Rights related to Property

CHURCHILL & TAIT v. RAFFERTY

FACTS:

Plaintiffs put up a billboard on a private land located in Rizal Province “quite distance from the road and
strongly built, not dangerous to the safety of the people, and contained no advertising matter which is
filthy, indecent, or deleterious to the morals of the community.” However, defendant Rafferty, Collector
of Internal Revenue, decided to remove the billboards after due investigation made upon the complaints
of the British and German Consuls.

Act No. 2339 authorized the then Collector of Internal Revenue to remove after due investigation, any
billboard exposed to the public view if it decides that it is offensive to the sight or is otherwise a
nuisance.

In the agreed statement of facts submitted by the parties, the plaintiffs "admit that the billboards
mentioned were and still are offensive to the sight."

The Court of First Instance perpetually restrains and prohibits the defendant and his deputies from
collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs and their property the annual tax mentioned and
described in subsection (b) of section 100 of Act No. 2339, effective July 1, 1914, and from destroying or
removing any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs and decrees the cancellation of
the bond given by the plaintiffs.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON Act No. 2339 was a legitimate exercise of the police power of the Government?

HELD:
YES. Things offensive to the senses, such as sight, smell or hearing, may be suppressed by the State
especially those situated in thickly populated districts. Aesthetics may be regulated by the police power
of the state, as long as it is justified by public interest and safety.

Moreover, if the police power may be exercised to encourage a healthy social and economic condition in
the country, and if the comfort and convenience of the people are included within those subjects,
everything which encroaches upon such territory is amenable to the police power of the State.

Hence, the judgment of the CFI is reversed. 

BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA rep. by BARANGAY

CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ, Petitioner

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE MAGTOTO III,

and PATRICIA SINDAYAN, Respondents

G.R. No. 150640, March 22, 2007

Facts:

Pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San

Fernando, Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for

eminent domain against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the

registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R.

Petitioner sought to convert a portion of respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road.

The alleged public purposes sought to be served by the expropriation were stated in Barangay

Resolution No. 6.

Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property was the most practical and nearest way to the

municipal road. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an

amount equivalent to the fair market value of the property.

Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the

benefit of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately

omitted the name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the

benefit of the residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being

proposed to be built across the respondents’ land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and

those who would purchase the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed out that under

Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, it is the subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder

road to the subdivision residents.

Issues:

Whether or not the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use.

Ruling:

The petition lacks merit.

In general, eminent domain is defined as “the power of the nation or a sovereign state to take, or

to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without the owner’s consent,

conditioned upon payment of just compensation.” It is acknowledged as “an inherent political

right, founded on a common necessity and interest of appropriating the property of individual

members of the community to the great necessities of the whole community.”

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional provisions: (1)

that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation under Article III

(Bill of Rights), Section 9 and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or

property without due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.

However, there is no precise meaning of “public use” and the term is susceptible of myriad

meanings depending on diverse situations. The limited meaning attached to “public use” is “use

by the public” or “public employment,” that “a duty must devolve on the person or corporation

holding property appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use

intended, and that there must be a right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or some

public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after it is condemned.”
The more generally accepted view sees “public use” as “public advantage, convenience, or

benefit, and that anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies,

and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of

the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the

employment of capital and labor, which contributes to the general welfare and the prosperity of

the whole community.” In this jurisdiction, “public use” is defined as “whatever is beneficially

employed for the community.”

It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on

the “numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to be

benefited.” The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use,

provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular individuals. Thus, the

first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the expropriator to prove

that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, this Court explicated

that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation declaring “that the plaintiff has a lawful

right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in

the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation.”

In the case at bar, petitioner harps on eminent domain as an inherent power of sovereignty similar

to police power and taxation. As a basic political unit, its Sangguniang Barangay is clothed with

the authority to provide barangay roads and other facilities for public use and welfare.

Petitioner’s delegated power to expropriate is not at issue. The legal question in this petition,

however, is whether the taking of the land was for a public purpose or use. In the exercise of the

power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be for a public

purpose. A corollary issue is whether private property can be taken by law from one person and

given to another in the guise of public purpose.

In this regard, the petition must fail.

The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just compensation.

Taking an individual’s private property is a deprivation which can only be justified by a higher

good—which is public use—and can only be counterbalanced by just compensation. Without

these safeguards, the taking of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void,

but would also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individual’s basic right to

property as well.

For this reason, courts should be more vigilant in protecting the rights of the property owner and

must perform a more thorough and diligent scrutiny of the alleged public purpose behind the

expropriation. Extreme caution is called for in resolving complaints for condemnation, such that

when a serious doubt arises regarding the supposed public use of property, the doubt should be

resolved in favor of the property owner and against the State.

PHILIPPINE COLUMBIAN ASSOCIATION V. HON. PANIS

DOCTRINE: The City of Manila, acting through its legislative branch, has the express power to acquire
private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home lots for sale to bona fide tenants or
occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of the city. That only a few could actually
benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not
possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. Public use now includes the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in particular, urban land reform and
housing.

