FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 06/06/2016 09:14 AM INDEX NO.

156844/2014
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 87 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 06/06/2016

SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF NEW YORK

Greg Waltman, ) Case No.: 156844/2014

)
)
The G1 Quantum Fund, LLC ) Motion for Recusal
)
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
)
vs. )
)
)
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. )
)
And )
)
)
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. )
)
)
Defendants )
)
)

Dated this June 6, 2016

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 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FOR RECUSAL

22 NYCRR 100.0.................................................... Pg. 7

22 NYCRR 100.1.................................................... Pg. 4

22 NYCRR 100.2.................................................... Pg. 6

22 NYCRR 100.3.......................................... Pg. 6, 7, 10

22 NYCRR 100.4.................................................. Pg. 10

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 55(B) 1, 2, a, b, c, d, (C) and Rule

60(B) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, (C) 1, 2, & CPLR § 2308…. Pg. 11

I. ARGUMENT

THE NEW YORK STATE RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL

CONDUCT REQUIRE JUDGE LEBOVITS TO RECUSE HIMSELF

A. The Rules Requiring the Court’s Recusal

The Chief Administrator of the Courts, with the approval of the Court of
Appeals, has promulgated Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, which are
incumbent upon all judges of the New York State Unified Court System.
These rules require judges: to uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary, 22 NYCRR 100.1; to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of the judge’s activities, 22 NYCRR 100.2 to act at all
times in a manner that promotes Public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, 22 NYCRR 100.2(A); to not allow ... social ...

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or other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment,
22 NYCRR 100.2(B); and to perform the duties of judicial office impartially
..., 22 NYCRR 100.3. Significantly, the rules dictate that “[t]he judicial
duties of a judge take precedence over all the judge's other activities.” 22
NYCRR 100.3(A) (emphasis added). Under certain circumstances specified
under the Rules, judges must exercise recusal. 22 NYCRR 100.3(E)(1)(a)-
(g). For instance, “[a] judge shall disqualify himself... in a proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” 22 NYCRR
100.3(E)(1) (emphasis added), including, but not limited to, instances where
“the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.” 22 NYCRR
100.3(E)(1)(a)(1). "Impartiality" means the “absence of bias or prejudice in
favor of, or against, particular parties ... as well as maintaining an open mind
in considering issues that may come before the judge.” NYCRR 100.00R).

Furthermore, 22 NYCRR 100.4 requires that “[a] judge shall so conduct the
judge's extra-judicial activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with
judicial obligations.” In particular, “[a] judge shall conduct all of the judge's
extra-judicial activities so that they do not: (1) cast reasonable doubt on the
judge's capacity to act impartially as a judge; (2) detract from the dignity of
judicial office; or (3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties
and are not incompatible with judicial office.” 22 NYCRR 100.4(A)(1)(3)
(emphasis added). And specifically, with regard to a judge’s extra-judicial
fiduciary activities, the rules provide that “[a] full-time judge shall not serve
as executor, administrator or other personal representative, trustee, guardian,
attorney in fact or other fiduciary ... except for the estate, trust or person of a
member of the judge's family, or, with the approval of the Chief

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Administrator of the Courts, a person not a member of the judge's family
with whom the judge has maintained a longstanding personal relationship

of trust and confidence, and then only if such services will not interfere with
the proper performance of judicial duties.” 22 NYCRR 100.4(E)(1)
(emphasis added).1

B. Statement: Motion for Recusal

Through this Motion Plaintiffs, Appellants seek recusal of Justice

Lebovits ahead of Motion to Renew and Reargue CPLR 2221 in response to
Justice Lebovits non-response to SCCNY 156844/2014 entry 69, lack of
transparency, clear interest in neglecting to clarify decision involving
questions regarding legibility, response to only JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.,
Bruno Iksil not existing, and decision and order to dismiss in response to
Defendants, Respondents JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. and Berkshire
Hathaway Inc. claims, ruling beyond the scope of Justice Lebovits’ judicial
authority 22 NYCRR 100.4 not vacating or citing any law to dismiss, but
fraudulently dismissing Plaintiffs, Appellants default judgment that stood for
over a year in favor of the Defendants, Respondents claims due to conflict of
interest and interest in relation to criminality perpetrated at Columbia
University 22 NYCRR 100.1 in relation to criminality as defined in SCCNY
156844/2014 to cover up and accommodate Defendants, Respondents
ongoing fraud being perpetrated against the Plaintiffs, Appellants.

