FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 110107. January 26, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, v s . DOLORES

LORENZO Y CORSINO , accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Martinez and Consigna for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT;

RULE; CASE AT BAR. — It is a well-entrenched rule that when such is the issue, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the ndings of the trial court considering that the latter
is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves
and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain
facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result
of the case. (People vs. Francisco, 213 SCRA 746 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA
227 [1992]; People vs. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613 [1992]). The trial court has the
singular opportunity to observe and consider certain potent aids in understanding and
weighing the testimony of witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture, and in ection of
the voice of the witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are not
incorporated into the record, the appellate court cannot avail of them and must
therefore rely on the good judgment of the trial court. (U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. 170
[1913]; People vs. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 [1993]). The appellant has not convinced us
that the trial court plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances which, if
considered, may affect the result of this case. We thus accept its assessment of the
evidence as correct and consider it binding, there being no showing that it was reached
arbitrarily. ( People vs. Santito, 201 SCRA 87 [1991]; People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164
[1992]). An evaluation thereof yields no cause for the application of the exception to the
settled rule.
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TESTIMONY OF A POLICE OFFICER;
WHEN MAY BE RELIED UPON. — Eclipse and the appellant both belonged to the same
police unit, the PNP at the Tuguegarao station. There is nothing in the records, and
more speci cally in the cross-examination of Eclipse and the direct examination of the
appellant, which suggests, even remotely, that Eclipse had any improper motive to
implicate a fellow police o cer in the commission of a serious crime or the slightest
bias against the appellant which would blemish his objectivity and truthfulness. If there
was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant because of esprit
de corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his o cial and public
duty as a peace o cer. It is settled that the absence of evidence as to an improper
motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed and that the
testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused had nothing to do
with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of human nature and
against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to falsely testify
against the accused.(People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA [1993])
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY MINOR INCONSISTENCIES. — Minor
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 inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they may,
even tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility because they erase any
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. ( People vs. Lase, supra at note 16; People vs.
Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 333 [1993]; People vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1 [1993])
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION; CONSTRUED; CASE AT BAR. —
Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the
testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the corroborative
evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but
the evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by law, e.g ., in treason
cases (Article 114, Revised Penal Code) the testimony of a single person, if credible
and positive and if it satis es the court as to the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict. (People vs. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 [1993]) In
determining the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not
numbered. (People vs. Romero, 119 SCRA 234 [1982]; People vs. Luces, 125 SCRA 813
[1983]; People vs. Canada, 144 SCRA 121 [1986]; People vs. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304
[1992]; People vs. Balajadia, 225 SCRA 22 [1993]) Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of
Court does not mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly
established by independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that
there should be some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart
from the confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof
would vanish if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other
evidence su cient to justify conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise
stated, the other evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish the
corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt. (People vs. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426 [1994])
5. ID.; ID.; CORPUS DELICTI; DEFINED. — Corpus delicti is the body (material
substance) upon which a crime has been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered
man or the charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the
substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a
certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been
burned, and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.
6. ID.; ID.; ADMISSION; CONFESSION; DISTINGUISHED. — It is clear from
Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there is a distinction between an
admission and a confession. These sections reads as follows: "SEC. 26. Admission of a
party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. . . . SEC. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him." In a confession, there is an
acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in criminal cases to statements
of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an acknowledgment of guilt of the
accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is charged. (U.S.
vs. Corrales, 28 Phil. 362 [1914]) Wharton defines confession as follows: "A confession
is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his guilt of the
crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of
facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is
but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insu cient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt."
Underhill distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows: "A confession is
de ned as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime charged or of the facts which
constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not a confession if the facts
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 acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts." While
Wigmore says: "A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused
in a criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of it."
(See U.S. vs. Lio Team, 23 Phil. 64 [1912])

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR. , J : p

For having allegedly killed her husband on 30 July 1990, accused-appellant

Dolores Lorenzo y Corsino, a policewoman, was charged with the crime of parricide in
an information 1 led with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, on 30
March 1992. The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2060-92-TUG and
raffled to Branch 5. The accusatory portion thereof reads as follows:

"That on or about July 30, 1990, in the Municipality of Tuguegarao,

Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, PO1 Dolores C. Lorenzo, armed with a bolo and a fan knife, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack and chop one, Agapito
Lorenzo, her own husband, in icting upon him several injuries on the different
parts of his body which caused his death.

