HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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G.R. Nos. 158930-31             March 3, 2008

UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES - DRUG, FOOD AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES UNIONS -

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (UFE-DFA-KMU), petitioner,
vs.
NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES, INCORPORATED, respondent.

Facts:

UFE-DFA-KMU was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees of Nestlé. On April 2001, existing CBA was to end on 5 June 2001, so the Union
informed respondent company of the intent to open a new CBA for the year 2001-2004; Nestle
said it was preparing its own proposal. Dialogue ensued but the parties failed to reach any
agreement on the economic conditions of the CBA; even conciliation proceedings failed. Nestle
refused to bargain, setting a precondition for the holding of collective bargaining negotiations the
non-inclusion of the issue of Retirement Plan.
October 2001: UFE-DFA-KMU filed a Notice of Strike predicated on Nestlé's alleged
unfair labor practices, that is, bargaining in bad faith by setting pre-conditions in the ground
rules and/or refusing to include the issue of the Retirement Plan in the CBA negotiations.T he
following month, Nestle filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of the
DOLE over the current dispute in order to effectively enjoin any impending strike by the
members of the UFE-DFA-KMU. Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the case and issued an
order to enjoin any strike.
On January 2002, despite said order, the employee members of UFE-DFA-KMU at
Nestlé's Cabuyao Plant went on strike.
On March 2002, case brought before CA with the Court ruling grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Secretary of DOLE. In order to finally settle the dispute, then Acting Secretary
of the DOLE issued an order calling for the execution of the CBA among other things
CA: ruled grave abuse of discretion.

Issue/s:

WoN Nestle’s setting of a precondition for the holding of CBA consists of Unfair Labor
Practice

Ruling & Ratio:

NO

ART. 248. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS. — It shall be unlawful for an

employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practices
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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(g) To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code

In the case at bar, except for the assertion put forth by UFE-DFA-KMU, neither the
second Notice of Strike nor the records of these cases substantiate a finding of Unfair labor
practice. It is not enough that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair
labor practice when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant
such a belief.

There is no per se test of good faith in bargaining. Good faith or bad faith is an inference
to be drawn from the facts. Herein, no proof was presented to exemplify bad faith on the part of
Nestlé apart from mere allegation. Construing arguendo that the content of the aforequoted
letter of 29 May 2001 laid down a pre-condition to its agreement to bargain with UFE-DFA-KMU,
Nestlé's inclusion in its Position Paper of its proposals affecting other matters covered by the
CBA negates the claim of refusal to bargain or bargaining in bad faith. Accordingly, since UFE-
DFA-KMU failed to proffer substantial evidence that would overcome the legal presumption of
good faith on the part of Nestlé.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the basic issues of the case having been passed
upon and there being no new arguments availing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is
hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit. Let these cases be remanded to the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment for proper disposition, consistent with
the discussions in this Court's Decision of 22 August 2006 and as hereinabove set forth. No
costs.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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G.R. No. 100158 June 2, 1992

ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE, petitioner,

vs.

HON. RUBEN TORRES, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,

and SAMAHANG NG MANGGAGAWANG PANG-EDUKASYON SA STA. ESKOLASTIKA-
NAFTEU, respondents.

Facts:

The Union and College initiated negotiations for a first ever CBA which resulted in a
deadlock and prompted the union to file a notice of strike with the DOLE. Union declared a
strike which paralyzed the operations of the College and Secretary of Labor immediately
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute.

Instead of returning to work, the union filed a motion for reconsideration of the return to
work order. The college sent individual letters to the striking employees requiring them to return
to work. In response union presented demands, the most important of which is the unconditional
acceptance back to work of the striking employees. But these were rejected.

Secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration for his return to work order and
sternly warned striking employees to comply with its terms. Conciliation meetings were held but
this proved futile as the college remained steadfast in its position that any return to work order
should be unconditional. The College manifested to respondent Secretary that the union
continued to defy his return to work order. The College sent termination letters to individual
strikers and filed a complaint for illegal strike against the union. The union moved for the
enforcement of the return to work order before the Sec.

The Sec. issued an order directing reinstatement of striking union members and holding
union officers responsible for the violation of the return to work order and were correspondingly
terminated. Both parties moved for the partial consideration of the return to work order.

ISSUE:

WON striking union members, terminated for abandonment of work after failing to
comply with the return to work order of Sec. of labor, reinstated.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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HELD:

The Labor Code provides that if a strike has already taken place at the time of
assumption, all striking employees should immediately return to work. This means that a return
to work order is immediately effective and executory, notwithstanding the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. It must be strictly complied with even during the pendency of any petition
questioning its validity. After all, the assumption and/or certification order issued in the exercise
of the Sec.’s compulsive power of arbitration and until set aside, must therefore be complied
with immediately.

