evils sought to be remedied.

The purpose of the law in granting longevity pay to Judges and

Justices is to recompense them for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
services rendered in the judiciary. (In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of
His Longevity Pay, 518 SCRA 263 [2007])

——o0o——

G.R. No. 145842. June 27, 2008.*

EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B. COLAYCO, RUFINO L.

SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON CHEN, and KUOK KHOON TSEN, petitioners,  vs.  BF
CORPORATION, respondent.

G.R. No. 145873. June 27, 2008.*

CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. BF CORPORATION, respondent.

Evidence; Appeals; Certiorari; Basic is the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, affirming
that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on the Supreme Court and may not be reviewed on appeal,
except for the most compelling of reasons.—It should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered
relate to the correctness of the CA’s factual determinations, specifically on whether or not BF was in delay
and had come up with defective works, and whether or not petitioners were guilty of malice and bad faith. It
is basic that in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law may be presented by the parties
and reviewed by the Court. Just as basic is the rule that factual findings of the CA, affirmatory of that of the
trial court, are final and conclusive on the Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most
compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF

Corporation

speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties; and (7) the
CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant evidence and undisputed facts, that, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion.
Same; Best Evidence Rule; Words and Phrases;   The only actual rule that the term “best evidence”
denotes in the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced and
secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had.—The only actual
rule that the term “best evidence” denotes is the rule requiring that the original of a writing must, as a
general proposition, be produced and secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the
original cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:SEC.
3.  Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases: (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;  (b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice.
Same; Same; Same; Secondary Evidence; Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or
document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself; A  party may present
secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it
is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party.—Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of
Rule 130, which reads: SEC. 6.  When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control.—If the
document is in the custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce
it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss. Secondary evidence of the contents of a written
instrument or document refers to evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A

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party may present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or
destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance,
however, certain explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites; The conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of
the photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence are—(1) there is proof of the original
document’s execution or existence, (2) there is proof of the cause of the original document’s unavailability,
and, (3) the offeror is in good faith.—The circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under
Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of
the original document’s execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original document’s
unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith. While perhaps not on all fours because it involved a check,
what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, 436 SCRA 677 (2004), is very much apt, thus: x x x The mere
fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does
not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to
secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the
form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party
or  via  a  subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to
produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer
to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Actions; Restitution; Moot and Academic; While the Supreme Court may have recognized the validity of
the issuance of the desired restitution order, restitution cannot be made when allowing the same would not
serve any purpose, but only prolong an already protracted litigation.—It is true that the Court’s Decision of
August 11, 1998 in G.R. No. 132655 recognized the validity of the issuance of the desired restitution order. It
bears to emphasize, however, that the CA had since then decided CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the main case, on
the merits when it affirmed the underlying RTC Decision in Civil Case

28
 28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED

Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF

Corporation

No. 63435. This CA Decision on the original and main case effectively rendered our decision on the
incidental procedural matter on restitution moot and academic. Allowing restitution at this point would not
serve any purpose, but only prolong an already protracted litigation.
Commercial Law; Corporation Law; Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil; A corporation, upon coming
to existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons composing
it; Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders of nearly all of the capital stock of the corporation
is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of separate corporate personality.—The Court notes
that the appellate court, by its affirmatory ruling, effectively recognized the applicability of the doctrine on
piercing the veil of the separate corporate identity. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot allow
such application. A corporation, upon coming to existence, is invested by law with a personality separate
and distinct from those of the persons composing it. Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders
of nearly all of the capital stock of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of
separate corporate personality. Thus, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as corporate agents,
are not theirs but direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. Solidary liability on the part of
corporate officers may at times attach, but only under exceptional circumstances, such as when they act
with malice or in bad faith. Also, in appropriate cases, the veil of corporate fiction shall be disregarded when
the separate juridical personality of a corporation is abused or used to commit fraud and perpetrate a social
injustice, or used as a vehicle to evade obligations. In this case, no act of malice or like dishonest purpose is
ascribed on petitioner Roxas-del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the corporate veil.
Same; Same; Same; Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or acquire any pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors
or trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the
corporation, its stockholders or members and other persons.—The above conclusion would still hold even if
petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, at the time ESHRI defaulted in paying BF’s monthly progress bill, was still a
director, for,