That in the commission of the offense, the aggravating circumstance of

cruelty was present." cdasia

After due trial, the trial court promulgated on 24 February 1993 2 its judgment
nding the appellant guilty of the crime of parricide and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00.
At the trial, the prosecution presented barangay captain Isabelo Liban and SPO1
Jose Eclipse as its witnesses. The defense presented the appellant herself and Romeo
Racheta. The versions of both the prosecution and the defense are summarized by the
trial court as follows:

"The prosecution's evidence tells the following story:

Agapito Lorenzo and accused Dolores Lorenzo were spouses residing in
Looban, Barangay 12, Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Among their neighbors are
Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Romeo Racheta and Robert Santos. Cdpr

In the evening of July 30, 1990, SPO1 Jose Eclipse of the Tuguegarao PNP
Station was in Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan because that was his post for the
night. At about a little past 10:00 o'clock that evening, a tricycle driver went to
Policeman Eclipse and reported to him a stabbing incident in said Barangay 12;
Policeman Eclipse rushed to the reported crime scene. On his way, he met
PO1 Dolores Lorenzo, a policewoman of his own Station who immediately
surrendered to him a blood-stained bolo and a fan knife and told him, 'I killed my
husband'.
The two proceeded to where the victim was. In front of the store of
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 Barangay Captain Isabelo Liban, Policeman Eclipse saw Agapito sprawled on the
ground with blood all over his body.

Policeman Eclipse called for Barangay Captain Liban to come out of his
house. In the presence and within the hearing of said barangay o cial,
Policewoman Lorenzo again said, 'I'm surrendering because I killed my husband'.
Policeman Eclipse ordered somebody to get a tricycle to bring the lifeless
body of Agapito Lorenzo to a funeral parlor while he and Policewoman Lorenzo
went to the Tuguegarao PNP Station. Policeman Eclipse turned over
Policewoman Lorenzo together with the bolo and knife to the Desk O cer, SPO3
Urbano Aquino. Eclipse then orally made his report to the Desk O cer which was
noted down in the Police Blotter.

The defense painted another picture of the incident. Its theory is that it was
not Policewoman Lorenzo but a certain Robert Santos who killed Agapito. Here is
the defense's version of the incident.
In the afternoon of July 30, 1990, Agapito Lorenzo and his neighbor Robert
Santos were in the former's house passing the time over a bottle of beer grande.
When Policewoman Lorenzo arrived home from work, Agapito, in the presence of
Robert Santos, met her with the following intemperate questions: 'Your mother's
cunt, why do you arrive only now? Where did you come from?' To avoid further
scandal, Policewoman Lorenzo just keep quiet, went to change her clothes and
proceeded to the kitchen to prepare supper. Finding nothing to cook, she asked
permission from her husband to go to market.

Policewoman Lorenzo went to market and then immediately went back

home to cook what she bought. While cooking in the kitchen, she heard a heated
exchange of words between Robert Santos and her husband in the sala of their
house pertaining to some bullets and a hand grenade which the latter gave Robert
Santos. LibLex

Policewoman Lorenzo went to the sala to pacify the quarreling men only to
meet Robert Santos running out of the house with a bolo and being chased by
Agapito Lorenzo who was holding a knife in his hand and whose clothes were
splattered with blood. When Agapito overtook Robert, a struggle for the
possession of the bolo ensued between the two men.
While wrestling, Agapito dropped his knife. Policewoman Lorenzo picked it
up and tried to stab Robert with it but she was so overwhelmed by nervousness
that she collapsed into unconsciousness. Seconds later on, she regained
consciousness and found herself beside her dying husband.

Policewoman Lorenzo stood and picked up the knife and bolo. It was at
this precise time when Policeman Eclipse arrived at the scene of the incident.

Policewoman Lorenzo gave the knife and bolo to Policeman Eclipse. The
Policeman invited her to go with him to the Tuguegarao PNP Station. She obliged.
When the two arrived at the police station, Policeman Eclipse, in the presence of
Policewoman Lorenzo, reported to the Desk O cer that the latter killed her
husband. Since the policewoman had not yet fully recovered her composure, she
did not say anything." 3

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It found nothing on record which showed that their impartiality had been
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 vitiated or compromised or that they had any motive to falsely impute upon the
appellant the commission of the crime. It further declared that when the appellant
surrendered the knife and bolo to SPO1 Eclipse and volunteered the information that
she killed her husband, she made an extrajudicial confession and nothing more was
needed to prove her culpability. 4 The trial court held that the confession was
admissible for it was not made in violation of paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution. 5 The appellant was neither under police custody nor under investigation in
connection with the killing of her husband. LibLex

