400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 113447. October 9, 1997.

ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON, petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; The search was valid,

being akin to a stop-and-frisk; Stop-and-Frisk; Defined.—We disagree with
petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk.
In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the
street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s).
Same; Same; Generally a search and seizure must be validated by a
previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge.—In Philippine jurisprudence, the
general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge.
Same; Same; Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional
provision is legally inadmissible in evidence.—Any evidence obtained in
violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a
“fruit of the poisonous tree,” falling under the exclusionary rule.
Same; Same; Five Recognized Exceptions to the Rule Against
Warrantless Search and Seizure.—This right, however, is not absolute. The
recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recog-

________________

* THIRD DIVISION.

401

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Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

nized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: “(1)
search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)
seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused
themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.”
Same; Same; Definition of Probable Cause.—In People vs. Encinada,
the Court further explained that “[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may
be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although
the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a search is, at best,
defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that
the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense
or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.”
Same; Same; Stop-and-frisk adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant.—Stop-and-frisk has
already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held
that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-
frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao
stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously.
They found inside petitioner’s bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of
live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas
grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to
require the police officers to search the bag only after they had obtained a
search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to
stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
Same; Same; Court concurs with the Solicitor General’s contention
that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object

402

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

thereto during the trial.—Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor

General’s contention that petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of
any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object
thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the
constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the concurrence of
the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person
waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she
had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Same; Same; Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first
time on appeal.—Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce
acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the
present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for
his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule
45, as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the
whole case is opened for review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors
assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first
time on appeal.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Witnesses; Court has ruled that the
trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is accorded great weight and respect.—
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals
as in this case, is accorded great weight and respect, since it had the
opportunity to observe their demeanor and deportment as they testified
before it. Unless substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked
or misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would materially
affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a departure from this
rule.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Elements of Illegal Possession
of Marijuana.—The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

403

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Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Evidence; Defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by

the Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.—
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not been given
sufficient grounds to believe the extortion angle in this case. Petitioner did
not file any administrative or criminal case against the arresting officers or
present any evidence other than his bare claim. His argument that he feared
for his life was lame and unbelievable, considering that he was released on
bail and continued to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988. Since then, he
could have made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the
custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed by this
Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Ciriaco A. Macapagal for petitioner.
     The Solicitor General for respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

When dealing with a rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal

situation in the city streets where unarguably there is no time to
secure an arrest or a search warrant, policemen should employ
limited, flexible responses—like “stop-and-frisk”—which are
graduated in relation to the amount of information they possess, the
lawmen being ever vigilant to respect and not to violate or to treat
cavalierly the citizen’s constitutional rights against unreasonable
arrest, search and seizure.

The Case

This rule is reiterated as we resolve this petition for review on

certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 19, 1993 and its
Resolution dated January 20, 1994 in CA G.R. CR No. 07266,
entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Alain Manalili y Dizon.”

404

404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

1
In an Information dated April 11, 1988, Petitioner Alain Manalili y
Dizon was charged by Assistant Caloocan City Fiscal E. Juan R.
Bautista with violation of Section 8, Article
2
II of Republic Act No.
6425, allegedly committed as follows:

“That on or about the 11th day of April 1988 in Caloocan City, MM,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his custody, possession and control
crushed marijuana residue, which is a prohibited drug and knowing the
same to be such.
Contrary to Law.”

Upon his arraignment3 on April 21, 1988, appellant pleaded “not

guilty” to the charge. With the agreement of the public prosecutor,
4
 4
appellant was released after filing a P10,000.00 bail bond. After
trial in due course, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 124, acting as
5
a Special Criminal Court, rendered on May
19, 1989 a decision convicting appellant of illegal possession of
6
marijuana residue. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused
ALAIN MANALILI Y DIZON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 8, Article II, of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Illegal
Possession of Marijuana residue), and hereby snetences (sic) said accused to
suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY; and to pay a
fine of P6,000.00; and to pay the costs.
x x x      x x x      x x x.”
7
Appellant remained on provisional liberty. Atty.8
Benjamin Razon,
counsel for the defense, filed a Notice of Appeal dated

______________

1 Docketed as Crim. Case No. C-30549.

2 CA rollo, p. 4.
3 Records, p. 12.
4 Ibid., p. 23.
5 Penned by Judge Rene Victoriano.
6 CA rollo, p. 12D.
7 Records, p. 180.
8 p. 13.