FACTS: Philippine Columbian Association, petitioner herein, is a non-stock, non-profit domestic

corporation and is engaged in the business of providing sports and recreational facilities for its
members. Petitioner's office and facilities are located in the District of Paco, Manila, and adjacent
thereto, is a parcel of land consisting of 4,842.90 square meters owned by petitioner. Private
respondents are the actual occupants of the said parcel of land, while respondents Antonio Gonzales, Jr.
and Karlo Butiong were duly-elected councilors of the City of Manila. Petitioner instituted ejectment
proceedings against herein private respondents before the metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. Judgment
was rendered against the said occupants, ordering them to vacate the lot and pay reasonable
compensation therefor. This judgment was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court, the Court of Appeals
and subsequently by the Supreme Court. As a result of the favorable decision, petitioner filed before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted. A writ of
demolition was later prayed and likewise issued by the same MTC. Private respondents filed with the
Manila RTC, a petition for injunction and prohibition with preliminary injunction and restraining order
against the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila and petitioner herein to enjoin their ejectment from and
the demolition of their houses on the premises in question. The City of Manila filed a complaint against
petitioner before the Manila Regional Trial Court, for the expropriation of the lot subject of the
ejectment proceedings. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging, inter alia,
that the City of Manila had no power to expropriate private land; that the expropriation is not for public
use and welfare; that the expropriation is politically motivated; and, that the deposit of P2 million in the
City of Manila representing the provisional value of the land, was insufficient and was made under P.D.
1533, a law declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The Manila Regional Trial Court denied
petitioner's motion to dismiss and entered an order of condemnation declaring that the expropriation
proceeding was properly instituted in accordance with law. The Court also ordered the parties to
submit, within five days, the names of their respective nominees as commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the land in question. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
its motion to dismiss, and later a motion to defer compliance with the order directing the submission of
the names of nominees to be appointed commissioners. The City of Manila, however, filed an ex-parte
motion for the issuance of a writ of possession over the subject lot, mentioning the P2 million deposit
with the Philippine National Bank, representing the provisional value of the land. The court issued the
writ of possession, and at the same time, denied petitioner's motion to defer compliance and motion for
reconsideration. As a result of the expropriation proceedings, the Manila RTC issued an order, granting
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the private respondents. A motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner was denied. Petitioner then filed before the CA a petition assailing the orders of the
Manila RTC. The CA denied the petition and subsequently denied consideration.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the City of Manila has power to expropriate private property; (2) assuming
that it does, whether or not this was exercised improperly and illegally in violation of the public use
requirement and petitioner’s right to due process.

HELD: (1) YES. The City has power to expropriate. (2) NO. This was not exercised improperly and illegally.
The land subject of this case is the 4,842.90 square meter lot, which was formerly a part of the Fabie
Estate. As early as November 11, 1966, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila passed Ordinance No.
5971, seeking to expropriate the Fabie Estate. Through negotiated sales, the City of Manila acquired a
total of 18,017.10 square meters of the estate, and thereafter subdivided the land into home lots and
distributed the portions to the actual occupants thereof. The remaining area of 4,842.90 square meters,
more or less, was sold in 1977 by its owner, Dolores Fabie-Posadas, to petitioner. Since the time of the
sale, the lot has been occupied by private respondents. On 23, 1989, the City Council of Manila, with the
approval of the Mayor, passed Ordinance No. 7704 for the expropriation of the 4,842.90 square meter
lot. Petitioner forgot that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, R.A. No. 409, expressly authorizes
the City of Manila to "condemn private property for public use" (Sec. 3) and "to acquire private land . . .
and subdivide the same into home lots for sale on easy terms to city residents" (Sec. 100). The Revised
Charter of the City of Manila expressly grants the City of Manila general powers over its territorial
jurisdiction, including the power of eminent domain. The City of Manila, acting through its legislative
branch, has the express power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide these lands into home
lots for sale to bona fide tenants or occupants thereof, and to laborers and low-salaried employees of
the city. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish
its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need
them. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage, including in
particular, urban land reform and housing. The due process requirement in the expropriation of subject
lot has likewise been complied with. Although the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner was not set for
hearing as the court is required to do, it never questioned the lack of hearing before the trial and
appellate courts. It is only now before us that petitioner raises the issue of due process. Indeed, due
process was afforded petitioner when it filed its motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order,
denying its motion to dismiss.

EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 (1987) G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987

Fact: On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a
certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu and
covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or less, for the establishment of an export
processing zone by petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area,
however, was public land which includes, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328
square meters owned by the private respondent. The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the
parcels of land from the respondent in acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the
sale of the property. The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu for expropriation with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent for the purpose of establishing the
Mactan Export Processing Zone. The respondent judge issued a writ of possession, order of
condemnation and order to appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the
court the just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated. The petitioner Objection to
Commissioner’s Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners; and that the
compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No. 1533.

Issue: Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533
which states “Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property acquired through
eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not exceed the value declared by the
owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in the property or determined by the assessor,
pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or
decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property.” valid and constitutional?

ASSOC. OF SMALL LANDOWERS IN THE PHILS INC. v SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM G.R No. 78742  July 14,
1989

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to
the constitutionality of several measures like E.O. No. 228, P.D. No. 27, Presidential Proclamation No.
131, E.O. No. 229 and R.A. No. 6657 – Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
In G.R. No. 7977

The petitioners in the said case are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds of
separation of powers, equal protection, due process and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310

The petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as provided in the Constitution is lodged in the Congress and not to the President. The
petitioners also seek to prohibit the implementation of Proclamation No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. The
petitioners contend that the taking of the property must be simultaneous with the payment of just
compensation which Sec. 5 of E.O. No. 229 does not provide.

In G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that the said
E.O.s violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or
just compensation which was denied to the petitioner.

In G.R. No. 78742

Petitioner claims that they are unable to enjoy their right of retention because they cannot eject their
tenants due to the fact that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has not issued the implementing
rules required under the said decree. The petitioners are therefore asking the Honorable Court for a writ
of mandamus to compel the DAR to issue the said rules

ISSUE: WON the laws questioned are valid exercise of power of eminent domain.