The trial court rejected the story of the defense and characterized it as "palpably
a put-up scenario . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality,
controverts logic and assails common sense." 6
"First, accused Policewoman Lorenzo testi ed that it is not true that she
confessed to Policeman Eclipse in the presence of Barangay Captain Liban that
she killed her husband. If her denial is true, why did she not correct or even protest
when Policeman Eclipse reported to the Desk O cer that she confessed having
killed her husband? Why did she not even try to correct the entry in the police
blotter containing said inculpatory report? On the contrary, by some inexplicable
quirk, she even let the cat out when she presented in evidence Exhibit "1". cdasia

Second, accused put forth the theory of her defense: it was not she but
Robert Santos who did her husband in. This theory is shot. If this is true, why did
she not tell it to Policeman Eclipse and Barangay Captain Liban at the scene of
the crime? Why did she withhold such a very vital information when she was
brought to the Tuguegarao PNP Station shortly after the incident? But the biggest
‘why’ is: Why did not the accused, wife of the slain man and policewoman at that,
file a criminal case against Robert Santos?

The accused's explanation was: she was still uncomposed when she
turned over the knife and bolo to Policeman Eclipse and even when she was in the
police station. She did not also le a case against Robert Santos because she
found herself the suspect and later on the accused.

These reasons do not cut ice. They are for the birds. No one with an
ordinary intelligence would buy such reasons.
Third, the accused never led a counter-a davit during the preliminary
investigation of this case. Not that a counter-a davit is obligatory but that it
afforded the accused the best opportunity to explain her innocence and to identify
the 'real killer' of her husband. Why did she not grab this chance — as normal
people in the same situation — would have done?

Fourth, accused version is simply implausible. According to Policewoman

Lorenzo, when she saw her husband Agapito chasing Robert out of the house,
Agapito's clothes were already bloodied. Since there is no proof at all that Robert
ever sustained any wound, the implication is that Agapito was already hacked
and stabbed by Robert inside the former's house. cdasia

It is therefore, di cult to believe that Agapito who already sustained

several wounds could chase Robert — and even harder to imagine that he
wrestled with Robert for the possession of the latter's bolo. But why, it may be
asked, should Agapito still try to divest Robert of his bolo when he (Agapito) was
holding a knife which he could have easily used against the latter during the
alleged clinching between the two?

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 Finally, it is very unnatural for 'assailant' Robert to have left his bolo before
running away from the scene of the crime. This is a concoction to provide an
explanation for the possession of the accused of a knife and a bolo.
Fifth, the version of accused and her witness Romeo Racheta are even at
variance at a very vital point. Thus, Policewoman Lorenzo said that when Agapito
was able to overtake Robert in front of the store of Barangay Captain Liban, the
two struggled for the possession of the bolo of Robert. Witness Racheta however
said that when Agapito chased Robert, he caught up with him when he was
already cornered. When Robert could no longer run anywhere else, he turned
around, faced Agapito and hacked and stabbed him many times. Such
inconsistency in the version of the two defense witnesses cannot but heighten
one's conviction that the defense theory is a conjured one." 7

The appellant appealed from the judgment to this Court and in her brief 8
contends that the trial court erred in:
"I. . . . GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ISABELO LIBAN AND SPO1 JOSE ECLIPSE.
II. . . . NOT HOLDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED WAS NOT PROVED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." 9

She discusses these jointly and, in support thereof, she asseverates that the
testimonies of Liban and Eclipse are inconsistent on material points, for while Liban
declared in court and stated in his sworn statement that he (Liban) came out of his
house and heard the appellant confess to Eclipse that she killed her husband, Eclipse
testi ed that Liban did not come out of his house. One of them, she continues, did not
tell the truth and argues that a testimony on Liban's presence was necessary to
corroborate Eclipe's testimony on her alleged confession, which would be devoid of any
evidentiary value without corroboration. cdasia