405

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Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

9
May 31, 1989. On April 19, 1993, Respondent Court promulgated
its assailed
10
Decision, denying the appeal and affirming the trial
court:

“ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from dated May 19, 1989 is

hereby AFFIRMED in all respects. Costs against appellant.”
11
Respondent Court denied reconsideration via its assailed
Resolution dated January 20, 1994, disposing:

“ACCORDINGLY, accused-appellant’s motion for reconsideration is, as is

hereby DENIED.”

The Facts Version of the Prosecution

12
 12
The facts, as found by the trial court, are as follows:

“At about 2:10 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, policemen from
the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Station were
conducting a surveillance along A. Mabini street, Kalookan City, in front of
the Kalookan City Cemetery. The policemen were Pat. Romeo Espiritu and
Pat. Anger Lumabas and a driver named Arnold Enriquez was driving a
Tamaraw vehicle which was the official car of the Police Station of
Kalookan City. The surveillance was being made because of information
that drug addicts were roaming the area in front of the Kalookan City
Cemetery.
Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from
their vehicle. They then chanced upon a male person in front of the
cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male

________________

9 The Eighth Division composed of JJ. Justo P. Torres, Jr., ponente; Reynato S. Puno (both
of whom are now members of the Supreme Court), and Pacita Canizares-Nye.
10 Rollo, pp. 45-51.
11 The former Eighth Division was reorganized and J. Emeterio C. Cui replaced J. Reynato
S. Puno.
12 Records, pp. 175-177. The narration of facts by the trial court is reproduced here because
it contains more details than the version of Respondent Court.

406

406 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a

swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the
latter approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The
policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his hands.
The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if
he could see what said male person had in his hands. The latter showed the
wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu
took the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana
residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo
Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl.
Tamondong the confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The
man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat.
Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the same with a white sheet of paper on
which he wrote ‘Evidence ‘A’ 4/11/88 Alain Manalili.’ The white sheet of
paper was marked as Exhibit ‘E-3.’ The residue was originally wrapped in a
smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit ‘E-4’)
 Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI
Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical analysis of the subject
marijuana residue (Exhibit ‘D’). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint
Affidavit of the apprehending policemen (Exhibit ‘A’). Pat. Angel Lumabas
handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit ‘D’) to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical
analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas appears on the left bottom corner of
Exhibit ‘D.’
The Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI received the aforesaid
referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 o’clock in the evening
of April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit ‘D.’
It was NBI Aida Pascual who conducted the microscopic and chemical
13
examinations of the specimen which she identified. (Exhibit ‘E’) Mrs.
Pascual referred to the subject specimen as ‘crushed marijuana leaves’ in
her Certification dated April 11, 1988

_________________

13 Exhibit “F,” Exhibits Envelope, p. 2.

407

VOL. 280, OCTOBER 9, 1997 407

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

14
(Exhibit ‘F’). These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for
marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the
specimen. In this examination, she also found that the ‘crushed marijuana
leaves’ gave positive results for marijuana. She then prepared a Final Report
of her examinations (Exhibit ‘G’).
After conducting the examinations, Ms. Pascual placed the specimen in a
white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit ‘E’). She then wrote
identification notes on this letter-envelope. (Exhibit ‘E-1’)
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit ‘F’ from the
NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl. Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof,
Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of
Kalookan City. (Exhibit ‘C’)”

On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a

tricycle but was walking in front of the cemetery when he was
15
apprehended.

Version of the Defense

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the defense witnesses

16
as follows:
“At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused
ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A. Mabini street near the
Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three
policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the tricycle
driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The
policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera
which the policemen were riding in. The policemen then bodily searched the
accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the
policemen why he was being searched and the policemen replied that he
(accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was found on the
persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle
driver to go

_______________

14 Exhibit “G,” Exhibits Envelope, p. 3.

15 TSN, April 19, 1989, pp. 2-4.
16 Records, pp. 177-178. The Memorandum for the Petitioner did not present the defense’s
version of the facts.

