Does 1-254 V Chiquita Brands Reply Brief
Does 1-254 V Chiquita Brands Reply Brief
___________________________________________
____________________________________________
REPLY BRIEF
Counsel certifies that the following is a complete list of the trial judge(s), all
(noted with its stock symbol if publicly listed) that have an interest in the outcome
and parent corporations, and other identifiable legal entities related to a party,
Berrio, Marcelina
Diaz, Eudilia
Guisao, Doraley
Higuita, Fidelina
Lopez, Salustiana
Mosquera, Yamileth
Santana, Petronila
Arenas, Tomas
Bohorquez, Raul
Cossio, Alvaro
Echavarria, Aurora
Londono, Henry
Orejuela, Juan
Sanchez, Dagoberto
Aguirre, Fernando
Alsama, Ltd.
Anacar LDC
Arvelo, José E.
B C Systems, Inc.
Baird, Bruce
Bandy, Kevin
Bronson, Ardith
Brundicorpi S.A.
Capital Bank
Carrillo, Arturo J.
CB Containers, Inc.
Childs, Robert
Chiquita Nordic Oy
Chiquita Norway As
Chiquita Sweden AB
Chiquita UK Limited
ChiquitaStore.com L.L.C.
CILPAC Establishment
Cioffi, Michael
Collingsworth, Terrence P.
Dante, Frank
Davies, Patrick
DeLeon, John
DLA Piper
Duraiswamy, Shankar
Dyer, Karen C.
FMR LLC
Friedheim, Cyrus
Garland, James
Girardi, Thomas V.
Glass, David M.
Gonsalves, Marc
Gould, Kimberly
GrayRobinson, PA
Green, James K.
Guralnick, Ronald S.
Hall, John
Howes, Thomas
HSBC
Janis, Judith G.
Janis, Christopher T.
Janis, Greer C.
Janis, Michael I.
Janis, Jonathan N.
Jones, Stanton
Keiser, Charles
King, William B.
Kistinger, Robert
Korvick, Tony
Lack, Walter J.
Lakatos, Alex C.
Losego, Clinton R.
Markman, Ligia
Martin, David
McCawley, Sigrid S.
Mosier, Mark
Mozabanana, Lda.
Ocean Bank
Olson, Robert
Ordman, John
Pescatore, Jada
Pescatore, Jarrod
Pescatore, John
Pescatore, Jordan
Pescatore, Josh
Pescatore, Olivia
Pescatore, Richard
Philips, Layn
Priedheim, Alissa
Rapp, Cristopher
Reiter, Jonathan C.
Scarola, Jack
Silbert, Earl
Simons, Marco
Skinner, William
Sperling, Jonathan
Spiers N.V.
Sprague, Ashley M.
Stansell, Keith
Stewart, Thomas
Stubbs, Sidney
TransFRESH Corporation
Tsacalis, William
Wachovia Bank
Wichmann, William J.
Wiesner, Eduardo A.
Wilkins, Robert
Wolf, Paul
Wolosky, Lee S.
Zack, Stephen N
Zuleta, Alberto
Certification
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 1
I-1
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III. Does 1-254 don't need to show a right to the FARC's assets
because they only seek a remedy. ................................................ 16
I-2
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CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 32
I-3
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Abreu v. Amaro,
534 So.2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) .................................. 18
Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954) .................................................................... 4
Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) ........................................................................ 3
I-4
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Fabre v. Marin,
623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993) ......................................................... 25
Gersh v Cofman,
769 So.2d 407 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) .................................. 18
Harry v. Marchant,
291 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ..................................... 20
Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941) ...................................................................... 22
Jaffree v. Wallace,
I-5
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Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) ......................................................................... 5
Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..................................................................... 5
McKinney v. Pate,
20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc) ...................................... 4
Ortiz v. Regalado,
113 So. 3d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ............................................. 24
Pescatore v Pineda,
345 F. Supp.3d 68 (2018) ............................................................ 10
Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292 (1993) .................................................................... 5
I-6
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Williams v. Pryor,
229 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000) ................................................... 5
STATUTES
I-7
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RULES OF PROCEDURE
Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 ..................................................................................... 17
OTHER
I-8
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ARGUMENT
Does 1-254 have standing because their spouses, children or siblings were
murdered by the FARC while Chiquita was paying the FARC. They don't need any
other standing for the remedy they requested. Nor do they need to allege injuries
by Pestatore or Stansell, even though such injuries have occurred, and are ongoing,
as Pestatore and Stansell continue to dissipate the assets of the FARC, with which
they are being unjustly enriched beyond any damages that could be awarded under
this Circuit's case law. Stansell was awarded over $300,000,000. U.S. dollars for
the murder of Tomas Janis and associated kidnappings. Stansell is sharing this
award with Pescatore according to a secret agreement that is not described in any
public filing. Meanwhile. the district court put a de facto stay on the non- U.S.