The college correspondingly had every right to terminate the services of those who
chose to disregard the return to work order issued by the Sec. of Labor in order to protect the
interest of the students who form part of the youth of the land.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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G.R. No. 88210             January 23, 1991

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents.

Facts:

The CBA between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees
Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for various categories of employees. The
PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work.

The Job Evaluation Committee of the panel had finished the reconciliation and initial
evaluation of positions in all departments within PAL. The PALEA members of the panel
proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum salary entry level for the lowest job
classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel members proposed PHP 2,310 and a PHP
200 across-the-board increase for employees who could not avail of the payscale adjustments.

The panel conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not
accept less than the amount it proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no
authority to offer more. PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith PALEA and filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike.

PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being
premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA
which would not yet expire. NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA
president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only for
preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike assuring that that the strike
votes cannot be certify. The Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption
of jurisdiction. PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations.

Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute ordering
the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all returning
employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the following monetary
benefits to the strikers and declaring the strike valid.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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Issue:

WoN the strike was illegal

Held:

The Court ruled in affirmative.

PALEA’s strike was illegal for three (3) reasons: First, it was premature for there was an
existing CBA which still had nine (9) months to run2. Second, it violated the no-strike provision
of the CBA; Third, the NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive
mediation. Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action
against the union officers who participated in it, and against any union members who committed
illegal acts during the strike. (Art. 264 of the Labor Code).
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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G.R. Nos. 86917-18             January 25, 1991

RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE
EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents.

Facts:

To avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal and non-work
related conversations, personal telephone calls and non-work-connected visits by personnel to
other departments, the respondent Reliance Surety Insurance Co., Inc. on 21 November 1986,
thru the manager, Celso Eleazar of its underwriting department, effected a change in the
seating arrangement of its personnel in said department.
Four of those affected namely: Isagani Rubio, Rosalinda Macapagal, Glene Molina, and
Severa Cansino protested the transfer of their tables and seats, claiming that the change was
without prior notice and was done merely to harass them as union members.
Heated arguments and insults were hurled against the management by the four and
disciplinary actions were enforced from preventive suspension on 3 February 1987 and
ultimately dismissed after investigation on 3 March 1987.
On 6 March 1987, the Reliance Surety & Insurance Employees Union filed in behalf of
Rubio, Macapagal, Molina, and Cansino with the NLRC-NRC Branch, Manila, against the
respondent company a complaint for illegal dismissal.
While the complaint for illegal dismissal and ULP was hibernating in the NCR Arbitration
Branch, the union filed with the DOLE a notice of strike predicated on unfair labor practices. On
13 March 1987, the company received a copy of the notice of strike and a telegram from the
DOLE setting the notice of strike for initial conciliation conference on 17 March 1987 at 2:00
p.m.
But even before the initial conference could take place, the union in the morning of 17
March 1987 struck and picketed the company premises. Because of this new development, the
company filed on 31 March 1987 with the NLRCNCR Arbitration Branch, Manila, a petition to
declare the strike illegal on the grounds that: (1) the 30 or 15 day cooling-off-period was
blatantly defied; (2) the legal requirement to furnish the department with the results of the strike
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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vote (2/3 required) at least 7 days before the strike was ignored; (3) the 24-hour period within
which BLR or the Regional Office should be furnished with a written notice of the meeting to
declare a strike was also not complied with.
The labor arbiter held that it was an illegal strike. NLRC affirmed but modified stating that
the dismissal is too harsh, merely reinstating them without backwages would suffice. All the
striking officers of the union should be reinstated to their former positions without the loss of
seniority rights but without backwages except the four employees whose dismissal due to gross
disrespect was found to be justified.

Issue:

WoN the strike done illegal

Held:

Yes. There is no dispute that the strike in question was illegal, for failure of the striking
personnel to observe legal strike requirements, to wit: (1)as to the fifteen-day notice; (2) as to
the two-thirds required vote to strike done by secret ballot; (3) as to submission of the strike vote
to the Department of Labor at least seven days prior to the strike.
As found likewise by the Commission, in the course of the strike held on April 1, 1987,
certain strikers harassed non-striking employees, called company officers names, and
committed acts of violence.
There is no question, finally, that the strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing
unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a change in the seating
arrangement in the office of the underwriting department, the petitioner merely exercised a
reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question, much less assail as an act of
unfair labor practice. As to the private respondent’s charges of harassment, the Commission
found none, and as a general rule, we are bound by its findings of fact.
The Court reiterates that good faith is still a valid defense against claims of illegality of a
strike. We do find, however, not a semblance of good faith here, but rather, plain arrogance,
pride, and cynicism of certain workers.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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G.R. No. L-49983 April 20, 1992