408

408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

while they brought the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan

City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and
signalled the latter to follow him. The neighbor thus followed the accused to
the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused
was asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another
companion. The policemen turned over the pants of the accused over a piece
of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found,
except for some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor
of the accused to tell the policemen to release the accused. The accused was
led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana
inside the pockets of his pants.
At about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon on the same day, the accused was
brought outside the cell and was led to the Ford Fiera. The accused was told
by the policemen to call his parents in order to ‘settle’ the case. The
policemen who led the accused to the Ford Fiera were Pat. Lumabas, Pat.
Espiritu and Cpl. Tamondong. Pat. Lumabas was the policeman who told
the accused to call his parents. The accused did not call his parents and he
told the policemen that his parents did not have any telephone.
At about 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, the accused was
brought in the office of an inquest Fiscal. There, the accused told the Fiscal
that no marijuana was found on his person but the Fiscal told the accused
not to say anything. The accused was then brought back to the Kalookan
City Jail.
Loreto Medenilla, the tricycle driver who was allegedly with the accused
when he and the accused were stopped by policemen and then bodily
searched on April 11, 1988, testified. He said that the policemen found
nothing either on his person or on the person of the accused when both were
searched on April 11, 1988.
Roberto Abes, a neighbor of the accused, testified that he followed the
accused at the Kalookan City Police Headquarters on April 11, 1988. He
said that the police searched the accused who was made to take off his pants
at the police headquarters but no marijuana was found on the body of the
accused.”

409

VOL. 280, OCTOBER 9, 1997 409

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

Appellant, who was recalled to the stand as sur-rebuttal witness,

presented several pictures showing that tricycles were allowed to ply
17
in front of the Caloocan Cemetery.

The Rulings of the Trial and the Appellate Courts

The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of

marijuana residue largely on the strength of the arresting officers’
testimony. Patrolmen Espiritu and Lumabas were “neutral and
disinterested” witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during
the performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the
appellant was found to be in possession of a substance which was
later identified as crushed marijuana residue.
The trial court disbelieved appellant’s defense that this charge
was merely “trumped up,” because the appellant neither took any
legal action against the allegedly erring policemen nor moved for a
reinvestigation before the city fiscal of Kalookan City.
On appeal, Respondent Court found no proof that the decision of
the trial court was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures.
On the alleged “serious” discrepancies in the testimonies of the
arresting officers, the appellate court ruled that the said
inconsistencies were insubstantial to impair the essential veracity of
the narration. It further found petitioner’s contention—that he could
not be convicted of illegal possession of marijuana residue—to be
without merit, because the forensic chemist reported that what she
examined were marijuana leaves.

Issues
Petitioner assigns the following errors on the part of Respondent
Court:

_____________

17 TSN, April 19, 1989, pp. 9-12.

410

410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

“I

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the findings of fact of the trial
court.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the conviction of (the) accused

(and) in ruling that the guilt of the accused had been proved (beyond)
reasonable doubt.

III

The Court of Appeals erred in not ruling that the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were material and substantial and
not minor.

IV

The Court of Appeals erred in not appreciating the evidence that the
accused was framed for the purpose of extorting money.

The Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting the accused when the
evidence presented is consistent with both innocence and guilt.

VI

The Court of Appeals erred in admitting the evidence of the prosecution

which are inadmissible in evidence.”

Restated more concisely, petitioner questions (1) the admissibility of

the evidence against him, (2) the credibility of prosecution witnesses
and the rejection by the trial and the appellate courts of the defense
of extortion, and (3) the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence to
sustain his conviction.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

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Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

First Issue: Admissibility of the Evidence Seized During a Stop-

and-Frisk

Petitioner protests the admission of the marijuana leaves found in his

possession, contending that they were products of an illegal search.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment dated July 5, 1994, which
was adopted as memorandum for respondent, counters that the
inadmissibility of the marijuana leaves was waived because
petitioner never raised this issue in the proceedings below nor did he
object to their admissibility in evidence. He adds that, even
assuming arguendo that there was no waiver, the search was legal
because it was incidental to a warrantless arrest under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid,
being akin to a stop-and-frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs.
18
Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular designation of
the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s):

“x x x (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads

him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity
may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed
and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior
he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection
of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in
19
evidence against the person from whom they were taken.”

______________

18 20 L Ed 2d 889; 88 S Ct 1868, 392 US 1, 900, June 10, 1968.

19 Herrera, A Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure and Custodial
Investigation, 1995 ed., p. 185; and Terry vs. Ohio, supra, p. 911.

412
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that
the interest of effective crime prevention and detection allows a
police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances and
manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual
arrest. This was the legitimate investigative function which Officer
McFadden discharged in that case, when he approached petitioner
and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately
about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not
waiting for anyone; paused to stare in the same store window
roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It would have
been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years’ experience to
have failed to investigate this behavior further.
In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-
frisk, the US Supreme Court held that what justified the limited
search was the more immediate interest of the police officer in
taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was
dealing was not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and
fatally be used against him.
It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches
and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused only by exigent
circumstances.
In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and
seizure must be validated by a previously secured judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
20
challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this
guarantee:

“SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,

____________

20Pita vs. Court of Appeals, 178 SCRA 362, 376, October 5, 1989; People vs.
Saycon, 236 SCRA 325, 328, September 5, 1994; People vs. Cuizon, 256 SCRA
325, 338, April 18, 1996; and People vs. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250, September 5,
1997.