cases, and allowed all of the assets of the FARC, who committed all of these
reason this Court has appellate jurisdiction is that the Order on appeal is one
denying injunctive relief. One test for that is whether it relates to an already
existing cause of action. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d
1117, 1127 (11th Cir. 2005) The already existing cause of action must be able to
1
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withstand scrutiny under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim). Id. The
Appellants must also show there is no adequate legal remedy, and that irreparable
injury will result if the injunction does not issue. Id. Showing that injury will
result isn't the same as showing that Stansell and Pescatore caused the injury.1 The
Appellees even argue that "a constructive trust is not an independent cause of
Does 1-254 were also injured by the violation of their due process right
itself.2 A violation of procedural due process becomes complete when the state
refuses to provide adequate due process. Club Madonna, Inc. v. City of Miami
Beach, 924 F.3d 1370, 1378 (11th Cir. 2019) Although it isn't argued under a
separate heading, Pescatore and Stansell emphasize throughout their brief that U.S.
nationals and non-nationals have different legal rights. Although they frame this as
a "right to the FARC's assets" see Appellees' Brief § III, the rights violated were
the due process and equal protection rights to have their cases heard, and be treated
1
Nevertheless, they clearly have. They have already taken and dissipated more
than twenty million dollars that should have been used to fairly compensate all of
the Plaintiffs in the MDL.
2
Due process and equal protection were argued in many different contexts below.
see DE 2667, 2676.
2
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protection forces the Court to rule impartially, rather than drawing distinctions
protection of a litigant's rights, and even more so in the context of Multi District
Litigation, where there are many different plaintiffs and lawyers competing for the
Court's attention.
Although most case law concerns the equal protection and due process
clauses of the 14th Amendment, which applies to states, the rights are identical
with respect to the federal government.3 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 253 (1995) (equal protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and the
protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (since the
3
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment repeats the language from
the Fifth Amendment making it binding on the states. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §
1. The Fifth Amendment language, in turn, stems from a longstanding English
tradition originating in the “law of the land” language in the Magna Carta. See
Francis W. Bird, The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM.L. REV. 37, 37 (1913).
3
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authorities may be brought as violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
935, 944 (11th Cir.1997) (since the language and policy considerations of the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are virtually identical,
decisions interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause guide the
jurisdictional context.)
Thus, the distinction between procedural and substantive due process is the
same with respect to 5th and 14th Amendment due process claims. A violation of
procedural due process occurs where the state fails to provide due process in the
(11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). A substantive due process violation occurs where an
are infringed - regardless of the fairness of the procedure. Id. at 1556. In addition,
“the substantive component of the Due Process Clause ... protects ... from arbitrary
F.3d 1274, 1278–80 (11th Cir. 2014). State action may not be arbitrary and
4
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interest, and considering whether the procedure under review is likely to produce
erroneous results. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In this case, the
strict scrutiny standard applies, because the difference between Pescatore and
Stansell, and Does 1-254, is their national origin.4 Like race, courts consider
such as race or national origin, are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the
Williams v. Pryor, 229 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2000), citing Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993), Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
4
National origin is the applicable category. There is no citizenship requirement to
have standing in federal court. The Fifth Amendment due process and equal
protection clauses apply to all "persons," rather than only citizens.
5
Although this language refers to statutes, the actions of any branch of
government, including the courts, are reviewed using the same constitutional
standards. For claims under the Equal Protection Clause, the issue is whether the
government can identify a sufficiently important objective for its discriminatory
policies. In order to make this determination, there are three main questions the
court must ask: 1) What is the classification, 2) What is the appropriate level of
scrutiny, and 3) Does the government action meet that level of scrutiny. City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 472 U.S. 432 (1985).