                                                                                                                                       
1  Supreme  Court  of  the  State  of  New  York  County  of  New  York:  31  The  

People  of  the  State  of  New  York  –Against-­‐  Alan  Hevesi  Defendant.,  SCI.  
NO  4632/2010,  Simon  and  Partners  LLP  5th  Ave.  NY.,  NY  10176  

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The Plaintiffs, Appellants submit this Motion for Recusal for briefing on the
issue whether Justice Lebovits should recuse himself from these actions. As
discussed below, the relevant case law makes clear that even where the issue
of disqualification is a close one, the balance tips decidedly in favor of
recusal. Plaintiffs, Appellants respectfully submit that the basis for recusal in
the present situation is clear and that, even if viewed as a “close call,” which
it is not, recusal is most appropriate in this instance.

II. BACKGROUND ESTABLISHING GROUNDS FOR RECUSAL

(α) Justice Lebovits works at Columbia University

Justice Lebovits works at Columbia University, has been Adjunct Professor

of Law at Columbia Law School (since 2010), and has a clear interest in
neglecting Plaintiffs, Appellants claims. Columbia University has played
and intricate role in fraudulently helping to create the fanciful fictional legal
narration regarding Edward Snowden who was created as a favor to Nicole
Lapin (formerly of Columbia University) Laura Dimon (formerly of
Columbia University) Warren Buffett (formerly of Columbia University),
Jamie Dimon, Steve Cohen, and numerous other individuals placed at
Berkshire Hathaway Inc., JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Time Warner Inc.,
other news corporations, and Hedge Funds to fraudulently target the
Plaintiffs, Appellants in order to redirect and cover up securities fraud as
defined in SCCNY 156844/2014, wire fraud, wire fraud dragnet with the
intent to entrap and murder the Plaintiffs, Appellants off. On account of

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clear conflict of interest and interest involving Columbia University Justice
Lebovits should recuse himself.

There are warrants out for Edward Snowden’s arrest all across the United
States, but for reasons regarding securities fraud and criminality in question
SCCNY 156844/2014 & SCCNY 162168/2014 Columbia University has
awarded Edward Snowden the Pulitzer Prize to try to cover up and
accommodate ongoing criminality ranging from securities fraud, wire fraud,
and wire fraud dragnet with the intent to entrap and murder the Plaintiffs,
Appellants off while at the same time profiting on the long and short end of
the Plaintiffs, Appellants energy project deals, and then fraudulently
blocking the deals, where Justice Lebovits cannot reasonably be expected to
rule against the place of his employment, which is a clear conflict of interest,
and solid grounds for Justice Lebovits’ recusal from this case.

The wire fraud dragnet called into question by the Plaintiffs, Appellants is
most prevalent at business like Daily News L.P. where Jamie Dimon’ s
daughter Laura Dimon (formerly of Columbia University) sits there at the
Daily News L.P. fraudulently on the wire cell phone hacking and computer
tampering day after day illegally monitoring the Plaintiffs, Appellants
performance and non-performance data executing wire fraud dragnet
strategies to induce of incite violence to redirect her fathers and JPMorgan
Chase Bank N.A.’s criminality, and then also fraudulently disseminate the
performance data related to the Plaintiffs, Appellants energy project deals to
her father and JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. so they can, along with Columbia
University endowment, profit asymmetrically relative to the market place.

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This strategy quietly defrauds the Plaintiffs, Appellants, and also defrauds
the Public 22 NYCRR 100.2 because nothing is said about the Plaintiffs,
Appellants energy deals publically, and the provisions set aside for
journalism to report news are abused to fraudulently steal, rip-off, and
defraud the Plaintiffs, Appellants, and the Public. In this instance when the
Defendants, Respondents strategy becomes exposed they are left with no
other choice, but to abuse access obstructing justice to no end fraudulently
having Justice Lebovits reassigned to this case by way of improperly
influencing Governor Cuomo, Mayor DeBlasio, and other Public officials.

(b) The circumstances in which these cases were reassigned to Justice

Lebovits

Justice Lebovits was reassigned 22 NYCRR 100.0 on account of

Defendants, Respondents on account of hour legal tactics 22 NYCRR 100.3
by way of outside influence and fraudulently lobbying Governor Cuomo,
Mayor DeBlasio, and other political officials. (see entry 69)

(c) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:

(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding." The
statute was adopted in its present form out of concern not to “undermine
Public confidence in the judiciary when there is an appearance of a conflict
of interest.” United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, 775 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007).

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Section 455(a) in effect says that “if there is a reasonable factual basis for
doubting the judge’s impartiality, he should disqualify himself and let
another judge preside over the case.” Id. Thus, the Court asks the question:
“[w]ould a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, conclude that the trial
judge’s impartiality could reasonably be questioned? Or, phrased differently,
would an objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the underlying
facts, entertain significant doubt that justice would be done absent recusal?”
Id. at 775 (quoting United States v. Lovaglia, 954 F.2d 811, 815 (2d Cir.
1992)).”