413

VOL. 280, OCTOBER 9, 1997 413

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals
 and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.”

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is

legally inadmissible in evidence as a “fruit of the poisonous tree,”
falling under the exclusionary rule:

“SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
21
This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs.
Lacerna enumerated five recognized exceptions to the rule against
warrantless search and seizure, viz.: “(1) search incidental to a
lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain
view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves
22
of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.” In People
23
vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that “[i]n these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the
essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition,
probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable
ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief

_____________

21 Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, allows a search without a warrant
for “dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission
of an offense” of a person lawfully arrested.
22 People vs. Lacerna, supra; People vs. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174, 182-183,
December 13, 1994. In the latter case, Puno, J., proposed a sixth exception: exigent
circumstances, as a catchall category that would encompass a number of diverse
situations where some kind of emergency makes obtaining a search warrant
impractical, useless, dangerous or unnecessary.
23 G.R. No. 116720, October 2, 1997, pp. 15-16, citing A Handbook on Arrest,
supra, p. 40.

414

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is

charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which
could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or
object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure
and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.”
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to
the general rule against a search without a warrant. In Posadas vs.
24
Court of Appeals, the Court held that there were many instances
where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said
case, members of the Integrated National Police of Davao stopped
petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously.
They found inside petitioner’s bag one .38-cal. revolver with two
rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun
and a tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the
Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only
after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless,
futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation,
it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo
while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions
observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and
was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which
according to police information was a popular hangout of drug
addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit
of the Caloocan City Police, such suspicious behavior was
characteristic of drug addicts who were “high.” The policemen
therefore had sufficient reason to

_________________

24 188 SCRA 288, 292-293, August 2, 1990, per Gancayco, J., concurred in by all
members of the First Division, namely: Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,
JJ.

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Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs.

During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner’s
25
possession:

“FISCAL RALAR:
Q And why were you conducting surveillance in front of the
Caloocan Cemetery, Sangandaan, Caloocan City?
A Because there were some informations that some drug
dependents were roaming around at A. Mabini Street in front of
 the Caloocan Cemetery, Caloocan City.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q While you were conducting your surveillance, together with Pat.
Angel Lumabas and one Arnold Enriquez, what happened, if
any?
A We chanced upon one male person there in front of the Caloocan
Cemetery then when we called his attention, he tried to avoid us,
then prompting us to approach him and introduce ourselves as
police officers in a polite manner.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q Could you describe to us the appearance of that person when you
chanced upon him?
A That person seems like he is high on drug.
Q How were you able to say Mr. Witness that that person that you
chanced upon was high on drug?
A Because his eyes were red and he was walking on a swaying
manner.
Q What was he doing in particular when you chanced upon him?
A He was roaming around, sir.
Q You said that he avoided you, what did you do when he avoided
you?
A We approached him and introduced ourselves as police officers
in a polite manner, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourselves?
A In a polite manner, sir.
Q What did you say when you introduced yourselves?
A We asked him what he was holding in his hands, sir.

________________

25 TSN, May 27, 1988, pp. 6-9.

416

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

Q And what was the reaction of the person when you asked him
what he was holding in his hands?
A He tried to resist, sir.
Q When he tried to resist, what did you do?
A I requested him if I can see what was he was(sic) holding in his
 hands.
Q What was the answer of the person upon your request?
A He allowed me to examine that something in his hands, sir.
  x x x      x x x      x x x
Q What was he holding?
A He was holding his wallet and when we opened it, there was a
marijuana (sic) crushed residue.”

Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General’s contention that

petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object
thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right, more particularly
of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be
waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge, actual or
constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to
26
relinquish the right. Otherwise, the Courts will indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards
and will not deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this
elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed
to have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before
the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished from an
ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for
review, the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by
petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first
27
time on appeal.

