DHARMASHASHTRA NATIONAL LAW

UNIVERSITY, JABALPUR

Subject- History-2

Project- CAD- Freedom of religion.

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Ms. Asmita Jatariya Vishrut Verma

Assistant Professor of History Semester- 2nd

Mr. Achyut Govindam Tiwari BAL/082/19

Research-Cum-Teaching Assistant

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 Acknowledgement

I would like to express my gratitude to the Vice Chancellor of my university, Prof. Balraj
Chauhan and the H.O.D Dr. V.S. Gigimon for giving me the opportunity to make a project on the
topic, ‘CAD- Freedom of Religion.’ I express my special thanks to my History professors Ms.
Asmita Jatariya, Assistant Professor of History and Mr. Achyut Govindam Tiwari, Research-
Cum-Teaching Assistant for helping me make this project successfully through their
consultations and guidance. I would also like to thank my batchmates and seniors for helping me
throughout the making of this project and for giving me ideas in its making. It was a combined
effort of the aforementioned people that this project was successfully completely.

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 Abstract
India is one of the most diverse nations in terms of religious communities. It allows itself to be a
secular state which tolerates all the religions and promotes non in specific. It explicitly
mentioned the word secular in its constitution in the year 1976 after the 42 nd amendment but it
was already a secular country as implicitly implied in the articles 25-28 of the constitution of
India. However, the Constitutional Assembly Debate on the freedom of religion saw major
problems and arguments that India faced when making the right to practice any religion as a
fundamental right of its citizens. One of the major arguments of this debate, which is still
questionable despite being discussed since as long as December 1948, is that whether the proviso
in Art. 25 which says, ‘ right to profess, practice and propagate religion,’ gives also the freedom
to forcefully convert people in the name of propagation. Does the right to freely practice any
religion also gives the right to follow discriminatory religious practices? The debate on freedom
of religion is one of the most long-lasting debates amongst the constitutional assembly debates.

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 Table of contents

Chapter Heading Page no.

name
Chapter 1 Introduction 6-7
Chapter 2 Constitutional Assembly Debate- problems and 8-15
arguments

Final result of the debates 16

Chapter 3 Provisions regarding freedom of religion in the 17-18

Constitution of India

Analysis of the provisions. 19

Chapter 4 Conclusion 20
Bibliography 21

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 Research Objective

 To find out whether the provisions in the articles concerning freedom of religion gives
unfair rights to the different religious communities.
 To analyse critically some important arguments given in the constitutional assembly
debate regarding freedom of religion.

Research Methodology

Nature of research: The research is doctrinal and analytical. The research has been done in a
speculative manner so as to understand the arguments and counter-arguments and find out the
flaws in the same and conclusions are drawn on the basis of the application of these arguments in
the real world, that is, practically.

Scope of research: Since the research has been done using secondary data, it is purely analytical
and critical. The various data collected and reviewed, has been analyzed thoroughly in order to
understand the various aspects of the topic of the research.

Literature Review

Review of literature is one of the most important part of the research that exposes a researcher to
the various studies and information relating to the research problems. Thorough review of
academic studies, journals, online articles and more enables them to understand the topic of their
research and do justice to their work.

In this project, the literature that has been used include online articles, research papers, the
constitution of India and excerpts from cases in order to understand and explain the topic.

The various literature has enabled the researcher to understand the meaning of the various
articles given in the constitution of India regarding freedom of religion. The knowledge gained
has been applied in the research.

The review of literature is very important as it has made this research practically possible and the
purpose of the project would not have been possible without it.

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 Chapter 1

Introduction

Freedom of religion in India is a fundamental right guaranteed by Article 25-28 of

the Constitution of India. Modern India came into existence in 1947 and the Indian constitution's
preamble was amended in 1976 to state that India is a secular state. However, in S.R Bommai v.
Union of India, Supreme Court of India ruled that India was already a secular state from the time
it adopted its constitution, what actually was done through this amendment is to state explicitly
what was earlier contained implicitly under article 25 to 28. Every citizen of India has a right to
practice and promote their religion peacefully. However, there have been numerous incidents of
religious intolerance that resulted in riots and violence, notably, the 1984 Anti-Sikh
riots in Delhi, 1990 Anti-Hindu riots in Kashmir, 2002 Gujarat riots and the 2008 Anti-Christian
riots in Odisha. Some perpetrators of the 1984 Anti-Sikh riots in Delhi have not been brought to
justice despite widespread condemnation.