5
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"Most statutes reviewed under the very stringent strict scrutiny standard are found
handing over its weapons to the United Nations.6 The FARC's seized assets are not
unlike the assets paid to creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, many mass
tort cases have ended in the defendant's bankruptcy. See Case Studies of Mass Tort
Elizabeth Gibson, Federal Judicial Center (2000). The article compares class
action settlements of mass torts pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(1)(B), with how mass torts
are resolved in bankruptcies. See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 42 B.R. 94, 95 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1984); In re A.H. Robins Co., Bankr. No. 85-01307-R (E.D. Va. filed
Aug. 21, 1985) (establishing a trust for Dalkon Shield claimants); Butler v. Mentor
Corp., No. 93-P-11433-S (N.D. Ala. filed May 14, 1993) (limited fund settlement
of breast implant litigation). In bankruptcy cases, the district court "shall have
1334(e). "Property of the estate," see 11 U.S.C. § 541, is broad in scope, United
6
This was argued below at DE 2688 at 7.
6
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States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983), and in any given case,
II. The ex parte, default judgments in the MDL transferee courts are void
and unenforceable.
showed that the MDL transferee courts had no jurisdiction because the JPML never
remanded Stansell or Pescatore's cases, and could not have had personal
jurisdiction over the FARC due to the nature of the organization, and lack of
contact with any forum in the United States. Stansell doesn't respond to the
evidence at trial proving that the FARC shot at every plane flying overhead, and
had no way to know Americans were onboard, and Pescatore didn't allege any kind
of contact with the United States, such as an extortion demand. The Court may
easily review the complaints of Stansell and Pescatore to see what contacts were
referring to threats against Americans is inaccurate and not based on the record.
The Appellees try to create factual issues over whether Stansell and
Pescatore's cases against the FARC were transferred by the JPML or not.
Appellees' Br. at 8, 11. They provide no additional evidence, and cite two
7
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documents in Appellants' Appendix, at pages 493 and 496. Id. The Appellees
should have the docket and filings in the JPML, which aren't available online.
In Appellants' Principal Brief at 8-11, they showed that on May 14, 2012,
duplicate evidence on the exact same damages issues." Appx. at 496. The D.C.
District Court stayed the case by Minute Order six days later. Appx. at 206. The
Status Report also states that "[o]nce these pretrial proceedings [in SDFL] finish,
Plaintiffs’ case will likely be returned to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407,
which requires that the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation remand this
case 'at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings.'” Id. The Appellees
Stansell's claims against the FARC had already been resolved in a default
judgment by the time his claims against Chiquita were transferred. On April 5,
2010, Stansell filed suit against Chiquita. See docket, Appx. at 514. The JPML
transferred this case to the District Court for the Southern District of Florida on
August 11, 2010. Id. In parallel proceedings, on June 15, 2010, the Middle
8
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August 9, 2010 the JPML transferred the Stansell v. Chiquita case to the SDFL.7
Appx. at 493.
Finally, the list of cases in the MDL docket includes Pescatore's cases
(FLM/8:10-cv-00786), but not Stansell's case against the FARC (Case No.
09-cv-2308 in the MDFL). See Appx. at 509. This probably reflects the fact that
Stansell's case against the FARC had already been resolved in a default judgment.
The fact that both of Pescatore's cases are listed in the MDL, and that the
judge in the transferor court was advised that a remand order from the JPML was
necessary, shows that the transferor court had no jurisdiction without the remand
order. The parallel litigation, with no notices filed in the MDL court, shows that
none of the judges, or other litigants in the MDL, were ever informed about what
Stansell and Pescatore were doing. Had Does 1-254 known what representations
were being made to these judges, they would have explained that Chiquita's
financing of the FARC is not a fact in dispute. The only disputed facts are those
relating to the causation of each murder and kidnapping by the FARC, which are
7
Appellants' Principal Brief contains a typographical error in this section, referring
to the Stansell v. FARC case. The Stansell v. FARC case had already been resolved
in a default judgment by that time.
9
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In their Principal Brief, Does 1-254 outlined the possible bases for personal
jurisdiction over the FARC, and showed this case is unique. No other terrorist
group has been successfully sued in the United States, let alone on an ex parte
basis. Id. at 19-30. The murders didn't occur in the United States, or have any
connection to the United States, other than the contacts between Chiquita and the
United States.
doesn't say whether they were made in the state of Florida, or how they were made.
