does amounts to a judicial admission on the part of

defendant-appellant that it has possession of its stocks, moneys and
receivables belonging to plaintiff-appellee.

Clearly, said document is not an actionable document contemplated in

Section 7, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Court but is merely evidentiary in
nature.

As such, there was no need for defendant-appellant to deny its

genuineness and due execution under oath.

We thus cannot sustain plaintiff-appellee' s contention that the aforesaid

Exhibit "J" amounted to a judicial admission because it's due execution and
authenticity was never denied under oath by defendant appellant.

Verily, an admission is any statement of fact made by a party against its

interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is
inconsistent with the facts alleged by him. To be admissible, an admission
must (a) involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite;
(c) be knowingly and voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter' s
interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and inadmissible.

The above findings of the CA are partially correct.

 108

To the mind of the Supreme Court,Exh. "J" is not an actionable

document

but is an evidence that may be admissible and;

hence, need not be denied under oath. Sections 7 and 8 of

the 1997 Rules of Court provide

A document, therefore, is actionable when

an action or defense is grounded upon such

written instrument or document.
The complaint filed by petitioner is an action for collection of sum of money arising
from the termination of the Agency Agreement with TDLSI. The CA, therefore,
was correct when

it stated that petitioner's cause of action is primarily based on the alleged

non-payment of outstanding debts of respondent

as well as the unremitted collections/payments and unsold stocks, despite

demand.

Thus,petitioner's cause of action is not based

solely on the April 30, 2001 letter allegedly stating the
"present value of stocks, collections and accounts receivables" of TDLSI.
 109

Admission Against Interest

The CA, however, ruled that

while TDLSI admitted Exhibit "J", it nevertheless qualified and limited said
admission to, merely, the existence thereof,

without Exhibit "J" the same court was not

thus,
convinced that petitioner was able to
preponderantly establish its claim against TDLSI in the amount
of ₱36,M for the value of the moneys, stock and accounts receivables which
TDLSI allegedly refused to deliver to petitioner.

This is erroneous.
The fact is, TDLSI indeed admitted the existence of Exhibit "J."

Exhibit "J" can be considered as an

Thus,

admission against interest.

Admissions against interest are those

● made by a party to a litigation

○ or made by one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such

party,

● and are admissible whether or not the declarant is

available as a witness.
 110

An admission against interest is the best evidence

that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute,

based on the no man would declare

presumption that
anything against himself unless such declaration is
true.
It is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds with the truth, and it
is his fault if it does not.

No doubt, admissions against interest may be

refuted by the declarant. In this case, however,
respondent failed to refute the contents of Exhibit
"J."
Be that as it may, the qualification made by respondent in the admission of Exhibit
"J" is immaterial as the contents thereof were merely corroborative of the other
pieces of evidence presented by petitioner and that respondent failed in its defense,
to present evidence to defeat the claim of petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court dated November 10, 2014 of BP Oil and Chemicals International Philippines,
Inc. is GRANTED. Consequently, the Decision dated April 30, 2014 of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Decision dated January 21, 2011 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 148, Makati City is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED
 111

Extrajudicial confessions

People vs. ANTONIO Dacanay ( We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to

the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution )
G.R. No. 216064, November 07, 2016
CAGUIOA, J. 1st Div. Decision

Facts:

Norma Dacabay, the wife of Antonio, was found lifeless with several puncture
wounds on the bathroom floor of their home by their son, Quinn. At that time, Antonio
had already left for work after having allegedly left the house at around six in the
morning.

both Quinn and Antonio proceeded back to their house and were met by some police
officers who were then already conducting an investigation on the incident.
Antonio was then interviewed by PO3 Santos.

Antonio alluded to a certain "Miller" as an alleged "lover" of Norma who may have
perpetrated the crime. However, after further investigation, the identity of "Miller" was
never ascertained, as none of Norma's friends knew of any such person.

While Antonio promised to proceed to the police station on the following day, he
never made good on such promise. PO3 Santos went to Antonio's workplace to
invite Antonio to the precint. Atonio acceded to such request.

When they arrived at the precinct, Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. and
some members of the media were present. While at the precinct,

Barangay Kagawad Antonio I. Nastor, Jr. informed PO3 Santos

that Antonio was already willing to confess to
killing Norma.
Accordingly, PO3 Santos proceeded to contact a lawyer from the
Public Attorney's Office.

In the meantime, PO3 Santos apprised Antonio of his constitutional

rights, including the right to remain silent.
 112

However, as determined by both the RTC and the CA,

despite having been apprised of his rights, Antonio

nonetheless confessed to the crime before the
media representatives,

who separately interviewed him without PO3

Santos,
Per [Antonio]'s account, around 4:00 in the morning, he and his wife had a
fight pertaining to the unaccounted amount of P100,000.00.

With extreme anger, he stabbed his wife several times. Thereafter, he

threw all the pieces of evidence to the river.

Insofar as accused's confession was heard, media men Nestor Etolle from the
Philippine Star and Jun Adsuara from Tanod (Bantay ng Bayan) alleged, in
the same tenor, that when it was reported that the case has (sic) been solved,
they each went, at different time intervals, to the detention cell of the Manila
Police District to interview the suspect.

Accused, however, remained consistent in admitting that he was the one who
killed his wife x x x. He was alleged to have said that he has been bothered
by his conscience that was why he admitted to the killing.

Notably, the reporters, Jun Adsuara and Nestor Etoile, were presented
by the prosecution during trial, wherein

both testified that Antonio voluntarily admitted his complicity in the crime
without any intimidation or coercion exerted on his person.

As a result of the interview, a news article entitled "Mister timbog sa

pagpatay sa asawa" was published in the October 10, 2007 issue of
Tanod Diyaryo Bayan.
 113

Moreover, it was later confirmed by PO3 Santos during a follow-up operation that the
missing jewelry were indeed stored in Antonio's locker at PIDMCO, consistent with
the latter's extrajudicial confession before the press. Medical report also consistent
with the statement of the accused.

For his defense, as summarized by the RTC, Antonio interposed the twin defenses
of alibi and denial, claiming coercion and intimidation on the part of the police officers
involved in the investigation of the crime

Upon arraignment, Antonio entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.31 Trial
on the merits then ensued. RTC gave weight to the extrajudicial confession
of Antonio and found him guilty of the crime of Parricide,

CA affirmed RTC Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Antonio’s extrajudicial confession of killing his wife admissible in

evidence thus finding him guilty?

Held: YES!

In his Appeal, Antonio insists that his extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible on the ground that it was given under a "coercive
physical or psychological atmosphere" .41 To support his claim, Antonio
underscores the fact that he was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other
detainees when he allegedly confessed to the crime before the media.42

We are not persuaded.

At the outset, we note that Antonio had already admitted in his Appellant's Brief that

he was not under custodial investigation at the time

he gave his extrajudicial confession:
Although he was not under custodial investigation, note must be taken that
Antonio Dacanay was inside a detention cell with two (2) or three (3) other
detainees when he allegedly confessed before the media.
 114

confession before the media does not

Lastly, although
form part of custodial investigation,
Antonio Dacanay should have been informed about the
consequences of his (sic) when he decided to confess his alleged
guilt

Antonio's reliance on constitutional safeguards is

Hence,
misplaced as much as it is unfounded. We need not
belabor this point.
At this juncture, it bears stressing that during the separate occasions that Antonio
was interviewed by the news reporters,

no indication of the presence of any

there was
police officers within the proximity who could
have possibly exerted undue pressure or influence.
As recounted by both reporters during their testimonies, Antonio voluntarily narrated
how he perpetrated the crime in a candid and straightforward manner, "with no trace
of fear, intimidation or coercion in him".

On this score, our pronouncements in People v. Andan are instructive. In said case,
we held that

a confession made before news reporters,

● absent any showing of undue influence from the police

authorities,

is sufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime confessed to by

the accused:
 115

appellant's confessions to the news

Clearly,
reporters were given free from any undue
influence from the police authorities.
The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed appellant.
They were not acting under the direction and control of the police. They were
there to check appellant's confession to the mayor.

They did not force appellant to grant them an interview and

reenact the commission of the crime.

In fact, they asked his permission before interviewing him.

They interviewed him on separate days not once

did appellant protest his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly
confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment.

All his confessions to the news reporters were witnessed by his family and
other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the
interview of appellant by the news reporters.

We rule that appellant's verbal confessions to the newsmen

are not covered by Section 12 (1) and (3) of

Article III of the Constitution.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation

● between a private individual

● and another individual.
 116

It governs the relationship between the individual and the

State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents.

certain rights of the individual exist

They confirm that
without need of any governmental grant, rights that
may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect.
The fact that the extrajudicial confession was made by Antonio while inside
a detention cell

does not by itself render such confession inadmissible,

contrary to what Antonio would like this Court to believe.

In People v. Domantay, where the accused was also interviewed while inside a
jail cell, this Court held that

such circumstance alone does not taint the extrajudicial

confession of the accused, especially since the same
was given freely and spontaneously:
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he
was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which
prevails in a custodial investigation. We are not persuaded. Accused-
appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell.

The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was
an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be
interviewed, but instead, he agreed.

He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso

Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
 117

Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around
because about two to three meters from the jail were the police station and
the radio room.

We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any

undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced
him into giving his confession.

Accused-appellant contends that "it is...not altogether improbable for the

police investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some
incriminating information from the accused."

This is pure conjecture.

Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no

evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter.

Following this Court's ruling the details

in People v. Jerez,
surrounding the commission of the crime,
● which could be supplied only by the accused,

● and the spontaneity and coherence exhibited by him during his

interviews,

belie any insinuation of duress that would render his confession

inadmissible.

Notably, while Antonio's testimony is replete with imputations of

violence and coercion, no other evidence was presented to
buttress these desperate claims.

Neither was there any indication that Antonio instituted corresponding criminal or
administrative actions against the police officers allegedly responsible. It is well-
settled that where the accused fails to present evidence of compulsion; where he did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators
for maltreatment; and where no physical evidence of violence was presented, all
these will be considered as factors indicating voluntariness.
 118

Rule 130 Admissibility

Best Evidence Rule: documentary Evidence

Rep vs. Cuenca et al ( Republic seeks exception to the application of the best
evidence rule by arguing that said documents were presented to prove their
existence and execution, and not their contents; Clearly, no amount of legal
hermeneutics could betray that what should be proven are the contents, and
not the mere existence, of the documents themselves )
G.R. No.198393 4 April 2018
TIJAM, J.

Facts:
On 1987, PCGG et al filed a complaint for reconveyance, against respondents Cuenca et al.
Republic sought to recover from respondents alleged ill-gotten wealth which they acquired in
unlawful concert with one another.

Republic enumerated the alleged illegal acts, one of the acts is stated below:

● secured loans and financial assistance fro[m] government financial institutions

without sufficient collateral, in contravention of banking laws and sound banking
practices,

The Republic then proceeded to formally offer its documentary evidence. Petitioner's
other documentary evidence which were mere photocopies were excluded by the
Sandiganbayan pursuant to the best evidence rule under Section 3, Rule 130.

Subsequently, Ongpin et al filed their respective demurrers to evidence which were

granted by the Sandiganbayan, and thus, the complaint as against them was
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. On August 5, 2010, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its presently assailed Decision dismissing the Republic's complaint
for insufficiency of evidence.

Sandiganbayan observed that the same merely consisted of the executive issuances
of then President Marcos and of court decisions and resolutions. According to the
Sandiganbayan, said executive issuances are not per se illegal considering that
every public official is entitled to presumption of good faith in the discharge of official
duties.

in the absence of bad faith and malice, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties stands. Hence the case at bar

Issue: Whether Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing Repblic’s complaint due to

insufficiency of evidence?
 119

Held: No

1st; Best Evidence rule

Except for the Presidential issuances and court decisions, Republic's documentary
evidence consisting of reports, sworn statements, memoranda, board resolutions,
letters of guarantee, deeds of undertaking, promissory notes, letters and loan
agreements

were excluded by the Sandiganbaya n for being mere

photocopies.
That these documentary exhibits were indeed mere photocopies were
never disputed by the Republic.

Section 3, Rule 130 Best Evidence Rule

● SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.-When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:

● (a) When the original been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror;

● (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

● (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and

● d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.

Thus, a photocopy, being merely secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is

shown that the original is unavailable.43 Section 5, Rule 130 provides:

● SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability
without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
 120

Pursuant to the aforequoted section, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary

evidence to prove the contents of the original, it is imperative that the offeror must
prove:

(1) the existence or due execution of the original;

(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and

(3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability ofthe original can be
attributed.

Hence, the correct order of proof is existence, execution, loss, and contents.

Sandiganbayan is correct in observing that the Republic failed to show, in case of

a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office,

an official publication thereof or a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record or by his deputy,

and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a

certification that such officer has the custody, or in the case of a public record
of a private document,

While witness Ma. Lourdes 0. Magno testified that she is the custodian of PCGG's
records, together with the excluded documents, and that the PCGG's records were
turned over by the previous Chairman and Commissioners of the PCGG and from
the PCGG's Research Department, such does not make the documents public in
character per se.

The Republic seeks exception to the application of the best evidence rule by arguing
that said documents were presented to prove their existence and execution, and not
their contents.

Clearly, no amount of legal hermeneutics could betray that what should be

proven are the contents, and not the mere existence, of the documents
themselves.
 121

2nd: Petition for review, Rule 45

In order to determine the veracity of the Republic's main contention that it has
established a prima facie case against respondents through its documentary and
testimonial evidence, a reassessment and reexamination of the evidence is
necessary.

Unfortunately, the limited and discretionary judicial review allowed under Rule 45
does not envision a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
respondent court's action was predicated.
 122

Object Evidence

People vs. MARIO TANDOY ( Since the aforesaid marked money was presented
by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not
its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is
therefore admissible )
G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990
CRUZ, J. 1st Div. Decision

Facts:

Police officers were dispatched to conduct buy-bust operation in Makati. Poilice

Singayan was to pose as the buyer. three men approached Singayan. One of them
was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang
umiskor?

Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there —

● two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00

● and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).

team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a
body search of the accused-appellant and took from him the

1. marked money,
2. as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.

Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination was performed on the

confiscated marijuana by NBI Chemist who later testified that the findings were
positive. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2

RTC found accused guilty admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A"
which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.

Hence the case at bar.

 123

accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and

questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only
of the marked P10.00 bill.

Issue: Whether the RTC erred in admitting the xerox copy of the marked P10 bill?

Held: NO!!

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly

refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00
bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is
excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.

Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that

said marked money is an ordinary document falling under Sec. 2,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court

which excludes the introduction of secondary

evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned
therein.

The best evidence rule applies only

when the contents of the document are the
subject of inquiry.
 124

Where the issue is only

● as to whether or not such document was

actually executed, or exists,

● or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding

its execution,

the best evidence rule does not apply and

testimonial evidence is admissible.

solely
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution

for the purpose of establishing its

existence and not its contents,
other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox
copy thereof, is therefore admissible

without the need of accounting for the original.

Moreover, the presentation at the trial of th e "buy-bust money" was not
indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant

because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by

the testimony of the police officers.

So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted
as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a
fatal omission.
 125

We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has overcome
the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant
with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the penalty
prescribed by law for those who would visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our
people.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED

in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant.

2nd Issue

Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another who is
a total stranger until the seller is certain of the identity of the buyer."

The conjecture must be rejected.

In People v. Paco, this Court observed:

Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that class of
crimes that

may be committed at anytime and at any place.

After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange

is made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes.
The fact that the parties are in a public place and in the presence of other
people

may not always discourage them from pursuing

their illegal trade as these factors may even
serve to camouflage the same.
 126

Hence, the Court has sustained the conviction of drug pushers

● caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall

● in front of a store
● along a street at 1:45 p.m.
● and in front of a house

As the Court has also held, " What matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and the seller

but their agreement and the acts constituting the

sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves."
 127

CONCEPCION CHUA GAW vs. SUY BEN CHUA & Felisa Chua ( Accordingly, we
find that the best evidence rule is not applicable to the instant case; Here,
there was no dispute as to the terms of either deed; hence, the RTC correctly
admitted in evidence mere copies of the two deeds )
G.R. NO. 160855 : April 16, 2008
NACHURA, J. 3rd Div. Decision

Facts:

Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of three business enterprises
namely:

● Hagonoy Lumber,
● Capitol Sawmill Corporation, and
● Columbia Wood

The couple had seven children namely,

1. Santos Chua;
2. Concepcion Chua;
3. Suy Ben Chua;
4. Chua Suy Phen;
5. Chua Sioc Huan;
6. Chua Suy Lu;
7. Julita Chua

1986, Chua Chin died, leaving his wife Chan Chi and his seven children as his only
surviving heirs. At the time of Chua Chin's death, the net worth of Hagonoy Lumber
was P415,487.20.

His surviving heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and

Renunciation of Hereditary Rights in Favor of a Co-Heir (Deed of Partition, for
brevity), wherein the heirs settled their interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows:
 128

petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw , asked
respondent, Suy Ben Chua, to lend them P200K for house contruction.
The parties agreed that

the loan will be payable within six (6) months

without interest

Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they

borrowed from the respondent within the designated period.
Respondent sent the couple a demand letter but unheeded.

Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the spouses Gaw with the
RTC. In their Answer (with Compulsory Counterclaim), the spouses Gaw
contended that the P200K was not a loan but petitioner's share in the
profits of Hagonoy Lumber,

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. The trial court further held that

the validity and due execution of the Deed of Partition

and the Deed of Sale, evidencing transfer of ownership of Hagonoy
Lumber from Chua Sioc Huan to respondent, was never impugned.

Although respondent failed to produce the

originals of the documents,
petitioner judicially admitted the due execution of the Deed
of Partition, and even acknowledged her signature thereon,
thus constitutes an exception to the best
evidence rule.
As for the Deed of Sale, since the contents thereof have not
been put in issue,

the non-presentation of the original document is not fatal so

as to affect its authenticity as well as the truth of its contents .
Also, the parties to the documents themselves do not contest their validity.
 129

petitioner appealed to the CA contesting that trial court erred

when it
considered admissible mere copies of the Deed of Partition and
Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the owner of
Hagonoy Lumber

Since petitioner did not dispute the due

CA affirmed RTC.
execution and existence of Exhibits "H" and "I",
there was no need to produce the originals of the documents in
accordance with the best evidence rule.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether trial court erred when it considered admissible mere

copies of the Deed of Partition and Deed of Sale to prove that respondent is now the
owner of Hagonoy Lumber ?

Held: NO!!

Petitioner, maintains that the RTC erred in admitting

in evidence a mere copy of the Deed of Partition and the Deed of Sale
in violation of the best evidence rule.

In addition, petitioner insists that the Deed of Sale was not the result of bona fide
negotiations between a true seller and buyer.

The "best evidence rule" as encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3,47 of

the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure applies only when

thecontent of such document is the subject of

the inquiry.

Where the issue is only as to

● whether such document was actually executed, or exists,

or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution,

 130

the best evidence rule does not apply and

testimonial evidence is admissible.

Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible

without need to account for the original.

production of the original may be dispensed

Moreover,
with, in the trial court's discretion,

whenever the opponent does not bona fide

dispute the contents of the document

and no other useful purpose will be served by

requiring production.

Accordingly, we find that the best evidence rule is

not applicable to the instant case.

● Here, there was no dispute as to the terms of

either deed;
hence, the RTC correctly admitted in evidence mere copies of the two
deeds.

The petitioner never even denied their due execution

and admitted that she signed the Deed of Partition.50

As for the Deed of Sale, petitioner had, in effect,

admitted its genuineness and due execution when she
 131

failed to specifically deny it in the manner required

by the rules.
The petitioner merely claimed that said documents do not express the true
agreement and intention of the parties since they were only provisional paper
arrangements made upon the advice of counsel.

Apparently, the petitioner does not contest the contents of these deeds but
alleges that there was a contemporaneous agreement that the transfer of
Hagonoy Lumber to Chua Sioc Huan was only temporary.

An agreement or the contract between the parties is the formal expression of the
parties' rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the
parties.53 The parties' intention is to be deciphered from the language used in the
contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or of third
parties who are strangers to the contract.54 Thus, when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to contain all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.55

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66790 dated May 23, 2003 and Resolution
dated December 2, 2003 are AFFIRMED.
 132

NENA Tating vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA et al ( Since Daniela is no

longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and
the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela’s sworn statement;

admissibility of evidence should not be

equated with weight of evidence. )
G.R. No. 155208 March 27, 2007
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. 3rd Div. Decision

Facts:

present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land 200sqms in Negros
Occidental owned by Daniela Tating. Daniela sold the subject
property

to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating

(Nena).

The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of

Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.

Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena.
She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate
taxes due thereon for the years

1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988

However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.

 133

December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement

● claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the

property;

● the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the
subject property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by
mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her
business expenses;

● she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property;

● she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her.

Daniela died on July 1988 leaving her children as her heirs, namely:

● Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and
was represented by herein petitioner.

Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement.
they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject
property as heirs of Daniela. But demend went unheeded.

