Saudia Arabian Airlines vs CA - Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict of laws that must be settled at

the outset. It maintains that private respondent's claim for alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant case for the application of the
law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the  lex loci delicti commissi rule. 34

On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based on Articles 19  35 and
21 36 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic law. 

In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by virtue of the employment
of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did transpire during her many occasions of
travel across national borders, particularly from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that
caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.

We thus find private respondent's assertion that the case is purely domestic, imprecise. A  conflicts problem
presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction 

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394 ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V. SAUDI
ARABIAN AIRLINES".

We find that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
suit.

Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon
City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of the litigant. Moreover, by hearing the case in the
Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties. The choice of
forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent) should be upheld.

Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her Complaint
and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of the court.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed several motions  praying for the dismissal of Morada's Amended
Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam. What is very patent and explicit from the
motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on
grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

WHETHER RESPONDENT APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN THIS CASE PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD
GOVERN.

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or
rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule."  The purpose of
"characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law. 

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact.  An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-
of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting
factor or point of contact, such as the  situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the
place of wrongdoing.

Here, we are convinced that there is reasonable basis for private respondent's assertion that although she was
already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense that she would merely testify in an
investigation of the charges she made against the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while
they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges, including
adultery and violation of Islamic laws and tradition.

Petitioner thereby allegedly facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of private respondent under the guise
of petitioner's authority as employer, taking advantage of the trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the alleged conviction and imprisonment of private respondent was
wrongful.

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of
contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or  lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give her due
and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of no moment.

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of  lex loci delicti commissi(law of the place where
the delict [tort] was committed), modern theories and rules on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh
judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find
here an occasion to apply the "State of the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d)
the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

There is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no question
that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign corporation
engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was
centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations.

Cases Jurisdiction:
Northwest Orient vs CA – WON the Philippines courts has jurisdiction

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the
invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of
summons effected at its home office in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese
Court did not, therefore acquire jurisdiction over it.

It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the procedural law of
Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process on
SHARP. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and
25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested
or authenticated copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly,
the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the
Japanese court must stand.

Alternatively in the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese

law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption  may be invoked. Applying it,
the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a
private foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines. Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides
that if the defendant is a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines, service may be made: (1) on its
resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, (2) if there is no such resident agent, on the
government official designated by law to that effect; or (3) on any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign corporation has designated an agent to receive summons, the designation is exclusive, and service of
summons is without force and gives the court no jurisdiction unless made upon him.

Where the corporation has no such agent, service shall be made on the government official designated by law, to
wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner in the case of a foreign insurance company; (b) the Superintendent of Banks,
in the case of a foreign banking corporation; and (c) the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the case of other
foreign corporations duly licensed to do business in the Philippines. Whenever service of process is so made, the
government office or official served shall transmit by mail a copy of the summons or other legal proccess to the
corporation at its home or principal office. 

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP profess to having had a resident agent authorized to receive court processes in
Japan. This silence could only mean, or least create an impression, that it had none. Hence, service on the
designated government official or on any of SHARP's officers or agents in Japan could be availed of.

As found by the Court of Appeals, it was the Tokyo District Court which ordered that summons for SHARP be
served at its head office in the Philippine's after the two attempts of service had failed.  16 The Tokyo District Court
requested the Supreme Court of Japan to cause the delivery of the summons and other legal documents to the
Philippines. Acting on that request, the Supreme Court of Japan sent the summons together with the other legal
documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan which, in turn, forwarded the same to the Japanese Embassy
in Manila . Thereafter, the court processes were delivered to the Ministry (now Department) of Foreign Affairs of
the Philippines, then to the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila, who
forthwith ordered Deputy Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the same on SHARP at its principal office in Manila. This
service is equivalent to service on the proper government official under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code. Hence, SHARP's contention that such manner of service is not
valid under Philippine laws holds no water.

Valmonte vs CA – WON petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

We hold that there was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte.

To provide perspective, it will be helpful to determine first the nature of the action filed against
petitioners Lourdes A. Valmonte and Alfredo D. Valmonte by private respondent, whether it is an
action in personam, in rem  or quasi in rem. This is because the rules on service of summons embodied in
Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the other of these actions.

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot be
personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14, §§7-8 is essential for the acquisition by
the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the
authority of the court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily abroad,
but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by leave of court, be made by
publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in an action in personam, who cannot be personally
served with summons, may be summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with
Rule 14, §8 or by publication as provided in §§ 17 and 18 of the same Rule.

In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an
action in personam cannot be brought because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding
decision.