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, GERARDO ROSANA, FE DIVINA, PATRICIO MIRANDA,

ARTURO GUEVARRA, PURIFICACION CABRERA, ANGELINA GAVIOLA, TITO MARQUEZ,
ELPIDIO ORINION, DELIA ABUEG, TERESITA GARCIA, ELENA PADILLA, DOLORES DAILEG,
CRESCELIA YBAÑES, ELENA ORTILLA, MARIETA SALONGA, RODOLFO LABARINTO,
AURELIA SAN JUAN AND LOURDES LUNA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG AND ARIS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Federation of Free Workers (FFW) is a legitimate labor organization duly
registered with the Ministry of Labor while petitioners Gerardo Rosana, Fe Diviña, Patricio
Miranda, Arturo Guevarra, Purificacion Cabrera, Angelina Gaviola, Tito
Marquez, Elpidio Orinion, Delia Abueg, Teresita Garcia, Elena Padilla,
Dolores Daileg, Crescelia Ybanes, Elena Ortilla, Marietta Salonga, Rodolfo Labarinto and
Aurelia San Juan are union officers of the FFW local union and Lourdes Luna is a member of
the union at private respondent Aris (Philippines), Incorporated.  Private
respondent Aris (Philippines), Incorporated (company) is a duly organized domestic corporation
engaged in the manufacture of leather gloves exclusively for export.
On September 17, 1977, a certification election was held in private respondent company under
the supervision of the Bureau of Labor Relations.  Petitioner FFW garnered the highest number
of votes and was subsequently declared the authorized bargaining representative.
Consequently, private respondent company and petitioner FFW executed a
memorandum of agreement on February 3, 1978 wherein (a) the company recognized FFW as
the bargaining representative of the rank and file employees in the bargaining unit as of
February 1, 1978; (b) the company and FFW shall negotiate for a new collective bargaining
agreement, but in the meantime FFW will continue to administer the then existing CBA which
expired on December 31, 1977 until a new CBA is executed; and (c) FFW will be entitled to all
union dues starting February 1, 1978.  The same hold-over CBA contained a "no strike - no
lockout clause."
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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Pursuant to the aforementioned memorandum of agreement, the company and FFW met
on February 7, 13, 15, 22 and 25, 1978 to negotiate for a new CBA that would govern the terms
and conditions of employment of the rank and file employees in the company.  However, the
parties failed to reach any agreement and a deadlock ensued.
On February 28, 1978, the FFW through its president, petitioner Gerardo Rosana filed
with the MOLE (now DOLE) a notice of strike.
The company and FFW met on March 7, 13, 27 and 29, 1978 at the Bureau of Labor
Relations for conciliation upon summons by Director Carmelo Noriel.  However, the parties still
failed to reach, any accord, so on March 29, 1978, FFW requested
respondent Amado G. Inciong (then Acting Secretary) to assume jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and undertake to terminate the case within two weeks.
On April 1, 1978, after the required thirty (30) days notice, the FFW staged a strike on all the
three (3) plants of the company.
The private respondent company having been classified as a vital industry pursuant to
Letter of Instruction No. 368 and thus protected by Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended
against any strike, the respondent Deputy Minister assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.
A marathon conference was held on April 2, 1978 between the company and FFW in
Camp Crame with the active mediation of respondent Inciong and Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas.
During the conference, an order dated April 2, 1978 was issued by
respondent Inciong directing the company to give a wage increase of P3.00 for three years and
to give one day additional vacation and one day additional sick leave each and ordered the
strikers to immediately return to work (see Rollo, pp. 32-33).
Notwithstanding the FFW's commitment to abide by the aforesaid order of April 2, 1978,
the strikers not only failed to lift the picket lines and return to work but intensified further the
barricades.
On April 4, 1978, the company filed with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion to
declare the strike illegal and to revoke the order of April 2, 1978 at the same time it applied for
clearance to terminate the employment of the illegal strikers with the Regional Office of the
Department of Labor and Employment for violation of Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended
and General Order No. 5.
In the meantime, the illegal strikers were placed under preventive suspension.
The respondent Deputy Minister rendered a decision on April 11,1978 that the strike is
illegal.
On the same date, the company and FFW, through the mediation of
respondent Inciong entered into a memorandum of agreement to end their dispute and the
strike.
 Pursuant to the aforementioned memorandum of agreement, the company and FFW
executed a CBA on April 12, 1978 before respondent Inciong.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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Anent the application for clearance to terminate the employment of the illegal strikers,
the respondent Deputy Minister rendered a decision on January 29, 1979 granting or approving
the application for clearance to terminate, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application for clearance to terminate the
services of Gerardo Rosana, Fe Divina, Patricio Miranda,
Arturo Guevarra, Purificacion Cabrera, Angelina Gaviola, Tito Marquez, Elpidio Orinion,
Delia Abueg, Teresita Garcia, Elena Padilla, Dolores Daileg, Crescelia Ybanes, Elena Ortilla,
Marietta Salonga, Rodolfo Labarinto, Aurelia San Juan and Lourdes Luna is hereby granted
and/ or approved.