See Does 1-254's Principal Brief at 22. They would have had to have been made in
Florida to count as contacts. Appx. at 386. Pescatore cites the ex parte, default
judgment in Pescatore v Pineda, 345 F. Supp.3d 68, 76 (2018), adding language "in
the United States" that doesn't appear in either the decision or the complaint.
Although this order does state that there were ransom negotiations with Pescatore's
family, this is not alleged in Pescatore's complaint, and does not appear in the
Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which allows a plaintiff to aggregate
contacts with more than one state, to prove that a defendant had contacts with the
United States as a whole for the court to have general personal jurisdiction. See
10
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Appellee's Brief at 21. Mwani in turn relies on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
that two conditions are met: (1) plaintiff's claims must ‘arise under federal law,’
and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction must ‘be consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States.’ ” Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286,
one U.S. state, and the plaintiff could sue in another state. Pescatore doesn't say
where the alleged ransom demand was made, and the "purposeful targeting of
because these are arguments about general, not specific personal jurisdiction. See
personal jurisdiction over the FARC on the basis that it is listed as a foreign
terrorist organization. Appx. at 420. Stansell argues on appeal that the FARC
down an airplane with American passengers on it. However, the evidence at trial
11
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in U.S. v. Palmera Pineda, 07-cr-494 (D.C.D.C.), showed that the FARC shot at
every airplane that flew over them, had no idea who was onboard the aircraft, and
were surprised when the plane went down. Intercepts of FARC communications
showed that the FARC were surprised by the incident, and their response to it.
Stansell has never contested the fact that the FARC couldn't have known there
were Americans on the plane, which was argued below and also in Doe 1-254's
Principal Brief at 25. Stansell argues that the FARC subsequently broadcast proof
of life videos and demanded an exchange of prisoners, Appellees' Brief at 20, but
doesn't show how these were contacts with any U.S. state. They would have to be
contacts with the District of Columbia, where Stansell filed his complaint. Like
Pescatore, Stansell cannot use contacts with one state to prove specific jurisdiction
in another state, because Mwani and Rule 4(k)(2) apply to general, not specific
personal jurisdiction.
In § C(1)(a) of their Principal Brief, Does 1-254 showed that any claims
against the FARC would relate back to their claims against Chiquita. Rule
long as "the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct,
12
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pleading." Id. The relation back doctrine doesn't require leave of the court.
Nevertheless, the District Court denied leave to amend to add these claims.
The Appellees argue that Chiquita and the FARC were not in privity, citing
Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1990).
Appellee's Brief at 22. They provide no facts or other authorities to show why this
is the case, or explain why they no longer rely on EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,
383 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 2004), as they did in District Court. The Pemco court set
forth the standard that "privity is a flexible legal term that generally requires that a
non-party have 'his interests adequately represented by someone with the same
interests who is a party.'” Id. at 1286. Chiquita vigorously defended both cases and
got both the Stansell and Pescatore cases dismissed on the merits, adequately
applies "when the respective interests are closely aligned and the party to the prior
litigation adequately represented those interests." Id. at 1287, quoting Delta Air
Lines, Inc. v. McCoy Rests., Inc., 708 F.2d 582, 587 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Under res
litigating an issue based on a prior lawsuit in which, although he was not a party,
his interests were represented by a party. This principle applies, however, only
when the respective interests are closely aligned and the party to the prior litigation
13
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Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 717 (5th Cir. 1975) (doctrine of virtual representation
provides in essence that "a person may be bound by a judgment even though not a
party if one of the parties to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be
The Court has employed four factors in determining whether there is virtual
between the parties and nonparties." Pemco, 383 F.3d at 1287, citing Jaffree v.
Wallace, 837 F.2d 1461, 1467 (11th Cir. 1988); 18 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice & Procedure § 4457, at 494-99. All of these factors need not be found to
The factors are easily met here. The fourth, the close relationship between
Chiquita and FARC, is based on the fact that Chiquita is being held secondarily
liable for the FARC's acts. The Appellees cannot argue that the FARC and Chiquita
had different legal interests just because of the difference in legal theories applied.