India is one of the most diverse nations in terms of religion, it being the birthplace of four major
world religions: Jainism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism. Even though Hindus form close to
80 percent of the population, India also has region-specific religious practices: for
instance, Jammu and Kashmir has a Muslim majority, Punjab has a Sikh
majority, Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram have Christian majorities and the Indian
Himalayan States such as Sikkim and Ladakh, Arunachal Pradesh and the state
of Maharashtra and the Darjeeling District of West Bengal have large concentrations
of Buddhist population.

Draft Article 19 was introduced and debated in the Constituent Assembly on the 3rd and 6th of
December 1948. It is the core and gateway provision of the right to religious freedom section of
the Constitution.

The mention of freedom to propagate religion triggered some conflict in the Assembly. Some
members were concerned that it could facilitate conversions – forced and voluntary.
Others argued that the propagation of religion did not mean forced or violent conversions.

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Further, it was noted that the free propagation of religion could lead to different religious
communities learning about each other’s religions, thereby promoting understanding and peace.

An important strand of the debate centred around the sub-clause which threw open Hindu
religious institutions to any class or section of Hindus. A member wanted the scope of the Article
to extend beyond Hindus to Buddhists, Jains and Christians. Another member proposed that ‘any
class or section…’ be replaced ‘all classes…’ to include a larger range of religious institutions.
The Assembly adopted the Article with some amendments.

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 Chapter 2
Constitutional Assembly Debate- problems and arguments
In discussions about religious freedom in India, the country’s conflict regarding conversion plays
a central role. The Constitution’s freedom of religion clause, Article 25, grants the right “freely
to profess, practice and propagate religion,” but this has generated a dispute about the meaning
of the right ‘to propagate’ and its relation to the freedom to convert. The recognition of this right
is said to be the result of a key debate in the Constituent Assembly of India. To find out which
ideas and arguments gave shape to this debate and the resulting religious freedom clause, we turn
to the Assembly’s deliberations and come to a surprising conclusion: indeed, there was
disagreement about conversion among the Assembly members, but this never took the form of a
debate. Instead, there was a disconnect between the member’s concerns, objections, and
comments concerning the draft article on the one hand, and the Assembly’s decision about the
religious freedom clause on the other. If a key ‘debate’ took this form, what then could the
ongoing dispute concerning conversion in India be about?

The next relevant exchange took place in a plenary meeting of the Constituent Assembly on 1
May 1947, where the Interim Report on Fundamental Rights was to be discussed. Initially, the
proposed clause 13, which included the right “freely to profess, practise and propagate religion”,
was accepted and nothing noteworthy happened during the meeting. However, when Munshi
moved an amendment about the conversion of minors, this caused upheaval: “Any conversion
from one religion to another of any person brought about by fraud, coercion or undue influence
or of a minor under the age of 18 shall not be recognized by law”1. At stake was the second part
of this amendment, which would in effect prohibit conversion under the age of 18. Immediately,
several members interfered by pointing out that Munshi’s amendment implied a negation of the
previously endorsed clause on the freedom to propagate.

From the proceedings, however, we cannot get clarity as to what the disagreement was about.
Two Christian Assembly members stated that the right to propagate religion had been recognized
but would now be taken away by the proviso ‘of a minor under the age of 18’. The Anglo-Indian
1
CAD, 1 May 1947

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representative Frank Anthony emphasized that “conversion under undue influence, conversion
by coercion or conversion by fraud should not be recognized by law.” He added: “My
community does not propagate. We do not convert, nor are we converted. But I do appreciate
how deeply, how passionately millions of Christians feel on this right to propagate their
religion.” Therefore, Anthony objected to the attempt to restrict this right:

I want to congratulate the major party for having, in spite of its contentious
character, retained the words ‘right to practise and propagate their religion’.
Having done that, I say that after giving with one hand this principal
fundamental right a right [sic] which is regarded as perhaps the most
fundamental of Christian rights, do not take it away by this proviso, ‘or of a
minor under the age of 18’.
(CAD, 1 May 1947)

To Anthony, the right to propagate was a “principal fundamental right,” which would be
undermined by adding the amendment about minors: “I say that if you have this particular
provision, or if you place an absolute embargo on the conversion of a minor, you will place an
embargo absolutely on the right of conversion.” He concluded: “You will virtually take away the
right to convert.” This will be the result, because no parent will adopt Christianity when the
effect is that of creating a divide between children and parents. Anthony reiterated: “You may
have your prejudices against conversion; you may have your prejudices against propagation. But
once having allowed it, I plead with you not to cut at the root of family life.” He also appreciated
the safeguards about undue influence, fraud and coercion and realized “how deeply certain
sections of this House feel on this question of conversion.” “But,” he asked, “having once
conceded the right to propagate, to concede this in consonance with the principles of family law
and in consonance with the principles of natural law and justice” 2.