Issue:
WoN the strike was illegal

Held:
Yes.
Applying this fundamental principle to the case at bar, it is readily evident that the
petitioners had ample opportunity to appeal the decision of the respondent Deputy Minister
revoking his previous order dated April 2, 1978.  The remedy of appeal to the Office of the
President was not pursued by the petitioners.  They nevertheless deliberately allowed the period
for appeal to pass without interposing one.  Worse, despite the then availability of the remaining
period for appeal, the petitioners allowed the decision to lapse into finality.  Hence, they cannot
now contest the legality of the decision through the present petition for certiorari.
The respondent Deputy Minister already declared the strike staged by the union illegal in his
decision dated April 11, 1978, the pertinent portion of which provides:
"It should be noted that the strike and the strike activities undertaken by the union were patently
illegal.  First, the employer is engaged in a vital industry and, therefore, protected by PD 823 as
amended from strikes and lockouts.  Second, the Secretary of Labor had already assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute and therefore, the parties are enjoined against strikes and
lockouts.  Third, the parties themselves have voluntarily agreed to maintain the status quo, while
waiting for the summary decision of the Secretary of Labor.  Moreover, even if the strike were
not illegal per se, the strike activities staged by the union, especially the establishment of
massive human barricades at all entrances to the company and the use of coercive methods to
keep company officials and other personnel out, were definitely illegal."  (Rollo, p. 20)

We already ruled in the case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. (G.R. Nos.
88710-13, December 19, 1990, 192 SCRA 396, 411) that "[a] strike that is undertaken despite
the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a
prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor
Code as amended (Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1989;
178 SCRA 482).  The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their
employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act."
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners actively participated in the illegal
strike staged by the union (see Rollo, pp. 27-28, 30).   Hence, the termination of the services of
the individual petitioners is justified.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed decisions of the respondent
Deputy Minister are not tainted with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion
or lack of jurisdiction and therefore, We find no reason to disturb the same.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decisions of the Deputy
Minister of Labor dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979 are hereby AFFIRMED.  The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 30, 1979 is hereby LIFTED.

G.R. No. L-59711-12 May 29, 1987

PROGRESSIVE WORKER'S UNION AND ITS 3,000 OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioners,

vs.
HON. FLAVIO P. AGUAS, THE COMMANDING GENERAL, P.C. METROCOM, THE DISTRICT
COMMANDER,EASTERN POLICE DISTRICT, METROPOLITAN POLICE FORCE, THE STATION
COMMANDER, MUNTINLUPA POLICE STATION, and SOLID MILLS INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Progressive Workers' Union is the local chapter of the Federation of Free Workers
[FFW] in respondent company, Solid Mills, Inc. In the collective bargaining agreement [CBA]
entered into on March 26, 1981 by and between Solid Mills, Inc. and the FFW as the certified
bargaining representative of the rank-and-file employees, respondent company agreed to grant
across-the-board wage increases to covered bargaining unit employees.

Respondent company implemented this CBA stipulation by giving the union members a
retroactive pay of P397.13 each for the first year wage increase, without further including said
P1.50 wage increase into the basic wage rate of the rank-and-file employees. Contending that
the P1.50 wage increase for the period January 1, 1980 to August 16, 1980 should be included
in the basic wage rate starting January 1, 1980 so that at the end of the three-year period the
workers shall have enjoyed a total increase of P4.50 a day, instead of just P3.00 a day, the
individual petitioners, thru their Union President, Manuel Arias, presented a grievance to
respondent company demanding strict and faithful compliance with said CBA provision.
Grievance meetings thereafter held between the representatives of the Union and the
respondent company proved to be unavailing. Hence, on January 4, 1982, the Union filed with
the Conciliation Division, Bureau of Labor Relations, Ministry of Labor & Employment [MOLE],
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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Manila, a notice of strike for unfair labor practice, violation of CBA, violation of SS law, job
evaluation and failure to restate work week.

Officer-in-charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations, Atty. Romeo T. Young, summoned the
parties to several conciliation conferences, but he likewise failed to settle the dispute.

On January 21, 1982, Atty. Young advised Mr. Manuel Arias thru a letter that the notice of strike
filed by the Union "is hereby considered as not duly filed on the ground that the real issue raised
therein as revealed in the conciliation conferences, is the interpretation of the CBA provisions on
the first year wage increase which is not strikeable. This is without prejudice to your bringing
said issue before the proper forum; viz: voluntary arbitration. 2

This notice notwithstanding, the Union notified the BLR on January 29. 1982 that it would
conduct a referendum on February 1, 2 and 3, 1982 for the purpose of a strike-vote. The
referendum was held as scheduled with 81 % of the union members allegedly voting to go on
strike against respondent company. After the result of the referendum had been reported to the
BLR, the union went on strike in the early morning of February 11, 1982. On the same day,
respondent company filed with the NLRC, MOLE, the twin petitions praying in the main that the
strike staged by the union be declared illegal and the participating officers and members thereof
be declared to have lost their employment status. Respondent company likewise prayed for a
preliminary injunction/restraining order commanding the union, its members, agents,
representatives and sympathizers to lift their picket lines and allow free and unobstructed
ingress to and egress from the company and to refrain from committing coercion, threats and
other illegal acts.