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before she could be held personally liable as corporate director, it must be shown that she acted in a
manner and under the circumstances contemplated in Sec. 31 of the Corporation Code, which reads: Section
31. Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation or acquire any pecuniary interest in conflict  with their duty as such directors or
trustees shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation,
its stockholders or members and other persons.
Contracts; Principle of Mutuality of Contracts; Fundamental is the rule that contracts are binding only
among parties to an agreement; Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except
in cases where the rights and obligations are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by
provision of law.—Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the controversy between the
principal parties started in July 1992 when Roxas-del Castillo no longer sat in the ESHRI Board, a reality
BF does not appear to dispute. In fine, she no longer had any participation in ESHRI’s corporate affairs
when what basically is the ESHRI-BF dispute erupted. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that contracts
are binding only among parties to an agreement. Art. 1311 of the Civil Code is clear on this point: Article
1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases where the
rights and obligations are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the orders of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
   Quisumbing Torres for petitioners EDSA Shangri-La Hotel & Resort, Inc., et al.
    Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-Del
Castillo.
   Ponce Enrile, Reyes and Manalastas for respondent.

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30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before us are these two (2) consolidated petitions for review under Rule 45 to nullify certain
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
In the first petition, docketed as  G.R. No. 145842, petitioners Edsa Shangri-la Hotel and
Resort, Inc. (ESHRI), Rufo B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Kuok Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon
Tsen assail the Decision1dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, affirming
the Decision2 dated September 23, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 in Pasig
City in Civil Case No. 63435 that ordered them to pay jointly and severally respondent BF
Corporation (BF) a sum of money with interests and damages. They also assail the CA Resolution
dated October 25, 2000 which, apart from setting aside an earlier Resolution3 of August 13, 1999
granting ESHRI’s application for restitution and damages against bond, affirmed the aforesaid
September 23, 1996 RTC Decision.
In the second petition, docketed as  G.R. No. 145873, petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo
also assails the aforementioned CA Decision of November 12, 1999 insofar at it adjudged her
jointly and severally liable with ESHRI,  et al. to pay the monetary award decreed in the RTC
Decision.
Both petitions stemmed from a construction contract denominated as  Agreement for the
Execution of Builder’s Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel Project4 that ESHRI and BF executed
for the construction of the EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, 1991. Among other things, the
contract stipulated for the payment of the contract price on the basis of the

_______________

1  Rollo  (G.R. No. 145842), pp. 96-122. Penned by Associate Justice Omar U. Amin and concurred in by Associate
Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Jose L. Sabio, Jr.
2 Id., at pp. 163-192.
3 Id., at pp. 450-454.
4 Id., at pp. 143-148.

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 Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
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work accomplished as described in the monthly progress billings. Under this arrangement, BF
shall submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure the work
accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for that month’s progress billing.5
In a memorandum-letter dated August 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the collection procedure
BF was to follow, to wit: (1) submission of the progress billing to ESHRI’s Engineering
Department; (2) following-up of the preparation of the Progress Payment Certificate with the
Head of the Quantity Surveying Department; and (3) following-up of the release of the payment
with one Evelyn San Pascual. BF adhered to the procedures agreed upon in all its billings for the
period from May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, submitting for the purpose the required Builders Work
Summary, the monthly progress billings, including an evaluation of the work in accordance with
the Project Manager’s Instructions (PMIs) and the detailed valuations contained in the Work
Variation Orders (WVOs) for final re-measurement under the PMIs. BF said that the values of
the WVOs were contained in the progress billings under the section “Change Orders.”6
From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of 19 progress billings following the
procedure agreed upon. Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13, ESHRI paid BF
PhP 86,501,834.05.7
According to BF, however, ESHRI, for Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not re-measure the
work done, did not prepare the Progress Payment Certificates, let alone remit payment for the
inclusive periods covered. In this regard, BF claimed having been misled into working
continuously on the project by ESHRI which gave the assurance about the Progress Payment
Certificates already being processed.

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 97-98.

6 Id., at pp. 98-99.
7 Id., at p. 100.

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32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

After several futile attempts to collect the unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26, 1993, before
the RTC a suit for a sum of money and damages.
In its defense, ESHRI claimed having overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13 and, by
way of counterclaim with damages, asked that BF be ordered to refund the excess payments.
ESHRI also charged BF with incurring delay and turning up with inferior work accomplishment.