RULING: YES. There are traditional distinctions between the power of eminent domain and police power
which logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time involving the same subject. The
property condemned under police power is harmful or intended for harmful purposes, like a building on
the verge of collapse, which needs to be demolished for public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. Under police power, the confiscation of such
property is not compensable, unlike the taking done in the exercise of power of eminent domain, which
requires the payment of just compensation to the owner.

The petitions before the Court present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable
taking is concerned. There is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution with regards to the extent that the laws in question merely prescribe
the retention limits for the landowners. However, there is definitely a taking under power of eminent
domain which payment of just compensation is imperative when in order to carry out the regulation, it
is necessary to deprive such land now

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc vs. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate

jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor

et al was authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was

directed by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property.

Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from

instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and

a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:

Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

Held:

The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is

unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional

Rationale (as was stated in each:

1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from

constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to

test the validity of a legislative act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter. The

constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental agencies. Failure to

comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure

2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is

to ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting
the Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions express the

objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except when

technical terms are employed in which case the significance attached to them prevails. This

case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has the

legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot

be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language employed is

not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated in the

constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only

at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not give rigid

answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.

The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical

environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for

why an act was passed would be helpful, it is not enough.

4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless.

There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its

taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the

condemned property is entitled

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc vs. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate

jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor

et al was authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was

directed by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property.

Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from

instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and

a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:

Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

Held:
The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is

unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional

Rationale (as was stated in each:

1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from

constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to

test the validity of a legislative act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter. The

constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental agencies. Failure to

comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure

2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is

to ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting

the Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions express the

objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except when

technical terms are employed in which case the significance attached to them prevails. This

case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has the

legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot

be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language employed is

not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated in the

constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only

at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not give rigid

answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.

The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical

environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for

why an act was passed would be helpful, it is not enough.

4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless.

There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its

taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the

condemned property is entitled

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc vs. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:
On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate

jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor

et al was authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was

directed by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property.

Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from

instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and

a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:

Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

Held:

The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is

unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional

Rationale (as was stated in each:

1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from

constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to

test the validity of a legislative act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter. The

constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental agencies. Failure to

comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure

2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is

to ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting

the Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions express the

objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except when

technical terms are employed in which case the significance attached to them prevails. This

case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has the

legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot

be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language employed is

not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated in the

constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only

at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not give rigid
answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.

The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical

environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for

why an act was passed would be helpful, it is not enough.

4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless.

There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its

taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the

condemned property is entitled

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc vs. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate

jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor

et al was authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was

directed by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property.

Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from

instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and

a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:

Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

Held:

The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is

unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional

Rationale (as was stated in each:

1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from

constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to

test the validity of a legislative act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter. The

constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental agencies. Failure to
comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure

2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is

to ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting

the Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions express the

objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except when

technical terms are employed in which case the significance attached to them prevails. This

case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has the

legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot

be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language employed is

not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated in the

constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only

at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not give rigid

answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.

The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical

environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for

why an act was passed would be helpful, it is not enough.

4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless.

There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its

taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the

condemned property is entitled.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc vs. Land Tenure Administration

Facts:

On August 3, 1959, Republic Act no. 2616 took effect. The act states that the Tatalon Estate

jointly owned by J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc, Gregorio Araneta and Co. Inc., and Florencio Deudor

et al was authorized to be expropriated. More than a year later Land Tenure Administration was

directed by the executive secretary to institute the expropriation of the aforesaid property.

Appellee thereupon filed a prohibition with a preliminary injunction to prevent respondents from

instituting the expropriation. The lower court decided that the said act was unconstitutional and

a writ of prohibition was granted to the appellee. Respondent appealed to C.A.

Issue:

Whether the RA 2616 as amended by 3454 is constitutional? YES

Held:

The decision of the lower court of January 10, 1963, holding that RA 2616 is

unconstitutional as amended by RA 3454 is reversed i.e. the expropriation is constitutional

Rationale (as was stated in each:

1. Judicial Review is granted, if not expressly, at least by clear implication from

constitutional provisions. It may be exercised if an affected part files the appropriate suit to

test the validity of a legislative act, executive act, or municipal ordinance for that matter. The

constitution is the supreme law and is binding on all governmental agencies. Failure to

comply provides a ground to nullify a governmental measure

2. The question if one of constitutional construction (of interpreting the constitution). The task is

to ascertain the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in adopting

the Constitution. It is assumed that that the words in the constitutional provisions express the

objectivity sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except when

technical terms are employed in which case the significance attached to them prevails. This

case is such a case and is therefore one of minimal construction. The congress has the

legislative will to expropriate and subdivide lands it deems to be fit for sale. Moreover, it cannot

be denied that congress has the capacity to exercise such authority. The language employed is

not swathed in obscurity (because congress has the legislative power as stated in the

constitution). It is presumed that the constitution suffices to govern the life of the people not only

at the present time but also in the indefinite future. The constitution though does not give rigid

answers but is flexible and accommodates the problems the future may pose.

The constitution is dynamic in nature and not static. It reflects the socialpolitical

environment of the times. It adapts and changes. Although looking at the historical reasons for

why an act was passed would be helpful, it is not enough.

4. There should be no fear that the constitutional grant of power to expropriate lands is limitless.

There is to be just compensation. This means the equivalent for the value of the property at its

taking. The market value of the land taken is just compensation to which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled.