Respondents filed a complaint with RTC Negors Occidental against Nena praying
for the

1. nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in her favor,

2. cancellation of the TCT issued in the name of Nena,
3. and issuance of a new title and tax declaration in favor of the heirs of Daniela.

In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or misrepresentation

attended the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute Sale. She also denied having
received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.

She prayed for the dismissal of the complaint

 134

RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, and hereby
sale executed between Daniela
declaring the document of
Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita Tating as
NULL and VOID
CA affirmed RTC, Nena’s MR denied. Hence the case at bar.

Petitioner contends that the case for the private respondents rests on
the proposition that the

Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is simulated because

Daniela’s actual intention was not to dispose of her property

but simply to help petitioner by providing her with a collateral.

Petitioner asserts that the sole evidence which persuaded both

the RTC and the CA in holding that the subject deed was simulated

was the Sworn Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977.

Sworn Statement should

However, petitioner argues that said
have been rejected outright by the lower courts

considering that Daniela has long been dead

when the document was offered in evidence,
thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-
examine her.
 135

Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred

in departing from the doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that

clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond

mere preponderance is required

to show the falsity or nullity of a notarial

document.
Petitioner also argues that the RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the
transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust relationship between them
because of the settled rule that where the terms of a contract are clear, it should be
given full effect.

Private respondents contend that

Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the
contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated;

Issue: Whether Daniela’s Sworn Statement is sufficient evidence to prove that the
contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely simulated?

Held: NO!

The Court finds for the petitioner.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between
petitioner and Daniela is simulated.

1. A contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all

(absolutely simulated)

2. or if the parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).

 136

The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the

intention of the parties. Such intention is
● determined from the express terms of their agreement

● as well as from their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.

In the present case, the main evidence presented by private

respondents in proving their allegation that
the subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto

is the sworn statement of Daniela dated

December 28, 1977.
The trial court admitted the said sworn statement as part of private respondents’
evidence and gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative weight
to this document.

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject

sworn statement.

admissibility of evidence should

However, the

not be equated with weight of

evidence.
The admissibility of evidence

● depends on its relevance and competence

 137

while the weight of evidence pertains to

● evidence already admitted

● and its tendency to convince and persuade.

Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible,

but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial

evaluation within the guidelines provided by the
rules of evidence.

It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay

evidence

since they are not generally prepared by the affiant

but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.

Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the

opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason,
affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay,

unless the affiants themselves are placed on the

witness stand to testify thereon.
The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in
giving the sworn statement probative weight.
 138

Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness

stand as she is already dead,
the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
Daniela’s sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of
sale between her and petitioner was simulated

and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other

evidence to sufficiently prove
their allegation that Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her
property when she executed the subject deed of sale in favor of
petitioner.

As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his
evidence

and not on the weakness of the evidence of the defendant.

Aside from Daniela’s sworn statement, private respondents failed to

present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even
the testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela had a different
intention when she entered into a contract of sale with petitioner.

In Suntay v. CA, the Court ruled that

the most protuberant index of simulation is the

● complete absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in

any manner to assert his rights of ownership over the
disputed property.
 139

In the present case, however, the evidence clearly shows that

● petitioner declared the property for taxation and paid realty taxes on it in her
name.

Petitioner has shown that from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate
taxes due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that she failed to pay
the taxes thereon.

While tax receipts and declarations and receipts and declarations of

are not, in themselves,
ownership for taxation purposes
incontrovertible evidence of ownership,

theyconstitute at least proof that the holder has a

claim of title over the property.

The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for

taxation purposes
● manifests not only one’s sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other
interested parties,

● but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the

Government.

Such an act strengthens one’s bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.

On the other hand, private respondents failed to present even a single tax receipt or
declaration showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as proof that she
claims ownership thereof.

The only Tax Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private respondents
presented in evidence, refers only to the house standing on the lot in controversy.
Even the said Tax Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns the lot
(Lot 56) upon which said house was built.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale did not really reflect the real intention of Daniela,
 140

why is it that she remained silent until her

death;
she never told any of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing
the subject deed;

she simply chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence of which she
kept secret from her relatives;

and despite her declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to
get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to recover the
subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years
later.

It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of the property even

after she executed the subject Absolute Deed of Sale and even after title to
the property was transferred in petitioner’s favor.

In fact, Daniela continued to occupy the property in dispute until her death
in 1988 while, in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila.

However, it is well-established that

ownership and possession are two entirely

different legal concepts.3

● Just as possession is not a definite proof of

ownership,

● neither is non-possession inconsistent with

ownership.
 141

The first paragraph of Article 1498 of the Civil Code

states that

when the sale is made through a public instrument, the execution

thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is
the object of the contract,

if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred.

Possession, along with ownership, is

transferred to the vendee by virtue of the
notarized deed of conveyance.

it is of no legal
Thus, in light of the circumstances of the present case,
consequence that petitioner did not take actual
possession or occupation of the disputed property after
the execution of the deed of sale in her favor
because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.

As to Daniela’s affidavit dated June 9, 1983, submitted by petitioner, which

confirmed the validity of the sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has
no probative value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to, for being hearsay.

Naturally, private respondents were not able to cross-examine the

deceased-affiant on her declarations contained in the said affidavit.
 142

However, even if Daniela’s affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded,

thefact remains that private respondents failed to prove

by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere
preponderance of evidence that the contract of sale between Daniela
and petitioner was simulated.

The legal presumption is in favor of the validity of contracts and the

party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its simulation.

Since private respondents failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation
that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14, 1969 Deed of Absolute Sale
stands.

Considering that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and
Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to
discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between
them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60,
 143

DNA Testing; Not a violation of the right against Self-Incrimination.

People v. Joel Yatar ( The right against self- incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt.
It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence )
G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
PER CURIAM: En Banc

Facts:

Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, Victim, were
on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, . Kathylyn
was left alone in the house

SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to
the house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.

The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen
going down the ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at
approximately 12:30 p.m. The police discovered the

● victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her naked
cadaver at the scene of the crime,

● and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood within 50
meters from the house of Isabel.

When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of

Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.

He was charged with Rape with Homicide and pleaded not guilty in his arraignment.
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with
Homicide sentenced to Death.

Hence the case at bar.

 144

Postmortem examination discovered that the presence of semen in the vaginal canal
of the victim. Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the
vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the
victim.

Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the

Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the

vagina of the victim

was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s

gene type.
Issue: Whether accused’s right against self-incrimintation was violated when the
prosecution obtained his DNA?

Held: NO!

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the
blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests

were conducted in violation of

● his right to remain silent

● as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and

17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable.

The kernel of the right against self-incrimination is not

against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.
 145

The right against self- incrimination is simply against

the legal
process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt.

It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not

an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

We ruled in People v. Rondero that

although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken

from him and submitted to the NBI for forensic examination,

hair samples may be admitted in evidence

the
against him,

proscribed is the use of testimonial

● for what is
compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the
accused under duress.

Hence, a person may be compelled to

submit to
● fingerprinting,
● photographing,
● paraffin,
● blood and
● DNA,

as there is no testimonial compulsion involved.

 146

Under People v. Gallarde, where immediately after the

incident,
the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel,

was no violation of the right against

we ruled that there
self-incrimination.

The accused may be compelled to submit to a

physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is
accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood
sampling which was conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the
presence of counsel.

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic

information in all living organisms.
A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a
person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and
vaginal and rectal cells.
 147

DNA print or identification technology

has been advanced as a

● uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a

crime,

or

● to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where

biological evidence has been left.
For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source
of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in
effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of securing the acquittal of the
the guilty,
innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.

The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI),

which conducted the DNA tests in this case,

used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method

by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis.

With PCR tiny amounts of a specific DNA

testing,
sequence can be copied exponentially within hours.
Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it
became possible to reliably amplify small samples
using the PCR method.
 148

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts

should consider, inter alia, the following factors:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,

3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,

4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper

standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,

5. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive. In Daubert v.
Merrell Dow,it was ruled that

pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used

● as long as it was relevant and reliable.

Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which testimony
they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when

it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce

belief in its existence or non-existence.
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo

is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically

valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
 149

Circumstancial Evidence
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s
trial court appreciated the following
vaginal canal, the
circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt:

(1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang together
with the victim, Kathylyn Uba;

(2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent
quarrels;

(3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998;

(4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m.
of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting
strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar;

(5) Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time
wearing a black shirt;

(6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
approaching;

(7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming down the
ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead;

(8) The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was
tied by a rope;

(9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines
protruding from her body on the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang,
with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery;

(10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina

 150

(11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be
positive with blood;

(12) DNA of slide, compared with the DNA profile of the appellant are
identical; and

(13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently
apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.

Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a

conviction,

must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair

and reasonable conclusion

that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the

perpetrator of the crime.
To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence,

three requisites must concur:

(1) there is more than one circumstance;

(2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a

conviction beyond reasonable doubt
 151

ROSENDO HERRERA vs. ROSENDO ALBA minor

G.R. No. 148220 June 15, 2005
CARPIO, J. 1st Div. Decision

Facts:

1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba represented by his mother Armi Alba,
filed before the trial court a

petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages

against petitioner.

denied that he is
petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he
the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied
physical contact with respondent’s mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of

DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the proceedings. To support the
motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D

Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended

that it has

● not gained acceptability.

● Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination

RTC granted respondent’s motion to conduct DNA paternity testing on petitioner,

respondent and Armi Alba. Thus:

Petitioner’s MR denied.
 152

CA denying the petition and affirming the questioned Orders of the trial court.
appellate court also stated that the

proposed DNA paternity testing does not violate his right

against self-incrimination

because right applies only to testimonial

the
compulsion
Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible
adverse result of the DNA paternity testing. Petitioner’s MR denied

Hence the case at bar.

ISsue: Whether DNA testing violates petitioenr’s right against Self incrimination?

Held: NO!

Paternity suit

of a paternity suit and

We deem it appropriate to give an overview
apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the
requirements of the Family Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity
and filiation.

An Overview of the Paternity and Filiation Suit

Filiation proceedings are usually filed

● not just to adjudicate paternity but also

● to secure a legal right associated with paternity,

○ such as citizenship,
○ support (as in the present case),
○ or inheritance.
 153

The burden of proving paternity is

person who alleges that the putative father

on the
is the biological father of the child.

There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional

paternity action which parties have to face:
1. a prima facie case,
2. affirmative defenses,
3. presumption of legitimacy,
4. and physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

A prima facie case exists

if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative
father.

In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward

and shift it to the putative father.15

There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father.

The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the
mother, because of either physical absence or impotency.

The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations
with other men at the time of conception.

A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed

legitimate. The child’s legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict
standards provided by law.
 154

Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may
be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique
unique to a paternity proceeding.

However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is no

mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or
must not look like his biological father.

This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the

four aspects.
1. Armi Alba, respondent’s mother, put forward a prima facie case when she
asserted that petitioner is respondent’s biological father.

Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered
corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures.

2. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Alba’s assertion. He denied ever
having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi
Alba’s child with another man.

3. Armi Alba countered petitioner’s denial by submitting pictures of respondent

and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other.

Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility

contests. We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help
us determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are
allowed in this jurisdiction.
 155

Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation

So far, the laws, rules, and jurisprudence seemingly limit evidence of paternity and
filiation to incriminating acts alone.

However,advances in science show that sources of

evidence of paternity and filiation need not be
limited to incriminating acts.

whether
The present case asks us to go one step further. We are now asked
DNA analysis may be admitted as evidence to prove
paternity.

DNA Analysis as Evidence

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up.
DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person.
Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile can determine his identity.

This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for

identical twins.

We quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with approval:
 156

fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches"

Just like in
are determined. To illustrate, when DNA or fingerprint tests are
done to identify a suspect in a criminal case,

the evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the
"known" print.
If a substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or
fingerprint is deemed to be a match.

if only one feature of the DNA or

But then, even
fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions
in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the
mother and child,

● it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the
mother.

● The other half must have been inherited from the biological father.
 157

Admissibility of DNA Analysis as Evidence

The 2002 case of People v. Vallejo discussed DNA analysis as evidence. In Vallejo,
the DNA profile from the vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim matched the
accused’s DNA profile. We affirmed the accused’s conviction of rape with
homicide and sentenced him to death. We declared:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,

courts should consider, among other things, the following data:

1. how the samples were collected,

2. how they were handled,

3. the possibility of contamination of the samples,

4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,

5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in

conducting the tests,

6. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Vallejo discussed the probative value, not

admissibility, of DNA evidence. By 2002, there was no longer
any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.

The Court moved

● from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence

● to the issue of observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis.

evidence is admissible when

1. it is relevant to the fact in issue

2. and is not otherwise excluded by statute or the Rules of Court.

 158

Evidence is relevant when it has such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce
belief in its existence or non-existence.

Section 49 of Rule 130, which governs the admissibility of expert testimony, provides
as follows:

The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,

experience or training which he is shown to possess may be received in
evidence.

This Rule does not pose any legal obstacle to the admissibility of
DNA analysis as evidence. Indeed, even evidence on collateral matters is
allowed "when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue."

Indeed, it would have been convenient to merely refer petitioner to our decisions in
Tijing, Vallejo and Yatar to illustrate that DNA analysis is admissible as evidence.

Probative Value of DNA Analysis as Evidence

Despite our relatively liberal rules on admissibility, trial courts should be cautious in
giving credence to DNA analysis as evidence. We reiterate our statement in Vallejo:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore,

courts should consider, among other things, the following data:

7. how the samples were collected,

8. how they were handled,

9. the possibility of contamination of the samples,

10. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,

11. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in

conducting the tests,

12. and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
 159

We also repeat the trial court’s explanation of DNA analysis used in

paternity cases:

In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile.

Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine

● which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother.

● The other half must have been inherited from the biological father.

The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain whether

he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal
types in the child.

If the man’s DNA types do not match that of the child,

● the man is excluded as the father.

If the DNA types match,

● then he is not excluded as the father.

It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative
father. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the DNA profile of
the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity.

For this reason, following the highest standard adopted in an American

jurisdiction,

trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a

minimum value of the Probability of Paternity ("W")

prior to a paternity inclusion.

 160

W is a numerical estimate for the likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared

to the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals.

An appropriate reference population database, such as the Philippine population

database, is required to compute for W.

Due to the probabilistic nature of paternity inclusions , W will never

equal to 100%.

However, the accuracy of W estimates is higher when

● the putative father,
● mother and
● child

are subjected to DNA analysis compared to those conducted

between the putative father and child alone.

DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity

should be conclusive proof of non-paternity.

If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the

DNA analysis should be considered as
corroborative evidence.

value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable

If the
presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption
of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo
standards.
 161

Right Against Self-Incrimination; DNA

Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself." Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples
from him for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that

the privilege is applicable only to testimonial
evidence.
Again, we quote relevant portions of the trial court’s 3 February 2000 Order with
approval:

Obtaining DNA samples from an accused in a criminal case or from the

respondent in a paternity case, contrary to the belief of respondent in this
action, will not violate the right against self-incrimination.

This privilege applies only to evidence that is "communicative" in

essence taken under duress

The Supreme Court has ruled that the right against self-incrimination is
just a prohibition on the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material.
 162

Parol Evidence

TOMAS Tan vs. JOSE Hosana ( Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law of these rules. There is no provision in
the Rules of Evidence which excludes the admissibility of a void document.
The Rules only require that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the
Rules for its admissibility )
G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
BRION, J. 2nd Div. Decision

Facts:

Jose Hosana married Milagros Hosana on Jan. 1979 During their marriage, Jose
and Milagros bought a house and lot located at Naga City. 1998, Milagros
sold property to petitioner as evidenced
by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself and as attorney-in-fact of
Jose, by virtue of a SPA executed by Jose in her favor

The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price for the lot was P200K.

Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of

Title/Reconveyance and Damages against Milagros, Tomas and Register of deeds
of Naga City before RTC Naga City. In the complaint, Jose averred that

while he was working in Japan , Milagros, without his consent and

knowledge, conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by
forging Jose's signature

making it appear that Jose had authorized Milagros to sell the subject
property to Tomas.

Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in good faith and for value. Before
he paid the full consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice from his
lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the subject lot was authentic and in
order.12 Furthermore, he alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the
property was annotated at the back of the title.

RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file her answer to Jose's complaint
and Tomas' cross-claim. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued
Jose presented
 163

● his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio), as sole witness.

Bonifacio testified that he learned of the sale of the subject property from
Milagros' son.

Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went back to the
Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with the Register of Deeds and
discovered that the title covering the disputed property had been transferred
to Tomas.

● Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA was

forged. Bonifacio presented documents containing the signature of Jose for
comparison

Tomas submitted his own account of events as corroborated by Rosana

Rosana was
Robles (Rosana). . Through a phone call by Milagros to Jose,
able to talk to Jose who confirmed that he was
aware of the sale and had given his wife authority to proceed with the sale.
Rosana informed Tomas of Jose's confirmation

With the assurance that all the documents were in order, Tomas made a partial
payment of P350K and another P350K upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the consideration written by
Milagros on the Deed of Sale was only P200K for tax purposes

RTC decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of

the subject property to Tomas. SPA dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly
appointed Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and void.
 164

CA affirmed the RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void. CA
modified the judgment of the RTC

directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the purchase

price of P200K

Despite Tomas' allegation that he paid P700K for the subject

lot, the CA found that there was no convincing evidence that
established this claim.

In Tomas’s MR

Tomas contended that on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as

reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and lot was insufficient
and not supported by the evidence formally offered before and
admitted by the RTC.

the actual amount he paid as consideration for the sale was P700K, as
supported by his testimony before the RTC

CA denied MR hence the case at bar.

Tomas argues that,

● first, all matters contained in the deed of sale, including the consideration
stated, cannot be used as evidence since it was declared null and void;

● second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered to prove the actual
consideration of the sale;

● third, his testimony establishing the actual purchase price of P700,000.00 paid
was uncontroverted; and,

● fourth, Jose must return the full amount actually paid under the principle
of solutio indebiti.
 165

Jose, on the other hand, argues that

first, Tomas is estopped from questioning the purchase price indicated in the
deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this question;

terms of an agreement reduced into

and second, the
writing are deemed to include all the terms
agreed upon

and no other evidence can be admitted other than

the terms of the agreement itself.
Issue: Whether testimony of Tomas is sufficient to establish the actual purchase
price of the sale?

Held: NO!

Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject property
is a factual question that the CA had already resolved in the
negative.
The CA found Tomas' claim of paying P700K for the subject property to be
unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any convincing evidence to
establish his claim.

We uphold the CA's finding.

In civil cases, the basic rule is that

the party making allegations has the burden of proving them

by a preponderance of evidence.
 166

Moreover, the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Preponderance of evidence is
● the weight,
● credit, and
● value

of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually

considered to be synonymous with the term

● "greater weight of the evidence" or

● "greater weight of the credible evidence."

Preponderance of evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means

probability of the truth.

It is evidence that is more convincing to the

court as it is worthier of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto

Tomas' bare allegation that he paid

We agree with the CA that
Milagros the sum of P700K

cannot be considered as proof of payment,

without any other convincing evidence to establish this claim.

Tomas' bare allegation, while uncontroverted, does not

automatically entitle it to be given weight and credence.
 167

It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads

payment has the burden of proving it;

the burden rests on the defendant to prove

payment,
rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-payment.

A mere allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges

has the burden of proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.

The force and effect of a void contract

is distinguished from its admissibility
as evidence.
2nd Issue: whether the CA correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00,
which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale, based on the principle of
unjust enrichment ?

Held: YES!

The next question to be resolved is whether the CA correctly ordered the

reimbursement of P200,000.00, which is the consideration stated in the Deed of
Sale, based on the principle of unjust enrichment.

The petitioner argues that the

CA erred in relying on the consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis
for the reimbursable amount

because a null and void document cannot be used as

evidence.

We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.

 168

A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from

the very beginning.

This rule applies to contracts that are declared void by

positive provision of law,
● as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse's written consent.

A void contract is equivalent to nothing and is

absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription.

When, however, any of the terms of a void contract

have been performed,

an action to declare its inexistence is necessary to

allow restitution of what has been given under it.

if a void contract has already "been performed,

It is basic that
the restoration of what has been given is in order."
This principle springs from Article 22 of the New Civil Code which states that

"every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other

means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground,

shall return the same."

Hence, the restitution of what each party has given is a

consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
 169

While the terms and provisions of a void contract

cannot be enforced since it is deemed inexistent,

it does not preclude the admissibility of the

contract as evidence

to prove matters that occurred in

the course of executing the
contract,
i.e., what each party has given in the execution of the contract.

Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial

proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact,
sanctioned by the Rules of Court.

The purpose of introducing documentary

evidence
is to ascertain the truthfulness of a matter at issue,
which can be the entire content or a specific
provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as

● a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration stated

and its actual payment.
 170

The purpose of introducing the deed of sale as evidence

● is not to enforce the terms written in the

contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract.