The different legal theories only relate to the difference between primary and
secondary liability of the tortfeasors. They both had an interest in proving that the
FARC didn't commit the crimes. That is what the "nucleus" of facts in dispute in
each case is always about. The FARC were adequately represented in the cases
14
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defended by Covington and Burling LLP and Blank Rome LLP, counsel for
Chiquita Brands, who got the Stansell and Pescatore cases dismissed with
prejudice. The FARC were not adequately represented in the ex parte default
judgments.
cases against Chiquita and the FARC involved different disputed facts. Appellees'
Brief at 8. Chiquita's payments to the FARC, like those to the AUC, are not in
dispute. Chiquita admits it paid the FARC. Factual Proffer, Appx. at 553; see § III
million dollars to the FARC. Appx. at 737-756; see § III (B)(6) infra. Like the
cases of Does 1-254 and all the other cases in the MDL, the only facts in dispute
are those pertaining to the circumstances of each particular murder, and whether
causation by the FARC can be proven. This is the issue currently on appeal in
and "defensive" use of issue preclusion, as well as whether the relationships are
"mutual" or "non-mutual." The relationship between Chiquita and the FARC was
15
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Citibank, since the FARC were paid by Chiquita on a regular basis to provide
security. After analyzing several out of circuit cases and secondary authorities, the
court held that "we conclude that the third element of claim preclusion, i.e., privity,
is met herein." Citibank, 904 F.2d at 1502 (11th Cir. 1990). The Appellants have
been arguing claim preclusion, but the instant case may also be construed as an
Appellees.
III. Does 1-254 don't need to show a right to the FARC's assets because they
only seek a remedy.
applicable law only authorizes United States nationals to enforce judgments against
the assets at issue..." Appellees Br. at 1. There are many laws that might apply to
these assets, which are now in the possession of Stansell and Pescatore.
In Rosen, the Court explained that "Rule 64 commands that the proper
pretrial remedy to ensure that a fund will be available with which to satisfy a
the forum state's law. But "[w]here the state attachment statute does not authorize
16
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v. Cascade, Int'l, Inc., 21 F.3d 1520, 1531 (11th Cir. 1994). In the instant case,
there is no conflict with the Florida attachment statute, which is found in Chapter
action, every remedy is available that, under the law of the state where the court is
(b). Rule 65 provides for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order while a
a motion with the court, along with an affidavit stating the grounds for the issuance
of the writ. § 76.08, Fla. Stat. Three of the grounds listed are that the purported
debtor resides out of state, or is moving, or has moved property out of the state. §
17
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The Pescatore case is brought by ten legal heirs, five of whom live in
Alabama, and the other five in New Jersey. Appx. at 381, 392. Pescatore's
complaints against the FARC and Chiquita are nearly identical, are for the exact
same injuries, allege the exact same facts, and were filed within a few months of
each other. Id. The Stansell case is brought by eight legal heirs residing in Florida,
Connecticut, Alabama, New York, and Virginia. Appx. at 418-419. Since these
plaintiffs have already collected $20 million dollars, there is no doubt that the
The Appellees argue that under Gersh v Cofman, 769 So.2d 407, 409 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) and Abreu v. Amaro, 534 So.2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1988), Does 1-254 must prove all elements by clear and convincing evidence.
Appellees' Brief at 31. In both of these cases, the imposition of a constructive trust
was the cause of action itself, as the Appellees illustrate by listing the elements. Id.
At the same time the Appellees recognize that Does 1-254 only seek a constructive
trust as a remedy. Nevertheless, neither § 76.01 et seq., Fla. Stat. nor F.R.C.P. 64
use this standard. Under § 76.08, "a writ of attachment may issue when the
grounds relied on for the issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts
8
It bears repeating that these cases were dismissed with prejudice by the MDL
transferee court, yet Stansell and Pescatore obtained ex parte, default judgments of
over $300 million dollars in the transferor courts after the cases were dismissed.
18
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applicable requirements of s. 76.09, s. 76.10, or s. 76.11 are met." Id. That the
grounds must "clearly appear" in the motion isn't the same as the clear and
who has them, whether or they are the proceeds of a terrorist organization or acts
of terrorism. Whether the TRIA "occupies the field" such that Federal law
preempts the state attachment statute, was never raised as an issue below.
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2236 (2014); Wiersum v U.S. Bank, N.A.,
785 F.3d 483 (11th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has identified three
circumstantial categories, where federal law preempts state law. First is express
preemption, where Congress defines “explicitly the extent to which its enactments
pre-empt state law.” English v. Gen. Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78 (1990); Fla. State
Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1167 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“Express preemption occurs when Congress manifests its intent to displace a state
law using the text of a federal statute.”). The second is called field preemption.