The RTC found for BF

On September 23, 1996, the RTC, on the main finding that BF, as plaintiff a quo, is entitled to
the payment of its claim covered by Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and to the retention money
corresponding to Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 11, with interest in both instances, rendered judgment
for BF. The fallo of the RTC Decision reads:
 “WHEREFORE, defendants [EHSRI], Ru[f]o B. Colayco, Rufino L. Samaniego, Cynthia del Castillo, Kuok
Khoon Chen, and Kuok Khoon Tsen, are jointly and severally hereby ordered to:
1. Pay plaintiff the sum of  P24,780,490.00 representing unpaid construction work
accomplishments under plaintiff’s Progress Billings Nos. 14-19;
2. Return to plaintiff the retention sum of P5,810,000.00;
3. Pay legal interest on the amount of  P24,780,490.80 representing the construction work
accomplishments under Progress Billings Nos. 14-19 and on the amount of P5,810,000.00 representing
the retention sum from date of demand until their full Payment;
4. Pay plaintiff  P1,000,000.00 as moral damages,  P1,000,000.00 as exemplary
damages, P1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and cost of the suit.”8

_______________

8 Supra note 2, at p. 192.

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According to the RTC, ESHRI’s refusal to pay BF’s valid claims constituted evident bad faith
entitling BF to moral damages and attorney’s fees.
ESHRI subsequently moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the RTC,
prompting ESHRI to appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399.
Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. CV No. 57399,  the following events and/or incidents
transpired:
(1) The trial court,  by Order dated  January 21, 1997, granted BF’s motion for execution
pending appeal. ESHRI assailed this order before the CA via a petition for  certiorari, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 43187.9Meanwhile, the branch sheriff garnished from ESHRI’s bank account
in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) the amount of PhP 35 million.
(2) On March 7, 1997, the CA issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187 a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the trial court from carrying out its January 21, 1997 Order upon ESHRI’s
posting of a PhP 1 million bond. In a supplemental resolution issued on the same day, the CA
issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing the trial court judge and/or his
branch sheriff acting under him (a) to lift all the garnishments and levy made under the enjoined
order of execution pending appeal; (b) to immediately return the garnished deposits to PNB
instead of delivering the same to ESHRI; and (c) if the garnished deposits have been delivered to
BF, the latter shall return the same to ESHRI’s deposit account.
(3) By a Decision dated June 30, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187, the CA set aside the trial
court’s January 21, 1997 Order. The CA would later deny BF’s motion for reconsideration.

_______________

9 Rollo (G.R. No. 145842), p. 101.

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34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation
 (4) Aggrieved, BF filed before this Court a petition for review of the CA Decision, docketed
as  G.R. No. 132655.10On August 11, 1998, the Court affirmed the assailed decision of the CA
with the modification that the recovery of ESHRI’s garnished deposits shall be against BF’s
bond.11
We denied the motions for reconsideration of ESHRI and BF.
(5) Forthwith, ESHRI filed, and the CA by Resolution of August 13, 1999 granted, an
application for restitution or damages against BF’s bond. Consequently, BF and Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc., the bonding company, filed separate motions for reconsideration.
On November 12, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the CA rendered a Decision resolving (1) the
aforesaid motions of BF and its surety and (2) herein petitioners’ appeal from the trial court’s
Decision dated September 23, 1996. This November 12, 1999 Decision, finding for BF and now
assailed in these separate recourses, dispositively reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED  in toto.  This Court’s
Resolution dated 13 August 1999 is reconsidered and set aside, and defendants-appellants’ application for
restitution is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”12

The CA predicated its ruling on the interplay of two main reasons. First, the issues the parties
raised in their respective briefs were, for the most part, factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no
reason to disturb the case disposition of the RTC, inclusive of its award of damages and attorney’s
fees and the reasons underpinning the award. Second, BF had sufficiently established its case by
preponderance of evidence. Part of

_______________

10 Id., at p. 102.
11 Id., at pp. 377-386; BF Corporation v. ESHRI, G.R. No. 132655, August 11, 1998, 294 SCRA 109.
12 Supra note 1, at p. 121.

