1605Scheina 10/7/97 9:39 AM Page 95

Argentine
Jointness
and the Malvinas
By R O B E R T L. S C H E I N A

conflict, but it did not exist ei-

ther strategically or doctri-
nally. In virtually every case it
was the product of initiatives
by mid-level officers who put
aside service parochialism to
confront a common enemy.
There are a number of specific
illustrations which stand out.
The Argentine air force
operated the only tankers in
the inventory. The two KC–
130s were essential to air
strikes against the British fleet
whether carried out by air
force or naval planes. For ex-
ample, Skyhawks (flown by
both services) had at most a
few minutes over their targets
if not refueled in the air. The
Malvinas were barely within
Royal Navy

range of the attack aircraft of

either service. In addition,
HMS Yarmouth training every mission flown by the
hoses on HMS Ardent navy’s Exocet-armed Super
which burns out of

I
dentity is as basic to an institution as it Etendards required at least one air-to-air re-
control after being hit
by Argentine air force
is to those who comprise it, and once es- fueling. These planes carried out five at-
and navy planes. tablished identity can assume greater tacks, the second of which sank HMS
importance than survival itself. This is Sheffield and the fourth Atlantic Conveyor.
particularly true of the military. The Argen- The last Super Etendard attack on May 30,
tine experience in the Malvinas (Falklands) 1982, needed a triple refueling to strike over
reveals that military institutions must evolve
in order to succeed and that adherence to in- Robert L. Scheina currently holds the George C.
stitutional identity can be fatal if main- Marshall Chair of Strategy at the Industrial
tained at all costs. Jointness existed at the College of the Armed Forces. He has published
operational and tactical levels within the Ar- widely on Latin American naval and maritime
gentine armed forces during the Malvinas affairs, including Latin America: A Naval History,
1810–1987.

Summer 1994 / JFQ 95

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1605Scheina 10/7/97 9:39 AM Page 96

ARGENTINE JOINTNESS

Super Etendard with 500 miles from base and to circle and ap-
Exocet missile prior to proach from the east. Without the air force,
attack on the morning Argentine naval aviation could not have
of May 4. sunk HMS Sheffield, Atlantic Conveyor, and
HMS Ardent nor have damaged other ships.1
The defense of the airfield at Puerto Ar-
gentina (Port Stanley) was also joint. The air
force contributed search radar; the navy
communication, plotters, and direction per-
sonnel; and the army twin barrel, radar-con-

Argentine Navy
trolled Oerlikon Contraves 35mm guns. Fol-
lowing an initial attack on May 1 by British

Close-up view of dam-

age to HMS Sheffield
(note Chaff rocket
launchers which were
part of a system de-
signed to offer protec-
tion from missiles like
Exocets).

U.K. Ministry of Defence

Chronology
April 2 Task Force 40 puts Argentine forces ashore April 21 South Georgia operation begins May 2 General Belgrano sunk on orders of War
near Port Stanley; Moody Brooks Barracks and Cabinet with loss of 321 Argentine sailors
April 25 South Georgia recaptured by British forces
Government House seized May 4 HMS Sheffield sunk; first Sea Harrier shot down
April 29 British task force arrives at exclusion zone
April 5 British carrier group sails from Portsmouth May 7 total exclusion zone extended to 12 miles off
April 30 total exclusion zone comes into force
April 12 maritime exclusion zone comes into effect Argentine coast
around Falklands May 1 initial SAS and SBSD landings; first raid on Port
May 9 trawler Narwhal attacked
Stanley by Sea Harriers and naval bombardment
April 14 Argentine fleet leaves Puerto Belgrano

96 JFQ / Summer 1994

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Scheina

Vulcans and Harriers, the latter had to control system and then mounted them on
change tactics from close-in bombing to less old trailers and christened them Instalación
accurate lob bombing. This was due largely de Tiro Berreta (a do-it-yourself firing system).
to the effective Argentine anti-aircraft de- It took an air force C–130 three attempts to
fenses which were credited with shooting get the system to the Malvinas. Once on the
down five Harriers, plus a few Argentine air- island, the system was mated to an army
craft which strayed too close. Importantly, Rasit radar operated by a marine officer. The
the defenders kept the airfield partially oper- first attempt to fire a missile failed, perhaps
ational throughout the entire conflict. The due to damage sustained in transit. A second
fact that in spite of British activity an Electra missile veered sharply to the right because of
carrying supplies was able to land on June a bad connection. On June 12, two days be-
14 (the day Port Stanley fell) testifies to the fore the fall of Port Stanley, a third missile
success of this joint effort.2 slammed into HMS Glamorgan.3
Another success that can be attributed Other cases of Argentine jointness arose
to jointness was the Exocet missile which hit when air force attack aircraft trained against
the destroyer HMS Glamorgan. In April, while navy type 42 destroyers (the same class of
tensions were building over the Argentine ship found in the British fleet); the air force
occupation of the Malvinas, the Argentine and navy shared meager reconnaissance as-
navy removed two Exocet missiles and sets; and the air force carried navy Exocets
launchers from the destroyer Santisima between Rio Grande and Espora for mainte-
Trinidad. It married these to a jury-rigged fire nance. Unfortunately for the Argentine
cause such ad hoc efforts on the operational
and tactical levels were too few and too late,
and could not make up for a lack of joint
Super Etendard Attack on HMS Sheffield (May 4, 1982) strategic planning and doctrine that was
necessary to overcome the inertia fostered
by each service’s institutional identity.
Today, the Argentines are fully aware of
the price that they paid for this lack of joint-
ness. In 1982 the last military junta tasked a
retired army general, Benjamin Rattenbach,
to conduct an investigation of the war effort.
Rattenbach, renowned for his professional-
ism, headed a joint team which produced a
secret report. Eventually, many of the report’s
findings were leaked to the press and, in
1988, a group of veterans published the full
report under the title of Informe Rattenbach: el
drama de Malvinas. The report concluded that
there was a lack of joint training and plan-
ning, and what did exist was purely theoreti-
cal and unable to be (translated) into action.4