On February 18, 1982, the union filed a motion to dismiss the complaints on the ground that
under B.P. 130, the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints or
the nature of the actions.

On February 19, 1982, in view of the violence that erupted in the picket lines which resulted in
the death of one of the strikers and physical injuries to others, respondent labor arbiter issued
the following interim Orders:

1. That the company should recognize the right of the Progressive Workers'
Union to strike and maintain picket lines without however prejudice to the final
determination of the main issues in these cases which is whether or not the strike
is violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130;

2. The strikers must not interfere or disrupt the peaceful ingress and egress of
the workers who may want to work and those of third parties transacting
business with the company;

3. The company should accept back these workers to their former positions
under the same terms and conditions existing before the strike;

4. The workers are urged to report for work within forty-eight [48] hours from
receipt of this Order, and,
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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5. The returning workers should not interfere in the peaceful picketing of the
strikers. 3

Upon receipt of the order, respondent company caused to be published on February 21, 1982 in
the Bulletin Today an announcement ordering the striking employees to return to work effective
6:00 A.M. of February 22, 1982.

On March 5, 1982, the Federation of Free Workers filed a motion for leave to intervene and
submit a manifestation, stating that as the certified exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file workers of the respondent company, it did not authorize petitioner-union to file the
present case; that in fact, the FFW on January 25, 1982 had disauthorized those previously
authorized to act for the union, including Manuel Arias, from undertaking major decisions
without the consent of the officers and members of the union; that as the entity which negotiated
the CBA, it confirms that respondent company agreed to give a retroactive pay of P1.50 per day
worked from January 1, 1980 up to August 16, 1980 only, because on January 18, 1980, the
company complied with P.D. 1713 by giving a P3/per day in wage increase and allowance
which absorbed the P1.50; that any grievance that some members of the union may have with
respect to the CBA stipulation should be resolved thru voluntary arbitration; and that it did not
authorize or sanction the strike at Solid Mills Inc.

Evidently due to the fact that no preliminary injunction was issue by the Court, respondent labor
arbiter proceeded with the hearing on the merits of NLRC Cases Nos. NCR-2-2209-82 and 2-
2222-82, and on March 15, 1982, rendered a decision that the strike was illegal.

ISSUE:

whether or not a labor arbiter is empowered to declare a strike illegal had not been passed upon
by the Court.

HELD:

In construing subparagraph [5] of paragraph [a] of Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Minister of
Labor in his Ministry Order No. 13 dated November 17, 1981, stated:

xxx xxx xxx

Declaring a strike or lockout to be illegal requires the exercise of judicial or quasi-

judicial authority, which in this instance is located in the National Labor Relations
Commission. Under Article 217 of the labor Code, as amended, Labor Arbiters
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over, among other disputes, "all other
claims arising from employer- employee relations," and the Commission has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. This
statement of jurisdiction is intended to cover all disputes between employers and
employees arising from their relationship as such, including those involving the
legality of concerted actions.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

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In view of the above, actions seeking the declaration of a strike or lockout to be

illegal and the application of the sanctions provided therefor by Article 265 of the
Labor Code, as amended by Section 12 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, shall be
filed in the appropriate Regional Arbitration Branch of the National labor
Relations Commission and the same shall be taken cognizance of by the Labor
Arbiter therein.

This Order shall take effect immediately.

The interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to
great respect. 6 We see no reason to detract from this rudimentary rule in administrative law,
particularly when later events have proved said interpretation to be in accord with the legislative
intent. thus, barely three [3] months after the strike in question, or on June 1, 1982, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 227 was approved, Section 2 of which explicitly recognizes the jurisdiction of
labor arbiters over "cases arising from any violation of Art. 265 of this Code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lockouts.7 the failure of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 to
specifically provide for cases involving the legality or illegality of strikes was, to oar mind,
nothing more than an avoidance of superfluity, as subparagraph [51, paragraph [a] of Article
217 was indeed encompassing enough to include cases of this nature.

Having reached this conclusion, the Court reconsiders its resolution of March 18, 1982 and
hereby reinstates with modification the decision of respondent labor arbiter dated March 15,
1982 in NLRC Cases Nos. 2- 2209-82 and 2-2222-82. We affirm the finding of respondent labor
arbiter that the strike staged by herein petitioners is illegal for being based on a non-strikeable
ground. However, in the light of Our ruling in Bacus, et al. vs. Ople, et al., 132 SCRA 690 that "a
mere finding of the illegality of a strike should not be automatically followed by wholesale
dismissal of the strikers from their employment," We modify that portion of the decision of March
15, 1982, declaring the officers of petitioner union and the members enumerated in Appendix
"A" of said decision to have lost their employment status as of February 11, 1982 and
considered dismissed for just cause.