Thedeed of sale, rather, is used as a means to

determine matters that occurred in the
execution of such contract,
i.e., the determination of what each party has given under the void contract to
allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.

Evidence is admissible
1. when it is relevant to the issue

2. and is not excluded by the law of these rules.

no provision in the Rules of Evidence which

There is
excludes the admissibility of a void document.

The Rules only require that the

evidence is relevant and not excluded by the Rules for its admissibility.

Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence

because the purpose of introducing it as

evidence is to ascertain the truth respecting a
matter of fact,
not to enforce the terms of the document itself.
 171

with respect to evidence

It is also settled in jurisprudence that
which appears to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility,

safer policy is to be liberal and not reject them on

the
doubtful or technical grounds,

but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,

immaterial, or incompetent;
for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent.

On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them
or ignoring them.

In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null and void by positive
provision of the law prohibiting the sale of conjugal property without the
spouse's consent.

It does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration
stated therein.

The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal
policy of the court to admit the evidence: which appears to be
relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.

While the deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it remains prima facie
evidence of the actual consideration paid.
 172

Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale remains sufficient evidence of
the actual amount the petitioner paid and the same amount which should be returned
under the principle of unjust enrichment.

Unjust enrichment exists

"when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a

person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience."

The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State and is
based on Article 22 of the Civil Code.

The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or

Milagros received under the void contract which presumably benefitted
their conjugal partnership.

Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the amount of P200K since this
the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower court.
Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment that Tomas is entitled to recover
the money paid by him in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the contract.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review on certiorari. The decision
dated August 28, 2009 and the resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
 173

f
Res Gestae
People vs. XXXX ( Based on the foregoing account, it is clear that at the time
AAA uttered her statements to EEE — a few hours after the incidents — the
effect of the occurrence on her mind still continued; Her demeanor, as
narrated by EEE, showed that she was still suffering as a result of the violation
of her person and honor by her father, herein accused-appellant XXX. Res
Gestae properly applied utterances made to Calug are far too removed from
the event described as to form part of the res gestae )
G.R. No. 205888, August 22, 2018
CAGUIOA, J. 2nd Div. Rape Case

Facts:

(4) separate Informations for Rape and one (1) Information for Attempted Rape were
filed in the RTC. Upon arraignment, XXX pleaded "not guilty" to all charges.
Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, the victim, AAA, died on January 4, 2003 before she could be
subjected to cross-examination . In her direct
testimony,
[AAA] testified that the accused is her father, and she is the eldest
of the three children.

At the hearing on January 20, 2003, Public Prosecutor Marites

Macarubbo informed the court that [AAA] died.

Upon motion by the defense,

thedirect testimony of [AAA] was ordered

expunged from the records on grounds that [AAA] was
not subjected to cross-examination.

However, inspite of the

 174

● death of [AAA]

● and her direct testimony having been expunged

from the records,
the prosecution presented other prosecution witnesses , namely:

1. Gelmie [Calug],

2. [EEE], aunt of AAA

3. Lovella Opada and

4. Vicente Tiengo,

and in an effort to salvage the cause for the state, the prosecution adduced
evidence of res gestae through the testimonies of
its witnesses, Gelmie Calug and [EEE].

[EEE], an aunt of [AAA], being the sister of the

mother of the latter, testified that
at noontime on April 16, 2001, [AAA] arrived at her house. She noticed that
[AAA] was sad and crying. Upon her inquiry,

[AAA] told her that she was raped by her father on April 8,
and three (3) times hours ago on April 15, 2001.

During the few days of [AAA]'s stay at her house, she often saw [AAA] crying.
A few days after, [AAA] went to the house of Pedro de los Santos to work as
a house helper.

Her employer, Pedro de los Santos, helped her in instituting these rape
cases, and [EEE] and de los Santos accompanied [AAA] to report the incident
to the police.
 175

Gelmie Calug testified that

on April 18, 2001, [AAA] reported for work for the first time as a househelper
in the house of Pedro de los Santos. He noticed that [AAA] was sad and
lonely, and often saw her crying.

She confided to him her problems, and revealed to

him that

she was raped by her own father on April 8

and 15 of that year 2001.
He noticed that [AAA] had told their employer, Pedro de los Santos, of what had
befallen to (sic) her. After eight (8) months, she left the de los Santos household, and
he did not know anymore of her whereabouts and only to hear (sic) from the radio
broadcast that [AAA] was dead.

RTC Decision as

● found guilty only for the three (3) counts of Rape committed on April 15, 2001
and

● acquitted from the charges in Criminal Case Nos. F-02-01-A and F-02-03-A
for Rape and Attempted Rape, respectively:

RTC, despite the lack of AAA's testimony due to her

intervening death, mainly relied on

separate testimonies of Gelmie Calug (Calug)

the
and EEE in finding guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
 176

The RTC found that the

utterances made by AAA to them,

● while not made immediately or simultaneous to the rape incidents,

could still be considered part of the res

gestae
as they were

● "so connected with it

● as to make the act or declaration and the

main fact inseparable,

● or be generated by an excited feeling which

extends, without break or let down, from
the moment of the event they illustrate."
The RTC also found that such statements were made

as to preclude a deliberate
under such circumstances
design or an opportunity to devise anything
contrary to the actual events that transpired.
 177

Cases was elevated to CA via Notice of Appeal. XXX mainly argued

that the
RTC erred in considering the testimonies as res gestae and
instead claimed that such statements were purely hearsay as they were

● offered in court only after two (2) years from the date of the alleged
incident.

CA affirmed RTC, Hence the case at bar.

In his appeal before SC , XXX argues that

● he cannot be convicted based mainly on the testimonies of Calug and EEE,

which he claims are purely hearsay evidence.

● Without the testimony of AAA identifying him as the perpetrator of all acts
complained of, XXX claims that he can no longer be found guilty
under the crimes charged.

Issue: Whether utterances made by AAA to the Aunt and Gelmie are Res Gestae so
has to hold XX guilt of Rape?

Held: YES!

The evidence is sufficient to prove XXX's guilt beyond reasonable doubt

RTC correctly proceeded

At the outset, the Court notes that the
with the trial despite the death of the private
complainant, AAA.
 178

In criminal cases,

● the offended party is the State

● and the role of the private complainant is limited to the

determination of the civil liability of the accused .

considering that the death of AAA did not

Hence, in this case,
extinguish the criminal liability of XXX, the trial rightfully
ensued with the rest of the evidence for the prosecution.

Death of AAA, Victim

However, the intervening death of AAA was not without consequence.

The Court herein reiterates, as initially observed by the RTC, that

an accused is guaranteed by no less than the

Constitution

the right to cross-examine a

witness.
Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides that

an accused shall have the right to meet the

witnesses face to face,
which is echoed in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of our Rules on Criminal Procedure.
 179

The right of an accused to cross-examine a witness is essential to

● test the credibility and truthfulness of the testimony offered and

● likewise provides an opportunity for the accused to demonstrate

substantial inconsistencies that could create reasonable doubt as
to his guilt.

RTC was correct in excluding

In this regard, the

AAA's direct testimony from the

records notwithstanding the incriminating
contents thereof.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the only issue that remains is simply

whether the testimonies of Calug and EEE pertaining to the

statements of AAA can be considered part of the res gestae and
thus produce a conviction.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

Res Gestae “The Things Done”

It is well entrenched that a

witness may only testify on facts derived from

his own perception

and not on what he has merely learned or heard

from others.
 180

Hearsay evidence, or

Those derived outside of a witness' personal

knowledge,

are Generally

● inadmissible due to serious concerns on their

trustworthiness and reliability;

● by their nature, are not given under

such evidence,
oath or solemn affirmation

● and have not undergone the benefit of cross-

likewise
examination to test the reliability of the out-of-court declarant
on which the relative weight of the out-of-court statement depends.

Hence, as a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible in courts of law.

 181

As an exception, however, Section 42 of Rule 130 allows

the admission of hearsay evidence as part of the res gestae,

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. —

Statements made person while a startling

by a
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior
or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae.

So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,

and giving it a legal significance may be received as part of the res gestae.

The following requisites must, thus, be satisfied for the exception to

apply:

(i)that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling

occurrence;

(ii)that the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and

(iii)that the statements must concern the occurrence in

question and its immediate attending circumstances.
 182

InPeople v. Estibal, the Court, citing People v.

Sanchez, explained the ratio behind such exception:

Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those

1. exclamations and statements made by either the

○ Participants,
○ victims, or
○ spectators to a crime

2. immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the

crime, when the circumstances are such that

as a spontaneous reaction
3. the statements were made
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion

no opportunity for the declarant to

4. and there was
deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement."

The admissibility of such exclamation is based on

our experience that,
under certain external circumstances of physical or
mental shock,

a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a

spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes
their control,
 183

so that the utterance which then occurs is a

● spontaneous

● and sincere response

to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external

shock.

Since this utterance made under the immediate and

is
uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and
reflection, and during the brief period when consideration of
self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,

the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief

of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him."

In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the

declaration is such that the declaration itself may
be regarded as

the event speaking through the

declarant rather than the declarant
speaking for himself.
 184

In the same case, the Court held that in determining the admissibility of evidence
as part of the res gestae, the test is

whether the act or declaration was made as a

spontaneous reaction and is so intimately
interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event

that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of

the transaction itself

and whether it negates any premeditation or

purpose to manufacture testimony.
 185

Anent the requirement of spontaneity, the Court in

People v. Manhuyod, Jr. laid down several factors in determining whether
statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have satisfied the
requirement of spontaneity:

It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following
factors are then considered in determining whether statements
offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made
spontaneously, viz.,

(1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and
the making of the statement;

As to the first factor, the following proves instructive:

The rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been

made before there had been time or opportunity to devise or
contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred.

What the law altogether distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought.

no limits of time within which the res

[T]here are
gestae can be arbitrarily confined. These limits vary in
fact with each particular case.

The acts or declarations are not required to be contemporaneous with

the primary fact,

but they must be so connected with it

as to make the act or declaration and the main fact particularly
inseparable,

or be generated by an excited feeling which extends, without break or

let-down, from the moment of the event they illustrate.
 186

if the acts or declarations sprang

In other words,
out of the principal transaction, tend to
explain it, were voluntary and spontaneous,
and were made at a time so near it as to preclude the idea of
deliberate design,

they may be regarded as contemporaneous in point of time, and

are admissible.

(2) the place where the statement was made;

As to the second factor, it may be stressed that

“a statement made, or an act done,

at a place some distance from the place where

the principal transaction occurred
will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible."

(3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement;

Anent the third factor, [a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if,

at the time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant was such as

● to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still
continued,

as where he had just received a serious injury, was suffering severe

pain, or was under intense excitement.
 187

Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the

cool demeanor of declarant, his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his
delay in making a statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he
made a different statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence."

(4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence

and the statement relative thereto; and

With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is

whether there intervened between the event or transaction and the

making of the statement relative thereto,

any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would
thus restore his mental balance and afford opportunity for deliberations.

(5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself.

The last factor needs no further elaboration.

Guided by the foregoing standards, the Court finds that the CA and RTC correctly
considered the statements of AAA as part of the res gestae.

As reflected in the records, EEE's testimony places AAA's

utterances only several hours from the time the disputed incidents took place on
April 15, 2001, i.e., 7 p.m., 9 p.m., and 12 midnight:

Based on the foregoing account, it is clear that

at the time AAA uttered her statements to EEE — a few hours

the effect of the occurrence on
after the incidents —
her mind still continued.
Her demeanor, as narrated by EEE, showed that she was still
suffering as a result of the violation of her person and honor by her
father, herein accused-appellant XXX.
 188

Moreover, following the standard in Manhuyod, Jr., while the utterances were not
Court finds that they
made contemporaneous to the act described, the
remained to be "so connected with it as to make the act
or declaration and the main fact particularly
inseparable."

More importantly, the Court

finds nothing on the records that
would show an intervening event between the time of the rape
incidents and the time of AAA's revelation to EEE that would indicate a restoration of
her mental balance as in fact, she was still under distress when she arrived at EEE's
home.

The Court thus adopts the RTC's disquisition on this score,

Meanwhile, with respect to Calug's testimony,

which consisted of statements given by AAA on April 18, 2001,

or three (3) days after the April 15, 2001 incidents ,

RTC and CA incorrectly considered

the S. Court finds that the
the same as part of the res gestae.
While the Court notes the similarity between the accounts of EEE and Calug as
regards AAA's utterances, the records nevertheless disclose that

AAA helped in the household chores for several days in EEE's home and
subsequently looked for a job elsewhere.

AAA would then end up working as a house help for a certain Pedro delos
Santos, where she would eventually meet Calug.
 189

Such circumstances, coupled with the fact that AAA's statements

were made three (3) days after the April
to Calug
15, 2001 incidents,
lead to the conclusion that

there was already a significant break in the

connection between the

● rape incidents

● and the time AAA made her statements to

Calug on April 18, 2001.

utterances made to Calug are

In this light, the Court finds that the
far too removed from the event described as to form
part of the res gestae.

Court finds that the critical

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the
element of carnal knowledge through force was
sufficiently established by the evidence on record.
The clear and straightforward testimony of EEE, together with the medico-legal
findings consistent with the facts described,45 produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt that XXX is guilty for the repeated defilement of his own daughter,
AAA.

In sum, the Court finds that XXX's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the
evidence of the prosecution. In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt"
does not mean such degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, that produces
absolute certainty; only "moral certainty" is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
 190

People vs. ROMEO Wan ( First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling
occurrence. Second, Janice never had the opportunity to fabricate a statement
implicating Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her attacker
when Jonathan saw her shortly after the assault took place. Lastly, the
statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her stabbing )
G.R. No. 226145 February 13, 2017
MENDOZA, J.: 2nd Div.

Facts:
Marigor Silan, Janice's seven (7)-year old daughter, saw Calinawan
stabbing her mother in their kitchen . Thereafter, Calinawan quickly fled the
scene.

Meanwhile, Jonathan Nevado (Jonathan), Janice's brother and neighbor, was

awakened by shouts coming from his sister's house. He rushed to her house and
saw her children crying. After bringing her children to his house, he went looking for
Janice whom he saw outside a neighbor's house pleading for help.

Seeing her bloodied, he carried her and asked her who stabbed her, and

she answered it was Calinawan who did it.

Then, Jonathan brought Janice to the hospital. When Darwin Silan, Janice's
husband, arrived at the hospital, he also asked her who stabbed her and she
reiterated that it was Calinawan.

After three (3) days, Janice died in spite of the

medical treatment at the hospital.
RTC convicted Calinawan for murder. The trial court noted that Marigor
positively and categorically identified him as the one who stabbed
her mother. It noted that she was able to identify him because of his amputated
fingers.

In addition, the trial court pointed out that the

dying declaration of Janice to Jonathan

corroborated Marigor's statement that
Calinawan killed her mother.
 191

The RTC stated that his positive identification trumped his denial and alibi, which
were considered as inherently weak defenses.

CA affirmed RTC Hence the case at bar.

Calinawan argues that Marigor's identification of him was unreliable

because she admitted she never saw the face of her assailant as it was
covered by a black hood and that she closed her eyes during the commotion.

He claims that treachery was not established and that the trial court merely made a
general assumption that the victim was defenseless because it was night time.

Issue: Whether statement of Janice was part of res gestae so to hold assuced guilty
of Murder?

Held: YES!

Dying Declaration; Rule on Res Gestae

Marigor's positive identification was further bolstered by the statement of
Janice to Jonathan that it was Calinawan who stabbed her.

The courts a quo considered the said statement as an admissible dying

declaration. For a dying declaration to be deemed an exception to
the hearsay rule, the following conditions must concur:

(1) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding

circumstances of the declarant's death;

(2) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was
conscious of his impending death;

(3) the declarant was competent as a witness; and

(4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for

● Homicide,
● Murder, or
● Parricide

where the declarant is the victim.

 192

Janice said that she

In this case, the Court notes that in her affidavit,
thought she could survive the attack.
She never thought that she was dying. In fact, she was optimistic of her
recovery.

In view of this, there seems to be a doubt whether she was aware of her impending
death.

Granting there is such doubt, Janice's statement, nevertheless, is

admissible

as an exception to the hearsay rule for being

part of res gestae.

In order for a statement to be considered part of res

gestae, the following elements must concur:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling occurrence.

(b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and

Second, Janice never had the opportunity to fabricate a statement implicating

Calinawan because she immediately identified him as her attacker when Jonathan
saw her shortly after the assault took place.

(c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.

Lastly, the statement of Janice concerned the circumstances surrounding her

stabbing.

All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bench.

 193

Thus, Calinawan's denial and alibi have no leg to stand. They are inherently weak as
defenses, especially when faced with the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witnesses identifying the accused as the perpetrator of the crime
 194

People vs. RODRIGO SALAFRANCA

G.R. No. 173476 February 22, 2012
BERSAMIN, J.: 1st Div. Decision

Facts:

1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports in Binondo. after stabbing
Bolanon, his assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the
house of his uncle Rodolfo Estano in order to seek help.

that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estaño that it

was Salafranca who had stabbed him;
that Bolanon eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite receiving
medical attention;

personally witnessed by
and that the stabbing of Bolanon was
Augusto Mendoza, then still a minor of 13 years,
who was in the complex at the time.

As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He evaded arrest for a long
period, despite the warrant for his arrest being issued. arrested on April 23, 2003,
and detained at the Manila City Jail.

RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:

● Not only because it was testified to by Augusto Mendoza

● but corroborated by Rodolfo Estaño, the victim’s uncle who brought
Bolanon to the hospital and who relayed to the court that when he aided
Bolanon and even on their way to the hospital while the latter was suffering
from hard breathing,

victim Bolanon was able to say that it was

Rodrigo Salafranca who stabbed him.
 195

CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of the RTC,

● citing the dying declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his as
his assailan

● and Salafranca’s positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether declaration made to his uncle pointing to Salafranca as his assilanst
is considered dying declaration hence admissible in evidence?

Held: YES!

The RTC and the CA correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estaño were credible
and reliable.

Salafranca did not persuasively show a misappreciation or

omission by the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to undo
or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA, which were entitled to great
weight and respect.

Dying Declaration: Res Gestae

utterance by
The Court further notes Estaño’s testimony on the
Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as his
assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony
follows:
 196

It appears from the foregoing testimony that

● Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estaño, his uncle, to seek help right
after being stabbed by Salafranca;

● that Estaño had hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the PGH by
taxicab;

● that on the way to the hospital, Estaño had asked Bolanon who had
the latter had told Estaño that his
stabbed him, and
assailant had been Salafranca;
● that at the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a hard
time breathing, causing Estaño to advise him not to talk anymore;

about ten minutes after his admission at the

● and that
emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had
expired and had been pronounced dead.

utterance of Bolanon as both a

Such circumstances qualified the
dying declaration and as part of the res gestae,
considering that the Court has recognized that the statement of the victim an
hour before his death and right after the hacking incident

bore all the earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of

the res gestae either of which was an exception to the hearsay rule.
 197

Dying Declaration although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its

hearsay character, may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites
concur, namely:

(1) that the declaration must concern thecause and

surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;

(2) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a
consciousness of an impending death;

(3) that the declarant is competent as a witness; and

(4) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or
parricide, in which the declarant is a victim or civil Case.

All the requisites were met herein.

1. Bolanon his ante-mortem statement to Estaño,

communicated
identifying Salafranca as the person who had stabbed him.

2. At the time of his statement, Bolanon was conscious of his impending death,
having sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estaño, was
then experiencing great difficulty in breathing.

Bolanon succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes

from admission, which occurred under three hours after the stabbing.

There is ample authority for the view that the declarant’s belief in the
imminence of his death can be shown by the declarant’s own
statements or from circumstantial evidence, such as the nature of his
wounds, statements made in his presence, or by the opinion of his
physician.

3. Bolanon would have been competent to testify on the subject of the

declaration had he survived.

4. Lastly, the dying declaration was offered in this criminal prosecution for
murder in which Bolanon was the victim.
 198

Res Gestae. A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res gestae

and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur, to wit:

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and

(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances

The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of the res

gestae concur herein.

1. Surely, when he gave the identity of the assailant to Estaño, Bolanon was
referring to a startling occurrence , i.e., his stabbing by
Salafranca.
2. Bolanon was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the hospital,
and thus had no time to contrive his identification of Salafranca
as the assailant.

3. His utterance about Salafranca having stabbed him was made in spontaneity
and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was relevant
because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.