Heirs of Jose Deleste v. Landbank of the Philippines (June 8, 2011)

FACTS:The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a
parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo,IliganCity. Said spouses were childless, but Gregorio had a
son named Virgilio Nanaman (Virgilio) by another woman. When Gregorio died in 1945, Hilaria and
Virgilio administered the subject property and sold the subject property to Dr. Jose Deleste (Deleste) for
PhP 16,000. The deed of sale was notarized on February 17, 1954 and registered on March 2, 1954. Also,
the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was canceled and a new tax declaration was issued in the
name of Deleste.On May 15, 1954, Hilaria died.Gregorios brother, Juan Nanaman, was appointed as
special administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. Subsequently, Edilberto Noel (Noel) was
appointed as the regular administrator of the joint estate. Noel, as the administrator of the intestate
estate of the deceased spouses, filed an action against Deleste for the reversion of title over the subject
property. The decision stated thatthe subject property was the conjugal property of the late spouses
Gregorio and Hilaria and that the latter could only sell her one-half (1/2) share of the subject property to
Deleste. As a result, Deleste, who died in 1992, and the intestate estate of Gregorio were held to be the
co-owners of the subject property, each with a one-half (1/2) interest in it.Thereafter, Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 27 was issued. This law mandates that tenanted rice and corn lands be brought under
the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries. Thus, the subject
property was placed under the said program.However, only the heirs of Gregorio were identified by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as the landowners. Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify
them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program;
hence, their right to due process of law was violatedEventually, on February 12, 1984, DAR issued
Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) in favor of private respondents who were tenants and actual
cultivators of the subject property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the e failure of the administrative body to give written notice that the property
bought by the ascendant of the petitioner is subject to PD 27 a violation of the heirs due process

HELD:

YES. PD 27 is a statutory notice to all owners of agricultural lands devoted to rice and/or corn
production, implying that there was no need for an actual notice. The importance of an actual notice in
subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with
it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law.Since land
acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law govern
the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed. Faithful
compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of
expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to
Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence,
any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the
proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be
deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.In addition, DAR
must have notified Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the
deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste wasregistered on March 2, 1954, and such
registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already
owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. DAR does not have the reason to feign ignorance of
the transfer of ownership over the subject property.Moreover, DAR should have sent the notice to
Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, since the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled
and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Althoughtax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are nonetheless good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive
possession. Petitioners right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify
them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.

Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI)

vs
PARC
G.R. No. 171101
April 24, 2012
670 SCRA 392 (2012)

Facts:
Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22, 2011 dated
December 16, 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita, Inc. (HLI) and the Motion for
Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9, 2011 filed by private respondents.
Hacienda Luisita Inc. maintains that the Notice of Coverage issued on January 2, 2006 may, at the very
least, be considered as the date of "taking" as this was the only time that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita were placed under compulsory acquisition in view of its failure to perform certain
obligations under the SDP. January 2, 2006, was the date when the Notice of Coverage was issued by the
DAR pursuant to PARC Resolution No. 2006-34-01 recalling/revoking the approval of the Stock
Distribution Plan(DSP).

Alyansa ng mga Manggagawang Bukid sa Hacienda Luisita (AMBALA) contends that if HLI or Tadeco is, at
all, entitled to just compensation, the "taking" should be reckoned as of November 21, 1989, the date
when the SDP was approved, and the amount of compensation should be PhP 40,000 per hectare as this
was the same value declared in 1989 by Tadeco to ensure that the FWBs will not control the majority
stockholdings in HLI.

Issue:
Whether or not in determining the just compensation, the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, when
PARC approved HLI’s SDP [stock distribution plan] "in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBS
were considered to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita"

Held:
We maintain that the date of "taking" is November 21, 1989, the date when PARC approved HLI’s SDP
per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2, in view of the fact that this is the time that the FWBs were considered
to own and possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject
of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the
SDP, that is, November 21, 1989. Thus, such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued
under compulsory acquisition.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held that "the ‘time of taking’ is the time when the
landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic." It should be noted, however, that "taking" does not only take place upon the issuance of title
either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). "Taking" also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and
approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme, as in the instant case.
Thus, HLI’s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval which should be considered
as the effective date of "taking" as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed
the CARP coverage of these lands.

REPUBLIC v. ESTATE OF HANS MENZI, GR No. 152578, 2005-11-23

Facts:

President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) tasked with, among others, the recovery of all ill-gotten... wealth
accumulated by former President Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates.

EO Nos. 2 and 14, respectively freezing all assets and properties in the Philippines in which the former
President, his wife,... their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees have any interest or participation, and defining the jurisdiction over cases involving the ill-
gotten wealth.

Pursuant to the executive orders, several writs of sequestration were... issued by the PCGG in pursuit of
the reputedly vast Marcos fortune

Following a lead that Marcos had substantial holdings in Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Bulletin), the
PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration dated April 22, 1986, sequestering the shares of Marcos, Emilio T.
Yap (Yap), Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (Cojuangco), and their nominees... and agents in Bulletin.

This was followed by another Writ of Sequestration issued on February 12, 1987, this time sequestering
the shares of stock, assets, properties, records and documents of Hans Menzi Holdings and
Management, Inc. (HMHMI).
The Republic then instituted before the Sandiganbayan on July 29, 1987, a complaint for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages... he complaint substantially averred that Yap knowingly
and willingly acted as the dummy, nominee or agent of the Marcos spouses in appropriating shares of
stock in domestic corporations such... as the Bulletin, and for the purpose of preventing disclosure and
recovery of illegally obtained assets.

