HA

H AZ
ZO PS
OP ST
TU DIIE
UD ESS
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE

P
Pre-HAZOP

HA
AZOP Team an
nd the Leader Nomination

Prepare
e the list of No
odes along wiith Design Inte
ent

C  Colour Mark-up node on

n P&ID

Gather Relev
vent Updated Documentatio
D on after Design
n Review

Sttart HAZOP

B  Se
elect a Design Intent Parameter (i.e. Flow
w, Pressure, Te
emperature,
Level...)

A  Se
elect an applic
cable Guidewo ord (i.e. More, Less, None, R
Reverse, As
Well As, Part
P of, Other than)

Generate th
he Deviation (i.e. More Flow, Less Pressure, etc.)

Identify
I Credib
ble/ Likely Cau
uses for each generated De
eviation in
Turn (one-by-one) and Record
R

Analyze the Potential

P Ultim
mate Consequ
uences for eac
ch Cause

List the Recom

mmendations, consider
c ing the
t adequacy of existing
Safeguaards and Controls

Yes
Arre there any
otheer applicable A
Guuidewords?
No
Yes
Is th
here any otherr
P
Parameter? B

No
Yes
Is th
here another
Revision - 00

node? C
No
Re
ecord and Rep
port the HAZO
OP Findings

Conclude HAZOP
 

Preparred by: PSM

M Team, HSE
EF Departm
ment
ESSAR
R OIL LIMITED
Re
efinery Division, Vadin 5, Jamnagar (Gujarat)
nar – 361305
 INTRODUCTION

HAZOP study is systematic & critical examination of a process to identify & address the potential hazards which
may arise due to deviations from the intended design condition. HAZOP must be done after each time the P&ID is
to be changed. It is “Structured Brainstorming” through application of Guidewords by multi-discipline of experts.

HAZOP TEAM

An operability study should be carried out by a team of experienced people, who have complementary skills and
knowledge; led by a team leader who is experienced in the technique. A HAZOP team will consist of a Leader; a
Scribe; experienced and knowledgeable Process and Operations Engineers along with Safety Representative.
Discipline wise experienced Maintenance Engineer should also be included as per the node under discussion.
The Leader should be chosen from another unit, preferably.

Note:
1. The scribe can be Process Engineer (here after referred Process co-ordinator) from the same unit for overall co-
ordination and tracking of the reports generated.

DATA REQUIREMENTS

− Updated P&IDs after Hydraulic and design checks against applicable codes/standards/ specification.
− Updated Process data sheet; Logic diagrams; Instrument control schematics; Line List; PSV summary
sheet; Plant layout schematics as applicable.
− Operating instructions/Procedures and Equipment manufacturers’ manuals as applicable.
− Node classification of the Unit by the Process Dept. Co-ordinator in consultation with HAZOP Leader.

Note:
1. At any point during the HAZOP, a request can be sent back for more information and noted down.
2. Process Co-ordinator to ensure the availability of above listed documents before HAZOP session.

NODE SELECTION

Each Node should be selected to cover a single design intent/ purpose and be clearly written below nodes
description in HAZOP sheet. For Example: The KO drum bottom pump recirculation system may have a node for
KOD drum bottom to pump suction for feeding the pump; a node from pump discharge back to KOD for
recirculation; and another node for pump discharge to other equipments as feed.

Note:
1. Always remember, whenever/wherever there is a change in operating conditions/intent, new node should be
considered.
2. The nodes should always be marked-up with a colour on flow-lines in P& ID including all in line components and
associated instrumentation.
3. In case HAZOP study is to be conducted on any node which has been modified, the study should include the nodes
before and after said node. HAZOP of both - process under consideration and its interface is very important.

GUIDEWORDS/ DEVIATIONS
These are the departures from designer’s intent (normal operating condition) which are detected by systematic
application of guide words. Commonly used seven basic guidewords are: More, Less, None, As Well As,
Reverse, Part of, Other than. Deviation = Guide Word + Process Condition (like Flow, Pressure, Temperature,
Level…)

Note:
1. While applying guide words always consider for the departure from normal condition only. For example: Consider No
Flow when there should be Flow. Don’t consider Power trips or failures supposed to happen as deviation.
2. In addition to these basic word combinations, Deviations must also include “Maintenance” and “Safety” parameters.
 3. When studying batch operation/control schemes with selector, consider deviations when inactive (during normal
condition) become active.
4. Refer to the attached list of Guide words provided for systematic application to the node being considered.
CAUSES

Consider all credible/ plausible scenarios leading to the deviations, including all operator errors. The Causes
should be “Local” to the node being studied. Causes should be listed one-after-another within the deviation being
considered. Move to consequences only after listing all the causes.