Insofar as the strikers who are ordinary unschooled laborers and who do not fully understand
the import of what constitutes a strikeable or non- strikeable issue are concerned, compassion
plays a role. The strikers here are low-income earners to whom a seemingly meager increase of
P1.50 in daily wage is worth fighting for. Their reading and interpretation of the CBA provision,
albeit erroneous, led them to believe in good faith that they are entitled to such increase and
that the failure on the part of respondent company to comply with the CBA provision provided a
valid ground for a strike. They had previously met with representatives of respondent company
over this matter, but to no avail. Under these circumstances, they cannot entirely be blamed for
thinking that only through the potent weapon of strike could they attain their objective. They
were ill-advised and obviously not aware of the dire consequences of their acts. Thus, unable to
sustain the strike for lack of funds and faced with the financial problem usually encountered
during the opening of classes, the strikers presented themselves to respondent company on
June 14, 1982 with an unconditional offer to return to work, but were rejected.

More important, however, respondent company had accepted back to work some of the strikers
listed in Appendix "A" of the March 15, 1982 decision during the pendency of this petition. In the
case of Solid Mills, Inc. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No 75950, Resolution of March 11, 1987,
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

respondent company entered into a compromise agreement with some of the strikers whereby it
agreed to extend financial assistance in the amount of P1,000.00 each to some of the private
respondents therein. Fairness and equity demand that respondent company accord the other
strikers the same treatment by reinstating them to their former positions without backwages, or if
reinstatement is not possible, by paying them the separation pay under the Labor Code or the
CBA, whichever is higher.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
However, on equitable considerations, respondent company is hereby ordered to reinstate the
employees listed in Appendix "A" of the decision of March 15, 1982 of the respondent labor
arbiter to their former positions without backwages, or if reinstatement is not possible, to pay
them the separation pay under the Labor Code or the CBA, whichever is higher, computed from
date of employment up to February 11, 1982, except those who have accepted their termination
and/or financial assistance from respondent company.

Principles:
The ingress to (entrance) and egress from (exit) the establishment struck against are not part of
the strike area and, thus, may not be blocked or picketed. (No. 025, Primer on Strike, Picketing
and Lockout). Peaceful ingress and egress of workers who may want to work and those of third
parties transacting lawful business with the company under strike is legal. (Progressive Workers
Union vs. Aguas, 150 SCRA 429).

G.R. No. 105775 February 8, 1993

BENITO D. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER BIENVENIDO V.
HERMOGENES and NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Union of Filipro Employees, of which Petitioner Benito D. Chua was a member, declared
a strike against the private respondent company, Nestle Philippines, Inc. During the strike,
several of he striking employees threw stones at the trucks entering and leaving the company
premises. This resulted in the death of 3 persons and extensive damage to private property.
Consequently, a criminal complaint for multiple murder and frustrated murder was filed against
petitioner and several other employees who were believed to be responsible for the stoning
incident which resulted in the deaths and property damage. 

The strike itself was, however, declared illegal in two decisions of the NLRC which were
affirmed by the Supreme Court. The union and its striking were readmitted by the company
except 69 union officers and 33 union members, including Chua an d received a notice of
dismissal. Two days later, petitioner initiated a complaint for illegal dismissal.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

ISSUE:
Whether or not an employment of a worker who participated in an illegal strike should be
terminated considering that the criminal complaint against him in connection with the strike was
dismissed.

RULING:
Yes. Petitioner contends that no substantial evidence exists on record to support the
findings of the NLRC. We find this contention to be without merit. Petitioner’s participation in the
illegal strike and his commission of illegal acts while the strike was in progress, i.e., he
participated in the barricade which barred people from entering and/or leaving the employer’s
premises, had been sufficiently established by substantial evidence, including the testimony of
the Personnel Supervisor that he was not able to report to work because of the presence of the
barricade.
The law prohibits any person engaged in picketing from obstructing free ingress to or
egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes. While the criminal complaint where
petitioner was included as one of the accused was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, the
Court considers that the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not preclude a finding by the
competent administrative authorities, that petitioner had indeed committed acts inimical to the
interest of his employer.

G.R. No. 92397. August 30, 1990

PROGRESIBONG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA ITM (PSM-ITM), ERASMO

PALOMATA, ROBERTO CRUZ, LETICIA OXALLES, SALVACION BAUTISTA, FERNANDO
DEL AGUA, and PRESCILLA CASTILLO, Petitioners,
v.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR and IMPERIAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., Respondents.