On the other hand, if the action is in rem  or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the  res. If the
defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the country, summons may be served exterritorialy.

In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in rem  is that it has
jurisdiction over the res, i.e.  the personal status of the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or the
property litigated or attached.

Service of summons in the manner provided in §17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction
but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process, so that he will be informed of the
pendency of the action against him and the possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him
or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.

Here, private respondent's action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of
an action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant's interest
in a specific property and not to render a judgment against him. 

As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of
summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons
and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or
(3) in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.

Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done by
means of any of the first two modes, the question is whether the service on her attorney, petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified under the third mode, namely, "in any . . . manner the court may
deem sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as
through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides.

Asiavest vs CA – WON Hongkong acquire jurisdiction over Heras

No, the main argument raised against the Hong Kong judgment is that the Hong Kong Supreme Court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of HERAS. This involves the issue of whether summons was properly and
validly served on HERAS. It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
process upon the defendant are governed by the  lex fori or the law of the forum, 7  i.e., the law of Hong Kong in
this case. HERAS insisted that according to his witness Mr. Lousich, who was presented as an expert on Hong Kong
laws, there was no valid service of summons on him.

In his counter-affidavit,8 which served as his direct testimony per agreement of the parties, 9 Lousich declared that
the record of the Hong Kong case failed to show that a writ of summons was served upon HERAS in Hong Kong or
that any such attempt was made. On cross-examination by counsel for ASIAVEST, Lousich' testified that the Hong
Kong court authorized service of summons on HERAS outside of its jurisdiction, particularly in the Philippines. He
admitted also the existence of an affidavit of one Jose R. Fernandez of the Sycip Salazar Hernandez & Gatmaitan
law firm stating that he (Fernandez) served summons on HERAS.

Under Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the New Rules of Evidence, the record of public documents of a sovereign
authority, tribunal, official body, or public officer may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof, which must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. The certificate may be issued by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent, or any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his
office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

There is, however, nothing in the testimony of Mr. Lousich that touched on the specific law of Hong Kong in
respect of service of summons either in actions in rem or in personam, and where the defendant is either a
resident or nonresident of Hong Kong. In view of the absence of proof of the Hong Kong law on this particular
issue, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption shall come into play. It will
thus be presumed that the Hong Kong law on the matter is similar to the Philippine law.

An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability. An action  in rem  is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the person. 19 An action quasi in rem is one wherein an
individual is named as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property

In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a  resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court can
be acquired by personal service of summons as provided under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he
cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in
accordance with Section 8 of said Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of
service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; 21 (2) personal service outside the country,
with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court;  22 or (4) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.
However, in an action in personam wherein the defendant is a  non-resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service of summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. 24 This method of service is possible if such defendant is physically present in the
country. If he is not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his person and therefore cannot
validly try and decide the case against him.

On the other hand, in a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the   res.
Nonetheless summons must be served upon the defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process requirements. 27 Thus, where the defendant is a non-resident
who is not found in the Philippines and (1) the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) the action
relates to, or the subject matter of which is property in the Philippines in which the defendant has or claims a lien
or interest; (3) the action seeks the exclusion of the defendant from any interest in the property located in the
Philippines; or (4) the property of the defendant has been attached in the Philippines — service of summons may
be effected by (a) personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court,
or (c) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. 

In the case at bar, the action filed in Hong Kong against HERAS was  in personam, since it was based on his personal
guarantee of the obligation of the principal debtor. Before we can apply the foregoing rules, we must determine
first whether HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong

Significantly, in the pre-trial conference, the parties came up with stipulations of facts, among which was that "the
residence of defendant, Antonio Heras, is New Manila, Quezon City." With that stipulation of fact, ASIAVEST
cannot now claim that HERAS was a resident of Hong Kong at the time.

Accordingly, since HERAS was not a resident of Hong Kong and the action against him was, indisputably, one   in
personam, summons should have been personally served on him in Hong Kong. The extraterritorial service in the
Philippines was therefore invalid and did not confer on the Hong Kong court jurisdiction over his person. It follows
that the Hong Kong court judgment cannot be given force and effect here in the Philippines for having been
rendered without jurisdiction

St. Aviation vs Grand Air – WON the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent
by the service of summons upon its office in the Philippines.

The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our legal system are contained in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. – The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title to the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties. It may be repelled, among others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want
of notice to the party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. 3

Respondent, in assailing the validity of the judgment sought to be enforced, contends that the service of summons
is void and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon a defendant are
governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, 4 which in this case is the law of Singapore. Here,
petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons outside Singapore. In an Order dated
December 24, 1997, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons on the
Defendant by a method of service authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating process
issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati
City, or elsewhere in the Philippines."5 This service of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r.
4(2) of the Rules of Court 19966 of Singapore, which provides.