“[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is preempted where it
19
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occupy exclusively.” English, 496 U.S. at 795. The third is conflict preemption,
which occurs when “state law is pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts
statutory interpretation. English, 496 U.S. at 78-79. “As in all cases involving
Congress, and we assume that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used.” Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "Indeed, a statute's plain language
Forces of Colombia, 704 F.3d 910, 915 (11th Cir. 2013) quoting United States v.
Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1245 (11th Cir.1998). “Where the language of a statute is
history.” Harry v. Marchant, 291 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
The Purpose of the TRIA was "to establish a temporary Federal program that
provides for a transparent system of shared public and private compensation for
insured losses resulting from acts of terrorism, in order to -- (1) protect consumers
20
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and affordability of property and casualty insurance for terrorism risk; and (2)
allow for a transitional period for the private markets to stabilize, resume pricing of
such insurance, and build capacity to absorb any future losses, while preserving
Act of 2002, § 101 (b). Given the clear language "while preserving State insurance
regulation and consumer protections," it cannot be true that the TRIA was intended
industry. The TRIA was passed the year after the attacks on the World Trade
Does 1-254, or any other case in the MDL. It is fair to infer that Chiquita didn't
have any insurance that would cover Chiquita's responsibility for murders
committed by the FARC while Chiquita was paying the FARC for security.
Perhaps this is because Chiquita pled guilty to a felony, and the insurance didn't
cover criminal acts. The plaintiffs can only speculate about this. Nevertheless, it's
not clear how the purpose of the TRIA is served by paying compensation from this
foreign country primarily impacted that country's citizens, but also several U.S.
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citizens who were killed or kidnapped while in Colombia. This reading of the
TRIA would disregard the rights of the Colombian plaintiffs, because the money
illegal activities in Colombia, and most of the people harmed by the FARC were
the U.S. can be traced to the FARC, it should be used to compensate all of the
plaintiffs, not just the ones in the jurisdiction where the accounts are held.
Nor can it be argued that field exemption applies. English, 496 U.S. at 795.
In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, giving states the authority
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance
is in the public interest, and that silence on the part of the Congress shall not be
the several states.” Id. at § 1011. The law also says that “no Act of Congress shall
be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for
for the Sherman and Clayton Acts, which were already in force. Id. at § 1012(b).
In other words, the Court would have to find a Congressional intent for the TRIA
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a Pennsylvania law requiring aliens to register with the state "[stood] as an obstacle
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941). (footnote omitted)
Congress couldn't have intended that all of the assets seized from the FARC would
be used to compensate two U.S. victims of the FARC to the exclusion of others,
intended to displace the normal remedies of attaching assets traceable to the FARC.
the Court may apportion damages according to fault, among both parties and
non-parties. Two cases, decided at about the same time, govern the jury's
Inc. v. Fox, 623 So.2d 1180 (Fla. 1993), an airline technician lost fingers while
9
Florida tort law merely provides an example of a situation where the court would
need to determine the fault of a non-party. See Fla. Stat. §768.81(3) (1986) (“In
cases to which this section applies, the court shall enter judgment against each
party liable on the basis of such party’s percentage of fault and not on the basis of
the doctrine of joint and several liability; …") The District Court held that
Colombian law applies. Article 2344 of the Civil Code of Colombia provides for
joint and several liability, and the same principles should apply, since a finding that
the FARC committed the murder is necessary to show causation for Chiquita's
negligence. In other words, the Court already has jurisdiction to determine that the
FARC was at fault, even if the FARC isn't a defendant in the case.
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servicing an aircraft fan. He sued the manufacturer in federal court for negligently
failing to instruct and warn with respect to the fan. His employer wasn't named as
a defendant, because it was immune from suit under the Workers Compensation
Act. The Florida Supreme Court held that the airline’s immunity from tort liability
didn't bar the jury’s consideration of its fault in causing the plaintiff’s damages.
In the other case, Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993), the plaintiff
her husband. The jury found that he was 50 percent at fault for the accident. While
the husband owed general duties of care to his wife, he was immune from suit
defendant’s liability by this amount. Id. at 1186. The Florida Supreme Court
Chiquita has at various stages of this case argued that they are not
responsible for the murders, because either the FARC or AUC were responsible.
on the verdict form pursuant to Fabre, the defendant must plead as an affirmative
defense the negligence of the nonparty and specifically identify the nonparty.”
Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc., 678 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1996);
Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993); Ortiz v. Regalado, 113 So. 3d 57, 63
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(Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (“A ‘Fabre defendant’ is a nonparty defendant whom a party
1-254's Complaint on March 29, 2012, see DE 513, the cases never progressed to
liable for any of the Plaintiffs’ claims, any such liability shall be reduced or
22 "To the extent that Plaintiffs and decedents are found to have suffered the harms
alleged in the Complaint, those harms were caused by persons or entities other than
Chiquita." Since the District Court allowed these defenses for Pescatore, see
The Appellants showed that the Crime Victim Rights Act ("CVRA"), 18
U.S.C. § 3771, provides an alternative theory for recovery. See Appellants Brief at
44-49. Does 1-254 didn't bring separate claims under the CVRA, but this isn't
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required, because the District Court already has jurisdiction over the Stansell and
The Factual Proffer provides more details about the payments to the AUC
than the FARC, but also says "Defendant CHIQUITA had previously paid money
Colombia ... Defendant CHIQUITA made these earlier payments from in or about
not in Appellants' Appendix, but the sentence was based on payments to both
groups. See Memo of Sept. 11, 2007 in Case 07-cr-055. Indeed, the reason
Stansell and Pescatore sued Chiquita was because payments to the FARC were
report states that although the FARC wasn't designated as a terrorist group before
1997, government officials advised Chiquita that the payments might have violated
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. "At no time did government representatives say
anything to suggest that the payments violated U.S. law, other than as a potential
violation of the FCPA, and no enforcement action was ever taken with respect to
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the payments." Appx. at 743. The SLC report also refers to a factual issue as to
when the payments to the FARC actually stopped. "While certain documentary and
testimonial evidence suggests that the Company made the payments to the guerrilla
groups until approximately mid-1997 or, according to at least one witness, until
department reflect their knowledge that payments to the FARC before 1997 were
illegal. See February 3, 1997 [Banadex lawyer] memo: "[A Banadex lawyer’s]
memo, titled “Crime of Extorsion and Kidnapping in Colombia” [sic], updated and
expanded on his June 10, 1994 memo. As with his earlier memo, this memo stated
that, “no punishment will be applied” when one makes ransom and extortion
payments “in a state of necessity.” Appx. at 741; September 9, 1997 B&M memo:
groups are not illegal if made to “defend the life and freedom of individuals.”
Appx. at 741-742. These are legal defenses reflecting knowledge that payments to
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IV. Does 1-254 were denied the same discovery granted to Pescatore, had no
input into any schedule imposed by the district court, and didn't consent
to being excluded from the bellwether process.
The Appellees argue that Does 1-254 "expressly joined" the scheduling
order.10 Does 1-254 moved multiple times for remand, in both the District Court
and this Court. See Order denying Renewed Motion to Remand, DE 2601,
The District Court wouldn't allow Does 1-254's cases to proceed while Stansell and
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
10
At the same time, they argue that the Court of Appeals should consider whether
the statutes of limitations on Does 1-254's claims have run. Appellees' Brief at 26.
Should the Court of Appeals wish to address this issue in the first instance, it
should also consider whether equitable tolling applies. Justice v. United States, 6
F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 1993) In addition, the Appellees explain in a footnote
that other counsel in the MDL moved to certify this mass tort case as a class action,
id. at 26 n. 4, which was denied. DE 2471. Nevertheless, the District Court
allowed the same counsel to file new claims, establishing a March 17, 2017
deadline. "Based on these conclusions, the Court holds that Colombia’s 10-year
ordinary statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, on March 17, 2007, the
date Chiquita’s D.C. plea to crimes relating to its financial support of foreign
terrorist organizations became public (Complaint, ¶1026), and it expired ten years
later, on March 17, 2017." Appx. at 1082. Does 1-254 filed their complaint six
years earlier, on March 17, 2011. Appx at 379. This was argued in Appellants
Principal Brief at 41, but the Appellees didn't respond to it.
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de Colombia (FARC)." DE 928.11 Does 1-254 argued that they "need substantially
the same evidence as the ATA Plaintiffs" from the government of Colombia and
that it would be more efficient to conduct this discovery at the same time as
Pescatore. Id. at 3. Chiquita opposed the motion, arguing that the information
In their November 28, 2015 Reply, Does 1-254 showed how they had an
equal right to the discovery allowed to the Pescatore plaintiffs, DE 945 at 4-9, and
that it would be unconstitutional to exclude Does 1-254 from it, since it gives
Chiquita an advantage in the litigation. DE 945 at 9-10. The District Court denied
the motion on September 1 2007, DE 1546. However, this was not an appealable
order.