Another member, the Reverend J. J. M. Nichols-Roy stressed that the amendment would prevent
minors from exercising their own consciences. Drawing on his own conversion experience at age
fifteen, Nichols-Roy argued as follows:

… [T]o think that a youth under the age of eighteen does not have a
conscience before God and, therefore, he cannot express his belief is wrong.
… There is a spiritual side in conversion which ought to be taken notice of by
this House. Conversion does not mean only that a man changes his form of
religion from one religion to another or adopts a different name of religion,
2
CAD, 1 May 1947, Frank R. Anthony

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 such as, a Hindu becomes a Christian. But there is the spiritual aspect of
conversion, that is, the connection of the soul of man with God, which must
not be overlooked by this House. I know there are those who change their
religion being influenced by material considerations, but there are others who
are converted being under the influence of spiritual power. When a boy feels
that he is called by God to adopt a different faith, no law should prevent him
from doing that.
(CAD, 1 May 1947)

Emphasizing the spiritual dimension, Nichols-Roy insisted that the amendment about minors was
“absolutely wrong,” for it “will oppress the consciences of the youths who want to exercise their
religious faiths before God.” Since the freedom to convert is inherently connected to the relation
between the conscience and the spiritual forces of God, Nichols-Roy argued, a law that puts an
age limit would be oppressive to the conscience. This implies not only that the freedom to
convert should be guaranteed by law, but also that other laws must be subordinated to it: “This
freedom I consider to be a Fundamental Right of the youths. No law should be made which will
work against good spiritual forces.” Nevertheless, Nichols-Roy clearly expressed his objections
against any conversion by undue influence or by fraud or coercion.

Several elements are significant in these two interventions. Firstly, it is crucial for these members
that the fundamental right to propagate religion implies a recognition of the freedom to convert
for all persons, including minors. Any attempt to curb the right to propagate religion, by
introducing an age limit or similar constraints, amounts to placing an “embargo absolutely on the
right of conversion.” Secondly, this is clarified by introducing the idea that each human being
has a conscience connected to God and each individual can feel that he or she is being called by
Him. One should always be free to convert from one religion to the other, if this happens under
the influence of spiritual forces. Thirdly, the use of force, fraud and allurement in attempts to
convert people is unacceptable and falls outside the boundaries of genuine conversion. But if
conversion is a free act of the conscience, then it should not be restricted in any way, for the
conscience cannot be oppressed by any law. In this sense, the freedom to propagate and convert
is a fundamental and inalienable human right. Finally, Anthony suggests that other Assembly
members are inspired by prejudices against conversion and propagation. He understands the
objections raised against the conversion of minors as a result of preconceived opinion, ignorance
or bias about the subject.

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These interventions were followed by a long statement by Purushottamdas Tandon, a famous
Congress leader and freedom fighter, who claimed to speak on behalf of other Congress
members. Tandon voiced his surprise: “Mr. President, I am greatly surprised at the speeches
delivered here by our Christian brethren.” “Some of them have said that in this Assembly we
have admitted the right of every one to propagate his religion and to convert from one religion to
another.” This is wrong, he argued:

We Congressmen deem it very improper to convert from one to another

religion or to take part in such activities and we are not in favour of this. In
our opinion it is absolutely futile to be keen on converting others to one’s
faith. But it is only at the request of some persons, whom we want to keep
with us in our national endeavour that we accept this. Now it is said that
they have a right to convert young children to their faith. What is
this? Really this surprises me very much.
(CAD, 1 May 1947)

For Tandon, the right to propagation of religion did not entail a general freedom to try to convert
others to one’s religion. He considered converting others to one’s faith as a futile endeavour,
which becomes improper when it involves children. Tandon also said that the right to propagate
was kept “out of regard for our Christian friends,” as a pragmatic step to include the Christians in
‘the national endeavour’. He suggested that the Congressmen wanted to carry the Christians
along, by accommodating their insistence on the right to propagate. In spite of his surprise,
Tandon makes no effort to make sense of what the Christian representatives had said about the
right to propagate and convert. In fact, when he and other Congress members intervene, they
largely ignore the statements and concerns voiced by Anthony and Nichols-Roy. There is no
attempt to find out why these two find the freedom to convert so important and what their claims
about the conscience and God mean. Instead, these other members expressed utter astonishment
at the claim that the Assembly had recognized a right to convert young children to Christianity.