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what it had sufficiently proven relates to ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to re-measure BF’s
later work accomplishments and pay the same. On the other hand, ESHRI had failed to prove the
basis of its disclaimer from liability, such as its allegation on the defective work accomplished by
BF.
Apropos  ESHRI’s entitlement to the remedy of restitution or reparation arising from the
execution of the RTC Decision pending appeal, the CA held that such remedy may peremptorily
be allowed only if the executed judgment is reversed, a situation not obtaining in this case.
Following the denial by the CA, per its Resolution13dated October 25, 2000, of their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners are now before the Court, petitioner del Castillo opting, however, to
file a separate recourse.
G.R. No. 145842
In G.R. No. 145842, petitioners ESHRI, et al. raise the following issues for our consideration:
 I. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in disregarding issues of law raised by
petitioners in their appeal [particularly in admitting in evidence photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to
19, PMIs and WVOs].
II. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in not holding respondent guilty of
delay in the performance of its obligations and, hence, liable for liquidated damages [in view that
respondent is guilty of delay and that its works were defective].
III. Whether or not the [CA] committed grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioners guilty of malice
and evidence bad faith, and in awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees to respondent.
IV. Whether or not the [CA] erred in setting aside its Resolution dated August 13, 2000.14

_______________
13 Rollo (G.R. No. 145842), p. 124.
14 Id., at pp. 24-25.

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Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

The petition has no merit.

Prefatorily, it should be stressed that the second and third issues tendered relate to the
correctness of the CA’s factual determinations, specifically on whether or not BF was in delay and
had come up with defective works, and whether or not petitioners were guilty of malice and bad
faith. It is basic that in an appeal by  certiorari  under Rule 45, only questions of law may be
presented by the parties and reviewed by the Court.15  Just as basic is the rule that factual
findings of the CA, affirmatory of that of the trial court, are final and conclusive on the Court and
may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both parties; and (7) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
evidence and undisputed facts, that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.16
In our review of this case, we find that none of the above exceptions obtains. Accordingly, the
factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, that there was delay on the part of
ESHRI, that there was no proof that BF’s work was defective, and that petitioners were guilty of
malice and bad faith, ought to be affirmed.

_______________

15  Allied Banking Corporation v. Quezon City Government, G.R. No. 154126, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 303,
316; Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Santamaria, G.R. No. 139885, January 13, 2003, 395 SCRA 84, 92.
16 Dungaran v. Koschnicke, G.R. No. 161048, August 31, 2005, 468 SCRA 676, 685; Larena v. Mapili, G.R. No. 146341,
August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 484.

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 Admissibility of Photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, PMIs and WVOs
Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily the trial court, on the matter of the admission in
evidence of the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the complementing PMIs and
the WVOs. According to petitioners, BF, before being allowed to adduce in evidence the
photocopies adverted to, ought to have laid the basis for the presentation of the photocopies as
secondary evidence, conformably to the best evidence rule.
Respondent BF, on the other hand, avers having complied with the laying-the-basis
requirement. Defending the action of the courts below in admitting into evidence the photocopies
of the documents aforementioned, BF explained that it could not present the original of the
documents since they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over to BF
despite requests.
We agree with BF. The only actual rule that the term “best evidence” denotes is the rule
requiring that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced17  and
secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original cannot be had. Rule
130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best evidence rule:
“SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.—When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;

_______________

17 Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., G.R. No. 143338, July 29, 2005, 465
SCRA 117, 131; citing McCormick, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW ON EVIDENCE 409 (1954).

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Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom
the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice”; (Emphasis
added.)

Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:

“SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control.—If the document is in the
custody or under control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary evidence may
be presented as in the case of loss.”

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to evidence

other than the original instrument or document itself.18 A party may present secondary evidence
of the contents of a writing not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in
the custody or under the control of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain
explanations must be given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
In our view, the trial court correctly allowed the presentation of the photocopied documents in
question as secondary evidence. Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the required basis for
presenting the photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 instead of their originals has to be
dismissed. The stenographic notes of the following exchanges between Atty. Andres and Atty.
Autea, counsel for BF and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF had complied with the
requirements:
ATTY. ANDRES:
During the previous hearing of this case, your Honor, likewise, the witness testified that certain exhibits namely, the
Progress Payment Certificates and the Progress Billings the originals of these

_______________

18 R.J. Francisco, Basic Evidence 283 (1991).

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documents were transmitted to ESHRI, all the originals are in the possession of ESHRI since these are internal documents
and I am referring specifically to the Progress Payment Certificates. We requested your Honor, that in order that
plaintiff [BF] be allowed to present secondary original, that opposing counsel first be given opportunity to
present the originals which are in their possession. May we know if they have brought the originals and whether
they will present the originals in court, Your Honor. (Emphasis added.)
ATTY. AUTEA:
We have already informed our client about the situation, your Honor, that it has been claimed by plaintiff that some of
the originals are in their possession and our client assured that, they will try to check. Unfortunately, we have not heard
from our client, Your Honor.

Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence
of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to
produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI
was not inclined to produce them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of
Rule 130. In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the
photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is
proof of the original document’s execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the
original document’s unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.19 While perhaps not on all
fours because it involved a check, what the Court said in Magdayao v. People, is very much apt,
thus:
“x x x To warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody
or control of the adverse

_______________

19 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 5.

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40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or
refuses to produce the same in court and that the offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence.
x x x x
 The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is
offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in
his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice
may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient
time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily
offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.”20  (Emphasis
supplied.)

On the Restitution of the Garnished Funds

We now come to the propriety of the restitution of the garnished funds. As petitioners
maintain, the CA effectively, but erroneously, prevented restitution of ESHRI’s improperly
garnished funds when it nullified its own August 13, 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 43187.
In this regard, petitioners invite attention to the fact that the restitution of the funds was in
accordance with this Court’s final and already executory decision in G.R. No. 132655, implying
that ESHRI should be restored to its own funds without awaiting the final outcome of the main
case. For ease of reference, we reproduce what the appellate court pertinently wrote in its
Resolution of August 13, 1999:
“BASED ON THE FOREGOING, the Application (for Restitution/Damages against Bond for Execution
Pending Appeal) dated May 12, 1999 filed by [ESHRI] is  GRANTED. Accordingly, the surety of [BF],
STRONGHOLD Insurance Co., Inc., is ORDERED to PAY the sum of [PhP 35 million] to [ESHRI] under its
SICI Bond.

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20 G.R. No. 152881, August 17, 2004, 436 SCRA 677, 684-685.

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x x x In the event that the bond shall turn out to be insufficient or the surety (STRONGHOLD) cannot be
made liable under its bond, [BF], being jointly and severally liable under the bond
is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of [PhP 35 million] representing the garnished deposits of the bank
account maintained by [ESHRI] with the [PNB] Shangri-la Plaza Branch, Mandaluyong City. Otherwise,
this Court shall cause the implementation of the Writ of Execution dated April 24, 1998 issued in Civil Case
No. 63435 against both [BF], and/or its surety, STRONGHOLD, in case they should fail to comply with these
directives.
SO ORDERED.”21

Petitioners’ contention on the restitution angle has no merit, for, as may be recalled, the CA,
simultaneously with the nullification and setting aside of its August 13, 1999 Resolution,
affirmed, via its assailed November 12, 1999 Decision, the RTC Decision of September 23, 1996,
the execution pending appeal of which spawned another dispute between the parties. And as may
be recalled further, the appellate court nullified its August 13, 1999 Resolution on the basis of
Sec. 5, Rule 39, which provides:
“Sec. 5. Effect of reversal of executed judgment.—Where the executed judgment is reversed totally or
partially, or annulled, on appeal or otherwise, the trial court may, on motion, issue such orders of restitution
or reparation of damages as equity and justice may warrant under the circumstances.”
 On the strength of the aforequoted provision, the appellate court correctly dismissed ESHRI’s
claim for restitution of its garnished deposits, the executed appealed RTC Decision in Civil Case
No. 63435 having in fact been upheld in toto.
It is true that the Court’s Decision of August 11, 1998 in G.R. No. 132655 recognized the
validity of the issuance of the desired restitution order. It bears to emphasize, however, that the
CA had since then decided CA-G.R. CV No. 57399, the

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21  Supra note 3, at p. 453.

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Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

main case, on the merits when it affirmed the underlying RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 63435.
This CA Decision on the original and main case effectively rendered our decision on the incidental
procedural matter on restitution moot and academic. Allowing restitution at this point would not
serve any purpose, but only prolong an already protracted litigation.
G.R. No. 145873
Petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, in her separate petition, excepts from the CA Decision affirming,
in its entirety, the RTC Decision holding her, with the other individual petitioners in G.R. No.
145842, who were members of the Board of Directors of ESHRI, jointly and severally liable with
ESHRI for the judgment award. She presently contends:
I. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT
ADJUDGING PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE TO RESPONDENT VOID FOR NOT STATING THE
FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR SUCH AWARD.
II. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT AS FORMER DIRECTOR, PETITIONER CANNOT BE
HELD PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR ANY ALLEGED BREACH OF A CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY
THE CORPORATION.
III. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD
OF MORAL DAMAGES.
IV. THE [CA] ERRED IN HOLDING PETITIONER PERSONALLY LIABLE TO RESPONDENT FOR
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
V. THE [CA] ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ANY AWARD
OF ATTORNEY’S FEES.22

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22 Rollo (G.R. No. 145873), p. 16.