________________

26 People vs. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407, 417-418, July 25, 1994, per Regalado, J.
27 Manila Bay Club Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 715, 729, July
11, 1995; Chua vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA

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VOL. 280, OCTOBER 9, 1997 417

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

Second Issue: Assessment of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the two arresting officers’ testimony

contained “polluted, irreconcilable and unexplained” contradictions
which did not support petitioner’s conviction.
We disagree. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses, particularly when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case, is accorded great
weight and respect, since it had the opportunity to observe their
demeanor and deportment as they testified before it. Unless
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misappreciated by the trial court which, if considered, would
materially affect the result of the case, we will not countenance a
28
departure from this rule. We concur with Respondent Court’s
ruling:

“(e)ven assuming as contended by appellant that there had been some

inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, We do not find
them substantial enough to impair the essential veracity of their narration. In
People vs. Avila, it was held that—‘As long as the witnesses concur on the
material points, slight differences in their remembrance of the details, do not
reflect on the essential veracity of their statements.’ ”

However, we find that, aside from the presumption of regularity in

the performance of duty, the bestowal of full credence on Pat.
Espiritu’s testimony is justified by tangible evidence on record.
Despite Pat. Lumabas’ contradictory testimony, that of Espiritu is
29
supported by the Joint Affidavit signed by both arresting
policemen. The question of whether the marijuana was found inside
petitioner’s wallet or inside a plastic bag is immaterial, considering
that petitioner did not deny

______________

339, 344-345, February 19, 1992; and Baquiran vs. Court of Appeals,2 SCRA 873,
877, July 31, 1961.
28 People vs. Atad, G.R. No. 114105, January 16, 1997, p. 19; People vs. Lua, 256
SCRA 539, 546, April 26, 1996; and People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494, 498-499,
April 22, 1993.
29 Exhibits “A” & “A-1,” Exhibits Envelope, p. 1.

418

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

possession of said substance. Failure to present the wallet in

evidence did not negate that marijuana was found in petitioner’s
possession. This shows that such contradiction is minor and does not
30
destroy Espiritu’s credibility.

Third Issue: Sufficiency of Evidence

The elements of illegal possession of marijuana are: (a) the accused

is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
31
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
The substance found in petitioner’s possession was identified by
NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Pascual to be crushed marijuana leaves.
Petitioner’s lack of authority to possess these leaves was established.
His awareness thereof was undeniable, considering that petitioner
was high on drugs when stopped by the policemen and that he
resisted when asked to show and identify the thing he was holding.
Such behavior clearly shows that petitioner knew that he was
holding marijuana and that it was prohibited by law.
Furthermore, like the trial and the appellate courts, we have not
been given sufficient grounds to believe the extortion angle in this
case. Petitioner did not file any administrative or criminal case
against the arresting officers or present any evidence other than his
bare claim. His argument that he feared for his life was lame and
unbelievable, considering that he was released on bail and continued
32
to be on bail as early as April 26, 1988. Since then, he could have
made the charge in relative safety, as he was no longer in the
custody of the police. His defense of frame-up, like alibi, is viewed
by this

_________________

30 People vs. Lua, supra, p. 547.

31 People vs. Lacerna, supra.
32 Records, p. 23.

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VOL. 280, OCTOBER 9, 1997 419

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

33
Court with disfavor, because it is easy to concoct and fabricate.

The Proper Penalty

The trial and the appellate courts overlooked the Indeterminate

Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended) by sentencing petitioner
to a straight penalty of six years and one day of imprisonment, aside
from the imposed fine of six thousand pesos. This Act requires the
imposition of an indeterminate penalty:

“SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense

punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
(As amended by Act No. 4225.)
“SEC. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those convicted of
treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or
espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual
delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum
term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
provided in Section 5 hereof.” (Italics supplied)

_______________

33 People vs. Velasco, 252 SCRA 135, 143, January 23, 1996, per Davide, J.

420

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Manalili vs. Court of Appeals

The Dangerous Drugs Law, R.A. 6425, as amended by B.P. 179,

imposes the following penalty for illegal possession of marijuana:

“Sec. 8. x x x x
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
possess or use Indian hemp.”

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court holds that the proper
penalty is an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from
34
six years and one day to twelve years.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to
suffer IMPRISONMENT of SIX (6) YEARS, as minimum, to
TWELVE (12) YEARS, as maximum, and to PAY a FINE of SIX
THOUSAND PESOS. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco,

JJ., concur.

Judgment and resolution affirmed with modification.

 Note.—A significant exception from the necessity for a search
warrant is when the search and seizure is effected as an incident to a
lawful arrest. (People vs. Figueroa, 248 SCRA 679 [1995])

——o0o——

________________

34 People vs. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144, 155, May 17, 1993, per Davide, J.

421

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