She pleads that this Court discredit both Liban and Eclipse because the
testimony of Liban was improbable while that of Eclipse "was not so rm and resolute
as to what was actually allegedly told him by the accused." At one time, while testifying,
he declared that the appellant told him that she "accidentally injured her husband," but
on another, he testi ed that the appellant told him that she "killed her husband." 1 0 Also,
as shown in the entry in the police blotter, 1 1 Eclipse was reported to have disclosed
that the appellant "voluntarily surrendered and asked him to bring her to the police
station because she allegedly killed her husband named Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together
with Robert Santos who first stabbed him"; yet, in his testimony in court he pinned down
only the appellant and mentioned nothing about Santos. Furthermore, she charges the
prosecution with suppression of evidence in not presenting as a witness another police
o cer who Eclipse said accompanied him to the scene of the crime and who used a
vehicle which they rode in going to the police station. 1 2
Meeting squarely the ratiocinations of the trial court in describing the story of the
defense as a "probably put-up scenario," the appellant asserts that it was error for the
trial court to hold her failure to correct the entry in the police blotter against her since
there is nothing in the records which clearly shows that she heard Eclipse making the
report to the desk o cer and that she saw the entry. The appellant also contends that
the trial court erred when it made capital of her alleged failure to le a criminal
complaint against Robert Santos since it was the police's duty to arrest and prosecute
Robert Santos, Eclipse having known of Robert Santos’ killing of her husband. Besides,
she was in detention all throughout and suffering from trauma. She avers that the trial
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 court erred when it held against her the failure to le her counter-a davit, since that
was not obligatory and her non- ling was in accord with her constitutional right to
remain silent. Finally, she contends that the conclusions drawn by the trial court in its
evaluation of her testimony and that of her witnesses are mere speculations.
The appellee agrees with the ndings of fact and conclusions of the trial court
and prays that the challenged decision be affirmed. cdasia

The pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellant's arguments is the
issue of the witnesses' credibility. It is a well-entrenched rule that when such is the
issue, appellate courts will generally not disturb the ndings of the trial court
considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 1 3 The trial court has the singular
opportunity to observe and consider certain potent aids in understanding and weighing
the testimony of witnesses, such as the emphasis, gesture, and in ection of the voice
of the witnesses while they are on the witness stand. As these are not incorporated into
the record, the appellate court cannot avail of them and must therefore rely on the good
judgment of the trial court. 1 4 The appellant has not convinced us that the trial court
plainly overlooked proved facts or circumstances which, if considered, may affect the
result of this case. We thus accept its assessment of the evidence as correct and
consider it binding, there being no showing that it was reached arbitrarily. 1 5 Our own
evaluation thereof yields no cause for the application of the exception to the settled
rule.
We agree with the trial court that prosecution witness SPO1 Jose Eclipse told
the truth when he declared under oath that the appellant surrendered to him a blood-
stained bolo and a fan knife and told him that she killed her husband. Eclipse happened
to be on his way to the scene of the stabbing incident which was reported to him by a
tricycle driver while he was in the performance of his o cial duty at his assigned post
in Barangay Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Eclipse and the appellant both belonged to
the same police unit, the PNP at the Tuguegarao station. There is nothing in the records,
and more speci cally in the cross-examination of Eclipse and the direct examination of
the appellant, which suggests, even remotely, that Eclipse had any improper motive to
implicate a fellow police o cer in the commission of a serious crime or the slightest
bias against the appellant which would blemish his objectivity and truthfulness.cdasia

If there was any bias, it should have been, logically, in favor of the appellant
because of esprit de corps. Eclipse did not allow that sentiment to compromise his
o cial and public duty as a peace o cer. It is settled that the absence of evidence as
to an improper motive strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that none existed and
that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credit, for, indeed, if an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it would be against the natural order of events and of
human nature and against the presumption of good faith for a prosecution witness to
falsely testify against the accused. 1 6
The appellant's emphasis on the inconsistency in the testimony of Eclipse as to
what she actually told him, i.e., that she "injured" her husband or "killed" him, is
misplaced; the latter word was used when the court asked him for the precise term
used by the appellant. 1 7
Nor is there merit to the claim that Isabelo Liban's testimony must corroborate
Eclipse's testimony or the confession of the appellant since without such corroboration
Eclipse's testimony would have no probative value. This theory could only be a product
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 of a misunderstanding of Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not su cient ground for conviction .
— An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be su cient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti."
cdasia