Xxxx

c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country for service of any originating process issued by
that country.

In the Philippines, jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, 7 his deputy or other
proper court officer either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant 8 or by substituted service.9 In this
case, the Writ of Summons issued by the Singapore High Court was served upon respondent at its office located at
Mercure Hotel (formerly Village Hotel), MIA Road, Pasay City. The Sheriff's Return shows that it was received on
May 2, 1998 by Joyce T. Austria, Secretary of the General Manager of respondent company. 10 But respondent
completely ignored the summons, hence, it was declared in default.

Considering that the Writ of Summons was served upon respondent in accordance with our Rules, jurisdiction was
acquired by the Singapore High Court over its person. Clearly, the judgment of default rendered by that court
against respondent is valid.

Pioneer vs Guadiz – WON the court acquire jurisdiction over PIL

PIL questions the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over it on two levels. First, that PIL is a foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines and because of this, the service of summons on PIL did not follow the mandated
procedure

The first level has two sub-issues: PIL’s transaction of business in the Philippines and the service of summons on
PIL. Section 12, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the manner by which summons may be
served upon a foreign juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines. Thus:

Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is a foreign juridical entity which has
transacted business in the Philippines, service may be made on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose, or, if there be no such agent, on the government official designated
by law to that effect, or any of its officers or agents within the Philippines.

As to the first sub-issue, PIL insists that its sole act of "transacting" or "doing business" in the Philippines consisted
of its investment in PPHI. Under Philippine law, PIL’s mere investment in PPHI does not constitute "doing
business." However, we affirm the lower courts’ ruling and declare that, based on the allegations in Todaro’s
complaint, PIL was doing business in the Philippines when it negotiated Todaro’s employment with PPHI. 

Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 7042, Foreign Investments Act of 1991, states:

The phrase "doing business" shall include soliciting orders, service contracts, opening offices, whether
called "liaison" offices or branches; appointing representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines
or who in any calendar year stay in the country for a period or periods totaling one hundred eighty [180]
days or more; participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of commercial
dealings or arrangements and contemplate to that extent the performance of acts or works, or the
exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution of commercial
gain or of the purpose and object of the business organization:

PIL’s alleged acts in actively negotiating to employ Todaro to run its pre-mixed concrete operations in the
Philippines, which acts are hypothetically admitted in PIL’s motion to dismiss, are not mere acts of a passive
investor in a domestic corporation. Such are managerial and operational acts in directing and establishing
commercial operations in the Philippines. The annexes that Todaro attached to his complaint give us an idea on the
extent of PIL’s involvement in the negotiations regarding Todaro’s employment.

Finally, the phrase "doing business in the Philippines" in the former version of Section 12, Rule 14 now reads "has
transacted business in the Philippines." The scope is thus broader in that it is enough for the application of the Rule
that the foreign private juridical entity "has transacted business in the Philippines." 26

As to the second sub-issue, the purpose of summons is not only to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, but also to give notice to the defendant that an action has been commenced against it and to afford it
an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against it. The requirements of the rule on summons must be
strictly followed; otherwise, the trial court will not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.

When summons is to be served on a natural person, service of summons should be made in person on the
defendant.27 Substituted service is resorted to only upon the concurrence of two requisites: (1) when the
defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time and (2) when there is impossibility of prompt
service as shown by the statement in the proof of service in the efforts made to find the defendant personally and
that such efforts failed.28

When summons is served on a foreign juridical entity, there are three prescribed ways: (1) service on its resident
agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, (2) service on the government official designated by law
to receive summons if the corporation does not have a resident agent, and (3) service on any of the corporation’s
officers or agents within the Philippines.30

In the present case, service of summons on PIL failed to follow any of the prescribed processes. PIL had no resident
agent in the Philippines. Summons was not served on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the
designated government agency, 31 since PIL is not registered with the SEC. Summons for PIL was served on De Leon,
Klepzig’s Executive Assistant. Klepzig is PIL’s "agent within the Philippines" because PIL authorized Klepzig to notify
Todaro of the cessation of his consultancy (Annexes "H" and "I"). 32 The authority given by PIL to Klepzig to notify
Todaro implies that Klepzig was likewise authorized to receive Todaro’s response to PIL’s notice. Todaro responded
to PIL’s notice by filing a complaint before the trial court.

