Labor
Labor
2019-0423
LABOR LAW 1 SATURDAY 2:00-5:00pm
Atty. Kristy Jane Balino
S.Y. 2020-2021
Facts:
Issue:
WON NLRC erred in finding that the petitioner was dismissed by the private respondent for a
just or authorized cause?
Ruling:
Petitioner has been illegally terminated; she is necessarily entitled to reinstatement to her
former previous position without loss of seniority and the payment of backwages.It bears
stressing that a worker’s employment is property in the constitutional sense. He cannot be
deprived of his work without due process. In order for the dismissal to be valid, not only must it
be based on just cause supported by clear and convincing evidence, the employee must also be
given an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. It is the employer who has the burden of
proving that the dismissal was with just or authorized cause. The failure of the employer to
discharge this burden means that the dismissal is not justified and that the employee is entitled
to reinstatement and back wages.
In the case at bar, both the handwritten listing and computer print-outs being unsigned, the
authenticity thereof is highly suspect and devoid of any rational probative value especially in the
light of the existence of the official record book of the petitioner’s alleged absences and
tardiness in the possession of the employer company. In the memorandum charging petitioner
and notice of termination, private respondents referred to the record book as its basis for
petitioner’s alleged absenteeism and tardiness. Interestingly, however, the record book was
never presented in evidence. Private respondents had possession thereof and the opportunity
to present the same. Thus, private respondents’ unexplained and unjustified non-presentation
of the record book, which is the best evidence in its possession and control of the charges
against the petitioner, casts serious doubts on the factual basis of the charges of absenteeism
and tardiness. Private respondents claimed that they sent several notices to the petitioner
warning her of her absences, however, petitioner refused to receive the same.
The Court, likewise, takes note of the fact that the two-day period given to petitioner to explain
and answer the charges against her was most unreasonable, considering that she was charged
with several offenses and infractions (35 absences, 23 half-days and 108 tardiness), some of
which were allegedly committed almost a year before, not to mention the fact that the charges
levelled against her lacked particularity. The law mandates that every opportunity and
assistance must be accorded to the employee by the management to enable him to prepare
adequately for his defense.
Facts:
Calamba Medical Center, engaged the services of medical doctors-spouses Dr. Ronaldo and
Dr.Merceditha Lanzanas as part of its team of resident physicians. Reporting at the hospital
twice-aweek on twenty-four-hour shifts, respondents were paid a monthly "retainer" of
P4,800.00 each. Also resident physicians were also given a percentage share out of fees charged
for out-patient treatments, operating room assistance and discharge billings, in addition to their
fixed monthly retainer. The work schedules of the members of the team of resident physicians
were fixed by petitioner's medical director Dr. Desipeda, and they were issued ID, enrolled in
the SSS and withheld tax from them. After an incident where Dr. Trinidad overheard a phone
conversation between Dr. Ronaldo and a fellow employee Diosdado Miscala, the former was
given a preventive suspension and his wife Dr.Merceditha was not given any schedule after
sending the Memorandum. On March 1998, Dr.Ronaldo filed a complaint for illegal suspension
and Dr. Merceditha for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
WON there exists an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and the
spousesrespondents?
Ruling:
Drs. Lanzanas are declared employee by the petitioner hospital. Under the "control test," an
employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital if the hospital controls both
the means and the details of the process by which the physician is to accomplish his task. That
petitioner exercised control over respondents gains light from the undisputed fact that in the
emergency room, the operating room, or any department or ward for that matter, respondents'
work is monitored through its nursing supervisors, charge nurses and orderlies. Without the
approval or consent of petitioner or its medical director, no operations can be undertaken in
those areas. For control test to apply, it is not essential for the employer to actually supervise
the performance of duties of the employee, it being enough that it has the right to wield the
power.
With respect to respondents' sharing in some hospital fees, this scheme does not sever the
employment tie between them and petitioner as this merely mirrors additional form or another
form of compensation or incentive similar to what commission-based employees receive as
contemplated in Article 97 (f) of the Labor Code. Moreover, respondents were made subject to
petitioner-hospital's Code of Ethics, the provisions of which cover administrative and
disciplinary measures on negligence of duties, personnel conduct and behavior, and offenses
against persons, property and the hospital's interest.