FACTS:
 Sept. 1989 – PSM-ITM filed a Notice of Strike against Imperial Textile Mills, citing as
grounds: violation of the CBA, dismissal of active union members; indefinite forced
leave; non-remittance of SSS premium and amortizations. Conciliation efforts were futile
and a few days after, the union staged a mass protest which lasted for several hours.
 One week after, ITM filed a petition before the Regional Arbitration Branch to declare the
mass protest illegal.
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

 Oct. 1989 – union amended its notice of strike and alleged other issues. Subsequently,
they staged a strike, held picket lines and prevented company vehicles and non-union
employees from going in and out of the company premises.
 Nov. 1989 – NLRC issued TRO enjoining the union from picketing and blocking the
egress/ingress to the company site; union, however, continued with the picket.
 Eventually, the Labor Arbiter – acting on the earlier petition to have the mass protest
declared illegal – did so and ruled that the individual petitioners herein who led that strike
were deemed to have lost their employment status.
 Jan. 22, 1990 – union lifted its picket lines.
 Jan. 26, 1990 – Sec. of Labor issued an order (prescinding from the Labor Arbiter’s
ruling) which noted that ITM being engaged in an undertaking affected with public
interest (since it is one of the country’s largest manufacturers and exporters of
garments), prolonged work stoppage thereat has an adverse effect on the nation’s
economy. Labor Sec thus certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. Further, the workers were ordered to return to work within 24 hours. The six
individual petitioners deemed terminated under the LA’s decision were unable to return
to work and filed the present petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the separation from service of the six is valid.

HELD:
Yes. Although the declaration that the mass protest earlier held was illegal was
appealed by the petitioners, supervening events transpired which calls for an affirmation
of the termination of the six; i.e., despite the restraining order of the NLRC, the
operations of ITM were obstructed by the picketers; the country was then in a state of
national emergency in view of the aborted December 1, 1989 coup d’ etat and the
prolonged work stoppage at ITM cost a heavy toll on the economy.
Such mass protest could not have materialized without the leadership of the
individual petitioners herein. For those acts which were inimical to the national interest,
the Secretary of Labor properly and lawfully upheld their separation from the service and
their exclusion from the return-to-work order. There was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Labor Secretary, as declared by the SC.

G.R. No. 104513 August 4, 1993

SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION OF
WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (GLOWHRAIN), SILAHIS
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CHAPTER, ROGELIO M. SOLUTA, ELMER C. LABOG, JOSELITO A.
SANTOS, FLORENTNO P. MATILLA, EDNA B. DACANAY, HENRY M. BABAY, RAY ANTONIO
E. ROSAURA, DENNIS C. COSICO, VICENTE M. DELOSA, IRENE V. RAGAY, APOLONIO
BONDOC, QUINTOS B. BARRA, ALFREDO S. BAUTISTA, RICHARD T. GALIGO, JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, respondents.

FACTS:
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

The petitioner Silahis International Hotel Inc. is the employer of private respondent employees.
Respondent-Union Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant and Allied
Industries (GLOWHRAIN)-Silahis International Hotel Chapter, is the exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank-and-file employees in the company.

On November 16, 1990, respondent-Union filed a notice of strike against petitioner-Silahis Hotel
for unfair labor practices: violation of CBA, dismissal of union officers/members, mass
termination/illegal lockout, and union busting.The private respondents staged a strike, picketing
and allegedly obstructing the ingress to and egress from the hotel.

On November 28, 1990, the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction and
issued an order certifying the dispute to the NLRC for consolidation with an earlier case and for
all striking employees to return to work.6 Accordingly, on November 29, 1990, the employees
ended the strike and return to work.

On February 1, 1991, petitioner Silahis Hotel filed a complaint for illegal strike against
respondent-Union, fourteen (14) named employees representing the union officers and John
Does and Jane Does representing all the other employees who joined the strike.

Labor Arbiter found private respondents guilty of illegal strike and declared the union officers to
have lost and forfeited their employment.8

On February 14, 1992, the day the private respondents learned of the decision, petitioner-
Silahis Hotel barred them from entering the hotel and terminated their services. Respondent-
Union and private respondent-employees filed their appeal on February 19, 1992, well within the
ten-day period for perfection of appeal provided by law.9

And on February 27, 1992, herein private respondents filed a Very Urgent Petition 10 for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction under Art. 218(e) of the Labor
Code, not in the illegal strike case then on appeal, 11 but as NLRC NCR IC No. 00-0235-92. In
that petition, respondents (petitioners therein) allege that petitioner-Silahis Hotel terminated the
employment of respondents on February 14, 1992 even before the illegal strike
decision 12 became final and executory and that most of the employees terminated were not
union officers nor proved to be participants in the strike. The termination of respondents'
employment would cause grave or irreparable injury which can be corrected by the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction.

The first division of the NLRC issued an order in favor of respondents dated March 11, 1992.

The labor arbiter ruled that the strike staged by the respondents was illegal. After receiving
notice of a favorable decision, petitioner-hotel dismissed the respondent-employees for having
participated in this illegal strike. Respondents then filed its appeal from this decision. And within
the same month, the respondents filed their petition for injunction as a new injunction case.