Note that what must be corroborated is the extrajudicial confession and not the
testimony of the person to whom the confession is made, and the corroborative
evidence required is not the testimony of another person who heard the confession but
the evidence of corpus delicti. Except when expressly required by law, 1 8 the testimony
of a single person, if credible and positive and if it satis es the court as to the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, is su cient to convict. 1 9 In determining the
value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. 2 0
As to the corroborative evidence of corpus delicti, the appellant herself does not
question its presence because she knows that it has been overwhelmingly established
in this case. Corpus delicti is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has
been committed, e.g., the corpse of a murdered man or the charred remains of a house
burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was
committed. It is made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for
example a man has died or a building has been burned, and (b) that some person is
criminally responsible for the act. Section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court does not
mean that every element of the crime charged must be clearly established by
independent evidence apart from the confession. It means merely that there should be
some evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the
confession. Otherwise, the utility of the confession as a species of proof would vanish
if it were necessary, in addition to the confession, to adduce other evidence su cient
to justify conviction independently of such confession. Otherwise stated, the other
evidence need not, independently of the confession, establish the corpus delicti beyond
a reasonable doubt. 2 1
Since the corroboration of Isabelo Liban’s testimony was unnecessary, we need not
discuss its intrinsic merits, more especially on its alleged inconsistencies vis-a-vis the
testimony of Eclipse which inconsistencies we, nevertheless, nd to be on minor matters.
Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses; on the contrary, they even
tend to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility because they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. 2 2
The claim of suppression of evidence has no merit. The testimony of the other
policeman whom Eclipse requested to get a vehicle could only be corroborative in
some respects but not of the fact of the surrender of the blood-stained bolo and fan
knife and of the appellant's telling Eclipse that she killed her husband since it was
explicitly shown that he was with Eclipse at the precise time of the surrender. The
prosecutor and the defense counsel asked no further questions of Eclipse to elicit
more on the presence of the other policeman. In any event, even if the latter were
present, his testimony would only be corroborative. Furthermore, it has never been
shown that the said policeman was not available to the defense. The presumption laid
down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced" does not apply when the testimony of the witness not
produced would only be corroborative, or when the said witness is available to the
defense because then the evidence would have the same weight against one party as
against the other. 2 3
We do not, however, agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's
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 declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an
admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that there
is a distinction between an admission and a confession. These sections reads as
follows:
"SEC. 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 33. Confession. — The declaration of an accused acknowledging

his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein,
may be given in evidence against him."

In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in

criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the offense
with which he is charged. 2 4 Wharton 2 5 defines confession as follows:
"A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement
by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment of
some fact or circumstance which in itself is insu cient to authorize a conviction,
and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt."
cdasia

Underhill 2 6 distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:

"A confession is de ned as an acknowledgment of guilt of the crime
charged or of the facts which constitute the crime; but it is an admission and not
a confession if the facts acknowledged raise an inference of guilt only when
considered with other facts."

While Wigmore 2 7 says:

"A confession is an acknowledgment in express words, by the accused in a
criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential part of
it." 2 8

Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible

against the appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts and
circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to disprove, by
strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove that she was not
guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court characterized her story as
"palpably a put-up scenario . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality,
controverts logic and assails common sense." The ve reasons enumerated by it to
support this conclusion are founded on or are inferred from facts duly established by
the prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on common experience, logic, and
common sense.
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant never confessed to Eclipse
that she killed her husband, she should have protested when Eclipse reported to the
desk o cer that she had confessed to the killing of her husband or she should have
attempted to correct the entry in the police blotter containing this inculpatory report.
The appellant demonstrated her penchant for falsehood when, in order to refute this
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 statement, she asserted in her brief that nothing in the record clearly shows that she
heard Eclipse making the report and that she read the entry in the police blotter. She
conveniently forgot that on cross-examination she admitted having heard Eclipse
making the report but claiming that she did not protest because she was not in her
right senses and was in a state of shock at the time. Thus: cdasia

"Prosecutor Sagucio:
Q Did the desk officer ever talk to you?
A No, sir.

Q So it was only PFC Eclipse who talked to the desk officer?

A Yes, Sir.
Q Within your hearing and you heard PFC Eclipse talked to the desk officer?
A Yes, Sir.

Q And what did PFC Eclipse report to the desk officer?

A The one that is appearing in the excerpt of the police blotter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Q When you said that you heard Pat. Eclipse reported to the desk o cer you
meant to say that you heard him telling the police o cer that you killed
your husband Agapito Lorenzo, Jr. together with Robert Santos who rst
stabbed him, is that not so? cdasia

A Yes, sir.
Court:
Proceed.
Pros. Sagucio:

Q You heard this and you did not make any comment?
A Yes, sir, but because at that time I was not in my right senses because I was
then shocked at that time." 2 9