Note:
1. Two events happening simultaneously without any correlation should not be considered.
2. While listing the cause always consider that things have been designed as per applicable codes and standards to
ensure design integrity. For Example: Failure/bursting of the line should not be considered as a cause for no flow.

CONSEQUENCES

“Global” effects should be considered for consequences i.e., keep researching the resulting reactions till you
reach the Ultimate Consequence of a deviation and write only that particular consequence. For Example: Low
level in a tank may cause drying or air pockets, but the ultimate consequence is cavitation and pump damage.
Remember that the HAZOP study is done to improve safety while paying equal emphasis to production.

SAFEGUARDS

Risk is a function of both Probability and Consequence. Safeguards reduce either Probability or
Consequence. These could be either related to hardware or operator practices & intervention. For an operating
plant, take into account only those safeguards that are existing & functional. For Example: A NRV that is known to
pass is not an adequate safeguard, and hence, must not be considered.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Making Recommendations is not mandatory; these should be made only when necessary. The Objective is to
“Flag” the issue. Recommendations should be reported with the three Ws in mind. Check whether these have
been explained – What is to be done? Where is it to be done? Why is it to be done? Use action-based words.

Always evaluate recommendations in following order: (1) Engineering Control – TERMINATE deviations (best
approach – give more emphasis); (2) Use Administrative Control – INTERVENE; (3) Suggesting PPE is the
Oldest rule in the book and should not be used unless really necessary.

HAZOP REPORT

The HAZOP Report is usually composed of 5 Chapters and Appendices, viz. 1) Introduction; 2) A Brief
Description of the Facility; 3) HAZOP Methodology; 4) HAZOP Team; 5) A Summary of the Major
Recommendations made; 6) Appendices (HAZOP Worksheet; Recommendations made; and Marked-up P&IDs).
The team leader & scribe should review & edit the record of each day’s study.

QUALITY OF HAZOP STUDY

For determining the Quality of HAZOP, the following should be considered:

− Team Composition
− Time Allotted (Good practice: maximum 4 – 5 nodes a day)
− Segregation of nodes
− Process Stages (Modes of Operation)
− Guidewords (including ‘Maintenance’ and ‘Safety’)
− Recommendations
 LLIIS
STTIIN
NGGO HA
OFF H AZZO
OPPG
GUUIID
DEEW
WOOR
RDDS
S
 
Select applicable ‘Credible/ Likely Scenarios’ for the node under study from the table below:
  High Flow  Pump over‐speed, delivery pressure lost, suction pressurized, increased Pumping Capacity & fluid 
density; scale dislodged, leak in heat exchanger tubes; CV Stuck open, Cross Connection; Faulty Control
Changes in  Defective Pump, Cavitation, Poor Suction; Scaling of Delivery, Presence of foreign sediment; Heat 
Low Flow 
Quantity  Exchanger Leak; Drain Leak, Valve Jammed; Filter Partial Blockage; Fouling of Orifice Plate, Valves 

No Flow  Pump Failure, Gas Locking; Delivery/ Main Vessel Over‐pressurized, Suction Vessel Empty, Incorrect 
 
Press. Diff.; Blockage, Valve ‐ VC, VO (Wrong Routing, Isolation in Error); Control Failure; Large Leak 

Reverse Flow  Pump Failure, Pump Reversed, Gas Locking, Pump Trip, Delivery/ Main Vessel Over‐pressurized, Wrong 
Diff. Pressure, Siphon Effect; Poor isolation; Surging, Back Siphoning, Emergency Venting 

High Pressure   +ve displacement Pumps, Thermal Over‐pressure, Boiling, Freezing, Gas Break‐through; Pressure 
Control Failure; Chemical Breakdown, Flashing, Exploding, Hammer/ Surge, Fire; Viscous Flow 