The record reflects that undersigned counsel's clients have been sidelined in
favor of clients of other attorneys. See, e.g., Response to Plaintiffs’ and Chiquita’s
Brands nor for the other Plaintiffs conferred with me before filing this statement on
the day before the status conference. I tried to confer with all other parties on these
11
These filings aren't in Appellants' Appendix because counsel hadn't anticipated
the Appellees would raise this issue. Neither the Appellees nor Chiquita Brands
responded to requests to collaborate on a Joint Appendix.
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issues and my positions are known to all of them, yet are not mentioned anywhere
in the Joint Status Conference Statement." Despite representing more than half of
the plaintiffs in the MDL, the District Court has allowed the "non-Wolf" plaintiffs'
counsel to negotiate the case schedule with Chiquita, and imposed the same
The district court excluded Does 1-254, and other cases involving injuries
caused by the FARC, rather than the AUC.12 In the Factual Proffer in the
group, which was somewhere between one and two million dollars over time. See
Appx. at 550-566.
Undersigned counsel objected to the list of the first bellwether cases to be set
for trial, which were determined by Chiquita and plaintiffs' counsel Jack Scarola of
Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhardt & Shipley, PA. DE 2501 The District Court
allowed Jack Scarola of Searcy Denney Scarola Barnhart & Shipley PA to select
the cases, without regard to the rights of other plaintiffs who were forced into the
bellwether trial process. Id. None of undersigned counsel's cases were included.
12
There are about 38 other plaintiffs in the MDL alleging FARC, rather than AUC
injuries, which I included in the first complaint in the MDL, Does 1-144 v.
Chiquita Brands, 07-cv-1048. See Memorandum in Support of Cross Motion to
Disqualify, DE 2373-1 at 1 n 5.
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At least one FARC-related case was part of the bellwether pool, though. On
March 13, 2019, plaintiffs' attorneys at Conrad & Scherer, LLP filed a motion to
"sever" the claims of a FARC victim in the first complaint, meaning remove it from
by excluding them from the bellwether trial pool, the FARC victims were
adequately represented. DE 2373. The Court held a hearing on April 27, 2020, at
Does 1-144. The representation was settled in an Order dated April 28, 2020 in
Chiquita didn't oppose the motion leading to the order on appeal, but stated
on much of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Constructive Trust over FARC Assets (DE 2667,
squabble instigated by the Wolf Plaintiffs, were it not for counsel’s suggestion that
the Court should somehow 'fashion an equitable remedy that equitable tolling
applies' to the Wolf Plaintiffs’ claims against Chiquita for alleged FARC-related
violence. (DE 2667-22 at 4-5, ¶ 9.)" DE 2673 at 1. When Does 1-254 moved for
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Chiquita waived the arguments it makes on appeal, which were not raised below,
Chiquita has also filed its own Supplementary Appendix. According to 11th
Cir. R. 30-1, "[i]f the appellant’s appendix is deficient or if the appellee’s brief, to
support its position on an issue, relies on parts of the record not included in
appellant’s appendix, the appellee must file its own supplemental appendix within
seven days of filing its brief." Chiquita is not the Appellee. Chiquita was
Motions, Oppositions, and Replies, which are all legal memoranda, even though
FRAP 30(a)(2) prohibits the inclusion of these materials in an Appendix. Id. The
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should REVERSE the District Court's
legal determinations, and REMAND the case so that a constructive trust may be
13
On March 10, 2021, Chiquita filed a motion to adopt sections of the Appellees'
Brief, to which undersigned counsel consented. However, neither Pescatore nor
Stansell adopted any part of Chiquita's Brief. Chiquita shouldn't be allowed to
change its position by incorporating arguments by reference.
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imposed, for the equitable distribution among all plaintiffs in the MDL alleging
Respectfully submitted,
Certificate of Compliance
with Type-Volume Limitation
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on this 31st of March, 2021, I served copies of this brief
by U.S. Priority Mail on the Court and counsel for all parties, as detailed below.
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One copy to
Michael Cioffi, Esq.
Blank Rome, LLP
201 E 5th St #1700
Cincinnati, OH 45202
Counsel for Chiquita Brands, International, Inc.
34