Tandon used an analogy to clarify the difficulty: “If a boy of eighteen executes a transfer deed in
favour of a man for his hut worth only Rs. 100, the transaction is considered unlawful,” but “our
brethren come forward and say that the boy has enough sense to change his religion.” This is
both improper and unreasonable, in Tandon’s eyes: “You can convert a child below eighteen by
convincing and persuading him but he is a child of immature sense and legally and morally
speaking this conversion can never be considered valid.” From this perspective, conversion of a

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child can only take place through force, fraud or allurement. Therefore, Tandon could also
suggest the following: “It is proper that a boy should be allowed to formally change his religion
only when he attains maturity.” He did not advocate a general rejection of ‘conversion’ as the
changing of one’s religion, since this act is unproblematic once one attains ‘maturity’.
Countering Anthony’s remark that what had been given with the right hand (clause 13) was
taken away with the left hand (clause 17), Tandon stressed: “What we gave them with our right
hand is that they have a right to convert others by an appeal to reason and after honestly
changing their views and outlook. The three words, ‘coercion’, ‘fraud’ and ‘undue influence’ are
included as provisos and are meant to cover the cases of adult converts.” The gap between
Nichols-Roy and Tandon is striking: the first assumed that minors, like adults, have an innate
conscience that should always be free to respond to God’s call; the second emphasized reason or
intellect, which needs to be cultivated and formed before individuals can make appropriate
decisions about changing religion. But this gap between their respective understanding of
‘conversion’ is not even noted, let alone debated.

More generally, the participants in this discussion made no attempt to understand or address each
other’s concerns and arguments. Algu Rai Shastri explained why the conversion of minors was
deplorable: “We want such an amendment in this clause of Fundamental Rights that a person
who wants to change his religion should be able to do so only after he is convinced through cool
deliberation that the new religion is more satisfactory to him than the old one” 3. Shastri too
emphasized that the problem is not the change of religion per se. If a mature person comes to the
realization that he wants to change his religion, this is perfectly acceptable, but not for children:

If we permit minors to be transferred like trees on land with the newly

embraced religion of their parents, we would be doing an injustice. Many
fallacious arguments are offered to permit this. We must not be misled by
these. We know that our failure to stop conversion under coercion would result
in grave injustice. I have a right to change my religion. I believe in God. If I
realize tomorrow that God is a farce and an aberration of human mind then I
can become an atheist. If I think that the Hindu faith is false, I, with my grey
hair, my fallen teeth and ripe age, and my mature discretion can change my
religion. But if my minor child repeats what I say, are you going to allow him
also a right to change his religion (at that age)?
CAD, 1 May 1947

3
CAD, 1 May 1947, Algu Rai Shastri

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Again, the suggestion is that citizens should be allowed to convert, only if this happens after
‘cool’ deliberation and reasoning. The idea that conversion is a question of ‘cool deliberation’
and ‘mature discretion’ is far away from the Christian conception of this process as a response of
the conscience to God’s spiritual forces, which had come to the surface in Nichols-Roy’s
intervention. Even though Shastri stressed how absurd it would be for him to give a minor a right
to change religions, he did not pause to think about why this was not absurd at all to his Christian
colleagues.

Yet another Assembly member, Jagat Narain Lal, pointed out that the right to propagate had not
been included to such an extent in the Constitution of any other country: “My submission is that
this House has gone to the farthest limit possible with regard to minorities, knowing well the fact
that there are a few minorities in this country whose right to carry on propaganda extends to the
point of creating various difficulties.” Lal supported Tandon’s standpoint that the inclusion of
this “right to do propaganda” is a concession towards the Christians, granted in spite of the fact
that “most of the Congress members of this House” did not want to keep this right. “The fact is
that we desire to make the minorities feel that the rights which they had been enjoying till now
shall be allowed to continue within reasonable limits by the majority. We have no desire to
curtail them in any way. But we do not concede the right to do propaganda.” The recognition of
this fundamental right is about having the minorities feel that they will continue to enjoy the
same rights but within reasonable limits. The language use again suggests that the right to
propagate religion is equivalent to the right to ‘do propaganda’. For the Christian members,
however, the right to propagate religion clearly meant something very different, since it is rooted
in the relationship between the conscience and God.