Low Pressure  Cavitation, Pump Failure, Pressure Control Failure, Restricted Pump/ Compressor Suction, Foaming, Gas 
Changes in  Release, Priming, Leakage; Vessel Drainage, Vacuum Condition (Condensation); Sedimentation 
Physical 
For all Process Lines and Vessels 

High Temperature  Cooling Water Failure, Defective Temperature Control, Fired Heater Control Failure, Ambient Temp.; 
Condition  includes those under Pressure High/Low; Fouled or Failed Exchanger Tubes; Rxn. Control Failure 

Low Temperature  Pressure Reduction; Fouled or Failed Exchanger Tubes; Loss of Heating; Ambient Temp., includes those 
  under Pressure High/Low; Depressurization of Liquefied Gas – Joule‐Thomson Effect 
High/ Low Mixing  Agitator Failure, Vortex, Layering, Erosion, Settling of Slurries, High solid concentration  

Static Build‐up  Sampling, Earthing, Source of Ignition, Personnel Shock, Explosion in contained systems, Monitoring 
Control Failure 

Changes in  High/ Low Concentration   Process Control Procedures, Interconnected Systems; Shutdown/ Start‐up Conditions; Leaking Isolation 

Valves or Exchanger Tubes, Phase Change, Incorrect Feedstock/ Specifications/ Quality Control, 
Chemical 
Formation of Reaction Intermediates and By‐products; Settling of Slurries 
Condition 
Contaminants  Gas Entrainment, Spray; Leakage through Heat Exchangers and isolation valves, Incorrect Operation; 
Ingress of Air, Water, Steam, Fuel, Lubricants, Wrong Additives, Grade Change; Shutdown/ Start‐up 
  (Solids/Liquids/Gases) 
Conditions; Corrosion Products, Other Process Materials from High Pressure Systems, etc

Start‐up &  Testing  Vacuum Pressure Testing with Harmless Material, Alarm/ Trip Testing Feasibility 

Shutdown  Commissioning  Concentration of Reactants, Intermediates; Start‐up and Operating Procedures, Control of Transient 

Condition  Conditions, Sampling, Purging Connections, Safe Venting 

Maintenance  Drainage/ Pump‐out Facilities, Positive Isolation, Thermal Relief Valves; Venting, Purging, Flushing, 
  Drying, Access, Spares; Safe Shutdown Facilities, Condition Monitoring, Machine Guarding 

Hazardous  Equipment Registration  Hazard Warning Notices; should this equipment be registered? – For Example: Critical Machines, 

Vessels, Pipelines, Lifting Gear, Ropes, Belts, Hydraulics, Braking Systems  
Equipment 
Materials of Construction/  Corrosion, Erosion, Brittle Failure, Creep, Accelerated Corrosion; Cathodic Protection Arrangements; 
  Corrosion  Engineering Specifications 
Vessels 

Changes inside  High/ Low Reaction  Frothing, Other Reaction, Runaway Reaction, Gassing, Exothermic, Endothermic, Enrichment, Catalyst 

Vessel  High/ Low Level  Imbalance in Input and Output; Level Control Failure; Flooding, Pressure Surges, Corrosion, Sludge 

Gas/Liquid Solid  Drain Connections, Washing Connections, Traps, Vents, Stacks, Flares, Sample Points 
Effluents 
Compatibility 
For Whole Section 

Reaction in Culverts, Drains, Sewers, Collecting Mains 

Failure of Power, Air,  Consider Partial and Total Failures and Compound Failures  
Steam, Nitrogen, Water,  Consider Lighting of Plant and Instrument Panels, Power for Alarms, and Local and General Failure in 
Emergency  Fuel, Vacuum and Vents  Actions of Controls 

  Unscheduled Shutdown  Procedures and Communication Systems; Co‐ordination with other Plants and Work Systems 

Safety ‐  Safety Equipments ‐ PSV and their Load/ Capacity, F&G Detectors‐Alarms, Means of Escape,  Fire‐
Toxic/Fire/Explosion  Fighting Response, Contingency, Ergonomics of Controls/ Layout; Toxicity of Process Materials, TLVs 

FOR ANY PROCESS SAFETY RELATED QUERY/ ISSUE, CONTACT: PSM GROUP-EOL-VADINAR or EXT. 1020/1014