It also averred that Cesar Zalamea (Zalamea) acted, together with Cojuangco, as dummies, nominees
and/or agents of the Marcos spouses in acquiring substantial shares in

Bulletin in order to prevent disclosure and recovery of illegally obtained assets, and that Zalamea
established, together with third persons, HMHMI which acquired Bulletin.

On March 10, 1988, the complaint was amended joining Cojuangco as Zalamea's co-actor instead of
mere collaborator.

The complaint was amended for the second time on October 17, 1990. The amendment consisted of
dropping Zalamea as defendant in view of the Deed of Assignment... dated October 15, 1987 which he
executed, assigning, transferring and ceding to the Government the 121,178 Bulletin shares registered in
his name.  These shares, as will be explained forthwith, formed part of the 214,424.5 shares (214 block)
which became the subject of a... case[1] that reached this Court.

The Second Amended Complaint also included the Estate of Hans M. Menzi (Estate of Menzi), through
its executor, Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo (Atty. Montecillo), as one of the defendants.

the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision[4] dated March 14, 2002

Declaring that the following Bulletin shares are the ill-gotten wealth of the defendant Marcos spouses

The 46,626 Bulletin shares in the name of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr

The 198,052.5 Bulletin shares in the names of:

No. of Shares

Jose Y. Campos

90,866.5

Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.

90,877

Cesar C. Zalamea

16,309

Total

198,052.5... which they transferred to HM Holdings and Management, Inc. on August 17, 1983, and
which the latter sold to Bulletin Publishing Corporation on February 21, 1986.
Ordering the defendant Estate of Hans M. Menzi through its Executor, Manuel G. Montecillo, to
surrender for cancellation the original eight Bulletin certificates of stock in its possession, which were
presented in court as Exhibits ...., which are part of the 212,424.5

Bulletin shares subject of the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated April 15, 1988 in G.R. No. 79126.

In 1957, Menzi purchased the entire interest in Bulletin from its founder and owner, Mr. Carson Taylor. 
In 1961, Yap, owner of US Automotive, purchased Bulletin shares from Menzi and became one of the
corporation's major stockholders.

On April 2, 1968, a stock option was executed by and between Menzi and Menzi and Co. on the one
hand, and Yap and US Automotive on the other, whereby the parties gave the each other preferential
right to buy the other's Bulletin shares.

Several years later, on June 5, 1984, Atty. Amorsolo V. Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza), Vice President of US
Automotive, executed a promissory note with his personal guarantee in favor of Menzi, promising to pay
the latter the sum of P21,304,921.16 with interest at 18% per annum as... consideration for Menzi's sale
of his 154 block on or before December 31, 1984.

On January 10, 1985, Atty. Montecillo filed a motion praying for the confirmation of the sale to US
Automotive of Menzi's 154 block.  The probate court confirmed the sale in its Order dated February 1,
1985.

Accordingly, on May 15, 1985, Atty. Montecillo received from US Automotive two (2) checks in the
amounts of P21,304,778.24 and P3,664,421.85 in full payment of the agreed purchase price and interest
for the sale of the 154 block.

Atty. Montecillo also wrote on the lower portion of the promissory note executed by Atty. Mendoza the
words "Paid May 15, 1985 (signed) M.G. Montecillo, Executor of the Estate of Hans M. Menzi."

Upon these facts, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the sale of the 154 block to US Automotive is valid and
legal.

According to the Sandiganbayan, the sale was made pursuant to the stock option executed in 1968
between the parties to the sale. Negotiations took place and were... concluded before Menzi's death,
and full payment was made only after the probate court had judicially confirmed the sale.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Republic's claim, based on the affidavit of Mariano B. Quimson, Jr.
(Quimson) dated October 9, 1986, that the sale should be nullified because US Automotive only acted as
a dummy of Marcos who was the real buyer of the shares. According to the... court, the Republic failed
to overcome its burden of proof since Quimson's affidavit was not corroborated by other evidence and
was, in fact, refuted by Atty. Montecillo.

Issues:

Whether or not the sale of 154,470 shares of stock of Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc., subject of this case by
the late Hans M. Menzi to the U.S. Automotive Co. Inc. is valid and legal
Whether or not the shares of stock of Bulletin Publishing Co. Inc. registered and/or issued in the name of
defendants Emilio T. Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., Cesar Zalamea and the late Hans M. Menzi (and/or his
estate and/or his holding company, HM Holding

& Investment Corp.) are ill-gotten wealth of the defendants Marcos spouses

The Republic, in G.R. No. 152758, assails the afore-quoted Decision insofar as it declared as not ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcos spouses the 154,472 shares (154 block) sold by Menzi to U.S. Automotive Co., Inc.
(US Automotive) and dismissed the Republic's claim... for damages.

In G.R. No. 154518, on the other hand, the Estate of Menzi imputes grave error and misinterpretation of
facts and evidence against the Sandiganbayan in declaring that the 46,626 Bulletin shares in the name of
Cojuangco, and the 198,052.5 shares (198 block) in the names of

Jose Campos (Campos), Cojuangco and Zalamea are ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.

The three blocks of Bulletin shares of stock subject of these consolidated petitions are:

154,472 shares (154 block) sold by the late Menzi and/or Atty. Montecillo to US Automotive on May 15,
1985 for P24,969,200.09;

198,052.50 (198 block) issued and registered in the names of Campos, Cojuangco, and Zalamea  which
were transferred to HMHMI and subsequently sold by HMHMI (through Atty. Montecillo) to Bulletin on
February 21, 1986 for P23,675,195.85;... the Republic argues that the Sandiganbayan failed to take into
account the fact that despite Menzi's claim that he acquired Bulletin in 1957, he did not include any
Bulletin shares in... his Last Will and Testament executed in 1977.