Facts:
Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired by Wacoal Taiwan, Inc., through petitioner agency Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency as a cutter. Subsequently, Cabiles was informed that her services
are already terminated and that she must report to their head office for her immediate
repatriation. Because of this, Cabiles filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Sameer and
Wacoal. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Sameer and held that there was no illegal dismissal
that took place because the termination of the services of Cabiles was for a just cause. It gave
credence to the contention of Sameer that Cabiles was terminated from service because of her
inefficiency. On appeal, the NLRC ruled in favor of Cabiles and held that she is illegally
dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of NLRC. Hence, the current petition.
Sameer reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of
Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her work. Therefore, it claims that respondent’s
dismissal was valid.
Issue:
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the respondent
was illegally dismissed. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just
cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of
law. Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at
work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these
standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.
Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of
acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. While the law acknowledges the plight and
vulnerability of workers, it does not “authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer.” Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence. This
prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is “tempered with the employee’s right to
security of tenure.” Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. .” Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.
In this case, Sameer merely alleged that Cabiles failed to comply with her foreign employer’s
work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to support such
allegations. Sameer did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what
efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.
Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal.
Facts:
Macario King, a naturalized Filipino citizen, became the owner of the business establishment
known as "Import Meat and Produce", previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores Inc. In
there were 3 Chinese employees of the previous owner, one having been employed as
purchaser and the other 2 as salesman. Three weeks after King had acquired the business as
aforesaid, he sought permission from the President of the Philippines to retain the services of
the three Chinese employees pursuant to Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108, coursing his
letter thru the Secretary of Commerce and Industry. However, this official recommended to the
President the disapproval of King's request on the ground that aliens may not be appointed to
operate or administer a retail business under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1180 which requires
that its capital be wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, the only exception thereto being
the employment of technical personnel which may be allowed after securing to that effect an
authorization from the President. The President approved the recommendation of the Secretary
of Commerce and Industry since the positions of purchaser and salesmen occupied by the three
Chinese employees are not technical positions within the meaning of Section 2-A of
Commonwealth Act 108, as amended by Republic Act No. 134.
Petitioners contend that their employment is not prohibited either by the Retail Trade Law or
the Anti-Dummy Law. The three Chinese petitioners testified that they had nothing to do with
the management and control of the business, nor do they participate in its profits outside of
their monthly salaries. They had been employed long before the enactment of Republic Act No.
1180. They only wait for customers and sell according to the prices appearing on the tags
previously fixed by their manager Macario King. They desire to continue in the employ of
Macario King in his business and their job is their only means of earning support for themselves
and their families
Issue:
It appears, however, that alien petitioners were already in the employ of the establishment
known as "Import Meat and Produce" previously owned by the Philippine Cold Stores, Inc.
when Macario King acquired the ownership of said establishment and because of the doubt he
entertained as regards the scope of the prohibition of the law King wrote the President of the
Philippines to request permission to continue said petitioners in his employment, and
immediately after the request was denied, he instituted the present petition for declaratory
relief. It cannot, therefore, be said that King has already breached the law when he filed the
present action.
The decision appealed from is reversed. This preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on
December 6, 1958 is hereby lifted. The petition for mandamus is dismissed, with costs against
appellees.
Facts:
Private respondent Kapunan Sr., was struck by a jeepney owned by Filamer Christian Institute
and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha. Kapunan commenced a civil case for damages
against Funtecha and Filamer Christian Insitute(petitioner). The institution contends that
Funtecha was merely a working scholar and he was not authorized to drive by the said
instution. Therefore; they are not liable for the act of Funtecha. However, the rial court found
the defendants liable for damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed this decision
Issue:
Ruling:
Yes, at the time of the accident Funtecha was a working student, part-time janitor and scholar
of the Institution(petitioner). Funetcha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment but for
the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner.
The petitioner invoked that under Sec. 14 Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor
Code that in the case of "working scholars" there is no employee-employer relationship.
Therefore; they are not liable for the act of Funcheta
The Court stated that the present case does not deal with a labor dispute but it involves a claim
for damages against the employer and his employee. In this case the following articles of the
Civil Code will govern.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The Court further quoted "An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a
shield to avoid liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code"
Facts:
Issue:
WON there was an illegal reduction of work when Linton implemented a compressed work
week by reducing from six to three the number of working days with the employees working on
a rotation basis?