The term res gestae has been defined as

"those circumstances which are the undesigned

incidents of a particular litigated act

and which are admissible when illustrative of

such act."
 199

In a general way, res gestae refers to the

circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character

and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous

with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication

encompasses the exclamations and

The rule on res gestae
statements made by
1. either the participants,
2. victims, or
3. spectators

to a immediately before, during, or

crime
immediately after the commission of the crime

statements were made

when the circumstances are such that the
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion

and there was no opportunity for the declarant to

deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
 200

The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,

whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is

so intimately interwoven or connected with the
principal fact or event

that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part

of the transaction itself,
and also

whether it clearly negatives any premeditation

or purpose to manufacture testimony.
 201

Direct Witness

his positive
Salafranca’s denial and alibi were worthless in the face of
identification by Mendoza as the assailant of
Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to such
incrimination by Mendoza

considering that Salafranca did not even project any ill motive that could
have impelled Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the
truth.14

Based on Mendoza’s account, Salafranca had attacked Bolanon from behind and
had "encircled his left arm over the neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing
blow using the right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and another
one encircling the blow towards below the left nipple
 202

Qualification of a Witness

People v. EDGAR Flores ( Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is

qualified to take the witness stand. A person with low Intelligence Quotient
may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her perception to
others )
G.R. No. 208013 July 3, 2017
LEONEN, J. 2nd Div. Decision

Facts:

The assailed Decision affirmed the RTC’s ruling tha t Allan was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Simple

Rape of AAA, a mental retardate (intellectually disabled) with a

mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months.

Joint trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution presented the following as
witnesses:

1. AAA's mother, BBB;

2. AAA’s older sister, CCC;

3. AAA's uncle, GGG;

4. AAA's aunt by affinity, EEE;

5. Dr. Gloria Araos-Liberato;B

6. renda Tablizo (Tablizo);

7. SPOl Diosdado Macaraeg ;

8. Dr. Rachel Acosta (Dr. Acosta);

9. and AAA

BBB testified that her sister-in law, DDD, told her that AAA was raped.
 203

CCC affirmed that sometime in 2002. CCC found out that AAA was pregnant .

Dr. Araos-Liberato, the Medical Officer issued the Medico Legal Certificate, which
NBI conducted AAA's
stated that AAA was 14 years old.
neuropsychiatric examination and evaluation

AAA had a mental age of five (5) years and eight

(8) months and an IQ of 42. Her intelligence level was
equivalent to Moderate Mental Retardation.

Tablizo, Psychologist II of NBI, testified that AAA told her that Allan "inserted his
penis into her organ" (inserrek na dadiay boto na kaniak) during an interview.

AAA underwent another neuropsychiatric

examination before taking the witness stand.
Dr. Rachel Acosta testified that she had examined AAA's mental status
including her "mental, behavioral and emotional conditions and her manner of
communicati[on]."

She found that AAA had a "mild degree of mental retardation" and
an Intelligence Quotient of 70.

AAA was already 19 years old at the time

Although
of examination,

● her mental age was that of a child aged five

(5) to seven (7) years.

AAA was fit to testify as a

Dr. Acosta concluded that
witness depending on her emotional condition
when she testifies although she was "not oriented to time, date
and place."
 204

Her degree of honesty was great because, with mental age of 5 to

7 years old, she does not know what is right or wrong

AAA was already 20 years old on May 21, 2008 when

she testified.
● She confirmed that XXX was her four (4)-year-old child.

● She identified Allan as XXX's father.

● She also confirmed that Allan was the man she was referring to when the
prosecutor pointed at Allan.

AAA was asked how Allan became XXX's father.

● She responded, "Iniyot nak, sir." (He had sex with me, sir.) She attested
that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with her on four (4)
occasions, each of which he gave her money.

Defense applied for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) paternity test, which

was granted on April 20, 2009.

Forensic Biologist Dela Cruz) and Forensic Chemist I Orbeta of NBI took
biological samples such as buccal swab and blood from Allan, AAA, and
XXX in open court.

She affirmed that the comparison of their DNA profiles revealed a "100%
proof that the accused is the biological father of XXX.
 205

RTC convicted Allan of four (4) counts of Simple Rape. RTC concluded:
AANs testimony was "categorical, straight forward and credible.

Since it was already established that the victim

was intellectually disabled,

it would be unlikely for her to fabricate the

accusations against Allan

Dr. Acosta, AAA's degree of honesty

As confirmed by
was great. Considering her mental age, she did not know
how to decipher right from wrong.

her simple recount of events showed her

Thus,
"honesty and naivet[e].
Similarly, AANs categorical identification of Allan as the offender was
corroborated by the testimonies of EEE, GGG, and Tablizo. Furthermore, the
DNA paternity test result "sealed the case for the prosecution.

In his appeal, Allan insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt because

● the records were bereft of any credible proof indicating that he raped AAA four
(4) times.

● AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she was not
oriented with place, date, and time.

CA affirmed Allan's conviction. CA held that

carnal knowledge of an intellectually disabled

person is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.74
 206

Evidence of force or intimidation is not

important since the victim is incapable of giving
her consent.

It affirmed the trial court's ruling that AAA's

testimony was credible.Her positive identification of the
accused and the narration of the sordid acts committed against her sufficed.

Hence the case at bar.

Allen contends that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt

ISsue: Whether AAA’s mental incapacity disqualifies her as a competent witness?

Held: NO!

Qualified Witness

To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether

● he [or she] can perceive and,

● perceiving,

● can make known his [or her] perception to others."128 Rule 130 provides

Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this

reason, ineligible from testifying in court.

"He or she can be a witness,

depending on his or her ability to relate what he

or she knows."

If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is

admissible in court.
 207

Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness

stand. A person with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of
making known his or her perception to others.
 208

Rape; Victim depreived of Reason

To warrant a rape conviction under Article 266-A, it should be shown

that "a man had carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted
another, under any of the following circumstances:"104

1) Through force, threat or intimidation;

2) The victim is deprived of reason;

3) The victim is unconscious;

4) By means of fraudulent machination;

5) By means of grave abuse of authority;

6) When the victim is under 12 years of age; or

7) When the victim is demented.

In this case, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA were
clearly established by the victim's testimony. Apart from identifying her
offender, AAA was also able to recount the sordid acts committed
against her.

The gravamen of rape under Article 266-A (1) is

1. carnal knowledge of "a woman against her will or without her consent."

Undoubtedly, sexual intercourse with an

intellectually disabled person is rape

since proof of force or intimidation becomes

needless
 209

as thevictim is incapable of giving

consent to the act.

AAA's intellectual disability was undisputed and

well substantiated by the testimonies of Tablizo and Dr. Acosta. The
defense did not even contest her condition.

1st; AAA was 14 years old when she had her

neuropsychiatric examination with Tablizo. The
examination revealed that at the time of examination,

● AAA's Intelligence Quotient was 42 and

● her level of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation.

● Also, she had a mental age of a five (5)-year-and-eight (8)-month-old child.

2nd: AAA underwent another mental status examination with Dr. Acosta
before being presented as a witness. The examination
revealed that

● she had a "mild degree of mental retardation."

● AAA "belonged to sub-average intellectual with an IQ of 70."

● Although AAA was already 19 years old at that time, her mental age
was that of a child aged five (5) to seven (7) years.

For this reason, Allan's acts amounted to rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
 210

In People v. Quintas y Badilla, this Court emphasized that the conditions under
Article 266-A should be construed in the light of one's capacity to give
Court clarified that an intellectually
consent. Similarly, this
disabled person is not automatically deprived of
reason.
We are aware that the terms,

"mental retardation" or "intellectual disability,"

had been classified under "deprived of reason."

● The terms, "deprived of reason" and "demented",

however,

● should be differentiated from the term,

"mentally retarded" or "intellectually disabled."

Anintellectually disabled person is not necessarily

deprived of reason or demented. This court had
even ruled that they may be credible witnesses.

However, his or her maturity is not there despite

the physical age. He or she

● is deficient in general mental abilities

● and has an impaired conceptual, social, and practical functioning
relative to his or her age, gender, and peers.

Because of such impairment, he or she does not meet the "socio-cultural

standards of personal independence and social responsibility.
 211

In Quintas, this Court also clarified that

one's capacity to give consent depends upon

his or her mental age

and not on his or her chronological age.

chronological age of 7 years and a

Thus, a person with a
normal mental age

capable of making decisions and giving

is as
consent
as a person with a chronological age of 35 and a mental age
of 7. Both are considered incapable of giving
rational consent because both are not yet considered to have
reached the level of maturity that gives them the capability to make rational
decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality.
 212

Decision-making is a function of the

mind.
Hence, a person's capacity to decide whether to give
consent or to express resistance to an adult activity

is determined not by his or her chronological age but by his or

her mental age.

Therefore, in determining whether a person is

"twelve (12) years of age" under Article 266-A
(1) (d), the interpretation should be in accordance with

chronological age of the child if

1. either the
he or she is not suffering from
intellectual disability,
2. or the mental age if intellectual disability is established.

If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, t

heaccused remains liable for rape even if the victim

acceded to the sordid acts.

The reason behind the rule "is simply that

● if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape,

carnal knowledge of a woman

● it must thereby follow that
whose mental age is that of a child below twelve
years should likewise be constitutive of rape."
 213

An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by

this reason,

● ineligible from testifying in court.

depending on his or her

● "He or she can be a witness,
ability to relate what he or she knows."

disabled victim's testimony is coherent,

● If an intellectually
it is admissible in court.

Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is

qualified to take the witness stand.
A person with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of
making known his or her perception to others.

Given that AAA's qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA's

mental state also does not prevent her from being a credible
witness.

The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld provided

that she is capable and consistent in narrating her experience.

In People v. Monticalvo y Magno

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the competence and credibility of
mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been upheld by
this Court

where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably

and consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity of the complainant's
accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone
as feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on
the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands
of the accused.
 214

DNA

DNA is the fundamental building block of a person's entire genetic make-up.

[It] is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person.
Genetic identity is [however] unique.

Hence, a person's DNA profile can determine his identity."

Based on the result of the DNA test conducted in this case , Allan is
disputably presumed to be the child's father.
The DNA testing result shows that "[t]here is a COMPLETE MATCH in all of
the fifteen (15) loci tested using the Powerflex 16 System between the alleles
of Edgar Allan F. Corpuz and [XXX]."

Based on the findings, "there is a 99.9999% Probability of

Paternity that Edgar Allan F. Corpuz is the biological father of
[XXX]
 215

Deaf Mutes not necessarily incompetent as witness

People vs. ADEL TUANGCO et al ( A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness.

All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.12 Deaf-mutes are competent
witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an
oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can
communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter. )
G.R. No. 130331 November 22, 2000
PER CURIAM: En Banc Decision

FActs:

naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters
away from the national highway in Apalit. two informations were filed in court
charging Adel Tuangco et al with the crimes of rape with homicide
and theft.

Adel Tuangco was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Principal evidence against the
eyewitness, Silvestre
accused consisted of the testimony of an
Sanggalan, a deaf-mute. He gave his testimony
through sign language, which was interpreted by a sign language
expert. The court's summation of the evidence is as follows:

1995 at around 6:00 pm in the evening, he was inside a 'beer house' along the
national highway. He had seven (7) companions at that time. The group consisting of
eight (8) persons including the witness arrived at the said place at day time.

When nighttime came, witness Sanggalan together with three (3) of his
companions left the place and proceeded to a rice field near the
highway.
 216

The three, accused

● Adel Tuangco,
● 'Baba' and
● 'Tatoo'

later left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to follow a girl who
was wearing a long hair. Through photographs of the deceased Aurea
Eugenio, witness Sanggalan identified her to be the girl
whom the three followed into the rice field.

As soon as they caught up with the deceased, ‘Tatoo' pushed her. Adel Tuangco got
hold of the shoulder bag which the deceased Aurea Eugenio was carrying at that
time. 'Baba' and 'Tattoo' then pushed Aurea against a tree and stabbed her with a
knife several times on the neck. At this point, Adel Tuangco joined the two and also
stabbed the deceased.

The deceased fell down. Then accused raped the victim.

guilt of the
Both accused denied the charges. trial court ruled that the
accused as charged was established with the
required quantum of evidence and concluded that the three
accused conspired to commit the crimes charged.

Hence the case at bar.

In discrediting the testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness, accused-

appellant points out that

because Silvestre Sanggalan has had no formal schooling in a special

school for deaf-mutes,

the possibility that resort to conjectures and surmises, brought about by

overzealousness to understand what his witness really wanted to say could
not be discounted.

The SolGen prays for an affirmance of the decision in all respects . He

asserts that

a deaf-mute is qualified to testify, and the interpreter

explained that through sign language,
 217

Sanggalan demonstrated how Eugenio was raped and thereafter

killed by appellants and Pineda, Jr.

It is claimed that the inconsistencies pointed out are minor and do not
detract from the positive identification made by witness Sanggalan of the
accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took
her personal effects.

Issue: Whether eyewitness Sanggalan a deaf-mute is competent to be a

witness?

Held: YES!!

We resolve to affirm the judgment of conviction. We find no cogent justification to

upholding the
disturb or set aside the finding of the trial court
credibility of the deaf-mute witness, on the following
rationalization:
"This Court, cognizant of the physical handicap of the
eyewitness Silvestre Sanggalan,

carefully scrutinized his testimony and noted that the same were
made, on several occasions from July 10, 1995 when he was called for
the first time to testify until July 5, 1996 when he was recalled for the
purpose of cross-examination on behalf of accused Sonny Tuangco, in
a candid and straightforward manner.

While Court observes minor inconsistencies in his

the
declarations, these are not reasons to render his testimony incredible.
On the contrary, it is well-established that

minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness are

indications that

same is not rehearsed and all the more

the
should be considered credible.
 218

Thus,discrepancies in minor details indicate

veracity rather than prevarication and only tend to bolster the
probative value of such testimony.

This Court likewise evaluated very carefully, the qualifications and

competence of Eva Sangco, the sign language expert utilized by
the prosecution

and found the same to be sufficient to put on record with

accuracy, the declarations being made by witness
Sanggalan on the witness stand.

According to Eva Sangco, sign language experts have different

mode of communications. These are

a) oral method
b) simultaneous method
c) pantomine
d) reverse interpretation
e) speech reading
f) natural signs and gestures and
g) interactive writings which are more on dramatization and drawing
illustrations.

In the interpretation of the declarations of witness Sanggalan, Eva Sangco

employed the natural homemade sign method . Eva Sangco has
undergone several trainings on this particular method.

In its futile attempt to destroy the credibility of witness Sanggalan ,

the defense attacked his character
and present a witness in the person of Merlita Baliber to show that he is a
drunkard and a drug addict.

Likewise the defense presented documentary evidence to show that

Sanggalan had been accused of rape in a criminal case before the
RTC Pasig, Rizal.
 219

These evidence presented by the defense are

unavailing.

In People vs. Dominguez,, it was held that

criminal conviction
even a fact of prior
alone does not suffice to discredit a
witness.
And in People vs. Tanco, it was held that

mere pendency of a criminal case

the

against a person
does not disqualify him from
becoming a witness.
For the test to measure the value of the testimony of
a witness is

whether or not such is in conformity to

knowledge

and consistent with experience of mankind.

(People vs. Morre, 217 SCRA 219).

This Court finds it unnecessary to reiterate the earlier discussion as to why it gives
credence to the testimony of witness Sanggalan.

If at all, the evidence of the defense with respect to the character of Sanggalan
substantiated the theory of the prosecution- that these people, witness
 220

Sanggalan, and the three (3) accused were often times seen drinking liquor
and taking prohibited drugs.

The theory of the accused-appellant that Sanggalan

"could not truthfully and convincingly convey what really transpired on that
fateful night" because he had no formal schooling in a school for special
persons like him and the interpreter was not the one who had taught him

is untenable.
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a
witness.

● All persons who can perceive,

● And All persons perceiving,

● can make known their perception to others, may

be witnesses.
 221

Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they

(1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity

of an oath;

(2) can comprehend facts they are going to

testify on; and

(3) can communicate their ideas through a

qualified interpreter.
Thus, in

● People vs. De Leon and

● People vs. Sasota,

the accused was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a

deaf-mute.

Although in People vs. Bustos

the testimony of a deaf-mute was rejected, this was because there were
times during his testimony that the interpreter could not make
out what the witness meant by the signs she used.

In the instant case, the interpreter was a certified sign language

interpreter with twenty-two (22) years teaching experience at the
Philippine School for the Deaf, had exposure in television programs and had
testified in five other previous court proceedings.
 222

The trial court evaluated her competence to put on record with

accuracy the declaration made by witness Sanggalan on the witness stand, and

● she testified that she employed the natural or homemade sign method.

manner in which the examination of a

Needless to stress, the
deaf-mute should be conducted

● is a matter to be regulated and controlled by the

trial court in its discretion,

● and the method adopted will not be reviewed by

the appellate court

in the absence of a showing that the complaining

party was in some way injured by reason of the
particular method adopted.
The imperfections or inconsistencies cited in appellants' brief arise from the fact that
there is some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is deaf-mute,

but these do not detract from the credibility of his testimony, much
less justify the total rejection of the same. What is material is
that
● he knew personally the accused-appellants,

● was with them on the fateful night when the incident happened, and

● had personally witnessed the rape-slay and theft three and ½ (3 ½) meters
away from the scene.
 223

He did not waver in the identification of the three

accused despite rigorous cross-examination, and positively pointed to the
accused-appellants as the persons who raped and killed Eugenio and took her
personal effects.

The trial court's assessment of the credibility of Sanggalan, whose testimony was
found to be candid and straightforward, deserves the highest respect of this Court.

Moreover, the testimony of Sanggalan was corroborated by the doctor who

conducted the autopsy.

The defense of alibi must yield to the positive

identification of the accused-appellants by
Sanggalan,
and the attempt of the mother of the accused-appellants, Erlinda Tuangco, a
sister, Glessen Tuangco, and the common-law wife of Adel Tuangco, Liza Reyes, to
corroborate such a defense must fail.
Moreover, no proof was adduced to show the physical impossibility of the accused
being at the scene of the crime; the evidence shows that the rape-slay took place in
Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan, Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, which was
ten to fifteen minutes from the residence of Adel Tuangco in Frances Bukid,
Calumpit, Bulacan.

In the case of Sonny Tuangco, who went into hiding

after learning that his brother Adel was arrested, and who stayed with a
relative in Caloocan City for about one (1) year until he was apprehended by
the police authorities,

his flight should be taken as an admission of his

guilt. death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
 224

Competency vs. Credibility of Witness

MILA SALES LLANTO et al vs. ERNESTO ALZONA ( The trial court gave
credence to Ernesto's testimony that he conducted a credit investigation
before he approved the loan sought and the property mortgaged. It is well
settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of credibility of witnesses is
properly within the domain of the trial court as it is in the best position to
observe their demeanor and bodily movements )
G.R. NO. 150730 : January 31, 2005
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J. 2nd Div. Decision

Facts:

Bernardo Sales and Maria Sales were husband and wife. They have
twelve children,

● eleven of whom are the present petitioners

● while the remaining child, Estela Sales Pelongco, is one of herein

respondents.

Maria was the registered owner of a certain parcel of land with an area of 202 sqms
in Laguna which she acquired under a free patent. Until they died, Maria and
Bernardo, together with some of their children, lived on said land and in the house
which they constructed thereon.

● Maria died on August 27, 198

● while Bernardo died on January 1, 1997.

1990, a real estate mortgage contract was purportedly executed by Maria,

who was already deceased at that time, and Bernardo in favor of herein
respondent Dominador Alzona. Respondent Estela Sales Pelongco
signed as an instrumental witness to the mortgage contract.

Respondent Ernesto Alzona admitted that

while he was a co-mortgagee of his brother, Dominador, his name does not
appear in the mortgage contract.

The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed for alleged failure of Bernardo and Maria
to settle their obligation secured by the said mortgage. Ernesto Alzona was the
highest bidder.
 225

Certificate of sale was awarded to Ernesto on December 20, 1990, and on January
22, 1992, he executed a Consolidation of Ownership over the property. TCT issued
in his name and cancelled Maria.

Herein petitioners caused the inscription of an adverse claim on the

title to the property.

Herein petitioners filed before the RTC Laguna a complaint

for Annulment of Mortgage and of Auction Sale, with
Reconveyance of Title and Damages.

Respondents Ernesto and Dominador Alzona and the Register of Deeds of

Calamba, Laguna filed their answers, respectively.

Estela Sales Pelongco failed to file

However, respondent
her answer; as a consequence of which, she
was declared in default.
RTC rendered in favor of defendants Dominador Alzona and Ernesto Alzona
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with costs against plaintiffs,

CA affirmed RTC Petitioner’s MR denied.

Hence the case at bar.

In the present case

It is no longer disputed that the mortgagors were not the owners of the
property subject of the petition

the question that remains is whether Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees
in good faith.
 226

Petitioners contend that the principle regarding innocent purchasers for

value enunciated by the CA in its decision is not applicable to the present case
because in the cases cited by the CA there was no question that the mortgagors
were the real owners of the property that was mortgaged,

while in the instant case, the mortgagors were impostors who pretended as
the real owners of the property.

Issue: Whether The principle of "innocent purchasers for value" is applicable to the
present case?

Held: YES!

Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code,

one of the essential requisites of the contract of mortgage is that the
mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the
property to be mortgaged;
otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void.

an exception to this rule is the doctrine of

However,
"mortgagee in good faith."Under this doctrine,
even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property,

the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale

arising therefrom are given effect by reason of
public policy.