Atty. Montecillo, the executor of Menzi's estate, likewise did not include any Bulletin share in the initial
inventory of Menzi's properties filed on May 15, 1985.  Neither were any Bulletin shares declared by
Atty. Montecillo... even after the probate court issued an Order dated November 17, 1992 for the
submission of an updated inventory of Menzi's assets.

The Republic claims that despite these circumstances, coupled with Quimson's affidavit detailing how
Marcos used his dummies to conceal his control over Bulletin, as well as the letters and correspondence
between Marcos and Menzi indicating that Menzi consistently updated Marcos... on the affairs of
Bulletin, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the 154 block was not ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.  The
Sandiganbayan's erroneous inference allegedly warrants a review of its findings.

The Republic insists that the sale between Menzi and U.S. Automotive was a sham because the parties
failed to comply with the basic requirement of a deed of sale in the transfer of the subject shares.

The Republic also contends that Menzi and Yap were both dummies of the late President Marcos, used
by the latter in order to conceal his interest in Bulletin. Hence, the 154 block should also have been
declared ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor the Government.

The Republic, therefore, prays that the Sandiganbayan Decision, insofar as it declares the sale of the 154
block to be valid and legal, be reconsidered and judgment accordingly rendered declaring the 154 block
as ill-gotten wealth
The Estate of Menzi and HMHMI filed a Memorandum[11] dated March 10, 2005, averring that the
Republic failed to adduce evidence of any kind that the 154 block was ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses.

They claim that the requirements for a valid... transfer of stocks, namely: (1) there must be delivery of
the stock certificate; (2) the certificate must be indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other
persons legally authorized to make the transfer; and (3) the transfer must be recorded in the books of
the... corporation in order to be valid against third parties, have all been met.

The parties to the sale allegedly confirm the indorsement and delivery of the Bulletin shares of stock
representing the 154 block. The requirement that the transfer be recorded in the books of the
corporation was also met because US Automotive exercised its rights as... shareholder.

Yap also maintains that the sale of the 154 block was valid and legal. The non-inclusion of the said block
of shares in the inventory of Menzi's estate was purportedly due to the fact that the same had, by...
then, been sold to US Automotive.

The absence of a deed of sale evidencing the sale is allegedly not irregular because the law itself does
not require any deed for the validity of the transfer of shares of stock, it being sufficient that such
transfer be effected by delivery of the stock certificates duly... indorsed

Moreover, the BIR certified that the Estate of Menzi paid the final tax on capital gains derived from the
sale of the 154 block and authorized the Corporate Secretary to register the transfer of the said shares in
the name of US Automotive.

Further, a stock certificate covering... the 154 block was issued to US Automotive by Quimson himself as
Corporate Secretary.

Ruling:

The Corporation Code acknowledges that the delivery of a duly indorsed stock certificate is sufficient to
transfer ownership of shares of stock in stock corporations. Such mode of transfer is valid between the
parties.  In order to bind third persons, however, the transfer... must be recorded in the books of the
corporation.

Clearly then, the absence of a deed of assignment is not a fatal flaw which renders the transfer invalid as
the Republic posits.  In fact, as has been held in Rural Bank of Lipa City, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[14]the
execution of a deed of sale... does not necessarily make the transfer effective.

In that case, petitioners argued that by virtue of the deed of assignment, private respondents had
relinquished to them all their rights as stockholders of the bank.  This Court, however, ruled that the
delivery of the stock certificate duly indorsed by the owner is the... operative act that transfers the
shares.  The absence of delivery is a fatal defect which is not cured by mere execution of a deed of
assignment. Consequently, petitioners, as mere assignees, cannot enjoy the status of a stockholder,
cannot vote nor be voted for, and will... not be entitled to dividends, insofar as the assigned shares are
concerned.

There appears to be no dispute in this case that the stock certificates covering the 154 block were duly
indorsed and delivered to the buyer, US Automotive.  The parties to the sale, in fact, do not question the
validity and legality of the transfer.
The objection raised by the Republic actually concerns the authority of Atty. Montecillo, the executor of
Menzi's estate, to indorse the said certificates. However, Atty. Montecillo's authority to negotiate the
transfer and execute the necessary documents for the sale of the 154... block is found in the General
Power of Attorney executed by Menzi on May 23, 1984, which specifically authorizes Atty. Montecillo
"[T]o sell, assign, transfer, convey and set over upon such consideration and under such terms and
conditions as he may deem proper, any and all... stocks or shares of stock, now standing or which may
thereafter stand in my name on the books of any and all company or corporation, and for that purpose
to make, sign and execute all necessary instruments, contracts, documents or acts of assignment or
transfer."

Atty. Montecillo's authority to accept payment of the purchase price for the 154 block sold to US
Automotive after Menzi's death springs from the latter's Last Will and Testament and the Order of the
probate court confirming the sale and authorizing Atty. Montecillo to accept... payment therefor.

Hence, before and after Menzi's death, Atty. Montecillo was vested with ample authority to effect the
sale of the 154 block to US Automotive.

That the 154 block was not included in the inventory is plausibly explained by the fact that at the time
the inventory of the assets of Menzi's estate was taken, the sale of the 154 block had already been
consummated.

Besides, the non-inclusion of the proceeds of the sale in the... inventory does not affect the validity and
legality of the sale itself.