Ruling:
The compressed workweek arrangement was unjustified and illegal. The Bureau of Working
Conditions of the DOLE, moreover, released a bulletin providing for in determining when an
employer can validly reduce the regular number of working days. The said bulletin states that a
reduction of the number of regular working days is valid where the arrangement is resorted to
by the employer to prevent serious losses due to causes beyond his control, such as when there
is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or services or when there is lack of raw
materials. Although the bulletin stands more as a set of directory guidelines than a binding set
of implementing rules, it has one main consideration, consistent with the ruling in Philippine
Graphic Arts Inc., in determining the validity of reduction of working hours that the company
was suffering from losses.
VII. Wages
Facts:
Sometime in December 2003, petitioner paid the 13th month pay, bonus, and leave
encashment of three union members in amounts proportional to the service they actually
rendered in a year, which is less than a full twelve (12) months. Respondent protested the
prorated scheme, claiming that on several occasions petitioner did not prorate the payment of
the same benefits to seven (7) employees who had not served for the full 12 months. The
payments were made in 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2003, and 2004. According to
respondent, the prorated payment violates the rule against diminution of benefits under Article
100 of the Labor Code. Thus, they filed a complaint before the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board. The parties submitted the case for voluntary arbitration.
The voluntary arbitrator,ruled in favor of petitioner and found that the giving of the contested
benefits in full, irrespective of the actual service rendered within one year has not ripened into
a practice. On appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the grant of 13th month
pay, bonus, and leave encashment in full regardless of actual service rendered constitutes
voluntary employer practice and, consequently, the prorated payment of the said benefits does
not constitute diminution of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.
Issue:
WON there was a violation of Article 100 (prohibition against elimination or diminution of
benefits) ?
Ruling:
Any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by employees cannot be reduced, diminished,
discontinued or eliminated by the employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is
founded on the Constitutional mandate to "protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare," and "to afford labor full protection." Said mandate in turn is the basis of Article 4 of
the Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this
Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be rendered in favor of labor."
Facts:
Simbol was employed by the company on Oct 1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of
the company, whom he married. Prior to the marriage, Ongsitco advised the couple that should
they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant to a company policy to which
Simbol complied.
1. New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has a relative,
up to the 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by the company.
2. In case of two of our employees (both singles ,one male and another female)
developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and
then decided to get married, one of them should resign to preserve the policy
stated above.
Issue:
WON the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid
exercise of management prerogative?
Ruling:
Petitioners’ sole contention that "the company did not just want to have two or more of
itsemployees related between the third degree by affinity and/or consanguinity" is lame.
The requirement that a company policy must be reasonable under the circumstances to qualify
as a valid exercise of management prerogative. It is significant to note that in the case at bar,
respondents were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when
they married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking Section, could
be detrimental to its business operations. e. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the questioned rule without
valid justification, the employer can create policies based on an unproven presumption of a
perceived danger at the expense of an employee’s right to security of tenure. The questioned
policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate
effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a
showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The
failure of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy
cannot prejudice the employee’s right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.
Facts:
In 1978, Jesus Villamor (petitioner) , was employed by Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI).
On November 3, 2006, he was brought to Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital, Manila, due to dizziness
associated with numbness and weakness on his left arm and leg. His Cranial Computed
Tomography (CT) scan revealed that he had an "acute non-hemorrhage infarct on the right
pons/basal ganglia. After more than a week of confinement, petitioner was discharged from the
said hospital with diagnoses of Hypertension Stage 1; Cerebro-Vascular Disease (CVD) Acute,
Non-Hemorrhagic Infarct Right Pons and Right Basal Ganglia; Dyslipidemia (abnormal levels of
lipids carried by lipoproteins in the blood).
On March 9, 2007, petitioner filed before respondent SSS, Pasig City Branch, claims for sickness
benefits under the SSS law and the EC TID benefits under the EC law for his CVD or stroke,
Infarct Hypertension.Respondent SSS Pasig Branch granted his claim for sickness benefits under
the SSS law.However, it denied his claim for EC TTD benefits on the ground that there is no
causal relationship between his illness and his working conditions. And it was affirmed by the
CA.
Issue:
Ruling:
Jesus Villamor is entitled to his claim for EC TTD benefits under PD No. 626, as amended.
The Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides that for an illness or disease to be
compensable, it must be a result of occupational disease listed under the said rules with the
conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the
disease is increased by the working conditions. Cerebro-vascular accident and essential
hypertension are considered as occupational diseases he Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626, as
amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation between the work and
the illness which resulted in the respondent's disability. The open-ended Table of Occupational
Diseases requires no proof of causation. In general, a covered claimant suffering from an
occupational disease is automatically paid benefits. What the law requires is a reasonable work-
connection and not direct causal relation.