The different participants in this exchange agreed about banning the use of fraud, coercion or
undue influence in conversion; they also admitted that changing between religions should be
possible. What was the problem then? Some interventions emphasized the freedom of conscience
of minors. Others reflected concerns about mass conversions or about the status of children
whose parents have converted. Yet others stressed that children are too immature to make
decisions about changing from one religion to another. We also know that there were worries
about the impact of Christian schools and their attempts to convert Hindu children, or about the
minorities and their position in post-Independence India. Judging from the reports, however, it is

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unclear what exactly was at stake, beyond the fact that the Assembly members disagreed about
the conversion of minors.

This intense disagreement stands in contrast to the way in which the exchange about Munshi’s
amendment was brought to an end. Ignoring the above interventions, the discussion was ended
by Ambedkar, who intervened and asked Munshi to drop the amendment. The gist of
Ambedkar’s argument was that this clause would end up forcing parents to be separated from
their children merely because they adopted another religion. He did not clarify how the
amendment could be modified to avoid this, but only made a mysterious reference to the ‘several
Assembly committees’ that had already dealt with this issue. He then rejected the proposition,
because it “would lead to many disruptions, to so many evil consequences” (CAD, 1 May 1947).
In other words, Ambedkar announced that the amendment should be rejected without addressing
any of the objections. Consequently, it was decided to refer clause 17 back to the Advisory
Committee on Fundamental Rights and Minorities, which eventually rejected it.

The second major problem which concerns the debates were about the extent of religious
practice under religious freedom. Can the various religions practice such practices which are
discriminatory?

No state can allow immorality in the name of religious freedom, nor is it desirable. Religion aims
at the moral wellbeing man but sometimes, certain religious practices have resulted immoral
acts, it is the duty of the state to see that such immoral practice under the grab of religious
freedom are not allowed to flourish in the society.

The constitutional assembly debate dated 6th December, 1948 argues about this issue. Shri
Lokanath Misra says that making propagation a fundamental right is something which will
adversely affect the Vedic culture that has been followed in ancient India:

I thought that the secular State of partitioned India was the maximum of
generosity of a Hindu dominated territory for its non-Hindu population. I did
not of course know what exactly this secularism meant and how far the State
intends to cover the life and manners of our people. To my mind life cannot be
compartmentalized and yet I reconciled myself to the new cry. Gradually it
seems to me that our ‘secular State’ is a slippery phrase, a device to by-pass the
ancient culture of the land. he absurdity of this position is now manifest in
articles 19 to 22 of the Draft Constitution. Do we really believe that religion
can be divorced from life, or is it our belief that in the midst of many religions

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 we cannot decide which one to accept? If religion is beyond the ken of our
State, let us clearly say so and delete all reference to rights relating to religion.
If we find it necessary, let us be brave enough and say what it should be. But
this unjust generosity of tabooing religion and yet making propagation of
religion a fundamental right is somewhat uncanny and dangerous. Justice
demands that the ancient faith and culture of the land should be given a fair
deal, if not restored to its legitimate place after a thousand years of suppression.
We have no quarrel with Christ or Mohammad or what they saw and said. We
have all respect for them. To my mind, Vedic culture excludes nothing. Every
philosophy and culture has its own place but now (the cry of religion is a
dangerous cry.) It denominates, it divides and encamps people to warring ways.
(In the present context what can this word ‘propagation’ in article 19 mean? It
can only mean paving the way for the complete annihilation of Hindu culture,
the Hindu way of life and manners. Islam has declared its hostility to Hindu
thought. Christianity has worked out the policy of peaceful penetration by the
back-door on the outskirts of our social life. This is because Hinduism did not
accept barricades for its protection. Hinduism is just an integrated vision and a
philosophy of life and cosmos, expressed in organised society to live that
philosophy in peace and amity. But Hindu generosity has been misused and
politics has over run Hindu culture. Today religion in Indian serves no higher
purpose than collecting ignorance, poverty and ambition under a banner that
flies for fanaticism. The aim is political, for in the modern world all is power-
politics and the inner man is lost in the dust. Let everybody live as he thinks
best but let him not try to swell his number to demand the spoils of political
warfare. Let us not raise the question of communal minor cities anymore. It is a
device to swallow the major city in the long run. This is intolerable and unjust.

Shri Lokanath Misra, CAD 6th December 1948.4

The proposition of India being a secular state on one hand while promoting the idea of Hindutva
and Vedic culture serves to destroy the meaning of the word secular.