Source: Robert L. Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987 (Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1987), p. 267.

May 12 QE2 leaves Southampton with May 28 Battle of Goose Green; 5th Brigade trans-ships June 8 Disaster at Fitzroy; HMS Galahad and HMS
5th Brigade on board from QE2 at South Georgia Tristam bombed with loss of 51 crewmen
May 14 SAS attack on Pebble Island May 29 42d Commando lands on Mount Kent June 11 Battle of Port Stanley begins; Mount Longdon,
Harriet, and Two Sisters
May 21 San Carlos landing begins. HMS Ardent sunk; June 1 5th Brigade disembarks at San Carlos
16 Argentine aircraft lost June 12 Battle of Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge
June 2 2d Para leapfrogs to Bluff Cove
May 23 Antelope sunk; 7 Argentine aircraft lost June 14 Argentine forces surrender at Port Stanley
June 6 Scots Guards land at Fitzroy; Welsh Guards
May 25 HMS Coventry and Atlantic Conveyor sunk embark for same Source: Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the
Falklands (London: Michael Joseph, 1983), pp.341– 43.

Summer 1994 / JFQ 97

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ARGENTINE JOINTNESS

Skyhawk 305 being

armed for attack on
May 1 (the intended
target of one bomb,
HMS Invincible, has
Argentine Navy

been enscribed by
deck crew).

Argentine Navy

The architects of the Osvaldo Garcia of the

Malvinas campaign army, commander of
conferring at Puerto V Corps in Patagonia
Argentina: (from left) and theater of opera-
Rear Admiral Carlos tions; and Rear Admiral
Busser of the marines, Gualter Allara of the
landing force com- navy, amphibious force
mander; General commander.

Malvinas Islands
Source: Public Information Secretariat of the Presidency of the Nation,
Islas Malvinas Argentinas (Buenos Aires, 1982).

(Carlos F. Ries Centeno)

Marine officer briefing

5th Battalion personnel
with Puerto Argentino
in distance.

98 JFQ / Summer 1994

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Scheina

Exocet MM38 SAM

Juan Carlos Murguizur, a lecturer at the
mounted on trailer in Argentine army staff college, laid bare the
naval workshops at failure of jointness on the strategic level:
Puerto Belgrano prior
The armed forces were divided into watertight
to being transported to
compartments, each service jealously guarding its
the Malvinas.
rights and privileges, and their compulsory participa-
tion in the to and fro of national politics merely ag-
gravated the situation.
The so-called Estado Mayor de Coordinacion,
or coordination staff, was responsible in theory for
drawing up plans for joint-service operations, but in
practice did very little. In military circles, this organi-
zation was referred to as “the pantheon” since it

Argentine Navy
served as an elegant burial-place for senior officers
too old for command posting but not yet old enough
to be retired. Plans for joint service operations needed
the approval of all three services; and the troops and
Argentine marine op- equipment necessary had to be requested from the re-
erating Rasit radar spective commanders, making it desperately hard to
loaned to the navy by get around the time-consuming bureaucracy and inter-
the army (at night the service jealousy.5
radar set recorded
distance and bearing These findings should not surprise those
of British ships bom- who have studied Central and South Amer-
barding Puerto Argen- ica, for the history of that region shaped the
tino; later it was used identity of its military institutions, one that
(Carlos F. Ries Centeno)