However, summons was not served personally on Klepzig as agent of PIL. Instead, summons was served on De
Leon, Klepzig’s Executive Assistant. In this instance, De Leon was not PIL’s agent but a mere employee of Klepzig. In
effect, the sheriff33 resorted to substituted service. For symmetry, we apply the rule on substituted service of
summons on a natural person and we find that no reason was given to justify the service of PIL’s summons on De
Leon.

Thus, we rule that PIL transacted business in the Philippines and Klepzig was its agent within the Philippines.
However, there was improper service of summons on PIL since summons was not served personally on Klepzig.

WON should not acquire jurisdiction base on forum non conveniens

The doctrine of forum non-conveniens requires an examination of the truthfulness of the allegations in the
complaint. Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not mention forum non-conveniens as a
ground for filing a motion to dismiss. The propriety of dismissing a case based on  forum non-conveniens requires a
factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion
of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, the trial court should do so only after vital
facts are established to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance

European vs Ingenieburo - There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what constitutes
"doing" or "engaging in" or "transacting" business in the Philippines. Thus, it has often been held that a single act
or transaction may be considered as "doing business" when a corporation performs acts for which it was created
or exercises some of the functions for which it was organized. We have held that the act of participating in a
bidding process constitutes "doing business" because it shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in
business in the Philippines. In this regard, it is the performance by a foreign corporation of the acts for which it was
created, regardless of volume of business, that determines whether a foreign corporation needs a license or not.

Consequently, the German Consortium is doing business in the Philippines without the appropriate license as
required by our laws. By participating in the bidding conducted by the CDC for the operation of the waste
management center, the German Consortium exhibited its intent to transact business in the Philippines.

As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident corporations cannot file suits in the Philippines.

A corporation has legal status only within the state or territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a
corporation organized in another country has no personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to subject a
foreign corporation doing business in the country to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license from
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and appoint an agent for service of process. Without such license, it
cannot institute a suit in the Philippines

However, there are exceptions to this rule. In a number of cases,  we have declared a party estopped from
challenging or questioning the capacity of an unlicensed foreign corporation from initiating a suit in our courts.  In
said case, we held that a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without license may sue in Philippine
Courts a Philippine citizen or entity that had contracted with and benefited from it.

Hence, the party is estopped from questioning the capacity of a foreign corporation to institute an action in our
courts where it had obtained benefits from its dealings with such foreign corporation and thereafter committed a
breach of or sought to renege on its obligations. In the case at bar, petitioners have clearly not received any
benefit from its transactions with the German Consortium. In fact, there is no question that petitioners were the
ones who have expended a considerable amount of money and effort preparatory to the implementation of the
MOA. 
To rule that the German Consortium has the capacity to institute an action against petitioners even when the latter
have not committed any breach of its obligation would be tantamount to an unlicensed foreign corporation gaining
access to our courts for protection and redress. 

Forum Non Conveniens

Manila Hotel vs NLRC - We note that the main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions
and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that
respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all
cases involving our citizens can be tried here.

Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the
case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision. The conditions are unavailing in the case at bar.

Not Convenient. — We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the
case — from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The
inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are
not nationals of the Philippines. Neither .are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main
witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.

No power to determine applicable law. — Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law
governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the
application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made). 38

The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified his
acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the Palace
Hotel in the People's Republic of China.

No power to determine the facts. — Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged
illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing, People's Republic of China. The NLRC was
not in a position to determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected
operations of the Palace Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.

Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision. — Even assuming that a proper decision could
be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel.
The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with
summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.

This is not to say that Philippine courts and agencies have no power to solve controversies involving
foreign employers. Neither are we saying that we do not have power over an employment contract
executed in a foreign country. If Santos were an "overseas contract worker", a Philippine forum,
specifically the POEA, not the NLRC, would protect him.39 He is not an "overseas contract worker" a fact
which he admits with conviction.
Raytheon vs Rouzie - Petitioner mainly asserts that the written contract between respondent and BMSI included
a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It
also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute – namely, the parties and witnesses involved are
American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be presented is located outside the Philippines – that
renders our local courts inconvenient forums. Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute
necessitate the immediate application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a court, in conflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties are not precluded from
seeking remedies elsewhere.34 Petitioner’s averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient
to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual
determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is within the discretion of the
trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established,
to determine whether special circumstances require the court’s desistance.

Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the trial court, the Court of Appeals respected its conclusion that it can
assume jurisdiction over the dispute notwithstanding its foreign elements. In the same manner, the Court defers to
the sound discretion of the lower courts because their findings are binding on this Court.