ISSUE:
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

WoN NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
issuing such an order the reinstatement of employees dismissed for leading and/or participating
in an illegal strike, in an injunction case1 which is separate and distinct from the illegal
case2 against them

HELD:

Yes. Public respondent-NLRC erred when it entertained the separate injunction case filed by
respondents. Moreover, it should have consolidated the petition for injunction with the case
already on appeal, for the fact of appeal and the attendant circumstances were stated in the
petition and even acknowledged in the questioned Resolution of the NLRC. 26

While we find the action taken by the respondents was ill-suited however, this does not mean
that the petitioner-hotel's act of dismissing respondent-employees before the decision of the
labor arbiter became final and executory should be sanctioned.

Despite our proscription against forum shopping, the respondents should be allowed to have
recourse to the processes of law and to seek relief from their dismissal as this allowance will
better serve the ends of justice. The propriety of the hotel's act of dismissing the respondents
and the resulting consequences may still be passed upon, in conjunction with the appealed
case after filing a proper petition therein.

However, the culpability of respondent's counsel, who are charged with the knowledge of the
law and with the duty of assisting in the administration of justice, is clearly manifest. Because of
the cunning practice they employed, respondents' lawyers, Attys. Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. and
A.E. Dacanay are hereby warned and admonished to be more circumspect in their professional
concerns otherwise a penalty more severe shall befall them for similar acts.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the ruling of the
respondent National Labor Relations Commission is hereby set aside. The temporary
restraining order dated March 26, 1992 is made permanent. No costs.

G.R. No. 73721 March 30, 1987

AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION [FFW], B.A. AGANON, D.T. GUILLES, E.G. SULIT
and E.C. RODRIGUEZ, * petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS and AHS/PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents.

FACTS
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

 Petitioner AHS/Philippines Employees Union [FFW] was the recognized collective

bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of private respondent AHS/Philippines
Inc., a company engaged in the sale of hospital and laboratory equipment and Berna
and Pharmaton products.
 A collective bargaining agreement [CBA] was concluded between the parties for the
period commencing December 1, 1981 to November 30, 1984.
 Private respondent company claim that as early as October 1983, its operations had
been seriously affected by the suspension of trade and foreign credit facilities, which
situation grew worse in early 1984 when its suppliers of Berna and Pharmaton products
insisted on a cash LIC basis or M guarantee by the mother company.
 As respondent company could not comply with these requirements, it decided to
strengthen its other division, the HML Division, which sold hospital and laboratory
equipment bought from the parent company.
 It posted a job-opening notice for 7 to 10 medical representatives and one field
supervisor for the HML Division. Amelita. Calderon, a member of petitioner union applied
for the position of medical representative, but was rejected for lack of the necessary
educational attainment and unwillingness to accept provincial assignments.
 When the economic crisis continued until mid-year of 1984, respondent company
decided to change its marketing strategy for the Berna and Pharmaton products to
ensure the whole company's viability. Instead of ethical selling through the field
representatives, it was decided to shift to the over-the counter [OTC] method and to
appoint Zuellig Pharma as national distributor.
 As this move would result in the abolition of the Pharmaceutical Division, the union
president was advised on July 26, 1984 of the impending dissolution of said division and
was asked to suggest ways and means by which the termination could be effected in the
smoothest manner possible and with least pain.
 On August 1, 1984, the union president categorically stated to the company president
that the union would oppose any termination at all costs, respondent company decided
to proceed with the announcement of the termination by serving notice on the same day
to the 31 employees of the Pharmaceutical Division, said termination to take effect
immediately upon service thereof.
 In lieu of the 3O day notice required by law, the employees were paid one month's
salary. Fifteen accepted their termination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondent company validly terminated its employees.

HELD:
NO. Under the New Labor Code, even if the dismissal is based on a just cause under
Article 284, the one-month written notice to both the affected employee and the Minister of
Labor is required, on top of the separation pay. Hence, unlike in the old termination pay laws,
payment of a month's salary cannot be considered substantial compliance with the provisions of
Art. 284 of the Labor Code.
Since the dismissal of the 31 employees of the Pharmaceutical Division of respondent
company was effected in violation of the above-cited provision, the same is illegal. Needless to
say, in the absence of a showing that the illegal dismissal was dictated by antiunion motives, the
HIDALGO, ALYANNAH M.

ELE1-LM1-2

same does not constitute an unfair labor practice as would be a valid ground for a strike. The
remedy is an action for reinstatement with backwages and damages.
Nevertheless, we take this actuation of respondent company as evidence of the abusive
and Oppressive manner by which the retrenchment was effected. And while the lack of proper
notice could not be a ground for a strike, this does not mean that the strike staged by petitioner
union was illegal because it was likewise grounded on a violation by respondent company of the
CBA, enumerated as an unfair labor Practice under Art. 249 [i] of the Labor Code.