This principle is based on the rule that

all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate

of Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not

required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.
 227

This is the same rule that underlies the principle of

"innocent purchasers for value" cited by the CA in its decision.
The prevailing jurisprudence is that

● a mortgagee has a right to rely in good faith on the certificate of title of the
mortgagor to the property given as security

● andin the absence of any sign that might arouse

suspicion,

● has no obligation to undertake further investigation.

even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of,

Hence,
or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property,

the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless,

entitled to protection.
For persons, more particularly those who are engaged in real estate or financing
business like herein respondents Ernesto and Dominador Alzona, to be considered
as mortgagees in good faith,

jurisprudence requires that they should take the

necessary precaution expected of a prudent
man to ascertain the

status and condition of the properties

offered as collateral
and to verify the identity of the persons they transact business
with, particularly those who claim to be the registered property owners.
 228

Credibility of the Witnesses

In the instant case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court that

Ernesto and Dominador are mortgagees in good faith.

Thetrial court gave credence to Ernesto's testimony

that
● he conducted a credit investigation before he approved the loan sought and
the property mortgaged.

It is well settled in our jurisdiction that the determination of

credibility of witnesses

is properly within the domain of the trial court

as it is in the best position to observe their

demeanor and bodily movements.
Further, findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to great respect, and even finality,

unless said findings are arbitrary, or facts and circumstances of

weight and influence have been overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied by the trial judge which, if considered, would have affected
the case.

These findings are binding on this Court especially when affirmed by the appellate
court. After a re-examination of the evidence presented, we find no
cogent reason to depart from this rule.

In fine, we hold that respondents Ernesto and Dominador Alzona are mortgagees in
good faith and, as such, they are entitled to the protection of the law.
 229

Relationship of a Witness

NORTHWEST AIRLINES vs. STEVEN Chiong ( (T)his Court has repeatedly held
that a witness' relationship to the victim does not automatically affect the
veracity of his or her testimony )
G.R. NO. 155550 - January 31, 2008
NACHURA, J. 3rd Div. Decision

Facts:

Philimare Shipping as the authorized Philippine agent of TransOcean Lines hired

respondent Steven Chiong as Third Engineer of TransOcean's vessel M/V Elbia at
the San Diego, California Port.

Philimare dispatched a Letter of Guarantee to CL Hutchins TransOcean's agent at

the San Diego Port, confirming Chiong's arrival thereat in time to board the M/V
Elbia.

For this purpose, Philimare purchased for Chiong a Northwest plane ticket for San
Diego, California with a departure date of April 1, 1989 from Manila. Ten (10) days
before his scheduled departure, Chiong fetched his entire family from
Samar and brought them to Manila to see him off at the airport.

Chiong arrived at MIA (3) hours before the scheduled time of departure. Chiong's
passport was duly stamped, after complying with government requirements for
departing seafarers.

Calvo remained at the PCG Counter while Chiong proceeded to queue at the
Northwest check-in counter. When it was Chiong's turn, the Northwest personnel
informed him that his name did not appear in the computer's list of
confirmed departing passengers.

Ultimately, Chiong was not allowed to board Northwest Flight No. 24 bound for San
Diego that day and, consequently, was unable to work at the M/V Elbia by April 1,
1989

Chiong's name was crossed out and

It appears that
substituted with "W. Costine" in Northwest's Air
Passenger Manifest
 230

Chiong filed a Complaint for breach of contract of carriage before

the RTC. Northwest filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint citing the trial court's lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, but the trial court denied the
same.

finding preponderance of evidence

RTC rendered a Decision
in favor of Chiong, and holding Northwest liable for breach of contract of
carriage. The RTC ruled that the

evidence adduced by the parties supported the conclusion that Chiong was
deliberately prevented from checking-in

and his boarding pass unjustifiably withheld to accommodate an American

passenger by the name of W. Costine.

CA affirmed RTC in toto.

Chiong's witnesses - who all corroborated his testimony on his presence at the
airport on, and flight details for, April 1, 1989, and that he was subsequently
bumped-off -

employees of Philimare which may have an

are, likewise,
interest in the outcome of this case.
Issue: whether Witnesses of respondent which may have an interest in the outcome
of this case is a competent witness?
 231

HEld: YES!!

We intoned in PAL vs. CA

(T)his Court has repeatedly held that

a witness' relationship to the victim does

not automatically affect the veracity of his
or her testimony.
While this principle is often applied in criminal cases, we deem that the same
principle may apply in this case, albeit civil in nature.

If a witness' relationship with a party does not ipso

facto render him a biased witness in criminal
cases where the quantum of evidence required is
proof beyond reasonable doubt,
there is no reason why the same principle should not apply in civil
cases where the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of
evidence.

The foregoing documentary and testimonial evidence, taken together,

amply establish the fact that Chiong was present at MIA on April 1, 1989, passed
through the PCG counter without delay, proceeded to the Northwest check-in
counter, but when he presented his confirmed ticket thereat,

he was not issued a boarding pass, and ultimately barred from boarding Northwest
Flight No. 24 on that day
 232

Disqualification of Witness

Immaturity; Childwitness Sec 21 b Rule 130

People vs. JUANITO ENTRAMPAS ( Neither do these alleged discrepancies, not

being elements of the crime, diminish the credibility of AAA's declarations.
Jurisprudence has consistently given full weight and credence to a child's
testimonies.64 "Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and sincerity. "65
"Leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they
are relating past incidents of abuse. )
G.R. No. 212161 March 29, 2017
LEONEN, J. 2nd Div Decision

Facts:

Accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas and BBB were common-law spouses. AAA,

BBB's daughter from a previous relationship, lived with them. She looked up to
Entrampas as her adoptive father. AAA was still in elementary school.

AAA arrived from school to cook for her family. She was interrupted by Entrampas
and was asked to go to the room upstairs.9 The 11-year old girl obeyed. The he
raped her. AAA's pregnancy test yielded positive. BBB asked Entrampas, who,
according to BBB, admitted that he was the father of AAA's child.

BEfore RTC Entrampas was charged with two (2) counts of qualified rape.
Prosecution presented

● AAA's certificate of live birth,

● the laboratory report of AAA's pregnancy test, Dr. Robert C. Nicolas's
certification dated October 26, 2004,

● and four (4) witnesses' testimonies.

The second prosecution witness,

● AAA, narrated how Entrampas raped her in February 2003, again

one (1) week after,

● and in the succeeding months until she had a baby bump.

He gave her ₱l0.00 for the first time he raped her.38 She had her menstruation at 11
years old, while she was in Grade 5, and Entrampas knew this.39 AAA had no
boyfriend as she had no suitors.
 233

RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory
rape.

He also contested the alleged inconsistent statements of AAA regarding the

time the first and second rape happened, and whether she was awake or asleep
before the sexual molestation.

CA affirmed the ruling of RTC. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether AAA, a minor, is competent to be a witness?

Held: YES!!

The alleged inconsistencies "are collateral and

minor matters
which do not at all touch upon the commission of the crime nor affect [the
minor victim]'s credibility."

AAA's inability to recall the

● precise date and time of the rape

is immaterial as these are not elements of the crime

"rape victims are not expected to cherish in their

Moreover,
memories an accurate account of the dates, number of
times and manner they were violated.
 234

Inconsistencies on minor details and collateral

matters

do not affect the substance, truth, or weight of the

victim's testimonies.

"[M]inor inconsistencies may be expected of [a girl]

of such tender years who is unaccustomed to a public trial[,]"
particularly one where she would recount such a harrowing experience as an assault
to her dignity.

The inconsistencies and contradictions in AAA's declarations are quite expected.

The victim is a child less than 12 years old and, therefore, more likely to commit
errors than teenagers or adults.

Neither do these alleged discrepancies, not being

elements of the crime, diminish the credibility of
AAA's declarations.

Jurisprudence has consistently given full weight

and credence to a child's testimonies.

"Youth and immaturity are badges of truth and

sincerity. "

"Leeway should be given to witnesses who are

minors, especially when they are relating past
incidents of abuse.
 235

AAA, then only 11 years old, had no reason to

concoct lies against petitioner. Her declarations are generally
coherent and intrinsically believable. In People v. Dimanawa:

[R]everence and respect for the elders is deeply

rooted in Filipino children and is even
recognized by law.
Thus, it is against human nature for a . . . girl to fabricate a story that would
expose herself, as well as her family, to a lifetime of shame, especially when
her charge could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.

Elements of Rape

Her failures to resist the sexual aggression and to

immediately report the incident to the authorities or to
her mother
do not undermine her credibility.

The silence of the rape victim does not negate her sexual molestation or make her
charge baseless, untrue, or fabricated.

A minor "cannot be expected to act like an adult or a mature experienced woman

who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threat to her life and
complain immediately that she had been sexually assaulted."
 236

Force and intimidation must be appreciated in light of the victim's perception and
judgment when the assailant committed the crime. In rape perpetrated
by close kin,

actual force
such as the common-law spouse of the child's mother,
or intimidation need not be employed.
While [accused-appellant] was not the biological father of AAA ... [she] considered
Moral influence or
him as her father since she was a child."73
ascendancy added to the intimidation of AAA.
 237

Dead Man's Statute Rule; Sec 23 Rule 130

APOLONIO GARCIA, vs. DOMINGA ROBLES VDA. DE CAPARAS ( PARAD,

DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that Amanda’s declaration in
her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged admission and recognition of the
alternate farming scheme is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead
Man’s Statute, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which
pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan
ng Lupa" such declaration cannot be admitted and used against the latter )
G.R. No. 180843 April 17, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J. 2nd Div. Decisions

Facts:

Flora Makapugay owner of a 2.5-hectare farm in Bulacan and being tilled by

Eugenio Caparas (Eugenio) as agricultural lessee under a leasehold agreement.
Makapugay passed away and was succeeded by her nephews and
niece, namely

1. Amanda dela Paz-Perlas (Amanda),

2. Justo dela Paz (Justo) and

3. Augusto dela Paz (Augusto).

On the other hand, Eugenio’s children –

● Modesta Garcia (Garcia),

● Cristina Salamat (Salamat) and

● Pedro –

succeeded him.

Before she passed away, Makapugay appointed Amanda as

her attorney-in-fact.
After Eugenio died, or in 1974,

Amanda and Pedro entered into an agreement entitled "Kasunduan sa

Buwisan",7
 238

followed by an April 19, 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract,8 covering the

land.

Pedro passed away in 1984,

and his wife, herein respondent Dominga Robles Vda. de

Caparas (Dominga), took over as agricultural lessee.

1996, the landowners

● Amanda, Justo and Augusto, on the one hand,

and Pedro’s sisters

● Garcia and
● Salamat on the other,

Garcia and
entered into a "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng Lupa" whereby
Salamat were acknowledged as Pedro’s co-lessees.
Herein petitioners Sister Garcia and Salamat filed a Complaint10 for
nullification of leasehold and restoration of rights as agricultural lessees

against Pedro’s heirs, represented by his

surviving spouse and herein respondent
Dominga.

Complaint, Garcia and Salamat claimed

● they entered into an

“that when their father Eugenio died,
agreement with their brother Pedro that they would
alternately farm the land on a "per-season basis";

● that the landowner Makapugay knew of this agreement;

 239

● that when Pedro passed away, Dominga took over the land and, despite
demands, continued to deprive them of their rights as co-lessees;

● Petitioners prayed that the 1979 Agricultural Leasehold Contract between

Pedro and Amanda be nullified; that they be recognized as co-lessees and
allowed to cultivate the land

PARAD ordered dismissal of case DECLARING defendant Dominga Robles Vda. de

Caparas as lawful successor-tenant. DARAB declared Dominga Robles Vda.
de Caparas as the lawful successor-tenant of Pedro Caparas

CA affirmed DARAB. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s alleged

admission and recognition of the alternate farming scheme is Admissible?

Held: NO! NOT Admissible

What the PARAD, DARAB and CA failed to consider and realize is that

Amanda’s declaration in her Affidavit covering Pedro’s

alleged admission and recognition of the
alternate farming scheme

is inadmissible for being a violation of the Dead

Man’s Statute,
which provides that

● "[i]f one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying

○ by death,
○ insanity, or
○ other mental disabilities,

● the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving

his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction."
 240

Thus, since Pedro is deceased, and Amanda’s declaration which

pertains to the leasehold agreement affects the 1996 "Kasunduan sa Buwisan ng
Lupa"

● which she as assignor entered into with petitioners,

● and which is now the subject matter of the present case

● and claim against Pedro’s surviving spouse and lawful successor-in-

interest Dominga,

such declaration cannot be admitted and used

against the latter, who is placed in an unfair situation
by reason of her being unable to contradict or disprove
such declaration

as a result of her husband-declarant Pedro’s prior

death.
If petitioners earnestly believed that they had a right, under their supposed mutual
agreement with Pedro, to cultivate the land under an alternate farming scheme,

then they should have confronted Pedro or sought an audience

with Amanda to discuss the possibility of their institution as co-
lessees of the land;

and they should have done so soon after the passing away of their father
Eugenio. However, it was only in 1996, or 17 years after Pedro
was installed as tenant in 1979 and long after his death in
1984, that they came forward to question Pedro’s succession to the
leasehold.

As correctly held by the PARAD, petitioners slept on their rights, and are thus
precluded from questioning Pedro’s 1979 agricultural leasehold contract.

Under the Dead Man's Statute Rule,

"if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by

 241

● death,
● insanity, or
● other mental disabilities,

the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction."

Thus, the alleged admission of the deceased Pedro Caparas (Pedro) that he
entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with the petitioners cannot be used
as evidence against the herein respondent as the latter would be
unable to contradict or disprove the same.
 242

Counter Claim: Dead Man’s Stature Not applicable

LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA vs. LAMBERTO Chua

( as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from
testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the deceased,
said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased )
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
GONZAGA-REYES, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:

Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto
in the distribution of Shellane LPG in MAnila. For business convenience ,
respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business
name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS

● Respondent allegedly delivered his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00

to Jacinto

● while the Jacinto in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart

contribution,

with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them.

The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by

Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy.

As compensation,

● Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross

profit and

● Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and
other remuneration from the business.

ts business operation went quite and was profitable. respondent however

suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated
and undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and
for tax avoidance.

Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989,

 243

1. his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and

2. particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth,

took over the operations, without respondent's consent. D espite respondent's

repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, petitioners failed
to comply.

Lamberto T. Chua, respondent filed a complaint

against
1. Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and

2. Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia),

daughter and wife, respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga

for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery of

Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with RTC Zamboanga
del Norte.

etitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in Manila, not RTC had jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed their

● Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims,

contending that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived
income/profits,

RTC ruled in favor of Lamberto, DIRECTING petitioner to render an accounting. CA

affirmed RTC.

Hence the case at bar.

Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial

court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed
 244

between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until

Jacinto's death.

Petitioners argues that In the absence of any written document to

show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto, these courts were
proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to
prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death.

To support this argument, petitioners invoke the

"Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130
of the Rules of Court that provides

Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his
alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims
against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.

We are not persuaded.

A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable property of
real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public instrument shall necessary.

Hence, based on the intention of the parties, as gathered

from the facts and ascertained from their language and conduct, a verbal contract of
partnership may arise. The essential profits that must be proven to that a partnership
was agreed upon are

(1) mutual contribution to a common stock, and

(2) a joint interest in the profits.

Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract of partnership

between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to the introduction of
documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said partnership.

The crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead Man's
Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible
respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.

The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that

 245

if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from

testifying

● by death,
● insanity, or
● other mental disabilities,

the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving

his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.

But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction
of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:

"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or

persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of

a deceased person or a person of unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of

such deceased person or against person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the
death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound
mind."10

Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.

First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim

against respondents in their answer before the trial court,

and with filing of their counterclaim, petitioners

the
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit
of the "Dead Man's Statute".
Well entrenched is the rule that
 246

when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of

the estates that sets up the counterclaim,

the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before
the death of the deceased to defeat the counterclaim.

Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified

from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate
or representatives of the deceased.14

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead

Man's Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."

Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence
that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her an assignor
because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a cause of action which
has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has
arisen."15

Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party
plaintiff.
 247

We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that

Josephine's testimony lacks probative value because
she was allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his
favor, Josephine merely declared in court that she was requested by respondent to
testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified.

We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that
Josephine's testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say
that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.

Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish
the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the
credibility of witnesses.16

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat

respondent's claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals

that a partnership was established between respondent and Jacinto.

Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as
well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for
respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership, albeit an
informal one.
 248

Doctor Patient Privilege

MA. PAZ Krohn vs. CA & Edgar Krohn ( In the instant case, the person against
whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,
surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify
on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this
does not fall within the claimed prohibition )
G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J 1st Div. Decision

Facts:

Respondent filed an annulment case against the petitioner. 1971, Ma. Paz
underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric
report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr.

In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric

Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as "either
unfounded or irrelevant. Edgar took the witness stand and
tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential
Psychiatric Evaluation Report.

This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on

privileged communication between physician and
patient.
Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to
any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient
privileged communication rule,"

trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
and Ma. Paz’s MR. CA denied Appeal.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the doctor patient privilage communication applies when the
hsuband will testify regarding the contents of the psychological report prepared by
the Doctor?
 249

Held: NO! Not privilege Communication

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that

"the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies only to

a physician.
Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the
case at bar

where the person sought to be barred from

testifying on the privileged communication is
the husband
and not the physician of the petitioner."

The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication

between physician and patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted.

Indeed, statutes making communications between

physician and patient privileged
are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a
full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition

Consequently, this prevents the physician from making public information that will
result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient.

Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however

misplaced.
 250

Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege
may be successfully invoked:

(a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

(b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized
to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;

(c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity;

(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,

(e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the
reputation (formerly character) of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is

claimed

is not one duly authorized to practice medicine,

surgery or obstetrics.

He is simply the patient's husband who wishes

to testify on a document executed by medical
practitioners.

Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the

claimed prohibition.

Neither can his testimony be considered a

circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony
cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of
the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
 251

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private

respondent on the ground that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial
court dated 10 May 1991,

he invoked the rule on privileged communications

but never questioned the testimony as hearsay.

It was a fatal mistake.
For, in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was
hearsay,

counsel waived his right to make such objection

and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
 252

Nelly Lim vs. CA & Juan Sim ( Dr. an expert witness; Although she testified that
she examined and interviewed the patient, she did not disclose anything she
obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of her
patient. A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert concerning a
patient’s ailment, when he can disregard knowledge acquired in attending
such patient and make answer solely on facts related in (sic) the hypothetical
question )
G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J. 3rd Div. Decision

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent are lawfully married to each other. private
respondent filed before RTC Pangasinan a petition for annulment of such marriage
on the ground that

petitioner has been allegedly suffering from a mental illness

called schizophrenia "before, during and after the marriage
and until the present."

Private respondent’s counsel announced that he would present as his next

witness the

● Chief of the Female Services of the National Mental Hospital, Dr.

Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in
Psychiatry.

Petitioner’s counsel opposed the motion on the

ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from
the witness is privileged since the latter had
examined the petitioner in a professional capacity
and had diagnosed her to be suffering from
schizophrenia.
Over such opposition, the subpoena was issued

Movant argued that having seen and examined the petitioner in a

professional capacity,
 253

Dr. Acampado is barred from testifying under the rule on the

confidentiality of a physician-patient relationship.

Counsel for private respondent contended, however, that

● Dr. Acampado would be presented as an expert

witness

● and would not testify on any information acquired

while attending to the petitioner in a professional
capacity.

The trial court, per respondent Judge, denied the motion and allowed the
witness to testify.

● Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand,

● was qualified by counsel for private respondent as an

expert witness

● andwas asked hypothetical questions related to

her field of expertise.

● She neither revealed the illness she examined and

treated the petitioner for

nor disclosed the results of her examination and the

medicines she had prescribed.

On the witness box, Dr. Acampado answered

➢ routinary (sic) questions to qualify her as an expert in psychiatry;

➢ she was asked to render an opinion as to what kind of illness (sic) are
stelazine tablets applied to;
 254

➢ she was asked to render an opinion on a (sic) hypothetical

facts respecting certain behaviours of a person;
➢ and finally she admitted she saw and treated Nelly Lim

➢ but she never revealed what illness she

examined and treated her (sic);
nor (sic) the result of her examination of Nelly Lim, nor (sic)
the medicines she prescribed.

petitioner filed with CA for certiorari and prohibition, to annul the aforesaid order of
respondent Judge grave abuse of discretion. CA dismissed appeal CA contended
that Dr. Acampado’s testimony,

We find no declaration that touched (sic) or disclosed any information

which she has acquired from her patient, Nelly Lim, during the period she attended
her patient in a professional capacity.
 255

Although she testified that she examined and interviewed the patient,

● she did not disclose anything she obtained in

the course of her examination, interview and treatment of
her patient.

Given a set of facts and asked a hypothetical

question,

rendered an opinion regarding the history

Dr. Acampado
and behaviour of the fictitious character in the
hypothetical problem.

The facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical

problem
did not refer and (sic) had no bearing to (sic) whatever
information or findings the doctor obtained from attending the
(sic) patient.

A physician is not disqualified to testify as an expert

concerning a patient’s ailment, when he can
disregard knowledge acquired in attending such
patient and make answer solely on facts related in
(sic) the hypothetical question.
 256

● Expert testimony of a physician

● based on hypothetical question (sic) as to cause

of illness of a person whom he has attended

isnot privileged, provided the physician does not

give testimony tending to disclose confidential
information related to him in his professional
capacity while attending to the patient.

ISsue: Whether Dr. Acampado’s testimony as an expert witness, is privilege

communication hence?

Held: NO!

Since the object of the privilege is to protect the patient, it may be waived if no timely
objection is made to the physician’s testimony.

In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following

requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;

2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics;

3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient
in his professional capacity;

4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and

5. the information was confidential, and, if disclosed, would blacken the

reputation (formerly character) of the patient.
 257

These requisites conform with the

(4) fundamental conditions necessary for the establishment

of a privilege against the disclosure of certain communications, to
wit:

"1. The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not
be disclosed.

2. This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and

satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties.

3. The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be
sedulously fostered

4. The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the
communications must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the
correct disposal of litigation."

The physician may be considered to be acting in his

professional capacity when
● he attends to the patient for curative,
● preventive, or
● palliative treatment

Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to
enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat his patient" are covered
by the privilege

It is to be emphasized that
"it is the tenor only of the communication that is
privileged.
 258

The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a

consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated."

One who claims this privilege must prove the presence of these aforementioned
requisites.

Our careful evaluation of the submitted pleadings leads Us to no

but to agree with the respondent
other course of action
CA’s observation that the petitioner failed to
discharge that burden

In the first place, Dr. Acampado was presented and

qualified as an expert witness.
As correctly held by the CA she did not disclose anything obtained in the
course of her examination, interview and treatment of the petitioner;

moreover, facts and conditions alleged in the

the
hypothetical problem did not refer to and had no
bearing on whatever information or findings the
doctor obtained while attending to the patient.
There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions
propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner.

Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or

knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by
reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them.
 259

As anexpert witness, her testimony before the trial

court cannot then be excluded.

The rule on this point is summarized as follows:

"The predominating view, with some scant authority otherwise, is that the
statutory physician-patient privilege, though duly claimed,

● is not violated by permitting a physician to

give expert opinion testimony in response
to a strictly hypothetical question in a
lawsuit
involving the physical mental condition of a patient whom he has
attended professionally,

where his opinion is based strictly upon the hypothetical facts stated,
excluding and disregarding any personal professional knowledge he
may have concerning such patient.

But in order to avoid the bar of the physician-patient privilege where it is

the physician must base his
asserted in such a case,
opinion solely upon the facts hypothesized in
the question,
excluding from consideration his personal knowledge of the patient
acquired through the physician and patient relationship.

If he cannot or does not exclude from consideration his personal professional

knowledge of the patient’s condition he should not be permitted to testify as to
his expert opinion."
 260

Presence of 3rd Persons even a family member

Secondly, it is quite clear from Dr. Acampado’s testimony that the

petitioner was never interviewed alone.

Said interviews were always conducted in the presence of a third party, thus:

Q I am asking you, doctor, whom did you interview?

A I interviewed the husband first, then the father and after having the
history, I interviewed the patient, Nelly.

information elicited during

There is authority to the effect that
consultation with a physician in the presence of
third parties removes such information from the
mantle of the privilege:
Some courts have held that the casual presence of a third person
destroys the confidential nature of the communication
between doctor and patient

and thus destroys the privilege, and that under such circumstances the doctor
may testify. Other courts have reached a contrary result."
 261

Thirdly, except for the petitioner’s sweeping claim —

that" (T)he information given by Dr. Acampado brings disgrace and invite (sic)
reproach to petitioner by falsely making it appear in the eyes of the trial court
and the public that the latter was suffering from a mental disturbance called
schizophrenia —

which caused, and continues to cause, irreparable injury to the name and
reputation of petitioner and her family," 22 —

which is based on a wrong premise, nothing specific or concrete was offered to

show that indeed, the information obtained from Dr. Acampado would blacken the
former’s "character" (or "reputation").

Dr. Acampado never disclosed any information obtained from the petitioner
regarding the latter’s ailment and the treatment recommended therefor.

Failure to object Waiver;

Finally, while it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request
for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado

and filed a formal motion for the quashal of the said subpoena a day before the
witness was to testify,

the petitioner makes no claim in any of her pleadings that her

counsel had objected to any question asked of the witness on the ground
that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege,

despite the trial court’s advise that said counsel may interpose his
objection to the testimony

"once it becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered

by the privileged communication rule."

The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of Dr. Acampado
quoted in the petitioner’s Petition 23 and Memorandum, 24 and in the private
do not at all show that any
respondent’s Memorandum, 25
objections were interposed.
 262

Even granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr.

Acampado could be covered by the privilege,

the failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to

a waiver thereof
 263

ACCRA vs. Sandigan ( From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily
deduce that the clients indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the
corporations in question. In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the
form of, among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering their
client's shareholdings )
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
KAPUNAN, J. En Banc

Facts:
offshoot of the institution of the Complaint before Sandigan by Republic against Eduardo
Cojuangco for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, which includes shares of
stocks in the named corporations in PCGG Case 33.

ACCRA Law Firm performed legal services for its clients, which included, among others, the
organization and acquisition of business associations and/or organizations, with the
correlative and incidental services where its members acted as incorporators, or simply, as
stockholders.

More specifically, in the performance of these services, the members of the law firm
delivered to its client documents which substantiate the client's equity holdings,

● i.e., stock certificates endorsed in blank representing the shares registered in the
client's name,

● and a blank deed of trust or assignment covering said shares.

relative to the assets of clients

Members of the law firm acquire information
as well as their personal and business circumstances. As members of
the ACCRA Law Firm, petitioners and private respondent Raul Roco
admit that

assisted in the organization and acquisition of the

they
companies included in Civil Case 33

ACCRA lawyers acted as nominees-

and in keeping with the office practice,
stockholders of the said corporations involved in sequestration
proceedings.

respondent PCGG filed a "Motion to Admit Third Amended Complaint" excluded private
respondent Raul Roco as party-defendant on his undertaking that
 264

he will reveal the identity of the principal/s for whom

he acted as nominee/stockholder in the companies
involved in PCGG Case
Petitioners were included in the Third Amended Complaint alleging ACCRA) plotted,
devised, schemed conspired and confederated with each other in setting up, through the use
of the coconut levy funds, the financial and corporate framework and structures that led to
the establishment of

● UCPB,
● UNICOM,
● COCOLIFE,
● COCOMARK,
● CIC,

and more than twenty other coconut levy funded corporations, including the acquisition of
SMC shares and its institutionalization through presidential directives of the coconut
monopoly.

In their answer to the Expanded Amended Complaint, petitioners ACCRA lawyers

alleged that:

Defendants-ACCRA lawyers' participation in the acts with which their codefendants

are charged, was in furtherance of legitimate lawyering.

The Counter-Motion for dropping petitioners from the complaint was duly set for hearing on
October 18, 1991 in accordance with the requirements of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
PCCG set the following conditions precedent for the exclusion of petitioners, namely:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignments petitioners executed in favor of its
client covering their respective shareholdings.

respondent Sandiganbayan denying the exclusion of petitioners in PCGG Case 33 or

their refusal to comply with the conditions required by respondent PCGG. It held:

ACCRA lawyers may take the heroic stance of not revealing the identity of the client
for whom they have acted,

i.e. their principal, and that will be their choice.

 265

But until they do identify their clients, considerations of whether or not the privilege
claimed by the ACCRA lawyers exists cannot even begin to be debated.

ACCRA’s MR denied. ACCRA lawyers filed the petition for certiorari hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether attorney-client privilege prohibits petitioners ACCRA lawyers from revealing
the identity of their client(s) and the other information requested by the PCGG?

Held: YES!!

The nature of lawyer-client relationship

is premised on the Roman Law concepts of

● locatio conductio operarum (contract of lease of services) where one person lets his
services

● and another hires them without reference to the object of which the services are to be
performed, wherein lawyers' services may be compensated by honorarium or for
hire, 17

● And mandato (contract of agency) wherein a friend on whom reliance could be

placed makes a contract in his name, but gives up all that he gained by the contract
to the person who requested him.

lawyer-client relationship is more than that of the principal-

But the
agent and lessor-lessee.

In modern day perception of the lawyer-client relationship, an attorney is more than a mere
agent or servant, because

powers of trust and confidence

he possesses special

reposed on him by his client.

Thus, in the creation of lawyer-client relationship, there are rules, ethical conduct and
duties that breathe life into it, among those, the

● fiduciary duty to his client which is of a very delicate, exacting

and confidential character, requiring a very high degree of fidelity and good faith,

that is required by reason of necessity and public interest based on the hypothesis that
abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to the
administration of justice.
 266

Encouraging full disclosure to a lawyer by one seeking legal

services opens the door to a whole spectrum of legal options which
would otherwise be circumscribed by limited information
engendered by a fear of disclosure.

An effective lawyer-client relationship is largely dependent upon the degree of confidence

which
which exists between lawyer and client which in turn requires a situation

encourages a dynamic and fruitful exchange and

flow of information.

It necessarily in order to attain effective

follows that

representation, the lawyer must invoke the privilege not

as a matter of option but as a matter of duty and
professional responsibility.
The question now arises

whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of
petitioners' client(s) in the case at bar.

Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must
be in the affirmative.

As a matter of public policy,

a client's identity should not be shrouded in mystery

general rule in our jurisdiction as well as in the
Under this premise, the
United States is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and
refuse to divulge the name or identity of this client.

The reasons advanced for the general rule are well established.

First, the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to
be protected is flesh and blood.

Second, the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
 267

Third, the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a general
rule, know his adversary.

"A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his opponent is." He cannot be obliged to
grope in the dark against unknown forces. 33

general rule is however

Notwithstanding these considerations, the

qualified by some important exceptions.

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that

revealing the client's name

would implicate that client in the very activity for which he

sought the lawyer's advice.

A client's identity and the nature of that client's fee arrangements may be privileged where
the person invoking the privilege can show that a strong probability exists that

disclosure of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity
for which legal advice was sought Baird v. Koerner, 279 F. 2d at 680.

While in Baird Owe enunciated this rule as a matter of California law, the rule also reflects
federal law. Appellants contend that the Baird exception applies to this case.

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability; his

identity is privileged.

For instance, the peculiar facts and circumstances of Neugass v. Terminal Cab
Corporation,37 prompted the New York Supreme Court to allow a lawyer's claim to the effect
that he could not reveal the name of his client because this would expose the latter to civil
litigation.

3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless,
by revealing the client's name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form the
chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime,

the client's name is privileged.

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.
 268

the content of any client communication to a

For example,

lawyer lies within the privilege if it is relevant to the

subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks legal assistance. 44
Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously disclosed
and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential, the identity of the client has been
held to be privileged, since such revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within
client's name itself has an independent
the ambit of the privilege when the
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.

Apart from these principal exceptions, there exist other situations which could qualify as
exceptions to the general rule.

For example, the content of any client communication to a lawyer lies within the privilege

if it is relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which the client seeks
legal assistance.

Moreover, where the nature of the attorney-client relationship has been previously
disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential,

the identity of the client has been held to be privileged, since such
revelation would otherwise result in disclosure of the entire
transaction. 45

Summarizing these exceptions, information relating to the identity of a client may fall within
client's name itself has an independent
the ambit of the privilege when the
significance, such that disclosure would then reveal client
confidences.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore,
clearly reveal that the instant case falls under at least two exceptions to the general rule.

First, disclosure of the alleged client's name would lead to establish said client's
connection with the very fact in issue of the case,
 269

which is privileged information, because the privilege, as

protects the subject matter or the substance
stated earlier,
(without which there would be not attorney-client
relationship).

The link between the alleged criminal offense and the legal advice or legal service sought
was duly establishes in the case at bar, by no less than the PCGG itself.

The key lies in the three specific conditions laid down by the PCGG which constitutes
petitioners' ticket to non-prosecution should they accede thereto:

(a) the disclosure of the identity of its clients;

(b) submission of documents substantiating the lawyer-client relationship; and

(c) the submission of the deeds of assignment petitioners executed in favor of their
clients covering their respective shareholdings.

clients
From these conditions, particularly the third, we can readily deduce that the
indeed consulted the petitioners, in their capacity as lawyers,
regarding the financial and corporate structure, framework and set-up of the corporations in
question.

In turn, petitioners gave their professional advice in the form of,

among others, the aforementioned deeds of assignment covering
their client's shareholdings.

preparation of the aforestated documents

There is no question that the
was part and parcel of petitioners' legal service to their clients.

More important, it constituted an integral part of their duties as lawyers.

Petitioners, therefore, have a legitimate fear

that identifying their clients would implicate

them in the very activity for which legal advice
had been sought,
 270

i.e., the alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth in

the aforementioned corporations.

Furthermore, under the third main exception, revelation

of the client's name would obviously provide the
necessary link for the prosecution to build its case,
where none otherwise exists.
It is the link, in the words of Baird, "that would inevitably form the chain of testimony
necessary to convict the (client) of a . . . crime."

Question ni dean
An important distinction must be made between

1. a case where a client takes on the services of an

attorney

for illicit purposes,

seeking advice about how to go around the law for the
purpose of committing illegal activities

The first case clearly does not fall within the privilege because the same cannot be invoked
for purposes illegal.

privilege cannot be
These cases may be readily distinguished, because the

invoked or used as a shield for an illegal act, as in

the first example;
The reason for the first rule is that

it is not within the professional character of a

lawyer to give advice on the commission of a
crime
 271

2. and a case where a client thinks

he might have previously committed

something illegal

and consults his attorney about it.

The second case falls within the exception because
whether or not the act for which the client sought advice turns out to be illegal,

his name cannot be used or disclosed if the

disclosure leads to evidence,

not yet in the hands of the prosecution, which might lead to

possible action against him.

prosecution may not have a case against the

while the

client in the second example

and cannot use the attorney client relationship to

build up a case against the latter.
The reason for the second has been stated in the cases above discussed and are founded
on the same policy grounds for which the attorney-client privilege, in general, exists.

Leverage

Petitioners further argue that even granting that such an undertaking has been
assumed by private respondent Roco,

they are prohibited from revealing the identity of their principal under their sworn
mandate and fiduciary duty as lawyers to uphold at all
times the confidentiality of information obtained during such lawyer-client
relationship.
 272

Respondent PCGG, through its counsel, refutes petitioners' contention, alleging that
the

revelation of the identity of the client is not within the ambit of the lawyer-client
confidentiality privilege, nor are the documents it required (deeds of assignment)
protected,

because they are evidence of nominee status.

Petitioners' contentions are impressed with merit.

It is quite apparent that petitioners were impleaded by the PCGG as co-defendants

to force them to disclose the identity of their

clients.
Clearly, respondent PCGG is not after petitioners but the "bigger fish" as
they say in street parlance. This ploy is quite clear from the PCGG's willingness to cut a deal
with petitioners — the names of their clients in exchange for exclusion from the complaint.

It would seem that petitioners are merely standing in for their clients as defendants
in the complaint. Petitioners are being prosecuted

solely on the basis of activities and services performed in the

course of their duties as lawyers.
Quite obviously, petitioners' inclusion as co-defendants in the complaint is merely

being used as leverage to

compel them to name their clients and consequently to enable the PCGG to
nail these clients.

respondent PCGG has no valid cause of

Such being the case,

action as against petitioners and should exclude

them from the Third Amended Complaint.

The fiduciary duty of a counsel and advocate is also what makes the law profession a unique
position of trust and confidence, which distinguishes it from any other calling. In this
instance,
 273

we have no recourse

but to uphold and strengthen the mantle of

protection

accorded to the confidentiality that proceeds from

the performance of the lawyer's duty to his client.
 274

Where there is no public

BANCO FILIPINO vs. Monetary Board (
interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule
Privilege Commn to public office, will not be
applicable; respondents have not established that public interest would
suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner.
Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985,
any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this
time pose no danger or peril to our economy.)
G.R. No. 70054 July 8, 1986

FActs:

RTC granted petitioner’s motion for the production, inspection, and

copying of certain papers and records which are claimed as needed by the
Petitioner Bank for the preparation of its comments,

It considered the documents sought to be produced as not privileged

because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the
Court. These materials are said to comprise of records of the administrative
proceedings conducted by respondent's officials and representatives

● from the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports

● and the resolution placing petitioner under receivership and

● thereafter under liquidation

as it regularity and impartiality of these

is the
administrative proceedings which are being
assailed by the petitioner,

trial court saw no reason why said documents

the
should be thus concealed from it.
 275

Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take exception to the said
order and pray in their petition before this Court for the reversal and setting aside
of the same. The grounds are as follows:

(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential pursuant to Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.

Petitioner contested that:

The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to

produce the Central Bank records because it is

based only on the generalized interest in

confidentiality.
Petitioner cites as a precedent the doctrine established in the case of U.S. vs.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states that

"when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials

based only on the
sought for use in a criminal case is
generalized interest in confidentiality,
it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law.

Respondent MB rebutted that:

so-called MB deliberations are privileged communications pursuant to

Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because statements and
opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members of the MB are
specifically vested with confidentiality under Secs. 13 and 15 of the
Central Bank Act.

The "public interest" requirement for non-disclosure is evident from the fact
that the statute punishes any disclosure of such deliberations.

Hence the case at bar.

ISsue: Whether The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential?
 276

Held: NO!

The motion for the production of the subject documents was filed by petitioner
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court. It has been held that

"a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books,

documents and papers which are material and relevant
to the establishment of his cause of action or defense"
"The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents
and the sufficiency of their description is

● one of reasonableness and practicability"

"On the ground of public policy,

the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not
authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter,

because of their confidential

that is, books, papers which
and privileged character could not be received
in evidence"

In passing on a motion for discovery of documents,

the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not

documents are relevant to the subject matter of action".

Likewise, "any statute declaring in general terms that official

records are confidential should be liberally construed,
to have an implied exception for disclosure when
needed in a court of justice
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, thi s Court holds that no
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the
 277

court below in granting petitioner's motion for the

production of the documents enumerated herein.
We accept the view taken by the court below that

the documents are not privileged

and that these constitute or contain evidence

material to the issues being inquired into by the
Court.
With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and
Examination Sector, Dept. II (SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank and
Monetary Board which were taken into consideration by said respondents in closing
petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports was furnished to the petitioner.

We, therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the annexes thereto
should be withheld.

On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which
states:

Section 21. Privileged Communications. The following persons cannot testify

as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards,
when the
as to communications made to him in official confidence,
court finds that the public interest would suffer
by disclosure.
 278

But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of
public officers

but for the protection of public interest

Where there is no public interest that would be

prejudiced, this invoked rule will not be applicable.

In the case at bar, the respondents have not established

that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and
documents sought by petitioner.

Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 25,

1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters,
reports, and transcripts

at this time pose no danger or peril to our

economy.

Neither will it trigger any bank run nor

compromise state secrets.

Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of

production are tenuous and specious.
If the respondents public officials acted rightfully and prudently in the performance of
their duties, there should be nothing at all that would provoke fear of disclosure
 279

On the contrary,
public interests will be best served by the
disclosure of the documents.
Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors
are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there
was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's
bank closure.
It will be well to consider that—

Public interest means more than a mere curiosity;

which the public, the community at

it means something in
large, has some pecuniary interest by which their
legal rights or liabilities are affected
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce documents dated
February 17, 1986 issued by the court below in S.C.- G.R. No. 70054, is hereby
affirmed,
 280

Executive Privilege

ROMULO Neri vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY ( right of

Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in aid of legislation
cannot be equated with the people's right to public information )
G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. EN BANC Resolution

FActs:

DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment

(ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of P16B. The Project was to be financed by the
People's Republic of China.

In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the
Senate, as follows:

Sen. Lacson P.S. Res. 129 TO CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF

LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF
AWARDING THE NBN to ZTE

Sen. Pimentel P.S. Res.. 127 NVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE

CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND
CONTRACT WITH ZTE

Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain

personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner
was among those invited. Neri only attended Sept. 26 hearing.
Sept. 18, 2007 hearing JDV III testified that several high executive officials and
power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA

● Project was initially approved as a BOT project

● but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a

government-to-government project, to be financed through a loan
from the Chinese Government.

Sept. 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for 11 hrs. He
disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos
 281

offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project.

He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and
that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further
on what they discussed about the NBN Project,

petitioner refused to answer, invoking

"executive privilege".
In particular, he refused to answer the questions on

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum

to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20,
2007.

ES Ermita requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioner's

testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of
the letter reads:

Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of

executive privilege on the following questions, to wit:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,

(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and

(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.

 282

foregoing questions
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the
fall under conversations and correspondence
between the President and public officials which are
considered executive privilege
Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary
in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process.

Disclosure of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the

President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties and
responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her
conversations.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the

information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well
as economic relations with the People's Republic of China.

Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in
an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions
propounded to him

except the foregoing questions involving executive

privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20
November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed
with.

petitioner did not appear in Senate. latter issued the show cause Letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
 283

Petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista,

stating, among others that:

(1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and

(2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive
national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the
bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.

The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioner's request that he "be furnished
in advance" as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately
prepare for the hearing.

Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest and detention at the Office of
the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms

petitioner filed on February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With

Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the
implementation of the said contempt Order.

Petitioner contends
● his conversations with President Arroyo are "candid discussions meant to
explore options in making policy decisions."

● According to him, these discussions "dwelt on the impact of the bribery

scandal involving high government officials on the

○ country's diplomatic relations and

○ economic and military affairs
○ and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in
the Philippines."

● He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the

order of the President

● and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita10 and United
States v. Reynolds.

● Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made

to him in official confidence under Section 712 of Republic Act No. 6713
 284

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered
by executive privilege?

Held: Yes!

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita18 becomes

imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the

● legislative Powers Sections 21 and

● oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sec.22, of

Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.

Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and
they should not be considered as
complementary to each other,
pertaining to the same power of Congress.
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct
inquiry, their objectives are different.
 285

Section 21 relates

● to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

● Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation.

● This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of

compulsory process. Congress CAN COMPEL

APPEARANCE OF EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS; MADATORY
On the other hand, Section 22 pertains

● to the power to conduct a question hour,

obtain information in pursuit of

● the objective of which is to
Congress' oversight function.
● This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of
compulsory process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot
compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 22.
The Court's pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita20 is clear:

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department

heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued ,

● its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President

to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a
report of their performance as a matter of duty.

In such instances,Section 22, in keeping with the separation of

powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance.
 286

Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their

is 'in aid of legislation' under Section
appearance
21, the appearance is mandatory for the same
reasons stated in Arnault.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive

officials under section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in
the principle of separation of powers.

While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot

frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.

The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this
case has also been settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held:

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy

era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
is, in theory,

no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be

subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Court's certiorari powers under
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

Hence, this decision

 287

The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by

Executive Privilege

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad.

This is based on the proposition that

a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of

information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change.

Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce

it.

But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations.

To be valid, it is imperative that

● it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of
procedure

rights of the persons appearing in or

● and that the
affected by such inquiries be respected.

The power extends even to executive officials

● and the only way for them to be exempted is

through a valid claim of executive privilege
This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a recognized claim of
executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
 288

A- Thereis a Recognized Claim

of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any
way diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
has Constitutional underpinnings.

we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to
clearly define the communications covered by executive
privilege.
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In
Chavez v. PCGG, this Court held that

there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect

to state secrets regarding

1. military,
2. diplomatic and
3. other security matters."

In Chavez v. PEA, there is also a recognition of the confidentiality

● of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-

door Cabinet meetings.

In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully

discussed.
 289

claim of executive
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
subject of inquiry relates

to a power textually committed by the

Constitution to the President,

such as the area of military and foreign relations.

Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the

● Commander-in-chief pwoers,
● Appointing powers,
● Pardoning powers,and
● Diplomatic powers.

Consistent with the doctrine the

of separation of powers,
information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
 290

The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch,
somehow provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:

1) The protected communication must relate to a "quintessential and non-

delegable presidential power."

2) The communication must be authored or "solicited and received" by a close

advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in "operational proximity" with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege

that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information

sought "likely contains important evidence" and by the unavailability of the

information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, ES Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on

the ground that the

communications elicited by the three (3) questions "fall under conversation

and correspondence between the President and public officials"

necessary in "her executive and policy decision-making process" and,

that "the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with the People's Republic of China."

Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive
on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign
privilege
relations.
 291

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the

communications elicited by the three (3) questions
are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.

First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable

power" of the President,

i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.

This authority of the President to enter into executive

agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.

Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President.

Under the "operational proximity" test,

● petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo's cabinet.

And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that

would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
 292

The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.

United States v. Nixon held that

a claim of executive privilege is subject to

balancing against other interest.
In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely
protected by the Constitution.

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica, where it was
held that

presidential communications are presumptively privileged

presumption can be overcome only by

and that the
mere showing of public need by the branch
seeking access to conversations.
The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political
branches of the government "in the manner that preserves the essential
functions of each Branch."

record is bereft of any categorical explanation

Here, the
from respondent Committees to show a compelling
or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the
enactment of a law.

Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the

legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI

rather than Section 21 of the same Article.

 293

Senate v. Ermita ruled that the

"the oversight function of Congress may be

facilitated by compulsory process

only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of

legislation."

It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between

● an inquiry in aid of legislation

● and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function

of Congress.

depend on the content of the

In this regard, much will
questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.

Respondent Committees argue that

does not guard against a

a claim of executive privilege
possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing.
We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v. Nixon48 that
"demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial" outweighs the
President's "generalized interest in confidentiality."

However, the present case's distinction with the Nixon case is very
evident.
 294

In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested

and it is the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal
justice that the information be disclosed.

This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to "limit the scope of its decision." It
stressed that it is "not concerned here with the balance between the President's
generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for
information."

the information here is elicited, not in a

Unlike in Nixon,
criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry.
In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive
privilege

● depends not only on the ground invoked but,

● also, on the procedural setting or the context in

which the claim is made.

in Nixon, the President did not interpose any

Furthermore,
claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive
national security secrets.

In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims

● executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in
relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic
secrets.
 295

Respondent Committees further contend that the

grant of petitioner's claim of executive privilege violates

the constitutional provisions on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to

limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development,

shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be

provided by law.

The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law.
Some of these laws are

1. Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,

2. Article 229 of the Revised Penal Code,
3. Section 3 (k) of R.A. No. 3019, and
4. Section 24(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential and
what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept of executive
privilege.

Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of

certain information.

We find the information subject of this case belonging to

such kind.
 296

More than anything else, though,

the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain

information in aid of legislation

cannot be equated with the people's right to

public information.
The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the people's
right to information.

The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate v. Ermita:

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions

● between the right of Congress to information which underlies the

power of inquiry

● and the right of people to information on matters of public concern.

For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents

does not have the
pursuant to his right to information
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces
tecum issued by Congress.
Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact
testimony from government officials.

These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people,

that in every
it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense,
exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
 297

The members of respondent Committees should not

invoke as justification in their exercise of power

a right properly belonging to the people in general.

This is because when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and
members of Congress.

Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should give
way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to
delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject
of careful review by numerous decided cases.
 298

People vs. WILLIAM ONG & ROBERT TIU ( Informer’s privilge N/A; the crime
charged against the appellants is capital in character and can result in the
imposition of the death penalty. They have foisted the defense of instigation
which is in sharp contrast to the claim of entrapment by the prosecution. The
prosecution has to prove all the material elements of the alleged sale of shabu
and the resulting buy-bust operation. Where the testimony of the informer is
indispensable, it should be disclosed. The liberty and the life of a person enjoy
high importance in our scale of values. It cannot be diminished except by a
value of higher significance)
G.R. No. 137348 June 21, 2004
PUNO, J. En Banc Decision

Facts:

1998 accused William Ong y Li and Ching De Ming @ Robert Tiu were charged with
violation of Section 15, Article III RA 6425 D.D. accused pled not guilty at
araignment. Their trial proceeded. In the course of the trial, the two (2) accused
were given the services of a Chinese interpreter.

prosecution, through the testimony of SPO1 Gonzales sought to establish that on

July 23, 1998 at around 5:00 P.M.,

a confidential informant (CI) of Special Operations Division

(SOD), reported to Chief Inspector Albert Ferro about the alleged illicit
drug activities of a certain William Ong and an unidentified Chinese male
partner.

After an evaluation of the confidential information, Chief Inspector Ferro decided

to conduct a buy-bust operation.

● Police Inspector Medel Poñe as team leader,

● SPO1 Gonzales as poseur-buyer and the rest as back-up support.

According to SPO1 Gonzales, the CI called up the alleged pusher, placed an order
for 1kg of Shabu worth 600K. Police parked their car along 6th Street corner Gilmore
Avenue. The rest of the team posted themselves at their back and their right side.

After the exhange of the drugs and money, SPO1 Gonzales himself arrested
accused Ong while the CI and the back-up agents arrested accused De Ming.
 299

1. The officers brought the (2) accused to their office where the corresponding
booking sheets and arrest report were prepared.

2. The plastic bag containing the white crystalline substance was referred to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.

The two (2) accused were subjected to a physical and mental examination as
required. They were found to be free from any external signs of trauma.

Polic Forensic Chemist, Grace Eustaquio, testified that the specimen she examined
had

● a net weight of 980.50 grams and

● manifested "positive results for methyl amphetamine hydrochloride"3 or what

is commonly known as shabu

Her testimony was supported by her Physical Sciences Report.

Appellants denied the story of the prosecution. RTC

convicted 2 accused. Appellants insist on their innocence.

They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether guilt of accused was proven beyodn reasonable doubt?

Held: NO!!

They claim that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

We agree.

Invalid arraignment

Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
provides:

SECTION 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed or
assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the
 300

in the language or
accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same

dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads

guilty or not guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named
in the complaint or information. (

The arraignment of appellants violates the above rule. Appellants are Chinese
nationals. Their Certificate of Arraignment6 states that they were informed of the
accusations against them.

It does not, however, indicate whether the

Information was read in the language or dialect
known to them.
From the records, it is clear that appellants only knew the Chinese language. Thus,
the services of a Chinese interpreter were used in investigating
appellants.

After arraignment and in the course of the trial, the lower

court had to secure the services of a certain Richard Ng Lee as
Chinese interpreter.

is the inability of
What leaps from the records of the case
appellants to fully or sufficiently comprehend any
other language than Chinese and any of its dialect.

appellants were arraigned

Despite this inability, however, the
on an Information written in the English
language.

information should
We again emphasize that the requirement that the
be read in a language or dialect known to the
accused is mandatory.

It must be strictly complied with

 301

as it is intended to protect the constitutional right of the accused to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
constitutional protection is part of due process.

Failure to observe the rules necessarily nullifies the arraignment.

Prosecution evidence failed to prove that appellants willfully and

unlawfully sold or offered to sell shabu.
Hearsay

More important than the invalid arraignment of the appellants, we find that the
prosecution evidence failed to prove that appellants willfully and unlawfully sold or
offered to sell shabu.

conviction is based on the lone testimony of

Appellants’
SPO1 Gonzales. He was the designated poseur-buyer in the team formed
for the buy-bust operation.

But a careful reading of his testimony will reveal that

he was not privy to the sale transaction that

transpired between the CI and appellant William
Ong, the alleged pusher.
It is beyond contention that a contract of sale is perfected upon a meeting of the
minds of the parties on the object and its price.

Not all elements of the sale were established by the

testimony of SPO1 Gonzales

it was the CI who made the initial

It is abundantly clear that
contact, albeit only through the telephone, with the
pusher.
The CI was likewise the one who closed the deal with appellant Ong as to the
quantity of shabu to be purchased and its price.
 302

It is therefore understandable that

in SPO1 Gonzale’s account of his meeting with appellant William Ong, SPO1
Gonzales

made no reference to any further discussion of the price and the quantity of
the shabu.

When they met, they just proceeded with the exchange of money and shabu,

Since only the CI had personal knowledge of the

offer to purchase shabu,
the acceptance of the offer and the consideration for the offer, we hold that
SPO1 Gonzales is, in effect, not the "poseur-buyer"
but merely the deliveryman.
 303

His testimony therefore on material points of the sale of

shabu

● is hearsay

● and standing alone cannot be the basis of the conviction of the

appellants.

Informer’s Privilege

Confidential informants are usually not presented by

the prosecution.

The Court is sharply aware of the compelling considerations why

confidential informants are usually not presented by the prosecution.

1. One is theneed to hide their identity and preserve

their invaluable service to the police.

necessity to protect them from being

2. Another is the
objects or targets of revenge by the criminals they
implicate once they become known.

have to be balanced with the

All these considerations, however,
right of an accused to a fair trial.
The ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Roviaro v. U.S. on informer’s
privilege is instructive. In said case,

the principal issue on certiorari is whether the United States District Court
committed when it allowed the
reversible error
Government not to disclose the identity of an
undercover employee
 304

● who had played a material part in bringing about the possession of

certain drugs by the accused,
● had been present with the accused at the occurrence of the alleged
crime,
● and might be a material witness to whether the accused knowingly
transported the drugs as charged.

The Court, through Mr. Justice Burton, granted certiorari in order to pass upon the
propriety of disclosure of the informer’s identity.

Mr. Justice Burton explained that

what is usually referred to as the informer’s privilege is in reality the

● Government’s privilege to withhold from

disclosure the identity of persons who
furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with enforcement of that law.
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public
interest in effective law enforcement.

The privilege recognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their

knowledge of the commission of crimes to law-enforcement officials and, by
preserving their anonymity, encourages them to perform that obligation.

It was held that the scope of the privilege is limited by

its underlying purpose.Thus,
will not
1. where the disclosure of the contents of the communication
tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the
contents are not privileged.

2. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been disclosed to those who
would have cause to resent the communication,

the privilege is no longer applicable.

 305

3. A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege, which arises from the
fundamental requirements of fairness was
emphasized.
Where the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or the contents of his communication,
is

● relevant and helpful to the defense of an

accused,
● or is essential to a fair determination of a cause,

privilege must give way. In these situations, the trial court

the
may require disclosure and dismiss the action if the
Government withholds the information.
In sum, there is no fixed rule with respect to disclosure of the identity of an informer.
The problem has to be resolved on a case to case basis and calls for balancing
the state interest in protecting people from crimes against the individual’s right to
prepare his defense.
 306

The balance must be adjusted by giving due weight to the following factors, among
others:

(1) the crime charged,

(2) the possible defenses,

(3) the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and

(4) other relevant factors.

In the case at bar, the crime charged against the appellants is capital in
character and can result in the imposition of the death penalty.
They have foisted the defense of instigation which is in sharp contrast to the claim
of entrapment by the prosecution.

Theprosecution has to prove all the material elements of

the alleged sale of shabu and the resulting buy-bust
operation.

Where the testimony of the informer

is indispensable, it should be disclosed.
The liberty and the life of a person enjoy high
importance in our scale of values. It cannot be
diminished except by a value of higher significance.
 307

Res Inter Alios Acta; Sec. 28 Rule 130:

People vs. JOSE CACHUELA et al ( exception to the res inter alios acta rule is
an admission made by a conspirator; But Conspiracy was not proved, extra
jusicial confession imputing accused inadmissible; BUT guilt based on
circumstancial evidence )
G.R. No. 191752 June 10, 2013
BRION, J. 2nd Div. Decision

Facts:

The prosecution’s evidence revealed that on July 23, 2004

One of the accused Ibañez went to Weapons System Corporation and told
Henessy Auron, WSC’s Secretary that he was the one who bought a gun
barrel at the company’s gun show in SM Megamall

Ibañez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the

rates of WSC’s firing range and the amount of the membership fee of its gun
club.

He also asked the days when there are many people in the firing range, and
whether Henessy was WSC’s only female employee.

July 26, 2004, Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, no one answered.
Henessy called the police. The police entered the firing range, and saw
the lifeless body of Rex, gun smith.

Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex, and found that the
victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and
abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol

NBI received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was involved
in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees. NBI conducted
an entrapment. and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute the
operation.

Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas approached them and told them that he
had been sent by Cachuela and Ibañez to look for buyers of firearms.
 308

The police introduced themselves and told Nabilgas that they were conducting an
entrapment operation against the suspects of the robbery at WSC.

Nabilgas surrendered to the police, and gave the names of the

other persons involved in the crime.

asset contacted Cachuela and informed

Thereafter, the
him that Nabilgas had already talked to the buyers,
and that they would like to see the firearms being sold.

Cachuela set up a meeting in their house. NBI agents went to their house and
Cachuela showed them the stolen guns. NBI arrested Cachuela. The
agents recovered

1. four (4) firearms from Cachuela’s house, including a .9 mm Bernardelli with

serial number T1102

Same operation was conducted against Ibanes. The agents recovered two guns
from Ibañez

At the NBI Main Office, Zaldy employee witness, pointed to the

appellants, during a police line-up, as the persons responsible for the robbery at
WSC and for the killing of Rex.

Nabilgas also executed a handwritten confession

implicating the appellants and Zaldy in the crime.

robbery with homicide

The prosecution filed an Information for
before the RTC against the appellants, Nabilgas and
Zaldy. accused all pleaded not guilty on arraignment.13 Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter. During trial, Zaldy died.

RTC found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Excepted from the
conviction was Nabilgas whom the RTC acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.

CA affirmed RTC. Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession is

admissible?
 309

Held: NO!

Res Inter alios acta rule.

At any Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is

rate,
inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view
of the res inter alios acta rule.
This rule provides that the

rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by

● an act,
● declaration, or
● omission

of another.

an extrajudicial confession is
GENERAL RULE: Consequently,
binding only on the confessant

and is not admissible against his or her co-accused

because it is considered as hearsay against them.
 310

One of the exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an

admission made by a conspirator under Section

30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
This provision states that the

● act or declaration of a conspirator

● relating to the conspiracy, and during its existence,

● may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the

conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her
co-conspirators, it is necessary that:

(a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the

admission itself;

(b) the admission relates to the common object; and

(c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged in

carrying out the conspiracy.

This exception, however, does not apply in the present case since there was no
other piece of evidence presented, aside from the extrajudicial confession, to prove
that Nabilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged.

Conspiracy cannot be presumed and must be shown as distinctly and conclusively

as the crime itself. Nabilgas, in fact, was acquitted by the trial court due to
insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in the crime.
 311

Admissibility of the out-of-court

identification and the extrajudicial
confession

NBI Agent Lino testified that

Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC
and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office

We note that Zaldy did not testify in court since he was brought to the
National Center for Mental Health, and subsequently died there during the
trial.

For this reason, we examine with greater scrutiny Lino’s testimony regarding
Zaldy’s alleged out-of-court identification.

People v. Algarme explains the procedure for out-of-court

identification and the test to determine its
admissibility, as follows:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways.

● It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is

brought face-to-face with the witness for identification.

● thru mug shots where photographs

It is done
are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect.
● It is also done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the
suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose x
xx
 312

In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court

courts have adopted the
identification of suspects,
totality of circumstances test where they consider the
following factors, viz.:

(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the

time of the crime;

(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;

(3) the accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness;

(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the

identification;

(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and,

(6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

 313

In the present case, Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a

police line-up, identified the appellants as the persons involved in the
robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex.

● Lino did not state when the line-up took place;

● how this line-up had been conducted;

● who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants (if there were indeed
other persons included in the line-up);

● and whether the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built
as the appellants.

● Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied Zaldy before

and during the line-up,

and whether there had been the possibility of prior or

contemporaneous improper insinuations on Zaldy regarding the
appearance of the appellants.

To our mind, Lino’s failure to state relevant details

surrounding the police line-up is a glaring omission
that renders unreliable Zaldy’s out-ofcourt
identification.
No way exists for the courts to evaluate the factors used in determining
the admissibility and reliability of out-of-court identifications, such as the

● level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;

● the length of time between the crime and the identification;
● and the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

The absence of an independent in-court identification by Zaldy additionally justifies

our strict treatment and assessment of Lino’s testimony.
 314

The records also bear out that Nabilgas executed an

extrajudicial confession at the NBI Main Office,
where he implicated the appellants and Zaldy in the crime charged.

During trial, he repudiated this confession, and claimed that he had been tortured by
the NBI agents, and that he was forced to copy a previously prepared statement.

we hold that
After a careful examination of the evidence on hand,
Nabilgas’ extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in
evidence. The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial
confession, to be admissible, must satisfy the following
requirements: "

(1) the confession must be voluntary;

(2) it must be made with the assistance of a

competent and independent counsel, preferably of
the confessant's choice;

(3) it must be express; and

(4) it must be in writing.

We point Nabilgas was already under

out that
custodial investigation by the authorities when
he executed the alleged written confession.
 315

"A custodial investigation is understood x x x

● as any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities

● after a person is taken into custody or otherwise

● deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner

1. It begins when there is no longer a general

inquiry into an unsolved crime

2. and the investigation has started to focus on a

particular person as a suspect,

starts interrogating or
i.e., when the police investigator
exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.
In People v. Rapeza we explained that

the lawyer called to be present during custodial investigations

should, as far as reasonably possible,

● be the choice of the individual undergoing

questioning.
 316

lawyer is furnished by the police for the

If the
accused, it is important that the
● lawyer should be competent,
● independent and
● prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,

as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a

routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the
individual's constitutional rights.

After a close reading of the records,

we rule that Nabilgas’
confession was not made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel.
The services of Atty. Melita Go, the lawyer who acted in Nabilgas’ behalf, were
provided by the very same agency investigating Nabilgas – the NBI itself;

● she was assigned the task despite Nabilgas’ open declaration to the agency’s
investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person of Atty. Donardo
Paglinawan.

Atty. Paglinawan confirmed this fact when he stated that he was already
representing Nabilgas at the time his client made the alleged confession.

Nabilgas also testified that Atty. Go did not disclose that she was a lawyer when she
was called to assist him; she merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the
confession.

There was also nothing in the records to show that Atty. Go

ascertained whether Nabilgas’ confession was made voluntarily,
and whether he fully understood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession and its impact on his constitutional rights.
 317

Circumstantial Evidence

From these established circumstances, the overriding intention of the appellants

cannot but be to rob WSC; the killing of Rex was merely incidental to the robbery.
 318

BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES, INC vs. CEZAR David Jr. ( if it is assumed that the
rule on res inter alios acta were to apply in this illegal dismissal case, the
treatment of the extrajudicial confession as hearsay is bound by the exception
on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of independently
relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such
statements have been made is relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and
the statements are admissible as evidence )
G.R. No. 222730, November 07, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J. 1st Div. Decision

Facts:

Respondent was employed as Service Manager by petitioner. he was

in charge of the

● overall day-to-day operations of petitioner,

● including the authority to sign checks, check vouchers, and purchase orders.

In the course of its business operations, petitioner implemented a company policy

with respect to the purchase and delivery of automotive parts and products.

The process begins with

1. the preparation of a purchase order by the Purchasing Officer, Sonny De

Guzman

2. which is thereafter, submitted to respondent for his review and

approval.

3. Once approved and signed by respondent and De Guzman, the duplicate

copy of the said order is given to petitioner's supplier who would deliver
the goods/supplies.

4. De Guzman was tasked to receive such goods and thereafter, submit a

copy of the purchase order to petitioner's Accounting Assistant,
Marilyn A. Del Rosario (Del Rosario),

5. who, in turn, prepares the request for payment to be reviewed by her

immediate supervisor Vasay.

6. Once approved, the check voucher and corresponding check are prepared to
be signed by any of the following officers: respondent, Vasay or VP Buenaflor
 319

It was company policy that all checks should be issued in the name of the
specific supplier and not in "cash," and that the said checks are to be
picked up from Del Rosario at the company's office in Muntinlupa City

CFO David) of petitioner's affiliate company, Diamond IGB, Inc., received a call from
the branch manager of Chinabank informing her that the

Chinabank had cleared several checks issued

by petitioner bearing the words "OR CASH"
indicated after the payee's name

The matter was then immediately brought to petitioner's attention through its
President, Exequiel T. Lampa (Lampa), and an investigation was conducted.

Accounting Assistant, Marilyn A. Del Rosario (Del

Rosario), confessed that

upon respondent's instruction, she inserted the

words "OR CASH" after the name of the payees when the same
had been signed by all the authorized signatories.

She also implicated

● De Guzman, who was under respondent's direct supervision, for preparing
spurious purchase orders that were used as basis in issuing the subject
checks,

● as well as petitioner's messenger/driver, Jayson G. Caranto (Caranto), who

was directed to encash some of the checks, with both persons also gaining
from the scheme

Her confession was put into writing in two (2) separate letters both of
even date (extrajudicial confession).

Respondent, together with Del Rosario, De Guzman, and Caranto, were placed
under preventive suspension. respondent and his co-workers were served their
respective notices of termination
 320

Aggrieved, respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto filed a complaint for

illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of damages and
attorney's fees against petitioner, Diamond IGB, and one Isagani Buenaflor before
the NLRC

In the meantime, Lee, on behalf of petitioner, filed a criminal

complaint[18] for twenty-seven (27) counts of Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Commercial Documents against respondent, De Guzman, Caranto,
and Del Rosario,

LA ruled that respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto were illegally

dismissed. The LA observed that
petitioner failed to establish the existence of conspiracy among respondent,
De Guzman, Caranto, and Del Rosario in altering the checks

the Del Rosario extrajudicial confession

and that
was informally made and not supported by evidence
NLRC affirmed LA with modification

finding De Guzman and Caranto to have been dismissed for cause,

but sustained the illegality of respondent's

termination from work.

NLRC found Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession

against respondent insufficient,
holding that the records failed to show that the Respondent had a
hand in the preparation and encashment of the checks ;

hence, his dismissal was without cause and therefore, illegal.

CA affirmed NLRC. CA ruled that

● Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession only bound her as the confessant

 321

● but Constitutes hearsay with respect to respondent and the other

co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule.

Moreover, while respondent was a signatory to the checks in question, the CA noted
that at the time these checks were signed, the words "OR CASH" were not yet
written thereon. As such, the CA held that no substantial evidence existed to
establish that respondent had breached the trust reposed in him.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession against respondent Constitutes

hearsay with respect to respondent and the other co-accused under the res inter
alios acta rule.

Held: NO! Admissible sya

Respondent was directly implicated in the controversy through the

extrajudicial confession of his co-employee, Del
Rosario, who had admitted to be the author of the checks' alterations, although
mentioned that she did so only upon respondent's imprimatur.

The NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, however, deemed the

same to be inadmissible in evidence

on account of the res inter alios acta rule, which, as per Section
30,[42] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
 322

provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or

omission of another.

Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding

only on the confessant and is not admissible
against his or her co-accused because it is
considered as hearsay against them.

However, the NLRC should not have bound itself by

the technical rules of procedure as it is allowed to be
liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor
cases.

The NLRC Rules of Procedure state that

"[t]he rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling

and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain
the facts in each case speedily and objectively,

without regard to technicalities of law or

procedure

In any case, even if it is assumed that the rule on res

inter alios acta were to apply in this illegal dismissal
case
the treatment of the extrajudicial confession as hearsay

is bound by the exception on independently relevant

statements.
 323

"Under the doctrine of independently relevant

statements,
● regardless of their truth or falsity,

● the fact that such statements have been made

is relevant.

The hearsay rule does not apply,

● and the statements are admissible as evidence.

Evidence as to the making of such statement is not

secondary but primary,

1. for the statement itself may constitute a fact in

issue

or

2. Be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of

such a fact."

Del Rosario's extrajudicial

Verily, confession is
independently relevant

to prove the participation of respondent in the instant

controversy

considering his vital role in petitioner's procurement

process.
 324

The fact that such statement was made by Del Rosario,

who was the actual author of the alterations,

should have been given consideration by the

NLRC as it is directly, if not circumstantially,
relevant to the issue at hand.

"labor suits require only substantial

Case law states that
evidence to prove the validity of the dismissal."
Based on the foregoing, the Court is convinced that enough substantial
evidence exist to support petitioner's claim that respondent was involved in the
afore-discussed scheme to defraud the company,

and hence, guilty of serious misconduct and/or willful breach of trust which are just
causes for his termination.

Substantial evidence is defined as

1. such amount of relevant evidence

2. that a reasonable mind might accept

3. as adequate to justify a conclusion,

which evidentiary threshold petitioner successfully hurdled in this case. As such, the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that respondent was illegally
dismissed.

Perforce, the reversal of the CA's decision and the granting of the instant petition are
in order. Respondent is hereby declared to be validly dismissed and thus, is not
entitled to backwages, separation pay, as well as attorney's fees
 325

LABOR LAW

Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from

employment only for a valid cause.

The burden of proof rests on the employer to prove that

the dismissal was valid, failing in which, the law considers the matter a
case of illegal dismissal.

Article 297 of the Labor Code, as renumbered, enumerates the just causes for
termination of an employment, to wit:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful

orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

In the case at bar, respondent's termination was grounded on his violation of

petitioner's Code of Conduct and Behavior, which was supposedly tantamount to

(a) serious misconduct and/or (

b) willful breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer.

 326

Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a

● transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

● a forbidden act,

● a dereliction of duty,

● willful in character,

● and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.

For serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the
following elements is required:

(a) the misconduct must be serious;

(b) it must relate to the performance of the

employee's duties showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer;
and

(c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent

On the other hand, for loss of trust to be a ground for

dismissal,
1. the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence,

2. and there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence.
 327

While loss of trust and confidence should be genuine,

itdoes not require proof beyond reasonable

doubt,

● sufficient that there is some basis for

it being
the misconduct
● and that the nature of the employee's participation therein rendered
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position

Respondent argues, in defense, that he had no control over the company's

finance and billing operations, and hence, should not be held liable

Although respondent's statements may be true, the Court, nonetheless,

observes that it is highly unlikely

that respondent did not have any participation

in the above-mentioned scheme to defraud
petitioner.

questioned checks would not

It is crucial to point out that the
have been issued if there weren't any spurious
purchase orders.
As per company policy, the procurement process of petitioner begins with the
preparation of purchase orders by the Purchasing Officer, De Guzman. These
purchase orders have to be approved by respondent himself before the delivery and
payment process can even commence.

It is only after the issuance of the approved purchase orders that petitioner's
suppliers are directed to deliver the ordered goods/supplies, and from there,
requests for payment and the issuance of checks (through Del Rosario) would be
made

To safeguard itself against fraud, the company implemented the policy that all
checks to its suppliers should be issued in their name and not in "cash." Thus, if the
 328

checks would be altered prior to the signing of all these corporate officers, then they
would obviously not pass petitioner's protocol.
 329

Erap vs. ANIANO DESIERTO,

G.R. Nos. 146710-15. April 3, 2001
PUNO, J. En Banc RESOLUTION

Facts:

For resolution are petitioners MR.

Issue: WHETHER THE ANGARA DIARY IS NOT ADMISSIBLE FOR BEING

VIOLATIVE OF THE FOLLOWING RULES ON EVIDENCE:

● HEARSAY,
● BEST EVIDENCE,
● AUTHENTICATION,
● ADMISSIONS AND
● RES INTER ALIOS ACTA;

Held: NO! ADMISSIBLE SYA

Evidentiary Issues

We now come to some events of January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath
taking of respondent Arroyo. We used the Angara Diary to decipher the
intent to resign on the part of the petitioner.

The use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the

hearsay rule.

Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at

by the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary

but that does not make the Diary inadmissible as evidence.

 330

HEARSAY RULE
Petitioner devotes a large part of his arguments on the alleged improper use
by this Court of the Angara Diary. It is urged that the

determine the state of mind

use of the Angara Diary to
of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation
violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence.

We are unpersuaded.

To begin with, the Angara diary is not an out of court

statement.

The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the

cases at bar. Petitioner cannot complain he was not furnished a copy of the
Angara Diary. Nor can he feign surprise on its use.

To be sure, the said Diary was frequently referred to by the parties in their pleadings.
Thus, petitioner had all the opportunity to contest the use of the Diary but
unfortunately failed to do so.

Even assuming arguendo

that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement,

still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule.

 331

Evidence is called hearsay when

● its probative force

● depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and credibility

● of some persons other than the witness by whom it is

sought to produce it.

There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence:

(1) absence of cross examination;

(2) absence of demeanor evidence, and

(3) absence of the oath.

Not at all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as

evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been
admitted by courts due to their

● relevance,
● trustworthiness and
● necessity.

The emergence of these exceptions and their wide spread acceptance is well-
explained by Weinstein, Mansfield, Abrams and Berger as follows:
 332

A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine

whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of
exclusion.

A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show

that they do not cover admissions of a

party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class.
Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that the

act, declaration or omission of a party as to a

relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

has long been settled that these admissions are

It
admissible even if they are hearsay.
Retired Justice Oscar Herrera of the Court of Appeals cites the various authorities
why admissions are not covered by the
who explain
hearsay rule:
A mans acts, conduct, and declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are
admissible against him,

for the reason that it is fair to presume that they

correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they
do not. (U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583).
 333

The Angara Diary contains direct statements of

petitioner which can be categorized as admissions
of a party:
● his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a
candidate;

● his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by Chief of
Staff Angelo Reyes;

● his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would
be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod na ako.

● Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. ETC

We noted that days before, petitioner had repeatedly declared that he would not
resign despite the growing clamor for his resignation. The reason for the meltdown is
obvious - - - his will not to resign has wilted.
 334

Adoptive Admission

It is, however, argued that the Angara Diary is not the diary of the
petitioner, hence, non-binding on him.

The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive

admission.
An adoptive admission is

a partys reaction to a statement or action by

another person

when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction

as an admission of something stated or implied

by the other person.

Jones explains that the basis for admissibility of admissions

made vicariously is that

arising from the ratification or adoption

by the party of the statements which the other person had
made
 335

In the Angara Diary ,

● the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces
withdrew its support from him as President and commander-in-chief.

● Thus, Executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to

advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation

Petitioner did not object to the suggested option

but simply said he could never leave the

country.
Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be
taken as an admission by him.

Res inter alios acta

use of the Angara diary

Petitioner further contends that the
against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta.
The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz:

The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced

by an act, declaration, or omission of another,

except as hereinafter provided.

Again, petitioner errs in his contention.

 336

has several exceptions. One of them is

The res inter alios acta rule
provided in section 29 of Rule 130

● with respect to admissions by a co-partner or

agent.

Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter

ego of the petitioner. He was the Little President.
Indeed, he was authorized by the petitioner to act for him in the
critical hours and days before he abandoned Malacaang Palace.

Thus, according to the Angara Diary, the petitioner told Secretary Angara:
Mula umpisa pa lang ng kampanya, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At
hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin.

This statement of full trust was made by the petitioner

after Secretary Angara briefed him about the progress
of the first negotiation .

Secretary Angara acted for and in behalf of the

petitioner in the crucial days before respondent Arroyo took her oath as
President. Consequently, petitioner is bound by the acts
and declarations of Secretary Angara.
Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding
on the principal (petitioner).
 337

Independently relevant statements.

ban on hearsay evidence does not cover

Moreover, the
independently relevant statements.

statements which are relevant independently

These are
of whether they are true or not.
They belong to two (2) classes:

(1) those statements which are the very facts in

issue, and

(2) those statements which are circumstantial

evidence of the facts in issue.
The second class includes the following:

a. Statement of a person showing his state of mind, that is, his mental
condition, knowledge, belief, intention, ill will and other emotions;

b. Statements of a person which show his physical condition, as illness and

the like;

c. Statements of a person from which an

inference may be made as to the state of mind
of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc.
of the latter;

d. Statements which may identify the date, place and person in question; and

e. Statements showing the lack of credibility of a witness.

 338

Again, Jones tells us why these independently relevant

statements are not covered by the prohibition against hearsay
evidence:

Mental State or Condition Proof of Knowledge.-

There are a number of common issues, forming a general class, in proof of

which hearsay is so obviously necessary that it is not customary to refer to its
admissibility as by virtue of any exception to the general exclusionary rule.

Admissibility, in such cases, is as of course. For example,

● where any mental state or condition is in issue, such as motive, malice,

knowledge, intent, assent or dissent,

unless direct testimony of the particular person is to be taken as

conclusive of his state of mind,

testimony of others to
the only method of proof available is
the acts or statements of such person. Where
his acts or statements are against his interest,
● they are plainly admissible within the rules hereinabove announced as
to admissions against interest.

if they are so closely

And even where not against interest,
connected with the event or transaction in issue
as to constitute one of the very facts in controversy,

● they become admissible of necessity.

 339

As afore discussed, The Angara Diary

contains statements of the petitioner which

reflect his state of mind

and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to

resign.
It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably
deduce petitioners intent to resign.

They are admissible and they are not covered by the

rule on hearsay.
This has long been a quiet area of our law on evidence and petitioners attempt to
foment a belated tempest cannot receive our imprimatur.
 340

Best Evidence Rule

Petitioner also contends that the

● rules on authentication of private writings and

● best evidence were violated in our Decision,

Petitioners contention is without merit. In regard to the Best

Evidence rule, the Rules of Court provides in sections 2 to 4 of Rule 130, as follows:

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the
Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February
4-6, 2001.

In doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate

the best evidence rule.
Wigmore, in his book on evidence, states that:

Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion,

whenever in the case in hand the

● opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the

document

● and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring

production.

an objection by the party against

Generally speaking,
whom secondary evidence is sought to be
introduced is essential to bring the best evidence rule into
application
 341

Suffice it to say here that the

objection should be made in proper season that

is,
whenever it appears that there is better evidence than that which is
offered and before the secondary evidence has been admitted.

A party who does not deny the genuineness of a

proffered instrument may not object that it was not
properly identified before it was admitted in
evidence.
Petitioner cites the case of State prosecutors v. Muro,

which frowned on reliance by courts on newspaper accounts.

In that case, Judge Muro was dismissed from the service for relying on a
newspaper account in dismissing eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos.

There is a significant difference ,

● however, between the Muro case

and

● the cases at bar.

In the Muro case, Judge Muro dismissed the cases against Mrs. Marcos on the
basis of a newspaper account without affording the prosecution the basic
opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment
or on oral argument. . .

● (this is) not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the
Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
 342

In the instant cases, however, the petitioner had an

opportunity to object to the admissibility of the
Angara Diary
1. when he filed his Memorandum dated February 20, 2001,

2. Reply Memorandum dated February 22, 2001,

3. Supplemental Memorandum dated February 23, 2001, and

4. Second Supplemental memorandum dated February 24, 2001.

He was therefore not denied due process.

, petitioner had been given an

In the words of Wigmore, supra
opportunity to inspect the Angara Diary but did not
object to its admissibility.

It is already too late in the day to raise his o

bjections in an Omnibus Motion, after the Angara Diary has been
used as evidence and a decision rendered partly on the basis thereof.
 343

Hearsay: Dying Declaration: Res Gestae

People vs. CHRISTOPHER BADILLOS

G.R. No. 215732, June 06, 2018
MARTIRES, J. 3rd Div.

Facts:

prosecution presented three (3) witnesses,

1. Domingo C. Gregory (Domingo),

2. Jonathan Gregory (Jonathan), and
3. Elsa H. Gregory (Elsa).

Domingo testified that on 11 August 2007, at around 7pm or 8pm he and

his cousin, Alex, were walking home to Brgy. Malibo Matanda, when, suddenly,
Accused Christopher and an unidentified person appeared in front of them.

Christopher was armed with a bladed weapon, while the unidentified

person held a wooden club more particularly described as a "dos por dos.

The unidentified person struck Alex with the wooden club three times hitting him on
the nape and at the back of his head. Christopher followed by stabbing Alex once
in his left chest.

Alex was able to run at first but shortly after fell to the ground. The
two assailants chased Alex, but they failed to catch him as residents from nearby
houses started gathering near the scene

Thereafter, Domingo ran towards the house of his co-worker to ask for help. On
cross-examination, Domingo stated that the place where the incident took place was
well-lit by the street lights

Domingo could not think of any reason or ill motive why

Christopher and his companion would harm Alex.
 344

He recalled, however, that Alex and Christopher had an argument prior to the
incident.

Alex’s borhter Jonathan testified that he immediately rushed to his brother on his
motorcycle.

There, he
He arrived at the scene of the crime at around 9:00 P.M.
saw Alex bloodied, sprawled on the ground, and
almost dying or "naghihingalo."

While in this condition, Alex told him that he was

stabbed by "Boyet" whose real name was
Christopher After a while, a police mobile arrived and brought Alex to the
hospital. Alex, however, died on the same night.

The defense presented Christopher, Their testimonies sought to establish the

defense of alibi,

RTC found Christopher guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

murder. the trial court

considered Alex's statement to Jonathan as a

dying declaration pointing to Christopher as his assailant. It
did not give credence to Christopher's defense of alibi

CA affirmed RTC and held that trial court properly considered Alex's last words
to his brother as a dying declaration.

Hence the case at bar.

Issue: Whether Alex's statement to Jonathan is a dying declaration pointing to

Christopher as his assailant.?

HEld: NO! BUT Res Gestae siya.

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Alex's declaration cannot be considered as a dying

declaration; admissible as part of res
gestae.

Before proceeding to the main issue of this case, the Court notes that the trial
and appellate courts erred when
they considered Alex's utterances to Jonathan identifying Christopher as the
perpetrator of the crime as a dying declaration.

A dying declaration is admissible in evidence if the following circumstances are

present:

(1) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the

declarant's death;

(2) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant

is under a consciousness of impending death;

(3) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he

or she survived; and

(4) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of the inquiry
involves the declarant's death.

In order to make a dying declaration admissible,

● a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent death

● must be entered into by the declarant.

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It is the declarant's belief of his impending death

and not the rapid succession of his death in point of fact

that renders his declaration admissible as a dying

declaration.The test is

whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of

survival

and looks on death as certainly impending.

While Jonathan was under the impression that his brother was in the
throes of death,

it does not appear that the declarant himself

was conscious of his impending death.

The fact that Alex was ripping his shirt while he

uttered the name of his assailant is not sufficient to
qualify such as a dying declaration.
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Part of Res Gesate

Nevertheless, while Alex's statement does not qualify as a dying declaration, the
samemay still be admitted as an exception to the
hearsay rule for being part of res gestae.
For a statement to be considered part of res gestae, the following elements must
concur:

(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;

(b) the statement was made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and

(c) the statement concerns the occurrence in question and its

immediate attending circumstances

All the foregoing elements are present in this case.

First, the stabbing incident constituted the startling

occurrence.

Second, there was no sufficient time for Alex to contrive or devise a

falsehood when he uttered the name of his assailant to Jonathan.

Between the infliction of the mortal wound upon Alex and his statement
surrounding this incident, at most two hours had elapsed.

This interval of time is hardly sufficient to conjure up a story or concoct

and contrive a falsehood given that even an interval of four hours is still
considered as nearly contemporaneous to the startling occurrence.

Lastly, the statement concerned the circumstances surrounding the stabbing of Alex.