(d) Recusal is no less appropriate simply because these cases will be tried
to a jury

Although this case will be tried to a jury, Justice Lebovits would still be
called upon to rule upon Plaintiffs, Appellants Motions to renew and reargue
CPLR 2221, and therefore the Plaintiffs, Appellants file Motion for Recusal.
Justice Lebovits would be the ultimate arbiter of the facts making recusal
Appropriate (see entry 69 SCCNY 156844/2014) where Justice Lebovits
concerning issues are very different from those presented here with the basis
that presiding over this case would be perceived as indicating impartiality,
particularly where the legal issues discussed overlap with those in dispute in
the case regarding fraud at Columbia University.

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(e) Where the question of recusal is a close issue, the balance tips in favor of
recusal

Justice Lebovits clearly works at Columbia University, and has not

responded to Plaintiffs, Appellants (see entry 69) seeking further
clarification having no interest in clarifying decision and order
accommodating Defendants, Respondents criminality. Justice Lebovits
should move to recuse himself. Furthermore, in the event that there is an
issue with just a “close” one, the law is plain – the Court should recuse
itself. See, e.g., United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d at 775 n.3 (§ 455
“eliminate[s] a judge’s ‘duty to sit” in very close cases”); United States v.
Holland, 501 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (“If it is a close case, the
balance tips in favor of recusal.”); In re Boston's Children First, 244 F.3d at
167 (“[I]f the question of whether § 455(a) requires disqualification is a
close one, the balance tips in favor of recusal.”); In re Chevron U.S.A., 121
F.3d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1997) (same); Republic of Panama v. Am. Tobacco
Co., 217 F.3d 343, 347 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d
347, 35(10th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344,
1349 (6th Cir. 1993) (Same).

Thus, recusal or disqualification cases are not decided on the basis of any
kind of “presumption against recusal,” indeed, the Second Circuit, in United
States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764, expressly disavowed any such principle
under Section 455:" There are numerous other reported cases in which a
judge was disqualified from a jury trial, with no mention from the court of
appeals of there being any exception or special standard to 28 U.S.C. § 144

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or § 455 for jury trials. See, e.g., United States v. Amico, 486 F.3d 764;
United States v. Holland, 655 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Lamborn v.
Dittmer, 726 F. Supp. 510, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[C]ertainly a judge must
recuse himself if the question of appearance of impartiality is a close one.”);
Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Sundlun, No. 88 CIV. 7966 (CSH), 1988 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13335, at #9 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1988) (“[W]here the
question is close, the judge whose impartiality might reasonably be
questioned must recuse himself from the trial.”); United States v. Ferguson,
550 F. Supp. 1256, 1259-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[W]here the question is
close, the judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned must
recuse himself from the trial.

III. CONCLUSION

While a judge should not recuse himself lightly, or in response to imagined

or concocted concerns as to his impartiality, that is not the situation here.
The test is an objective one, based on factual evidence. Justice Lebovits was
fraudulently reassigned to SCCNY 156844/2014 in an 11th hour political
legal tactic 22 NYCRR 100.4 to accommodate Defendants, Respondents
ongoing criminality, criminality that clearly involves Columbia University,
where Justice Lebovits is gainfully employed presenting a clear conflict of
interest and interest in seeing Plaintiffs, Appellants default judgment
fraudulently dismissed. Justice Lebovits acted beyond the scope of his
judicial authority in violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
55(B) 1, 2, a, b, c, d, (C) and Rule 60(B) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, (C) 1, 2, in further
violation of CPLR § 2308 and has privately made advancing similar themes

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disseminating non-public information about the case to third parties and with
the fact that this case was reassigned to Justice Lebovits by way of outside
influence Plaintiffs, Appellants respectfully submit that an objective
observer, apprised of these facts, would conclude that Justice Lebovits’s
impartiality in presiding over these cases “might reasonably be questioned.”
28 U.S.C. § 455(a). 2

Date: June 6, 2016

G1 Quantum Fund, LLC

235 Sullivan St. New York, N.Y. 10012
www.g1quantumfund.com
347-445-8227

                                                                                                                                       
2  Re:  UniCredito  Italiano  SpA,  et.  al.  v.  JPMorgan  Chase  Bank  N.A.,  et.  al.  No:  02    

Civ.  5328;  DK  Acquisition  Partners,  L.P.  et.  al.  v.  JPMorgan  Chase  &  Co.  et.  al.,    
No.  08  Civ.  0446;  Avenue  Capital  Management  II,  L.P.  v.    J.P.  Morgan  Chase  &    
Co.,  et.  al.  No:  08  Civ.  0447      

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