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 First off, Roxas-del Castillo submits that the RTC decision in question violated the
requirements of due process and of Sec. 14, Article VII of the Constitution that states, “No
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based.”
Roxas-del Castillo’s threshold posture is correct. Indeed, the RTC decision in question, as
couched, does not provide the factual or legal basis for holding her personally liable under the
premises. In fact, only in the dispositive portion of the decision did her solidary liability crop up.
And save for her inclusion as party defendant in the underlying complaint, no reference is made
in other pleadings thus filed as to her liability.
The Court notes that the appellate court, by its affirmatory ruling, effectively recognized the
applicability of the doctrine on piercing the veil of the separate corporate identity. Under the
circumstances of this case, we cannot allow such application. A corporation, upon coming to
existence, is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct from those of the persons
composing it. Ownership by a single or a small group of stockholders of nearly all of the capital
stock of the corporation is not, without more, sufficient to disregard the fiction of separate
corporate personality.23  Thus, obligations incurred by corporate officers, acting as corporate
agents, are not theirs but direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. Solidary
liability on the part of corporate officers may at times attach, but only under exceptional
circumstances, such as when they act with malice or in bad faith.24 Also, in appropriate cases, the
veil of corporate fiction shall be disregarded when the separate juridical personality of a
corporation is abused or used to commit fraud and perpetrate a social injus-

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23 Union Bank of the Philippines v. Ong, G.R. No. 152347, June 21, 2006, 491 SCRA 581, 602.
24 Petron Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 154532, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 596,
613-614.

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Edsa Shangri-La Hotel and Resort, Inc. vs. BF
Corporation

tice, or used as a vehicle to evade obligations.25  In this case, no act of malice or like dishonest
purpose is ascribed on petitioner Roxas-del Castillo as to warrant the lifting of the corporate veil.
The above conclusion would still hold even if petitioner Roxas-del Castillo, at the time ESHRI
defaulted in paying BF’s monthly progress bill, was still a director, for, before she could be held
personally liable as corporate director, it must be shown that she acted in a manner and under
the circumstances contemplated in Sec. 31 of the Corporation Code, which reads:
“Section 31. Directors or trustees who willfully or knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts
of the corporation or acquire any pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees
shall be liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.” (Emphasis ours.)

We do not find anything in the testimony of one Crispin Balingit to indicate that Roxas-del
Castillo made any misrepresentation respecting the payment of the bills in question. Balingit, in
fact, testified that the submitted but unpaid billings were still being evaluated. Further, in the
said testimony, in no instance was bad faith imputed on Roxas-del Castillo.
 Not lost on the Court are some material dates. As it were, the controversy between the
principal parties started in July 1992 when Roxas-del Castillo no longer sat in the ESHRI Board,
a reality BF does not appear to dispute. In fine, she no longer had any participation in ESHRI’s
corporate affairs when what basically is the ESHRI-BF dispute erupted. Familiar and
fundamental is the rule that contracts are binding only among parties to an agreement. Art. 1311
of the Civil Code is clear on this point:

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25 Enriquez Security Services, Inc. v. Cabotaje, G.R. No. 147993, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 169, 175.

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“Article 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in cases
where the rights and obligations are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of
law.”

In the instant case, Roxas-del Castillo could not plausibly be held liable for breaches of
contract committed by ESHRI nor for the alleged wrongdoings of its governing board or corporate
officers occurring after she severed official ties with the hotel management.
Given the foregoing perspective, the other issues raised by Roxas-del Castillo as to her liability
for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are now moot and academic.
And her other arguments insofar they indirectly impact on the liability of ESHRI need not
detain us any longer for we have sufficiently passed upon those concerns in our review of G.R. No.
145842.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 145842 is DISMISSED, while the petition in G.R. No.
145873 is GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the CA in
CA-G.R. CV No. 57399 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioner in G.R. No.
145873, Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo, is absolved from any liability decreed in the RTC Decision
dated September 23, 1996 in Civil Case No. 63435, as affirmed by the CA.
SO ORDERED.

Carpio-Morales (Actg. Chairperson), Tinga, Reyes** and Brion, JJ., concur.

Petition in G.R. No. 145842 dismissed, while in G.R. No. 145873 granted.

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** Additional member as per April 16, 2008 Zero Backlog Raffle.