At any rate, the Sandiganbayan's factual findings that the 154 block was sold to US Automotive while
Menzi was still alive, and that Atty. Montecillo merely accepted payment by virtue of the authority
conferred upon him by Menzi himself are conclusive upon this Court, supported,... as they are, by the
evidence on record

As held by the Sandiganbayan:

... The sale was made pursuant to the Stock Option executed in 1968 between the parties to the sale,
considering the restrictions contained in Bulletin's Articles of Incorporation as amended in 1968 limiting
the transferability of its shares. Negotiations for the... sale took place and were concluded before the
death of Menzi. After his death, full payment of the entire consideration of the sale, principal and
interest, was made only after judicial confirmation thereof in the Probate Case. The transaction was duly
supported by the... corresponding receipt, voucher, cancelled checks, cancelled promissory note, and
BIR certification of payment of the corresponding taxes due thereon.

We, therefore, agree with the Sandiganbayan that the sale of the 154 block to US Automotive was valid
and legal.

It is also important to note that the Estate of Menzi did not include the 198 and 214 blocks in the
inventory of the estate's assets dated May 15, 1985.  If, as it claims, the Bulletin shares of Campos,
Cojuangco and Zalamea were held by them as nominees of Menzi, then... these shares should have been
included in the inventory. The justification advanced for the said non-inclusion, which is that the stock
certificates covering them were not in the possession of Atty. Montecillo, is nothing but a hollow pretext
given the fact that even after the... certificates came to Atty. Montecillo's possession in 1987, an
updated inventory declaring the said shares as part of Menzi's estate was not filed pursuant to the Order
of the probate court dated November 17, 1992.

Parenthetically, the fact that the stock certificates covering the shares registered under the names of
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were found in Menzi's possession does not necessarily prove that the
latter owned the shares.

A stock certificate is merely a tangible... evidence of ownership of shares of stock.[39] Its presence or
absence does not affect the right of the registered owner to dispose of the shares covered by the stock
certificate.  Hence, as registered owners, Campos and Zalamea validly ceded their... shares in favor of
the Government. This assignment is now a fait accompli for the benefit of the entire nation.

The contention that the sale of the 214 block to the Bulletin was null and void as the PCGG failed to
obtain approval from the Sandiganbayan is likewise unmeritorious.  While it is true that the PCGG is not
empowered to sell sequestered assets without prior Sandiganbayan... approval,[40] this case presents a
clear exception because this Court itself, in the Teehankee Resolution, directed the PCGG to accept the
cash deposit offered by Bulletin in payment for the Cojuangco and Zalamea sequestered shares subject
to the... alternatives mentioned therein and the outcome of the remand to the Sandiganbayan on the
question of ownership of these sequestered shares.

In light of the foregoing, we are not inclined to disturb the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the weight and
sufficiency of the evidence presented by the Republic and its finding that the evidence adduced by the
Estate of Menzi and HMHMI do not prove their allegation that Campos,... Cojuangco and Zalamea are
Menzi's nominees, taking into account the express admission of Campos that he owned the shares upon
Marcos' instruction, the declaration of Zalamea that he does not claim true and beneficial ownership of
the shares, and the absolute dearth of evidence... regarding Cojuangco's assertion that he is Menzi's
nominee.

Principles:

Sec. 63 of the Corporation Code provides the requisites for a valid transfer of shares:

Sec. 63.  Certificate of stock and transfer of shares. The capital stock of stock corporations shall be
divided into shares for which certificates signed by the president or vice-president, countersigned by the
secretary or assistant secretary, and sealed... with the seal of the corporation shall be issued in
accordance with the by-laws. Shares of stock so issued are personal property and may be transferred by
delivery of the certificate or certificates indorsed by the owner or his attorney-in-fact or other person
legally... authorized to make the transfer. No transfer, however, shall be valid, except as between the
parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation showing the names of the parties
to the transaction, the date of the transfer, the number of the certificate or... certificates and the
number of shares transferred.

No shares of stock against which the corporation holds any unpaid claim shall be transferable in the
books of the corporation.

Parenthetically, the fact that the stock certificates covering the shares registered under the names of
Campos, Cojuangco and Zalamea were found in Menzi's possession does not necessarily prove that the
latter owned the shares.  A stock certificate is merely a tangible... evidence of ownership of shares of
stock.[39] Its presence or absence does not affect the right of the registered owner to dispose of the
shares covered by the stock certificate.

Apo Fruits Corporation v. Land Bank of the Philippines [G.R. No. 164195. April 5, 2011]

03SEP

FACTS:

Petitioners voluntarily offered to sell their lands to the government under Republic Act 6657, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Government took petitioners’ lands on
December 9, 1996. Land Bank valued the properties atP165,484.47 per hectare, but AFC-HPI rejected
the offer of that amount. Consequently, on instruction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
Land Bank deposited for AFC and HPI P26,409,549.86 and P45,481,706.76, respectively, or a total
of P71,891,256.62. Upon revaluation of the expropriated properties, Land Bank eventually made
additional deposits, placing the total amount paid at P411,769,168.32 (P71,891,256.62
+ P339,877,911.70), an increase of nearly five times. Both petitioners withdrew the amounts. Still, they
filed separate complaints for just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), where it was
dismissed, after three years, for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a case with the RTC for the proper
determination of just compensation. The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners fixing the valuation of
petitioners’ properties at P103.33/sq.m with 12% interest plus attorney’s fees. Respondents appealed to
the Third Division of the Supreme Court where the RTC ruling was upheld. Upon motion for
reconsideration, the Third Division deleted the award of interest and attorney’s fees and entry of
judgment was issued. The just compensation of which was only settled on May 9, 2008. Petitioners filed
a second motion for reconsideration with respect to denial of award of legal interest and attorney’s fees
and a motion to refer the second motion to the Court En Banc and was granted accordingly, restoring in
toto the ruling of the RTC. Respondent filed their second motion for reconsideration as well for holding
of oral arguments with the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to admit for Reconsideration in-
Intervention by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)

(3)  Whether or not the Honorable Court ignored the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission showing that just compensation for expropriated agricultural property must be viewed in
the context of social justice.