The appellant's failure to assert, at any part of the entire event, from the time she
went with Eclipse to the police station up to the time she was committed to jail and
even thereafter until she took the witness stand, that it was not she who killed her
husband only serves to reinforce and strengthen this Court's respect for the trial court's
nding that her story that "it was not she but Robert Santos who did her husband in," is
"shot." We nd it incredible that a peace o cer and a wife of the victim would not
forthwith denounce or reveal the identity of the assailant if it were true that it was not
she who killed her husband. This Court has held that the testimony of the accused is
not credible where he has adopted an attitude of indifference relative to the crime he is
accused of and where he failed to inform the police authorities and the scal during the
investigation that it was not he but somebody else who committed the murder. 3 0
Even granting for the sake of argument that the appellant only surrendered a
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 blood-stained bolo and a fan knife but did not admit that she killed her husband, we nd
in this case several circumstances whose concordant combination and cumulative
effect 3 1 point to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty party. These
circumstances are the following: cdasia

1. A tricycle driver reported to Eclipse a stabbing incident and the latter

immediately proceeded to where it took place;
2. Eclipse met the appellant who had with her a blood-stained bolo and a
fan knife;
3. The appellant surrendered to Eclipse the blood-stained bolo and the
fan knife;
4. The appellant's husband lay dead nearby with nine chop wounds,
thirteen stab wounds, and nine incised wounds on different parts of
his body, with abrasions and multiple contusions as well; 3 2
5. Eclipse accompanied the appellant to the police station and, in her
presence, the former reported to the desk o cer that she
surrendered to him and told him that she had killed her husband; the
desk officer then entered this report in the police blotter;
6. Although the appellant heard the report, she did not protest to Eclipse
or except to the report; and
7. The appellant never asked the police authorities to investigate Robert
Santos for his complicity in the killing of her husband; despite the
unhampered opportunities for her to denounce Santos as the alleged
killer of her husband, she implicated Santos only when she testified on
21 January 1993, 3 3 or after the lapse of nearly two and one-half years
after the incident.
These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that points to the appellant, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person. The requirements then of Section 4, Rule 133 3 4 of the Rules of Court on
the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to convict the appellant are present. 3 5
To be appreciated in the appellant's favor, however, is the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. The penalty for parricide under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties.
In the light of the mitigating circumstance, the proper penalty which should be imposed
upon the appellant should be reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Section 2, Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code. cdasia

The challenged decision is then in accordance with the facts and the applicable
laws.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tuguegarao, Cagayan in Criminal Case No. 2060-92-TUG is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

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 Footnotes

1. Original Records (OR), 1; Rollo, 3.

2. OR, 102-113; Rollo, 11-22. Per Judge Hilarion L. Aquino.

3. OR, 102-105.

4. Rollo, 15.
5. It provides:

"SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel."

6. OR, 109.
7. OR, 109-112.

8. Rollo, 34-51.
9. Id., 36.
10. TSN, 30 September 1992, 6.

11. Exhibit "1."

12. TSN, 30 September 1992, 7; Rollo, 47.

13. People vs. Francisco, 213 SCRA 746 [1992]; People vs. Florida, 214 SCRA 227 [1992];
People vs. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613 [1992].
14. U.S. vs. Macuti, 26 Phil. 170 [1913]; People vs. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 [1993].
15. People vs. Santito, 201 SCRA 87 [1991]; People vs. Garcia, 209 SCRA 164 [1992].
16. People vs. Lase, 219 SCRA [1993].
17. TSN, 30 September 1992, 6.

18. E.g., in treason cases (Article 114, Revised Penal Code).

19. People vs. Kyamko, supra at note 14.
20. People vs. Romero, 119 SCRA 234 [1982]; People vs. Luces, 125 SCRA 813 [1983];
People vs. Canada, 144 SCRA 121 [1986]; People vs. Villalobos, 209 SCRA 304 [1992];
People vs. Balajadia, 225 SCRA 22 [1993].
21. People vs. Barlis, 231 SCRA 426 [1994].
22. People vs. Lase, supra at note 16; People vs. Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 333 [1993]; People
vs. Ducay, 225 SCRA 1 [1993].
23. People vs. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 [1992]; People vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992].
24. U.S. vs. Corrales, 28 Phil. 362 [1914].
25. 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 337 (12th ed. 1955).
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 26. 2 Underhill's Criminal Evidence § 385 (5th ed. 1956).
27. 3 Wigmore on Evidence § 821 (3d ed. 1940).

28. See U.S. vs. Lio Team, 23 Phil. 64 [1912].

29. TSN, 21 January 1993, 12-14.

30. People vs. Boduso, 60 SCRA 60 [1974].

31. People vs. Viernes, (unreported), 99 Phil. 1045 [1956].
32. Exhibits "A," "A-1," and "A-2"; OR, 15-17.

33. TSN, 21 January 1993, 3-7.

34. It provides:

"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt."
35. See People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991].

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