Misra says that India was primarily a Hindu country so giving the freedom of religion as a
fundamental right is ‘dangerous and uncanny’ which he argues is uncalled for saying that no
other country gives freedom of propagation of religion as fundamental right.

‘Justice demands that the ancient faith and culture of the land should be given a fair deal, if not
restored to its legitimate place after a thousand years of suppression’, this is arguably one of the
most flawed statements given in the debate. The argument was a direct indication of the fight
between Hinduism and the other religions. Misra says that Hindu religion was the original

4
CAD 6 December, 1948 part1

15
religion of the ‘Akhand Bharat’ and so it would be injustice to the Hindus if the other religions
are given the freedom to propagate as a fundamental right. But if this is accepted then the
fundamental right to freedom of religion in itself gets affected and thus it was not accepted.

Final result of the debates

The final outcome of the various debates turned out the various articles into what
they are today. Eventually, it can be seen that the word ‘propagation’ was retained
in the fundamental right to freedom of religion and this shows that the propagation
of religion is part and parcel of the freedom of religion.

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 Chapter 3
Provisions regarding freedom of religion in the Constitution of India
The constitution of India provides Articles 25, 26, 27 and 28 in the Right to Freedom of Religion
in its part 3 as a fundamental right to the citizens of India. The various articles talk about the
following:

Article 255 - Freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and propagation of religion.

(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all
persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practice and
propagate religion.

(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from
making any law—

(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may

be associated with religious practice;

(b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions
of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Explanation I.- The wearing and carrying of kirpans shall be deemed to be included in the
profession of the Sikh religion.

Explanation II.- In sub-clause (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as
including a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion, and the reference
to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.

Article 266 - Freedom to manage religious affairs.

5
Indian const. art. 25
6
Indian const. art. 26

17
Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof
shall have the right—

(a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;

(b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;

(c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and

(d) to administer such property in accordance with law.

Article 277 - Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion.

No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically
appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion
or religious denomination.

Article 288 - Freedom as to attendance at religious instruction or religious worship in certain

educational institutions.

(1) No religious instruction shall be provided in any educational institution wholly maintained
out of State funds.

(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to an educational institution which is administered by the
State but has been established under any endowment or trust which requires that religious
instruction shall be imparted in such institution.

(3) No person attending any educational institution recognized by the State or receiving aid out
of State funds shall be required to take part in any religious instruction that may be imparted in
such institution or to attend any religious worship that may be conducted in such institution or in
any premises attached thereto unless such person or, if such person is a minor, his guardian has
given his consent thereto.

7
Indian const. art. 27
8
Indian const. art. 28

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 Analysis of the provisions.

 Article 25- This article talks about the freedom of practice, profession and propagation of
religion. In the constitution assembly debate dated 6th December,1948, it was argued that
the proviso in this article which allowed freely propagating any religion would allow
people to forcefully convert other people religiously under the umbrella of this article.
The argument was debated time and again and can be substantiated with the number of
conversions that happened before and after the independence.
 Article 26- The article says that the people have the right to manage religious affairs
freely. They have the right to own and acquire property- both movable and immovable in
the name of religion but in accordance with law and order.
 Article 27- This article gives the right to citizens to not be forced to pay taxes in the
promotion or maintenance of religion specifically.
 Article 28- In educational institutions, no one shall be forced or compelled to attend any
religious instruction or affair which is managed, funded or recognized by the state. Also,
the state in institutions run by its funds, shall not promote any religious affair or
instruction. In cases of religious instructions in institutions recognized by the state such
as private schools, these instructions cannot be forced unless consent is given by the
student or the guardian of a minor student.

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 Chapter 4

Conclusion

The Constitution of India guarantees religious freedom, which is indigenous to Indian religious
ethos and to its sociocultural context so as to satisfy the multi religious tradition of the country.
Article 25 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of conscience. However, clause (2) of article
23 does not oblige exemption to conscientious objectors on religious scruples from compulsory
service of the State when services of sort are necessary for public welfare and for the security of
the country Although religious practices protected under the provision of clause (1) of article 25
are free from State regulation unless detrimental to public order, morality, health and the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution, nevertheless these practices
cannot be protected if they contravene social welfare and reform measures initiated by the State
as provided under sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of the same article.

Bibliography

 www.indiakanoon.com
 www.constitutionamendments.com

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 www.legalserviceindia.com
 www.constitutionofondia.nic.in
 www.mdpi.com
 www.allresearchjournal.com
 Constitution of India

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