for fire control of “do- can be surrendered only with great difficulty.
it-yourself” Exocet As elsewhere, the principal role of the soldier
systems). in Latin America is to defend the nation. But
that role was pursued in ways which differed
significantly from those of the military in the
United States. The armed forces of Latin
Malvinas (Falklands) War: America found an identity in defining na-
April 2–June 14, 1982 tionality as well as in defending it.
Argentine Armed Forces British Armed Forces As Latin American nations gained their
independence (most by 1824), many lacked
Army Army
a sense of identity. The monarchs of Spain,
10th Infantry Brigade (8,500), 3d Commando Brigade, 5th Infantry Portugal, France, Britain, and Holland had
2d Infantry Brigade (1,300), Brigade (28,000 combat or combat
owned the region, and two of them, the
3d Infantry Brigade (1,675) support troops)
kings of Spain and Portugal, ruled over the
Navy Royal Navy largest parts. Latin America was a huge area
1 aircraft carrier, 1 cruiser (sunk), 2 aircraft carriers, 8 destroyers with isolated pockets of inhabitants. Almost
6 destroyers, 3 frigates, 2 submarines (2 sunk), 15 frigates (2 sunk), 1 ice impassable natural barriers—mountains,
(1 captured), 9 merchant vessels patrol ship, 8 amphibious ships deserts, jungles, and rivers—reinforced this
(all lost ); naval attack air: 5 Super (1 sunk), 12 troop transports (1 sunk);
isolation and contributed to a lack of na-
Etendards, 8 Skyhawks naval air: 15 squadrons with 171
aircraft and helicopters
tional identity. For example, Argentina was
Air Force not united as a nation until 1853 even
8 air brigades with A–4P Skyhawks, Royal Air Force though it was among the first Spanish
IAI Daggers, Mirage III–E fighters 15 squadrons with Harriers, Vulcans, colonies to win independence in the 1800s.
Losses: Hercules C–130 transports, Chinooks Also, colonial powers frequently fought each
655 killed, 12,700 taken prisoner Losses: other and had little incentive in defining the
255 killed boundaries of their empires. The King of
Spain, who owned perhaps three-fifths of
Sources: Brenda Ralph Lewis, “Unexpected War in the Falklands: Colonial War in the Missile Age,” Strategy and Latin America, was unconcerned over
Tactics, no. 103 (September/October 1985), pp. 37–43; Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the
Falklands (London: Michael Joseph, 1983), pp. 316–18; and Martin Middlebrook, The Fight for the ‘Malvinas’:
The Argentine Force in the Falklands War (London: Penguin Group, 1989), pp. 282–83.

Summer 1994 / JFQ 99

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ARGENTINE JOINTNESS

Argentine soldiers, boundaries which subdivided his many pos-

airmen, and marines sessions. As a consequence the military of
taking cover during
British air raid.
the region emerged not only as guarantors
of sovereignty but also as creators and
guardians of national identity.
In preserving national identity, many
Latin American military establishments
evolved into closely knit institutions whose
cohesion served to bond a larger but weaker
national identity. But that cohesion within
the military was achieved in part by creat-
ing loyalty to a service and its unique terri-
torially-defined mission, and participating
(Carlos F. Ries Centeno) in an extensive and isolationist social in-
frastructure. The distinctive duties of the
services traditionally found in Latin Amer-
ica—army, navy, air force, and federal po-
lice—reinforce this separateness and territo-
Tiger Cat SAM battery
launcher near the riality. These duties, traditionally implicit or
Puerto Argentino air- at times explicit in Latin American constitu-

(Carlos F. Ries Centeno)

field (this weapon was tions, give the services separate, inviolable
quite old and had identities. While defending the nation, a
limited range, and its
service must act to define nationality. Con-
missiles did not down
any British planes). sequently, one finds many examples in

Argentine and British forces, Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), 1030 hours, June 14

Source: Informe Oficial Ejército Argentino, Conflicto Malvinas, vol. 2., Abreviaturas, Anexos y Fuentes Bibliográficas (Buenos Aires, 1983).

100 JFQ / Summer 1994

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Scheina

Latin America’s past of a service acting to

define the nation’s political course.
Given this tradition it should not be
surprising that the Argentine army, navy,
and air force fought three wars against the
British in the Malvinas. But one must under-
stand that the Argentine view of service
identity, as established and reinforced by
tradition, is the greatest obstacle to joint ac-
tivity, no matter how desperately circum-
stances press for such an innovation. For
truly effective jointness, new institutional
perspectives must evolve. That unnatural
process takes time, vision, and commitment,
for it must work against the forces of history
Photos taken with and tradition. JFQ
pocket camera by
a senior officer of NOTES
General Belgrano
1 Interview with Capitan de
showing (1) main
deck below bridge Fragata Jorge Colombo, who
as crew pushes life- commanded the Super Etendard
raft canister into squadron (September 15, 1983).
2 Interview with the Argen-
water; (2) bow
folded under by tine navy’s Malvinas analysis
second torpedo hit group on September 30, 1983;
(note “B” turret is interview with Contra Almi-
swung starboard to rante Eduardo Otero, who
test maneuverability commanded Naval Forces Mal-
without power); and vinas (September 8, 1982).
3 Interview with Capitan de
(3) sea climbing
over main deck on Fragata Julio Pérez, who was in
port side as list charge of the special detach-
increases dramati- ment responsible for the instal-
cally (note rafts lation of the Exocet in the Mal-
standing near for- vinas (September 9, 1982).
4 Centro Ex-Combatientes
ward turrets rela-
tively close to sink- Malvinas—La Plata, Informe Rat-
ing vessel). tenbach: El drama de Malvinas
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Espáraco, 1988), pp. 204, 274.
5 Juan Carlos Murguizur, “The South Atlantic Con-

flict: An Argentine Point of View,” International Defence

Review, vol. 16, no. 2 (February 1983), pp. 135–36.
(Photos by Martin Sgut)

Summer 1994 / JFQ 101