RULINGS:

Political Law (Constitutional Law)

(1)  No. The present case goes beyond the private interests involved; it involves a matter of public
interest – the proper application of a basic constitutionally-guaranteed right, namely, the right of a
landowner to receive just compensation when the government exercises the power of eminent domain
in its agrarian reform program.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution expresses the constitutional rule on eminent domain –
“Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” While confirming the
State’s inherent power and right to take private property for public use, this provision at the same time
lays down the limitation in the exercise of this power. When it takes property pursuant to its inherent
right and power, the State has the corresponding obligation to pay the owner just compensation for the
property taken. For compensation to be considered “just,” it must not only be the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken; it must also be paid to the landowner without delay.

From this perspective, the court demonstrated that the higher interests of justice are duly served.

(3)  Yes. In fact, while a proposal was made during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission to give a lower market price per square meter for larger tracts of land, the Commission
never intended to give agricultural landowners less than just compensation in the expropriation of
property for agrarian reform purposes.

[N]othing is inherently contradictory in the public purpose of land reform and the right of landowners to
receive just compensation for the expropriation by the State of their properties. That the petitioners are
corporations that used to own large tracts of land should not be taken against them. As Mr. Justice
Isagani Cruz eloquently put it:

[S]ocial justice – or any justice for that matter – is for the deserving, whether he be a millionaire in his
mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt
the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich
simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law.

HENRY L. SY v. LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, GR No. 202690, 2013-06-05

Facts:
the City, through then Mayor Ismael Mathay, Jr., filed a complaint for expropriation with the
RTC in order to acquire a... parcel of land, owned and registered under the name of Sy...
which was intended to... be used as a site for a multi-purpose barangay hall, day-care
center, playground and community activity center for the benefit of the residents of
Barangay Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City.
Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, was enacted... the City deposited
15% of the fair... market value of the subject property based on its tax declaration.
During the preliminary conference
Sy did not question the City's right to expropriate the subject property. Thus, only the
amount of just compensation remained at issue.
the RTC appointed... commissioners to determine the proper amount of just compensation
to be paid by the City for the subject... property.
the RTC... adopted the findings of Commissioners... and thus, held that the just...
compensation for the subject property should be set at P5,500.00 per sq. m.
it awarded six percent (6%) legal interest, computed... until full payment of just
compensation.
Dissatisfied, Sy filed an appeal with the CA.
the CA affirmed the RTC's ruling but modified the same, ordering the City to pay Sy the
amount of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees equivalent to one
percent (1%) of the total amount due.
Issues:
whether the CA correctly:... upheld the amount of just compensation as determined by the
RTC as well as its grant of six percent (6%) legal interest;
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
A. Failure to seasonably move for reconsideration;... excusable negligence; relaxation of
procedural rules
B. Rate of legal interest and time of accrual... the correct rate of legal interest to be applied
is twelve percent (12%) and not six percent (6%) per annum, owing to the nature of the
City's obligation as an effective... forbearance.
the debt incurred by the government on account of the taking of the property subject of an
expropriation constitutes an effective forbearance which therefore, warrants the application
of... the 12% legal interest rate
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to
the market value of the property
Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court
having jurisdiction over the case,... the final compensation must include interests on its just
value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the
actual payment, legal interests... accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
This allowance of interest on the amount... found to be the value of the property as of the
time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help
eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over
time.
award of 12% interest is imposed in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in
effect makes the obligation on the part of the government... one of forbearance.
As to the reckoning point on which the legal interest should accrue, the same should be
computed from the time of the taking of the subject property in 1986 and not from the filing
of the complaint for expropriation
[T]he final compensation must include interests on its just value to be computed from the
time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with
the court
This is based on the principle that interest "runs as a matter of law and follows from the right
of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can accomplish, as of the date
of the taking."
Notably, the lack of proper authorization, i.e., resolution to effect expropriation,[45] did not
affect the character of the City's taking of the subject property in 1986
Case law dictates that... there is "taking" when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a practical destruction or a material impairment
of the value of his property or when he is deprived of the ordinary use thereof.
Therefore,... notwithstanding the lack of proper authorization, the legal character of the
City's action as one of "taking" did not change.
In this relation, the CA noted that the City enacted Ordinance No. Sp-181, s-94, only on
April 12, 1994 and filed its expropriation complaint on November
7, 1996. However, as it previously admitted, it already commenced with the taking of the
subject property as early as 1986.
Accordingly, interest must run from such time.
This irregularity does not, however, proceed without any consequence.
exemplary damages and attorney's fees should be awarded to the landowner if the
government takes possession of the property for a... prolonged period of time without
properly initiating expropriation proceedings.
a... government agency's prolonged occupation of private property without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings undoubtedly entitled the landowner to damages:
Such pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or
compensatory damages, which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of
the land at the time of taking, from said point up to full payment by the
MIAA.
C. Amount of just compensation
It is well-settled that the amount of just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of
the taking.[49] However,... the above-stated documents do not reflect the value of the
subject property at the time of its taking in 1986 but rather, its valuation in 1996.
Consequently, the case must be remanded to the RTC in order to properly determine the
amount of just compensation during such time the... subject property was actually taken.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
Principles: