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527 views384 pages

¡México, La Patria! - Propaganda and Production During World War II

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Timoteo Alvarez

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¡México, la patria!

the mexican experience William H. Beezley, series editor

Propaganda and Production during
World War II monica a. rankin

unive rs it y of nebraska press | lincoln & london

© 2009 by the Board of Regents of the
University of Nebraska
All rights reserved
Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Data

Rankin, Monica A., 1972–

¡México, la patria! : propaganda and
production during World War II / Monica A.
Rankin.
p. cm. — (The Mexican experience)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 978-0-8032-2455-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Mexico—Politics and government—
1910–1946. 2. Propaganda—Mexico—
History—20th century. 3. World War,
1939–1945—Mexico. 4. World War,
1939–1945—Propaganda. 5. Mass media—
Political aspects—Mexico—History—20th
century. 6. Propaganda, American—Mexico—
History—20th century. 7. Propaganda,
German—Mexico—History—20th century.
8. Mexico—Foreign relations—United States.
9. United States—Foreign relations—Mexico.
10. United States. Ofﬁce of Inter-American
Affairs—History. I. Title.
f1234.r25 2009
940.54'88972—dc22
2009023616

Set in Sabon by Kim Essman.

To Kyla Belén, my little research assistant
conte nts

List of Illustrations | viii

List of Tables | x
Acknowledgments | xi
List of Abbreviations | xiv

Introduction | 1
1. A Propaganda Mosaic, 1933–1940 | 13
2. A Blueprint for Propaganda: Diplomacy and the OIAA,
1940–1941 | 58
3. A Revolutionary Mural of Propaganda | 104
4. Soup Can Propaganda: The OIAA and the American Way
of Life, 1942–1943 | 159
5. A Propaganda Chalkboard: Patriotism, Education, and
Propaganda | 207
6. A Propaganda Billboard: Heroes, Victims, and a View to
the Postwar Era, 1944–1945 | 257
Conclusion: World War II in a Mexican Deck of Cards | 292
Notes | 301
Bibliography | 337
Index | 355
i l lustr ati ons

1. “How have you helped?” poster | 29

1. oiaa posters distributed in Mexico, July 1, 1943–July 1,

1944 | 197
2. oiaa pamphlets distributed in Mexico, July 1, 1943–July 1,
1944 | 199
acknowledgments

This project is a product of many years of training and research

and is a reflection of my growth as a historian. The book be-
gan as my PhD dissertation at the University of Arizona, and
its completion would not have been possible without the sup-
port and assistance of many people and institutions. My ad-
viser, William Beezley, provided crucial support and helped me
to mature as a scholar during my years at Arizona, and he has
continued to be a valuable mentor as I make my way through
the initial years of my academic career. I wish to acknowl-
edge Bert Barickman, Kevin Gosner, and Michael Schaller,
who provided valuable feedback during the dissertation pro-
cess and offered insightful suggestions for revising that hefty
tome into a cohesive and effective book manuscript. I must
also mention Richard Walter at Washington University and
Mark Burkholder at the University of Missouri–St. Louis—
two professors who helped to shape my academic develop-
ment in the early years of my graduate studies.
Research for this project was funded by a Fulbright–García
Robles Fellowship from the United States government. Ad-
ditional support came from the University of Arizona
Ramenofsky Fellowship, the Hewlitt Foundation, the Engel
Scholar in Residence Program, and the University of Texas at
Dallas School of Arts and Humanities. I am indebted to the
staff of the various archives and libraries I consulted, including
the Archivo General de la Nación, the Archivo Histórico de la
Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, the Museo Nacional de
México, the archives of the Secretaría de Educación Pública, the
Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, and the Biblioteca Mexicana
de la Fundación Miguel Alemán, all in Mexico City. I also
spent a considerable amount of time at the Hemeroteca and
the Centro de Estudios sobre la Universidad at the Universidad
Nacional Autónoma de México in Mexico City. Archives in
the United States include the National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, Maryland, the Nettie Lee
Benson Latin American Collection at the University of Texas,
the Josephus Daniels Papers at the University of North Carolina
Wilson Library, the George S. Messersmith Papers at the
University of Delaware Library, the Rockefeller Archive Center
in Sleepy Hollow, New York, and the Library of Congress in
Washington dc. In particular, I would like to extend a special
thank-you to the staff of the Prints and Photographs Division
at the Library of Congress, who were extraordinarily helpful
in guiding me through some hidden gems in their collection
and in promptly answering countless e-mails as I obtained re-
productions of many of the images in this book. I must also
mention the staff at the McDermott Library at the University
of Texas at Dallas, who at times seemed to work miracles pro-
curing enormous amounts of interlibrary loan material as I
made the final revisions to the manuscript.
In the process of writing and revising this book, I was for-
tunate to have a large circle of colleagues who were willing
to read and reread numerous drafts of chapters. Their cri-
tiques helped to shape the work into the final version that ap-
pears in this volume. Rachel Kram-Villareal, Michelle Berry,
Ageeth Sluis, Victoria Christman, and other peers in the History
Department at the University of Arizona saw the earliest drafts

xii | acknowledgments
and provided invaluable feedback. I would like to thank my
colleagues at the University of Texas at Dallas—specifically,
Nadine Peterson, Jack Rushing, and Stephen Rabe—for read-
ing and critiquing sections of the manuscript during the revi-
sion phase. As a professor I have pleasantly discovered how
much I can learn from my own students. I thank the partici-
pants of my graduate seminars, whose insightful analysis and
probing questions in the classroom influenced my approach
to my own research. I also owe a debt of gratitude to audi-
ence members and my fellow panelists at the various confer-
ences where I read sections of this study. They include meet-
ings of the Latin American Studies Association, the Rocky
Mountain Council for Latin American Studies, and the Society
for Historians of American Foreign Relations.
Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends for their un-
wavering support during my research. I have an encouraging
circle of non-academic friends who politely feign interest in
the exciting stories I tell from recent trips to the archives and
academic conferences. I thank my parents, who instilled in me
at a tender age a deep appreciation for education and a gen-
eral thirst for knowledge. I especially owe a debt of gratitude
to my daughter, who as an infant accompanied me on my re-
search trips, and to my husband, who let me take her. Over
the years they have played the roles of cheerleader, therapist,
secretary, and financier as this project evolved. Mexico has be-
come such an important part of our lives that my seven-year-
old güerita is firmly convinced that she is “from Mexico.”
While I acknowledge the contributions of many, I take re-
sponsibility for any shortcomings in the following pages.

acknowledgments | xiii
a bb r e vi ati ons

ccpn Comisión Coordinadora de Propaganda

Nacional (Coordinating Commission for
National Propaganda)
cnc Confederación Nacional de Campesinos
(National Confederation of Campesinos)
ctm Confederación de Trabajadores de México
(Confederation of Mexican Workers)
iapc Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee
jusmdc Joint United States–Mexican Defense
Commission
lear Liga de Escritores y Artistas Revolucionarios
(League of Revolutionary Writers and Artists)
macec Mexican-American Commission for
Economic Cooperation
nadyrsa Nacional Distribuidora y Reguladora, sa
(National Distribution and Regulatory Agency)
ofp Oficina Federal de Propaganda (Federal
Propaganda Office)
oiaa Office of Inter-American Affairs
pcm Partido Comunista Mexicano (Mexican
Communist Party)
tgp Taller de Gráfica Popular (People’s Graphics
Workshop)
ugt Unión General de Trabajadores (General
Union of Workers)
¡México, la patria!
Introduction

In 1965, in his landmark study La democracia en México,

Mexican sociologist Pablo González Casanova argued that
despite achieving economic growth in the 1940s and 1950s,
Mexico had failed to develop in its post-revolutionary era.
He took his argument one step further by tying national de-
velopment to political democracy and tracing how national
decisions had been made in the country.1 He contended that
Mexico was an underdeveloped nation and that it had failed
to correct inequalities in domestic and international spheres.
Mexico’s problems, he argued, could be linked to one funda-
mental policy problem: the failure of democracy in national in-
stitutions.2 As one of the first Mexican intellectuals to question
revolutionary rhetoric that had dominated the country since
the 1940s, González Casanova sparked a debate that spread
to other intellectuals, politicians, and university students. He
had questioned the success of the country’s economic develop-
ment and the validity of its democracy. By extension, he had
challenged the legitimacy of the Mexican Revolution.
González Casanova’s work contributed to the dismantling
of the myth of the revolution’s legacy. This myth had devel-
oped during the years of sustained economic growth and pros-
perity that started in the 1940s and was dubbed the “Mexican
Miracle” by many contemporary observers. The government
had used economic prosperity to legitimize its rule and to ar-
gue that the revolution had indeed succeeded. Although the
policies that precipitated economic growth are generally as-
sociated with the administration of Miguel Alemán (1946–
52), the Miracle and the rhetoric surrounding it had origins
in government decisions and messages in the early 1940s. In
particular, the nation’s involvement in World War II provided
a platform for shifting economic development strategies that
privileged industrialization in the second half of the twenti-
eth century. Public discussions of the war allowed leaders to
fuse those economic strategies with more abstract definitions
of democracy and shifting concepts of la patria. As Mexico
was drawn into the Allied coalition, a government propaganda
campaign emerged that incorporated economic production,
political democracy, and national identity to varying degrees.
In recent years, scholars have begun to pay more attention
to the 1940s as a time when the growth of print media, film,
and radio allowed for and helped to create a more modern
and cohesive national culture in Mexico.3 Studies show that
the government seized upon the expansion of mass media to
try to forge a sense of patriotism and national identity based
on its own evolving version of modernity.4 This book demon-
strates how World War II propaganda campaigns fit within
a broader context of the Mexican government’s attempts to
define the nation.
Scholars are also beginning to view the World War II era
in particular as a rich setting for exploring the relationship
between nationalism and internationalism throughout Latin
America as a whole.5 The destructive outcomes of World War
I and the onset of the worldwide Great Depression had con-
vinced many Latin Americans that the steadfast economic and
cultural links that had tied them to rest of the world in the nine-
teenth century needed to be broken.6 Starting as early as the

2 | introduction
1920s and accelerating in the 1930s, governments through-
out the hemisphere began experimenting with varying degrees
of nationalistic policies—ranging from aggressive populism,
to artistic celebrations of native cultures, to the beginnings
of protectionist economic policies.7 With the onset of World
War II, the impulse to promote nationalism was often coun-
tered by the need for international cooperation.
For Mexico, national policies in the decades leading up to
World War II were complicated by the ever-present legacy of
the 1910 revolution. The nationalist compulsion was particu-
larly prevalent in Mexican society and in government policy-
making in the era following more than a decade of violence
and civil war. Political scientists have argued that in newly
emerging or reemerging states, national identity is often the
dominant force in foreign-policy decision making.8 Its need
for recovery after a long period of devastating internal vio-
lence placed Mexico in a state of “reemergence” that lasted
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Backed by insistent revolu-
tionary rhetoric, national interest often dominated Mexico’s
foreign policies—a trend that continued even with the interna-
tional crisis of World War II. Indeed, in 1940 political leader
and businessman Ramón Beteta boldly announced to a U.S.
audience, “Mexico’s present-day foreign policy is a result of
what Mexicans call ‘The Revolution.’”9 Beteta declared that
the nation’s revolutionary movement started a “renaissance”
and that the government was forced to adjust foreign policy
to make it coherent with national interests.10
Beteta’s comments focused largely on what he called the his-
toric mismanagement of resources and the need for new pol-
icies to correct those earlier mistakes. Throughout the 1930s
the Mexican government had struggled to balance social and

introduction | 3
economic reform in the name of the revolution with interna-
tional pressures coming from the United States and Europe.
But the onset of world war changed that dynamic by creating
a more pressing and immediate international crisis around
which Mexico and the United States could unite. Collaboration
in issues of trade and security were valued for the benefit they
could bring to both sides, not judged as a compromise of na-
tional interests. Economic policies established during World
War II set the stage for the vast economic growth Mexico ex-
perienced after the war. The war also provided an opportu-
nity for the official party to place the Mexican Revolution in
a global ideological context. Through domestic propaganda
strategies and wartime diplomatic policies with the United
States, government leaders pursued a national unity campaign
designed to redefine the country’s revolutionary past as one
of pro-democracy, and they placed the revolution in the con-
text of the anti-totalitarianism of World War II.11
The government largely succeeded in unifying the country
around its contrived version of revolutionary legacy despite
extreme divisions that prevailed in the country in the 1930s.
The Lázaro Cárdenas administration (1934–40) began inten-
sifying revolutionary reforms in 1935, and extreme factions
on the left and right reacted by further polarizing their po-
sitions.12 At the same time, the Spanish Civil War mirrored
many of the tensions and ideological divisions that existed in
Mexico between political extremes. Both the right and the
left sought to use the Spanish conflict to define the revolution
according to their political and ideological agendas. As a re-
sult, by 1940 much of the country was divided as the world
witnessed the outbreak of another global war.
In the last years of the Cárdenas administration and through-

4 | introduction
out the administration of Manuel Avila Camacho (1940–46),
the government saw industrialization as a mechanism for heal-
ing the fissures between the right and the left.13 Government
leaders also saw the emerging wartime climate in Europe as
a method for promoting their domestic platform. The new
administration in particular used the war to push industrial-
ization and modernization by employing the rhetoric of both
the right and the left. Therefore, in a very different way, the
government also incorporated international trends into its do-
mestic agenda. But while special-interest groups’ use of war-
time ideologies further divided Mexico in the decades after
its revolution, government rhetoric surrounding World War
II united the country—at least temporarily.
In the 1940s, the national solution to ideological conflicts
became “democracy.” All Mexicans took pride in what they
saw as the pro-democracy aspects of their revolution, and gov-
ernment rhetoric began to define the Allies’ democratic objec-
tives as an extension of the ideals of the Mexican Revolution.
Furthermore, by associating industrialization and moderniza-
tion with World War II, Avila Camacho was able to push an
industrial development agenda in neutral, democratic terms.
The government constructed propaganda messages to argue
that production equaled patriotism, and it contributed to Allied
efforts to protect the Mexican nation and spread democracy
worldwide. By industrializing and being productive in World
War II, Mexicans were continuing the democratic legacy of
the revolution as well as helping to ensure worldwide democ-
racy. As national unity and patriotism were increasingly in-
serted into the discourse over Mexico’s economic role in the
war, industrialization eventually came to mean Mexican in-
dustries protected by Mexican government policies.

introduction | 5
One classic study of public opinion and mass communica-
tion defines propaganda generally as messages sent through
radio, press, and film aimed at large audiences.14 Propaganda
messages seek to influence popular opinion on controversial
issues and to instill loyalty. For the historian, it is more diffi-
cult to analyze the reception of propaganda than it is to exam-
ine messages going out. There are often few reliable sources
providing a meaningful measure of popular responses to a
given message. As a result, in this study I focus primarily on
the process of constructing propaganda messages, paying par-
ticular attention to how and why messages were created the
way they were. Despite a lack of evidence regarding the re-
ception of propaganda, examining the process of construct-
ing those messages can provide important clues about pub-
lic responses. Propagandists paid close attention to what they
perceived to be popular opinion. They often discussed pro-
paganda strategies in terms of reception and also in terms of
subtle messages they wanted to send that were unrelated to
war. In the case of Mexico, the government carefully crafted
wartime information to adapt to perceived changes in public
attitudes. Propagandists aimed to win support for the govern-
ment’s official war policies, and over the course of World War
II they altered their strategy in response to their understand-
ing of public opinion. At the same time, these propagandists
aimed to promote broader, long-term goals of the national
government, including national unity, industrial production,
and eventually economic protectionism.
Foreign powers also developed a propaganda campaign in
Mexico. German agents began operating in Mexico in 1935 and
produced pro-Nazi information that was frequently countered
by leftist special-interest groups. The result of the Nazi-versus-

6 | introduction
leftist public debate was often a divisive public discourse that
played out in the press and in public spaces. British, French,
and U.S. agents also became active in the propaganda crusade.
By 1942 the United States controlled nearly all foreign wartime
information in Mexico, and U.S. agents operated with differ-
ent motives than Mexican propagandists. The U.S. program
emphasized hemispheric cooperation and urged Mexicans to
follow the lead of the United States. Aside from winning war-
time support, U.S. propagandists hoped to gain a viable trad-
ing partner during and after the war. Throughout the cam-
paign, U.S. propaganda was tinged with direct and indirect
suggestions of commercial and economic cooperation.
The U.S. propaganda campaign had important consequences
for the propaganda campaign being promoted by the Mexican
government. First, many Mexicans rejected the underlying
themes of U.S. hegemony implied in U.S. propaganda mes-
sages. They managed to reconcile the inherent contradiction
of rebuffing U.S. dominance while forming an official alli-
ance with the United States in wartime. Often Mexicans re-
sponded to U.S. propaganda with a renewed sense of nation-
alism, which amplified the Mexican propaganda campaign.
Second, the Avila Camacho administration took advantage of
U.S. trade priorities that formed part of the propaganda cam-
paign. World War II allowed Avila Camacho to attract U.S.
assistance and investments for industrial development in the
name of hemispheric security. U.S.-Mexican economic coop-
eration provided a degree of wartime security and allowed
Avila Camacho to proceed with his national industrialization
agenda and to integrate industrial development into an evolv-
ing definition of the revolutionary legacy.
The process of incorporating international ideologies into

introduction | 7
the Mexican Revolution through propaganda evolved over
time, responding to domestic and international currents. I out-
line three distinct phases of wartime propaganda in Mexico.
In the first phase, from 1933 to 1941, Mexicans reacted to
the rest of the world mobilizing for war. During this phase,
special-interest groups dominated the nation’s propaganda.
During the second phase, from 1941 to 1943, World War II
reached the Western Hemisphere, and Mexico became a part
of the U.S.-led Allied initiative in the Americas. As the wartime
threat became more immediate, responsibilities for propaganda
shifted to agencies within the U.S. and Mexican governments.
In the final phase, from 1944 to the end of the war, U.S. and
Mexican leaders began preparing for peace as an Allied vic-
tory seemed imminent. During this phase, propaganda mes-
sages changed to reflect shifting priorities as government lead-
ers turned their attention to postwar initiatives.
The first two chapters cover the first phase. Chapter 1, “A
Propaganda Mosaic,” outlines early propaganda campaigns
formed by nongovernmental special-interest groups in reaction
to the emergence of European fascism. Hitler’s rise to power in
1933 sparked an intense ideological debate among communists
and fascists within Mexico. Special-interest groups eventually
dominated that debate and developed a patchwork of propa-
ganda themes that responded directly to domestic agendas of
the right and the left, but those themes and agendas changed
over time. Through special-interest propaganda, world con-
flicts played out locally among political extremes in Mexico.
The governments of the United States, Great Britain, France,
and Mexico only became involved after the official outbreak of
war in the fall of 1939. Incipient government propaganda strat-
egies are covered in chapter 2, “A Blueprint for Propaganda.”

8 | introduction
In 1940 and 1941 the U.S. government formulated a strategy
aimed at unifying the Western Hemisphere against Axis ag-
gressors. Through a series of diplomatic accords, U.S. lead-
ers achieved some successes in their relations with Mexico.
Responding to growing diplomatic pressures, the Mexican
government began a policy of censuring fascist propaganda.
The Office of Inter-American Affairs (oiaa), a U.S. propa-
ganda agency formed in 1940, established important economic
agreements with Mexican businesses and began to control
the nation’s press. In the organizational (“blueprint”) phase
of propaganda, the U.S. and Mexican governments laid the
groundwork for a more forceful program later in the war.
The next three chapters cover the second phase in the evo-
lution of World War II propaganda. Phase two begins with
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which brought World
War II directly to the Western Hemisphere, and ends with ma-
jor Allied victories in early 1944. During this period, govern-
ment propaganda offices replaced special-interest groups as the
primary producers of wartime information. Propaganda pro-
duced by the U.S. and Mexican governments focused primarily
on hemispheric security and winning the war. Chapter 3, “A
Revolutionary Mural of Propaganda,” presents the period be-
tween the attack on Pearl Harbor and Mexico’s entrance into
the war in the summer of 1942. This chapter demonstrates that
in the five months between Pearl Harbor and Mexico’s decla-
ration of war, the Avila Camacho administration took impor-
tant steps to move the nation closer to the Allies. At the same
time, the attitudes of many Mexicans shifted from ambiva-
lence to genuine concern. Those shifting attitudes culminated
in responses to the country’s declaration of war that associated
memories of Mexico’s revolutionary past with the pursuit of

introduction | 9
freedom and democracy in World War II. Chapter 4, “Soup
Can Propaganda,” outlines the strategies and objectives of the
oiaa and shows that U.S. leaders hoped to win Mexican sup-
port by promoting an image of the United States as the hemi-
spheric leader. U.S. agents pushed the notion of the “American
way of life” onto Mexicans, emphasizing great achievements
in U.S. history and culture. They portrayed a middle-class life-
style through mass media and images of consumer culture. At
the same time, U.S. propagandists tried to reinforce commer-
cial ties between the two countries to strengthen the wartime
alliance. Chapter 5, “A Propaganda Chalkboard,” analyzes
the Mexican government’s maturing propaganda campaign.
The Avila Camacho administration borrowed notions of rev-
olutionary greatness expressed in the nation’s collective mem-
ory in the summer of 1942, and Avila Camacho manipulated
those themes around his domestic platform. Through radio,
education, and visual media, the government redefined the
legacy of the Mexican Revolution around themes of democ-
racy and freedom, and the government taught this legacy to
the population with its “propaganda chalkboard.”
In the first five chapters, two parallel discussions emerge to
analyze the first two phases of wartime propaganda. First, I
examine how Mexicans were talking about the war and why
they used certain language and symbols. That discussion em-
phasizes an underlying objective of production, industrial-
ization, and modernization in government propaganda and
reveals a strong nationalist impulse within popular opinion.
Second, I explore U.S. propaganda in Mexico and identify a
desire to spread a U.S.-defined middle-class consumer culture.
Prior to 1945 those two discussions appear to have little in

10 | introduction
common, but by the end of the war the two propaganda cam-
paigns converge in the “American way of life.”
Among Mexicans there was a mixed reaction to the U.S.
propaganda campaign. Although some interpreted oiaa pro-
grams as a genuine extension of goodwill, others saw U.S. pro-
paganda as an effort to extend U.S. dominance. Generally,
oiaa surveys found that Mexicans preferred nationally pro-
duced radio programs, films, and songs. The reactions re-
flected a strong nationalist inclination that the oiaa frequently
tried to minimize. Nevertheless, by 1945 demand for con-
sumer goods and generally a middle-class lifestyle had begun
to emerge in Mexico.
The final phase of World War II propaganda is discussed
in chapter 6, “A Propaganda Billboard.” By the beginning of
1944 it had become apparent that the Allies had the advantage
in the war, and propaganda agents in the United States and
Mexico became concerned with incorporating postwar objec-
tives into their information campaigns. Commercial themes
came to dominate wartime rhetoric as U.S. propagandists
shifted their messages to emphasize that Mexico could best
succeed in the postwar era through open trade with U.S. busi-
nesses. Many Mexicans had significant savings by the end of
the war, and the population demanded many of the products
that made up the American way of life. But popular reactions
to U.S. wartime information had also strengthened the coun-
try’s nationalist impulse, and Mexicans looked for postwar
policies that would reinforce those feelings.
The country resolved those seemingly contradictory reac-
tions to wartime circumstances in ways that became impor-
tant in the decades that followed. In 1945 the Mexican gov-
ernment also shifted its attention to postwar rhetoric and tied

introduction | 11
the themes of freedom and democracy to its industrialization
agenda. The public offered support for a national industrial-
ization strategy during and after the war as a means to acquire
the consumer goods that deﬁned a middle-class lifestyle.
By 1945 the Avila Camacho administration was trying to
strengthen protectionist trade barriers to prevent U.S. con-
sumer goods from competing with Mexico’s new and devel-
oping industries. In the years after the war, the country im-
posed aggressive import substitution industrialization policies
that facilitated decades of economic growth. The Mexican
Miracle that Pablo González Casanova questioned when he
challenged the myth of revolutionary legacy became possi-
ble because the government enjoyed widespread popular sup-
port for industrialization. The foundations of that support—
under the rhetoric of production and patriotism—were laid
during World War II.

12 | introduction
1
A Propaganda Mosaic, 1933–1940

Betty Kirk began serving as a foreign correspondent in Mexico

in 1936. As a journalist for major newspapers in the United
States and London, she not only reported her observations
of the society around her but also chronicled the details of
social and political currents in her personal account. Her re-
flections on Mexican society, published in 1942 as Covering
the Mexican Front, serve as a valuable firsthand account of
the country during a volatile era. In her introduction, titled
“Fragment for a Larger Mosaic,” Kirk argues that Mexico
represented “the world in miniature during the 1930s.”1 She
saw broad trends that led to major world conflict being played
out at the local level among special-interest groups in Mexico.
In the late 1930s, non-government interests, such as the small
but influential community of German nationals and Vicente
Lombardo Toledano’s labor movement, incorporated the emerg-
ing world conflict into a local context.
Prior to the outbreak of World War II, propaganda debates
that can be tied to emerging ideological conflicts in Europe
had already developed in Mexico. Between 1934 and 1940 the
country entered an era of implementing revolutionary reforms
and defining the nation during the administration of President
Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40).2 For Mexicans, the 1930s be-
came a time of recovery and consolidation after decades of
internal fighting and continued violence. Between 1910 and
1940 the revolution came to have different meanings for dif-
ferent participants.3 Many sought a way to justify the conflict
while ensuring that their own notions of what the revolution
meant became a part of national identity.
At the same time, the world witnessed a growing ideologi-
cal battle as fascism battled communism over the solution to
worldwide problems brought by the political crisis after World
War I and the Great Depression. Responding to those polit-
ical trends, many Mexicans began to interpret fascism and
communism through the perspective of their national experi-
ences. This trend was not widespread, but it was quite visible.
Vocal public figures associated with national political move-
ments, ranging from the Sinarquistas on the right and the la-
bor movement on the left, called attention to the ideological
battle in Europe. Those leaders imported the global ideologi-
cal discourse and often drew parallels between the European
movements and Mexico’s post-revolutionary political land-
scape.4 As the debate between the followers of the two doc-
trines escalated in Europe, the extremes of Mexican national
politics at times identified more closely with either commu-
nism or fascism. Those ideologies quickly became a part of
the Mexican political debate.
Mexicans’ divided responses to European conflicts resulted
in a “mosaic of propaganda” between 1933 and 1940. Special-
interest groups dominated the information campaign, collec-
tively producing a mosaic of pro-fascist and anti-fascist in-
formation tied to domestic political agendas.5 In contrast,

14 | a propaganda mosaic
government leaders in Mexico remained outside the debate
between groups on the political right and left. While govern-
ment policy demonstrated the leanings of the Cárdenas ad-
ministration, government leaders did not use a formal propa-
ganda strategy to voice an ofﬁcial position on communism,
fascism, or the developing hostilities in Europe until after
1940. As a result, non-government groups produced virtu-
ally all targeted propaganda in the late 1930s.
A sundry assortment of politically, economically, and so-
cially conservative groups emerged to constitute the so-called
ideological right in Mexico in the years leading up to World
War II. Diverse groups in the growing middle sectors of soci-
ety, such as Mexican capitalists, ardently conservative polit-
ical leaders, and resolute Catholics in organizations such as
the Sinarquistas and the Acción Católica, made up the small
but vocal Mexican right in the 1930s.6 These groups often
found unlikely allies in German nationals and members of
the Spanish Falange. Many groups on the political right had
very little in common ideologically, but they did share an ar-
dently anti-communist stance, and leftist groups often lumped
them together in anti-fascist discourse. Right-leaning groups
of German nationals and conservative Mexican citizens tied
European events to Mexican Catholicism, anti-communism,
and anti-imperialism. German propagandists and Mexican
nationalists tried to deﬁne Mexico as a nation similar to fas-
cist countries by emphasizing the collective plight of smaller
nations, such as Mexico and Germany, against imperial pow-
ers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union. The right
aimed to compound the fears of mainstream Mexicans that a
communist revolution would take over the country.
At the same time, the left assimilated European ideological

a propaganda mosaic | 15
currents into its domestic platform. Leftist groups such as
the Partido Comunista Mexicana (pcm; Mexican Communist
Party), the Confederación de Trabajadores de México (ctm;
Confederation of Mexican Workers), Spanish Civil War ex-
iles, and prolific groups of socially conscious artists viewed
European fascism as a grave threat and grew increasingly
alarmed as the Mexican right seemed to identify with the con-
servative ideology. Leaders of labor unions and other leftist
organizations defined Mexico—and by extension its revolu-
tion—in terms of social justice. They identified international
fascist symbols with national figures they considered a threat
to the left. They sent a message that fascism challenged work-
ers’ rights and social reform as contained in the revolution.
This patchwork of propaganda messages became increas-
ingly complicated in the 1930s as each side evolved in re-
sponse to national and international events. Pro-fascist and anti-
fascist propaganda in this period can be divided into three
phases, based on unfolding events in Europe. First, from 1933
to 1936 the Nazi Party rose to power in Germany and put strat-
egies in place to consolidate its influence over Germans living
in Mexico and also to influence the Mexican public. Official
responses to fascism remained minimal, both in Mexico and
worldwide, as many leaders did not yet see Adolf Hitler as
a threat to global peace. The foremost opposition in Mexico
came from leftist interests who responded by denouncing fas-
cism as a threat to the social reform programs of the Mexican
Revolution. During the first phase, propagandists targeted a
small audience of rightist and leftist special-interest groups.
The second phase began with the start of the Spanish Civil
War in 1936. As European fascists and communists engaged
in armed conflict, special-interest groups in Mexico became

16 | a propaganda mosaic
more vocal with their propaganda. Both sides infiltrated the
mainstream press, and the left promoted a powerful anti-
fascist propaganda campaign through conferences and graphic
images in public spaces. As the Spanish Civil War came to a
close, German and Italian aggression escalated in other areas
of Europe, marking the beginning of the final phase. Between
1938 and 1940 the propaganda war in Mexico fluctuated in
response to European actions, such as the German annexa-
tion of Austria, the Munich agreement, and the Nazi-Soviet
Pact. The last brought a major shift in the country’s wartime
rhetoric as a tenuous and short-lived propaganda alliance
emerged between fascists and communists.

Growth of Nazism in Mexico

An examination of World War II propaganda in Mexico must

start by considering the origins of the fascist threat in the
country. Since anti-fascist propaganda—whether produced
by the Mexican left or later by Allied government agencies—
emerged as a response to perceptions of a fascist threat in
Mexico, a brief background summary of fascist activities is
imperative.7 Nazi agents directed the ﬁrst pro-fascist propa-
ganda almost exclusively toward Germans living in Mexico
in the early 1930s. By limiting the scope of their propaganda
activities, Nazi Party members succeeded in bringing German
nationals into the party network, which allowed agents to ex-
pand their activities more effectively later. Because Mexico’s
German community was small and already organized into a
cohesive social unit, the Nazi Propaganda Ministry incorpo-
rated the Nazi ideology into its preexisting structure.
A small but economically important German colony had a
long tradition in Mexico, dating back to the nineteenth century.

a propaganda mosaic | 17
In the ﬁrst half of the 1930s between six and seven thousand
German nationals resided in Mexico.8 In the twentieth cen-
tury, German nationals contributed to the Mexican economy
in the automotive, electrical, construction, and pharmaceuti-
cal industries.9 Business dealings between the two countries
were interrupted during World War I, which coincided with
some of the most violent phases of the Mexican Revolution.
Nevertheless, during the 1920s and 1930s German nationals
once again became involved in the Mexican economy.10
Although many German families assimilated into Mexican
national culture, the German colony in Mexico maintained a
strong sense of solidarity. Members of the colony shared sim-
ilar economic interests, and a strong loyalty to the fatherland
persisted, especially among recently arrived and ﬁrst-genera-
tion German nationals. German businessmen belonged to ex-
clusive social organizations, and families sent their children to
German schools in an attempt to maintain a sense of German
identity.11 For decades private German organizations promoted
conservative, nationalist ideals among their members and en-
couraged members to speak the German language and prac-
tice German customs. Nazism’s ideological emphasis added
a new dimension to German nationalism, but the Nazi Party
utilized the basic operational framework of the German col-
ony that had always existed. Nevertheless, anti-fascist inter-
est groups perceived the rise of Nazism in Europe to be a se-
rious ideological threat within Mexico.12 Leftist groups such
as the pcm and organized labor groups sensed that the rise
of the Nazi Party in Germany and its subsequent activities in
Mexico signaled a growth in right-wing opposition. Emerging
diplomatic strains on an international level compounded left-
ist fears. The United States and other European powers looked

18 | a propaganda mosaic
toward Mexico with increasing suspicion, concerned that the
country might become a Nazi haven and a springboard for
fascist espionage and ideological expansion throughout the
Western Hemisphere.
As a result, much of the documentation on Nazi activities
in Mexico comes from Allied investigations and leftist propa-
ganda. These sources contained an inherent bias, which exag-
gerated the extent of Nazi penetration and “Fifth Column”
activities. On the other hand, German sources describing Nazi
activities in Mexico prior to World War II were equally bi-
ased. Sources from private German associations and from the
German embassy describe a small, non-political community
whose economic and social interests were persecuted by ag-
gressive leftist groups. An accurate picture of the growth of
fascism in Mexico in the 1930s lies somewhere between the
two extremes.13 A Nazi propaganda and control apparatus
emerged and became an important part of the German com-
munity between 1935 and 1940. The ofﬁcial Nazi Party in-
corporated German nationals and their social organizations
into that apparatus, but the structure and operation of those
organizations changed little.
In 1933, Hitler rose to power and began to consolidate his
inﬂuence over Germany and over German nationals living
abroad. In Mexico the Nazi strategy took shape in 1935 un-
der Dr. Heinrich Northe, the recently appointed First Secretary
of the German Legation. Northe directed a propaganda cam-
paign that initially targeted the German colony. His strat-
egy used existing German businesses, social organizations,
and schools as mechanisms to spread propaganda and in-
still loyalty to the Nazi Party among German nationals liv-
ing abroad.14 He reorganized nearly all previously existing

a propaganda mosaic | 19
German social organizations into the Centro Alemán, a new
community group controlled by the Nazi Party. Previous or-
ganizations included the Casino Alemán and the Society of
Women and frequently expressed an outdated, conservative
monarchist ideology.15 Northe’s agents made them subordi-
nate to the Centro Alemán and immediately set about to re-
place their old ideologies with Nazism.
The Centro Alemán became the hub of Nazi activities. The
community set up a system of dues through which members
of the German colony provided ﬁnancial support to the Nazi
Party.16 Through the Centro Alemán, the German govern-
ment also established a formal Nazi Party in Mexico and at-
tempted to recruit pure German Aryans for its membership.
The party tightly controlled its membership, disallowing chil-
dren of mixed German-Mexican marriage and even Germans
with Mexican spouses. The party also aimed to capture the
loyalties of German youth through the Juventudes Hitleristas
(Hitler Youth), an organization composed of all young people
of pure German ethnicity who were being trained eventually
to become members of the Nazi Party. The Colegio Alemán,
a German school that was also brought under the supervision
of the Nazi Party, complemented the Juventudes.
Through the Centro Alemán, the Nazi Party, the Juventudes
Hitleristas, and the Colegio Alemán, Nazi propaganda pro-
liferated among Germans living in Mexico. School and youth
organizations indoctrinated young people with the Nazi ide-
ology. Through the Centro’s activities and printed material,
the Nazis reinforced conservative values of militancy, patri-
otism, and gendered divisions that were, to some extent, al-
ready a part of pre-Nazi German values. The Nazi Party fur-
ther attempted to implant the idea that German nationals were

20 | a propaganda mosaic
culturally and intellectually superior to Mexicans.17 The effi-
cacy of the Nazi strategy in Mexico varied among individual
German families. For those who had resisted acculturation in
the early decades of the twentieth century, Nazism provided an
ideological platform to strengthen feelings of German identity
and national loyalty. But not all Germans welcomed the Nazi
Party’s aggressive propaganda program. Businessmen who re-
sisted Nazi policies often found themselves at a disadvantage
within the extensive network of German commercial enter-
prises orchestrated by the Nazi government in Berlin.18
The Nazi Party soon aimed to win the support of the Mexican
population as well. Hitler recognized immediately that gain-
ing Mexicans’ trust and loyalty would be a great asset in his
overall global strategies. The country’s vast supply of natu-
ral resources could provide vital war materials in future con-
flicts, and an alliance with Mexico would bolster Germany’s
strategic advantage for any military activity in the Western
Hemisphere.19 Hitler’s government took steps to improve trade
relations almost immediately. A trade delegation toured Mexico
in the fall of 1934 to develop trade agreements.
Hitler’s government eventually devised a propaganda strat-
egy aimed at the Mexican public. The German embassy in
Mexico City began pushing pro-Nazi propaganda in 1935
when Arthur Dietrich became chief of the press office. For the
next five years he led the German efforts to sway public opin-
ion in favor of the Nazis and the basic tenets of the fascist ide-
ology. Eventually, Mexico’s press became the main medium
for the ongoing propaganda battle as pro-fascists and anti-
fascists resorted to bribes and payoffs to secure space for their
information on the pages of Mexico’s newspapers and maga-
zines.20 Nazi propagandists began their foray into print media

a propaganda mosaic | 21
in 1935 by attempting a newsletter titled “Defensa,” a short-
lived but virulently anti-Semitic publication. The Nazi strat-
egy also included producing pamphlets and posters for mass
distribution to businessmen, Catholics, and military men.21

Anti-fascist Propaganda

Anti-fascist propaganda began to appear in Mexico in the

early 1930s. Alarmed at the growing worldwide influence of
the fascists—and especially the Nazis—leftist groups began to
develop strategies to combat them. Between 1935 and 1939
the Mexican government produced no overt anti-fascist propa-
ganda, although Lázaro Cárdenas’s policies implied a disdain
for the ideology. The president maneuvered carefully through
the nation’s diplomatic challenges—first in the Spanish Civil
War and later in Mexico’s controversial expropriation of for-
eign oil companies. Although Cárdenas and his cabinet were
ideologically opposed to fascism, they took no formal pub-
lic stand against it. Similarly, the United States, Great Britain,
and France did not become involved in producing anti-fascist
propaganda in these years. Until the war began, in 1939, the
nations that would become the Allied powers did not have
official propaganda agencies operating in Mexico. Instead,
communists and labor groups led the left in producing pro-
paganda to oppose fascism. The left incorporated anti-fascist
propaganda into its anti-imperialist agenda. Leftists also pro-
moted their own domestic political agenda by including social
welfare and labor reform aspects of the Mexican Revolution
in anti-fascist rhetoric.
Following orders from Comintern, the pcm began produc-
ing materials to oppose fascism in the early 1930s. The inter-
national communist movement held a series of conferences

22 | a propaganda mosaic
and passed resolutions calling on all communists worldwide
to oppose the ideology of the Nazi Party in Germany.22 The
pcm, formed in 1919, had not become an important public
voice until the 1930s, when labor leader Vicente Lombardo
Toledano began to develop a close relationship with President
Cárdenas. With the president’s support, Lombardo Toledano
became the leader of the ctm, the new national labor union.23
He succeeded in winning concessions for workers in the late
1930s, and this success made him an influential political voice
for the working sector of the population.
Lombardo Toledano began making public denunciations of
Hitler’s rise to power as early as 1934. In a January edition of
the review Futuro, which he founded and directed, Lombardo
Toledano condemned Hitler as inhumane and anti-intellec-
tual.24 He defined fascism as another form of capitalism and
blamed imperialist movements for the rising conflict between
fascist and capitalist nations. In this way he followed the pre–
World War I Marxist line that considered major world con-
flict the inevitable consequence of imperialist competition.25
Lombardo Toledano argued that fascism broadly represented
bourgeois repression of the working class. He drew parallels
between the fascist bourgeoisie in Europe and the industrial
class in Mexico. This comparison allowed him to incorporate
a worldwide fascist enemy into his Marxist interpretation of
the Mexican Revolution.26
Other Mexicans sympathetic to the communist cause also
began to speak out against fascism after Hitler’s rise to power.
Leftist artists Leopoldo Méndez, Pablo O’Higgins, and Luis
Arenal as well as writer Juan de la Cabada responded to
Comintern resolutions calling for the formation of popular
front organizations by founding the Liga de Escritores y Artistas

a propaganda mosaic | 23
Revolucionarios (lear; League of Revolutionary Writers and
Artists) in 1934. The lear worked closely with the pcm, and
its leaders eventually began cooperating with the Cárdenas
administration. The group openly opposed fascism, Nazism,
and other rightist organizations in Mexico. It advocated the
use of art and literature to combat the fascism and welcomed
into its membership anyone who opposed the ideology.
The lear’s earliest propaganda activities incorporated op-
position to international fascism with its domestic political
agenda. Between 1934 and 1937, members produced graphic
broadsides for display in public spaces in Mexico City.27 The
group also published a review titled Frente a Frente for mass
distribution. Through these two media, lear produced im-
ages aimed at promoting socialism over fascism. Frequently,
images portrayed conservative icons such as priests and fas-
cists attacking workers. The lear repeated its message that
all Mexicans needed to unite against the international evils of
fascism and its local manifestations within Mexico.28
In their graphic representations of leftist interests, artists
frequently combined images representing the Mexican right
with international symbols of fascism. An image published in
a 1936 edition of Frente a Frente showed the torso and head
of an assassinated Mexican worker, juxtaposed with images of
Plutarco Elías Calles, Benito Mussolini, and Adolf Hitler.29 In
this example, the editors of the review saw Calles as a threat
to social reform and workers’ rights and attempted to associ-
ate his regime with European fascism.
The polemic between fascist and communist groups in
Mexico developed slowly. Before 1936, pro-fascist and anti-
fascist propaganda was relatively restricted to interest groups

24 | a propaganda mosaic
such as the Centro Alemán and the pcm. Those groups limited
their propaganda to private social gatherings and specialized
publications read by only a small number of Mexicans. Both
sides targeted an audience that was literate and intellectually
involved. These modest beginnings later gave way to an ag-
gressive propaganda war as European hostilities provoked
strong reactions within Mexico’s borders.

The Spanish Civil War

Pro-fascist and anti-fascist propaganda became more elabo-

rate and pervasive after 1936 as the Spanish Civil War rein-
forced the ideological divisions that separated Mexico’s pre-
existing political extremes. Mexicans began taking sides in
the Spanish conflict, and ideologically based propaganda pro-
liferated in the press, in public gatherings, and in private so-
cial circles. Eventually, German agents formed an unofficial
alliance with agents of the Spanish Falange and cooperated
to combat anti-fascist propaganda produced by the Mexican
left. Spanish and German exiles began filtering into Mexico
after 1937. This became a critical moment for fascist agents
in Mexico to expand their propaganda campaign to include
Mexicans as well as German nationals.
In Europe, the Spanish Civil War became the first open war
between the ideologies dividing the continent in the 1930s.
Leftist and rightist political philosophies divided Spain after
the defeat of King Alfonso and the establishment of the Second
Republic in 1931. Leftist political parties, although divided,
struggled to impose political, economic, and social reforms in
the early 1930s. Conservative Spaniards reacted strongly to
leftist reforms and established a right-wing opposition to the

a propaganda mosaic | 25
Second Republic. During those tumultuous years several fas-
cist political parties merged and formed the Falange. Falangists
did not attract a large following at first, but they did work to
destabilize the leftist republican government until civil war
erupted in 1936.30
Political and social conflict in Spain escalated during the
1930s. Leftist parties formed the Popular Front, a coalition
aimed at offsetting the increasing power of the right, especially
the Falange. The Popular Front’s victory in the 1936 elections
ignited a series of political murders and eventually led to the
1936 military coup that initiated the Civil War. After General
Francisco Franco took power over the Falangists, the war be-
came increasingly violent. During three years of fighting ap-
proximately half a million people lost their lives. Franco began
receiving monetary and military aid from Hitler in Germany
and Mussolini in Italy. Aid from these fascist powers gave
Franco a significant advantage over the Popular Front.31
Political and social conflict in Spain closely mirrored Mexico’s
own internal disputes following the 1910 revolution, and many
Mexicans identified with the struggle and began taking sides.
As Mexicans learned of the Civil War, some recalled their own
ideological divisions and saw the Spanish conflict as a possi-
ble preview of their future.32 Leftists interpreted the Spanish
conflict in terms of their revolutionary interests, while fas-
cist, Nazi, and Falange interests in Mexico formed an alliance
against local leftist groups. Conservative forces from abroad
and from within Mexico’s own borders combined and fought
an aggressive propaganda war against the left. As Mexican
interest groups took sides in the Spanish conflict, they began
to frame their positions in ways that served as a precursor to
the propaganda war of World War II.

26 | a propaganda mosaic
The Leftist Position on the Spanish Civil War

On the political left, Vicente Lombardo Toledano took the

lead by sending messages of unity and support on behalf of
the ctm to Spain’s most prominent socialist organization,
the Unión General de Trabajadores (ugt; General Union of
Workers). Other leftist Mexican labor unions and political
groups followed Lombardo Toledano by sending messages of
support.33 The lear, the pcm, and other smaller labor groups
declared their support for the Spanish Republic with expres-
sions of solidarity and soon with monetary aid, food, cloth-
ing, and medical donations.34 Eventually, these groups sent
volunteers to fight in the Popular Front army.
For Mexico’s left, the war in Spain became a symbol of
the working class’s struggle against fascism.35 In speeches,
editorials, letters, and other propaganda, leftist leaders as-
sociated Mexico’s struggle for social justice with the Spanish
Republicans’ fight against Falangists’ fascism. Ordinary work-
ing-class Mexicans echoed this interpretation. The ctm raised
money and support for the Republicans by asking workers
to show their solidarity for Spain’s social struggle. Workers
identified with “comrade worker militiamen of Spain” fight-
ing against the dictators “who wish[ed] to muzzle the liber-
ties of the proletariat.”36 Labor leaders began circulating peti-
tions asking the government to expel members of the Spanish
Falange in Mexico, calling them foreign agitators who would
destabilize Mexico’s internal affairs.37
The ctm called on leftist artists to help raise money and to
encourage support for the Spanish Republicans. By 1937, the
lear’s membership had declined and leftist artists regrouped
and formed a new, more cohesive organization, the Taller de

a propaganda mosaic | 27
Gráfica Popular (tgp, People’s Graphics Workshop). The tgp
became the most important producer of anti-fascist visuals
until 1939. tgp artists also took part in opposing Falange ac-
tivities in Mexico.38
Working closely with the ctm, the tgp produced a series
of posters encouraging workers to aid their Spanish counter-
parts. Once again, artists incorporated local circumstances
into their messages surrounding the international conflict. In
figure 1, a worker sits down to a hearty meal of meat, bread,
and coffee. His bountiful table shows that he has benefited
from Cárdenas’s and Lombardo Toledano’s support for la-
borers.39 As he prepares to feast, the collective conscience of
the Mexican left, personified in the “left hand” of the ctm,
intrudes on his banquet, reminding him that it is the Week of
Aid to Spain and asking him what he has contributed, ask-
ing “ya ayudaste?” or “have you given aid yet?” Significantly,
the left hand targets the diner’s right hand, which is selfishly
clutching a piece of bread, representing wealth, abundance,
and general well-being. The poster not only urges workers
to unite and help Spain but also subtly associates apathy and
selfishness with the right.
In another poster (figure 2) that became part of the ctm cam-
paign to send aid to Spain, a man rests comfortably on his sofa
while a child plays at his side. An anonymous figure, wrapped
in a shawl, sits solemnly in the background. As the figures sit
in tranquillity, bombs explode in Spain and planes swarm in
the sky. The caption, “Tu tranquilidad peligra!” (Your tran-
quility endangers!), challenges the apathy of Mexicans and the
world. The poster implies that lack of action poses an equal
danger as Falange bombs to the Spanish Republic.
In response to Comintern appeals, communist groups

28 | a propaganda mosaic
fig. 1. “How have you helped?” (tgp poster).
Courtesy of Museo Nacional de México, Inv. 426.

worldwide attempted to aid the Spanish left.40 The International

Brigades, a volunteer army organized by the Comintern to
halt the spread of fascism in Spain began to arrive early in
1937. Many volunteers in the International Brigades came

a propaganda mosaic | 29
fig. 2. “Your tranquillity endangers!” (tgp poster).
Courtesy of Museo Nacional de México, Inv. 865.

from Mexico, perhaps with support from the Cárdenas

government.41 Some contemporary observers believed that
Cárdenas himself encouraged volunteers to participate in the
International Brigades and provided government funding to

30 | a propaganda mosaic
facilitate their transportation costs, although recent studies ar-
gue that Cárdenas did not directly aid Mexicans in joining the
Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless, the ctm and the pcm actively
recruited and funded Mexican volunteers to the International
Brigades. As many as three hundred Mexicans may have fought
in the Spanish Civil War. Of that number, only 20 percent sur-
vived and returned to Mexico.42
As early as 1936, Lombardo Toledano was making an ar-
gument that set a precedent for the World War II propaganda
campaign. The labor leader began emphasizing a direct corre-
lation between Mexican experiences and the conflict unfold-
ing in Europe. He urged his countrymen to be alarmed at what
he called “the fascist justification for imperialism.”43 He also
frequently juxtaposed the terms “revolution,” “fascism,” and
“communism.”44 Writing in El Popular in 1938, Lombardo
Toledano claims that Spain’s war—as the manifestation of long-
standing ideological conflicts—marks a repetition of Mexico’s
1910 revolution. He draws a correlation between the exis-
tence of large landowners, corrupt church leaders, and foreign
business interests in opposition to the working classes in both
Spain and Mexico. He argues that victory for the Republicans
would bring Spaniards and Mexicans closer to an ideal soci-
ety.45 He makes similar connections to the Mexican Revolution
in his review Futuro with the phrase “to fight against fascism
. . . is to fight for the Mexican Revolution.”46
Lombardo Toledano’s comments represent the tendency
among Mexico’s many competing interest groups to view the
conflict in Europe through the lens of their individual inter-
ests. Lombardo Toledano’s rhetoric did turn to totalitarian-
ism versus democracy at times, but generally his arguments
emphasized fascism as a threat to socialist interests, especially

a propaganda mosaic | 31
workers’ rights and social reform. For Lombardo Toledano
and the left in the late 1930s, the immediate enemy was not
the Spanish Falange, or Italian fascists, or even German Nazis.
The enemy was “the right,” at times afﬁliated with these for-
eign groups, but speciﬁcally comprising local Mexican orga-
nizations, including the emerging Sinarquista movement, the
church, and landowner associations.

The Civil War and the Mexican Right

Just as Mexico’s leftist interests found parallels between their

own struggle and the Spanish Civil War, Mexican conservatives
identified Franco’s Nationalist movement as an extension of
their individual interests. Capitalists, businessmen, Catholics,
and middle-class Mexicans who opposed many of the reforms
implemented by the revolutionary government sided with
the Spanish Falange.47 Their influence, supported by German
agents in Mexico, could be seen in the way the Spanish Civil
War unfolded on the pages of the nation’s main newspapers.
Throughout the summer of 1936, Excelsior and El Universal
provided daily coverage of the developing conflict with large,
bold headlines declaring “Bloody Insurrections Occurring
in Spain—Strikes in Various Provinces”; “Demonstrations
Continue in Spain in the Wake of Elections”; “Strikes Cause
More Disorder in Spain.”48 Many of the front-page stories sug-
gested that the cause of the growing conflict was general ag-
itation led by Spain’s peasants and working class. Some sto-
ries specifically blamed the interference of the international
communist movement for the problems in Spain.49
The anti-socialist bent of the Mexican right’s attitude to-
ward the Spanish Civil War should be viewed in the context
of national politics. In the late 1930s, President Cárdenas

32 | a propaganda mosaic
alienated many in the urban middle and upper classes with his
nationalization of industries, labor policies, attitude toward
the church, and land-redistribution programs. Mexico suffered
from growing inflation and economic depression, and many
moderate and conservative business leaders and other mem-
bers of the middle class blamed revolutionary reforms for those
economic problems.50 They also opposed Cárdenas’s decision
to allow Spanish refugees into the country. Furthermore, the
colony of Spanish nationals, despite a number of Republican
refugees, tended to side with Franco. Pro-Franco interests eas-
ily disseminated their propaganda in Mexico during the Civil
War. In fact, one September issue of Excelsior included a half-
page advertisement for the Spanish Falange in Mexico. The
article included the Falange’s manifesto, emphasizing the os-
tensibly unified religious and class culture between Spain and
Hispanic America.51
Some of the conservative support in Mexico was surpris-
ingly muted compared to the clamor generated by Lombardo
Toledano and the Mexican left. Pope Pius XI publicly fa-
vored the Spanish Nationalists and called on Catholics to op-
pose Spanish, Russian, and Mexican communism. Because of
the Constitution of 1917 and the Cristero War, the Mexican
church hierarchy was less vocal, but many local clergy encour-
aged parishioners to pray for peace and true liberty in Spain,
which they interpreted as a Falange victory. Others sent mes-
sages of support and encouragement directly to their Spanish
counterparts. Nevertheless, official Mexican church support
for the Nationalists remained stifled by fears of political re-
percussions at home.
Other conservative interests had no compunction or le-
gal prohibition when it came to aggressively publicizing their

a propaganda mosaic | 33
support for the Nationalists. Generally the right viewed the
Spanish Civil War first as a conservative confrontation with
communism and second as an example of corporatism and
authentic Hispanidad that should be emulated in Mexico.
Catholic doctrine required followers to reject totalitarian op-
pression and violence. Many conservatives frequently did this
by arguing that Franco was not totalitarian, and some went
so far as to argue that he was not fascist. Writers in the con-
servative journal Abside drew a distinction between Franco
and European fascism. This distinction defined Falangism as
a democratic movement that offered an alternative to the in-
evitable civil war between fascism and communism.52
Other conservatives saw the Falange’s Hispanidad as an
alternative to the Pan-Americanism promoted by the United
States.53 A movement born in the late nineteenth century with
the creation of a regional organization that would eventually
become the Pan American Union, Pan-Americanism experi-
enced a series of transformations in the first half of the twenti-
eth century. The idea of Pan-Americanism moved from an em-
phasis on improving inter-American trade in the first decade
of the twentieth century to a focus on curtailing U.S. interven-
tion in the 1920s and 1930s.54 Despite the shifting meanings
of Pan-Americanism, most Mexicans interpreted it as an idea
dominated by the interests of the United States.
Hispanidad, in contrast, stressed that the foundation of
Latin American culture lay in its Spanish heritage, or at least
in the heritage of the Romanized areas of Europe.55 This heri-
tage set Latin Americans apart from the Anglo-American cul-
ture to the north. To many Mexicans, the cultural distinction
expounded in Hispanidad provided the basis for resisting U.S.
hegemony, which many associated with Pan-Americanism.

34 | a propaganda mosaic
Just as communist interests used anti-imperialism in their op-
position to fascism, pro-fascist groups equated imperialism
and Pan-Americanism as the basis for their propaganda in
Mexico.
The rise of Falange activity in Mexico further divided the
nation. It spurred local rightist organizations to identify with
conservative European ideologies. The incipient Mexican
Sinarquista movement, in particular, drew inspiration from
the Spanish Falange.56 Founded in 1934 by former partici-
pants in the Cristero revolt, the Unión Nacional Sinarquista
de México (National Synarchist Union of Mexico) had grown
in size and inﬂuence by 1937, drawing members from zealous
Catholics.57 Sinarquista leaders quickly formed alliances with
local Falange representatives. Although Sinarquista rhetoric
denounced Nazi aggression in theory, in practice the group’s
policies dovetailed with Nazi rhetoric. In fact, investigations
by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation concluded that al-
though the Sinarquista movement was not a fascist organiza-
tion, it posed a threat to hemispheric security nonetheless.58

The Civil War in Mexico’s Press

Mexico’s newspapers offered the most accessible mass me-

dium for both sides of the Spanish Civil War propaganda cam-
paign to try to inﬂuence the public. Mainstream periodicals
and special-interest publications were inundated with arti-
cles, opinion pieces, and images promoting either the Spanish
Republicans or Franco’s Nationalists. Mexican leftists com-
plained that the Spanish Falange fully controlled Mexico’s ma-
jor dailies through ﬁnancial collusion and other forms of cor-
ruption. They claimed that the nation’s mainstream periodicals
applauded Franco and slanted their coverage accordingly.59

a propaganda mosaic | 35
Certainly the conservative press printed pro-Nationalist cov-
erage and the mainstream press frequently printed material
sympathetic to Franco. At the same time, many news stories
seemed to support the Republic. In fact, opinion pieces penned
by Lombardo Toledano frequently appeared in the editorial
section of El Universal.
A full-scale propaganda battle emerged in Mexico’s press
as stories denouncing socialists and other groups within the
Spanish Republicans appeared alongside stories criticizing the
rise of the Falange.60 For example, in May 1936 Excelsior
printed a story detailing the efforts of the conservative Unión
Nacional de Veteranos de la Revolución (National Union of
Veterans of the Revolution) to rid Mexico of communism in
the interest of maintaining “national integrity.” The group
had addressed the Chamber of Deputies requesting legisla-
tion to prohibit the immigration of communists from abroad
and to facilitate the deportation of foreign communist agita-
tors.61 One week later, Excelsior published a scathing anti-
communist editorial in which the author insisted that dicta-
tors who came to power by the “will of the people,” such as
Hitler and Mussolini, could play a valid political role in con-
trast to dictators who came to power through the use of ter-
ror—namely, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.62 But just one month
later, that same newspaper printed a front-page story heralding
a speech by a pro-Republican Spanish diplomat who had out-
lined the similar cultures and destinies of Mexico and Spain.63
At times, writers for El Universal and Excelsior seemed to
engage in verbal sparring matches over the meaning of the
Spanish conﬂict.64
Leftist artists continued to use their talents to promote anti-

36 | a propaganda mosaic
Franco messages throughout the Civil War. The tgp chose
José Chávez Morado to represent the group in meetings of the
International Alliance of Anti-fascist Intellectuals in Valencia,
Madrid, Barcelona, and Paris in 1937.65 After returning to
Mexico, Chávez Morado initiated a series of prints dedicated
to the Spanish Civil War. His prints aimed to portray the bru-
tality of war and to show fascism as the destroyer of civili-
zation. They depicted darkness and despair, particularly for
Spain’s popular masses.66 By using his art to portray the war
in the context of popular emotions and the role of family,
Chávez Morado attempted to appeal to the masses and win
support for the Spanish Republicans.

Spanish Refugees in Mexico

As the war drew to a close and Franco emerged victorious in

Spain, hundreds of thousands of his leftist opponents were
forced to ﬂee the country. Mexico became a primary destination
for Republican Spanish refugees. As early as 1937, Mexican
leftist intellectuals began pressuring President Cárdenas to
provide asylum for small numbers of elite Spanish leftists. By
1938 Cárdenas had expressed his willingness to take up to ﬁfty
thousand refugees, but in response to pro-Franco pressures
in Mexico he delayed implementation for several months.67
Finally, in the summer of 1939, Mexico began receiving thou-
sands of Republican refugees. By 1945 over forty thousand
Spanish refugees, who had been living in exile camps in France,
had arrived. Pro-Franco groups in Mexico incorporated this
policy into their propaganda campaign.
The Mexican right reacted strongly to the large numbers of
Republican exiles entering Mexico’s borders. Many believed

a propaganda mosaic | 37
that Cárdenas was trying to spread Spanish communism to
Mexico, and they feared the influence the Spanish left could
have within their country. Opposition to refugees was not
limited to Mexican conservatives and Franco sympathizers.
Members of Mexico’s middle class who had not yet taken a
strong stance on the Civil War frequently protested the gov-
ernment’s refugee policy.68 While not ardently conservative,
many of the middle class feared the expansion of commu-
nism and saw Spanish exiles as an unwanted leftist influence
in the country.69 Some Mexican leftists also voiced their oppo-
sition to the refugee policy. Labor unions and peasant groups
feared that refugees would compete for valuable jobs and land.
Mexican intellectuals and educators frequently found them-
selves at odds with their Spanish counterparts. Nevertheless,
thousands of Spanish exiles began incorporating themselves
into Mexican life, and many eventually became important
contributors to the emerging propaganda war surrounding
World War II.70
Leftist-leaning Mexicans, anti-fascist Spaniards, and Germans
in exile in Mexico formed the Liga Pro-Cultura Alemana (Pro-
German Cultural League) in Mexico in 1938. Its initial ob-
jectives were to combat the spread of fascism in Mexico and
to facilitate the dissemination of anti-Nazi propaganda. The
Liga and its affiliates produced the first true anti-Nazi propa-
ganda, intended to destabilize the Nazi apparatus in Mexico
as well as in Europe. In 1938 the Mexican government still
had not become involved in the developing propaganda battle.
Likewise, the United States and western Europe had focused
little attention on swaying public opinion against Germany.
Therefore, the most important anti-Nazi information being
produced in 1938 came from the Liga.

38 | a propaganda mosaic
Deﬁning Moments and World War II

As conﬂict in Spain began to subside in 1938, German and

Italian aggression began to escalate. The two nations had been
remilitarizing in violation of international peace agreements and
had formed the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936. By the end of the
Spanish Civil War, it appeared that European aggression would
continue through the German and Italian armies. Propaganda
messages in Mexico shifted accordingly, as the country turned
its attention to the prospect of Axis expansion.
The propaganda war fluctuated tremendously in the last
two years of the 1930s. Mexican attitudes toward European
events responded to a series of defining moments in 1938 and
1939. First, Germany’s annexation of Austria in the spring of
1938 shifted propagandists’ attention away from the Spanish
Civil War and focused it on German and Italian aggression.
Throughout 1938 and most of 1939, the propaganda battle
emphasized a confrontation between fascism and communism
in European affairs. The Munich agreement and Hitler’s in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938 marked the sec-
ond defining moment, which further escalated the ideologi-
cal polemic. The sparring between rightist and leftist interests
culminated in an unexpected final turning point in the fall of
1939. The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany entered into a non-
aggression pact, which completely changed the nature of the
propaganda war in Mexico. The tenuous official alliance be-
tween the two powers brought a short-term end to the com-
munist-fascist propaganda confrontation in Mexico. It also
coincided with the beginning of World War II and the creation
of an official propaganda agency by European allies.
On March 12, 1938, the German army invaded Austria as

a propaganda mosaic | 39
part of Hitler’s strategic Anschluss to annex the neighboring
country and promote a nationalist unification of German peo-
ple. The invasion provoked a period of intense propaganda
in Mexico’s press. Prior to the annexation, the mainstream
Mexican press had paid little attention to Germany’s activi-
ties in Europe. But Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria provided the
first of many subsequent illustrations of the German leader’s
ability not only to rally Germans around the nationalist Nazi
ideology but also to export his ideas and influence abroad. In
response, anti-fascist interests in Mexico escalated their pro-
paganda campaign, and pro-German propaganda also inten-
sified.71
Throughout 1938, German propagandists worked to ma-
nipulate editorials in mainstream newspapers to win support
among the Mexican public. Arthur Dietrich and his staff sub-
sidized Mexican newspapers and in exchange editors printed
material favorable to the Axis. Nazi agents developed a se-
ries of pro-German themes meant specifically to appeal to
Mexicans. Their strategies included glorifying militarism and
trying to rouse sympathy for the plight of Germans against
the imperialist Allied powers after World War I. They played
up the nationalist aspects of Nazism to appeal to Mexican na-
tional pride and anti-American sentiments. These propaganda
themes proved useful to Nazi agents in Mexico, but the most
successful and most widely used propaganda strategy before
the fall of 1939 involved setting Nazism against communism
and provoking fears that communist subversives were taking
over the country.72
As world war seemed imminent, German propagandists
began paying subsidies to Mexican newspapers and periodi-
cals. U.S. military intelligence reports in 1939 indicated that

40 | a propaganda mosaic
many of the country’s most popular newspapers and maga-
zines received large sums of money every month from a bank
account that had been traced to the German military atta-
ché in Washington.73 In particular, the two most widely read
Mexico City dailies, Excelsior and El Universal, were believed
to be receiving large subsidies.74 Other newspapers and peri-
odicals on the Nazi payroll included Revista de Revistas, Hoy,
Ahora, Diario de la Guerra, Noticias Militarias, Combate,
Hispanidad, La Semana, Acción Nacional, España Popular, La
Marsellesa, Avanzada, Afirmación, Ser, Perfiles, El Espectador
and El Observador.75
Conservative special-interest groups owned and oper-
ated many of the periodicals under Nazi influence. For ex-
ample, Diario de la Guerra was funded exclusively by the
German embassy. The Spanish Falange operated Hispanidad
and España Popular, and far-right interest groups produced
Acción Nacional. The circulation of these special-interest pub-
lications was quite small and devoted to Mexicans with far-
right tendencies. Excelsior and El Universal, on the other hand,
were the large independent dailies in the country, with a com-
bined daily circulation of nearly three hundred thousand.76
They were based in Mexico City but also circulated nation-
wide. Anti-fascists considered the Nazi propaganda appearing
in these two newspapers a serious threat. German subsidies
contributed to editors’ willingness to print pro-Nazi material,
but the nature of these two mainstream periodicals further
explains their pro-German leanings in the late 1930s. Both
Excelsior and El Universal boasted a readership composed
primarily of the urban middle and upper classes. These seg-
ments of the population tended to value certain national and
individual characteristics that they saw reflected in Nazism.77

a propaganda mosaic | 41
Many had felt threatened economically by the dominance of
the United States in Mexican business affairs.78 They saw the
United States as an imperialist country bent on extending its
economic inﬂuence worldwide.
Many middle-class business leaders tended to admire
Germany and Italy. To them, the fascist nations represented
the plight of all smaller countries against imperialist pow-
ers. In particular, Mexican business leaders demonstrated a
keen appreciation for the economic successes that Hitler and
Mussolini had been able to achieve in the midst of worldwide
depression. They saw many similarities between German and
Italian experiences and those of their own country. They inter-
preted Hitler’s and Mussolini’s actions as stubborn deﬁance
of the imperialist inclinations of the United States.
Many Mexicans responded to the anti-imperialist nature
of pro-fascist propaganda and equated support for Germany
with opposition to the United States. They believed that the
Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, had treated
Germany unfairly, and they blamed the United States, Great
Britain, and France for the harsh conditions and large repara-
tions imposed on Germany in the treaty. Editorials in Excelsior
and El Universal saw early German attempts at expansion in
Europe as correcting the inequalities created at Versailles.79
Many readers of Excelsior and El Universal were also moti-
vated by fears of communism. For the country’s business lead-
ers, revolutionary reforms implemented by Cárdenas were too
close to communism. Members of the middle and upper classes
saw their economic interests threatened by agrarian reform
and policies protecting workers. Cardenas’s oil policies, while
initially sparking widespread national support, also began to
weigh heavily on the minds of industrialists, who feared that

42 | a propaganda mosaic
the same mechanisms used to expropriate foreign properties
could eventually be turned on them.
German propagandists capitalized on these existing tenden-
cies among Mexico’s upper and middle classes by subsidiz-
ing major newspapers in exchange for printing pro-German
editorials. Dietrich and his propaganda staff demonstrated a
distinct awareness of Mexican culture and national tenden-
cies in the way they modiﬁed their propaganda messages to
appeal to Mexicans. Reactions to the annexation of Austria
in the mainstream press illustrate the inclinations of upper-
and middle-class Mexicans. German-sponsored editorials em-
phasized that the annexation was not achieved by violent
conquest but rather was a peaceful union of ethnic equals.
They insisted that the only opposition to the Austrian-German
merger came from a small number of Jews in Vienna who ex-
erted disproportionate economic and political inﬂuence.80 The
independent press also attacked the Soviet response to the an-
nexation. Soviet leaders pushed strongly for an international
anti-fascist front, which would comprise an alliance between
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France.81 Propaganda
in the Mexican press accused the Soviet Union of inciting
German aggression and doubted Soviet sincerity in promot-
ing freedom and democracy.82

The Anti-fascists’ Response

In 1938, anti-fascist countries did not have an organized strat-

egy to combat German propaganda. In Mexico, the most im-
portant anti-fascist information came from leftist Mexicans,
such as labor leaders and members of the Liga Pro-Cultura
Alemana. Although the Liga only operated in Mexico City,
its visibility in the capital made the group an important early

a propaganda mosaic | 43
anti-fascist voice. The Mexican left engaged in the propaganda
battle by confronting fascism ideologically. Mexican commu-
nists isolated aspects of the fascist ideology that threatened
national pride. They emphasized that German aggression and
the fascist ideology in general represented a grave threat to
Mexican well-being.
The most aggressive printed opposition to pro-German pro-
paganda appeared in El Popular. Following the annexation
of Austria, El Popular adopted the ctm’s pro-communist line
and tended to print material favorable to the Soviet Union.
Lombardo Toledano also appeared at several international la-
bor meetings in Europe in the spring of 1938. He used those
opportunities to denounce the British and French ambivalence
in his public speeches. He stated that their compromising at-
titude, based on the theory of the “lesser of two evils,” was
“contrary to the interests of humanity.”83 His speeches and
writings drew a speciﬁc correlation between international fas-
cism, the Spanish Falange, and the Mexican right.84 Lombardo
Toledano particularly appealed to the working class to take a
stand against fascist aggression.85
Leftists in the Liga also pursued an aggressive campaign
against fascism in Mexico. In 1938, members organized a se-
ries of conferences in Mexico City with anti-Nazi themes as
the basis of their propaganda strategy. Hosted at the Palacio
de Bellas Artes in Mexico City, each conference attracted au-
diences of one thousand to ﬁve thousand people.86 Mexico
City’s major radio stations broadcast Liga conferences and
other programs to reach even larger audiences.87 Liga members
hired tgp artists to produce anti-fascist posters corresponding
to each of the conference themes. Liga members displayed the

44 | a propaganda mosaic
posters throughout Mexico City both to advertise the confer-
ence events and to spread anti-Nazi messages.88
The first series of conferences in the summer of 1938 fo-
cused on combating fascism, and its themes centered on the
nature of the ideology in countries such as Germany, Italy,
Japan, and Spain. Posters associated with the conferences
typically associated fascism with death and destruction. A
poster titled “Fascism in Latin America” portrayed the ideol-
ogy as a fierce beast, resembling an alligator, poised to strike
against a figure with strong indigenous features. One of the
most persuasive anti-fascist posters was produced for the July
6 conference that featured Lombardo Toledano as a guest
speaker (figure 3). The poster’s heading reads “How to fight
fascism,” and below the phrase appear four figures represent-
ing Mexican society. From left to right, a businessman, a sol-
dier, a laborer, and a peasant lock arms in unity. Not only do
these figures represent Mexican society in the 1930s, but they
also represent the various factions of the revolution, which
had since been incorporated into the national official political
party. This poster, produced by the tgp in conjunction with
the Liga, encompassed the message of national unity that the
Mexican government had been trying to achieve—a message
that would eventually become the basis for the government’s
propaganda campaign.
In another popular public event, the Liga hosted a memo-
rial service for Nobel Peace Prize winner Carl von Ossietzky
in May 1938 at the Palacio de Bellas Artes. Only two weeks
earlier, von Ossietzky had died in Berlin after spending five
years in a German concentration camp. At the memorial ser-
vice, he was honored by representatives from various coun-
tries, including Mexico, France, England, Spain, and Italy.89

a propaganda mosaic | 45
fig. 3. “How to ﬁght fascism” (tgp poster).
Courtesy of Taller de Gráﬁca Popular, Inv. 103-0363.

The service provided a suitable forum for Liga members to

denounce Nazi repression and atrocities, particularly against
a Nobel Prize winner who was internationally renowned as
a pacifist. Leftist messages in the first half of 1938 addressed
German and Italian aggression and conveyed a warning to
Mexicans that fascism would only bring destruction.
Throughout 1938, Cárdenas gradually began to take a more
aggressive stand against Nazi aggression. In a September meet-
ing of the International Congress against War, he gave a speech
promoting freedom and pacifism. While he avoided specify-
ing Nazi and fascist aggressors, he publicly denounced “dic-
tatorial” practices. He also framed his message in terms of a
proletarian struggle against “instigators of war.”90 He began
borrowing the rhetoric of Lombardo Toledano and the ctm

46 | a propaganda mosaic
and reinforced the working class’s ideological identification
with the developing European conflict.
A second defining moment in the propaganda battle came
in September 1938 with the Munich agreement between Great
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy. The agreement gave Hitler
the right to invade the Sudeten area of Czechoslovakia, but
it stipulated that he must not seize any other European ter-
ritory. El Universal ignored the fact that the Munich agree-
ment was little more than an attempt at appeasement by Great
Britain and France; instead, the newspaper used the oppor-
tunity to attack communism and applauded the fact that the
Soviet Union was excluded from the Munich talks.91 The re-
port claimed that “the world breathed a sigh of relief” at the
successful termination of the conference.92 Editorials empha-
sized that Nazism had saved Germany from communist influ-
ence. “Germany was on the brink of falling into the Marxist
abyss,” reported El Universal, “but conservative forces tri-
umphed, saving the Reich from chaos.”93 German propagan-
dists in Mexico influenced editorials in the major newspapers
to present fascism as a pacifist ideology whose main objective
was to rid the world of communism.94
Editorials in El Popular criticized Great Britain and France
for isolating the Soviet Union at the Munich talks, and they
saw German expansionist tendencies as direct threats to the
territorial sovereignty of the Soviet Union. Lombardo Toledano
published a special edition of Futuro in response to what he
called “the Munich betrayal.”95 He warned that appeasement
would eventually bring war and began cautioning against
Mexican neutrality.
A later series of conferences sponsored by the Liga coincided
with the Munich agreement. Once again, tgp artists produced

a propaganda mosaic | 47
fig. 4. “Lost youth” (tgp poster).
Courtesy of Taller de Gráﬁca Popular, Inv. 109-CL.

posters to advertise the series. The autumn conferences em-

phasized Nazism as a threat to individual and social interests.
A September conference featured Nazism as a threat to agrar-
ian interests and was titled “Tragedy of the Countryside.”
The Liga members hoped to appeal to the agrarian segment
of the Mexican public. The country’s long history of agricul-
tural disputes made the “Tragedy of the Countryside” a par-
ticularly salient theme in the late 1930s.
The October conference took up the theme of Nazism’s “ju-
ventad perdida” (lost youth). Emphasizing the Nazi propen-
sity for indoctrinating its youth with a nationalistic, conser-
vative, and militant ideology, the conference aimed to strike
a sympathetic chord in Mexican society. The poster in ﬁgure

48 | a propaganda mosaic
fig. 5. “Cross and swastika” (tgp poster).
Courtesy of Taller de Gráﬁca Popular, Inv. 111-CL.

4 shows the silhouette of a young face, superimposed by a

figure that has become a military machine. Decked in tank
treads and sporting bayoneted sleeves, the figure is an apt
representation of militarism. No face is visible on the mili-
tary figure, indicating that militarist propaganda has blinded
the young person.96 For a nation recovering from a decade-
long, violent revolution such as Mexico, the image of blindly
militarized youth was shocking as most Mexicans remem-
bered with horror the militarization of the entire society only
twenty years earlier.
The Liga pushed the limits of its propaganda strategy by at-
tempting to appeal to Mexico’s long tradition with Catholicism.
Aware that much of the country’s ardently pro-Catholic public
supported the Spanish Falange—and by extension supported

a propaganda mosaic | 49
international fascism—the Liga organized a conference to con-
vince Catholics that Nazism was an anti-Catholic doctrine. In
another October conference, titled “Cruz y swastica” (Cross
and swastika), the Liga portrayed a Nazi figure with gro-
tesque and evil hands breaking a crucifix (figure 5). The Nazi
figure clearly had established a firm grip on the cross prior to
breaking it, just as Liga members feared fascist powers had
been tightening their grip on Mexican Catholics. The Liga
wanted to convince Mexican Catholics that Nazism was a
major threat to their existence.
The Liga took advantage of the large number of writers
in its membership and published a book titled La verdad-
era cultura alemana (The Real German Culture) in 1938.97
It contained excerpts of speeches delivered at one of its con-
ferences on the authentic German culture. The book and the
series of conferences attempted to demonstrate that Nazism
was not synonymous with German culture. They emphasized
positive aspects of German culture by celebrating Germany’s
musical tradition, much of which had been censored by the
Reich. They also stressed that Germany had a rich history of
intellectual pursuits and that the Nazi Party had destroyed
much of that history by banning and burning books by pop-
ular German scholars.
The Liga’s propaganda activities in 1938 provoked imme-
diate and aggressive reaction from the German embassy in
Mexico City. On April 22, 1938, Ambassador Freiherr Rüdt von
Collenberg sent a strongly worded letter to Mexico’s Ministry
of Foreign Relations protesting the Liga’s upcoming confer-
ence series at Bellas Artes. In his correspondence, Rüdt von
Collenberg argued that none of the leaders of the Liga were
of German nationality. He considered the conferences to be

50 | a propaganda mosaic
organized attacks, and he expressed his concern over the effects
they would have in Mexico’s German community. Furthermore,
he argued that the conferences misrepresented Nazi Germany
to the rest of Mexico, and he expressed concern that the Liga
had the official sanction of the Mexican government, since
the conferences were being held at Bellas Artes.98
Rüdt von Collenberg sent a similar letter to the Ministry
of Foreign Relations on September 14, 1938, to protest a sec-
ond series of conferences. At the first conference in the series,
prm president Luis I. Rodríguez delivered the keynote address.
Rodríguez’s participation further angered German officials and
fed suspicions that the Mexican government was secretly sanc-
tioning the Liga’s activities. The content of the keynote speech
was particularly offensive to the German diplomat. Rodríguez
had accused Hitler of only having destructive ambitions and
claimed that the German dictator had assassinated many of
his close friends in cold blood. The German Legation also
took offense at Rodríguez’s comments that Hitler was physi-
cally weak and that his mental well-being was compromised
because his youth had been characterized by failures.99
The German embassy used Rodríguez’s position as a rep-
resentative of Mexico’s main political party as the basis of its
protest. Furthermore, after the earlier series of conferences, the
Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations had assured Rüdt von
Collenberg that Bellas Artes would no longer be the setting of
such anti-Nazi activities. Citing the local press, the ambassa-
dor further charged that Mexico’s secretary of education had
attended the conference and that other government officials
had committed to speaking at future programs.
German diplomatic complaints escalated in October when
the Liga colluded with a German immigrant after the German

a propaganda mosaic | 51
government refused to grant his wife of Spanish ancestry Aryan
status. He had received a letter and a questionnaire asking him
to prove that his wife’s family was free of Indian ethnicity. The
Liga and the tgp copied the letter and questionnaire and pro-
duced a series of pamphlets and posters that stated, “Mexicans,
do you know that you are a race of second class?”100 Their
ethnic-based propaganda strategy ignited racial sensitivities
among Mexicans and provoked a backlash against Nazism.
Ultimately, the Mexican government refused to become in-
volved, citing the right to freedom of speech and the right of
the Liga to congregate. The Cárdenas administration main-
tained its distance from the propaganda war in this instance,
just as it had in earlier instances prior to 1938.
On October 15, 1938, the German army occupied the
Sudetenland in accordance with the Munich agreement. Five
months later, Hitler conﬁrmed the fears of many world lead-
ers by invading the rest of Czechoslovakia. Excelsior and El
Universal limited their commentary to coverage largely taken
from the New York Times and the United Press wire service.101
El Nacional, on the other hand, reﬂected the growing opposi-
tion of the Cárdenas administration by denouncing Hitler’s ac-
tions as well as the willingness of British and French leaders to
“deliver Czechoslovakia to the voracious Nazis.”102 Likewise,
El Popular took an aggressive stand, accusing Germany of
“annihilating Czechoslovakia.” Its editors considered Hitler
an “acute menace to world peace.”103

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and Mexican Propaganda

A ﬁnal deﬁning moment came on August 23, 1939, when

Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union entered into a non-
aggression pact. The agreement, which resulted from a series

52 | a propaganda mosaic
of secret negotiations, divided eastern Europe into German
and Soviet spheres of inﬂuence. At the same time, the two
countries agreed not to attack each other and to consult with
each other on issues of collective security for a period of ten
years. As knowledge of the pact became public, world lead-
ers became increasingly concerned that the alliance between
Germany and the Soviet Union would threaten the delicate
balance of world peace. Indeed, in accord with the agree-
ment, Germany invaded Poland from the west on September
1 and the Soviet Union invaded from the east on September
17. In response to Nazi aggression, Great Britain and France
declared war on Germany on September 3, thus beginning
World War II.
The non-aggression pact and the outbreak of war had im-
portant repercussions on propaganda in Mexico. Most im-
portantly, the content of wartime information changed con-
siderably. The awkward alliance of powers representing the
opposing ideologies of Nazism and communism meant that
the two could no longer attack each other in wartime rheto-
ric. Interest groups on the Mexican right and left had to look
for alternate messages in their discussions of the war. As a re-
sult of the new alliance, the left fell silent as the leading anti-
fascist voice in Mexico. A short time later, U.S. and western
European powers began to consider propaganda strategies in
the Americas. The alliance between Hitler and Stalin allowed
those nations to avoid the communist component that had
been a part of earlier anti-fascist propaganda. Instead, they
could create a “democratic” front against “totalitarianism,”
and that platform became an important part of U.S.-led pro-
paganda in the early 1940s.
The ctm and El Popular interpreted the non-aggression

a propaganda mosaic | 53
pact as a defensive strategy on the part of Stalin. Editorials in
El Popular argued that the Soviet Union needed a brief alli-
ance with Hitler to allow itself time to build up a viable mil-
itary for an eventual German attack. Editors did not encour-
age the alliance, but rather understood and justified it. After
August, El Popular shifted its approach to wartime informa-
tion. It began presenting the war as an imperialist conflict that
did not concern Mexico. Lombardo Toledano’s stance mir-
rored that of the ctm. In his writings and public speeches, he
denounced the European War as an imperialist conflict and
urged Mexico to take a position of strict neutrality.104
Other leftist organizations fell silent as well. The Liga, which
had been one of fascism’s most vocal opponents in 1938, tem-
porarily discontinued its public opposition.105 The group qui-
etly continued to secure asylum for leftist German refugees,
but the powerful anti-fascist messages they had once produced
ceased. The tgp also withdrew from the propaganda war. After
1938 the artist group began experiencing financial problems
and lacked the means to produce large quantities of posters
and other broadsides for mass distribution in public spaces.
Their financial hardships coincided with the new alliance be-
tween Hitler and Stalin. Therefore, after 1939 the tgp shifted
its focus from producing and distributing broadsides to orga-
nizing graphic and printing workshops to earn money.106
Likewise, the anti-communist message of German propa-
ganda changed in 1939 with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. At that point,
other themes developed by Arthur Dietrich’s office replaced the
attack on communism. German propagandists incorporated
existing anti-Americanism in Mexico into their propaganda.
This aspect of German propaganda appeared as early as 1938,

54 | a propaganda mosaic
but it became increasingly prominent as the war evolved and
the United States came closer to joining the conflict.
Perhaps the most profound change in wartime rhetoric ap-
peared in the mainstream press after the Nazi-Soviet alliance.
Editorials in Excelsior and El Universal became increasingly
antagonistic toward both Germany and the Soviet Union af-
ter August 1939.107 Although evidence suggests that the two
independent newspapers may have still been receiving sub-
sidies, the tone of their editorials became increasingly anti-
totalitarian and they strongly urged neutrality. Once again, the
nature of the readership of these two dailies explains their po-
sitions. Both newspapers used the outbreak of war to continue
their attacks on communism, which was now allied with fas-
cism. As a consequence, fascist powers faced increasing hos-
tility in the mainstream press.
El Universal argued that the Soviet Union was primarily re-
sponsible for starting the war, because Stalin had guaranteed
Hitler a peaceful and stable eastern front. “What upset the
balance was one of the most comical betrayals ever recorded
in diplomatic history: the Moscow felony. The German-Soviet
pact brought Germany to re-affirm its designs over Danzig. . . .
Who can be pointed out as the instigator, if not Russia?”108 El
Universal acknowledged at first that Germany was the princi-
pal aggressor in the action against Poland, while stories com-
ing from German news agencies portrayed Hitler as a strong
and decisive leader in his actions in Poland.109 A September 1
story from a German news agency claimed that German mil-
itary action was not an act of war but a punitive expedition
in response to Polish aggression on German soil the day be-
fore.110 By the time Great Britain and France declared war on

a propaganda mosaic | 55
Germany, El Universal had begun to characterize Nazi behav-
ior as wartime aggression.
Once the Soviet Union invaded Poland, the mainstream
press became increasingly anti-totalitarian. The headline of
a September 17 story illustrates the press’s opposition to the
Soviet Union. El Universal reported that Stalin had sent troops
into Poland “a Sangre y Fuego” (“by fire and sword”).111 This
headline bears a striking contrast to headlines such as “It Is
Not War, Just an Expedition” and “The [Soviet] Betrayal That
Unleashed War” to describe German activities there.112 Despite
the contrast in the portrayal of the two belligerents in the first
weeks of the war, newspaper coverage in the final months of
1939 recognized German culpability and increasingly referred
to the collective totalitarian threat posed by both Germany
and the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

Mexican attitudes toward European events between 1933 and

1940 evolved from ambivalent to alarmist. In this sense, U.S.
journalist Betty Kirk was correct in asserting that Mexican
trends in the late 1930s represented “the world in miniature.”
Many Mexicans, like others around the world, identified with
the ideologies that emerged in Europe in response to World
War I and economic depression. But Mexico’s “fragment of
a larger mosaic” developed within the context of the coun-
try’s unique experiences. The social divide that remained as
a relic of the 1910 revolution became the basis for a propa-
ganda mosaic that was exclusively Mexican. Special inter-
ests on the left became vocal opponents of fascism and be-
gan to define the Mexico’s revolution explicitly in Marxist
terms. Likewise, the right identified with the anti-imperialist

56 | a propaganda mosaic
and anti-communist nature of fascism and moved to promote
that ideology in Mexico. As a result, decades-old revolution-
ary divisions deepened. Small but vocal extremist factions be-
gan to redeﬁne the revolution according to European ideolo-
gies, and they reacted to revolutionary reforms implemented
by the Cárdenas administration accordingly.

a propaganda mosaic | 57
2
A Blueprint for Propaganda

Diplomacy and the O I A A , 1940–1941

In 1947, Donald Rowland wrote The History of the Ofﬁce

of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs as part of a se-
ries of U.S. government publications on World War II.1 The
report tells the history of a short-lived U.S. government war-
time agency between 1940 and 1946. It details the bureaucratic
side of the Office of Inter-American Affairs, which became the
powerful propaganda voice representing U.S. anti-Axis inter-
ests in Latin America during the war. According to Rowland’s
account, between the middle of 1940 and the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor late in 1941, the agency went through an or-
ganization stage, devising U.S. wartime strategies for Latin
America. The oiaa developed its “propaganda blueprint” by
emphasizing economic and cultural cooperation between the
United States and its southern neighbors.2 Rowland’s report
does not make a direct link between economic and cultural
strategies; indeed, the agency’s language in its planning phase
emphasized promoting economic cooperation in the interest
of hemispheric security. Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of
this blueprint stage reveals that in its first year of operation the
oiaa began laying a foundation for a campaign to promote
cultural exchange intertwined with economic cooperation and
led by the United States in the hemisphere.
The United States became involved in the propaganda war
in Mexico in early 1940. The diplomatic staff in Mexico had
observed the pro-fascist and anti-fascist propaganda cam-
paigns that developed in the late 1930s and even had partici-
pated to a moderate degree in promoting pro-U.S. material in
the national press.3 As war broke out in Europe, policy mak-
ers in the United States began to identify new security con-
cerns at home and abroad, and a propaganda campaign in
Mexico and the rest of Latin America took on a new sense of
urgency. The heightening of wartime hostilities revealed the
vulnerability of the Western Hemisphere to Axis invasion and
highlighted the strategic importance of many Latin American
countries as suppliers of wartime materiel for Allied pow-
ers.4 Economic concerns and raw material needs played on
the minds of many people in the United States, especially as
reports of Nazi Fifth Column activities in Latin America be-
gan to circulate. Government officials struggled to find new
ways to ensure economic stability and to secure access to nec-
essary resources. U.S. leaders also considered ways to protect
the security of the hemisphere. Therefore, U.S. involvement
in World War II coincided with new attention among govern-
ment and business leaders toward Latin American countries
and their role as defensive and economic allies.5 To combat
Axis aggression and wartime economic turmoil, government
leaders implemented a policy aimed at forging hemispheric
unity with the American republics.6
U.S. diplomatic efforts to smooth over relations with Latin
American nations began during a series of conferences in the
1930s and resulted in various resolutions signed by U.S. and

a blueprint f or propaganda | 59
Latin American leaders outlining intentions to cooperate. The
resolutions contained strong diplomatic rhetoric, but they lacked
any guarantee of compliance.7 U.S. relations with Mexico be-
came increasingly contentious when the Cárdenas administra-
tion expropriated foreign-owned oil companies in 1938 and a
U.S. boycott of Mexican oil drove Cárdenas into a commercial
relationship with Germany and Japan. As the war began in
Europe in 1939, U.S.-Mexican relations had reached its nadir
as leaders on both sides were consumed with the oil contro-
versy. The fall of France to German forces in 1940 compelled
U.S. leaders to put aside their grievances and to concentrate
on improving relations with all of Latin America.
The United States formed the oiaa for the Latin American
region in August 1940. The agency was to promote greater
cultural and economic awareness between the United States
and all of Latin America.8 In its first year, the agency devoted
most of its time and resources to organizing its strategy for
Latin America. The oiaa produced little in the way of pro-
paganda material at first, but in that first year it laid an im-
portant basis for its aggressive propaganda campaign later
in the war.
As the United States became increasingly involved in pro-
ducing wartime information in Mexico, domestic events were
occurring that had important repercussions for the country’s
official stance on the war. Two issues dominated Mexican
public debate in 1940. First, the country found itself in a po-
lemical sparring match with the U.S. public. In reaction to
Cárdenas’s expropriation of the oil industry, the U.S. press
printed scathing diatribes against Mexican society. The 1940
presidential election in Mexico also captured the attention of

60 | a blueprint f or propaganda
many. As a result, the mainstream press seemed much more
interested in following these two stories than in the cover-
age of the war in Europe. Excelsior and El Universal covered
the events unfolding in Europe, but the war took a backseat
to domestic politics and the oil controversy in both news re-
ports and editorials.
Official and popular attitudes toward the war began to
change in 1941. The new president, Manuel Avila Camacho,
seemed much more willing than his predecessor to make for-
mal, public wartime agreements with the United States. A se-
ries of economic agreements pushed the two countries toward
commercial cooperation. Commercial treaties gave way to
other forms of diplomatic cooperation as the Mexican gov-
ernment began to move against Axis interests by seizing their
ships in Mexican harbors and passing anti-sabotage legislation.
At the same time, the U.S. government published its “black-
lists” of individuals and businesses in Mexico suspected of
aiding Axis powers and began to boycott them.
Wartime events had reached a critical point in terms of U.S.-
Mexican relations by June 1941, when Germany broke the
Nazi-Soviet alliance by invading the Soviet Union. That ac-
tion reinvigorated the anti-fascist rhetoric of Mexican leftists,
who had remained awkwardly silent during the short-lived
Hitler-Stalin pact. At the same time, German submarines be-
gan attacking U.S. ships in the Atlantic, and war with Japan
seemed inevitable in the Pacific. With World War II quickly ap-
proaching the Western Hemisphere, U.S. and Mexican leaders
finally resolved the outstanding oil controversy. One month
later, wartime pressures culminated with the Japanese attack
on Pearl Harbor. By December 1941, the nature of wartime

a blueprint f or propaganda | 61
information had changed signiﬁcantly in Mexico as the U.S.
and Mexican governments became more directly involved in
producing propaganda and had a blueprint for future infor-
mation campaigns.

The United States, the Good Neighbor

Policy, and Hemispheric Alliances

Policy makers in the United States developed a two-part strat-

egy for encouraging solidarity in the Western Hemisphere.
U.S. officials first sought to establish diplomatic alliances with
Latin American nations, and then aimed to build closer cul-
tural bonds between the United States and its southern neigh-
bors. Through this policy, U.S. leaders hoped to foment strong
diplomatic bonds rooted in a solid base of popular support
throughout Latin America.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and U.S. diplomats encour-
aged Latin American political leaders to construct a strong, of-
ficial hemispheric alliance against Axis aggression. Roosevelt
faced considerable challenges in Latin America during the
1930s. U.S. intervention in the Western Hemisphere had bred
anti-American sentiments throughout Latin America. Mexico
was no exception.9 The U.S. invasion of Mexico during the
1846 war with the subsequent loss of Mexican territory still
weighed heavily in the minds of many nationalists in Mexico.
In recent memory, the United States had intervened in Veracruz
during the revolutionary conflict, and General John J. Pershing
embarked on his famous pursuit of Pancho Villa in northern
Mexico around the same time.10 U.S. oil interests had domi-
nated U.S.-Mexican relations until Lázaro Cárdenas expro-
priated foreign oil companies and nationalized the oil indus-
try in 1938. By the 1940s, Mexicans had developed a strong

62 | a blueprint f or propaganda
sense of anti-Americanism based on military invasion, border
disputes, political interventions, and economic aggression.11
Roosevelt’s advisers understood that the potential for world
war in the 1940s posed great risks to the United States and to
the security of the Western Hemisphere. Nazi Germany aimed
to become a singular world power through conquest and con-
ciliation. U.S. leaders looked back to World War I, when only
Cuba declared war in coalition with the United States. In
fact, eight Latin American countries—including Mexico—
remained completely neutral, refusing to become embroiled
in the European conflict. U.S. officials feared that any Latin
American nations not fully allied with the United States would
support Germany by default. Roosevelt could not afford to
allow nations so close geographically to the United States to
fall under the influence of the Germans. Any Nazi strong-
hold in the Western Hemisphere would threaten the security
of the United States.
Hoping to create a sense of inter-American cooperation and
to avoid the hemispheric divisions of World War I, Roosevelt
turned to his Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America.
Established in his 1933 inaugural address, the policy marked
a tactical shift away from interventionist and overtly hege-
monic policies employed by the United States in the Western
Hemisphere in earlier decades.12 Although the new strategy
aimed to preserve U.S. dominance in the region, Roosevelt’s
administration also understood the need for hemispheric sol-
idarity during a time of growing conflict in Europe. The on-
set of the Great Depression in 1929 had combined with new
extremist ideologies of fascism and communism to produce
a volatile atmosphere in Latin America. The United States
needed to make amends with its own neighbors before Latin

a blueprint f or propaganda | 63
Americans became attracted to threatening European ideo-
logical currents. Mexicans’ seemingly divided responses to
European events in the 1930s confirmed U.S. concerns. U.S.
policy makers hoped that the new policy would create general
goodwill and that Mexico and other Latin American nations
would defer to U.S. leadership during and after the war.13 By
guaranteeing a policy of non-intervention in Latin America
and by establishing reciprocal trade agreements, the Good
Neighbor policy set the stage for hemispheric cooperation
on an official level.
A second component of the U.S. plan for encouraging co-
operation among Latin American nations began to evolve in
the late 1930s. While persuading Latin American governments
to cooperate with the United States was an important part of
their strategy, U.S. officials recognized that a threat remained
among Latin America’s masses. Although Good Neighbor di-
plomacy had produced official decrees proclaiming a policy
of non-intervention by the United States and reciprocal trade
agreements were signed between the U.S. and individual Latin
American nations, those formal agreements frequently met
a cool reception at the popular level. Roosevelt and his dip-
lomatic staff concluded that to secure hemispheric defense,
they needed to encourage a sense of cultural understanding
throughout the region. U.S. diplomats began to formulate strat-
egies to export U.S. culture to Latin America in an attempt to
strengthen popular support for a hemispheric alliance.
The two parts of Roosevelt’s strategy converged in a series
of inter-American meetings specifically designed to address
security concerns that were developing in response to events
that made war seem imminent in Europe. The meetings also
went a step further as U.S. representatives introduced plans

64 | a blueprint f or propaganda
for a program to promote hemispheric cultural exchange. The
second part of the strategy dovetailed with the official coop-
eration aspect created in diplomatic agreements. Specifically,
Roosevelt saw a cultural exchange program as a means to
support the Good Neighbor policy and encourage trade.14 By
making Latin Americans more culturally aware of the United
States, Roosevelt hoped, they would be more inclined to view
the United States as a natural economic partner. Ultimately,
closer economic ties would provide a measure of hemispheric
security in the face of growing European hostilities.15
The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of
Peace was held in Buenos Aires on December 21, 1936, at the
request of President Roosevelt. The conference resulted in the
new “principle of consultation,” which stated that the gov-
ernments of all American republics would consult and col-
laborate with each other regarding any threat to peace in the
hemisphere.16 Delegates in Buenos Aires also declared that
any aggression against one American nation would be con-
sidered aggression against all.17 Those stipulations satisfied
Roosevelt’s strategy of forming official alliances with Latin
American nations.
The Buenos Aires conference addressed the second part of
Roosevelt’s hemispheric strategy by setting the stage for im-
proving cultural relations in the hemisphere. In addition to de-
fense initiatives, U.S. and Latin American diplomats also ap-
proved the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American
Cultural Relations.18 Introduced by the United States, this
convention provided for the exchange of educators and stu-
dents among nations of the Americas as an initial step in shap-
ing popular opinion. The preamble of the convention, which
was introduced by the United States, argued that the goals

a blueprint f or propaganda | 65
of the meeting would be advanced by mutual understand-
ing among the citizens of all countries represented. It encour-
aged exchange programs for professors, teachers, and stu-
dents among American countries and pushed for a “closer
relationship between unofficial organizations which exert an
influence on the formation of public opinion.”19 The Buenos
Aires meeting resulted in the ratification of numerous other
treaties and resolutions dealing with cultural relations. The
agreements addressed aspects of intellectual exchange such as
books, radio broadcasts, press coverage, and private organi-
zations. The agreements promoted mutual appreciation and
targeted public opinion to achieve peace.20
Following the Buenos Aires conference, the United States
called the Eighth International Conference of American States
in Lima, which was held in December 1938. U.S. leaders had
grown increasingly alarmed at the escalating hostilities in
Europe. Italy and Germany had militarized and had formed the
Rome-Berlin Axis alliance. Germany had also invaded Austria
and the Czech Sudetenland earlier in 1938. A major European
war seemed imminent. Furthermore, a full-scale war between
China and Japan had been raging for more than a year.
In his opening address to conference attendees, U.S. secre-
tary of state Cordell Hull emphasized the risk to hemispheric
security posed by the Axis powers, defining that risk not only
in terms of strategic defense but also in terms of the way of
life in the hemisphere. He introduced a notion that eventually
dominated U.S. wartime propaganda in Latin America when he
emphasized that the United States and Latin American nations
shared a common past and common belief systems. Based on
those purported congruities, Hull pushed a message of unity
and American identity.21 U.S. diplomats hoped to achieve those
goals through new government agencies, created ostensibly

66 | a blueprint f or propaganda
to promote the ideals of democracy and unity to the general
population of Latin American countries. Through programs
of cultural exchange, U.S. agencies aimed to improve the im-
age of the United States abroad and to pave the way for U.S.
leadership in the hemisphere. U.S. responses to these first steps
at inter-American cooperation were favorable as U.S. busi-
ness leaders began considering the potential of closer relations
with Latin America.22
Fearing the spread of Axis culture in Latin America,
Roosevelt’s administration created the Division of Cultural
Relations in the State Department in 1938, and U.S. delegates
announced the formation of the new division at the Lima con-
ference. The Division of Cultural Relations aimed to coun-
ter the cultural influence of Axis activities such as art exhib-
its, concerts, language classes, and scientific exchanges for
fear that Latin Americans would begin to welcome the fas-
cist doctrine.23 In the 1930s U.S. officials considered Soviet
Russia an equally challenging threat, and U.S. diplomats tended
to approach totalitarian propaganda from Germany and the
Soviet Union as equal dangers.24 The Roosevelt administra-
tion hoped to instill in Latin Americans an appreciation for
U.S. culture—an appreciation that would eventually translate
into unity against the totalitarian powers.
The Division of Cultural Relations began putting together
specific programs in its first year of operation. The enthusiastic
group of Latin American specialists had as their first objective
to implement the 1936 Buenos Aires agreement. Nevertheless,
the new division faced initial budgetary challenges and a con-
fusing hierarchy of government bureaucracy. It finally received
its first congressional appropriation of $75,000 to launch the
conference’s education exchange programs.25

a blueprint f or propaganda | 67
U.S.-Mexican Relations and the Oil Controversy

Despite Roosevelt’s good-faith efforts to ameliorate relations

between Latin America and the United States, events specific
to the Cárdenas administration complicated U.S. attempts to
improve interaction with Mexico. A Mexican delegation at-
tended the conferences in Buenos Aires and Lima, but the pop-
ular perception of the United States among the Mexican pub-
lic grew increasingly antagonistic in the late 1930s. Mexican
reactions to the growing tide of European fascism and com-
munism as well as the country’s nationalist response to the
developing oil conflict caused concern for many in the United
States. That many Mexicans identified with either the fascist
or communist interests in the Spanish Civil War seemed to
prove that Mexico was a nation deeply divided. In particular,
the proliferation of Nazi propaganda and the large support
that fascism seemed to have garnered concerned the Roosevelt
administration.
On March 18, 1938, Cárdenas added to U.S. diplomatic
concerns when, in an act of revolutionary nationalism, he
expropriated the country’s oil industry. Following the proce-
dures outlined in the Constitution of 1917, the president in-
tervened in a dispute between Mexican laborers and the U.S.
and European oil companies that had dominated the indus-
try since the late nineteenth century. When the companies re-
fused to comply with a Mexican Supreme Court ruling in fa-
vor of the laborers, Cárdenas countered their obstreperous
behavior by nationalizing the industry.26
Oil company representatives demanded that the Roosevelt
administration take action. Some promoted going to war if
necessary to save their companies and their profits. Between

68 | a blueprint f or propaganda
1934 and 1936, foreign oil companies in Mexico had seen
investment returns averaging 16.81 percent per year.27 Oil
company representatives claimed that the value of the indus-
try in 1938 was close to $500 million.28 The companies ini-
tiated a worldwide boycott of Mexican oil, which crippled
the industry and had broader repercussions on the whole of
Mexico’s economy. By the 1930s, Mexico’s petroleum indus-
try not only provided vital export and tax revenues but also
supplied the growing demand for energy in the nation’s emerg-
ing industrial sectors.29 By implementing a boycott, foreign
oil companies were in a position to cripple the nation’s econ-
omy. The companies controlled the largest ﬂeet of oil tank-
ers and refused to transport Mexican oil. Through political
and economic pressure, they also prevented other companies
from shipping Mexican oil. The boycott included U.S. com-
panies’ refusal to process Mexican oil. The companies even
persuaded other U.S. companies to refuse to sell oil-related
machinery and equipment to Mexico. As a result, Mexican
oil production fell from 47 million barrels in 1937 to 38.5
million in 1938, and exports fell from 23 million barrels in
1937 to 13.9 million in 1938.30
A period of intense negotiation followed, as the U.S. State
Department attempted to arbitrate by pushing Mexico to pay
fair reparations. Several days after the expropriation, the United
States stopped purchasing Mexican silver, sending the mining
industry into crisis. Oil companies demanded a return of ex-
propriated properties, and the Cárdenas administration found
itself sinking into a ﬁnancial crisis. The boycott on Mexican
oil drove the nation further into economic ruin. The oil indus-
try represented one of the chief sources of income, and with
falling production and exports, the Cárdenas administration

a blueprint f or propaganda | 69
had few resources to compensate companies for the expro-
priated property. In an attempt to salvage the nation’s econ-
omy, Cárdenas began negotiating sales of Mexican oil to Axis
nations.31 He continued trying to settle the dispute with the
United States throughout 1938 and 1939 while trying to ﬁnd
new markets for Mexican oil to bolster the economy.
In the United States, Cárdenas’s decision to expropriate
the oil companies set off a series of events that eventually
helped to shape Mexico’s role in the war effort. Partially in re-
sponse to accusations in the U.S. press that Mexico was har-
boring Axis subversives, the Cárdenas administration became
more actively involved in trying to curb Axis propaganda in
Mexico. Encouraged by U.S. oil companies, newspapers and
other periodicals throughout the United States began to print
reports critical of fascist sympathizers and Axis spies residing in
Mexico.32 U.S. commentators argued that the Good Neighbor
policy was unraveling, and they grew increasingly alarmed
as Cárdenas engaged in trade talks with potential enemies of
the United States.33 One New Jersey editorial concluded that
Mexican ofﬁcials favored totalitarianism.34
The fact that Cárdenas responded to the U.S. oil embargo
by negotiating oil sales with Germany and Japan only added
to resentment in the U.S. press and produced more accusations
of a Mexico-Nazi alliance. Editorials suggested that German
and Japanese propaganda had swayed the Mexican public,
and they urged Roosevelt to cut economic ties.35 Labor leader
Vicente Lombardo Toledano only added to those concerns by
publicly denouncing what he called a massive fascist spy ring
throughout Mexico and the rest of Latin America.36
Fascist propagandists did enjoy unprecedented success in
proliferating their anti-American messages in Mexico in 1939

70 | a blueprint f or propaganda
and the first half of 1940, but reports in the U.S. press exag-
gerated the threat. German agents had made important gains
by starting a newspaper after the war started. Diario de la
Guerra reported news of war-related activity from the German
perspective. The newspaper glorified German military efforts
and vilified the French and the British.37 Other conservative
interests began printing pro-Nazi material as well. In 1940,
Mexican intellectual and former minister of education José
Vasconcelos started Timón, a far-right newspaper. Timón’s
content promoted the Falange and Hispanidad, and the pa-
per earned a reputation as being ardently pro-Nazi and viru-
lently anti-American.38
By the spring of 1940, an anti-Mexico campaign was in
full swing in the U.S. press as the news articles and editorials
criticized Mexico’s oil policies and printed charges of fascist
sympathies.39 In 1939 Standard Oil Company sponsored the
publication of a book by Burt McConnell, a member of the
editorial staff of Literary Digest and vocal critic of Mexico’s
oil policies.40 Mexico at the Bar of Public Opinion told the
story of the expropriation of U.S. oil properties using edito-
rials from U.S. periodicals. The book offered a scathing cri-
tique of Cárdenas, the Mexican Revolution, and Mexican na-
tional character. It emphasized the socialist inclinations of the
Cárdenas government and at the same time accused Mexico
of becoming fascist because of its economic dealings with
Germany.
There is every indication that Axis spies were even more
active in Mexico after the oil expropriation. Arthur Dietrich’s
office stepped up its activities in distributing pro-Nazi pam-
phlets and other material throughout the country. Some of
the pro-German propaganda even made it into the hands of

a blueprint f or propaganda | 71
members of the Mexican military.41 Concerns grew that the
Germans and the Japanese were plotting an invasion of the
Americas and that Mexico would be brought under Nazi con-
trol. Anti-U.S. sentiment thrived in the midst of the oil con-
troversy, and oil companies used those sentiments as more
evidence of a fascist conspiracy in Mexico.42 Indeed, numer-
ous editorials in Excelsior and El Universal criticized Pan-
Americanism and labeled the United States as Mexico’s great-
est enemy, over any European power.43
Concerns over possible fascist activities in Mexico prompted
investigations by U.S. intelligence agencies.44 The Federal Bureau
of Investigation, the Office of Military Intelligence, and the
Office of Strategic Services became involved in investigating
accusations of fascist activity in Mexico between 1936 and the
end of World War II. Based on the information contained in
their investigative reports and anti-American editorials, U.S.
citizens were convinced the Mexican press was strongly pro-
fascist.45 But Josephus Daniels, U.S. ambassador to Mexico in
the late 1930s, argued at the time that the Mexican reaction
to the oil controversy was not necessarily pro-Axis but rather
bitterly anti-American. The oil-company-led embargo com-
bined with the U.S. government’s ceasing to buy Mexican sil-
ver created an economic impact that was felt throughout the
country. Mexican business leaders appealed to Ambassador
Daniels, arguing that they would prefer to deal with demo-
cratic countries, but U.S. policies gave them no choice.46
The oil conflict had severely strained U.S.-Mexican rela-
tions, but this public relations fiasco had two important re-
sults. First, the U.S. government was forced to take a more
accommodating stance in negotiating an oil settlement with
Cárdenas. U.S. public opinion began to demand a solution that

72 | a blueprint f or propaganda
would not involve sales of Mexican oil to Germany. Editorials
worried that commercial ties between fascist dictatorships
and the Mexican government would give fascism greater po-
litical influence in the hemisphere.47 Second, Cárdenas was
forced to make an effort to stifle German propaganda in or-
der to move Mexico’s interests forward in the oil negotia-
tions. In the 1930s, Cárdenas had remained uninvolved in
the propaganda war that was developing in his country. The
U.S. oil boycott forced him to look to the Axis for potential
markets, and censoring Axis propaganda would have threat-
ened the tenuous economic relationship he desperately tried
to maintain. By 1940, new understandings of Nazi aggression
and new opportunities for a resolution with the United States
brought with them new concerns, demands, and expectations.
U.S. officials wanted assurances that Mexico was not becom-
ing a haven for Axis saboteurs.
German successes seemed to indicate that the Nazis were
becoming the new imperialist world power. Press coverage
in Mexico and the United States began to express concerns
about Nazi Fifth Column activities in the Western Hemisphere.
Mexicans began to acknowledge the need for Mexico to ally
itself formally with the United States in the war. Some reports
even expressed concern that Cárdenas was not capable of con-
trolling subversive fascist elements within Mexico.48
A final inducement to act against Axis influence in Mexico
came with the findings of an official government investiga-
tion into Nazi activities in the country, published in May
1940.49 The report indicated that Nazi agents had been active
in Mexico for several years and had established a sophisticated
network of propaganda and espionage. Cárdenas faced dip-
lomatic pressures from the United States as well as concerns

a blueprint f or propaganda | 73
expressed in the mainstream press. He feared the possibilities
of a Nazi-controlled world and wanted to curb German influ-
ence in his country. On June 11, Cárdenas and the Ministry
of the Interior issued a public declaration that Mexico offi-
cially supported the efforts of the United States in World War
II. Although the United States had not yet formally entered
the war, it was supplying vital weapons and other materials
to the Allied powers. Cárdenas’s declaration moved Mexico
one step closer to joining the Allies officially in the war effort.
At the same time, Mexico’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs de-
clared the German propaganda mastermind Arthur Dietrich
persona non grata and forced him to leave the country. After
Dietrich’s expulsion, Axis propaganda faced its first official
challenge from the Mexican government. Spanish Falangists
quickly stepped in to fulfill Dietrich’s mission, but the influ-
ence of Axis propaganda had received a severe blow.50
After France succumbed to Nazi invasion in June 1940, and
as other areas of Europe seemed vulnerable to Nazi penetra-
tion, Roosevelt became increasingly concerned that European
colonies in the Caribbean basin could be used to launch an
Axis attack against the Western Hemisphere. Shipping lanes
in the Caribbean, and the Panama Canal in particular, became
potential targets for Axis aggression. In response, the United
States called a meeting of American republics in Havana to
reinforce plans for hemispheric security. At that meeting, held
in July 1940, American leaders reaffirmed earlier agreements
and strengthened trade agreements to bolster the Western
Hemisphere’s war economy. The United States increased fi-
nancial aid to several Latin American countries in exchange
for permission to operate regional military bases within their

74 | a blueprint f or propaganda
borders.51 By the end of 1940, ofﬁcial cooperation between
the United States and Latin American governments was se-
curely in place.

The U.S. Propaganda Agency

A European propaganda agency started operating in Mexico

immediately after war began in 1939. British and French lead-
ers understood Mexico’s strategic importance in maintain-
ing security in the Western Hemisphere and in maintaining
Allied trade. They also saw that many Mexicans had been in-
clined to oppose western Europe and the United States, mak-
ing them supportive of Germany in the eyes of Allied leaders.
Faced with uncertainties in Mexico, in the fall of 1939 the
British and French established the Inter-Allied Propaganda
Committee (iapc) to combat German propaganda in Mexico
and to win support for the Allied cause among the Mexican
population.52
By March 1940 the iapc had developed several strategies
for influencing Mexican public opinion. First, it took advan-
tage of the tradition among periodicals to accept subsidies
for editorial space, and throughout the year the iapc and
Germany’s propaganda office engaged in a subsidy war in an
attempt to gain editorial space in the main newspapers. Allied
propagandists also became involved in establishing news ser-
vices in Mexico. Early in 1940, the iapc helped to establish a
Mexican news agency called Anta, which it subsidized through-
out the war. Controlling Anta allowed the iapc to influence
much of the news distributed in Mexico and keep its influ-
ence out of public knowledge.53 The iapc considered its in-
volvement with Anta one of its greatest successes in the pro-
paganda war in Mexico.

a blueprint f or propaganda | 75
Another of iapc’s strategies involved influencing the press
in a different way. The supply of newsprint in Mexico was
regulated through a government agency called Productora e
Importadora de Papel, sa de cv (pipsa).54 Since Mexico had
to import paper, the iapc saw an opportunity to compel the
Mexican government to become involved in censoring the
press through the pipsa paper monopoly. The iapc also be-
gan providing important resources to the news media such as
photographs and maps related to the war.55
The iapc’s influence in Mexico’s wartime information was
important but short-lived. By the middle of 1940 the iapc
faced serious challenges in continuing its propaganda cam-
paign in Mexico. The German invasion of France had effec-
tively erased that country’s ability to devote resources to war-
time information outside its own borders, and Great Britain
was equally distracted as the fighting escalated in Europe.
As a result, iapc activities trickled to a halt after June 1940
and the United States stepped in to fill the void. Throughout
1940, Franklin Roosevelt had established diplomatic agree-
ments to secure official cooperation from the governments
of Mexico and other Latin American nations. As the war
proceeded in Europe, he recognized that diplomatic alliances
would only work if they were accompanied by popular sup-
port. Mexican public opinion had grown increasingly anti-
American, and Roosevelt saw similar attitudes in other Latin
American nations.56
Roosevelt faced growing concerns within the United States.
U.S. business interests saw the war in Europe as a threat to
their position in world trade. Although the United States did
not officially join the war until December 1941, trade be-
tween the United States and Europe had decreased significantly

76 | a blueprint f or propaganda
throughout 1939. U.S. business leaders found themselves look-
ing for alternative markets and sources of raw materials as
destruction and devastation on a scale similar to World War
I seemed imminent in Europe. The Roosevelt administration
saw Latin America as a potential solution, but it needed to
sell Latin America to U.S. business leaders and it needed to
sell the United States to Latin Americans.
By 1940 the Roosevelt administration understood that the
acceleration of hostilities in Europe required a more aggressive
cultural campaign in the Americas. In August, Roosevelt cre-
ated the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural
Relations between the American Republics and appointed
Nelson A. Rockefeller to lead the agency.57 In the first years of
its existence, the agency underwent several reorganizations and
name changes. By 1942 it became the Office of Inter-American
Affairs. Roosevelt and Rockefeller placed two main respon-
sibilities upon the oiaa. First, the agency was to promote a
closer cultural understanding between the United States and
Latin America. This aspect of the oiaa’s mission overlapped
with that of the newly formed Division of Cultural Relations.
Second, Rockefeller’s office took into account the growing
pressure from U.S. businesses looking for economic and com-
mercial security in a time of war and when the end of the war
was in sight. The business community and politicians alike
were actively seeking a strategy to prevent the return of an
economic maelstrom like the one that had followed World
War I. In the years after the Treaty of Versailles, the United
States seemed to be on sound financial footing, but economic
and physical devastation in Europe meant that U.S. businesses
did not have stable and reliable markets in which to sell their
products. Roosevelt and his advisers saw a potential for strong

a blueprint f or propaganda | 77
commercial relationships with Latin American countries dur-
ing and after the war to offset the decline in U.S. trade with
Europe. They faced competition from Germany and the Axis
powers, who were also jockeying for commercial and cultural
inﬂuence in Latin America.
The plan was for the oiaa to foment cultural awareness
and promote the United States to Latin Americans by sending
a message that the United States was a powerful, stable, and
advanced society with whom Latin Americans would want
to do business. In addition, the oiaa developed programs in-
tended to promote Latin America to the U.S. public. This part
of the agency’s mission aimed to show U.S. citizens a side of
Latin America that was cultured and advanced, creating an
image of a viable trading partner. The oiaa also promoted
Latin America to U.S. businesses, but this important part of
the agency’s mission is beyond the scope of this study.
Roosevelt’s executive decrees regarding the new agency em-
phasized the commercial importance of Latin America in the
current crisis but also acknowledged the importance of win-
ning the cultural battle in Latin America. The oiaa was to co-
ordinate commercial and cultural relations in the interest of
hemispheric defense. The president stipulated that the agency
should develop programs through the arts and sciences, ed-
ucation and travel, and mass media to bring together the na-
tions of the Americas. He stressed that those cultural activities
were to be carried out in the interest of national and hemi-
spheric security.58 From the beginning, the Roosevelt admin-
istration emphasized the dual role of the agency. It would
make the Americas safe from Axis aggression by strengthen-
ing economic and cultural ties between the United States and
Latin America.

78 | a blueprint f or propaganda
The newly formed Division of Cultural Relations fell un-
der the State Department, while the oiaa operated under the
auspices of the executive branch. It quickly became apparent
that the Division of Cultural Relations would conflict with the
oiaa. Although the oiaa had more economically and commer-
cially oriented motivations, its cultural mission crossed into the
Division of Cultural Relations’ territory. Rockefeller’s group
was given budgetary and logistical priority over other govern-
mental agencies that carried out similar functions. The oiaa
enjoyed an initial annual budget of $3.5 million (compared
to $75,000 for the Division of Cultural Relations), and that
budget ballooned to $60 million by 1943.59 Over the course
of World War II the oiaa engaged in numerous bureaucratic
duels, not just with the Division of Cultural Relations but also
with U.S. embassies and consulates in Latin America. George
Messersmith, who eventually became the U.S. ambassador to
Mexico, worried that the oiaa would flood Latin America
with incompetent personnel, and he immediately opposed
the new agency.60
The executive orders establishing the oiaa provided the
basis for this bureaucratic conflict. Roosevelt specifically or-
dered the agency to collaborate with existing government de-
partments and agencies that performed similar functions and
to use the facilities and resources of those agencies in carrying
out its mission. He also stipulated that a Committee on Inter-
American Affairs be established within the oiaa with mem-
bers from the State, Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce
departments as well as the president of the Export-Import
Bank and representatives from other agencies as deemed nec-
essary by Rockefeller. This committee had the responsibility

a blueprint f or propaganda | 79
to coordinate inter-American activities between the oiaa and
other government agencies.61
The agency’s organizational phase lasted from August 1940
to December 1941. During this period the oiaa tried to de-
ﬁne its purpose and to establish its place among other gov-
ernment agencies. Its most tangible achievements in Latin
America during this period came in the ﬁeld of economic co-
operation through bilateral trade agreements. Nevertheless,
the oiaa also produced a strategy for cultural exchange that
became the blueprint for the agency’s propaganda campaign
after 1941.

Commercial Success of the OIAA

The original organizational structure of the oiaa estab-

lished three main divisions: Commercial and Financial,
Communications, and Cultural Relations. But in the oiaa’s
first year of operation, Rockefeller considered economic af-
fairs the agency’s priority concern. Therefore, agency repre-
sentatives concentrated most of their attention on coordinat-
ing commercial, financial, and economic activities with the
countries of Latin America. Rockefeller devoted considerable
time and resources to the Commercial and Financial Division.62
oiaa officials specifically considered problems that had ac-
companied the disruption of international trade and finance
after the war began. An agency report submitted to President
Roosevelt late in 1940 outlined five main objectives of the
Commercial and Financial Division:

1. Extending direct ﬁnancial aid to the American repub-

lics in amounts sufﬁcient to enable them to preserve in-
ternal stability;

80 | a blueprint f or propaganda
2. Reducing foreign exchange requirements of the American
republics by adjusting their external debt services to ac-
cord with the capacity to pay, until developmental ac-
tivity can be undertaken which will increase their abil-
ity to meet old and new ﬁnancial obligations;
3. Utilizing the Inter-American Development Commission
to stimulate commerce between the Republics, develop
their resources and assist desirable advances in their in-
dustrialization;
4. Securing adequate provision for transportation facilities
and adding to these as conditions warrant;
5. Harmonizing the personnel and advertising policies
of Latin American branches and agencies of United
States concerned with the objectives of Hemisphere
Defense.63

The objectives of the Commercial and Financial Division

reﬂect the overall goals of the United States in establishing the
oiaa. Roosevelt wanted to ensure the stability of U.S. eco-
nomic and trade relationships, and he saw Latin American
countries as the most reliable trading partners during the war
years; by extension, they could help secure the defense of the
hemisphere. The agency’s ﬁrst major achievement was secur-
ing an increase in the Export-Import Bank’s lending authority
from $200 million to $700 million.64 The agency also spear-
headed a new initiative whereby the Export-Import Bank estab-
lished special lines of credit between U.S. and Latin American
banks, which enabled Latin American importers to postpone
payment for U.S. goods until the shipments arrived at the port
of destination. Previous international trade procedures had
required payment in advance.

a blueprint f or propaganda | 81
The Export-Import Bank’s line-of-credit program was ﬁrmly
in place by the end of 1941, and it helped to ﬁnance a substan-
tial portion of U.S. exports to Latin America during the war
years. The credit program became particularly important for
Mexico as the administration of Manuel Avila Camacho em-
barked on an aggressive industrialization program and relied on
imports of capital-intensive, heavy machinery from the United
States to carry out that program.65 It also served as indirect
propaganda, providing middle- and upper-class industrialists
with favorable terms of trade with U.S. exporters. As Mexican
industrialists saw their economic interests tied more closely to
the United States, they concomitantly became more likely to
give their full support to the Allies in the war effort.
Other activities of the Commercial and Financial Division
went beyond economic objectives of promoting U.S. exports
to Latin America. One of the division’s most important and
most successful initiatives involved promoting Latin American
commodity exports to the United States. Beginning in the
summer of 1940, the British naval blockade of Europe cut
off large portions of the continent as a market. The blockade
was particularly devastating for Latin American nations that
had traditionally sent a large percentage of exports to Europe.
U.S. leaders feared that economic instability threatening the
region as a result of the Allied blockade might compel many
Latin Americans to view the Axis favorably in the war ef-
fort. oiaa representatives further feared that, isolated from
their traditional trading markets, Latin American exporters
would turn to the Axis powers to trade surplus commodities.
Understanding that strong trade relationships could lead to
wartime alliances, oiaa representatives initiated programs to
purchase Latin American commodities, particularly those that

82 | a blueprint f or propaganda
were vital as war materiel, such as minerals, cotton, metals,
rubber, and oil. They hoped that such policies would solid-
ify Latin Americans’ identification with Allied interests and
would effectively alienate the Axis from Western Hemisphere
economic and trade relations.
In the name of hemispheric defense, the oiaa pushed a pro-
gram of “preclusive buying” whereby the United States ab-
sorbed surplus production of strategic Latin American raw
material to prevent them from falling into the hands of the
Axis. Working in conjunction with the State Department and
the Board of Economic Warfare, the oiaa entered into agree-
ments with Latin American countries that stipulated that the
United States would purchase specific quantities of certain
commodities at fixed prices for periods ranging from one to
five years.66
The situation in Mexico indicated that U.S. leaders’ fears
of financial collapse in Latin America were well founded.
Cárdenas’s fiscal and monetary policies had started an infla-
tionary trend beginning in 1935.67 That trend intensified af-
ter the oil expropriation in 1938 and the subsequent flight
of foreign capital. As U.S. export outlets closed, Axis pow-
ers seemed a suitable market for Mexican oil and other re-
sources.68 Mexico’s economic situation became even more
precarious as the war started and exports to Europe declined.
Total exports fell from $155 million in 1939 to $147 million
in 1940.69 Furthermore, Cárdenas’s nationalization of the oil
industry had provoked serious concerns about the safety of
U.S. investments in Mexico. As a result, U.S. businesses hes-
itated to make new investments.
In January 1941 the U.S. government began to encourage
Mexico to restrict its exports of strategic material to nations

a blueprint f or propaganda | 83
outside the hemisphere.70 The State Department and the U.S.
Tariff Commission began to identify speciﬁc Mexican resources
that were vital to the developing U.S. war effort. In July the
Mexican government entered into an agreement with the U.S.
Federal Loan Agency in which Mexico agreed to suspend
all exports of vital mineral products, especially zinc, to non-
hemispheric countries. In exchange, the United States agreed
to purchase those materials not absorbed by other countries
in the Western Hemisphere.71
At the same time, U.S. government and business leaders
began taking a closer look at Mexico’s transportation sys-
tem. The nation’s highway system and railroad industry des-
perately needed substantial improvements to make them re-
liable options for the transport of vital wartime materials.
Furthermore, U.S. industrialists argued that Mexico’s high-
ways and railroads could offer a viable backup to the Panama
Canal in case of wartime emergency.72 U.S. and Mexican gov-
ernment negotiators began to consider the possibility of U.S.
assistance for the transportation system. Highway assistance
became part of the oil settlement agreement, while railroad
assistance was addressed fully after Pearl Harbor.
In 1940 and 1941, the oiaa, in cooperation with other U.S.
government agencies, orchestrated diplomatic agreements that
facilitated preclusive buying of vital Mexican materials. The
agreements came about in the interest of hemispheric security
on two levels. First, they ensured a reliable supply of wartime
resources for the United States as the country put itself on a
wartime footing and demand for certain products rose. Second,
it guaranteed that Mexico would not turn to Axis powers as an
outlet for mineral exports. In so doing, the agreement limited

84 | a blueprint f or propaganda
Axis countries’ access to vital resources and obstructed Axis
attempts to form economic alliances with Mexico. Agents of
the oiaa hoped to instill a sense of loyalty and economic co-
operation between U.S. and Mexican businesses while alien-
ating the Axis from Western Hemisphere markets. The agree-
ments in 1940 and 1941 set a precedent for future wartime
cooperation between the two countries.
The emphasis on economic collaboration and industrial de-
velopment met a warm reception among Mexico’s business
leaders in the early 1940s. In stark contrast to the anti-Amer-
ican sentiments that had dominated the public discourse in
the midst of the oil controversy, by 1941 editorials extolled
the evolving relationship with the United States. Government
leaders promoted industrialization as the best course for the
Mexican economy as the war escalated in Europe. They ar-
gued that the government should devote national resources
to developing select economic activities, and that other in-
dustries would naturally and simultaneously arise as a re-
sult.73 For their part, business leaders called cooperation with
the United States and wartime industrialization a “great op-
portunity” for Mexico, anticipating that Mexican industries
could ﬁll the void in Latin American markets as the availabil-
ity of U.S. manufactured goods began to wane.74 The labor
movement also welcomed the closer industrial relationship
between the United States and Mexico, viewing bilateral co-
operation as a vital step toward securing economic stability
in Mexico.75 The Mexican government did not form an of-
ﬁcial propaganda agency until 1942, but the discourse sur-
rounding industrialization as early as 1940 set the stage for
later propaganda messages.

a blueprint f or propaganda | 85
The OIAA and Organizing a Propaganda Strategy

The Communications and Cultural Relations divisions of the

oiaa eventually became the main arms of U.S. wartime pro-
paganda in Latin America. During its first year of existence,
the agency devoted most of its time and resources to devising
a strategy for the activities of these divisions in Latin America.
Throughout 1941, most of the oiaa’s activities took place in
Washington dc or New York. By April, Rockefeller had already
introduced the idea of establishing local coordinating commit-
tees in individual Latin American countries to carry out oiaa
business, but the first of those local field operations did not
open until August. Mexico’s Coordinating Committee only be-
gan operation in October 1941.76 oiaa agents in Washington
also spent a significant amount of time competing with other
government agencies for resources and influence in that first
year. The oiaa faced many distractions during this organiza-
tional phase, but it still managed to carry out some important
programs in Latin America.
The Communications Division became the principal pro-
ducer of wartime propaganda for the oiaa.77 Established in
October 1940, the Communications Division spent its first
eighteen months devising an organizational strategy. As a
result, the oiaa saw few tangible results in its propaganda
campaign until 1942. Nevertheless, in those initial months
the agency laid an important foundation for winning pop-
ular support for the United States and the Allies in World
War II. The Communications Division immediately identified
two main goals for its information program: (1) promoting
a sense of greater understanding and cooperation among the
peoples of the Western Hemisphere by engendering a public

86 | a blueprint f or propaganda
understanding of the seriousness of wartime events, and (2)
counteracting Axis propaganda throughout Latin America.78
The oiaa had identified print media, radio, and motion pictures
as the best mechanisms for spreading propaganda. Therefore
the Communications Division included departments devoted
to those three forms of information dissemination.
As the Communications Division began to devise a propa-
ganda strategy, the oiaa generally found mass media in Latin
America to be underdeveloped. Therefore, it spent much of its
time and resources in the first year developing the communi-
cations infrastructure throughout the hemisphere. Rockefeller
spent most of 1941 negotiating subsidies and transportation
for newsprint, which had become a scarce commodity during
the war. Shortages of newsprint caused many Latin American
newspapers to reduce circulation. The oiaa used subsidies and
transportation agreements to control the supply of newsprint,
guaranteeing a supply for newspapers considered friendly to
the Allies.79 The oiaa could also pressure periodicals to shift
allegiances by threatening to cut off their supply of news-
print.80
Most Latin American countries had national news services
with relatively low circulation, but Mexico’s print media was
generally more developed. oiaa officials were particularly
concerned with the extent to which Axis propaganda seemed
to proliferate in the national press. Although the British-led
Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee had experienced some
success in subsidizing major Mexican newspapers and influ-
encing the nature of wartime information they published, U.S.
agents believed the Axis still enjoyed a stronghold in the na-
tion’s press.
The oiaa found that most Mexican newspapers relied on

a blueprint f or propaganda | 87
foreign press associations for war news. Frequently the services
of U.S. independent commercial press associations proved too
costly, so Mexican newspapers turned to the Axis-subsidized
associations. The German Transocean Agency, for example,
frequently offered news features and photographs at reduced
rates or even at no cost to Mexican periodicals. The oiaa
wanted to ﬁnd a way to combat German penetration of the
Mexican press without competing with U.S. press associa-
tions. It began services designed to provide materials and as-
sistance to U.S. press associations in an attempt to supplement
and improve their presence in Latin America.81
The oiaa worked in cooperation with the iapc and the
Mexican government’s paper-import-regulating agency, pipsa.
It also began programs of providing assistance to U.S. press
associations, and by the end of 1941 the oiaa had eliminated
most pro-Axis news in Mexico. In October, the U.S. Embassy
in Mexico City reported that nearly all of the city’s newspa-
pers printed editorials and articles favorable to the Allies.82
The same newspapers included some headlines and photo-
graphs considered favorable to the Axis, but the majority fa-
vored the Allies.83
Rockefeller spent much of 1941 negotiating arrangements
with private radio interests in the United States to encourage
them to improve and expand their coverage in Latin America.
Axis involvement in radio propaganda had worried U.S. lead-
ers for several years, and Germany’s propensity to broad-
cast pro-Nazi information was well known.84 Research into
the Latin American radio industry revealed that the United
States lagged behind fascist powers. Led by Don Francisco, a
former advertising specialist, the Radio Section of the oiaa’s
Communications Division identiﬁed only twelve U.S. stations

88 | a blueprint f or propaganda
broadcasting to Latin America in 1940. Francisco found that
U.S. stations frequently operated at a loss and saw little finan-
cial incentive to improving their broadcasts to Latin America.
Crude audience surveys conducted during an oiaa information-
gathering trip throughout Latin America in the early months of
1941 revealed that most Latin Americans preferred U.S. pro-
grams, even though the signal coming from U.S. stations was
significantly weaker than that from comparable European sta-
tions.85 Therefore, oiaa agents determined that radio would
become an important ally in its propaganda war in the Western
Hemisphere.
Francisco considered the lack of radio receiver sets through-
out the region as the major obstacle to any radio propaganda
plan. oiaa officials briefly pursued an ill-fated scheme to dis-
tribute cheap radio sets, since surveys indicated that the ma-
jority of the population did not have access to radio receivers,
and therefore had no way of hearing pro-Allied broadcasts.
Rockefeller aggressively pursued this plan throughout 1941
and managed to convince the War Production Board that radio
propaganda in Latin America was a high priority. The State
Department approved the plan, but wartime shortages of nec-
essary materials precluded its full implementation.86 oiaa of-
ficials eventually concluded that, while reaching the majority
of Latin Americans through radio broadcasts was the ideal
way to carry out a propaganda strategy, the upper and middle
classes who already owned sets were likely the most politically
and economically influential members of Latin American soci-
ety. Therefore, the oiaa ultimately developed radio programs
to appeal to them, though many of those programs were not
developed until 1942.87
Mexico’s radio industry was considerably more developed

a blueprint f or propaganda | 89
than that of much of the rest of the region in 1940. Throughout
the 1920s, U.S. companies had been involved in developing
Mexico’s commercial radio broadcast industry, and in 1930
Mexican radio mogul Emilio Azcárraga founded station xew,
the country’s ﬁrst national radio station.88 Dubbed “La voz de
América Latina desde México” (The voice of Latin America
from Mexico), xew became the most powerful radio station
in the Western Hemisphere and became the hub of a vast net-
work of regional stations.89 Furthermore, the Mexican gov-
ernment had played an active role in developing and utilizing
the country’s radio industry. Revolutionary regimes identi-
ﬁed radio as a means of maintaining political order, modern-
izing the country, and establishing national unity. The 1917
Constitution had established the government’s monopoly con-
trol over the radio industry, and a 1926 law made radio ser-
vices a national resource. The law gave the government con-
siderable regulatory powers over the industry and gave limited
ownership and operation of radio stations to Mexican citi-
zens.90 During the Calles era (1924–36), new decrees pre-
vented citizens from using radio broadcasts to challenge the
revolutionary government or to engage in any kind of politi-
cal discourse. The government began to develop educational
programs to promote health, education, culture, and citizen-
ship during the 1930s. A campaign of distributing radio sets
to schools and rural communities, begun in 1933, expanded
under the Cárdenas administration. In 1937 the government
initiated La hora nacional (The National Hour), a program
that broadcast cultural and educational material and became
a means of disseminating government political reports.
The unique nature of the radio industry in 1940 forced the
oiaa to approach radio propaganda cautiously. Throughout

90 | a blueprint f or propaganda
1941, Rockefeller and Francisco negotiated with Azcárraga
and officials in Mexico’s Ministry of Communications and
Public Works to reach a cooperative agreement that would
allow oiaa participation in the country’s radio industry. Until
the Coordinating Committee for Mexico was established in
October 1941, the oiaa made only made minimal inroads in
the radio industry. Finally, in December, the director of Radio
Operations for the oiaa’s Coordinating Committee for Mexico
began to make progress in gaining approval for oiaa-spon-
sored radio programs.91 By May 1942, Azcárraga’s stations
and programs still dominated the radio industry, and oiaa
reports indicate that only a small percentage of Mexicans lis-
tened to U.S. shortwave broadcasts.92
The Mexican film industry, like the press and radio indus-
tries, was also more developed than its counterpart in many
other Latin American countries.93 Rockefeller’s agents devoted
much of their attention in the propaganda planning stage to
establishing cooperative relationships with movie companies.
The oiaa eventually provided vital material and financial assis-
tance to the Mexican film industry.94 Although the oiaa pro-
duced no films during the blueprint phase in 1940 and 1941,
it established a cooperative relationship that allowed its film
propaganda to be effective later in the war.
oiaa strategies in these first years established an important
framework for promoting cultural exchange based on com-
mon commercial pursuits. Rockefeller’s strategies implied that
economic motivations underlay his objective of hemispheric
security. In all of its Latin American activities, the oiaa relied
heavily on the participation of private-sector corporations in
the United States. Rockefeller adeptly negotiated with both
U.S. and Latin American interests in establishing economic and

a blueprint f or propaganda | 91
information strategies. He convinced U.S. companies to coop-
erate in preclusive buying strategies so that the financial bur-
den did not fall solely upon the U.S. government. He carried
that approach to the Communications Division as well by in-
corporating private U.S. radio and film companies into his ne-
gotiations with Mexican industries. Rockefeller and Roosevelt
did not want to see the oiaa become a state-run arm of the
communications industry. Instead, they pushed the U.S. com-
munications industry to export to Latin America in a commer-
cial relationship, supported and encouraged by the state.
Rockefeller also encouraged a closer commercial relationship
in the assistance programs he promoted for Latin American
communications industries. He set up plans that provided
U.S. materials to expand Latin American news service, ra-
dio, and film. He encouraged a U.S.-led commercial culture
in the communications industry by controlling materials such
as newsprint and radios. In providing production equipment
for the film industry in Mexico, oiaa material assistance fur-
ther linked the two countries in an economic and cultural re-
lationship. Through its strategies involving the private sector
as well as its emphasis on material assistance, the oiaa be-
gan to formulate a specific definition of U.S. culture based in
commercial traditions that eventually became the focus of its
cultural exchange programs.

Prelude to Pearl Harbor

The establishment of both the British-led Inter-Allied Propaganda

Committee and the Ofﬁce of Inter-American Affairs in par-
ticular came at a crucial time for the nations opposing the
Axis. Communist opposition to fascist propaganda in Mexico
was silenced by the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939. Until
Germany broke that pact in June 1941, there was no voice

92 | a blueprint f or propaganda
in Mexico opposing fascism. The left had shifted its message
from one of anti-fascism to one of anti-imperialism target-
ing the United States and Great Britain as Mexico’s main en-
emies. The Allied propaganda agencies stepped in to oppose
the Axis and at the same time pressured the Mexican govern-
ment through diplomatic means to take action.
The Cárdenas administration expelled the German pro-
paganda minister and had declared its official backing of the
United States in the conflict. The Avila Camacho administra-
tion propelled the country even closer toward an official alli-
ance with the United States. As German sedition became more
of a threat and as the government became more directly in-
volved in the propaganda war, the Mexican public grew more
sympathetic to the Allies.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941
marks the definitive date when the Mexican government offi-
cially declared full support for the Allies, but the hostilities be-
tween Mexico and the Axis powers were escalating throughout
1941. As Hitler’s armies enjoyed one military success after an-
other in Europe, Mexicans followed those events in the coun-
try’s national newspapers. President Avila Camacho and many
citizens grew increasingly concerned with what they saw as
a war of aggression, with Germany becoming the imperial-
istic power. By the end of 1940, Germany had effectively de-
feated all major western European powers with the exception
of Great Britain, and defeat of the British seemed imminent.
The Soviets had easily dominated eastern Europe, and in Asia,
China appeared to be on the verge of falling to the Japanese.
World domination by totalitarian powers seemed to be the
wave of the future.
By 1941 the mainstream press began to talk of Mexico’s role

a blueprint f or propaganda | 93
in the war in more specific terms. News editors saw the United
States being pulled ever closer to joining the war, and they un-
derstood that U.S. involvement could also draw Mexico into
the war.95 Major news stories compared British and German
losses from 1940 and detailed the massive destruction being
inflicted upon London via air raids.96 The dailies appeared to
give full support to the notions of hemispheric unity estab-
lished in inter-American conferences.97 Their position may re-
flect the considerable gains made by the iapc and the oiaa in
promoting pro-Allied sentiments in the press through subsi-
dies and control of newsprint supplies and transportation.
The government gradually came to articulate publicly a pro-
U.S. position. Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla addressed the
need for hemispheric cooperation in a speech to Congress. He
connected the U.S. position in the war to Mexican national
consciousness by urging Mexicans to embrace their destiny to
fight for freedom. He also asserted that the Indian and mes-
tizo populations would be oppressed by German racial pol-
icies.98 Padilla led Mexico’s diplomatic rapprochement with
the United States and encouraged the public to mirror his ac-
tions with a democratic alliance at the popular level.
In April 1941 the Mexican government took even more ag-
gressive action against Axis interests. Avila Camacho allowed
ten Italian and two German ships to seek asylum in the ports
of Tampico and Veracruz. Fearing the ships would be confis-
cated by the Allies, the crew of one of the Italian ships, the
Atlas, tried to sink their vessel to prevent it from falling into
enemy hands. Mexican officials responded on April 11 by seiz-
ing all of the ships on suspicion of Axis subversion, citing the
Atlas crew’s actions as evidence of warlike activity. Similar sei-
zures occurred simultaneously in other Western Hemisphere

94 | a blueprint f or propaganda
countries, including the United States, Ecuador, Peru, and
Venezuela. Although the Mexican government claimed it was
responding to illegal activity, it is likely that Avila Camacho
ordered the seizures to demonstrate his cooperation with U.S.
defense strategies. Fascist sympathizers in Mexico used the
event to argue that Avila Camacho was bowing to U.S. pres-
sures and surrendering Mexican sovereignty. They argued that
it was more than a coincidence that Axis ships were seized si-
multaneously throughout the Hemisphere.99
The national press, under considerable pressure from the
oiaa and the iapc, backed the government’s actions fully.
Excelsior reported that the actions of the Atlas’s crew proved
that Axis powers were planning subversive activities in the
country.100 The government emphasized its rights of sover-
eignty and its responsibility in protecting its citizens. The na-
tion’s press mirrored that stance.101 Government rhetoric and
the position of the press moved the country even closer to an
alliance with the United States without presenting it as such.
Instead, the government justiﬁed its actions in nationalistic
terms of sovereignty and security.
The following day, the Mexican government announced it
had signed an agreement with the United States calling for re-
ciprocal use of air bases in each country in the interest of mu-
tual defense. In an earlier agreement, Lázaro Cárdenas had
requested U.S. assistance in training Mexican aviators.102 The
agreement amounted to allowing U.S. forces to use Mexican
air bases. The extreme right and fascist sympathizers reeled at
this news. Beginning with these April events, Mexican relations
with the Axis deteriorated throughout the rest of 1941.103
As the war escalated in Europe in the summer of 1941,
Mexico continued to move closer to the United States and to the

a blueprint f or propaganda | 95
Allies. On June 15 it signed the Douglas-Weichers Agreement,
which stipulated that Mexico would sell all strategic minerals
to the United States. The agreement became the ﬁrst in a se-
ries of economic pacts between Mexico and the United States
during and after the war. It formed the basis for Mexico’s war-
time economy, which shifted to producing industrial goods
and raw materials for wartime consumption. The agreement
also indicated Mexico’s move away from reliance on the Axis
powers for its economic well-being.
On June 22, events in Europe once again had important im-
plications for Mexico’s response to the war and the develop-
ing propaganda campaign. Germany violated the Nazi-Soviet
Pact by invading the Soviet Union, prompting outcries among
the Mexican left. While the German and Soviet alliance was
in place, leftists had abandoned their anti-fascist rhetoric, had
adopted a strong anti-imperialist position, and had pushed
for Mexican neutrality. Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union
destroyed the alliance and forced Mexican leftists to change
sides once again. Fascism and the Axis governments were the
natural enemy to Mexican communists, even if it meant an
alliance with the United States and Great Britain—the coun-
tries that Mexican leftists had spent nearly two years vilify-
ing as imperialistic. Lombardo Toledano, who had become
the champion of neutrality, now pushed for Mexican involve-
ment in the war. The left now regarded the war as “a popular
struggle against fascist barbarism.”104 Lombardo Toledano
and other leftist leaders began urging unity against fascist en-
emies and called on Avila Camacho to declare war.105
Germany’s invasion changed the way Mexico’s press cov-
ered events in Europe. Prior to 1941 the Nazi-Soviet alliance
had lumped two totalitarian but opposite ideologies into one

96 | a blueprint f or propaganda
common enemy for mainstream Mexico. It had simpliﬁed
the rhetoric surrounding anti-totalitarian propaganda. The
independent dailies, largely under the inﬂuence of the Allies
in 1941, grew increasingly concerned at the ease with which
Germany and Soviet forces had taken control of much of the
rest of Europe. The alliance had created a powerful enemy for
the Allies, and Germany’s invasion weakened the Axis in their
eyes. But the mainstream press initially directed its antago-
nism more toward the Soviet Union, emphasizing the need to
impede the spread of communism. Many editorials expressed
relief at news of the German invasion because it would debili-
tate the Soviet Union. El Universal boldly claimed that a war
between Germany and the Soviet Union would effectively end
all totalitarian threat and be “the salvation of humanity.”106
Germany’s invasion also allowed a strong anti-communist
discourse to resurface among the country’s conservative in-
terests, who considered all Mexican leftists to be puppets of
Moscow. The left responded by accusing all conservative sec-
tors of Mexican society of being fascists in Hitler’s loyal ser-
vice.107 Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union provoked ide-
ological reactions in Mexico that further divided the nation.
It also complicated the rhetoric surrounding World War II.
The mainstream reaction in the press rekindled fears among
the left and the Allied powers alike that many Mexicans sup-
ported Germany and the Axis.

In July 1941, the United States put increased pressure on

Mexico and all of Latin America to diminish their economic
cooperation with the Axis powers. U.S. investigations had
indicated that many individuals and businesses throughout
Latin America were Axis sympathizers and were involved in

a blueprint f or propaganda | 97
subversive activities. Names of eighteen hundred groups and in-
dividuals were compiled on blacklists and distributed through-
out Latin America along with notification that the subjects
on the list were to be boycotted by the United States.108 The
lists implicitly encouraged Mexican and other Latin American
governments to engage in their own embargo of Axis busi-
nesses.
Although the Mexican government at first did not officially
boycott the 181 Mexican persons and businesses included in
the blacklists, Avila Camacho’s administration did nothing to
prevent the U.S. boycott.109 In fact, Ezequiel Padilla issued a
statement to the press declaring that publication of the lists
had been a defensive measure for the United States. Most pe-
riodicals skirted past the issue of the blacklists with little fan-
fare. They published the blacklists, but generally without ac-
companying commentary. The press’s silence ended abruptly
when German consul Freiherr Rüdt von Collenberg sent a
note of protest to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, urging
the government to resist U.S. imperialism and not allow the
boycott in Mexico.110 Most news sources reacted aggressively
to Germany’s attempt to interfere in Mexican-U.S. relations.
They reported this protest as an affront to nationalism, and
the blacklists quickly became a symbol of resisting German
interference.
Mexico took additional action against Axis interests and
moved closer to the Allies on August 22 by closing all German
consulates and expelling the diplomatic corps. At the same
time, Avila Camacho recalled all Mexican diplomatic staff in
areas occupied by Germany. One month later, the government
passed an espionage law to attack Axis espionage activity and
to prevent further Axis strongholds in the country.111 The anti-

98 | a blueprint f or propaganda
espionage legislation coincided roughly with new German
threats in the Western Hemisphere. Beginning in September
1941, German submarines began engaging in attacks on civil-
ian U.S. ships. The influence of the United States in Mexico’s
press was evident by this time. Ignoring the fact that targeted
ships were carrying war materials, newspapers reported these
incidents as cruel attacks against a pacifist and neutral nation.
They emphasized the damage inflicted to U.S. property and the
numbers of civilian casualties. The reports elicited sympathy
for the United States and enmity toward Germany.112
The German submarine attacks had important consequences
on official relations between the United States and Mexico.
The United States had initiated an oil embargo against Japan
earlier that summer, moving the two countries ever closer to
an ultimatum. As hostilities escalated with both Germany
and Japan, U.S. officials understood that it was only a mat-
ter of time before the United States was formally drawn into
the war. With war looming, Roosevelt and his diplomatic
staff hastened to resolve the oil expropriation controversy as
well as conflicts over outstanding claims by other U.S. inter-
ests that had resulted from Mexico’s agrarian reforms. U.S.
and Mexican diplomats had struggled to reach a settlement
since 1938, but U.S. oil companies had continually put po-
litical pressure on the U.S. government and had blocked pro-
posed agreements. Although Mexico had recently taken deci-
sive measures against the Axis and a formal wartime alliance
between the two nations was probable, Roosevelt could ill-
afford to leave the oil issue unresolved.
By November, wartime exigencies had created a new sense of
urgency for settling outstanding claims. U.S. leaders ultimately
ignored oil company demands and reached a settlement that

a blueprint f or propaganda | 99
the oil men perceived as favorable to Mexico. On November
19 the U.S. and Mexican governments agreed to the Global
Settlement, whereby Mexico guaranteed payment of $40 mil-
lion for agrarian and other general claims. Mexico’s leaders
also promised $9 million as a down payment on oil company
claims and agreed to allow a panel of experts to determine
any additional compensation owed to the oil companies. In
exchange, the U.S. government agreed to loan Mexico $40
million for ﬁscal stabilization and guaranteed future silver
purchases. It promised an additional $30 million through an
Export-Import Bank loan to improve the highway transpor-
tation system. Finally, the agreement paved the way for a re-
ciprocal trade treaty between the two nations.113
The terms of the settlement represented a victory for Mexico.
Under Cárdenas, Mexico had stood up to powerful economic
interests in the United States and had recuperated its economic
sovereignty. Avila Camacho had continued the nationalist push
by refusing to give in to oil company demands for huge repa-
rations. Avila Camacho’s government had taken advantage of
the wartime climate to improve its bargaining power with the
United States. But the settlement represented more in terms of
the United States’ image. By ignoring oil company demands,
U.S. leaders acted as truly “good neighbors” intent on treat-
ing Mexico fairly. The Global Settlement did far more for win-
ning Mexican support in the war effort than any direct pro-
paganda campaign had so far achieved.114

Pearl Harbor and Reactions in Mexico

On December 7, 1941, the news that Japan had attacked Pearl

Harbor brought a new sense of urgency to diplomatic relations
and wartime propaganda throughout the Americas. Leaders

100 | a blueprint f or propaganda

in Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama declared
war against the Axis powers almost immediately. Within one
month, leaders in Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with Axis
powers. The reaction of the Avila Camacho administration
was swift and decisive. Most members of the cabinet were re-
laxing at their weekend retreats that Sunday afternoon. As
news of the Japanese attack spread across Mexico, telephones
began to ring. Government officials scrambled to confirm the
news with the U.S. Embassy and met to coordinate their of-
ficial reaction. Jaime Torres Bodet rushed to the Ministry of
Education to address the nation on La hora nacional. Foreign
Minister Padilla returned immediately from his weekend re-
treat in Cuernavaca to help the president compose a press re-
lease stating the government’s position.115 In the statement,
Avila Camacho referred to the Havana Conference of 1940,
stating that any aggression against a neighbor in the Western
Hemisphere was considered aggression against Mexico’s sov-
ereignty. The president and his advisers agreed that the attack
on Pearl Harbor required Mexico to sever all relations with
the Axis powers. They were aware of the more aggressive re-
actions in many other Latin American countries, where lead-
ers had issued formal declarations of war against the Axis.
Nevertheless, Avila Camacho and his cabinet members deter-
mined that Mexico would remain officially outside the con-
flict unless the country itself were attacked.

Conclusion

Throughout 1940 and 1941, the governments of the United

States and Mexico moved closer together diplomatically as

a blueprint f or propaganda | 101

World War II encroached on the Western Hemisphere. As for-
mal involvement in the war became increasingly likely, U.S. of-
ficials put together a strategy to win popular support through-
out Latin America. Created in August 1940, the Office of the
Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs spent its first year in
an organization phase, outlining a propaganda blueprint for
Mexico and the rest of Latin America. It established important
relationships with private-sector interests in the United States
and began to negotiate with local communications industry rep-
resentatives in Mexico. Only after the attacks on Pearl Harbor
did the oiaa put its plan fully into action. Nevertheless, the
agency’s planning activities prior to December 1941 laid an
important foundation for later propaganda and set a precedent
for the cultural messages the oiaa would send. Specifically, its
wartime message for Mexico focused on spreading U.S. com-
mercial culture to its southern neighbor.
At the same time, the Mexican government under President
Manuel Avila Camacho also took an active interest in the pros-
pect of war. Avila Camacho moved the country closer to the
United States by reaching important diplomatic agreements
that established close commercial ties between the two nations.
He allowed the U.S. boycott of suspected Axis subversives in
Mexico and initiated important defensive alliances. The pres-
ident also took direct actions against Axis interests by seiz-
ing Axis ships and introducing anti-espionage measures. The
country’s formal shift away from Axis powers culminated with
the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor, when Avila Camacho
severed all diplomatic ties with the Axis.
Government leaders deemed 1942 a defining year in Mexico’s
involvement in World War II. For them, this critical year actu-
ally began on December 7, 1941. Mexico technically remained

102 | a blueprint f or propaganda

neutral for another six months, but its ofﬁcial loyalties had been
deﬁned in its reaction to Pearl Harbor. As early as December 9,
Mexico severed diplomatic relations with Japan, and it broke
relations with Germany and Italy by December 11. Still sensi-
tive to anti-American sentiments, Avila Camacho quickly stip-
ulated to his fellow citizens that breaking diplomatic relations
was not equivalent to a declaration of war. Mexico would par-
ticipate in a system of collective defense for the Americas as
a producer, but its armed forces would not become engaged
except to ensure Mexico’s own national security.

a blueprint f or propaganda | 103

3
A Revolutionary Mural of Propaganda

In the 1920s, the Mexican minister of education commissioned

well-known artists to create national public art to tell a visual
story of the country’s revolutionary past. Under the program
initiated by José Vasconcelos, “Los Tres Grandes”—Diego
Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, and David Alfaro Siqueiros—
began a muralist tradition in which they portrayed their per-
sonal interpretations of the revolutionary legacy in the con-
text of the nation’s social and political needs.1 In 1942 other
Mexicans mirrored the trends initiated by Los Tres Grandes
by creating their personal interpretations of the revolution-
ary legacy in the context of World War II. As Mexico was
pulled into the war, a short-term trend evolved that equated
the worldwide struggle for freedom in World War II with the
fight for democracy in the nation’s 1910 revolution.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had a profound im-
pact on the way Mexicans viewed World War II. The attack
on U.S. territory brought the war directly to the Western
Hemisphere. Government leaders became increasingly con-
cerned that Mexico could be attacked by Axis powers, and
a new sense of urgency emerged on the diplomatic front as
the government imposed measures of national security. The
country remained officially neutral in the conflict, but the
Avila Camacho administration moved closer to an official al-
liance with the United States. In January 1942 Mexico’s for-
eign minister, Ezequiel Padilla, participated actively in a hemi-
spheric security conference in Rio de Janeiro and became a
vocal advocate of promoting hemispheric unity. A new round
of commercial negotiations followed, which resulted in even
closer economic cooperation between Mexico and the United
States. The oiaa intensified its campaign to secure Mexican
goods for the U.S. wartime economy. As a result, Mexican
agricultural and industrial production, and those whose live-
lihood depended on it, became even more closely tied to the
United States and the Allies in World War II. After 1940, the
shift in government attention toward industrialization that
had started under the Cárdenas administration intensified.
But whereas public discourse about the national economy in
the late 1930s often vilified the United States, new conversa-
tions about industrialization welcomed U.S. involvement in
the context of the wartime emergency.
At the same time, the Mexican government began to take an
active interest in producing wartime information to win domes-
tic support for the Allies. In the first half of 1942, government
leaders began to consider the need for a propaganda agency
to disseminate war-related information. The Avila Camacho
administration had recent memories of European ideologies
and a European war dividing Mexicans in the 1930s. As the
war seemed to extend beyond the borders of Europe and Asia
in 1942, government leaders feared that the conflict would di-
vide Mexicans even further. They understood that the coun-
try’s close economic cooperation with the United States could

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 105

eventually pull Mexico into the war even though leaders tried
to maintain the country’s neutrality.
The attack on Pearl Harbor affected the public perception
of the war. Between 1939 and 1941, most of the country re-
sponded to World War II with ambivalence. They saw the war
as an imperialistic, European conflict that did not concern
them. Even Mexicans who sympathized with the Axis did not
want to see their country drawn into the conflict. After Pearl
Harbor a general sense of ambivalence remained, but peo-
ple also grew increasingly concerned that the war might ex-
tend into Mexican national territory. Many people reflected
the government’s concern that the Axis powers might attack
Mexico. In the first half of 1942, grassroots organizations be-
gan to form to fight Axis aggression. Local defensive leagues
sprang up as arms of campesino and labor organizations.
Although the groups were few in number, they set a prece-
dent for Allied support that would surface later. They indi-
cate that the reaction to Pearl Harbor followed that of the
government and that some public sentiment was beginning
to turn against the Axis. Local defensive leagues became ac-
tive in promoting security, but they stopped short of advocat-
ing that Mexico join the war.
A major shift in attitudes toward World War II and a change
in the production of wartime propaganda came less than six
months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In May
1942, German submarines began targeting Mexican oil tankers
in the Gulf of Mexico, and in the following months the gov-
ernment and many citizens became increasingly anti-Axis in
response to these attacks. German submarine warfare served
as the final catalyst that pushed Mexico into an official dec-
laration of war and propelled a shift in popular opinion. The

106 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

government took an active role not only in preventing Axis
propaganda but also in promoting pro-Allied information.
Avila Camacho created a government propaganda agency
specifically to disseminate wartime information and to win
the support of Mexicans. Between May and August 1942 the
government produced posters, pamphlets, and radio broad-
casts to gain support for the war. The administration also be-
gan cooperating more closely with the oiaa in disseminating
pro-Allied information through the press, radio, and film.
The most profound change after May 1942 came in the
shift in popular opinion. In a short-lived patriotic movement,
much of the country rallied around the president in support
of his declaration of war. Support for Avila Camacho was
widespread, as between May and August 1942 a wave of pa-
triotic support swept the country. Many feared the possibil-
ity of additional attacks, and a pervasive but short-term unity
emerged as the public identified a common, external enemy.
They identified themselves as Mexicans and as guardians of
the democratic legacy of the revolution. They saw the Axis
as the enemy of that legacy. Just as famous Mexican mural-
ists had done in the 1920s, Mexicans in 1942 adopted a rev-
olutionary national identity that conformed to their current
circumstances.

The Push for Hemispheric Solidarity

Immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor, President Avila

Camacho conferred at length with his political advisers over
the course Mexico should take. He recalled former president
Lázaro Cárdenas to the capital from his home in Michoacán
to discuss national defense, and Avila Camacho immediately
assigned Cárdenas to command the newly created Paciﬁc

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 107

Defense Zone.2 Concerned about the potential for Japanese
attack on the northern Pacific coast, Avila Camacho had cre-
ated the security zone to protect the sparsely populated re-
gions in Baja California. Cárdenas’s appointment allowed the
president and U.S. military leaders to benefit from his military
expertise, but it also provided important popular support to
Avila Camacho’s decision to back the United States after Pearl
Harbor. Eventually, the former president became secretary of
National Defense in the Avila Camacho administration. The
image of the popular, revolutionary ex-president command-
ing such an important defensive position appealed to many
people and brought legitimacy to the argument that Mexico
could face potential Axis threat.
The attack on Pearl Harbor had a significant impact on
popular opinion. Many who had felt ambivalent toward the
war began to show indignation toward Japan and the Axis
powers.3 Many sympathized with the United States as a vic-
tim of unprovoked foreign aggression. The attack coincided
with aggressive efforts by the iapc and the oiaa to promote
anti-Axis sentiments. As a result of Allied censorship and con-
trol of newsprint supplies, combined with a growing concern
and fear of the Axis, the press reacted with overt sympathy
and support for the United States.4
Local political leaders reinforced the shift toward the Allies
by organizing public gatherings. They gave speeches to de-
nounce Japanese aggression and ensure that all citizens were
aware of the Pearl Harbor attack.5 Gradually, the government
began a public campaign to sway popular opinion in favor of
the Allies. Avila Camacho understood that the ardent anti-
communist feelings among much of the population still
prompted hesitation and uncertainty toward the war. In order

108 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

for Avila Camacho’s economic agreements with the United
States to succeed, he needed full support from the people.
The government began to broadcast public messages urging
the Mexican people to work hard and produce for the war
effort, and to support the United States as it mobilized for
war. As Avila Camacho slowly developed a public informa-
tion strategy at home, he also took steps to bolster diplomatic
relations abroad.
U.S. and Mexican representatives began negotiating to form
a joint defense commission. Informal talks had been under
way for two years, but the settlement of the oil controversy,
followed immediately by the attack on Pearl Harbor, pro-
vided a new sense of urgency for finalizing the defense agree-
ment. On January 20, 1942, the Mexican government an-
nounced the formation of the Joint United States–Mexican
Defense Commission (jusmdc).6 The commission identified
improving Mexico’s ability to contribute to hemispheric de-
fense as its highest priority. It aimed to strengthen a strate-
gic alliance between the two nations that would facilitate the
United States’ ability to aid in the defense of Baja California.
At the same time, it planned for Mexico to act as a strategic
partner in the security of the southwestern United States.7 The
U.S. War Department immediately began providing aid to de-
fense projects through the lend-lease program. Projects under-
taken by the jusmdc included aircraft facilities and a weather
station in the Yucatán Peninsula. The commission devised an
Airfield Development Program to build landing strips through-
out the country to service U.S. military planes in transit to the
Panama Canal and military stations in Brazil.8 Airbases man-
aged through the jusmdc became important refueling stops for
thousands of aircraft in the early years of U.S. participation in

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 109

the war. The activities of the commission illustrate the impor-
tance both nations placed on hemispheric defense after Pearl
Harbor. Mexican and U.S. leaders alike were concerned with
the immediate needs of winning the war.
On January 15, 1942, Mexican delegates met with repre-
sentatives from the other Latin American nations in Rio de
Janeiro for a hemispheric security summit. Just as he had led
the way in promoting a U.S.-Mexican alliance nearly a year
earlier, Ezequiel Padilla stepped up to promote solidarity with
the United States throughout the Americas at this conference.
One argument states that by January the Mexican government
had already decided to back the U.S. government fully in the
war effort but that Padilla had used the conference to win the
backing of the rest of Latin America. Only with unanimous
regional support did Mexican leaders feel comfortable mov-
ing forward with their own wartime strategy.9 Delegates at the
conference established an Inter-American Defense Council and
made other agreements to cooperate economically during the
war. These important meetings facilitated later wartime indus-
trial cooperation. Early negotiations set the stage for U.S.-led
industrial development assistance in Mexico after 1940.
Despite the goodwill demonstrated by Padilla at Rio de
Janeiro, Mexican officials determined it was in the country’s
best interest to remain officially neutral after Pearl Harbor. In
an attempt to object to Axis aggression yet remain officially
neutral, Mexico only severed diplomatic relations with the
Axis. Avila Camacho consulted with Cárdenas, Padilla, and
others before reaching his decision. All agreed that the pub-
lic was too wary of a formal alliance with the United States at
that point. Although economic cooperation with the United
States had the support of many people, government officials

110 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

still maintained an autonomous position with respect to par-
ticipation in the war. Furthermore, in the early months of 1942
most Mexicans felt that World War II was “Europe’s war.”
They supported the notion of national defense and believed
that a genuine risk of Axis attack existed. Nevertheless, gov-
ernment leaders feared that a formal declaration of war im-
mediately after Pearl Harbor would lead most Mexicans to
feel that the United States was pulling them into the conflict.
Moreover, many Mexicans in the 1940s had survived the 1910
revolution, and their living memory of the horrors of war com-
pelled them to avoid becoming involved in the war overseas.
They knew the atrocities of war firsthand, and in the early
months of 1942 most Mexicans wanted to avoid seeing simi-
lar hardships played out in their country again. Leftists were
the exceptions to this general trend. Since Hitler’s invasion
of the Soviet Union, the left had been pushing for a restora-
tion of diplomatic ties between Mexico and the Soviet Union
as well as a formal commitment to the war effort. Although
many Latin American countries formally declared war on the
Axis powers after the Rio de Janeiro conference, Mexico at
first remained neutral.

Mexico’s Emerging Propaganda

Government propaganda mechanisms already existed prior to

the expanding concerns of World War II. Under the Cárdenas
administration, ofﬁcial government propaganda fell under the
purview of the General Press and Propaganda Ofﬁce (Dirección
General de Prensa y Publicidad). This agency controlled the
publication of all government materials and oversaw the na-
tional press. It focused mainly on electoral campaigns, press re-
leases, and other general issues of national interest.10 Although

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 111

the ideological battle surrounding the buildup to World War
II was being played out in a propaganda war, the Mexican
government remained largely removed from fascist and anti-
fascist propaganda prior to 1940.
In 1940, with the new presidential administration, the
General Press and Propaganda Office closed and its duties
were absorbed by the General Information Division (Dirección
General de Información) of the Ministry of the Interior.
Although the Mexican government became more involved
in the propaganda war by expelling Arthur Dietrich and try-
ing to censure pro-Nazi periodicals, the General Information
Division did not become actively involved in producing war
related propaganda prior to 1942. Nevertheless, as Mexico
felt drawn closer to the Allied cause in the war, the government
began to consider its need to begin producing propaganda.
Early attention to wartime propaganda began to yield re-
sults in the summer of 1941. As Mexico and the United States
finalized the Douglas-Weichers agreements and set the stage
for full economic partnership, Avila Camacho’s administration
began a rudimentary program of selling the partnership to the
public. This initial government propaganda focused almost ex-
clusively on urging Mexicans to work harder in wartime indus-
tries. Avila Camacho worked closely with state governors to
sell the industrialization strategy to them first.11 The president
also appealed to the agrarian sector to produce more, com-
paring their national pursuit of social justice with the global
fight against totalitarianism.12 The underlying theme in this
propaganda strategy was that production equaled patriotism
and that Mexicans who loved their country and wanted to de-
fend their honor should be productive.13 In its earliest stages,
the official wartime propaganda campaign was run through

112 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

the General Information Division with no attempt to consult
propaganda or war experts.
Government leaders began experimenting with establish-
ing an official propaganda agency to deal with wartime infor-
mation as early as August 1941. Possibly in response to the
German protest to the U.S. blacklists and boycott, a group of
congressmen banded together to form the Comité contra la
Penetración Nazi-Facista en México (Committee against Nazi-
Fascist Penetration in Mexico).14 In a memo to President Avila
Camacho, members of the committee expressed their concerns
and their proposed plans for defending Mexico. They argued
that although Mexico was a neutral country, it had been sub-
jected to a barrage of Nazi and fascist propaganda as well as
anti-democratic activities of groups sympathetic to the Axis.
They cited the Sinarquista movement, the Acción Nacional,
the Spanish Falange, and the German and Italian diplomatic
corps. The committee proposed that the government become
actively involved in preventing the dissemination of pro-Nazi
propaganda and that it develop its own anti-fascist campaign.
The committee members established their bylaws and devel-
oped a propaganda strategy to fight the Nazi influence.
Other efforts to develop a propaganda campaign came from
average citizens. After the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor,
many feared a similar attack on Mexico. Some Mexicans be-
gan banding together to form local defensive leagues. These
groups went by various names in different locations. Little in-
formation exists about how and when the leagues were estab-
lished, but it appears that some formed between December
1941 and May 1942, while many others formed after Mexico
declared war. These groups frequently took on the responsi-
bility of fighting fascist propaganda and generating their own

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 113

propaganda at the local level. Some appealed to the govern-
ment for help. For example, the Mexico City–based Legion of
Victory accused the Transocean News Agency of developing
propaganda against the ideals of Mexico’s government and its
citizenry. The legion asked the Avila Camacho administration
to close down Transocean and expel its employees.15
In Veracruz, the local movement to fight Axis influence grew
to be particularly strong and active. The Comité Anti-totalitario
de Veracruz (Anti-totalitarian Committee of Veracruz) formed
in response to the attacks on Pearl Harbor and began publish-
ing posters and pamphlets for local distribution. The commit-
tee borrowed the national government’s incipient propaganda
strategy and urged Mexicans to fight totalitarian influence by
producing for the war effort. Members also sent regular intel-
ligence reports directly to Avila Camacho detailing any sus-
picious activity in the area that they attributed to Axis sabo-
teurs.16 In one report, Veracruz citizens accused Axis spies of
trying to recruit local members, and they included samples of
Nazi propaganda pamphlets.17
Mexico City resident Luis Audirac felt that Mexico needed
an organized propaganda strategy after Pearl Harbor, and
he took it upon himself to develop a program that he sent to
Avila Camacho for consideration.18 The documentation does
not indicate what happened to most of these committees or to
what extent their plans for developing propaganda succeeded,
but it does not appear that the government became actively
involved in a propaganda strategy prior to the official decla-
ration of war. The formation of local defense committees in-
dicates that concern over Axis activities was becoming more
widespread in Mexico as the war progressed in Europe in 1942.
Despite the aggressive anti-Axis rhetoric, early local defense

114 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

committees limited their campaigns to espionage and propa-
ganda. They maintained the national preference for neutral-
ity and did not push for Mexico to join the war.

The Declaration of War

Mexicans’ reluctance to enter the war changed abruptly in

the spring and summer of 1942, as government officials re-
sponded swiftly to German aggression against Mexico. On
May 13 the oil tanker Potrero del Llano was sunk by a torpedo
fired by a German submarine in the Gulf of Mexico. Several
crew members died in the attack, and Avila Camacho’s gov-
ernment responded quickly with diplomatic notes of protest
demanding an apology and compensation for physical and
human losses.
The nation’s press reacted with near unanimous indigna-
tion. The oiaa had succeeded in eliminating most anti-U.S.
and pro-fascist information from the mainstream dailies, so an
examination of press content reveals more about U.S. censor-
ship practices than it does about public opinion. Nevertheless,
Mexicans still read those newspapers, which means that the
stories and opinion pieces published in the mainstream press
were the only version of war information that many Mexicans
received. Pro-Allied information that appeared in the press
may have had an important influence on how Mexicans saw
their role in the war.
Editorials insisted that the government elevate its formal
protest to defend the dignity and honor of la patria.19 Others
urged the public to trust Avila Camacho’s decisions because
the administration knew what its patriotic duties were.20 A
general attitude prevailed that Mexico had been drawn un-
willingly into the conflict by unprovoked Axis aggression.21

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 115

Many considered the attack an act of international piracy and
began to perceive the world in two main camps: the totalitar-
ian dictators versus the forces of democracy.22 Editorials in-
sisted that the government take firm action to restore national
honor, but they stopped short of pushing for a formal decla-
ration of war after the attack on the Potrero del Llano. Most
editorials and opinion columns urged Mexicans to allow the
Avila Camacho administration to resolve the issue through
diplomatic channels and to wait calmly and patiently for the
German response.23
Only the leftist voice, through El Popular, demanded an im-
mediate declaration of war. Mirroring Lombardo Toledano’s
insistence that Mexico join the conflict after Germany invaded
the Soviet Union one year earlier, the ctm newspaper printed
editorials that challenged the government to respond aggres-
sively in defense of national honor. The left argued that the
Mexican nation had a heroic history of bravery and strength
in times of crisis.24 El Popular urged the president to defend
the dignity of the nation in his response to the attack. It de-
manded that he protect the nation’s sovereignty and honor.25
The newspaper urged the nation to unite under the flag and
urged workers to mobilize in defense of the country.26
Less than one week after the attack on the Potrero del Llano,
Germany responded to Avila Camacho’s diplomatic protests
by targeting another oil tanker. A German torpedo sank Faja
de Oro on May 21, killing seven more sailors. The press and
the government might have overlooked the first submarine at-
tack if the German government had responded to diplomatic
protests in a suitable manner, but the second attack sent a
clear sign that Mexico was considered an enemy of the Nazi

116 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

regime. This attack had important consequences for the way
Mexicans saw the war and their role in it.
Calls for war began to appear in the editorials of the main-
stream press. Some far-right interests, in an effort to draw
Mexico into the war, circulated rumors that the United States
was behind the attacks.27 Editorials in other dailies immedi-
ately addressed the erroneous information. La Prensa argued
that declaring war could unite the country by consolidating
support behind the president. Addressing fears that the coun-
try’s army would be sent to fight in foreign combat if Mexico
formally joined the war, it emphasized that Costa Rica and
Cuba had declared war immediately after Pearl Harbor but
had not sent armed forces overseas.28 Novedades boldly in-
sisted that Mexicans were ready and willing to sacrifice as
necessary for the good of the nation.29
A new emphasis began to work its way into the rhetoric of
the press. As the government insisted that armed forces would
not be sent abroad, editorials in the mainstream dailies took
up the theme of production for the war effort. An overwhelm-
ing consensus emerged in the press by May 25 that Mexico’s
role in the conflict would be as a supplier of strategic mate-
rial.30 Editorials argued that the country must wage a war of
production and that increasing industrial output would en-
sure national defense.31 One headline declared: “We must pro-
duce more and more”; the article explained the need “to re-
duce inflation, to store materials, to provide for the war, to
ensure peace!”32 El Universal went so far as to accuse train
workers on strike of being “unpatriotic” for not following
the orders of management and for defying the nation’s need
for production.33
On May 25, President Avila Camacho called a special session

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 117

of the Congress to declare war on the Axis powers. He deliv-
ered a moving and persuasive speech to request support for
the declaration. Broadcast by radio to the entire nation, his
speech emphasized that he was declaring a state of war that
would not require Mexico to commit its military to Europe.
In this way, the president remained sensitive to the concerns
of many Mexicans who did not want to see the army involved
in foreign combat.
The tone of his speech was one of reluctance as Avila
Camacho commented that Mexico had been given no alter-
native to drastic measures. He explained that Nazi aggres-
sors had attacked Mexican territory and sovereignty without
provocation. He called on Mexicans to answer the call of na-
tional duty to defend democracy against the Axis forces.34 In
this initial wartime address, the president introduced the in-
terpretation that Mexico’s involvement in the conﬂict repre-
sented a ﬁght for democracy. Later he would use an analogy
comparing World War II to the Mexican Revolution.
The mainstream press backed Avila Camacho’s decision to
declare war. Editorials praised the decision and urged Mexicans
to give their full support to the government. They called for the
country to unite to destroy any remnants of the enemy within
the nation’s borders.35 Days before the speech, El Universal’s
front-page story anticipated the president’s call to arms, de-
claring, “Mexico is uniting together after the sinking of ships
in ways that previously were not possible . . . the country has
not demonstrated this kind of indestructible unity in years.”36
News stories interpreted the action as responsible service to la
patria.”37 La Prensa’s editorials anticipated Avila Camacho’s
taking extraordinary measures as a way of ensuring the na-
tion’s unity and prosperity.38 Overwhelmingly, the press called

118 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

for national unity around the Avila Camacho administration
in wartime emergency.39 El Popular’s editorials predicted
that it would be necessary for the nation to make sacrifices,
but argued that Mexicans would patriotically accept those
sacrifices.40
On June 1, Avila Camacho presented the Congress with a
proposal to declare a state of national wartime emergency.
The proposal included the suspension of constitutional guar-
antees such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press.
The state of emergency gave the government considerable
leverage in fighting the propaganda war against Axis influ-
ence in Mexico. The president delivered another emotional
speech to justify his actions in the name of national unity and
regional defense. He characterized the war as a time of total
mobilization that required the support of all classes of society.
Significantly, he conceded that the enemy was more powerful
than Mexico because of its strong national unity.
The mainstream press largely supported Avila Camacho’s
decision to suspend constitutional guarantees. Even though
censorship of the press was part of the emergency measures,
most news editorials saw Mexico’s fascist enemies as a greater
threat than internal censorship. Novedades stressed that the
emergency measures marked a suspension of guarantees, not
an abolition. Its editorial went on to remind Mexicans that
the nation was in a state of wartime emergency and pressed
all citizens to act in the country’s best interest.41 An editorial
in El Universal urged Mexicans to have faith in the rectitude
of their leaders and insisted that Avila Camacho would use
his emergency powers only for the well-being and protection
of the country.42
Only Excelsior opposed the emergency measures. Its ed-

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 119

itorials argued that freedom of the press should only be re-
stricted if there was clear evidence that the nation has been be-
trayed. They argued that other freedoms should be suspended
only if doing so was absolutely necessary to prevent crimes
against the country. Those conditions, argued Excelsior, did
not exist in Mexico. Instead—according to the newspaper—
the country was united around a solid block of patriotism
with support for the government.43 Excelsior opposed the
measures because it did not perceive a need for them in a pa-
triotic and united Mexico.
As soon as the German submarine attacks began, Avila
Camacho began to direct his attention toward popular opin-
ion. Presidential reports between May 16 and June 13 include
thorough summaries of mainstream press reports and edito-
rial pieces.44 Avila Camacho weighed his options cautiously,
understanding that many Mexicans might oppose a declara-
tion of war. Once the declaration of war seemed inevitable
with submarine warfare escalating in the Gulf of Mexico, the
government began to consider more seriously its own ability
to sway public opinion. On the same day that Avila Camacho
addressed Congress and declared war, he also created a spe-
cial ofﬁce in charge of national wartime information. While
the public reception of propaganda is difﬁcult to gauge, it is
clear that government leaders were attempting to measure
popular opinion and that they took the public reaction into
account in forming wartime information policies.

The Federal Propaganda Ofﬁce

The responsibilities of domestic wartime propaganda fell to the

General Information Division of the Ministry of the Interior,
led by José Altamirano. In a memorandum to Interior Minister

120 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

Miguel Alemán dated May 25, 1942, Altamirano argued that
Mexico should follow the example of other countries and es-
tablish a central office to organize and coordinate an internal
propaganda campaign.45 Altamirano established the Oficina
Federal de Propaganda (ofp; Federal Propaganda Office), and
he defined the objectives of this new office as twofold. First,
in the context of Mexico’s impending declaration of war, he
aimed to sway Mexicans’ opinions in opposition to the Axis
powers. Second, he hoped that anti-Axis sentiments would
lead to full support for the Avila Camacho administration.
Although the ofp did not outline its approach as method-
ically as the oiaa did, the new agency did develop a basic
strategy for creating and disseminating wartime information.
It outlined four basic approaches to winning public support.
First, the ofp appealed to national unity to rally Mexican sup-
port, calling for all factions to defend la patria and their free-
doms. The office specifically targeted workers through federa-
tions and unions. It directed propaganda at campesino groups
and ejido committees, and universities and schools. The office
specified professionals, writers, homemakers, religious orga-
nizations, the armed forces, and public and private workers
as potential audiences for its propaganda.
Second, the propaganda program involved encouraging
a sense of sympathy and solidarity with the United States.
Government officials understood that many Mexicans har-
bored resentment toward the United States. Recent memories
of U.S. economic meddling and the recalcitrant behavior of oil
companies in the wake of Cárdenas’s expropriation still influ-
enced much of the country. Only two years earlier, anti-U.S.
sentiment had run rampant through the national press, and
the government realized that those feelings of antipathy still

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 121

existed. Mexico’s involvement in the war required close col-
laboration with the United States on a number of levels. The
two countries were already working closely on strategic mili-
tary and defense initiatives, and wartime industrialization re-
quired an expansion of U.S. participation in the Mexican econ-
omy. Altamirano argued that government propaganda needed
to present the United States in a favorable light, as a mutual
ally fighting for freedom and democracy in the world. He
also decided that most of the ofp’s propaganda should avoid
making close connections between Mexico and the United
States in the context of the war. Instead, wartime propaganda
should emphasize that Mexicans should support the war effort
in the interest of protecting Mexico’s well-being. Most war-
time information did not emphasize that Mexican involvement
would benefit the United States in its war effort, but rather
that Mexican patriotism would benefit la patria.
Third, the strategy encouraged a strong work ethic in all
citizens to maximize production. This part of Altamirano’s
plan dovetailed with the incipient propaganda program that
the government already had in place. To bolster its commer-
cial agreements with the United States and to make those
agreements benefit the national economy, Avila Camacho’s ad-
ministration needed the general public to support the war by
working harder and producing more. Because Mexico’s pri-
mary role in the war was as a strategic producer, this theme
quickly came to dominate government propaganda. Particularly
throughout the summer of 1942, when patriotic enthusiasm
encompassed much of the country, the government tried to
capitalize on that zeal by urging high rates of industrial and
agricultural output. It equated production with patriotism in

122 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

its messages in an effort to convert nationalist energy into in-
creased productive capacity.
Finally, Altamirano recommended promoting private ini-
tiative to encourage people to volunteer in any capacity that
would help in the war effort. The Mexican government pos-
sessed limited resources for producing significant amounts of
wartime propaganda. Altamirano understood that private ini-
tiative would strengthen the government’s wartime message.
Inspired by the local defensive leagues that formed after Pearl
Harbor, the government believed that information produced
by private citizens and organizations could be extremely per-
suasive and contribute in important ways to the government
propaganda campaign. After Mexico joined the war, local de-
fensive leagues proliferated throughout the country. Private
individuals and local organizations became involved in the
war effort. Labor and campesino organizations supported
Avila Camacho and produced their own local wartime pro-
paganda. But some of the most significant contributors were
Catholic groups that had been inclined to support the fascist
ideology in the 1930s. Mexico City’s archbishop, Luís María
Martínez, had articulated an official church position in sup-
port of the government since the beginning of his term in 1937.
Nevertheless, many religious groups, such as Acción Católica
Mexicana (acm; Catholic Action of Mexico), had become as-
sociated with the pro-fascist sympathies that existed in the
country. After Mexico entered the war, the acm began to or-
ganize events in support of the government. Their activities
included organized prayers, material assistance, and spread-
ing a general feeling of patriotism.46 Archbishop Martínez’s
support for the government’s position in the war was bla-
zoned across the front page of El Universal, and his pro-

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 123

government pronunciations implied that Catholics across the
country should echo his sentiments.47
With regard to implementing an effective propaganda cam-
paign, the ofp recognized that the nation possessed two fun-
damental yet distinct characteristics. First, Mexico City and
other highly populated urban areas hosted a generally literate
population, which the office deemed capable of understand-
ing Mexico’s decision to enter the war. Altamirano determined
that the literate urban population would easily understand
the subtleties of propaganda messages and would support the
Avila Camacho administration. Urban residents were more
aware of the war in Europe prior to 1942 because of easy ac-
cess to international news and international propaganda that
targeted the cities. After Mexico entered the war, the propa-
ganda campaign in the cities increased even more as the United
States picked up its efforts and the government became di-
rectly involved in producing propaganda. Altamirano’s strat-
egy for the ofp emphasized that a daily and persistent effort
would be necessary to stimulate the patriotic conscience of
the Mexican nation.48
Second, the rural population was generally illiterate, and
Altamirano worried that campesinos and other rural uned-
ucated citizens would not understand wartime information
easily and therefore would be less supportive of the govern-
ment. Altamirano’s plan emphasized that most of the nearly
five thousand small towns that made up Mexico in the 1940s
suffered various states of poverty. His strategy included en-
suring that each small town received a public radio and am-
plifier. He organized two daily transmissions: at noon, when
campesinos gathered to eat, and at dusk, when they retired
for the day. The government broadcast programs on Sundays,

124 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

when those who lived in the countryside tended to gather in
town plazas or churches. Finally, the propaganda ofﬁce helped
to organize public festivals in rural villages, using public gath-
erings to spread propaganda. The messages outlined campesi-
nos’ rights as Mexican citizens and the duties they had to their
country. Rural propaganda played on campesinos’ attach-
ment to their land. It called on them to defend the soil that
provided sustenance to the living and a resting place for the
deceased. Altamirano claimed that their sentimental attach-
ment to the land was the secret to campesinos’ existence and
that it rooted them deeply in their native soil.49
Altamirano also outlined a basic organization for the new
propaganda agency. The ofp comprised ﬁve divisions based on
methods of disseminating propaganda (Printed Propaganda,
Radio, Theater, Cinema, and Conference and Competition)
and one administrative division.

Printed Propaganda Division

The Printed Propaganda Division developed and spread pro-

paganda through newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, post-
ers, comics, and corridos. It immediately began an aggres-
sive graphic information campaign by printing large, colorful
posters to spread the government’s war message. Throughout
1942, government propaganda posters addressed two main
themes: the German submarine attacks against Mexican ships,
and the need to produce to contribute to the war effort.
First, the ofp explained Avila Camacho’s decision to de-
clare war by reminding Mexicans of the submarine attacks.
By keeping the attacks and the deaths of fellow countrymen
fresh in public memory, the government hoped to encourage
a patriotic response and instill loyalty to the Avila Camacho

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 125

administration. The Ministry of the Interior produced the
poster in figure 6 in response to the submarine attacks. A strong
and robust young man grips a pole carrying the Mexican flag,
which is waving in the breeze behind him. An intense and al-
most pained expression appears on his face as he poses above
the caption, “El grito de guerra” (The call to war). The young
man and the caption are superimposed over an ocean scene,
and in the background an oil tanker flying the Mexican flag
explodes. The image was intended to recall the German at-
tack and encourage a firm and patriotic response.
Another poster also represented the submarine attack, but
with a much different message. The poster in figure 7 shows
a female figure in mourning, with her head bowed and her
hand to her face. In the background, a ship, already partially
submerged, sinks from a torpedo attack. The caption reads,
“Recuerda el 13 de mayo de 1942,” urging Mexicans not
to forget May 13, 1942. The poster was printed in the three
colors—red, white, and green—of the Mexican flag. It aimed
to invoke feelings of sacrifice and mourning. By reminding
Mexicans of the losses the country had suffered both in lives
and in dignity at the hands of German aggressors, the govern-
ment hoped to rally the population during the war.
A third poster approached the declaration of war from the
perspective of Mexican traditions (figure 8). A traditionally
dressed man, complete with sombrero, cartridge belt, jacket,
and pistol, rings the liberty bell as the Mexican flag waves in
the background. The image recalls the long tradition of ringing
a liberty bell in honor of Hidalgo and his Grito de Dolores to
begin the movement for Mexican independence in 1810. The
caption reads: “Mexicans! The dictators have finally attacked
us, a free land wanting to keep its patriotic deeds stainless,

126 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

fig. 6. “The call to war” (government propaganda poster). Courtesy of
U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. A774.1.

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 127

fig. 7. “Remember May 13, 1942” (government propaganda poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex.
B15.5.

128 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

with no other recourse than to accept reality bravely and de-
clare war. Our weapons: Ideal, Justice, and Love for Freedom.”
The bottom caption, “México por la libertad!” (Mexico for
freedom!), became the rallying cry for much of the govern-
ment’s wartime propaganda.
The slogan appears again in the poster in figure 9, which
shows the eagle—a symbol of Mexican nationalism—perched
between the two volcano peaks that surround Mexico City.
The volcanoes are the geographic icon for the nation. The ea-
gle shreds a swastika-emblazoned flag as the sky glows in the
colors of the Mexican flag behind it. The poster needs no cap-
tion. Only the tiny words “Mexico por la libertad” at the bot-
tom of the poster punctuate the representation of the Mexican
eagle destroying Nazism.
By producing images of the submarine attacks, the Mexican
government wanted to provoke indignation among the people
toward German and the Axis powers. Particularly with such
recent memories of pro-fascist leanings among many, the gov-
ernment wanted to send a message that Hitler and his Nazi
governments were enemies to all Mexicans. By identifying
a common enemy beyond national borders, Avila Camacho
called for national unity in the context of World War II.
The second theme in government posters corresponded to
the new economic and trade agreements with the United States
that made Mexico a major supplier of Allied war materials.
Government posters encouraged all Mexicans to work hard
to produce those goods for the war effort. Avila Camacho’s
administration carefully began to craft messages that tied
worker productivity to good citizenship. The message em-
phasized that the country needed industrial and agricultural

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 129

fig. 8. “Mexicans!” (government propaganda poster). Courtesy of U.S.
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. M67.3.

130 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

fig. 9. “Mexico for freedom!” (government propaganda poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex.
B75.1.

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 131

fig. 10. “What are you making/doing for your homeland?”
(government propaganda poster). Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress,
Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. A77.1.

132 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

production, not only for the good of Allied powers, but also
for the good of Mexico.
The poster in figure 10 exemplifies this theme. A factory
worker stands atop a large steel beam being hoisted by a large
chain and hook. He represents industrial workers as a sil-
houette of factory buildings and smokestacks rise in the dis-
tance. Below him the caption reads, “Y tú, que haces por tú
patria? (And you, what are you making/doing for your pa-
tria?). The verb “hacer” translates both as “making” and as
“doing.” The poster’s designers chose the word deliberately
to indicate that Mexicans should “do” something to contrib-
ute to the war effort by “making” products that were neces-
sary for the war.
In figure 11, two workers appear in an industrial setting,
surrounded by heavy machinery. They are involved in heavy
manual labor—hoisting, pulling, and lifting to contribute to
industrial production. Once again, silhouettes of smokestacks
and factory buildings rise in the background. In bold red let-
ters, the caption reads, “Trabajo: fortaleza de nuestras fron-
teras” (Work: the strength of our borders). The poster sug-
gests that Mexicans need to work and produce to ensure the
security of their national borders.
A final poster from 1942 pushed the message of produc-
tion past factories and industry. Figure 12 shows a poster fea-
turing a soldier in the foreground, armed with a bayoneted
rifle and a serious expression on his face. The caption reads,
“En sus puestos” (At their posts), and is borrowed from mil-
itary terminology. In the background, two non-military fig-
ures appear. A campesino labors in a field behind the soldier’s
right shoulder, while a factory worker appears behind his left.
The image suggests that production efforts in agriculture and

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 133

fig. 11. “Work, the strength of our borders” (government
propaganda poster). Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and
Photographs Division, LC-USZC4.

134 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

fig. 12. “At their posts” (government propaganda poster). Courtesy of
U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. M378.1.

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 135

industry are just as important as military service to the war
effort. The flags of Western Hemisphere nations border the
right side of the poster, indicating that each nation contrib-
utes what it best can for victory and promoting the concept
of hemispheric cooperation. Avila Camacho’s declaration of
war stipulated that Mexico would not send its armed forces
overseas. The posters in figures 11 and 12 reemphasized that
the nation’s role would be one of production and supply.
In addition to producing posters, the General Information
Division negotiated with the mainstream press to purchase
space in the nation’s dailies.50 Historical documentation does
not indicate how often government press releases ran or what
form they took, but financial records indicate that within the
first year after the declaration of war, the General Information
Division paid regular invoices ranging from 15 to 1,056 pesos
to La Prensa, El Popular, and Novedades for “propaganda
to maintain a patriotic spirit and national unity.” The record
includes correspondence with Excelsior and El Universal.51
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that the government’s war
message appeared regularly in mainstream periodicals. The
ofp ran full-page ads throughout the summer of 1942 dis-
seminating a prowar message. A common sentiment that ap-
peared in nearly all ads appeared immediately after the dec-
laration of war: “Mexico needs industry . . . working is now
our primary duty.”52

Radio Division

The ofp’s Radio Division developed programs and coordi-

nated efforts between state and the national governments to
ensure that radio transmissions reached all major population
centers. This division sent special vehicles to cities and towns

136 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

throughout the country to broadcast government war propa-
ganda over loudspeakers. It cooperated closely with radio ex-
perts of the oiaa, but it also developed its own propaganda.
Most of the Radio Division’s material consisted of messages
broadcast during La hora nacional along with regular radio
spots. Spots produced by the ofp in the summer of 1942 con-
tinued to push the government’s message of production, urging
the agricultural and industrial sectors to be more productive
for the good of the country. The messages emphasized that it
was only by being productive that Mexicans could ensure that
the nation would emerge victorious from World War II.
Radio spots emphasized production in the context of in-
dustrialization more than any other theme. They pushed in-
dustrialization in several ways. First, government messages
argued that industrialization would assure victory in World
War II and bring freedom to the world. Second, radio broad-
casts emphasized that the nation must embrace industrial-
ization to ensure economic freedom. They argued that new
industries would bring complete independence to the coun-
try.53 Particularly on the heels of the economic experience of
the 1930s, the theme of economic independence appealed to
many Mexicans. This theme illustrates the nationalist nature
of government propaganda. It also demonstrates that from
its initial involvement in the war, the government saw World
War II as an opportunity to unite the country around the idea
of industrialization and economic nationalism.
Government radio propaganda promoted industrializa-
tion in the context of World War II as the dominant theme.
Many radio spots targeted potential industrialists and busi-
ness owners directly by promoting Mexico’s potential and its
security. Propagandists took advantage of the wartime crisis

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 137

to argue that Mexico’s defense of democracy and personal
freedoms would equate to financial security for private inves-
tors.54 Avila Camacho saw industrialization as the best course
for the country, and the war provided a legitimate backdrop
for pushing that campaign.55 Nevertheless, radio propaganda
did not omit other economic sectors of the nation. Many ra-
dio spots urged agriculturalists to be productive as well. One
message made a direct appeal to the revolutionary patriotism
of the agrarian class: “The peasantry demanded land from the
revolution. The revolution now demands productive lands
from the peasantry.”56 The message implied that World War
II threatened to erase the benefits and reforms that the revo-
lution had brought to the country’s agricultural workers. By
working hard and increasing productivity, peasants could as-
sure an Allied victory and thereby guarantee continuation of
revolutionary reforms in their lives.
Radio spots moved beyond the theme of production to urge
Mexicans to be good citizens and to promote the idea of na-
tional unity. The government feared that wartime emergency
might require Mexicans to make sacrifices in their daily lives.
Messages urged them to accept sacrifice in the interest of en-
suring their own freedom. Much of government propaganda
openly pushed national unity as a single theme. The ideologi-
cal differences that had divided the country so severely in the
1930s still existed and could threaten the government’s at-
tempts to win support for the war. Avila Camacho saw the
war as an opportunity to end revolutionary differences that
had existed for decades.
The president’s emphasis on industrialization posed a chal-
lenge to his message of national unity. The agrarian sector had

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benefited from reforms under Cárdenas, but the Avila Camacho
administration diverted resources and attention away from
the agricultural sector in its industrialization strategy. In an
attempt to push a message of national unity without surren-
dering its industrialization priorities, the government devel-
oped radio spots that incorporated both the industrial and ag-
ricultural sectors. Propaganda messages insisted that Mexicans
could affirm their nationality by increasing production in both
sectors.57 They emphasized that Mexico’s success in the war
depended equally on industry and agriculture without plac-
ing one above the other. The messages called all major sec-
tors of the economy to rise to the challenges presented in the
wartime crisis and fulfill their patriotic duty.
Another spot went one step further and presented agricul-
ture and industry as two intricately intertwined sectors, with
the nation dependent on both for prosperity.58 By tying the
agricultural and industrial sectors together, the government
accomplished several goals. It pushed its message of produc-
tion in wartime emergency, which emphasized the shift Avila
Camacho’s administration was trying to make toward indus-
trialization. More importantly, the radio spot advertised the
goal of national unity in the context of wartime propaganda.
The government encouraged agrarians and industrialists to
view each other as allies and patriots. Instead of having two
separate sectors compete for government resources, the Avila
Camacho administration wanted agrarians and industrialists
to see the advantages of establishing a beneficial relationship.
The president hoped that by uniting to confront wartime cri-
sis, the two sectors would forget their past differences and
move the nation closer to presenting a unified national front
to its international enemies.

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Theater and Cinema Divisions

The Theater and Cinema divisions of the ofp relied on the

appeal of drama and the performing arts in their propaganda
campaign. The Theater Division organized open-air perfor-
mances in cooperation with local student groups, actors’ and
writers’ guilds, and local theaters. The performances included
traditional plays as well as dance festivals and musical perfor-
mances. The Cinema Division worked in cooperation with U.S.
cinematography companies to develop short propaganda films
and wartime news broadcasts that were shown as movie trail-
ers. This division also participated in establishing mobile cin-
ematic exhibitions, which traveled throughout Mexico show-
ing propaganda films in small towns and villages that did not
have movie theaters. The Cinema Division immediately be-
gan cooperating with Rockefeller’s oiaa to produce and dis-
seminate wartime propaganda films.
Because the U.S. film industry was more developed in the
1940s, the Cinema Division did not become as involved in
producing propaganda as the Radio and Printed Propaganda
divisions. As part of emergency wartime measures, the gov-
ernment tightened its censorship over films being produced
and shown in the country. Numerous Hollywood war films
were shown throughout Mexico, and the oiaa collaborated
in producing several Mexican-made films, but the national
film industry did not produce many directly propagandistic
films.59 Nevertheless, immediately after Mexico declared war,
the film company Estudios Aztecas began work on a war-
related film.
Soy puro mexicano, directed by Emilio “Indio” Fernández
and produced by Raúl de Anda, was released in the fall of

140 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

1942.60 The film offered a comedic interpretation of a ma-
cho confronting three Axis saboteurs in a village in Jalisco.
Through his bravery and manliness, he defeats the German,
Italian, and Japanese spies. The film presented an extremely
patriotic version of Mexico’s role in the war and demonstrated
that a “uniquely Mexican” characteristic, such as machismo,
could be indispensable for winning the war.61 Despite its patri-
otic bent, the film received only mediocre reviews and failed
to attract large audiences.62
Several films released in 1943 were produced in conjunction
with the oiaa. ¡Espionaje en el golfo! depicted a fictionalized
Axis spy ring and tied the purported espionage to the real-life
sinking of Mexican tankers in the summer of 1942.63 Tres her-
manos told the story of three Mexican-born brothers living in
the United States who decided to enlist in the U.S. military in
order to defend the cause of freedom and democracy.64 The
more subtly propagandistic films tended to be the most well
received by the population. Mexican filmmakers worked to-
gether with Rockefeller’s oiaa to produce ¡Mexicanos al grito
de guerra! Historia del himno nacional in 1943. The film told
the story of the national struggle against European imperi-
alism during the 1860s French Intervention, but the themes
of conservative enemies (fascism) against the noble forces of
democracy (Mexico) tied the film in important ways to the
nation’s experiences in World War II.65 Cooperation between
the U.S. and Mexican film industries strengthened as the war
progressed, and the oiaa remained a dominant force in that
collaborative relationship. The environment created by the
war combined with vital assistance from the United States
laid the foundation for what is considered the “Golden Age”
of Mexican cinema in the 1940s and into the 1950s.66

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Conference and Competition Division

The ofp’s Conference and Competition Division worked in

cooperation with intellectuals, public educators, religious
leaders, and conference organizers to sponsor various public
events in promoting of the war effort. Conferences, public ral-
lies, and general celebrations fell under the responsibility of
this division. The Conference and Competition Division or-
ganized contests in which individuals competed for best pa-
triotic plays, movies, poems, posters, comics, and corridos.
Through this division, the government hoped to encourage
the people to participate in the propaganda war by produc-
ing their own pro-Allied material.

Administrative Division

Finally, the Division of Distribution, Operations, and Reg-

istration was the administrative arm of the ofp. It saw that
propaganda materials were distributed as required and also
monitored the propaganda initiative to ensure that pro-
government and pro-Allied messages had the desired effect on
the public. It served as an internal review for the other divi-
sions, constantly monitoring the propaganda being produced
and evaluating it for its efﬁcacy. The ofp employed a total of
nineteen people under its initial organizational structure.

Less than a month after it was established, the Oficina

Federal de Propaganda had changed names to the Comisión
Coordinadora de Propaganda Nacional (ccpn; Coordinating
Commission for National Propaganda), directed by Adolfo
Fernández Bustamante. By June 24, 1942, Fernández had re-
ﬁned the agency’s approach toward the propaganda campaign.

142 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

He devised a three-month strategy, which he believed would
be the surest and quickest way to develop loyalty to the nation
and to the cause of democracy.67 His basic strategy involved
thirteen weekly propaganda themes, which were used in news-
paper advertisements, radio spots, movie trailers, and public
festivals. The ccpn devised these themes in a chronological
fashion to tell the story of how Mexico became involved in
the war, how the Allies could win the war, and what the na-
tion’s role would be among the Allies after the war. The ccpn
outlined its budget for the rest of 1942. The ofﬁce planned
to spend over 1.3 million pesos on a campaign that included
10,000 balloons, 100,000 posters, 200,000 corridos, 20,000
ﬂyers, and 300,000 pamphlets.68 The budget included 39,000
pesos for government-sponsored public celebrations in Mexico
City and in all the state capitals.
The agency worked diligently throughout 1942. It dedi-
cated considerable resources to producing propaganda and it
immediately generated powerful wartime messages. Members
of the ccpn understood that the Avila Camacho administra-
tion needed widespread public support in its wartime policies,
and they largely succeeded in winning that support. The pub-
lic responded with fear and indignation to the German sub-
marine attacks, and a widespread patriotic movement spread
across the country in the months following the attacks. Much
of the public’s patriotic zeal can be connected to the govern-
ment propaganda campaign, but an immediate patriotic re-
action after the German attack on Mexican ships is a natural
response. Throughout 1942, government leaders attempted to
monitor national sentiment and public opinion. They found
that the popular reaction included a new component of war-
time rhetoric—one that moved beyond general government

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 143

themes of freedom and nationalism. Many citizens recalled
sentiments of revolutionary nationalism, and their responses
incorporated that rhetoric into their expression about World
War II.

Public Response

Most of the country reacted swiftly and patriotically in the

wake of the German attacks. Initially, the public seemed to
support Avila Camacho’s decision to declare a state of war.
Public-opinion polls conducted by Tiempo magazine in May
1942 reflected the dramatic shift in public sentiment. In the
May 20 poll, nearly 60 percent of respondents answered no
when asked if Mexico should enter the war. Members of left-
ist organizations and government-employed workers made
up the majority of those who favored war. The “man in the
street” and other social and political groups clearly opposed
Mexico’s entrance into the hostilities.69 Only nine days later,
over 80 percent of Mexicans polled in a new survey believed
the government’s actions were proper.70 Previous studies have
attributed this popular support to the government’s gradual
shifting of its official diplomatic policy in support of the United
States and the Allies.71 Others have pointed to U.S. and British
propaganda efforts that had been ongoing since the beginning
of the war.72 These studies fail to consider Mexico’s history of
authoritarianism, which many believed had ended with the
perceived democratic achievements of the 1910 revolution.
For many, the new totalitarian threat posed by the German
attacks renewed their revolutionary patriotism.
In times of international crises, a society will often push
aside domestic political differences, in what sociologists call
the “rally around the flag” effect.73 In the summer of 1942,

144 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

Mexicans quickly “rallied around the flag” to meet the chal-
lenge of world war.74 The national unity that Avila Camacho
was trying to achieve as a domestic program came in response
to the international crisis. At the time of Tiempo’s second poll,
the president had already declared war against the Axis. The
shift in the results could demonstrate that Mexicans fell under
theories of social response by reacting to a perceived threat to
their security with a united front behind their leader. But in the
1940s that social response and patriotism were also affected
by the country’s recent experience with revolution.
The nature of Mexicans’ nationalism compelled them to
look to their past to understand the state of war. The German
submarine attacks had physically threatened national honor,
and the nation united to defend it. Before the attacks, Mexicans
tended to remember their most recent wartime enemies as
other Mexicans.75 The Mexican Revolution had been the most
deadly and violent military engagement in the nation’s his-
tory. Ten years of warfare at the national level were followed
by more than a decade of smaller local skirmishes and near-
constant political infighting. During that time, Mexican fought
Mexican as families were torn apart and people who had once
been friends and neighbors chose sides and faced off on the
battlefield. In the 1940s, much of the adult population had
a living memory of a time when their own countrymen were
the greatest and most immediate enemy.76 The submarine at-
tacks in 1942 provided the entire country with a new enemy
that resided outside their national borders. After recent de-
cades of fighting each other and remaining ideologically di-
vided, Mexicans joined together in May 1942 to fight Nazi
Germany, the nation’s newest and most immediate enemy.
The unified response to German aggression fit nicely within

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 145

the national unity campaign that the government had initi-
ated in the 1930s. Beginning with the Cárdenas administra-
tion, political leaders understood that for Mexico to move
forward, the country needed to put aside its revolutionary
differences and unite for the betterment of all. Cárdenas had
launched the Committee for National Unity, which became
the basis for Avila Camacho’s national unity campaign, and
the Cárdenas administration succeeded in uniting much of the
country around its oil policy. For Mexicans in 1938, national
unity was cultural and economic in nature and aimed at chal-
lenging the British, Dutch, Germans, and others. The initial
support created by Cárdenas’s move against the oil compa-
nies was stiﬂed quickly by economic hardships, growing divi-
sions among the left, competing interests among revolutionary
groups, and concern among national industrialists. Business
leaders became increasingly alarmed at the accommodating
relationship developing between the government and the la-
bor movement.77 National unity following the German sub-
marine attacks did not threaten internal interests. Although
many Mexicans had sympathized with the Axis powers in the
early years of the conﬂict, they would not tolerate a direct at-
tack upon Mexican citizens.
Mexico’s entry into World War II, in addition to provid-
ing a foundation for national unity, had another meaningful
consequence. Ideological divisions had run deep in the 1930s.
Arguments over revolutionary reforms were common, and rev-
olutionaries challenged programs they considered contrary to
their objectives. Many ordinary citizens felt betrayed by the
revolution and questioned what the country had achieved af-
ter so much violence and destruction. They wondered what
outcomes of the revolution Mexicans could look to with pride.

146 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

World War II provided the answer, and the answer was prog-
ress toward a more democratic and just society. To many
Mexicans, the Allied attempts to defeat the totalitarian Axis
powers became an extension of the democratic goals of their
own revolution.
Letters of wartime support written to Avila Camacho of-
fer one of the best sources for analyzing popular reaction and
memory after the declaration of war.78 Ordinary people from
all over the country wrote to the president to express general
support and allegiance to the government in response to the
declaration of war. The 847 letters in the files contain more
than 1,500 signatories. Many appear to be part of organized,
neighborhood letter-writing campaigns, while others are spon-
taneous and individual demonstrations of support. Most were
written and mailed between May and October 1942. More
than 40 percent of the writers offered their general service to
the government, using phrases such as “a sus ordenes” (at your
service), while 25 percent specifically volunteered for military
service to protect the country. Many offering to enlist iden-
tified themselves as former soldiers, with 227 claiming to be
ex-revolutionaries and an additional 203 claiming more gen-
erally to be ex-military men. The occupations of the writers
included doctors, lawyers, scientists, teachers, telegraph op-
erators, farmers, factory workers, and even prisoners.
Another large collection of letters came from government
bureaucrats and politicians. The national archive includes thou-
sands of letters of support from political groups, politicians,
and bureaucrats, but this type of letter writing was common
for such groups at the time. Individuals and groups seeking
political favor frequently wrote letters of support and con-
gratulations following any major presidential decision. While

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 147

letters of this sort reveal even larger numbers of supporters for
Avila Camacho’s decision, they demonstrate little in the way
of popular opinion, because many political respondents typ-
ically wrote their letters of support lest their oversight be no-
ticed by someone important, or they wrote supportive letters
in response to direction from their superiors.
Nearly all citizens who wrote letters volunteered for some
kind of service to their government in the time of crisis.
Generally, professionals offered services that related to their
occupations. Doctors and nurses frequently volunteered their
medical expertise as necessary to care for victims of the mili-
tary conﬂict. In the spirit of hemispheric defense and military
cooperation, many teachers offered to teach English to mem-
bers of the army or to give Spanish lessons to soldiers in the
U.S. armed forces.79 Often telegraph operators felt their ser-
vices could be useful in monitoring communications within
the country in an effort to combat potential Axis espionage
activities.80 Less educated Mexicans such as farmers and fac-
tory workers adopted the government’s rhetoric of producing
to fulﬁll their patriotic duty. Most prisoners who wrote let-
ters asked to have their sentences suspended so that they could
serve in the military in defense of la patria. Usually they also
promised that when the crisis was over, they would return to
prison to serve the remainder of their sentences.81
Regional variations existed within the series of letters. Nearly
30 percent of the letters came from Mexico City, suggesting
that proximity to the national government facilitated commu-
nication between citizens and their president. Nevertheless,
letters came from nearly all Mexican states.82 Nearly all of
the letters were typed, suggesting that many letter writers em-
ployed professional scribes and that many illiterate people

148 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

were participating in the letter-writing campaign. The num-
ber of doctors, professors, engineers, and other profession-
als who listed their occupation demonstrates that there were
also many literate letter writers.83 Several hundred letters of
support do not indicate that public approval of wartime pol-
icies was universal, or even that the majority of the country
held the same beliefs. Furthermore, the public response ex-
pressed in the letter-writing movement does not establish the
extent to which people were swayed by the incipient govern-
ment propaganda campaign. But the combination of regions,
employment, and socioeconomic backgrounds indicates that
the sentiments of the letter writers were relatively widespread
and can provide a measure of popular response to the decla-
ration of war. The popular responses in the letters of support
do not demonstrate that everyone agreed about the meaning
of the war, but they do strongly suggest a considerable shift
in support for the war.
The greatest value of these letters comes not from their use
as a source for statistical analysis but rather from their con-
tent. When examining the language used in the letters, it be-
comes clear that many people had turned to the revolution to
understand the country’s participation in the war. Since the
onset of that conflict in 1910, people had been creating, alter-
ing, and re-creating the meaning of the revolution in the con-
text of their personal experiences.84 Through the letter-writing
campaigns in the summer of 1942, many people found new
meaning in the revolution through the lens of World War II.
Some letter writers referred to national heroes or historical
events that they identified with the current crisis. The specif-
ics varied by region, but a common theme based on the revo-
lution runs through many of the letters. Specifically, Mexicans

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 149

seemed to identify the revolution as a struggle between au-
thoritarianism and democracy in which democracy emerged
victorious. While references to the revolution do not appear
in all of the letters, the ubiquity with which they do is signifi-
cant. It indicates that during World War II the revolution be-
came a unifying national event about which many Mexicans
could be proud.
In his May 25, 1942, letter, Alberto Salgado from Guerrero
exclaimed that he has always “placed himself in front of a
fistful of men to defend the conquests of the revolution. All
of us Mexicans have the unavoidable obligation to sacrifice
ourselves for la patria.”85 Pedro Cananas expressed his patri-
otic sentiments, “During our past struggles, we have always
faithfully confronted enemy weapons to defend the rights of
the revolution.” He specified those rights to be “maintain-
ing absolute freedom.”86 Roberto Gardia de León S. consid-
ered the Axis powers to be “enemies of freedom and democ-
racy.”87 Many writers pointed to their ancestors who always
fulfilled their patriotic duties to defend freedom and democ-
racy. Felipe Gutiérrez considered it contemptible that any vet-
erans of the revolution would remain idle, “without offering
their services to la patria.”88
Letter writers who did not specifically mention the revolu-
tion often used patriotic language nonetheless. A letter from
Jalisco claimed that “peace is a beautiful thing, but has no
value without honor.”89 J. José Luís Rodríguez Mata from
Zacatecas recognized that Mexico was poorly armed com-
pared to its Axis enemies, but he recalled that Mexicans had
always defended the sovereignty of their nation with heroism
and brave hearts.90 World War II brought a renewed sense of

150 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

honor and national pride to many Mexicans who had begun
to lose confidence in their revolutionary government.
Many of the 227 self-identified ex-revolutionaries indi-
cated their affiliation during the revolution. One supporter
from Mexico City fought proudly against the 1916 Punitive
Expedition.91 Eusebio Nieto Cervantes from Michoacán fought
against de la Huerta in 1923.92 Some identified themselves as
Villistas, some as Zapatistas, and others as Constitutionalists.
The varied revolutionary affiliations reveal that even oppos-
ing revolutionary interests made the same type of connections
between World War II and the country’s revolutionary past.
They demonstrate the collective experience of the revolution
as unifying. Those connections specifically centered on World
War II and the Mexican Revolution as mutual struggles for
such notions as freedom, democracy, and la patria. The Nazi
threat allowed many people to move past the revolutionary
affiliations that had divided them. Regardless of the sides they
took beginning in 1910, the experience of the revolution itself
brought unity to these revolutionaries in 1942.
Another important demonstration of patriotism and sup-
port came from Mexicans residing in the United States. As
part of a bilateral defense agreement with the United States,
Mexico allowed its residents living there to be drafted into the
U.S. military. More than 150,000 Mexicans became members
of the U.S. military under this agreement. An impressive sta-
tistic came from Mexican consulates across the United States.
Between July and September 1942, over 60,000 Mexicans liv-
ing in the United States had visited their local consulate to offer
to return home to serve in the Mexican military to defend the
honor of la patria. Many Mexicans living abroad wrote letters
of support to Avila Camacho, offering their services.93

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 151

Many letter writers had not been ardent Avila Camacho
supporters before the war, and others felt that the revolution
had abandoned them before 1942. In a letter dated May 30,
Román Campos Viveros from Mexico City admitted to having
participated in “action against the government” in 1940, but
he supported Avila Camacho’s war policy.94 Enrique Arévalo of
Veracruz wrote: “having been a supporter of General Almazán
in the last electoral campaign—I now place myself at your ser-
vice.”95 World War II provided the president the opportunity
to unite the nation politically for the ﬁrst time since the over-
throw of Porﬁrio Díaz in 1911.
In addition to the letter-writing campaign, people demon-
strated their support and patriotism in other ways. Newspaper
editorials reiterated the sentiments of many letter writers by
relating revolutionary democracy and the threat of world war.
A September opinion piece in El Universal declared that after
the divisions and armas fratricidas (fratricidal warfare) of the
1910 revolution, World War II has brought peace to Mexico.96
Other people showed their support by joining the local defen-
sive leagues that formed throughout the country, and many
participated in numerous public celebrations throughout the
summer of 1942.
After Mexico joined the war, many citizens expressed their
patriotic sentiments in war-related songs and poetry. Individual
expressions through poetry and corridos offer yet one more
lens into popular responses to the declaration of war. Just as
letter writers used national heroes and references to the revo-
lution in their wartime rhetoric, so did other Mexicans when
composing poems and songs. Revolutionary veteran Elías I.
López sent a patriotic poem to President Avila Camacho in
the summer of 1942:

152 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

Mexican!
It is your country that is speaking and calling you
And it wishes to gather its children around
It is the shadow of Hidalgo that is searching for you
As is the shadow of Morelos97

López had fought as a ﬁrst captain in the Constitutionalist

Army of the Revolution, and his poem reﬂects a strong con-
nection to the country’s history and national heroes. He ex-
pressed admiration for Mexicans who were noble in peace but
who did not back down in time of war. Other patriotic po-
ems made speciﬁc reference to the German submarine attacks.
Trivinio Valdéz, a Mexican immigrant living in California,
wrote a poem which declared that if the Axis powers did not
compensate Mexico adequately for its losses, “there will be
a great revolution.”98
Other people expressed their patriotism by composing and
singing corridos. Corridos have been a part of Mexican cul-
ture since the time of the Spanish conquistadores, who intro-
duced Spanish musical romances to the Western Hemisphere.
Over time, corridos became transformed into one of the most
important forms of popular expression. Corridos tradition-
ally have taken up themes that are important to ordinary peo-
ple such as political events, natural disasters, and love stories.
More common in rural areas, the traditional folk music became
a form of entertainment and a news medium for the illiterate
population before the days of radio and television. Frequently,
corridos were written to tell the story of current events, and
Mexicans outside of urban areas relied on them to remain in-
formed of what was happening in the country.99 In the twen-
tieth century, musicians wrote corridos to the revolution as

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 153

well as to the deaths of many of its heroes. In the years imme-
diately prior to World War II, the most common corridos dealt
with policies of the Cárdenas administration, such as oil ex-
propriation and land redistribution.100 Corridos in the 1930s
also took up political themes such as the attempted Cedillo
revolt and the presidential elections of 1940.
Most corridos written about local events ignored the devel-
oping situation in Europe prior to 1942. For the rural popu-
lation especially, the growing tensions in Europe seemed too
far away to have much of an impact on their daily lives. A few
corridos dealing with the Spanish Civil War circulated in the
country, but by and large corrido musicians ignored the on-
set of world war in 1939. By the summer of 1942, however,
World War II had become a dominant theme of the popular
folk music. Beginning with the attack on Pearl Harbor, peo-
ple reacted to the new threat close to their shores. Guillermo
Argote’s “Corrido de la traición japonesa” (Corrido of the
Japanese betrayal) emphasized that the treacherous attack
on the United States was unprovoked and illustrated the im-
morality of the Axis.101
The public outcry against the German submarine attacks
of May 1942 was manifested in the tradition of the corrido.
Several corridos to the Potrero del Llano and to the Faja de
Oro were composed and performed across the country. They
emphasized that the attacks occurred on Mexico’s territory
and that fellow countrymen had lost their lives.102 Corridos
often named the victims who had been killed in the attacks
and called on Mexicans to defend their honor.103 Other cor-
ridos pushed the government’s theme of unity:

Today the entire patria

Without [political] party distinction

154 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

Has united her sons
Under the heroic ﬂag.104

Late in 1942, the corrido tradition attracted the attention of

the oiaa. Seeing an opportunity to promote the folk culture of
Mexico to the U.S. public, Rockefeller’s office published a spe-
cial report in the October issue of its English-language journal
on U.S.–Latin American relations, Inter-American Monthly.
The article, titled “Mexico’s Corrido Goes to War,” featured
the “Corrido de la guerra” with lyrics by Rodolfo Lozada.105
Lozada’s corrido is one of the most comprehensive in its cov-
erage of the unfolding of hostilities in Europe, Axis atroci-
ties against civilian populations, and the German attacks on
Mexico. The corrido illustrates a broader trend that had de-
veloped in Mexico in the summer of 1942 to associate the
country’s involvement in World War II with defending its na-
tional honor. Lozada provided a thorough account of European
events in World War II, which was summarized in the oiaa
article. He stressed that Mexico had always sympathized with
oppressed people and would fight for the victims of hate and
barbarism. Lozada promoted oiaa objectives by stating that
Mexico was involved in the war, “working side by side with
England and the United States, her sister nations.” His cor-
rido also supported Avila Camacho’s goals of national unity,
but urging Mexicans to support their president in wartime cri-
sis.106 The corrido included an image of a traditional Mexican
figure on a horse, chasing down and trapping a Nazi tank
with his lasso (figure 13). The image added a Mexican com-
ponent to the Allied fight against the Axis and conveyed the
idea that Mexican involvement would make an importance
difference in the war.

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 155

fig. 13. “Corrido de la guerra” (illustration). Reprinted from “Mexico’s
Corrido Goes to War,” Inter-American Monthly 1, no. 6 (October 1942).

Corridos had a long tradition in Mexico as expressions of

national history through popular memory.107 But in recent years,
the popular folk songs had also been used by competing polit-
ical factions as a way to win popular support. Revolutionary
leaders had appropriated the corrido as a form of ideological
propaganda targeting the nation’s illiterate masses.108 That
trend continued in the decades following the revolution as
competing political leaders sought to use the popular expres-
sion as a way to reinforce specific notions of identity onto the
nation. The historical record does not always reveal the or-
igin of Mexican corridos. Therefore, it is difficult to discern
which folk songs were spontaneous and genuine individual
expressions and which were commissioned by government
propagandists. Furthermore, there is no indication that the
sentiments expressed in corridos were widespread or that the
songs succeeded in swaying public opinion. What is signifi-
cant is that the messages they contained were disseminated

156 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

and received by a large portion of the population. The impor-
tance of corridos and the letter-writing campaign is that the
messages were being heard and that many people expressed
their sentiments in similar ways.

Conclusion

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Mexican gov-

ernment moved the country even closer to an alliance with the
United States. On the diplomatic level, the Avila Camacho ad-
ministration participated in hemispheric conferences and en-
tered into new bilateral commercial and defense agreements
with the United States. On the popular level, the government
began to consider developing a national propaganda campaign.
German submarine attacks against Mexican ships in May 1942
pushed the Mexican government into action. Avila Camacho
declared an official state of war and established a government
propaganda agency to produce wartime information. The ofp,
and later the ccpn, produced posters, radio spots, and other
propaganda that initially reminded the public that the coun-
try had been attacked and encouraged Mexicans to increase
industrial output for the war effort. The country responded to
the attacks with widespread support for the president in the
summer of 1942, and much of the wartime rhetoric mirrored
official government propaganda. Other responses introduced
the revolution into the public wartime dialogue.
Popular responses to World War II can test historical so-
ciologists’ theories of social response and patriotism. Many
of the arguments those theories propose can contribute to an
analysis of Mexicans’ collective memory of the revolution af-
ter the German attacks. The crisis allowed the society to rely
on unified notions of national identity in responding to an

a revoluti onary mural of propaganda | 157

outside threat.109 Some studies have found that for societal ex-
istence, individuals have to believe they constitute a society and
that they have something in common uniting them. Moreover,
within that society, people have a basic need to define them-
selves positively.110 World War II provided this positive iden-
tification for Mexico. In comparison to Germany, Italy, and
Japan, Mexicans saw noble qualities in their society despite the
negative aspects of revolution. Many in the country expressed
common beliefs in democracy versus authoritarianism. They
remembered their revolution as a fight against the same kind
of dictatorial regime they saw in the Axis powers.
As Mexico became involved in the conflict, its citizenry did
not look to the United States or western Europe as the repre-
sentatives of freedom and democracy. Instead, many looked
to their own nation and created their own mural of propa-
ganda through their memories of the revolution. After all, in
the minds of many people, Mexico had started the move to-
ward democratic revolutions in 1910. Ordinary Mexicans
and those writing the official story looked to the struggle in
which revolutionary forces united to remove an authoritarian
dictator. To many in the 1940s, the authoritarianism of the
Porfiriato became synonymous with the wave of totalitarian-
ism that was sweeping across Europe. Just as famous mural-
ists in the 1920s created a popular memory based on revolu-
tionary nationalism, many individuals in the 1940s created a
new memory based on their own circumstances. They made
a new, short-term metaphoric revolutionary mural through
their wartime rhetoric in 1942. They emphasized the revolu-
tion as a fight to replace totalitarianism with democracy, and
they saw the war in Europe as an extension of their own dem-
ocratic revolution.

158 | a revoluti onary mural of propaganda

4
Soup Can Propaganda

The oiaa and the American Way of Life, 1942–1943

Commercial-illustrator-turned-pop-culture-artist Andy Warhol

exhibited a painting in 1962 that would become his signature
work and that introduced a new genre in twentieth-century
art. Warhol’s 32 Campbell’s Soup Cans showed in the Ferus
Gallery in Los Angeles and made an important statement about
consumer culture in the twentieth century. Warhol proceeded
to produce an entire series of paintings that relied on the same
theme over the next six years. By featuring Campbell’s soup
labels in a variety of sizes, shapes, conditions, and numbers,
his work reflected a society whose popular culture had be-
come dominated by a combination of mass-media advertis-
ing and mass production. His art served as a critique of U.S.
mass communications advertising, through which brand names
had become both celebrated and banal at the same time. By
using the same image repeatedly in his art, Warhol mimicked
the condition of sameness brought about by mass advertising
and mass production.1
Warhol’s “soup can” art reflected conditions that had
been developing in U.S. culture for decades. It also serves as
a metaphor for the type of wartime propaganda that the oiaa
developed and distributed in Latin America two decades be-
fore his initial exhibition. Rockefeller’s agency identified two
main objectives during its blueprint phase before the attack on
Pearl Harbor. First, the agency aimed to assist other U.S. gov-
ernment agencies in protecting national security by bolstering
hemispheric defense. Second, it wanted to protect U.S. eco-
nomic stability by encouraging close commercial relations be-
tween the United States and Latin American countries during
and after the war. These two objectives came to dominate the
agency’s propaganda campaign from 1942 through 1943.
To achieve those objectives after Pearl Harbor, two main
themes emerged in the oiaa’s wartime information. As a re-
sult of U.S. mobilization for war, propaganda emphasized the
strength of the U.S. armed forces. The oiaa began publish-
ing and distributing a monthly magazine, En guardia, which
featured photographs and stories that glorified U.S. military
might. The agency developed radio programs that dramatized
the heroic efforts of the U.S. armed forces in Europe, Africa,
and Asia and produced posters and pamphlets that took up the
military theme as well. Finally, the Motion Picture Division as-
sisted in the production of wartime movies, shorts, and news-
reels, all of which portrayed the U.S. military as a formidable
fighting force that assured victory. The combination of pro-
paganda techniques through the various forms of mass me-
dia underscored the first theme—that the Allies, led by the
U.S. military, would win the war. Underlying this emphasis
on victory, oiaa propaganda encouraged Latin Americans to
join the winning side.
Another theme supported both the defensive and economic
objectives of the oiaa’s mission. Agency propagandists pushed
wartime messages promoting the “American way of life.”2

160 | soup can propaganda

Rockefeller’s office hoped to instill a sense of unity throughout
the Americas based on common goals and common lifestyles.
Propaganda aimed to instill a notion of hemispheric unity de-
fined by U.S. cultural leadership. Military themes dominated
En guardia, but the magazine also featured stories that por-
trayed U.S. society as unified and equally mobilized for the
war effort. En guardia aimed to show the strength and satis-
faction of the U.S. workforce and the appeal of the middle-
class lifestyle, all in the context of wartime unity. The oiaa
developed radio programs and films that promoted a mid-
dle-class version of the American way of life. Posters and
pamphlets focused more on hemispheric unity, but their mes-
sages always placed the United States as the leader of a uni-
fied Western Hemisphere.
Throughout 1942 and 1943 the oiaa developed additional
programs that did not rely on sending wartime messages di-
rectly to the public but instead served as a type of indirect pro-
paganda. Programs such as the Railway Mission and the pro-
gram to settle border water disputes provided a platform for
the agency to develop strategies that benefited the Mexican
economy, while at the same time strengthening the commer-
cial bonds between the two countries. Indirect propaganda
programs that portrayed the United States less as a domi-
neering, imperialist power and more as a good neighbor fre-
quently created results that were favorable to Mexico. More
importantly, the agency aimed to demonstrate that the United
States was a strategic economic partner who shared impor-
tant common interests with Mexico. By strengthening those
commercial ties, the oiaa hoped to reinforce the bonds of
wartime alliance and, by extension, the commerce between
the two nations.

soup can propaganda | 161

The social conditions that inspired the spirit of Andy
Warhol’s 1960s art had their origins in the 1940s. Warhol’s
32 Campbell’s Soup Cans relied on the mundane repetition of
mass-produced brand names through mass advertising and the
consumerism it engendered as a form of social articulation.
U.S. propaganda in Latin America during World War II serves
as a precursor to Warhol’s new trends in artistic expression.
Rockefeller and the oiaa relied on mass-media advertising
through motion pictures, radio, and print to promote a ver-
sion of the American way of life that was deﬁned by U.S. con-
sumer culture and leadership to Latin Americans. The agency
combined indirect propaganda with direct wartime messages
to win Latin Americans’ support during World War II and to
advance U.S. economic and security objectives.

From Blueprint to Soup Cans

Until December 1941, the oiaa seemed to expend much of its

energy in bureaucratic wrangling with other U.S. government
agencies and trying to establish its own operating philoso-
phy. Just as the attack on Pearl Harbor marked a major turn-
ing point in the Mexican government’s involvement in war-
time propaganda, so too did it change the oiaa’s approach to
war information for all of Latin America. After Pearl Harbor,
Rockefeller’s agency moved beyond the planning stage to put
its propaganda plans into action.
During its blueprint phase, the oiaa articulated the philoso-
phy and objectives for its operations in Latin America. It pub-
lished the Philosophy and Organization of the Office of the
Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs late in 1941.3 This doc-
ument justified propaganda activities in Latin America by de-
fining the region’s importance and outlining a specific mentality

162 | soup can propaganda

or credo the agency hoped to instill in Latin Americans. It also
delineated the strategy the oiaa would employ to ensure that
Latin Americans recognized the Axis threat and supported
the Allied cause.4
Rockefeller and his agents believed that the United States
needed Latin America’s economic and defensive support dur-
ing the war. Economically, the United States needed access to
raw materials that Latin American nations could provide to
aid in the war effort. Although the agency hesitated to iden-
tify Latin American nations openly, earlier trade agreements
reached with Mexico and trade statistics between the two
countries during the war years indicate that Mexico was one
of the United States’ most important suppliers of war mate-
rials and therefore a major component in the economic strat-
egy. Militarily, Rockefeller’s office defined Latin America as
the right flank of the United States. With Mexico bordering
more than half of the southern United States, it became a vi-
tal part of military objectives as well.
Rockefeller’s office produced the “U.S. Credo for the
Individual Citizen of Latin America” and incorporated this
philosophy into its propaganda strategy.5 The credo included
four main points. First, Latin Americans needed to understand
that their best interests were linked with the United States. This
part of the credo attempted to persuade Latin Americans that
a close relationship with the United States ensured a better
life for all. Second, the credo urged Latin Americans to under-
stand that their interests would be harmed by the Axis pow-
ers. The oiaa emphasized Axis plans for world domination,
which included subjugating the countries of Latin America.
The agency publicized atrocities committed by the Axis pow-
ers in occupied areas of Europe and Asia. Third, the credo

soup can propaganda | 163

promoted the idea that the United States was going to win
the war because of its military, economic, and moral strength.
Fourth, the credo aimed to persuade Latin Americans to sup-
port the United States and to cooperate for victory by mak-
ing personal sacrifices and helping to produce goods needed
for the war effort.
At the same time, the agency adopted a general propaganda
strategy, which included themes to be emphasized through ra-
dio, motion pictures, and print.6 The first themes contrasted
U.S. strengths with the evils of the Axis. Propaganda focused
on emphasizing the mutually beneficial relationship between
the United States and Latin American nations. This premise,
titled “Relations of the Americas,” sought to promote the part
of the credo that tied Latin Americans’ interests to those of the
United States.7 The main message promoted hemispheric unity
and urged Latin Americans to identify themselves as Americans.
Hemispheric unity became one of the most important aspects
of the oiaa’s propaganda strategy for Latin America.
The oiaa used Pan-Americanism to try to forge a shared
American identity throughout the hemisphere. Although the
agency never outlined its definition of “American,” its pro-
paganda messages suggest certain definitions. The oiaa used
the geographic boundaries of the Western Hemisphere to de-
fine Americans, but it excluded Canada. Although Americans
technically came from all parts of Latin America, the oiaa
emphasized Mexico and Brazil in keeping with the underly-
ing economic objective. The agency also defined Americans
as defenders of democracy. The notion of democracy became
problematic as many Latin American countries at the time
had regimes where democracy was questionable at best. The
agency resolved this potential conflict in another aspect of its

164 | soup can propaganda

definition of American. The oiaa produced propaganda that
modeled a definition of American after the United States, which
complemented other propaganda themes as well. It promoted
the notion of the American way of life through political and
economic institutions as well as through social and cultural
trends. This emphasis allowed the agency to overlook undem-
ocratic regimes in Latin America while promoting the United
States as a role model for the hemisphere.
Another propaganda theme emphasized the “Axis Menace
to Freedom,” in which the oiaa insisted that Latin American
interests would be harmed by an Axis victory.8 As part of the
call to unity, the United States identified a common external
enemy. In its Latin American propaganda, the oiaa denounced
the Axis powers, and particularly Nazi Germany, as the enemy
of all of the Americas. This message served as a counterpart
to the notion of the American republics united by a common
dedication to democracy. The oiaa stressed the ideological dif-
ferences that separated fascist powers from the democratically
oriented American republics. The message was quite effective,
and the Mexican government used it in its own national war-
time propaganda campaign. Mexicans identified many of the
Axis actions and strategies not only as an affront to their way
of life but also as a general attack on humanity.
Two other propaganda themes placed an emphasis on U.S.
victory in the war and its position as a world leader after
the war. “We Will Win the War” claimed that because of its
strengths, the United States would win the war, and initially
the agency tried to minimize the difficulties the United States
faced in the military campaigns.9 Throughout 1942 and 1943,
U.S. military strength became another major theme in oiaa
propaganda. Finally, the agency attempted to parlay wartime

soup can propaganda | 165

support into support for the United States after the war. This
“We Will Win the Peace” message pushed the notion of U.S.
leadership and the American way of life even further.10 It sug-
gested that a wartime alliance with the United States would
bring greater prosperity to Latin American nations after the
war. Much of the propaganda under this theme implied that
American prosperity would be characterized by greater access
to consumer goods and living a middle-class lifestyle. Coupled
with its message of hemispheric unity through American prin-
ciples, the oiaa promoted the United States as the appropri-
ate leader for the hemisphere. In much of its propaganda, the
agency suggested that being American meant being like the
United States.
Before the United States became involved in World War II,
Rockefeller’s office had time to organize and articulate the
agency’s official philosophy and objectives. After the attack
on Pearl Harbor, the agency rushed to put its plan into place.
Although some agency programs had started earlier in 1941
and many were in the planning stages prior to Pearl Harbor,
the official declaration of war created a sense of urgency in
carrying out oiaa programs in Latin America. The scope of
oiaa activities increased throughout 1942 and after in the re-
gion, becoming more numerous and more aggressive in war-
time propaganda.

The Coordinating Committee for Mexico

Rockefeller considered his agency’s need to inﬂuence individual

countries at the local level. In the summer of 1941, agency of-
ﬁcials devised a strategy to create semi-ofﬁcial bodies to repre-
sent the oiaa in each Latin American country. Rockefeller be-
gan to create coordinating committees made up of prominent

166 | soup can propaganda

U.S. citizens already living in Latin America. Working in con-
junction with the State Department and U.S. embassies, the
oiaa appointed committee members, who agreed to work vol-
untarily without pay. Comprising primarily U.S. businessmen,
the coordinating committees administered oiaa propaganda
projects, oversaw cultural exchange programs, and served as
advisers on economic issues.11
In October 1941, oiaa representatives traveled to Mexico
City and, with the help of the U.S. embassy, established the
Coordinating Committee for Mexico. They selected represen-
tatives from some of the most vital industries in U.S.-Mexican
commercial relations. The committee’s chairman was James R.
Woodul, general manager of American Smelting and Refining
Company, and the vice-chairman was a partner in a major U.S.
law firm operating in Mexico. W. S. Sollenberger, the assistant
executive secretary, also served as vice-president of Anasteca
Petroleum Company. Other U.S. businesses represented in the
committee’s membership included General Electric, General
Motors, National City Bank of New York, the Sydney Ross
Company, Colgate Palmolive, Baldwin Locomotive Works,
National Paper and Type Company, and Price Waterhouse.12
The committee’s makeup underscored that the activities of the
oiaa prioritized strengthening economic ties between the two
countries and encouraging a consumer culture in Mexico.
The Coordinating Committee for Mexico immediately
formed subcommittees to focus on its local objectives. By
mid-1943 the committee had established twenty-one regional
subcommittees in major cities throughout the country. Other
subcommittees concentrated on specific propaganda activities.
One of the most active subcommittees specialized in commu-
nications and propaganda and worked in cooperation with

soup can propaganda | 167

the oiaa’s Motion Picture, Radio, and Press and Publications
divisions.13 Throughout 1942 and 1943, these forms of mass
media produced an aggressive propaganda campaign.

Motion Picture Division

The Motion Picture Division included representatives from

Paramount Pictures, Price Waterhouse, and Billings and
Goodrich law firm. Because Mexico’s film industry was rela-
tively well developed, Mexico became one of the most active
markets for the agency’s Motion Picture Division. Like the
oiaa in general, its operations evolved in a series of phases,
which it defined as (1) organization, (2) indirect operations
with emphasis on educational subjects, and (3) direct action
wherein military defense and propaganda films were stressed.14
On December 7, 1941, in response to the attack on Pearl
Harbor, the Motion Picture Division began operating in the
third phase.15 The oiaa assisted directly and indirectly in the
production of motion pictures that promoted its primary pro-
paganda messages of military strength and hemispheric unity
through the American way of life.
As the Motion Picture Division’s propaganda strategy ma-
terialized, the oiaa identified three kinds of films that proved
effective in Latin America. The agency created and distrib-
uted specialized films, or short subjects, which featured Latin
American themes as well as wartime propaganda. The Motion
Picture Division also relied on newsreels as a form of propa-
ganda, again emphasizing Latin American themes. A final strat-
egy involved promoting U.S. feature films in Latin America.
In all three areas of film production, the oiaa used the coop-
erative relationships it had established in the early years of its
existence to work closely with private U.S. industries.

168 | soup can propaganda

The short subjects program demonstrated the cooperation
with the U.S. motion picture industry. U.S. companies pro-
duced the films without subsidy at the oiaa’s request. Most
shorts were twenty minutes in length and focused specifi-
cally on a wartime issue or an issue that would bring greater
hemispheric unity. By April 1942 a total of thirty-five such
films had been released throughout Latin America. One year
later, the oiaa had 108 shorts in circulation throughout Latin
America, of which 83 went to Mexico.16 The agency’s prior-
ities were reflected in the subject matter of these films. The
shorts promoted a variety of themes, but nearly 25 percent
promoted military or civilian defense themes.17 Titles such
as “Army of Champions,” “Building a Bomber,” “Eyes of
the Navy,” “Tanks,” and “Men of West Point” portrayed a
powerful U.S. military that would lead the Allies to victory.
Other titles, such as “Don’t Talk,” “Women in Defense,” and
“Victory in the Air,” showed the patriotic civilian population
mobilized for war.18 They depicted the U.S. civilian popula-
tion as the example Mexicans should emulate.
Although military themes appeared in many oiaa shorts,
the theme of unity and the American way of life dominated,
as nearly 40 percent of shorts promoted common technolog-
ical, economic, and cultural traits in the hemisphere with the
United States as the region’s leader.19 Titles such as “Alaska’s
Silver Millions,” “California Fashions,” “Colleges,” and “An
Airplane Trip” used film to advertise the strengths of U.S. indus-
try and technology to the rest of the region, while at the same
time pushing the American way of life through fashion and
education. In nearly all of these short films, the United States
appeared as the region’s leader in industry and culture.20
As the oiaa further developed its propaganda strategies in

soup can propaganda | 169

Latin America, it found new ways to utilize the cooperation of
U.S. filmmakers. In the fall of 1941, the Motion Picture Division
organized a meeting of all major executives and producers in
the U.S. film industry and secured a commitment from each that
they would produce three or four shorts on subjects approved
by the oiaa. Production on these films began immediately af-
ter Pearl Harbor. Some of the early titles that were particularly
popular in Mexico included “Viva Mexico,” “Highway to
Friendship,” “Peace by Hitler,” “Francisco Madero,” “Hidden
Enemies,” and “Pan American Story.” Other early shorts em-
phasized themes from other Latin American nations: “The
Argentina Question,” “Gaucho Sports,” “Eyes on Brazil,”
and “Sports in South America.”
As the war progressed, the oiaa’s short subjects program
developed into one of the most important propaganda tools
in Mexico. Between July 1, 1942, and January 1, 1943, U.S.
film producers released more than 225 shorts in Mexico alone,
reaching estimated audiences of 100,000 to 375,000 with
each picture.21
Newsreels also became an effective propaganda tool of the
Motion Picture Division. Like the oiaa’s short subjects pro-
gram, the newsreels program involved close cooperation with
U.S. newsreel companies. Before World War II, U.S. companies
found little profit in tailoring newsreels for Latin American
markets, but in its initial investigations into the Latin American
motion picture industry, the oiaa found that Axis powers
were using newsreels effectively throughout the region as an
instrument of propaganda. The agency quickly became in-
volved in recruiting U.S. cooperation in monopolizing news-
reel production in Latin America. By mid-1942, five American
newsreel companies were sending weekly productions to Latin

170 | soup can propaganda

America: Paramount, Pathe, Universal, Fox-Movietone, and
News of the Day.22 At the same time, the oiaa managed to
curtail pro-Axis newsreels so that by 1943 they were virtu-
ally nonexistent. Newsreels circulated in motion picture the-
aters and showed before feature ﬁlms.
The oiaa inﬂuenced the subject matter contained in materials
sent to Latin America through its relationship with U.S. news-
reel companies. Most U.S. companies began dubbing Spanish
narrative on the newsreels, while oiaa agents worked to make
the subject matter not only appealing to Latin Americans but
also effective propaganda. By April 1942, agents estimated
that at least 65 percent of newsreel coverage emphasized the
U.S. national defense program.23 The following are examples
are early newsreel themes:

Five stories on the Conference of Rio

Mexican and U.S. Army troops march together for the
first time
Brazilian minister of finance signs a trade treaty with our
government
Brazilian government officials get rights to make Wright
engines
Mexican foreign minister in conference with Undersecretary
of State Sumner Welles
Wives of Latin American diplomats doing voluntary Red
Cross work in Washington24

One challenge the Motion Picture Division faced was that

many Mexicans living in remote rural areas of the country did
not have access to a movie theater and therefore could not see
ﬁlm propaganda. To resolve this issue, the division supplied

soup can propaganda | 171

regional coordinating committees with portable equipment
and trucks to send propaganda films into remote areas. In
this way, the oiaa introduced many Mexicans to the film in-
dustry for the first time and reached large segments of the il-
literate population for whom print propaganda was not ap-
propriate.25
The final category of motion pictures used by the oiaa in-
volved less-direct propaganda. The use of U.S. feature pic-
tures was intended to foster a general feeling of goodwill to-
ward the United States among Latin Americans. The Motion
Picture Division encouraged U.S. film producers to release
popular feature films in Latin America. Agents soon learned
that Mexican audiences preferred films with comedic or ro-
mantic subjects. In fact, Mexicans demonstrated more apa-
thy toward the war upon viewing war-related films, which
they recognized as overly propagandistic.26 They hoped that
feature films would help Latin Americans understand life in
the United States and also view the United States as the hemi-
spheric leader.
Another strategy employed by the Motion Picture Division
involved encouraging U.S. producers to take up themes based
on Latin American subjects. In these instances, the oiaa served
in an advisory capacity but did not provide direct funding
for the projects. In one failed attempt, rko Radio Pictures
Inc. hired Orson Welles to produce a full-length picture to be
filmed in Brazil. Because of a disagreement between Welles and
rko, however, the project was abandoned after five months
of filming.
In a more successful project, the oiaa arranged a tour
through Latin America for Walt Disney and entered into an

172 | soup can propaganda

agreement with the Disney organization for the production
of twelve feature pictures. Unlike its relationships with other
production companies, the oiaa’s agreement with Disney in-
volved financing the films under a “guarantee-against-loss
plan,” where Rockefeller guaranteed $150,000 against losses
on the series.27 Under the agreement, Disney produced two
animated motion pictures with Latin American themes. The
first, Saludos amigos, was released in 1943 and highlighted
South American characters as friends of Donald Duck. Brazil
held a position of importance, as the main character, a par-
rot named José Carioca, represented Brazil and became patito
Donald’s most important South American companion.
Generally, the oiaa found that animated films were well
received in Mexico, particularly in remote, rural areas.28 The
less-educated sectors of the population responded more fa-
vorably to Disney animations than to other films, first be-
cause cartoons tended to be dubbed in Spanish instead of us-
ing subtitles, which made it easier for the less literate to follow.
Furthermore, Mexicans enjoyed the bright colors, energetic
music, and generally lighthearted themes presented in the an-
imations.29 Most Mexicans did not perceive Disney films to
be overt wartime propaganda.30
Another film involved Mexico in the theme of hemispheric
unity. Walt Disney created The Three Caballeros in 1945 for
distribution in Latin America. In the film, Panchito, “a som-
brero-wearing, charro-clad, pistol-packing rooster,” hosts
Donald Duck and the Brazilian parrot, José Carioca, on a
tour through Mexico.31 Mexican audiences enjoyed the tradi-
tional mariachi score, “Ay jalisco, no te rajes,” performed by
the trio. In later scenes, Donald becomes part of a Guelaguetza-
inspired dance with his China Poblana partner. The two swing

soup can propaganda | 173

and twirl to traditional folk music, meant to show positive as-
pects of Mexican culture.32
The three characters represented the oiaa’s efforts to pro-
mote unity in the hemisphere, but no other countries were rep-
resented in Walt Disney films. Most Latin Americans found
the animated characters entertaining, and some even identi-
fied with the message of unity contained in heavily stereotyped
Mexican and Brazilian characters.33 The Mexican government
responded positively to the cooperative relationship between
the national film industry, the oiaa, and private U.S. motion
picture interests. In 1943, President Avila Camacho awarded
the Order of the Aztec Eagle—Mexico’s highest honor given
to foreigners—to Walt Disney, Francis Alstock of the oiaa,
and two other film industry experts for their efforts in pro-
ducing motion pictures in Mexico.34 Nevertheless, the idea of
hemispheric unity led by the United States did not appeal to
Mexicans or Latin Americans in general. Most oiaa feedback
indicated that Mexicans responded more positively to Pan-
Americanism defined as Latin American unity, which gener-
ally did not include the United States.35
Early in 1943, the oiaa in conjunction with the Office of
Strategic Services Psychology Division, Research and Analysis
Branch began to compile data that attempted to provide a mea-
sure of popular response to motion pictures. U.S. consulates
throughout Mexico worked in cooperation with local oiaa
coordination subcommittees to complete questionnaires that
reported conditions of the local industry. Between January 26
and December 3, U.S. consular officials observed local theaters
and interviewed managers and staff. Their research provided
the oiaa with a variety of feedback on projection equipment,
film content, attendance, and audience reaction.36 Most of the

174 | soup can propaganda

surveys reported that Mexican audiences enjoyed the high pro-
duction quality of American movies but that they disapproved
of most war-related films or motion pictures with high pro-
paganda content. Only the consulate at Matamoros reported
that “clapping of hands and stamping of feet” greeted the lat-
ter films.37 The consulate in Monterrey reported that audiences
responded to pro-Allied propaganda shorts with enthusiasm.
It credited this reaction to the success of motion picture pro-
paganda that stressed the United Nations’ cause.38
Nevertheless, most theaters reported that audiences re-
mained skeptical of films that appeared overtly propagandis-
tic. According to a report from Guadalajara, audiences reg-
ularly booed or hissed at early newsreels and propaganda
films that showed American symbols such as the U.S. flag or
prominent public figures. As the war progressed, those re-
actions evolved generally to silence.39 Most observers found
that Mexicans preferred locally produced films because they
were filmed in Spanish and because they tended to highlight
themes that appealed to Mexican nationalism. Shortly after
Mexico declared war, the government passed a regulation re-
quiring theaters to display the national emblem and play the
national anthem prior to showing feature films. U.S. consular
reports indicated that audiences responded to these national-
istic displays with respect and enthusiasm.40
The oiaa’s motion picture research indicated that after the
Mexican government declared war, emergency censorship ef-
forts had effectively eliminated Axis propaganda in the film
industry. Nearly all consular officials reported that no Nazi
newsreels were shown in the country. Several even concluded
that U.S. propaganda films were yielding favorable results be-
cause no Axis or domestic films offered propaganda favorable

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to the Axis.41 This argument reveals important assumptions
made by U.S. propagandists that influenced the nature of oiaa
wartime information in Mexico. Despite the fact that many
Mexican-produced films emphasized national historic heroes
and other nationalist themes, agency officials did not consider
them to be effective propaganda. By 1943, oiaa representatives
had clearly defined wartime propaganda as information relat-
ing directly to the war that specifically emphasized the role of
the United States. The agency frequently ignored nationalist
themes that appealed to the Mexican public and instead pro-
moted messages that emphasized a guarantee of a U.S. victory
and a unified Americas led by the United States.42

Radio Division

The Radio Division of the oiaa, like the Motion Picture

Division and the agency as a whole, went through an initial
organizational period in which it outlined its objectives and
strategies but put few of its planned programs into action. As
he did with other divisions of the oiaa, Rockefeller set about
to make the Radio Division a partnership between the U.S.
government and private U.S. interests. Donald Francisco, vice-
president of the Lord and Thomas Advertising Agency, be-
came the division’s director in 1941. Mexico’s local coordi-
nating committee for radio attracted executives from major
U.S. companies such as Colgate Palmolive, Coca-Cola, and
Sydney Ross–Sterling Drugs.43
Pearl Harbor provided the impetus for the oiaa to become
more aggressive in its radio propaganda.44 By 1942 the agency
had improved shortwave broadcasts from powerful stations in
the United States to Latin America. It also began a strategy of
rebroadcasting programs by local stations. Most shortwave and

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rebroadcast programs consisted exclusively of wartime news
and commentary. The oiaa supplied news scripts to broad-
casting companies such as cbs and nbc and assisted the pri-
vate companies in finding Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking
on-air commentators.45 One of the most successful of the ra-
dio news programs was La marcha del tiempo, modeled after
the March of Time program broadcast in the United States.
In addition to shortwave news broadcasts, the oiaa became
involved in local radio production in Latin American markets.
The agency sent transcriptions to radio stations, and coordi-
nating committees became involved in aiding in the produc-
tion of local radio shows. Imitating popular radio trends in
the United States, the oiaa began producing dramatizations
that provided fictional accounts of wartime adventures.
Several radio programs emphasized the atrocities that Nazi
forces had committed in occupied areas of Europe. El verda-
dero enemigo (The real enemy) sent the message that Axis lies
and violence against civilians were the “true enemies” of free-
dom-loving people. In a July 1943 episode, German officers
occupying a small village in northern France are ordered to
evacuate and to remove all civilians from the town. During
their conversation, they reveal that most of the village’s res-
idents had been sent to German factories and concentration
camps. The only civilians who remain are too old or too young
for resistance activities. The Nazi officers callously decide that
they cannot worry about such details as keeping families to-
gether and discuss plans to send small children to “instruction
camps” while older residents would be sent to factories. The
French citizens are portrayed as innocent and good-hearted,
facing the cold and emotionless Nazi officers.46
A similar program, Espíritu de victoria, presented weekly

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dramatizations featuring the efforts of the occupied nations
of Europe against the Axis aggressors. The scripts told the
story of how countries such as Russia and Italy were invaded
by German forces. In each episode, civilians sacrificed at
the hands of “death, hunger, and [Nazi] brutality” and be-
came more united on their path to “freedom and victory.”47
Another program, La marca del jaguar, told the exploits of
Alberto, an “audacious Latin American” in Europe who con-
tinually fought against the atrocities of Hitler. In one episode,
Alberto traveled to Alsace-Lorraine to free the French of Nazi
oppression.48
Other dramatic radio programs portrayed the heroic ex-
ploits of the Allied military forces fighting overseas. In Prólogo
de la invasión, General Mark W. Clark leads U.S. forces into
regions of North Africa occupied by the enemy. The narra-
tor, a Frenchman, introduces the program as a report on the
“salvation” of North Africa from the “tyranny of the Axis.”
From the introduction, the “soldiers of democracy” appear
“strong, animated, well-armed, and feared.”49
Just as the Mexican public preferred motion pictures with
light-hearted subjects, radio listeners enjoyed humorous radio
programs. El Barón Eje offered a comedic look at the war-
time attitudes of Axis industrialists. One episode portrayed
the Axis Baron, “master of all and expert of nothing,” as be-
lieving Axis propaganda and clinging desperately to the no-
tion that Germany and Japan would win the war.50
While dramatic radio programs adopted a variety of ap-
proaches, they all sent a common message: Allied forces were
stronger and more powerful than their Axis opponents. The
fictional dramatizations portrayed Allied military forces that
were destined to win the war. Radio programs went further to

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portray the Allies as more intelligent and more ethical than their
Axis counterparts. Radio programs not only insisted that the
United States and its allies would win but also gave Mexicans
many reasons for wanting to be on the winning side.
In addition to developing scripts for full-length dramatic
radio programs, the oiaa created shorter, one- to two-min-
ute “spot announcements” to be read on local radio stations.
Spot announcements typically appeared as a dialogue between
two or more people and tended to justify U.S. participation
in the war. “Nuestros aliados” used a clown analogy to ex-
plain that U.S. leaders did not arbitrarily interfere in the inter-
nal affairs of sovereign nations. In the case of World War II,
German, Italian, and Japanese aggression toward other sover-
eign nations compelled the United States to become involved:
“If you decide to walk around dressed as a clown, go ahead
. . . we could continue being friends despite your mania; but if
one day you grab me by the neck and you want to force your
disguise onto me, things [would] change.”51
Other spots stressed Axis cruelty. One announcement listed
civil liberties that were not allowed by the Nazis, such as
freedom of the press, suffrage, and freedom of expression.
Another spot told the story of Juan, who had been living in
Europe and had recently returned after the Nazis conﬁscated
or destroyed everything he owned. Other spots simply pro-
moted hemispheric unity, using phrases such as “the free na-
tions of the Americas” and referring to their united struggle
against totalitarian nations.52 Some oiaa radio programs did
not directly push a war message. Hit Parade was a musical
show popular with young listeners throughout Latin America.
Nevertheless, the lighthearted entertainment was interrupted

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frequently by the one-minute spot announcements, which al-
ways brought listeners’ attention back to the war.53
One radio program produced in Mexico departed from di-
rect wartime drama and instead appealed to women’s sense
of culture and fashion in a wartime environment. Mexican
Women’s Magazine of the Air began airing early in 1942 and
promoted a middle-class lifestyle to Mexican women and urged
them to follow the example set by their U.S. counterparts.54
One episode reported a rebirth in fashion in 1942 due to the
worldwide state of war. The program described how U.S. fash-
ion designers had devised ways to create new fashions because
much of the fine cloth that had previously come from Europe
was no longer available.55 Another program discussed the war-
time efforts of U.S. women on the home front. It emphasized
their contributions in factory work and in such organizations
as the Red Cross.56 Another episode told the story of famous
U.S. actresses who were spending all of their free time making
clothes for children who had been orphaned in the war.57 One
of the important ways the program influenced Mexican cul-
ture came in an episode that described how U.S. women doing
men’s jobs in the workforce now largely wore pants instead of
skirts. The program reported that young women seen on the
streets of New York often wore masculine clothing, and the
woman radio announcer of the program approved of this new
trend.58 Many Mexican women who entered the workforce in
record numbers during World War II also adopted this new
fashion and began wearing pants instead of skirts.59
Early in 1943, the Radio Division began to look closely at
the Mexican market and tried to devise a strategy to measure
popular reaction to its radio propaganda. The Coordinating
Committee for Mexico first established a system of administering

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surveys to gauge the popularity of radio programs.60 The agency
began evaluating public response in Mexico City, and then
moved on to other major cities, such as Puebla, Guadalajara,
Morelos, San Luis Potosí, Monterrey, and Torreón. The com-
mittee immediately faced several obstacles in its strategy. First,
it found that several of the interviewers who had been hired
were fabricating answers, and those interviewers had to be re-
placed. Second, interviewers found that many listeners did not
remember which program they had listened to the night be-
fore; moreover, listeners also fabricated answers.61 Telephone
checks during radio programs were effective, but only a small
percentage of the population had telephone service, so this
method only gave feedback for listeners in the higher-income
brackets. The coordinating committee attempted to supple-
ment telephone checks with house-to-house surveys, but they
found that many Mexicans in the poorer sections of the cities
would not allow the interviewers into their homes at night and
refused to answer questions.62 Finally, the committee devised
what might be called a survey espionage plan to send survey-
ors out to poorer sections of the cities armed with portable
radios. As they passed homes with windows open and radios
on, they would tune their portable radio until they found the
station that matched the program they could hear through
the window. They would record the time, the station, and
the home and then move on. As surveyor-spies perfected the
system, each one could “clock” an average of one hundred
radios during a three-hour period.63 The coordinating com-
mittee found the combination of telephone checks and sur-
vey espionage to be the most effective way of gathering reli-
able feedback to radio programs.
The survey results indicated overwhelmingly that Mexicans

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preferred Mexican programs. Emilio Azcárraga’s station, and
nbc affiliate, xew held the majority of the radio listening mar-
ket. In Mexico City and throughout the country, listeners en-
joyed oiaa programs that featured Mexican music and Mexican
talent.64 In Mexico City, in particular, the oiaa found that ra-
dio audiences preferred variety programs with well-known
Mexican talent as well as local music and culture. The most
popular program, with a rating of 88.72, was a one-hour
Mexican production that featured national performers such
as Cantinflas, Jorge Negrete, and Sara García.65 Two of the
most popular news programs, El espectador and La inter-
pretación mexicana de la guerra, were produced by the oiaa
in Mexico with local radio commentators.66 The oiaa’s sur-
vey reports did not reach any conclusions about the appeal of
propaganda programs, but the fact that few war-related pro-
grams were included in the highest-rated shows indicates that
many parallels existed between motion picture and radio en-
tertainment. By oiaa measures, most Mexicans were not in-
terested in overtly propagandistic entertainment. Instead, they
preferred lighthearted or comedic films and radio programs,
or those with a nationalist flair.

Press and Publications Division

By 1942, the oiaa’s Press Division had put important mea-

sures into place to inﬂuence the Mexican national press.
Subsidies and newsprint supply strategies began to yield re-
sults as Rockefeller’s Washington ofﬁce received reports that
most mainstream newspapers were friendly toward the United
States. Nevertheless, as the war progressed, new problems sur-
faced. Field reports began to indicate that many editors had
turned away from free or inexpensive Axis news services and

182 | soup can propaganda

had refused Axis subsidies. Newspapers subscribed to ex-
pensive U.S. news agencies, but at the same time advertising
revenues from U.S. private businesses had declined as U.S.
manufacturers converted to wartime production and had re-
duced exports. As U.S. businesses decreased sales to Mexico
and Latin America, they also cut their advertising budgets in
Latin American newspapers by as much as 35 percent.67 The
oiaa feared that many pro-Allied newspapers would go out
of business as a result of lost revenue.
Rockefeller immediately began a public-relations campaign
directed at U.S. businesses. In cooperation with the Commerce
Department, the oiaa sent nearly seventeen hundred letters
to U.S. manufacturers urging them to continue advertising in
Latin America. He pointed to marketing advantages of main-
taining familiarity with brand-name products and the com-
mercial sense of placing U.S. goods in a strategic position in
Latin America for gaining markets after the war. Rockefeller
also convinced the Treasury Department to rule that U.S. busi-
nesses could use advertising expenses in Latin America as a tax
deduction. Over the next several years, U.S. advertisers contin-
ued and even accelerated their marketing efforts in Mexican
newspapers. Bethlehem Steel declared “Steel is the lever of vic-
tory” and promised that steel products in short supply dur-
ing the war would be available in “unlimited quantities” af-
ter the Allies achieved victory.68 Ford Motor Company ran
ads featuring the Mexican ﬂag ﬂying proudly over the Sierra
Madres. Conspicuously absent in the ads were automobiles,
which were largely unavailable during the war.69 Advertisers
began to use wartime marketing to foster a consumer culture
for postwar products, anticipating a strong consumer mar-
ket in Mexico after the war.

soup can propaganda | 183

By the end of 1943, U.S. advertising expenditures had dou-
bled throughout Latin America.70 Advertisements promoting
U.S.-produced consumer goods—many of them in short supply
during the war—appeared regularly on the pages of Mexico’s
main newspapers. The war itself became a marketing tool for
many advertisers. Goodrich ads encouraged drivers to prevent
tire wear as part of wartime sacrifice, while blazoning the com-
pany name across the page in large, bold letters. Local retailers
quickly caught on to the power of patriotism as a selling point
for their products. The department store Liverpool regularly
took out large ads to promote sales and other special events.
A full-page of images of clothing, appliances, and other con-
sumer goods on sale was often punctuated by a large caption
reading “Mexico will emerge even stronger from the current
crisis.”71 Perhaps the most significant aspect of wartime mar-
keting was the general acknowledgment that many consumer
goods being marketed in Mexico would be produced in the
United States. And many items that were locally produced—
such as clothing and beauty products—were increasingly in-
fluenced by U.S. popular culture.72
The oiaa attempted to improve U.S. coverage in Latin
American newspapers and magazines by inviting Latin
American journalists to tour the United States. In October
1942, reporters and columnists for Mexican newspapers such
as Exclesior, El Universal, Novedades, La Prensa, El Nacional,
and El Popular toured the United States as guests of the oiaa.73
Human-interest stories featuring friendly portrayals of life in
the United States appeared regularly in Mexico’s press over
the next several years.
One of the oiaa’s most important propaganda tools was
the monthly magazine En guardia (Em guarda in Portuguese),

184 | soup can propaganda

published in Spanish and Portuguese and distributed through-
out Latin America. The agency began publishing En guardia
in January 1942 specifically to inform Latin Americans of the
U.S. military efforts in the war. The magazine ceased publi-
cation in December 1945. To publish En guardia, the agency
hired editors from Life magazine in the United States, and En
guardia took on many characteristics of the U.S. popular cul-
ture publication.74 Similar in size to Life, En guardia was pub-
lished on a monthly basis with a color cover and a variety of
color and black-and-white photos throughout the magazine
illustrating articles. It included articles about battles in Europe
and Asia, detailing the strengths and resources of the U.S. mil-
itary. It also reported regularly on the U.S. home front by fea-
turing special articles on U.S. industries and workers as well
as women and children. In later years the magazine also be-
gan reporting on U.S. culture, highlighting different regions
of the United States each month.
In its initial years of circulation, En guardia was distributed
at no charge to people in Latin America whom the oiaa con-
sidered the most influential. The magazine became extremely
popular, and the agency began processing subscription requests.
The first issue’s circulation of 80,000 copies had grown to
550,000 by the end of the war. Of its Spanish-language cop-
ies, roughly 20 percent went to Mexico alone, underscoring
the importance the oiaa had placed on Mexico.75
An examination of the contents of En guardia reveals that
the publication’s primary objective was to promote a defini-
tion of American life according to U.S. standards. During its
run, En guardia never devoted more than 40 percent of its
coverage to specific Latin American countries, and on average
it devoted less than 15 percent to Latin American coverage.

soup can propaganda | 185

Most issues of En guardia included thirty to forty pages on
the U.S. war effort. These stories emphasized the strength of
the U.S. military with photos of large, imposing warships and
other military equipment. Other stories featured U.S. mili-
tary and political leaders and described how their training
and expertise would ensure a U.S. victory. Partly to combat
Axis propaganda that promised a German victory, oiaa pro-
paganda aimed to persuade Latin Americans that siding with
the United States was in their best interest.
Other oiaa stories featured the heroic efforts of the U.S.
workforce. Photos depicted clean working environments and
happy workers. One story described how U.S. workers ate
healthy, well-balanced meals provided by cafeterias in the
factories. A September 1945 story provided information on
working conditions inside U.S. factories. The photo that ac-
companied the story shows a cafeteria worker surrounded by
rows and rows of tasty and nutritious desserts. oiaa propa-
gandists wanted to show that the American way of life meant
living the good life. They emphasized nutritious food and a
robust workforce that could also indulge in small luxuries
such as cakes and pies.
The magazine encouraged women to be patriotic by fea-
turing articles on females as nurses in the war and as factory
workers at home. Many U.S. women worked in industries pro-
ducing military equipment, further contributing to the war ef-
fort. Other women performed their patriotic duty by trans-
forming themselves from housewives into farmers to keep up
agricultural production. In all of the photos of U.S. laborers,
the workers are well dressed, well groomed, and smiling. The
magazine painted a picture of a patriotic American population
in which all citizens did their part to aid in the war effort.

186 | soup can propaganda

En guardia promoted its patriotic propaganda by including
articles on U.S. families during the war and people buying war
bonds. One prominent article featured eleven-year-old Teddy
Burton, who sent his entire savings of $428.88 to President
Roosevelt to help win the war. Teddy Burton sent a dual mes-
sage to Latin Americans. First, he provided another example
of wartime support for Latin Americans to follow. The oiaa
hoped to demonstrate that even children took seriously their
patriotic responsibilities. Second, his $428.88 sent a compel-
ling message about the American way of life. The story demon-
strated not only that the eleven-year-old was willing to donate
his life savings to help the war effort, but that he had $428.88
to send. It subtly implied that the American way of life meant
that eleven-year-old children could accumulate a savings ac-
count worth more than most Mexicans made in an entire year.
The majority of En guardia’s stories featured the U.S. mili-
tary or civilian population, but some stories highlighted Latin
American countries. Frequently, those stories reported Latin
American contributions toward the war effort.76 Other fea-
tures aimed to make Latin American feel more economically
and culturally connected to the United States. A story printed
in the January 1944 issue explained that coffee, a product ex-
ported by many Latin American nations to the United States,
was becoming an American national passion.77
The oiaa believed that hemispheric unity would be more
appealing to Latin Americans with an advanced and progres-
sive nation like the United States as a leader. Through En guar-
dia it sent a message that the powerful U.S. military would
lead the way to an Allied victory in World War II. With the
emphasis on military might and wartime mobilization, the
magazine’s content almost assured a U.S. victory. The oiaa

soup can propaganda | 187

wanted to send the message that Latin Americans should want
to join the winning side. It portrayed the American way of
life deﬁned by a U.S. standard of living and encouraged Latin
Americans to aspire to similar standards. Finally, En guardia
stressed that United States offered strong potentials for trade
during and after the war.

posters

As the Press and Publications Division further developed its

propaganda strategy, it began looking beyond print media as
a form of propaganda. In 1942 the oiaa began putting plans
into place to develop a propaganda poster campaign in Latin
America. Although using visual media did not require exten-
sive research into local infrastructure and industry, devising
a plan that would be most appealing to individual countries
required knowledge of local trends and customs. After Pearl
Harbor, oiaa agents began to investigate the use of posters
throughout Latin America to broaden its propaganda cam-
paign.78
The oiaa used visual media to appeal to both literate and
illiterate groups in the Mexican population. The poster cam-
paign was not the most important aspect of oiaa propaganda,
and U.S. posters competed for space and public attention with
posters produced by Mexico’s propaganda agency. Nevertheless,
the Press and Publications Division did devote considerable
resources to producing posters in all of Latin America.
oiaa posters tended to fall into one of two main themes:
Allied victory or American unity. Frequently the oiaa used lo-
cal artists to give the posters a more authentic Latin American
character. Antonio Arias Bernal, famous Mexican caricaturist
and front-page cover designer for the weekly magazine Hoy,

188 | soup can propaganda

fig. 14. “Mexican versus Nazis” (oiaa/Arias Bernal poster). Courtesy
of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. B46.6.

soup can propaganda | 189

went to work for Rockefeller’s agency to produce wartime car-
icature posters for distribution in Latin America.79 His works
tended to the humorous and frequently featured prominent
Mexican characteristics.
The poster shown in figure 14 was a popular image within
Mexico, but it is unclear how it was received in other ar-
eas. It shows short and effeminate Nazi officers cowering be-
fore a towering, muscular, sombrero-clad Mexican peasant,
fully equipped with a sagging gun belt and a buck tooth. The
Mexican appears to be rolling up his sleeves, preparing for
physical confrontation with his outmatched opponents. True
to Arias Bernal’s form, the Mexican is portrayed in a stereo-
typical fashion, as a rural peasant with almost primitive traits.
To Arias Bernal, Mexico as a nation exhibited similar char-
acteristics: rural yet imposing. The outline of Latin America
appears in the background. The Mexican peasant leans in
slightly to place his left shoulder between the Nazis and the
American continents, implying that he is protecting the en-
tire hemisphere.80 The poster sent the message of hemispheric
unity and Allied victory, and it portrayed the idea that Mexico
played a vital role in that victory.
Another Arias Bernal poster, shown in figure 15, appealed
to a broad audience with multiple messages. With the caption
reading “Unidos para la victoria” (United for victory), the im-
age portrays Axis leaders Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito in a
pile. The leaders are bandaged and appear beaten down, help-
lessly confronting defeat. As a final humiliating act, Mussolini,
with his back to the viewer, peeks over his own shoulder as he
straddles Hitler’s neck and is poked in the back with a “V”
for Victory. The “V” is personified with two faces, one wear-
ing a soldier’s helmet and the other a peasant’s sombrero. The

190 | soup can propaganda

fig. 15. “United for victory” (oiaa/Arias Bernal poster). Courtesy of
U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-B-Mex. B46.2.

soup can propaganda | 191

fig. 16. “Union is strength” (oiaa/Arias Bernal poster). Courtesy of U.S.
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-B-Mex. B46.5.

192 | soup can propaganda

message intends to emphasize the military ability of the United
States united with the productive capacity of Latin America
to bring victory against the Axis.
A similar message appears in the “La union es la fuerza”
(Union is strength) poster in figure 16. This poster shows a
soldier and an industrial worker smiling and shaking hands in
friendship. Both figures are muscular and imposing, giving the
image of strength and ability. They appear behind columns of
smoke rising from an industrial production complex. At the
bottom, Mussolini, Hitler, and Hirohito recoil in fear and awe.
It is clear that the Axis leaders fear the combination of indus-
trial and military strength that the U.S.–Latin American union
provides. Although this poster was produced by a Mexican
artist, only 8,000 of the nearly 80,000 copies made were dis-
tributed in Mexico. The oiaa may have preferred to use im-
ages that appeared more “Mexican” in Mexico.81
A final example of Arias Bernal’s posters deviated from
the theme of American unity and emphasized the Allied vic-
tory. At the same time it promoted the concept of a United
Nations movement after the war. The poster of “Hitler caged,”
shown in Figure 17, portrays Hitler and Hirohito trapped in
a cage comprising flags of all Allied nations. Latin American
nations are not prominently featured in this figure, although
the Mexican flag appears fourth behind the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. This image sends a mes-
sage that the unity of all Allied nations will bring down the
evil Axis powers.
Other oiaa posters sent similar messages. The “Buenos ve-
cinos, buenos amigos” (Good neighbors, good friends) poster
(figure 18) promoted the spirit of the Good Neighbor policy
and emphasized historical bonds between the United States

soup can propaganda | 193

fig. 17. “Hitler caged” (oiaa/Arias Bernal poster). Courtesy of U.S.
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-B-Mex. 058.1.

194 | soup can propaganda

fig. 18. “Good neighbors, good friends” (oiaa poster). Courtesy of U.S.
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, DLC/PP-1997:039.

and Mexico. The image shows U.S. hero Abraham Lincoln

alongside Mexican hero Benito Juárez. Behind each figure ap-
pears the flag of his country. In the center, a figure dressed as
a U.S. farmer shakes hands with a Mexican campesino. Both
figures are smiling and approach each other as friends.
In figure 19, the theme of hemispheric solidarity is repeated.
The figure of a man with no discernible facial features rises
from the Americas, wielding a weapon. He has one foot planted
in North America and the other in South America. The cap-
tion reads “Como un solo hombre” (As one man), indicating
a united Americas generates a formidable military force. True
to the agency’s definition of “America,” the poster excludes
Canada as part of the Western Hemisphere.
As in other areas of its propaganda campaign, the oiaa con-
sidered Mexico a priority for distribution of wartime posters.

soup can propaganda | 195

fig. 19. “As one man” (oiaa poster). Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress,
Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. B46.4

196 | soup can propaganda

table 1. oiaa posters distributed in Mexico, July 1, 1943–July 1, 1944

“Mute Mexican” 3,500

“As One Man” 16,250
“United for Victory” 1,600
“The Americas United for Progress and Victory” 70,000
“Hitler Caged” 25,000
“Careless Talk” 2,800
“The Vision of Our Heroes” 6,000

Total 124,350

Source: Schuyler Bradt to Harry Frantz, Subject: Printed Literature Campaign for the
Other American Republics, February 23, 1942, NARA, RG 229, Entry 127, Box 1467.

Between July 1, 1943, and July 1, 1944, the agency printed

a total of 775,491 posters for distribution in Latin America.
Of that number it sent 124,350 to Mexico (see table 1).82 The
only country that received more posters during that period
was Cuba, with approximately 160,000 prints.

PA M P H L E T S

Like other aspects of oiaa propaganda, pamphlets were not de-

veloped and used by the agency until after the U.S. entry into the
war. In February 1942, agency representatives in Washington
dc began to consider distributing pamphlets at frequent in-
tervals throughout Latin America. Since the publication of
En guardia had recently begun, agency leaders felt that using
pamphlets to cover military matters would be a poor use of
resources. Similarly, they felt that Latin Americans would not
be interested in pamphlets devoted to background material.83
Therefore, oiaa pamphlets tended to be historical or tech-
nical in nature. Historical material frequently promoted the
United States as the democratic leader of the Americas. Other

soup can propaganda | 197

historical themes compared Latin American historical leaders
to U.S. national heroes, extolling the virtues of democracy and
freedom. Technical pamphlets focused on health, sanitation,
and education and promoted the United States as a leader in
those fields. A few pamphlets went beyond the historical and
technical fields by depicting Nazi atrocities in Europe. By the
end of the war, the oiaa was distributing nearly five million
pamphlets a year in the region, of which nearly two million
went to Mexico (see table 2).84
During the war, the oiaa published El pueblo y su triunfo
(The people and their victory), dedicated to explaining the
United States’ long history of social progress. According to
this pamphlet, social progress has occurred in countries with a
long democratic history of promoting social welfare and where
social concerns were priorities. The introduction explains that
some of the main components of a socially advanced society
are the development of the labor movement, improvements
in rural life, the development of a Social Security system, and
the promotion of education.85 According to the oiaa, these
aspects of social progress were top priorities for the United
States, as a democratic nation. The agency chose to empha-
size strengths of U.S. society, which were also important el-
ements of the Latin American social structure in general. In
doing so, agency representatives promoted conceptions of de-
mocracy and social progress in U.S. history that would not
offend Latin Americans. Likewise, the oiaa avoided events
in U.S. history that would not portray the United States as a
socially advanced and democratic role model.
The pamphlet begins with a discussion of the United States’
pursuit of independence, followed by a review of the American
Civil War and the abolition of slavery. As one agent divulged

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table 2. oiaa pamphlets distributed in Mexico, July 1, 1943–July 1, 1944

“A People Marches” 10,000

“A Man—What’s He Worth?” 40,665
“Heroes Verdaderos” 450,000
“Road to Victory” 200,000
“Jokes of the War” 99,000
“Cordell Hull” 25,000
“The Americas United” 2,000
“Automotive Transport in the Americas” 10,000
“Our Future” 500,000
“Spanish-Speaking Americans in the War” 67,000
“The U.S. in the War” 75,000
“How Shortwave Works” 1,500
“Makers of Victory” 100,000
“After the Storm” 50,000
“The War in the Air” 50,000
“Stories from Real Life” 250,000

Total 1,930,165

Source: “Summary of Pamphlet and Poster Distribution, July 1, 1943–July 1, 1944,”

n.d., NARA, RG 229, Entry 127, Box 1467.

in his criticism of State Department censorship, this account of

U.S. history conveniently omitted any mention of the Mexican-
American War or the settling of the western frontier.86 The
pamphlet stresses that the United States has a long history
of ﬁghting to protect the rights of the people and to preserve
the democratic way of life. It goes on to compare the U.S.
role as protector of democracy to its present-day role in the
European crisis.
In addition to discussing the U.S. education system and
the Social Security program, the pamphlet outlines a glowing

soup can propaganda | 199

account of the pursuit for workers’ rights in the United States.
This account portrays the United States government as play-
ing a cooperative role in securing laws to protect workers. It
emphasizes that the government passed many laws to pro-
vide a minimum wage and describes a strong and growing la-
bor movement in the first decade of the twentieth century. It
does not acknowledge the obstacles that the labor movement
faced as the government historically yielded to the interests
and demands of big business.
Another oiaa pamphlet seemed, on the surface, to target pa-
triotic and nationalist interests of some Latin American coun-
tries. Hombres de las Américas que lucharon por la democra-
cia (Men of the Americas who fought for democracy) provides
biographical information on several Latin American heroes
and presents them as true defenders of democracy.87 A closer
look at this pamphlet reveals that the agency’s true message
once again featured the United States as a role model for the
hemisphere, downplaying the importance of Latin America’s
heroes.
The pamphlet begins by explaining that the six Latin
American heroes represent the fight for democracy because
each had become familiar with it in practice in the United States.
The pamphlet states that prominent Latin American histori-
cal figures, such as Benito Juárez, José Martí, and Domingo
Sarmiento, were influenced by democratic ideals by spending
brief periods of time in New York, New Orleans, and Ann
Arbor, Michigan. These leaders then returned to Latin America
to share democratic values with the rest of the American re-
publics. Because of the State Department’s censorship and
its desire to present the United States as the ideal democratic
role model, the oiaa clouded potentially effective nationalistic

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propaganda by stressing the role of U.S. influence over that
of Latin American heroes.
Through the poster and pamphlet program developed in
1942, the oiaa continued to emphasize the main themes laid
out in its propaganda strategy. Visual material supported the
theme of military victory, but posters and pamphlets stressed
hemispheric unity more than any other theme. The oiaa sent
the message that as a unified body, the countries of the Americas
would be victorious in World War II. Nevertheless, the agen-
cy’s message of unity was overshadowed by its portrayal of
the United States as a hemispheric leader. By emphasizing U.S.
leadership, the oiaa ignored potentially effective propaganda
themes that appealed to Latin American nationalism. The war-
time information program initiated by the Avila Camacho ad-
ministration in Mexico in the summer of 1942 serves as a stark
contrast to the methods used by the oiaa. The Mexican gov-
ernment continued to develop its propaganda program, and
the wartime information campaign persisted with deeply na-
tionalist themes. It is difficult to measure popular response to
the oiaa propaganda campaign, but an analysis of Mexicans’
rhetoric with respect to the war suggests that many rejected
the United States’ emphasis on Pan-Americanism in the agen-
cy’s wartime information and preferred to consider the war
in terms of their own nationality.

Indirect Propaganda
The U.S. Railway Mission to Mexico

Rockefeller and his agents at the oiaa considered Mexican

transportation a serious issue in wartime emergency. Earlier
economic agreements had made Mexico a major supplier and
shipper of vital raw materials, such as antimony, molybdenum,

soup can propaganda | 201

zinc, lead, tin, copper, tungsten, manganese, mercury, rub-
ber, henequen, mahogany, graphite, and coffee.88 Throughout
1941, U.S. transport ships became increasingly committed to
transatlantic shipping, as fewer vessels were available to move
goods from Mexico and Central America. A shortage of vessels
combined with escalating submarine warfare made Mexico’s
railways the safest option for inter-American shipping, but it
quickly became apparent that the Mexican railway system suf-
fered disrepair and inefficiency and that it could not accom-
modate the increased demands of wartime shipping.
The oiaa commissioned a survey of Mexican railways in
February 1942. That investigation concluded that the railway
suffered from various problems that needed to be addressed
immediately. First, equipment and design were old and out-
dated. The tracks and bridges were not suitable for high speeds
and heavy transports, and much of the equipment had been
poorly maintained. The survey found large sections of lines
in deteriorated conditions, and there was a shortage of loco-
motives and other equipment as many sat idle awaiting re-
pairs. Finally, the oiaa found railroad management to be inef-
ficient.89 As a result of operations and maintenance problems
in the rail system, other Mexican industries had been operat-
ing under capacity for lack of shipping capability.
A second survey began in April to establish a plan for reme-
dying railway problems. After several months of investigations
and several more months of negotiations, U.S. and Mexican
officials agreed to a joint program of railway rehabilitation in
November. The Railway Mission targeted for immediate re-
pair those lines that would provide direct transport between
the United States and Central America.90 The Mexican govern-
ment agreed to make changes in management and operations,

202 | soup can propaganda

while the United States agreed to provide technical and finan-
cial assistance. The United States also agreed to guarantee
procurement of necessary equipment and supplies that came
from U.S. suppliers.
The Railway Mission operated until June 30, 1946. During
the war it helped to repair thousands of miles of track and
replaced or strengthened several bridges.91 This program im-
proved daily operations of the rail lines, increased shipping
capacity, and ensured that rail transport continued uninter-
rupted during the war years. U.S. experts submitted sugges-
tions for long-term projects to continue improvements and
efficiency after the official mission ended.
The Railway Mission illustrates important aspects of oiaa
operations in Mexico. First, it supported the original economic
and commercial objectives laid out by the U.S. government
in creating the office. Improvements to Mexico’s rail lines en-
sured uninterrupted transport of vital war materials during
the immediate crisis of the war. It also contributed to long-
term U.S. commercial goals by putting a system into place that
made the Mexican rail system reliant on U.S. equipment and
technology to continue efficient operations after the war. The
considerable attention and resources the U.S. government de-
voted to the Railway Mission indicates Mexico’s strategic im-
portance during the war in terms of supply and defense. More
than bolstering an economic objective, the Railway Mission
solidified Mexico’s strategic and defensive cooperation with
the United States. Finally, the Railway Mission served as a
form of indirect wartime propaganda. By providing resources
and aid to improve a vital part of Mexico’s infrastructure,
the oiaa portrayed the United States as a strategic ally and a
good neighbor.

soup can propaganda | 203

Colorado River Water Treaty

The oiaa became involved in an environmental dispute be-

tween the United States and Mexico that dated back to the
1870s when the two nations began considering the irriga-
tion potential of the Colorado River and the Rio Grande.92 A
1906 treaty had allocated water from the upper Rio Grande
but had left the controversy of the lower Rio Grande and the
Colorado River unresolved. As Mexico continually developed
agricultural activities in its northern regions, the issue became
crucial to that country.93
As the war escalated, the Avila Camacho administration
saw an opportunity to revisit the issue, particularly as an alli-
ance between the two nations became imperative to the United
States. As early as January 1941, Avila Camacho had initiated
negotiations with the U.S. State Department to resolve the con-
ﬂict. U.S. leaders faced serious opposition from Colorado River
basin states to allocating water to Mexico.94 They also worried
that failure to reach a settlement could jeopardize the delicate
and crucial alliance the two nations had formed. After the at-
tack on Pearl Harbor, reaching a compromise with Mexico
became even more imperative, and strategic defense objectives
took priority over domestic political concerns. Furthermore, the
U.S. Commission to the American Section of the International
Boundary Commission completed a study of the issue and
found that Mexico’s irrigation needs had expanded substan-
tially over the previous two decades and that the United States
had water to spare.95 State Department ofﬁcials worried that
failure to settle the issue through diplomatic channels would
compel Mexico to seek arbitration, which U.S. leaders feared
would favor Mexican demands.96

204 | soup can propaganda

The two governments negotiated technical details through-
out 1942 and 1943, and in February 1944 they signed a pro-
posed treaty that guaranteed Mexico 1.5 million acre-feet of
Colorado River water each year.97 As the treaty went to the
U.S. Senate for ratification, domestic opposition flared up once
again, this time led by California lobby interests. Rockefeller,
who had served only in an advisory capacity prior to 1944,
became actively involved in trying to assure to treaty’s pas-
sage.98 The oiaa supported the U.S. ambassador to Mexico,
George Messersmith, and the State Department in their efforts
to encourage the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to en-
dorse the treaty. Both agencies argued that the treaty was fair
and reasonable in its concessions to Mexico, and they crit-
icized the California opposition movement.99 The Senate fi-
nally ratified the treaty on April 18, 1945.
The Senate’s ratification marked an important victory for
the oiaa. Rockefeller had argued that the future of the United
States’ strategic alliance with Mexico would be jeopardized if
the United States failed to ratify the treaty. The Mexican gov-
ernment considered the outcome of the dispute to be of vital
importance to the two nations as they moved forward in a
postwar relationship.100 More importantly, the oiaa and many
in the State Department viewed the treaty as fair. They under-
stood that Mexico had genuine irrigation needs, and they be-
lieved the treaty addressed those needs in a manner that was
equitable to both countries. Rockefeller felt that settling the
water dispute was a strategic public relations move to improve
the perceptions many Mexicans had of the United States.101
By treating Mexico fairly and expressing genuine concern for
the country’s development needs, the oiaa hoped to portray
the United States as a good neighbor and to solidify popular
support for the United States in World War II.

soup can propaganda | 205

Conclusion

Andy Warhol painted his “soup can” art two decades after
the oiaa began producing its propaganda campaign in Latin
America. Nevertheless, his art reflects important trends in 1960s
American pop culture that existed already in the 1940s and
that influenced the agency’s wartime information. The oiaa
relied on the same forms of mass media that Warhol criticized
to promote a mass-produced version of the American way of
life that it wanted to spread throughout the hemisphere. Its
messages frequently glorified ordinary aspects of American
life, such as factory work, and consumer goods like food and
cosmetics. The agency’s reliance on major U.S. firms to mar-
ket and sponsor its programs further reflects Warhol’s art. The
oiaa used celebrity in brand names such as Colgate Palmolive
and General Electric to advertise the American way of life.
It aimed to unify the hemisphere around a common yet con-
trived definition of “American” based largely on U.S. con-
sumer culture.
Although the oiaa claimed to promote cultural awareness,
its underlying objective—to promote U.S.-led economic co-
operation—influenced the way the agency pursued its propa-
ganda campaign. The agency focused on Pan-Americanism and
encouraged a shared American identity for all of the Western
Hemisphere. Its definition of “American” promoted the United
States as the role model for Latin America. Mexico’s reaction
to these strategies can partially be measured by its own propa-
ganda techniques. In their rhetoric, Mexicans tended to iden-
tify little with being American. Instead, they looked to national
heroes and their own national interests in World War II.

206 | soup can propaganda

5
A Propaganda Chalkboard

Patriotism, Education, and Propaganda

The initial enthusiasm for the war displayed by Mexicans in

the summer of 1942 was tempered by the reality of the strug-
gle by August. Economically, the country had been on a war
footing for more than a year. Many factory owners and ag-
riculturalists had already converted to wartime production
to meet the demand generated in trade agreements with the
United States. As they increased production of war supplies
for export to the United States, the availability of staple goods
for domestic consumption decreased. Inflation quickly set in,
and people found their paychecks shrinking in terms of real
buying power. For many, the war for which they were sac-
rificing grew increasingly distant, and public support began
to wane.
Many began to retreat from their initial enthusiasm for the
war when the Avila Camacho administration implemented the
Compulsory Military Service Law in August 1942. Government
attempts to train a reserve force for domestic security met a
popular backlash as protests erupted throughout the coun-
try. Many feared that compulsory military service meant the
Mexican armed forces would be sent abroad to fight. Others
resisted the draft for the burden it would impose on the fami-
ly’s resources. National unity that seemed solid in the summer
of 1942 appeared to be threatened later in the year as many
citizens questioned some government programs.
As a result, the Mexican government adapted its propa-
ganda strategy to these changing circumstances. Information
agents devised new programs to reduce factional affiliations
and promote a common Mexican identity. They used the up-
coming Independence Day celebration in 1942 to reinforce
messages of national unity. The Avila Camacho administra-
tion also took advantage of oiaa resources to augment the
national wartime information program. The government be-
came directly involved in several oiaa programs to give a
Mexican voice to U.S. propaganda. Mexican contributions
to the oiaa programs made U.S. wartime propaganda more
appealing to the public and allowed Avila Camacho to pro-
mote his domestic agendas of national unity, military mod-
ernization, and industrialization.
By 1943 the wartime information campaign shifted to the
education system, where propaganda messages incorporated
national unity, military service, and modernization. Using the
personnel and resources in the Ministry of Education (Secretaría
de Educación Pública), the government targeted adults and
children alike. The Ministry of Education took over produc-
tion of propaganda posters and pamphlets from the Ministry
of the Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación), and the empha-
sis shifted to promoting a sense of national unity and military
responsibility. Posters frequently incorporated traditional sec-
tors of the population, but stylistically with a modern pres-
ence. They used the strength of the country’s indigenous past
to portray a shift to a more modern—and, by implication,

208 | a propaganda chalkboard

industrial—society. Other Ministry of Education posters pro-
moted the idea that a modern nation must fulfill its patriotic
duty by educating its youth. This goal not only appeared in
propaganda but also became part of school curriculum and
the 1944 literacy campaign. World War II provided a back-
drop for messages of modernity and patriotism that appeared
in educational materials for both adults and children.
A final shift in wartime propaganda can be seen in govern-
ment rhetoric. Following the examples set by patriotic letter
writers in the summer of 1942, government officials began to
incorporate the revolution into their wartime discourse. They
drew parallels between the 1910 revolution and World War II
to define the nation’s revolutionary legacy as one of freedom
and democracy. The Avila Camacho administration incorpo-
rated national unity, military modernization, and industrial-
ization into its rhetoric. It argued that by uniting and support-
ing the government’s modernization agenda, Mexicans would
help ensure an Allied victory in the war. They portrayed the
war as an extension of the revolution and argued that only
a victory in World War II would preserve the nation’s dem-
ocratic legacy.
As its immediate needs in the war changed, the Mexican gov-
ernment’s propaganda approaches changed as well. Throughout
1943 and into 1944, internal wartime information aimed to
educate the population. By using the school system and public
forums, the Avila Camacho administration taught Mexicans
how to be patriotic with a national propaganda chalkboard.
The president urged the country to support the nation’s mil-
itary modernization and to support industrial expansion.
Furthermore, the government taught the Mexican public a
new version of the nation’s revolutionary legacy—one that

a propaganda chalkboard | 209

emphasized democracy and modernity to defend the successes
of the 1910 conﬂict.

Wartime Challenges

Mexico’s primary contribution to the war effort came through

production. The government’s earliest propaganda slogan,
“Produce to Be Patriotic,” reflected this role. Nevertheless, the
lure of a steady paycheck and rising standards of living after
years of economic depression attracted more loyalty among
Mexicans. By mid-1942 Mexico had already become the main
supplier of raw materials to the United States. As the United
States was pulled further into the conflict, it required greater
quantities of raw materials from its southern neighbor. The
Avila Camacho administration viewed industrialization as a
vital part of its modernization agenda, and it identified the
demand for wartime production as a means to develop the
country’s industry. As wartime demand for steel, cotton, and
foodstuffs rose, production for local consumption in Mexico
began to dwindle.
The imbalance in war production meant that although more
Mexicans were earning a wage and more dollars were pour-
ing into the country, fewer consumer goods were available.
Inflation took a serious toll on the country. Between 1939
and 1946 the number of Mexicans participating in the official
workforce rose by 11.3 percent, while the cost-of-living index
saw an increase of over 280 percent.1 The average worker had
more money than ever in his pocket, but it was not enough to
buy basic necessities for his family.
The agricultural system also felt the impact. Avila Camacho
had inherited a volatile agrarian situation from the Cárdenas
administration. Cárdenas’s agrarian policies were extremely

210 | a propaganda chalkboard

popular and had raised expectations among the rural popula-
tion as to what the revolution would do for them. Nevertheless,
Avila Camacho recognized the need to continue a trend that
had actually begun in the last years of the Cárdenas admin-
istration. He argued that much of the nation’s land was un-
suitable for agriculture and that many traditional agricultural
techniques were outdated and inefficient. These facts, coupled
with a population growth of more than one million every year,
meant that the country was no longer self-sufficient in feeding
its population. Instead of further dividing the country’s agri-
cultural resources, Avila Camacho determined to improve ag-
ricultural production through investments in irrigation, infra-
structure, and technology. The immediate result was a decline
in the distribution of available land to the rural population
that was growing in numbers and in expectations.2
The expanding surplus of rural labor coincided not only
with increased demands for industrial labor in the cities but
also with increased labor demands in the United States. As
millions of young American men were drafted or voluntarily
joined the U.S. military forces, a labor void was created on U.S.
farms and factories. To fill that void, the U.S. and Mexican
governments reached a series of agreements starting in August
1942 to import temporary Mexican laborers, braceros, to the
United States. The bracero program became extremely popular,
with more than two hundred thousand Mexicans participat-
ing over the course of the war.3 Even more Mexicans entered
the United States illegally to supplement the shrinking work-
force. Nevertheless, many in Mexico could not help harboring
some resentment for the labor-exchange program. Braceros
frequently left their families behind for extended periods to
work in the United States. Many of those families, and others

a propaganda chalkboard | 211

in Mexico, could not help seeing the irony of Mexico’s slow-
ing its revolutionary reforms and sending its surplus agrar-
ian workers abroad.4

Compulsory Military Service

One of the most controversial issues in Mexico during the war

was in the area of national defense. Despite the strong show
of support in the letter-writing campaign in the summer of
1942, and despite the fact than many Mexicans seemed eager
to volunteer for military duty, when the government finally en-
acted the Compulsory Military Service Law in August 1942,
the administration met popular resistance. Several months
later, an agreement between the United States and Mexico
allowed Mexican citizens living in the United States to be
drafted into the U.S. military. This agreement also provoked
popular protests.
In reality the Compulsory Military Service Law was only a
small part of a larger plan by the Avila Camacho administra-
tion to modernize the country’s military.5 In 1940 the Mexican
army was made up of approximately fifty thousand men, of
whom roughly 20 percent were administrative personnel. Avila
Camacho himself had reached the rank of general in the army’s
accounting office. The country’s actual fighting force was in-
efficient, ill-equipped, and poorly trained. As part of his plan
to modernize the Mexican military, Avila Camacho put into
force the Compulsory Military Service Law that had been en-
acted by Lázaro Cárdenas in 1940. It called for all Mexican
males age eighteen to forty-five to devote a minimum of one
year to compulsory military training and service if necessary.6
The program created a military reserve system in Mexico,
guaranteeing an adequately trained military force if needed

212 | a propaganda chalkboard

for national defense. It increased the number of trained mil-
itary reserves in Mexico to over 250,000.7 It limited the ob-
ligation to one year, thereby continually rotating the burden
of military responsibility among eligible men. The law also
stipulated that military training exercises were to become a
part of physical education programs for youth as early as el-
ementary school.8
Avila Camacho’s intentions seem logical. Mexico had just
declared a state of war, and in the summer of 1942 it was not
known if the Western Hemisphere would come under fur-
ther Axis attack. U.S. and Mexican leaders worried that the
Japanese could target the west coast of North America, and
they specifically feared the vulnerability of California and Baja
California.9 Furthermore, German submarine warfare esca-
lated in the Atlantic and the Caribbean throughout 1942 and
1943, and German submarines frequently came close to U.S.
and Mexican territory.10 The military service plan also comple-
mented Avila Camacho’s broader program for national unity.
The president aimed to create a loyal reserve fighting force
among young adult males and to promote national loyalty
among Mexico’s schoolchildren. The Avila Camacho admin-
istration stipulated from the beginning of its involvement in
the war and throughout 1942 that the military would not be
sent to a foreign battlefield, but instead would serve to guar-
antee national defense.
The majority of Mexicans accepted the plan and participated
in the military service program without protest. Nevertheless,
dissent began to emerge in many areas, particularly in re-
mote, rural regions. Petitions for exemption began to surface
as it became clear that the law included various provisions
for avoiding service. Those who could prove that they were

a propaganda chalkboard | 213

their family’s primary income earner could have their service
legally postponed. Other postponements were granted for ad-
vanced education, and government employees were exempt
from service.11 Many sent petitions directly to President Avila
Camacho requesting postponements or exemptions for hard-
ship reasons.12
Louder protests emerged as local government officials be-
gan to incorporate the military service law into the existing
network of corruption and favoritism. Officials frequently tar-
geted the rural poor for conscription, allowing the affluent to
pay bribes for exemptions. Other officials illegally charged lo-
cal citizens for uniforms and other expenses associated with
military exercises. The secretary of defense received complaints
that local officials frequently used the threat of compulsory
military service to force compliance from striking workers or
other recalcitrant members of the community.13
Some objections to the military service law emerged from
local political divisions. An investigation into an uprising in
Huamantla, Tlaxcala, in December 1942 revealed that the
community was already deeply divided over a disputed local
election. Groups loyal to the losing candidate initiated the pro-
test, using the military service law as an excuse to oppose local
government authority. Those who supported the winner ac-
cepted the military service law. In addition to its findings that
the demonstration was politically motivated, the investigators
concluded that several leaders in the disturbance were women
who claimed to be acting in defense of their sons.14
Most who engaged in protests did so because they interpreted
the military obligation as the government’s attempt to send its
citizens to fight a foreign war. Despite government assurances
to the contrary, many rural Mexicans in particular feared that

214 | a propaganda chalkboard

the United States would pressure Mexico into sending troops
abroad to serve as cannon fodder.15 Government officials and
other war supporters tended to blame the remnants of pro-
Axis groups that had been active in the 1930s. In particular,
they accused the Unión Nacional Sinarquista of propagating
false rumors and agitating social disturbances.16
The introduction of compulsory military service and the
inefficiency with which it was implemented at the local level
provoked a popular backlash against the Avila Camacho ad-
ministration and the country’s involvement in World War II.
In some instances, Mexicans reacted violently, physically at-
tacking government officials, destroying telegraph and tele-
phone lines, and in some extreme cases laying siege to local
towns.17 Most protests took the form of passive resistance as
eligible men frequently did not report for the selection pro-
cess. Others who participated in training exercises engaged
in foot-dragging and other strategies of nonperformance to
protest the system.18
The government quickly recognized that it needed to re-
spond to draft protests in the interest of maintaining war-
time support and national unity. In September 1942 the Avila
Camacho administration sent Cárdenas to visit rural areas.
He personally assured the local populations that the war was
justified and that Mexico would not use the obligatory mil-
itary service law to send troops abroad to fight.19 One study
of national unity concludes that Cárdenas’s assurances had
calmed disturbances in rural areas within four months and
that peasants willingly presented themselves for military ser-
vice. Another study challenges those conclusions by point-
ing to an armed insurrection in Guerrero as late as October
1943.20 Cárdenas’s involvement reassured much of the public

a propaganda chalkboard | 215

and brought a widespread sense of reassurance in the govern-
ment’s actions. Nevertheless, some opposition to the military
service law persisted.
The government used other methods to encourage partici-
pation in the conscription program. Late in 1942, government
planes flew over remote areas of Central Mexico and dropped
thousands of fliers that urged young men to become better cit-
izens through national military service and to help the coun-
try reach its full potential. Government propaganda also as-
serted that those who were spreading rumors and claiming
that Mexican armed forces would be sent abroad were “trai-
tors to la patria.”21
In late 1942 the Avila Camacho and Roosevelt adminis-
trations signed an accord that allowed Mexican citizens re-
siding in the United States to be drafted into the U.S. Army.
The agreement allowed U.S. military representatives to set up
recruiting stations throughout Mexico to encourage volun-
teers. It was signed in December 1942 and immediately went
into effect. The policy evoked a mixed reaction. On the one
hand, many eagerly joined for economic reasons, as enlisted
men’s pay was frequently a tempting financial offer.22 Others
may have joined out of a sense of duty. Estimates indicate that
150,000 to 250,000 Mexicans served in the U.S. military dur-
ing the war and that even more Mexican Americans joined.23
Despite a widespread show of support for the accord, many
Mexicans protested the agreement as a breach of their sover-
eignty.24 As discontent emerged around the new military ser-
vice law and the draft agreement with the United States, the
Mexican government began to adjust its wartime messages
to emphasize patriotism and national unity, with underlying
themes of modernization.

216 | a propaganda chalkboard

National Unity Programs

National unity strategies appeared in the government propa-

ganda campaign in the last months of 1942. From an adminis-
trative perspective, the Comisión Coordinadora de Propaganda
Nacional resolved to consolidate its authority as the sole pro-
ducer of wartime information. It passed a series of regulations
declaring that it would not accept or approve propaganda ini-
tiatives submitted by any individuals or groups not directly
associated with the ccpn.25 Members of the commission felt
that by being the only creator of wartime information, the
agency could ensure that factional groups would not produce
propaganda that promoted special interests.
Guided by the ccpn and with the cooperation of the oiaa,
the Mexican government altered its wartime message to stress
national unity and to support the nation’s military efforts above
all other messages. It aimed to persuade citizens to view them-
selves as Mexicans over other factional afﬁliations. Government
leaders stressed the need for domestic security through a new,
modern military. They hoped to persuade Mexicans to iden-
tify themselves as members of a society united in protecting
itself from Axis aggression. To do so, contended government
propaganda, meant supporting a modern military established
for national defense. The Avila Camacho administration ex-
panded its use of radio, printed materials, and public cele-
brations to broadcast this message. It also began utilizing the
education system in an attempt to teach a more patriotic war-
time attitude both to adults and children.
One of the last documented programs organized by the ccpn
began in August of 1942 and continued through 1943. Adolfo
Fernández Bustamante orchestrated a nationwide patriotic

a propaganda chalkboard | 217

campaign called Abanderado de la Libertad (Standard-bearer
of Liberty).26 Through this program, the ccpn hoped to ap-
peal to a large audience and secure general support in ﬁghting
for Mexico’s freedoms. The Abanderado campaign serves as a
representative expression of the government’s overall propa-
ganda strategies. It illustrates the culmination of propaganda
themes such as national unity based on “la patria y libertad,”
and it demonstrates the government’s attempts to recruit ordi-
nary individuals both to disseminate patriotism and to protect
Mexico from Nazi-sympathizing traitors. Finally, the ccpn’s
use of public festivals and mass media as forums for spread-
ing propaganda was a central component of Abanderado de
la Libertad.
The commission used the concept of national unity as the
main theme in its propaganda campaign. Understanding that
many Mexicans remained divided politically, ideologically, ec-
onomically, and religiously, the ccpn had to look outside these
spheres for a concept to unite them. Through Abanderado de
la Libertad, the rallying cry for national unity became “La
patria y libertad.” Regardless of prior divisions, the ccpn
hoped that all Mexicans could agree on general beliefs about
Mexico and freedom.
To begin the Abanderado campaign, the commission dis-
tributed a memorandum to government ofﬁces, schools, la-
bor organizations, ejido groups, religious organizations, and
businesses throughout the country. The memo explained that
only two fundamental characteristics were necessary to be-
come a bearer of liberty: love for Mexico and love of lib-
erty. The memo stated that Mexicans had always been and
would continue to be lovers of freedom.27 To emphasize the
call for complete national unity, the commission stressed that

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all inhabitants of Mexico could become standard-bearers re-
gardless of sex, age, political association, or religious affilia-
tion. Members of the Abanderado program accepted the duty
of serving Mexico above all else. They were also obliged to
wear the badge of the Abanderados in a conspicuous place on
their clothing. In exchange, the government wanted them to
be recognized as patriots respected by their government and
fellow Mexicans.
The Abanderado program also set the stage for Mexicans
to become actively involved in promoting patriotism among
community members. Standard-bearers became responsible
for creating and spreading all types of propaganda in favor of
Mexico and freedom. This propaganda included displaying the
Abanderado de la Libertad banner in their homes or places of
businesses. The program required each new signatory to recruit
ten new members until all Mexicans became Abanderados.28
The ccpn expected this program to guarantee that all loyal
Mexicans would voluntarily become Abanderados and actively
participate in spreading patriotic propaganda. The commis-
sion stated that those who rejected the Abanderado campaign
clearly demonstrated that they did not love their patria and
would open themselves up to immediate suspicion of being a
quintacolumnista, a spy, and an enemy of Mexico.
The ccpn designed the Abanderado program to become
widespread and public. The initial plan called for nation-
wide public celebrations to be carried out simultaneously on
September 11, 1942, in all public schools, government of-
fices, factories, small shops, mining operations, local busi-
nesses, and rural ejidos. The commission planned the celebra-
tions to allow a platform for government officials to explain
clearly why Mexico had joined the war and to promote the

a propaganda chalkboard | 219

Abanderado campaign. The plan called on all radio stations
in the country to play the Mexican national anthem at noon
on that day to initiate the celebrations.29
The Abanderado program did not require feedback from
the population. It was intended to be a voluntary program in-
volving informal compliance. Nevertheless, the ccpn received
more than eighty letters from radio stations, newspapers, civic
organizations, businesses, and individuals between September
1942 and April 1943. All gave their support to the program.
Many groups circulated local petitions to attract new mem-
bers, which amounted to more than 180 additional signa-
tures.30 The Abanderado slogan appeared in numerous news-
paper advertisements sponsored by government agencies and
local businesses. Since the Abanderado program did not re-
quire signatories to record their participation with the ccpn,
these numbers represent only those who chose to correspond
with the propaganda ofﬁce. The total number of participants
was probably much higher.

Independence Celebration

As the country’s Independence Day celebration approached,

the ccpn began looking for additional strategies to take ad-
vantage of growing patriotism and push for national unity.
Following the trend set by other former presidents and polit-
ical leaders, former president Abelardo Rodríguez had volun-
teered his services to the Avila Camacho administration shortly
after the declaration of war. The ccpn capitalized on his name
recognition and revolutionary symbolism and appointed him
as president of the Committee for National Rapprochement.31
This committee aimed to use the war in Europe to promote a
greater sense of national unity in 1942. It targeted September

220 | a propaganda chalkboard

16, Independence Day, as the Day of National Rapprochement
and engaged in a propaganda campaign to convince citizens
that they were indeed united as a nation.
On September 1, Elías Alvarez del Castillo, director of the
committee, sent a list of radio spots to all broadcast stations
in the country to promote the event. Radio spots emphasized
that Mexicans were confronting an enemy that threatened the
entire world and encouraged citizens to produce and to con-
tribute to the unification of national thought. The spots em-
phasized that as a united nation, Mexico could confront its
universal enemies and be victorious in the war. They repeatedly
used phrases such as “unity,” “patria,” and “Mexicanidad” to
promote the concept that citizens were united by their coun-
try and their Mexican heritage.32
The Independence Day celebrations in 1942 provided an-
other platform for Avila Camacho and the ccpn to promote
the war effort. In the context of wartime crisis, the president
saw the September 16 celebrations as an opportunity to pro-
mote both of his wartime objectives.33 The traditional military
parade that was part of the celebration allowed the govern-
ment to unveil its new, modern military. The parade lasted for
more than two hours and displayed the first round of modern
machinery that Mexico had acquired from the United States
through the lend-lease agreement. The Avila Camacho ad-
ministration emphasized the notion of national unity by in-
viting former presidents Plutarco Elías Calles, Emilio Portes
Gil, Pascual Ortiz Rubio, Abelardo Rodríguez, Adolfo de la
Huerta, and Lázaro Cárdenas. The sight of former presidents
who represented conflicting revolutionary factions made an
important symbolic statement that the nation had united on an
official level to face the international crisis. The Avila Camacho

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administration aimed to use the symbolism of political unity
to set an example to be followed by the popular masses.
Avila Camacho’s speech at the ceremony turned the coun-
try’s attention to both the national heroic past as well as to
the current crisis. He outlined the principles of the nation’s
enemies: hate, rancor, servitude, violence, and abdication of
spiritual and humane values. He compared those qualities to
Mexico’s foundation: energy instead of fury, the desire for
peace and understanding in place of vengeance, harmony in-
stead of force, and love of justice and liberty over despotism.
He called on Mexicans to consider their nation a sacred union
that could not be divided.34
Government propaganda further promoted national unity
and domestic defense through printed materials late in 1942.
The propaganda ofﬁce distributed the pamphlet “Defendamos
la patria” (Let’s Defend Our Homeland), which offered a nar-
rative of how Mexico became involved in World War II. It em-
phasized that the Avila Camacho administration had desper-
ately attempted to maintain neutrality in the conﬂict but had
been forced to declare war by German aggression. The pam-
phlet provided a reproduction of Avila Camacho’s pronounce-
ment to Congress in which he requested support for a decla-
ration of war. Through “Defendamos la patria,” government
propaganda stressed that the nation needed to defend its do-
mestic security against foreign aggression and that it would
at all times protect its independence and its dignity.35

Cooperation with the United States

As Nelson Rockefeller’s agency became more involved in

Mexican propaganda in 1942, the Mexican government be-
gan to develop an increasingly cooperative relationship with

222 | a propaganda chalkboard

it and other U.S. agencies. Since an important aspect of the
ccpn’s propaganda plan was to promote greater understand-
ing of and unity with the United States among Mexicans, the
Avila Camacho administration determined to lead by exam-
ple. Initially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs served as the main
liaison between the oiaa and the Mexican government, but
quickly other departments began cooperating with the agency
as well. As government representatives from the Ministry of
the Interior and the Ministry of Education, among others,
began to engage in the propaganda campaign jointly with
Rockefeller’s agency, many of the oiaa’s programs took on a
distinctively Mexican character. These cooperative programs
frequently were more appealing to Mexicans than generic
oiaa programs designed for Latin America as a whole. The
relationship allowed the Mexican government to benefit from
the financial resources and manpower the oiaa had at its dis-
posal, and the relationship allowed the oiaa to use Mexicans’
expertise to produce more effective propaganda targeted spe-
cifically at Mexico.
A telling example of the cooperation between the oiaa and
the Mexican government occurred in August 1942. The two
governments shared information and responsibility in orga-
nizing a public celebration to commemorate victims of Nazi
atrocities in Europe. Although the celebration was formally
sponsored by the oiaa, Mexican planners helped to design an
agenda that emphasized uniquely Mexican characteristics.36
On June 10, 1942, the small Czechoslovakian town of Lídice
was attacked and destroyed by the German army. That same
day, Berlin radio publicly broadcast a report accusing the res-
idents of Lídice of having given asylum and protection to the
assassins of German official Reinhard Heydrich. The report

a propaganda chalkboard | 223

revealed that town residents had engaged in acts of defiance
against the German Reich, which included accumulating sub-
versive propaganda, compiling weapons, hoarding rationed
supplies, and collaborating with the enemy. As punishment
for these acts, the German army assassinated all of the men
of Lídice and sent all women and children to concentration
camps. The army then destroyed the village, erasing every
physical sign that it had ever existed.37
News of this Nazi atrocity horrified Allied leaders and the
rest of the world, and the oiaa immediately initiated a cam-
paign to use the Lídice incident as propaganda in the Americas.
Rockefeller’s agency began to make a connection between the
Czechoslovakian village and many small pueblos through-
out the Americas. Working in cooperation with the Mexican
government, the oiaa proposed changing the name of a small
town to Lídice in honor of the Czechoslovakian village to keep
its memory alive. In fact, the oiaa had made similar propos-
als in other Latin American countries and had carried out a
similar celebration in a small town in Illinois, but local par-
ticipation in the Lídice ceremony made it a unique experi-
ence for Mexicans.
The Mexican government scheduled its highly publicized cel-
ebration for August 30, 1942. The town chosen for the honor
was San Jerónimo, fifteen kilometers outside Mexico City.
Selected partially for its similarities to Lídice, San Jerónimo also
offered high visibility for the ceremony with its proximity to
Mexico City. The ceremony began at three o’clock on a Sunday
afternoon with a series of patriotic songs.38 Congressional
Deputy Alejandro Carrillo initiated the festivities with an in-
troductory speech in which he evoked heroic figures such as
Hidalgo, Morelos, and Juárez as symbols of Mexico’s fight

224 | a propaganda chalkboard

against fascism. He insisted that Lídice had not died, but rather
lived on through San Jerónimo de Lídice. Following Carrillo’s
speech, Mexico City’s mayor, Javier Rojo Gómez, gave a brief
declaration that officially changed San Jerónimo’s name. Rojo’s
declaration was followed by the traditional rallying cry of “Viva
Lídice” as the officially commissioned police band played the
Czechoslovakian national anthem.39
In the last part of the program, Mexican organizers took
advantage of the public festival to incorporate and reinforce
the message of national unity. Alejandro Carrillo returned to
the podium to identify the elements that made up Mexican na-
tionality. He delivered a narrative declaring that all Mexicans
felt the anguish of all the victims of Lídice. He then summoned
to the podium citizens representing specific social sectors to
give a declaration demonstrating how the population of Lídice
paralleled their own experiences. He first called a worker to
the podium who proclaimed worker solidarity against oppres-
sion. The laborer declared that two hundred Czechoslovakian
workers had been shot and that the Mexican workforce would
stand up in their defense. An indigenous campesino repre-
sented the rural sectors of society. He rejected Nazi theories of
racial superiority and declared that American natives would
fight fascism. The government ceremony drew parallels be-
tween Nazi atrocities in Lídice and two disparate factions of
Mexican society. By placing representatives of the labor and
agrarian sectors on the same platform to oppose Nazism, the
government made important appeals for national unity against
an international enemy.
Carrillo called citizens who represented middle-class fami-
lies. A housewife made an emotional statement by pronounc-
ing her solidarity with the widows in concentration camps

a propaganda chalkboard | 225

who did not know where their children were. Finally, a small
child addressed the crowd. He read the following message:
“I feel for the children of the other Lídice who do not have
daddies and mommies now and who do not have homes any-
more. Some day I will be able to help you.”40
Mariachi music followed the testimonials to give the effect of
traditional Mexico. The ceremony ended with a speaker reading
various telegrams sent by influential leaders from around the
world, including Czechoslovakian president Eduardo Benes,
former U.S. ambassador to Russia Joseph E. Davies, and a
spokesman from Lídice, Illinois. Vice-President Henry Wallace
of the United States delivered a radio address in Spanish, trans-
mitted from Washington dc to the crowd. Finally, Secretary
of the Interior Miguel Alemán delivered the closing speech,
followed by the Mexican national anthem.
The Lídice ceremony illustrates important benefits that
came with cooperation between the oiaa and the Mexican
government. The oiaa provided indispensable financial re-
sources and international exposure for the event. For the cere-
mony, the Press and Publications Division provided an eleven-
page illustrated color pamphlet that told the story of Lídice
through images and short captions. The oiaa helped to se-
cure the participation of international leaders. Nevertheless,
the event drew the interest of the public because of local con-
tributions. By including members of local society in the cere-
mony, the government succeeded in drawing personal paral-
lels between individual Mexicans and the Lídice victims. As
a result, Mexicans identified with the ceremony on a patri-
otic level instead of viewing it as a foreign concept imposed
upon them by the oiaa.

226 | a propaganda chalkboard

Patriotic Radio: Interpretación mexicana de la guerra

Mexican cooperation with the oiaa can be seen clearly in the

ﬁeld of radio. Although the oiaa initially preferred to imitate
U.S. programs in Latin America, it soon learned that Mexicans
responded more strongly to programming that possessed a
clear Mexican character. The Coordinating Committee for
Mexico planned programs that included Mexican music and
commentary on Mexican customs. It also used local person-
alities in many of its programs. In November 1942, radio
stations xeb and xeoy began cooperating with the oiaa to
broadcast a daily program devoted to reporting news of the
war. Written, produced, and orated by renowned journalist
and diplomat Félix Fulgencio Palavicini, Interpretación mex-
icana de la guerra (Mexican Interpretation of the War) be-
came one of the country’s most popular and inﬂuential war-
time radio programs.41
Félix Palavicini, a native of Tabasco, started his career as
a topographer but quickly changed to journalism and poli-
tics. As a teenager he founded a local newspaper in Tabasco
before relocating to Mexico City and eventually to Europe
to pursue his studies. In 1908 he began editing the political
newsletter El Partido Republicano, and the following year he
joined Francisco Madero’s anti-reelectionist campaign. With
Madero’s victory, Palavicini became part of the political ma-
chine that represented the victorious revolution. During the
presidency of Venustiano Carranza, Palavicini served as head of
the Ministry of Education. In 1916 he founded El Universal, a
newspaper that became one of the nation’s more important pe-
riodicals. Between 1920 and 1942 Palavicini became involved
in diplomacy, serving posts in England, France, Belgium, Italy,
Spain, and Argentina.42

a propaganda chalkboard | 227

During his diplomatic posting in Argentina in the early
1940s, Palavicini became actively involved in promoting the
ideals of Pan-Americanism on behalf of the Mexican govern-
ment. During his tenure he began a propaganda campaign to
promote the future of the American continental economies
and published his ideas in Mapa económico de América. In
1941 he published Democracias mestizas, which exalted the
virtues of Mexican democracy and further promoted the ideals
of continental solidarity.43 Throughout his career, Palavicini
represented Mexico’s evolving revolution through his own
politics. His call for Pan-American unity in 1941 appealed to
the oiaa to bring a Mexican voice to the hemispheric unity
arm of its propaganda campaign.
On November 16, Palavicini’s program began limited broad-
casts in stations supported by the Mexican government and the
oiaa. Using U.S. wire services and oiaa resources, Palavicini
reported war news as a Mexican authority. The fact that the
program was an arm of the oiaa was not widely publicized.
In interviews, Palavicini presented himself as an independent
journalist, without ideological, economic, or political ties.44
He never made reference to his relationship with the oiaa in
his commentaries, although he did acknowledge on air that
the United Press provided him up-to-the-minute coverage of
wartime news. He relied exclusively on U.S. news sources, and
frequently his commentary went directly from the teletype to
the microphone.45 He claimed in his initial broadcast that he
intended to interpret the war “with a minimum of doctrine,
and a maximum quantity of information.”46 Nevertheless, be-
cause he was paid and supported by the oiaa, his commen-
tary generally emphasized those themes that the Rockefeller
agency wanted to promote.

228 | a propaganda chalkboard

Palavicini’s program broadcast many of the objectives of
the oiaa, and it also incorporated Avila Camacho’s wartime
messages. In his first months, Palavicini devoted most of his
commentary to justifying Mexico’s involvement in the war.
He used language similar to Avila Camacho’s rhetoric in his
declaration of war, promoting concepts of peace, democracy,
and freedom. He advocated the government’s industrializa-
tion strategy as one of the best means of assuring an Allied
victory.47 He called on the country to unite against Axis ag-
gressors and to increase production, using phrases such as
“Mexico’s weapon is production.”48 One of his most impor-
tant achievements was creating a psychology of war among
the public.49 He constantly urged Mexicans to be on alert for
enemy propaganda and to embrace the sacrifices required by
the war as part of their patriotic duty.50
The popularity of Palavicini’s program grew and its broad-
casts eventually reached most of the country by the end of
the war. As the oiaa’s relationship with media mogul Emilio
Azcárraga developed, the agency saw an opportunity to ex-
pand the influence of Palavicini’s program. In July 1943 the
program moved to Radio Programas de México. Azcárraga’s
network connected forty-four associated stations and allowed
Palavicini’s program to evolve from a local, Mexico City broad-
cast to a national wartime news program. By the end of the
war it had become the most popular source of wartime radio
news in the country.
Palavicini tied Mexican well-being to U.S. objectives through-
out his program, but at the same time he avoided making refer-
ences to his relationship with Rockefeller’s office. He regularly
made references to Pan-Americanism as something that would
be beneficial to both countries. Generally, his commentaries

a propaganda chalkboard | 229

argued that the United States aimed to improve productivity
and transportation services in Mexico.51 He promoted oiaa
programs, but in the three years that he worked for the agency
he mentioned it in only one program.52 Palavicini intended
to generate support for the war through nationalist appeals.
Instead of imposing U.S. messages of hemispheric unity onto
the public, he relied on issues that concerned Mexicans. He
tried to demonstrate that in addition to contributing to hemi-
spheric security, Mexico’s participation in the war would ben-
eﬁt its citizens internally. His radio commentary represents
one of the few oiaa programs that presented a Mexican per-
spective to the war and allowed nationalist propaganda to
sway public opinion.

The National Chalkboard: A Lesson in Patriotism

By the end of 1942 and into 1943, the government’s pro-

paganda agency stopped its activity and propaganda efforts
shifted to the Ministry of Education.53 One likely explana-
tion is that with the oiaa becoming more involved in generat-
ing wartime propaganda, the government chose to devote its
limited resources to educational campaigns. By late 1942 the
Ministry of Education began printing war propaganda posters
and pamphlets. It also developed a system of indirect propa-
ganda in the school system by encouraging teachers to adopt
the government position toward the war in their classrooms.
World War II became incorporated into education missions
by rural school inspectors. It began to appear in classroom
curriculum and the National Campaign against Illiteracy in
1944. Through the Ministry of Education, the government’s
ofﬁcial propaganda campaign matured and began to repre-
sent not only the desire to win support for its actions in the

230 | a propaganda chalkboard

war but also the broader agenda for modernization and na-
tional unity. The Ministry of Education responded to many
of the war-related challenges that began to emerge in the last
years of the war.
Beginning late in 1942, the Ministry of Education began
producing wartime pamphlets. One of the most important
of these, “La educación mexicana y la educación nazi,” com-
pared Mexico’s education system to that of Germany, stress-
ing the differences between the two systems. The purpose
of Mexican education, the pamphlet argues, is to ensure the
freedom and well-being of the population and to bring fam-
ilies closer. In contrast, it stresses the rigidity of Nazi educa-
tion, quoting one of Hitler’s famous statements, “Knowledge
would corrupt my youth.” The Ministry of Education pro-
duced a poster that featured this phrase below a large, impos-
ing Nazi soldier destroying books, classrooms, and libraries
(figure 20). As the soldier tramples the remains of civilized
society, his bayonet pierces the word “culture.”
A clear shift occurred in the Ministry of Education’s poster
campaign when compared to earlier posters printed by the
Ministry of the Interior. The government’s wartime rheto-
ric moved away from emphasizing solely industrialization
and unity and began to express a message of modernization
more broadly defined. The image of a modern nation that the
Avila Camacho administration was trying to craft included
new industries, but it also incorporated national service and
literacy.
The Ministry of Education placed a clear emphasis on pro-
moting the government’s military service program by producing
posters that instilled a sense of military duty and patriotism.
In figure 21, the silhouette of a Mexican soldier overlooks a

a propaganda chalkboard | 231

fig. 20. “Knowledge would corrupt my youth” (Ministry of
Education poster). Reprinted from “Mexican War Posters,” Inter-American
Monthly 1, no. 8 (December 1942).

232 | a propaganda chalkboard

fig. 21. “Mexico united against aggression” (Ministry of Education
poster). Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division,
POS-C-Mex. B15.6.

a propaganda chalkboard | 233

sinking ship meant to represent the Potrero del Llano as de-
scribed in the caption below. The message reminds Mexicans
that their call to arms was a response to an attack by a foreign
aggressor and not an arbitrary decision by the government to
force its citizens into military service. The government con-
tinued to use the Nazi submarine attacks in its propaganda
messages, but by 1943 it had infused the theme of the neces-
sity of military service into its propaganda. The shift is par-
ticularly clear when comparing figure 21 to earlier Potrero
del Llano posters, which featured civilians rallying around
the nation.54
In figure 22, a young, strong Mexican in military uniform
stands proudly behind a shield bearing the seal of Mexico, his
body protecting the outline of Mexico below him. The word
“Listos!” (Ready!) appears behind him in bold letters, and the
caption claims, “Por mi raza hablara el espiritu” (My spirit
speaks for my race). The image portrays a message that mili-
tary service is a matter of pride for the Mexican people and la
patria. Figure 23 shows two strong hands grasping a weapon,
which is superimposed over the Mexican symbol of the eagle
and serpent atop a pyramid. The text reads, “La patria mexi-
cana, defended by her sons.” The image combines traditional
images of the nation, such as the eagle and serpent and the
Indian pyramid dating back to pre-Colombian civilizations,
with symbols of modern military force.
All of the defense posters produced by the Ministry of
Education sent a subtle message of the modernization in the
nation’s military. The features of the soldiers in figures 21 and
22 are chiseled, strong, and give the impression of modernity.
The powerful forearms in figure 23 give the same impression.
Stylistically, the images represent various versions of cubism,

234 | a propaganda chalkboard

fig. 22. “Ready!” (Ministry of Education poster). Courtesy of U.S.
Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. M497.27.

a propaganda chalkboard | 235

fig. 23. “Defended by her sons” (Ministry of Education poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex.
R45.1.

236 | a propaganda chalkboard

featuring stark angles, insistent geometry, and fragmentation
of objects. The cubist style assumes a universal understand-
ing of geometric shapes as a sign of modernity. In contrast,
earlier propaganda posters featured a more traditional, nat-
uralist style, in which objects were portrayed in a setting that
was more realistic, precise, and true to perspective.55 All of
the later images show modern weapons in defense of the na-
tion. Even the captions are printed in a contemporary font,
completing the message of modernity.
Other posters printed by the Ministry of Education pro-
moted cooperation and solidarity with other nations, while
playing on notions of national identity. As part of its Pan-
Americanism campaign, the ministry printed the poster in
figure 24. It shows silhouettes of two men shaking hands
and standing over a globe without country silhouettes. The
caption presents a quotation from President Avila Camacho:
“Why do we fight? For a world where man can be the friend
of man.” The dark figures purposely show no distinctive fea-
tures and could be persons of any nationality. The image re-
flects the influence of artistic primitivism as an expression of
modernity that was growing in popularity in the Americas in
the 1940s. Primitivism allowed artists to reject the dominant
social discourse in European culture and incorporate sym-
bols from other parts of the world and from their own tradi-
tional roots.56 The international primitivist movement com-
plemented the nationalist artistic movement of indigenismo
that had been growing in Mexico since the 1920s.57 The poster
in figure 24 juxtaposes primitivism as a modern portrayal of
traditional and national culture with the international crisis
of World War II. Again, the men are muscular and exude a

a propaganda chalkboard | 237

fig. 24. “Why do we ﬁght?” (Ministry of Education poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex.
P75.6.

238 | a propaganda chalkboard

sense of modernity through their primitivism, but they also
represent international solidarity.
Another aspect of the Ministry of Education’s propaganda
strategy emphasized inculcating youth with a sense of pa-
triotism and duty. The ministry sent a general message that
young Mexicans had a duty to love their country and to pur-
sue an education to fight ignorance, which would in turn de-
fend Mexico. In figure 25, a young boy is shown saluting with
a caption above claiming “Present!” Photographs beside the
boy show Mexican students in classrooms, eagerly learning.
The caption at the bottom of the poster explains that students
also fight for their country. The same general theme of mo-
dernity is present in this image, suggesting that a nation be-
comes modern not only through military might and interna-
tional cooperation but also through education.
The Ministry of Education targeted young people in other
ways. Through its program of sending inspectors to rural
schools, it had access to regular communication with teachers
in small villages and could disseminate a central message rela-
tively easily. When many rural Mexicans began to question the
Compulsory Military Service Law in the fall of 1942, the gov-
ernment used rural inspectors to explain the project. Parents
feared that their sons would be sent abroad to fight, and many
did not understand why their children were participating in
military exercises at school. The Ministry of Education used
its inspectors to communicate the government program both
to teachers and to parents. Inspectors regularly organized open
forums with parents to listen to their concerns and to explain
government policies. During these meetings, inspectors em-
phasized that the government reluctantly declared war only
because the country had been attacked by Germany. They also

a propaganda chalkboard | 239

fig. 25. “Present!” (Ministry of Education poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photograph Division, POS-C-Mex.
P75.1.

240 | a propaganda chalkboard

stressed that the new military service law was enacted for na-
tional defense and that conducting military exercises in ele-
mentary school would better prepare the children for compul-
sory military training.58 Inspectors reported that after hearing
these explanations, parents were eager to support the govern-
ment’s wartime policies.
Inspectors kept teachers up-to-date on changes in the cur-
riculum that accompanied the state of war. Primary school
readers published by the ministry in 1942 and 1943 used
themes of patriotism and national unity in their lessons. Mi
nuevo amigo included an entire section titled “Mi patria es
México,” which contained reading lessons about the national
flag, the national anthem, and famous historical sites such as
Chapultepec, Xochimilco, and pre-Colombian pyramids.59
Another primary school reader, Un gorrión en la guerra de
las fieras, took up the theme of World War II directly. It told
the story of a sparrow who was caught in a battle between el-
ephants and other large and fierce jungle creatures. The spar-
row, although smaller in size, became instrumental in defeat-
ing the elephant because he stood for justice and freedom. The
story ends with a caption that reinforces the government’s
patriotic message. It recounts the German submarine attacks
of 1942 and it underscores the dignity and patriotism of the
president’s decision to declare war. The lesson concludes by
reprinting a German government’s reaction to Mexico’s dec-
laration of war: “the entrance of Mexico into the conflict is
like a bird interfering in a battle between elephants.”60
As the war continued, the Avila Camacho administration
adopted new programs to promote its educational agenda and
to use the education system to promote its war propaganda.
In 1944, Congress passed the president’s Ley de Emergencia,

a propaganda chalkboard | 241

fig. 26. “Ignorance is our enemy” (Ministry of Education poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex.
M497.28.

242 | a propaganda chalkboard

which set the stage for the National Campaign against Illiteracy.
Avila Camacho recruited Jaime Torres Bodet, former assistant
secretary of state and former protégé to José Vasconcelos, as
the new minister of education to lead the new campaign. The
president made it clear that the literacy campaign was neces-
sary in the time of emergency to combat ignorance and to in-
still loyalty to the country.61 The program, dubbed the “each
one teach one” plan, called for all literate citizens with at least
a fifth-grade education to teach an illiterate countryman to
read and write. The law made teaching literacy a legal obli-
gation for the literate population.62
Under Torres Bodet, the Ministry of Education initiated a
publicity campaign to promote the new program. Posters ad-
vertising the campaign frequently made reference to World War
II as impetus for promoting literacy and stressed that Mexicans
had a patriotic duty to participate. One of the most widely
circulated publicity posters, shown in figure 26, made explicit
connections between the dangers of illiteracy and World War
II. The text in the middle of the poster reads: “We are at war
and one of our most dangerous enemies is ignorance.” Other
posters called on Mexicans’ sense of patriotism to participate.
The text in figure 27 reads: “All who have received instruc-
tion have the duty of teaching [others] to read and write. It is
an act of patriotism and humanity.”
The curriculum developed for the literacy campaign used
World War II as a subject for reading lessons. In 1944 the
Ministry of Education printed and distributed ten million cop-
ies of a 109-page Cartilla, which served as the primary teaching
material in the literacy campaign.63 The first section provided
introductory exercises to practice basic letter combinations.
The second section provided reading exercises on a variety of

a propaganda chalkboard | 243

fig. 27. “Patriotic duty” (Ministry of Education poster). Courtesy of
U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. P75.2.

244 | a propaganda chalkboard

topics, including lessons on family, health, and the land. Other
exercises promoted a clear patriotic message. Several focused
on national heroes such as Cuauhtémoc and Benito Juárez.
Some lessons took up themes such as the national anthem and
the Constitution. Several lessons focused specifically on World
War II. “Estamos en guerra” (We are at war) included lines
such as “Eduardo is interested in the war” and “The brave
aviators are going to fight for freedom.” Another lesson was
devoted specifically to Squadron 201, which stressed: “Brave
Mexicans want to fight for the liberty of the world.” The les-
son ended with the phrase, “A mother gives her life to her sons
and gives the lives of her sons for freedom.”64

The OIAA Literacy Experiment

The illiteracy issue provided a lens into local reactions to U.S.

pedagogical techniques. As Torres Bodet orchestrated the “each
one to teach one” plan, education experts in the oiaa worked
in cooperation with Walt Disney studios to design a literacy
and health program through educational films. Agency repre-
sentatives invited Mexican educators to the United States to
participate in the planning stages to assist in developing spe-
cific curricula. The oiaa then established test groups in urban,
semi-urban, and rural areas of Jalisco. Agency representatives
reported enthusiastic reactions among illiterate Mexicans who
participated in the program. One agent reported that an Indian
woman had fallen in love with one of the male characters in
the films and dreamed about him regularly. Another reported
that a woman in the rural testing area had caught on to the
lesson quickly and regularly shouted answers in anticipation
of the film. In response, the rest of the class began shouting
as well, trying to drown her out. oiaa educators described

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adult students eagerly participating in the reading lessons and
taking pride in the fact that they were learning to read. They
rated the pedagogical techniques of the literacy project a suc-
cess and sent the films on to other Latin American countries
to be tested there as well.65
Despite the oiaa’s reports of positive feedback among stu-
dents, the agency’s attempted literacy program provoked a
political backlash among some educators, journalists, and
government officials. Eulalia Guzmán, a representative of the
Ministry of Education and participant in the planning stages
of the program, led an aggressive public-relations campaign
against the final result.66 She argued that the oiaa had ig-
nored important advice from the Mexican contributors re-
garding content and strategy.67 In particular, she and others
balked at the opening credits of the education films, which
included an announcement that the films were a gift from the
United States. Guzmán also argued that the oiaa disregarded
her input and reproduced English reading lessons, translated
into Spanish.68 She considered this approach to be inappro-
priate and ineffective compared to devising new and original
lessons in Spanish.
Guzmán’s objections quickly led to a public debate in Mexico
City’s editorials. Journalists, educators, and other opinion lead-
ers largely opposed the literacy program as another illustra-
tion of U.S. attitudes of imperialism and superiority. One ed-
itorial found the films to be offensive, accusing the oiaa of
making fun of Indians and presenting indigenous traditions in
a “vulgar manner.”69 An Excelsior editorial pointed to a ques-
tionnaire that the oiaa incorporated into the reading lessons,
which included questions about how often individuals bathed,
if they used soap, how they disposed of their garbage, and if

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they had the same comforts as people in the United States.70
Critics argued that these questions demeaned the Mexican poor
and represented yet another instance of the United States act-
ing in a superior manner to its southern neighbors.
The opinion piece found other excerpts of the film demean-
ing to Mexico’s illiterate citizens. It quoted one particular
section, “José is a healthy young man. José eats well, José is
healthy because he eats well.” For Excelsior’s writer, the ref-
erences to food and health were insensitive because many
Mexicans were poor and did not eat well because they could
not afford to do so.71
The outcome of the oiaa’s health and literacy campaign
reveals important aspects of the popular perception of the
United States in Mexico. As a result of the strong backlash
against the program, Secretary Torres Bodet announced that
he did not want to use the films in Mexico.72 He pointed to
the Ministry of Education’s literacy campaign and argued that
the national program was best suited to meet the country’s
immediate needs. The reaction in editorials indicates that the
public largely supported his position. The oiaa’s literacy pro-
gram attempted to promote improvements in health by making
Latin Americans more aware of health issues. Nevertheless,
Mexicans viewed the program skeptically. Many took offense
at the content of the educational films and questioned U.S. in-
tentions in developing the program.

Government Language and the Revolution

Another evolution in the government’s propaganda strategy

developed following the outpouring of emotion demonstrated
by many Mexicans in the summer of 1942. As the initial public
enthusiasm for the war effort waned in response to economic

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crises and the military laws, the Avila Camacho administration
determined to integrate wartime rhetoric with its revolution-
ary legacy. The government devised new strategies to deal with
wartime shortages and rising prices, and it promoted those
new programs as part of revolutionary reforms. The admin-
istration adopted a rhetoric that equated World War II to the
1910 revolution. By doing so it sought to persuade the pub-
lic that supporting the war effort meant defending the suc-
cesses of the revolution.
The Avila Camacho administration developed internal strat-
egies to combat the food shortages and inﬂation created by the
wartime economy. In particular, a national food agency be-
came one of the largest social projects of the wartime admin-
istration after 1942.73 The president had created the Nacional
Distribuidora y Reguladora, sa (nadyrsa; National Distribution
and Regulatory Agency) in May 1941 to regulate the price,
supply, storage, and transport of basic grains. Urban workers
began to put increasing pressure on the government in 1943 to
take action to correct the decline in real wages that accompa-
nied inﬂation. In response, Avila Camacho increased funding
to the nadyrsa, which allowed the agency to increase food
subsidies from 536,380 pesos in 1942 to 3,226,175 pesos in
1943.74 The agency sought to curb the rising costs of food by
persuading agrarians to sell basic foodstuffs to the govern-
ment at controlled prices. The government would then sell
food to the urban population at prices that were frequently
lower than the purchase price.75
Agricultural representatives, through the Confederación
Nacional de Campesinos (cnc; National Confederation of
Campesinos), pushed the government to guarantee higher prices
to producers. Avila Camacho’s concern with maintaining social

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stability in the cities superseded the complaints of agrarians,
and the government kept payments low to reduce the cost of
living for urban consumers. At the same time, internal trans-
portation problems affected food production. The nadyrsa
frequently lacked ways to ship and store crops. As a result, a
black market arose for the domestic food supply during the
war. The government responded by developing wartime pro-
paganda that targeted growers.
The Ministry of Education began producing posters aimed
at rural Mexicans in 1943. The poster in figure 28, for exam-
ple, instructed teachers to tell the campesino that “Victory
is in the harvests.” This and other posters featured country
people as an important cornerstone of the nation’s patriotic
identity and its potential for success in the war. Other rural
propaganda urged campesinos not to be fooled by charlatans
offering higher prices for grain. Instead, they should fulfill
their patriotic duty by selling to the nadyrsa.76
Government rhetoric began to incorporate the revolu-
tion in ways that mirrored the sentiments expressed by many
Mexicans in the summer of 1942. In their letters of support
after Avila Camacho’s declaration of war, many citizens had
made a correlation between Mexico’s 1910 revolution and
the world crisis. In an effort to understand their country’s in-
volvement in what seemed like Europe’s war, Mexicans looked
to their own revolution as a movement to rid the country of
a dictator and as the predecessor to a worldwide movement
to end totalitarianism. The Avila Camacho administration
recognized that those sentiments could be used to strengthen
the national unity campaign. World War II provided the pres-
ident the opportunity to unite the nation politically for the
first time since the overthrow of Porfirio Díaz in 1911. It did

a propaganda chalkboard | 249

fig. 28. “Victory is in the harvests” (Ministry of Education poster).
Courtesy of U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-C-Mex. L67.1.

250 | a propaganda chalkboard

not take Avila Camacho long to begin drawing upon the col-
lective memory that related revolutionary democracy and the
crisis of world war.
In May 1942, no part of the government’s propaganda
strategy involved emphasizing the revolution in the context of
the broader world conflict. On the contrary, Avila Camacho
feared that images of the revolution could renew the fervor
of the revolutionary factions that had divided the country
for decades, especially the recent, short-lived rebellion led by
Saturnino Cedillo and the dispute surrounding the 1940 pres-
idential election.77 Nevertheless, as letters continued to pour
in that summer, government officials appear to have learned
an important lesson from popular opinion, and government
propaganda began to incorporate the Mexican Revolution as
a symbol of democracy. The government did not abandon the
themes laid out in its initial propaganda strategy, but rather
used the concept of the revolution within that plan.
Mexican propaganda first incorporated the revolution in
messages sent to its military. In September 1942, shortly af-
ter the Compulsory Military Service Law went into effect,
President Avila Camacho delivered a speech to Mexico’s armed
forces in which he publicly recognized for the first time a cor-
relation between the revolution and World War II:

The Mexican Army grew not out of Academies and school

buildings; but out of the trying days of battle. Nearly one
hundred years after the political freedom of the Country, the
Mexican Army was formed by the freedom from bondage, it
is the cause and the result of the Revolution. . . .
Although unforeseen, this war in its international scope,
is for us, a sequel to our own internal struggle. Now in many

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languages we hear the same words uttered by our elders, the
same words that ﬁred us to greater achievements, and the ones
that must be the slogan for our lives: Country, Liberty, Justice,
Independence, and Honor.78

In commemoration of the anniversary of the revolution in

November 1942, political leader Isidro Fabela gave a speech
at the Palacio de Bellas Artes that sent a similar message. After
reviewing the decades of struggle, including agrarian, labor,
and political reforms, he argued that the most important as-
pect of the revolution was the country’s ﬁght for liberty and its
defense of individual freedoms. Fabela claimed that the revo-
lution allowed the country to participate in the Pan-American
and the international systems by making Mexico a civilized,
respectable nation, held in high esteem around the world. The
most compelling part of his speech claimed that Mexico was
at war precisely to defend what had been won in its own rev-
olution. Arguing that World War II was the largest political,
economic, and social revolution that modern history had wit-
nessed, Fabela insisted that a totalitarian victory would mean
enslavement and complete subjugation to the tyrannous Axis
powers, who would divide among themselves the economic,
political, and religious domination of the world. He urged
Mexicans to protect their democratic heritage by defeating
the Axis powers.79
A 1943 speech by Avila Camacho commemorating the
ﬁfth anniversary of the founding of the cnc made similar
patriotic appeals. In an excerpt later printed in the Ministry
of Education’s journal Educación Nacional, Avila Camacho
claimed that the revolution was fully alive and that “those who
believe that the Revolution has ended are fooling themselves.”

252 | a propaganda chalkboard

He considered World War II to be an immense revolution that
represented the ideals that Mexico’s revolutionaries fought
for in 1910. He defined those causes as a democratic politi-
cal system supported by complete civil liberties.80 The publi-
cation of this excerpt is significant because it provides clear
evidence that the government’s official story forcefully made
the direct connection between the war in Europe and Mexico’s
fight for democracy in its revolution. It emphasized the demo-
cratic objectives of the revolution as the nature of the world-
wide conflict. Avila Camacho boldly claimed that the Mexican
Revolution continued and had expanded to a broader scale as
democratic powers in Europe fought for the same freedoms
that Mexico’s revolutionary heroes had achieved.
Furthermore, Avila Camacho’s speech is significant for where
it appears. For the government there was no better medium
than the education system for establishing and spreading its
official history. By 1944 the Avila Camacho administration
turned to the schools as a medium in its propaganda cam-
paign. It used the school system not just for wartime pro-
paganda but for general propaganda as well, in a continua-
tion of the programs established in the 1920s under Plutarco
Elías Calles.81
The Mexican government’s official history became further
clarified by Luis Sanchez Pontón, who had briefly served as
minister of education in the early days of the Avila Camacho
administration. In 1944, Sanchez Pontón made a connection
between Europe’s war and the Mexican Revolution in his book
Guerra y revolución.82 His book serves as an intellectual his-
tory of World War II and postwar peace plans, analyzing the
ideological currents that had led to war and those that would

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bring peace. His underlying argument was that World War II
was indeed a revolution. He insisted that the struggle would
bring democracy to totalitarian and extremist nations, and that
it was a revolution that had begun in Mexico in 1910.

Conclusion

As the realities of war began to take hold in Mexican society,

much of the initial enthusiasm for the war effort seemed to
waver. Rising prices, food shortages, and forced military con-
scription provoked popular opposition and compelled the gov-
ernment to alter its wartime messages. The Avila Camacho ad-
ministration began cooperating with the oiaa and provided a
Mexican voice to some U.S. propaganda programs. Programs
such as the Lídice celebration and Interpretación mexicana de
la guerra promoted Pan-Americanism not only as a movement
for hemispheric unity but also as an idea that could beneﬁt
Mexico. Despite Mexican participation, some oiaa programs
still evoked suspicion, even resentment among the public as
campaigns for U.S. imperialism.
In an effort to instill a deeper sense of nationalism among
the nation’s children and adults alike, Avila Camacho trans-
ferred propaganda duties from the Ministry of the Interior
to the Ministry of Education. Through the education system,
the government produced posters and other printed materials
that stressed the national objectives of military defense and
modernization. Educators incorporated wartime messages into
classroom curricula, and rural school inspectors used public
addresses to parents as a forum for promoting the war effort.
The 1944 literacy campaign reﬂected Avila Camacho’s strat-
egies of using the war to promote his domestic agendas and
to modernize the country.

254 | a propaganda chalkboard

A final shift in government propaganda became visible in its
official rhetoric surrounding the war. Official references to the
war began borrowing from the ideas espoused by Mexican let-
ter writers in the summer of 1942. Guerra y revolución served
as the culmination of popular memory and the Mexican gov-
ernment’s official history of the revolution in the context of
World War II. The book had government approval and was
dedicated to President Avila Camacho and Foreign Minister
Ezequiel Padilla.
After Mexico became officially involved in the war, its citi-
zens began looking to their 1910 revolution as a success story,
not necessarily a success story of social reform, but rather the
success of freedom and democracy. Soon the government and
some intellectuals began making the same argument. In the
late 1930s, totalitarian extremism seemed to be the wave of
the future as Germany and Japan pursued expansionist poli-
cies and Soviet communism gained popularity worldwide. As
Mexico became involved in the conflict, its citizens did not
look to the United States or western Europe as the representa-
tives of freedom and democracy. Instead, many turned to their
own nation’s history. They argued that Mexico had started
the move toward democratic revolutions in 1910. Ordinary
Mexicans and those writing the official history looked to their
revolution when revolutionary forces united to remove an au-
thoritarian dictator. Many in the 1940s saw Porfirio Díaz’s
authoritarianism as synonymous with the wave of totalitari-
anism that swept across Europe. They emphasized their rev-
olution as a fight to replace totalitarianism with democracy,
and they saw the war in Europe as an extension of their dem-
ocratic revolution. By the last years of the war, it was clear

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that the Avila Camacho administration had joined Mexican
citizens in conﬂating World War II and the 1910 revolution.
The president had developed his own “chalkboard of propa-
ganda” designed to teach the nation his version of the revo-
lutionary legacy through the education system.

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6
A Propaganda Billboard

Heroes, Victims, and a View to the Postwar Era, 1944–1945

The momentum of World War II began to shift in favor of

the Allies during 1943, as their forces experienced a series of
successes that marked a major turning point. The British de-
feated Axis forces in Africa, and the Soviet Union succeeded
in expelling the German invasion of its territory. The Allies
fought their way into Italy, and the Italian people overthrew
Mussolini. Allied leaders met in November to plan the in-
vasion of France as well as more aggressive operations in
Asia. Because of those successes in Europe and Asia, by 1944
most Mexicans felt assured that the Allied forces would claim
victory.
As a result, the nature of wartime information produced
by the U.S. and Mexican governments changed considerably.
Neither government stressed the need for victory as they had
done in the previous two years. Instead, leaders looked to post-
war issues and began incorporating them into propaganda
messages. The changing nature of wartime information after
1943 reveals important aspects of both governments’ objec-
tives as U.S. and Mexican leaders became increasingly con-
cerned with safeguarding national economic welfare. U.S. lead-
ers pushed the American way of life more aggressively after
1943, hoping to make U.S.-produced consumer goods attrac-
tive to the Mexican public. The Mexican government incorpo-
rated postwar economic issues in a different way as its wartime
messages began to prioritize the needs of the nation’s indus-
trialists, and postwar plans increasingly came to cater to that
group. At the same time, the Avila Camacho administration
upset the diplomatic balance it had achieved with the United
States by implementing protectionist measures to safeguard
incipient industries against U.S. competition after the war. By
turning their attention to postwar economic matters, the U.S.
and Mexican governments both converted their wartime in-
formation strategies into a propaganda billboard. They be-
gan using war propaganda to advertise potential commercial
developments after the war and tried to win popular support
for their distinct strategies.
Mexican and U.S. propagandists approached the promo-
tion of their postwar objectives differently in the ﬁnal years
of the war. Avila Camacho’s administration established an
air squadron to participate in direct combat in an attempt to
bolster domestic support for the war and to secure a greater
role for Mexico in the international postwar peace plans. U.S.
agents, on the other hand, worried that Latin Americans were
beginning to believe that the Allies would win the war easily.
They altered their propaganda messages to downplay mili-
tary might and instead emphasized economic collaboration
and cultural similarities. The oiaa produced messages to en-
courage greater trade after the war, while the Mexican gov-
ernment used the war to begin an industrialization project
and used its propaganda as a billboard to sell that project to
the public as an extension of revolutionary legacy and world-
wide democracy.

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Late Mexican Propaganda: Mexican Heroes

When the Avila Camacho administration saw support for the

war effort begin to wane in the fall of 1942, it became more
aggressive with its propaganda campaign. The production
of wartime information had shifted from the Ministry of the
Interior to the Ministry of Education. As a result, Mexicans
not only heard the government’s wartime message through
the radio, the press, public celebrations, and graphic arts, but
they also heard patriotic wartime propaganda in the education
system. Nevertheless, as the war continued and the well-being
of Mexicans was further compromised by wartime sacrifices,
the president understood that new tactics might be in order.
A sense of apathy toward the war still remained according to
some public-opinion surveys, and propaganda tactics needed
a new approach.1 At the same time, the Avila Camacho ad-
ministration began focusing its attention on Mexico’s role in
the postwar world. The president wanted to protect the na-
tion’s developing economy, and he wanted to have influence
in peace negotiations. Direct military participation became
the resolution to the nation’s new wartime needs.
Almost immediately after Avila Camacho delivered his ad-
dress to the Chamber of Deputies and declared a state of war
in May 1942, military leaders rallied behind the president in
a demonstration of national unity. In the war-related corre-
spondence received in the president’s office throughout that
summer, military officers and other political leaders pledged
their full support and loyalty to the nation in time of crisis.
Many of those officers asked to be allowed to lead troops in
combat. While ordinary Mexicans offered to serve as neces-
sary to defend Mexican soil, officers and politicians pushed

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for direct foreign involvement from an early date.2 Foreign
Minister Ezequiel Padilla announced in November 1942 that
the nation’s armed forces would bravely serve overseas if called
to do so and that the people would support their military he-
roes.3 Senator Salvador Franco Urias took a diplomatic tour of
the United States in May 1943 and made similar declarations.
He affirmed that Mexico would gladly send armed forces into
the conflict and that the public would give its full support.4
Stronger pressure came from military leaders. Excelsior
reported that several unnamed generals were arguing that
the country should send at least ten thousand men to fight in
Europe.5 Many felt a genuine sense of duty to be directly in-
volved in the war, while others saw direct participation in World
War II as a way of preserving their influence as the president
modernized the nation’s armed forces. Avila Camacho’s ren-
ovation of the military had significantly decreased the num-
ber of high-ranking officers. Between 1942 and 1945 he had
forced more than three hundred generals to retire.6 Military
men saw World War II as an opportunity to bring security
and even advancement to their careers.7 A token fighting force
would appease many in the military who were pushing for di-
rect involvement.
Aside from mollifying officers’ demands, the Avila Camacho
administration saw direct military involvement in World War II
as having direct benefits to the government. Much of the coun-
try’s military modernization scheme relied on U.S. lend-lease
dollars to finance expenditures in new equipment. Officials
realized that much of the modernization effort depended on
U.S. resources, which were in short supply or were commit-
ted to other nations for direct military participation.8 The ad-
ministration concluded that for Mexico to become a priority

260 | a propaganda billboard

of U.S. lend-lease and other aid programs, the country would
have to move beyond a defensive role and take part in mili-
tary action.
As another incentive for Mexican military participation
in the war, Avila Camacho understood that the United States
and its allies would eventually win the war. As U.S. and other
world leaders began discussing postwar plans, Mexican lead-
ers knew that only military participation would assure them
a voice in the peace plans. One military leader suggested that
the country needed to “pay a price in human blood” to gain a
place of prestige in the international system after the war.9 This
initially prompted Avila Camacho to propose an arrangement
whereby the United States would supply and train Mexican
armed forces for overseas combat.10 At the time, however,
U.S. officials seemed hesitant to accede to Avila Camacho’s
wishes, and with the deficient state of the Mexican military,
the president temporarily abandoned his push for military
participation.11
As a final incentive, direct and voluntary military participa-
tion by a Mexican force in the war fit into the Avila Camacho
administration’s changing propaganda strategies. As public
support for the war effort vacillated, administration officials
looked to military involvement as a way to change the tide of
public opinion. Mexicans watched prices rise and saw their
standard of living deteriorate as the entire country made sac-
rifices for the war effort. Unlike the U.S. public, who had a
strong connection to the war effort through family members
fighting overseas, most Mexicans did not connect their expe-
riences with battlefield sacrifices. Many argued that U.S. sol-
diers and the U.S. government were the primary beneficiaries of
Mexican sacrifices to the detriment of the Mexican people.12

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The United States provided a model for Avila Camacho in
his effort to garner more support for the war effort. He deter-
mined that if Mexicans had a vested interest to win the war—
in the form of countrymen fighting in combat—they would be
less likely to withdraw their support. With the country’s mili-
tary in battle, Mexicans would be more likely to work harder
to produce more and to accept daily sacrifices such as rising
prices, frozen wages, and food shortages. Participation in bat-
tle meant that many Mexicans would have family members
and friends fighting overseas, and their relationship to those
soldiers would provide the direct connection to the war that
the Avila Camacho administration sought.

Selling the Squadron

Organizing military participation and selling it to the public

was not a simple task. Local resistance to compulsory mili-
tary service in 1942 was still fresh in the minds of adminis-
tration officials. Axis propaganda had insisted that young
Mexicans would be drafted and sent to die on foreign battle-
fields. It had also emphasized that national leaders had yielded
to U.S. pressure to raise an army to defend U.S. interests.
Avila Camacho understood that any talk of sending armed
forces abroad could incite violent reactions among the pub-
lic. In the latter months of 1943, an editorial debate emerged
among the country’s main periodicals over the issue of send-
ing Mexican troops abroad.13 Even Avila Camacho’s brother
spoke out against sending Mexican forces to fight in a foreign
front.14 The president understood that putting together an ex-
peditionary force would require a delicate balance between
promoting the force as a patriotic symbol in the propaganda
front while downplaying its importance to avoid opposition.
He also understood that any force fighting abroad would have

262 | a propaganda billboard

to be voluntary to avoid the type of resistance that had been
generated by the Compulsory Military Service Law.15
Because the United States was providing substantial ﬁnan-
cial resources through the Lend-Lease military aid program
and because U.S. leaders were coordinating much of the Allied
military strategy, Avila Camacho had to negotiate Mexico’s
potential military participation with leaders in Washington
dc. U.S. military leaders began considering how to accommo-
date Mexico’s desire to participate in the war, and through-
out 1943 representatives from the two countries negotiated
the details of an expeditionary force. U.S. leaders worried that
training and equipping the force would be a drain on U.S. re-
sources that could be better devoted to the U.S. military effort.
In 1943, Mexico’s military was in the midst of an aggressive
restructuring; although it had seen vast improvements, the mil-
itary was still not adequately trained or equipped to contrib-
ute much to an Allied victory. U.S. leaders feared that bring-
ing the Mexican military up to reasonable standards would
require too much time and resources. Several military lead-
ers expressed concern over the language and cultural barriers
that would complicate working with a Mexican military unit.
Leaders from both countries agreed that sending ground troops
would not be the best use of Mexico’s military, since a ground
invasion force would require large numbers of troops and the
language barrier would hinder its effectiveness. Furthermore,
the Mexican government felt that a small ﬁghter squadron
would have a greater impact on the overall war effort than a
large ground force.16 Having a visible impact on the war ef-
fort would lend more legitimacy to the government’s appeals
to patriotism in its propaganda campaign.
Since 1941, many Mexican pilots and ground support per-

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sonnel had been receiving training in the United States, and by
the end of 1943 U.S. military leaders were satisfied that Mexico
could provide a legitimate Air Force squadron. In January 1944,
Ambassador George Messersmith traveled to Washington dc
to discuss the possibility of allowing Mexican troops to join
the fighting. After a series of meetings with President Roosevelt
and top military advisers, Messersmith returned to Mexico
and presented Avila Camacho with a proposal calling for the
participation of an air force squadron.17
Avila Camacho proceeded cautiously in releasing publicity
about plans for the squadron. He needed special congressio-
nal approval to send Mexican troops abroad, and Congress
would not be in session until later in the year. Avila Camacho
decided not to publicize the squadron fully until he had se-
cured congressional approval. In the meantime, he began test-
ing the waters of public opinion. In March he announced to
a group of aviators at a luncheon that the squadron had been
approved. Military men and pilots responded with enthusi-
astic support, and thousands stepped forward to volunteer
their services.18
In April, Avila Camacho began the recruitment process
to form Squadron 201. General support for the operation
grew as Mexicans came to embrace the fact that their coun-
try would provide military assistance in the war.19 The pres-
ident became actively involved in overseeing the recruitment
process and in selecting the nation’s new heroes. During the
recruiting and training stage, Squadron 201 enjoyed contin-
ued support from the public. Press coverage emphasized that
the country was fulfilling a duty of honor and that the vol-
unteers who made up Squadron 201 were national heroes.20
Mexicans praised the government for allowing the servicemen

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the honor of volunteering. They claimed the voluntary nature
of the squadron made its actions all the more heroic.21 With
plenty of positive publicity surrounding the recruitment pro-
cess, a sense of anticipation and national pride began to build
throughout the country. By the time the squadron was set to
depart for training in the United States, public responses dem-
onstrated a new sense of patriotism. Much of the country
banded together to support the young men who would leave
their homes under the Mexican ﬂag and go into foreign com-
bat to ﬁght for freedom and democracy in the world.

Deploying the Squadron and Propaganda

On July 24, 1944, the three-hundred-man expeditionary force

was set to depart and the nation came together full of pride,
admiration, and support to give them a send-off. One hour
prior to their scheduled departure, the members of Squadron
201 gathered at the train station in Mexico City for a patriotic
farewell. According to press coverage of the event, hundreds
gathered at the station to show their support for the squad-
ron’s mission. Family members, friends, military personnel,
and government ofﬁcials joined the general public in cheer-
ing, singing, and crying in honor of the heroes. Throughout
the crowded station, mothers exchanged tearful good-byes
with their sons while wives and husbands embraced. Fathers
kissed their children good-bye, with pats on the head and
murmurs of “be a good boy.” All the while, cries of “Viva
México!” could be heard throughout the crowd as Mexicans
cheered the squadron for bringing a sense of pride and honor
to the country.22
Members of the squadron offered interviews to El Nacional.
They promised to fulﬁll their patriotic duties to the country.

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Pablo Herrasti Dondé dedicated his patriotic mission to his
mother and his fiancée, promising that he would carry them
into battle in his heart. Max Gutiérrez promised to defend
world freedom with the same fervor with which he would de-
fend la patria against foreign enemies. Another soldier hum-
bly stated that those remaining at home were as honorable
as those chosen to fight.23 One of the most nationalistic dec-
larations came from Jesús Carranza, son of the former pres-
ident and commander of the Constitutionalist Army of the
Revolution, Venustiano Carranza. In a symbolic action, Jesús
evoked revolutionary patriotism as he publicly bid farewell
to the undersecretary of defense, Francisco Urquizo. He as-
serted that he was proud to fulfill his duty for his country, his
army, and his people.24
As the train pulled out of the station, the ceremony ended
with the government’s officially sanctioned song in honor of
the squadron, written by Corporal Hugo Sansón Jiménez. It
emphasized that the country’s armed forces were going into
combat to defend the country and to preserve its honor:

We march off to combat

To victory or to die
Now there is no one who will back down
To save the country
. . .

Tomorrow when with our heads raised

We leave the battleﬁeld
We will be distinguished
Soldiers of the country25

Sansón’s song emphasized the importance the government

placed on the squadron as a symbol of national honor, and

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the Avila Camacho administration hoped the entire nation
would react with the same sense of pride. The song stressed
the bravery, strength, and pride of the nation’s fighting force.
Although it was a small force and most of its members were
young and inexperienced, the airmen of Squadron 201 em-
braced the opportunity to show their bravery and sacrifice
their lives. The song did not mention that the squadron would
fight for the freedom of the Philippines or that it would defend
the notions of liberty and democracy in the world. Instead,
it stressed that the squadron’s participation in World War II
would make its members into distinguished soldiers for their
country, fighting for the honor of la patria.
During the last half of 1944, Squadron 201 engaged in in-
tensive training exercises to prepare the aviators and ground
crew for combat. Excelsior sent a correspondent to accom-
pany the squadron to Randolph Field in the United States and
to report on training activities.26 The public periodically re-
ceived progress reports on the squadron’s activities, and gener-
ally heard that the force was disciplined and learning quickly.
Newspapers described a heroic group of well-trained young
men who impressed their North American counterparts.27
At the end of the training period, Avila Camacho became
involved once again in determining to which combat zone the
unit would be sent. Drawing on Mexico’s common history of
Spanish colonialism with the Philippines, he pushed to have
the squadron sent to the Pacific. The president also wanted
to fulfill a promise he had made to the Philippine president
at the beginning of the war that Mexico would do everything
possible to secure the independence of the islands.28 As the
squadron prepared to depart the United States in March 1945,
many citizens responded again with patriotism and pride. Just

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as people in 1942 wrote letters and composed songs and po-
ems to express their patriotism, in 1945 the public made sim-
ilar shows of support.
One example came from Baldomero Ibarra Herrera, who
wrote a corrido dedicated to Squadron 201. He sent a copy
to Avila Camacho in March 1945 in honor of the squadron’s
departure for the Philippines. In his letter, the writer claimed
that he had had the corrido professionally printed using his
own money.29

Now the 201 is gone

Carrying their ﬂag to the front
They will demonstrate their valor
To all of Europe

We will show the world

That we have not known fear
And if by chance we don’t return
“Good-bye dear Mexico”
. . .

Onward Mexican
With boldness and valor
It does not matter the elements
The enemy presents
. . .

Good-bye dear Mexico

Good-bye our fathers and brothers
Good-bye sons and women
If by chance we don’t return

Ibarra’s corrido followed a pattern similar to that of the ofﬁ-

cial song sanctioned by the government when the squadron

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departed Mexico. It emphasized the bravery and honor of the
country and the members of the squadron. It also stressed the
idea of sacrifice by repeating lines of “good-bye” and the idea
that many might not return. Ibarra considered the nation’s
military personnel a source of pride and honor. His corrido
made the connection between pride in the squadron and pride
in Mexico’s government by placing the two side-by-side in
the poem’s final lines: “Long live the 201, / Long live the su-
preme government.”
The nation’s press continued to cover the squadron’s activi-
ties as it fought in combat operations in the Pacific. News sto-
ries encouraged patriotic support by noting that the young men
of the squadron described their living quarters as “a little cor-
ner of Mexico in the Philippines.” They explained that soldiers
and officers coexisted cordially with a deep sense of equality
and pride in each other. El Universal referred to Commander
Cárdenas Rodríguez as the “big brother” to the rest of the
squadron.30 Headlines boasted that Mexico’s finest, bravest,
and best-prepared were bringing glory to the nation.31

Squadron 201 in Combat

Squadron 201, known as the “Aztec Eagles,” arrived in Manila

Bay on April 30, 1945, and after a short pre-combat instruction
period, Mexico’s heroes began participating in combat missions.
Members of the Aztec Eagles flew in fifty-nine missions and
logged more than twelve hundred hours of flight time. They
contributed to major bombing missions in Luzon and Formosa
and also served as ground support to U.S. airmen.32 Although
the unit participated in active combat for less than six months,
twenty airmen of the Aztec Eagles received U.S. medals recog-
nizing their contribution to the war effort. Seven pilots died

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during the squadron’s combat missions in the Philippines, and
the squadron received the Philippine Presidential Unit Citation
and the Mexican Medal of Valor.33
The Japanese surrendered on August 10, 1945, and the
squadron prepared to return to Mexico. As the war drew to
a close, some popular expressions of the squadron’s role in
the war began to incorporate ethnicity into the public rhet-
oric. Some individuals took the government line of national
pride and national honor one step further by insisting that the
country’s indigenous heritage and its mestizo physical char-
acteristics set Mexican soldiers apart from their Anglo coun-
terparts. The propaganda surrounding this public perception
emphasized taking even greater national pride in Mexico’s in-
digenous heritage.
Two corridos written in honor of the return of Squadron
201 and sent to the president illustrate this new rhetoric. The
ﬁrst came from a professor in Michoacán.

Here come the heroes! They return to their native soil!

. . .

Here they come, bringing in their strong, dark hands

Strong from the bronze that forges the indomitable—race
of Juárez—
They carry high the standard of free Mexico
That speaks to us of eagerness, of love, of patria!34

The tribute not only hails members of squadron as national

heroes but also draws a comparison with historic national he-
roes. It argues that because of its indigenous heritage, seen in
heroic ﬁgures like Benito Juárez, Mexico cannot be defeated.
The corrido deemphasizes the squadron’s mission to liberate

270 | a propaganda billboard

the Philippines and its larger objective to fight for world free-
dom. Instead, it states that by carrying the Mexican flag into
battle, Squadron 201 was first and foremost fighting for la
patria.
A corrido sent by Enrique de Avila y Villaluazo extends
pride in the country’s indigenous heritage beyond Mexico’s
borders: “Hail! Bronze race! Indian! / American soul! Hail!
In your glory!”35 In his corrido, Avila y Villaluazo considers
the bronze race to be the heart of the American soul. His song
implies a sense of Latin American unity—with the exclusion
of the United States—due to its indigenous heritage. It rep-
resents the strength of Mexican nationalism in the country’s
approach to the war. Throughout World War II, the public
tended to support the nation’s participation in the conflict
when viewed through the lens of national interests. Malfavó
and Avila y Villaluazo justified Mexico’s involvement in terms
of defending national honor and sovereignty, and they took
renewed pride in the country’s unique national identity that
derived from its indigenous past.
When the airmen of Squadron 201 returned home, the na-
tion gave them a hero’s welcome. The Aztec Eagles arrived at
the port of San Pedro in California on November 13, 1945.
The group traveled by train through the U.S. Southwest for
several days en route to Texas, where they crossed into Mexico
at Laredo. During that trip, U.S. citizens of Mexican ances-
try greeted them and welcomed them as heroes.36 The squad-
ron finally arrived in Mexico City on November 18, and large
crowds gathered to watch the airmen parade through the city
to the Zócalo to meet the president. Avila Camacho gave an
emotional speech from the balcony of the national palace in
which he praised the squadron for its contribution in fighting

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for the ideals of humanity. He encouraged the Aztec Eagles to
be proud for having fought for their nation’s honor.37 The cel-
ebration welcoming the squadron home became another rep-
resentation of Mexican identity and nationalism.
The incorporation of nationalist, indigenous pride in World
War II rhetoric had important implications for U.S. propaganda
as well. Throughout the war, oiaa representatives continually
tried to avoid using language or images in their propaganda
campaign that would strengthen nationalist sentiments in Latin
America.38 Instead, U.S. propaganda sought to promote hemi-
spheric unity and a sense of American identity. Mexicans’ na-
tionalist reactions to the war indicated that oiaa propaganda
was not having its desired effect. It gave credibility to con-
cerns that began to surface in the agency, and those concerns
propelled a change in U.S. propaganda tactics.

Changes in U.S. Propaganda

The propaganda strategies developed by the oiaa in late 1941

and 1942 proved to be short-lived. The agency’s early wartime
messages stressed the need for hemispheric unity and high-
lighted the strength and expansion of the U.S. military. While
the United States put the country and the hemisphere on a war
footing, the propaganda stressing U.S. military might was ef-
fective. Putting forth an image that the United States would
win the war was particularly important as the country con-
verted heavy industry to war production and began recruit-
ing and training its army. The oiaa wanted to assure Latin
Americans that the Allies would achieve victory and therefore
that supporting the Allied cause would put Latin Americans
on the winning side. Furthermore, since relatively few U.S.
forces were actively involved in combat operations prior to

272 | a propaganda billboard

June 1944, the agency did not have other illustrations of the
U.S. war effort to use in its propaganda. For propagandists
wanting to emphasize the U.S. war effort to Latin Americans
prior to the Normandy invasion, the military buildup was the
best information to report.39
In the second half of 1943, oiaa agents looked ahead to
the impending European invasion and began to rethink their
approach to propaganda. In August 1943, Agent Lawrence
Duggan of the Content Planning Division wrote a memo to
Nelson Rockefeller urging him to reconsider the oiaa’s pro-
paganda strategy.40 Duggan argued that the perception cre-
ated by existing propaganda in Latin America, as well as the
nationalist tendencies prevalent in Latin American countries,
required a new approach to winning popular support. He
took his case one step further by looking ahead to the post-
war world and how the peace plans would incorporate Latin
America.
Duggan argued that the oiaa’s existing propaganda had
emphasized the military might of the United States to such
an extent that Latin Americans had begun to assume that
the Allies would easily win the war. That assumption, he be-
lieved, was having serious consequences. He argued that Latin
Americans felt distant from the violence and destruction of
the war in Europe because the tragedy of war had not truly
touched their daily lives. He stressed that Latin Americans
had not seen their families torn apart and had not lost loved
ones in combat. The popular perceptions in Mexico of the
war prior to the advent of Squadron 201 seemed to conﬁrm
his concerns. As a result, the general Latin American public
increasingly refused to accept the daily inconveniences that
resulted from their wartime sacriﬁces. Duggan argued that

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Latin American people saw little difference in an Allied or an
Axis victory. Instead, they understood that in the short term,
prices were rising and consumer goods were scarce because
of the war. He urged the Content Planning Division to change
its propaganda strategy from emphasizing military might to
stressing the real sacrifices being made by the Allies in terms
of materials, goods, money, and lives.
In his memo, Duggan also pointed out that a strong sense
of nationalism prevailed in Latin American countries and
that oiaa propaganda had purposely placed very little em-
phasis on individual countries’ nationalist appeal. He argued
that Latin American nationalism came at the expense of Pan-
Americanism and a sense of hemispheric interdependence.
Mexico’s national wartime rhetoric illustrated this tendency.
Duggan saw these nationalist inclinations as a threat to the
hemispheric unity the oiaa had been trying to achieve with
its Latin American propaganda. He felt that by emphasiz-
ing the contributions made by other Allied nations, the oiaa
could curb some of the nationalist impulse present in Latin
American policy and culture.
Finally, Duggan recommended taking early steps to address
Latin Americans’ concerns about their place in the postwar
world. He found that as early as 1943, government leaders
throughout the hemisphere had already begun to concern them-
selves with how to avoid the problems their countries had ex-
perienced after World War I. The entire world had suffered a
severe economic depression partially due to postwar financial
provisions. Already facing currency problems and inflation,
Latin American leaders in 1943 wanted to see a peace plan
put in place that would safeguard the economic well-being of
their countries. Leaders feared that after the war the Allied

274 | a propaganda billboard

nations—particularly the United States—would cut back the
amount of raw materials they were purchasing from the re-
gion, creating economic hardship in Latin American nations.41
Furthermore, they worried that consumer goods in short sup-
ply during the war would continue to be in short supply after
the war, as the European areas devastated by the war would
have priority on receiving civilian products. A United Nations
Food Conference had stipulated that areas formerly occupied by
the Axis would be the ﬁrst to receive relief in the areas of food
and civilian supplies.42 Duggan believed that the oiaa should
immediately begin stressing that victory would not bring an
immediate resumption in the availability of consumer goods
and that agency propaganda should emphasize why the dev-
astated occupied areas would have priority on receiving con-
sumer goods.43 Duggan also felt that Latin American leaders’
fears could be assuaged by giving them a voice in the post-
war world through a new peace agency. Latin Americans did
not have a positive experience in the League of Nations af-
ter World War I, and giving them a more constructive role in
the post–World War II agency could go a long way in calm-
ing their anxieties.
Duggan’s call for change prompted Rockefeller and other
senior advisers to reevaluate the agency’s approach to pro-
paganda in Latin America. In the following months, agents
of the Content Planning Division held a series of conﬁdential
meetings aimed at addressing the issues raised by Duggan as
well as proposing real solutions to the region’s changing needs.
Some agency leaders objected to shifting the propaganda em-
phasis away from the U.S. military production capacity and
insisted that military might was one of the greatest strengths
the United States could demonstrate.44 Other agents insisted

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that the emphasis on military power had served its purpose in
the months immediately following Pearl Harbor but that cur-
rent circumstances warranted a change in approach. In partic-
ular, field agents in Latin America were beginning to perceive
that the emphasis on the U.S. military was creating a sense of
overpowering strength and that many Latin Americans viewed
it as a threat to their own independence.45 The argument for
downplaying the potential for U.S. hegemony in the Western
Hemisphere became a compelling one, and it eventually suc-
ceeded in changing the agency’s propaganda strategy.
Throughout 1944 the oiaa altered its approach to propa-
ganda in Latin America and placed a new emphasis on human
suffering, casualties, and death suffered by the Allied powers
in combat operations. The agency also emphasized areas of the
world that had been occupied by the Axis and justified why
those areas should have a priority on foodstuffs and other ci-
vilian goods after the war. Finally, the oiaa attempted to ad-
dress some of the concerns of Latin America nations regarding
the postwar world. It was too early to talk specifically about a
new peace agency, so agents of the Content Planning Division
took up the theme of U.S. hegemony and fears of U.S. impe-
rialism in the hemisphere by reviving the idea of the Good
Neighbor policy. By May 1944, three themes surrounding the
Good Neighbor policy had become official agency policy: the
United States and Latin American nations had an immediate
common stake in the war, they had mutual long-term economic
interests, and they held common cultural aspirations.46
Field agents had expressed concern that Latin Americans
viewed the Good Neighbor policy as merely a device for keep-
ing the hemisphere under control during wartime, and that
the good neighbor rhetoric would disappear once peace was

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achieved.47 The first two themes under the Good Neighbor
policy made no departure from previous oiaa propaganda.
Since its inception in 1940, the agency had emphasized that an
Allied victory was in the best interest of Latin American na-
tions and that cooperation with the United States would help
Latin American economies. The third theme represented a new
approach. Content Planning agents hoped to emphasize that
the United States did not expect to dominate the hemisphere
politically or economically after the war and that the United
States did not intend to exercise cultural hegemony.
The agency established a new official dictum, which stressed
that U.S. propaganda should not try to impress Latin Americans
with material goods. Instead wartime information should em-
phasize that people in the United States had achieved financial
success and possessed material goods because of their “pio-
neering spirit.” The new propaganda philosophy aimed to send
a message that the average U.S. citizen was simple and hard-
working and had much in common with his Latin American
neighbors. The agency wanted to portray U.S. people as or-
dinary and nonthreatening.48
New strategies focused renewed attention on the American
family. Agents aimed to show that “the little American who
lives modestly in any small town in U.S.A., is no glamorous,
adventurous Hollywood character, no thrill seeking get-rich-
quick-Wallingford, but a plain, down to earth citizen to whom
a Saturday night movie is a real thrill.”49 They emphasized
that the U.S. public did not want to superimpose its culture on
other regions of the hemisphere, but rather to share U.S. cul-
ture and blend other cultures with that of the United States.
Through these new techniques, the oiaa hoped to portray
a victorious United States in a nonthreatening way to Latin

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America. Agents promoted an image of the neighbor to the
north as a benign, friendly, and welcoming force to achieve
the betterment of the entire hemisphere.
Press coverage of the war, controlled by the oiaa and sent
to Latin American news agencies, began to deemphasize the
growing military machine in the United States and instead re-
ported U.S. casualties and destroyed property.50 Some press
coverage featured stories of Allied soldiers who had been cap-
tured and tortured by the Japanese through methods such as
bleeding, starvation, and overwork. El Universal ran a story
that described the Bataan death march in graphic detail.51 In
another story, a French refugee wrote his personal account
of torture at the hands of the Nazis.52 In the midst of its new
propaganda strategy, the United States hosted Mexican mili-
tary leaders on a tour of European battleﬁelds in August 1944.
Upon returning to Mexico, General Gustavo Salinas wrote
an article relating a particular episode that impressed upon
him the realities of war and the atrocities that occupied areas
were suffering. He had witnessed the lynching and quarter-
ing of a Nazi soldier by an Italian village. The village “tore
his body to pieces” to take revenge on the soldier for having
killed an innocent family.53 According to Salinas, the soldier
had invaded the family’s home and demanded the last of the
food supply. After the family complied, the soldier left and
bombed the house, killing the parents and their small children
instantly.54 The oiaa publicized these types of stories to illus-
trate that Allied nations were making tremendous sacriﬁces
in their battle with the Axis oppressors. The agency wanted
Mexicans to feel sympathy for occupied areas and to accept
continued but temporary shortages after the war as the United
States helped Europe and Asia rebuild.

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The oiaa magazine En guardia experienced a similar meta-
morphosis as its stories reported less on military production
and more on sacrifices made by U.S. armed forces and civil-
ians. The February 1944 edition featured a story on wounded
U.S. soldiers, highlighting the care they received in military
hospitals and including photographs with rows of stretchers
and wheelchairs.55 Another story showed the families of mil-
itary men, featuring wives, children, and parents who wor-
ried about the safety of their loved ones and who anxiously
awaited letters from the front.56 Other issues began showing
graphic photographs of wounded and dead soldiers on the bat-
tlefield to demonstrate the sacrifices the Allied armed forces
were making.57 En guardia also encouraged Latin Americans
to understand the rehabilitation needs of occupied areas by
featuring human-interest stories depicting the devastation of
war on civilians.58 Stories stressed the sacrifices being made
by the U.S. civilian population. One dramatic photograph
showed a soldier’s wife and infant son accepting a medal af-
ter the soldier was killed in the Pacific.59
Furthermore, the magazine began devoting more atten-
tion to Latin American stories. A story on baseball incorpo-
rated U.S. and Latin American interests by stressing the con-
tributions Hispanic players had made to the sport. Describing
the game as a unifying force that had brought greater hemi-
spheric understanding, it featured baseball leagues in several
Latin American countries.60 Other stories featured individ-
ual countries. The January 1944 issue included a story on the
contributions of Mexican women in the war, focusing specif-
ically on nurses and women working in war industry facto-
ries.61 Another story reported on the Mexican film industry,
emphasizing that film studios were developing an advanced

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industry.62 The magazine included features on the participation
of Brazil’s and Mexico’s armed forces in combat.63 Throughout
1944 and 1945, En guardia included more stories on individ-
ual countries and Latin American historic heroes.
At the same time, En guardia printed stories and photos
depicting a comfortable, middle-class lifestyle as the norm in
the United States. Stories and photographs portrayed house-
wives enjoying new appliances in their modern kitchens and
women modeling the latest fashion.64 The emphasis on con-
sumer goods is notable, especially considering that most of
the consumer items featured on the pages of En guardia were
not widely available in the United States or in Latin America
due to wartime rationing. In other photographs, well-dressed
schoolchildren eagerly learned scholastic lessons and families
engaged in recreational activities together.65 Other stories de-
scribed U.S. pastimes such as ballet and opera.66 One issue
included a story on television as a new entertainment in the
United States that seemed like magic, but was indeed a real-
ity.67 An October 1945 story tried to alleviate any potential
concerns Latin Americans might have over atomic weapons
by emphasizing the beneﬁts society could reap from atomic
energy.68 These types of stories painted a picture of the United
States that the oiaa wanted Latin Americans to see. Not only
was the United States portrayed as a role model for the rest of
the hemisphere, but it was also presented as an advanced nation
to encourage commercial interest among Latin Americans.
This shift in oiaa propaganda was designed primarily to
address the growing complacency among Latin Americans to-
ward the war and the disconnect that many felt from the most
serious wartime sacriﬁces. It also stressed positive aspects of
U.S. society to encourage interest in trade after the war. It

280 | a propaganda billboard

presented the United States as a victim of wartime circum-
stances whose population was selﬂessly making even greater
sacriﬁces than those of Latin Americans. U.S. families were
torn apart, and many Allied soldiers were losing their lives
in combat. Nevertheless, U.S. society continued to prosper,
and the oiaa hoped that Latin Americans would want to fol-
low that example.

Mexican Propaganda Approaching

the Postwar: Industrialization

The Avila Camacho administration’s approach to postwar

planning added a new dimension to Mexican and U.S. pro-
paganda. Early in his administration, the president had begun
considering the war’s economic effects on the country. Avila
Camacho pushed his industrialization strategy through trade
agreements with the United States, but he intended the nation’s
industrial expansion to be more than just short-term wartime
collaboration. Instead, he envisioned Mexico’s economic future
as being based on modern industry.69 When Avila Camacho
declared war in 1942, he concentrated on unifying the na-
tion around the war effort. Once that unity was achieved, he
hoped to parlay wartime support into backing for his indus-
trialization plans. The Mexican government’s wartime propa-
ganda campaign reﬂected those intentions. As early as 1942,
the Comisión Coordinadora de Propaganda Nacional incor-
porated the need to develop the nation’s industries into its call
for wartime support. The ccpn’s messages insisted that by in-
dustrializing, Mexico would help ensure an Allied victory and
the protection of democracy worldwide.
Throughout World War II, the Avila Camacho administration
appealed to the Mexican public and largely won their support

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for the war effort.70 Building on the success of Squadron 201
in particular, the government sensed that its call to national
unity had yielded the intended results. As an Allied victory
loomed in 1945, the administration understood that it needed
to use the support and unity gained during the war to further
its postwar objectives. Specifically, officials hoped to use the
incipient industrial base established during wartime to con-
tinue to advance the country’s industrial potential and mod-
ernize the economy.
To cement his legacy of national unity, Avila Camacho in-
tended to incorporate the country’s growing industrial class
into his definition of revolutionary legacy. Those who had in-
vested time, money, and other resources into expanding the
production of war products became increasingly concerned
that the government would turn its back on them as the war
came to a close.71 They feared Avila Camacho would bow to
U.S. pressures to engage in open, unprotected trade. In 1945,
Mexico’s industries were relatively new and weak compared
to those in the United States. As the war drew to a close, dip-
lomatic exchanges between the United States and Mexico be-
gan to focus on trade and trade barriers between the two
countries.72
U.S. leaders had viewed Latin America as the best potential
for export markets after U.S. peacetime industries resumed
production after the 1930s.73 Mexico in particular had a siz-
able population that represented a largely untapped market
for U.S. exports of consumer goods. Furthermore, Mexico
had amassed substantial dollar reserves as a result of wartime
production and exports to the United States.74 By promoting
a greater cultural understanding between the United States
and Latin America, Rockefeller’s office hoped to achieve an

282 | a propaganda billboard

economic objective as well. Mexico’s new group of industri-
alists pushed for increased protection against competing U.S.
imports throughout the war, while oiaa propaganda empha-
sized a commercial relationship. Although Mexico suffered
from shortages of consumer goods during the war and the
United States was not exporting such products, Mexican in-
dustrialists feared that the end of the war would bring a del-
uge of U.S. imports, which would compete with newer and
weaker Mexican industries.75
Discussions of industrialization in editorials in the late years
of the war contrast signiﬁcantly with similar discussions earlier
in the war. As early as 1943, opinion pieces began to express
concerns over the postwar economy, and business leaders be-
gan to urge greater degrees of economic protection against the
nation’s military ally—the United States. Industrialists waged
an aggressive campaign in the press to argue that the country
must emphasize industrialization as an economic policy pri-
ority after the war to continue to address the nation’s needs.76
But unlike news coverage in 1941 and 1942, which saw U.S.
and Mexican economic cooperation as a great opportunity
for Mexican industry, opinion pieces and other articles later
in the war often portrayed U.S. involvement as a “danger”
to local industry.77 New stories often spoke of “nuestras in-
dustrias” (our industry) and of the possibility of losing con-
trol of “lo nuestro” (our own) to outside economic interests.78
Others borrowed wartime rhetoric, using words such as “im-
perialism” and “defense” when referring to the relationship
between the U.S. and Mexican economies.79
The oiaa had attempted earlier to respond to economic prob-
lems brought to Mexico by the war. As Mexico industrialized,
it began to feel the impact of shortages of machinery, spare

a propaganda billboard | 283

parts, and supplies. The U.S. and Mexican governments estab-
lished a joint program to remedy the situation. The Mexican-
American Commission for Economic Cooperation (macec)
began in 1943 to develop a long-range program to promote
Mexican economic growth.80 This commission made recom-
mendations for expanding public-works industries as well as for
developing new private manufacturing enterprises.81 Mexican
industrialists had high expectations for the macec as the solu-
tion to the country’s wartime industrial needs.82 Nevertheless,
most projects required substantial amounts of equipment and
materials from the United States, and the commission could
only make recommendations and establish priorities for after
the war. Furthermore, the macec began to face considerable
opposition from U.S. politicians who feared that many of the
proposed projects would lead to higher Mexican tariffs.83 As
early as July 1944, U.S. political and business leaders were
growing concerned at the possibility that Mexico would increase
tariffs or impose other protectionist trade barriers.84 As the
war drew to a close, business leaders in the United States con-
sidered new industries in Mexico and in other smaller nations
around the world as a potential threat to U.S.-manufactured
exports after the war.85
At the same time, the Avila Camacho administration and
Mexican private business interests pressured U.S. diplomats
in Mexico City to push through a postwar economic aid pack-
age to continue the cooperation between the two nations that
had developed during the war.86 Much of that pressure was
manifested in discussions of postwar industry in the press,
while the activities of the macec came under increasing scru-
tiny by numerous politicians in Washington dc. Unable to
initiate immediate development projects and facing growing

284 | a propaganda billboard

opposition in the United States, the commission disbanded
early in 1945. Although the macec failed to implement any
programs that produced results during the war, its activities il-
lustrate important trends in U.S.-Mexican relations that were
established through the oiaa. The commission demonstrates
that the United States intended to maintain close economic
ties after the war and that U.S. leaders wanted a commercial
relationship free of trade barriers.
The macec also provided a plan for Mexico’s postwar in-
dustrial development. As part of this plan, the Avila Camacho
administration attempted to implement broad tariff increases
early in 1944. Mexican industrialists hoped that the distrac-
tion of war in Europe and the Paciﬁc would facilitate passage
of the new tariff legislation that would then be in effect as the
war drew to a close. Nevertheless, diplomatic pressures from
Ambassador Messersmith, combined with the precedent set in
the Reciprocal Trade Treaty of 1942, forced Avila Camacho
to abandon hopes of implementing protectionist trade barri-
ers prior to the end of the war.
Mexico’s industrialists understood the need for patience
and caution with the war still ongoing overseas. Nevertheless,
they continued to push for a postwar economic policy aimed
at protecting their new business endeavors. Their demands
were not out of line with the Avila Camacho administration’s
postwar plans. To the contrary, the president and his staff
continued to make industrialization a top priority after the
war. In October as 1942, the Ministry of National Economy,
in cooperation with the School of National Economy at the
Universidad Autónoma de México, sponsored a series of con-
ferences on the war economy. Conference participants debated

a propaganda billboard | 285

Mexico’s economic role during the war and tried to anticipate
problems the country might face with a return to peace.87
At the same time, Avila Camacho appointed a national
commission to study potential peacetime concerns and formu-
late a plan to protect the country’s interests. By mid-1944 the
Comisión Nacional de Planación para la Paz (cnpp; National
Commission of Planning for Peace) had taken on an increas-
ingly important role in wartime propaganda.88 Much of its
propaganda was directed narrowly to the country’s industrial
class, while Squadron 201 continued to dominate propaganda
directed at the masses. In the second half of 1944 and through-
out 1945, the Avila Camacho administration began a subtle
yet important transition in its wartime messages. Government
propaganda gradually ceased to be an attempt to win support
for the war and eventually shifted toward enlisting support
for the government in peace. For Avila Camacho and the of-
ﬁcial revolutionary party, peacetime support equated to sup-
port for an aggressive industrialization and economic mod-
ernization policy, which centered on protectionist economic
and trade measures.
cnpp rhetoric emphasized that the country needed to pre-
pare itself for a changed world after the war ended, and that
failure to do so would result in devastation equal to that seen
in wartime.89 Commission members sent this message to a
small circle of industrialists and assured them that the gov-
ernment was taking measures to address the economic chal-
lenges the nation would face after the war. The government’s
plan included developing new industries during the war and
protecting those industries in peace.90
The government’s industrialization propaganda became
more subtle as the end of the war approached. Instead of

286 | a propaganda billboard

sponsoring festivals, posters, corridos, and other forms of
mass appeal, Avila Camacho’s industrialization propaganda
was much quieter and narrowly directed. In 1945, industrial
expansion was a volatile topic and had the potential for rup-
turing the delicate sense of national unity the government had
tried to achieve during the war. Devoting national resources
to developing industry necessarily meant that other interests
might suffer. Furthermore, the government could carry out
an industrialization strategy without widely publicizing its in-
tentions to the country. Unlike declaring war, freezing wages,
and implementing the draft, Avila Camacho did not necessar-
ily need full national support for industrialization. The admin-
istration had support from Mexican industrialists who stood
to gain from a national industrialization program.
The president also had the support of the country’s middle
and upper classes. People who had beneﬁted from the war-
time economy had accumulated savings due to large amounts
of dollars pouring into Mexico. The country had faced short-
ages in the availability of consumer goods, particularly prod-
ucts that were considered luxury goods such as small and large
appliances and automobiles. At the same time, oiaa propa-
ganda had targeted middle- and upper-class Mexicans, fea-
turing luxury consumer products as part of the American way
of life. By 1945 a new consumer culture had emerged among
many Mexicans as they began to demand the products that
had been featured in U.S. propaganda.91 Avila Camacho used
this new consumer demand to gain popular support for his
industrialization plans. He promised consumers that national
industrial development would give them greater access to the
products they wanted to buy. He promoted his strategy to
middle- and upper-class consumers as the best way to fulﬁll

a propaganda billboard | 287

their demands for consumer goods, while supporting the na-
tion’s economic growth. Industrialization propaganda aimed
not to win widespread national support but rather to appease
a small but influential group of industrialists as well as mid-
dle- and upper-class consumers who wanted to see their in-
terests protected.
A second factor requiring low-key propaganda techniques
was the diplomatic pressure the administration received from
the United States. The U.S. State Department’s strong reaction
to early attempts by the Mexican government to raise protec-
tionist trade barriers confirmed Avila Camacho’s suspicions
that U.S. officials were counting on Mexico as major mar-
ket for peacetime industrial production. While Ambassador
Messersmith sympathized with and even supported Mexico’s
position that it needed a certain degree of protection to en-
courage continued growth of its new industries, officials in
Washington were much less sympathetic and pointed to the
Reciprocal Trade Treaty of 1942 to prevent Mexico from rais-
ing tariffs.92 Avila Camacho understood that the United States
would play a leading role in determining the nature of a peace
agency and therefore the nature of Mexico’s place in the post-
war world. He could ill-afford to alienate U.S. diplomats dur-
ing such a volatile time in the international system. In an effort
not to offend U.S. diplomatic sensibilities and not to alienate
large sectors of the Mexican public, he limited his promotion
of industrialization to speeches and publications aimed at a
narrow audience as well as policy implementation.
The differences in U.S. and Mexican visions of the peace
culminated at the Inter-American Conference on Problems
of War and Peace held at the Chapultepec Castle in Mexico
City in March 1945. The conference resulted in the resolution

288 | a propaganda billboard

on Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity, also
known as the Act of Chapultepec. It set out principles of sov-
ereignty and non-intervention that became an important in-
fluence on the United Nations Charter.93 Even though the con-
ference’s final act represented the new era of good relations
between the United States and Latin America, negotiations
during the conference demonstrated that their commercial in-
terests were diverging. U.S. representatives made declarations
and proposed resolutions that would prohibit trade barriers
within the hemisphere. They discouraged the development of
any new industries that would require protectionist restric-
tions.94 Delegates to the conference managed to resolve their
differences in commercial policy by using vague language in
the final charter. Nevertheless, U.S. and Mexican participa-
tion in the conference demonstrates that the two nations had
differing visions of the commercial relationship that would
develop after the war.

Conclusion

As the tide of the war turned to favor the Allies in 1944, U.S.
and Mexican propaganda evolved and incorporated the new
shift in wartime events. Mexican messages considered domestic
price increases and consumer goods shortages that propelled
continued opposition to the war effort. The Avila Camacho
administration also began to look to the nation’s role in the
world after the war, and the president adapted his approach
accordingly. The country sent Squadron 201 to participate in
combat in the Philippines and the president used the new na-
tional heroes to consolidate his war position. Much of the coun-
try reacted with patriotism as people watched young military
men leave their homes and risk their lives for the country and

a propaganda billboard | 289

for world peace. The nation followed the last six months of the
war through the activities of the Aztec Eagles. For Mexicans,
the war came to an end when members of Squadron 201 re-
turned home as their countrymen welcomed them with honor
and pride. The country’s military participation solidified the
president’s national unity campaign and allowed the govern-
ment to increase its rhetoric promoting postwar industrial-
ization. It also legitimized Avila Camacho’s involvement in
the peace process.
The oiaa made adjustments to its wartime information in
1944. Sensing that Latin Americans had grown apathetic to
the war, U.S. agents began to place a stronger emphasis on the
sacrifices being made by the Allied nations. oiaa propaganda
moved away from stressing U.S. military might and instead
portrayed the sacrifices made by U.S. soldiers and families. As
the U.S. armed forces became more involved in combat oper-
ations, U.S.-controlled news stories emphasized casualty fig-
ures and Axis cruelty. Many En guardia stories concentrated
on human suffering, while others portrayed a progressive U.S.
society despite wartime challenges. The oiaa hoped to renew
Latin American sympathies for the sacrifices U.S. citizens were
making; at the same time, it promoted the United States as a
worthwhile trading partner after the war. U.S. leaders hoped
to strengthen wartime agreements that had allowed open trade
during the war.
U.S. and Mexican commercial interests diverged during the
war, and the extent of those differences became evident in the
final years of the conflict. Mexican leaders hoped to strengthen
new industries that would compete with U.S. peacetime pro-
duction. They also perceived that a new middle- and upper-
class consumer culture had emerged, in part as a result of U.S.

290 | a propaganda billboard

propaganda pushing the American way of life. In 1944, Avila
Camacho began taking measures to raise tariffs and provide
protection to developing Mexican industries. New tariffs did
not take hold until after the war was over, but the different
commercial objectives of the two nations had become clear
in their billboards of wartime propaganda.

a propaganda billboard | 291

Conclusion

World War II in a Mexican Deck of Cards

Eight months before the war ended, Mexican caricaturist

Antonio Arias Bernal collaborated with Ignacio Carral Icaza to
commemorate Mexico’s participation in World War II through
art. Icaza’s publishing company sponsored Arias Bernal’s Album
histórico de la II Guerra Mundial, in which the artist told the
story of the war through caricature. The portfolio included
fifty-six original prints designed as a deck of playing cards. It
chronicled the major episodes that influenced the outcome of
the world conflict, beginning with the ace of diamonds where
a young Hitler wanders through the streets of Vienna dream-
ing of conquering the world. The deck concluded with three
joker cards, the last of which shows world leaders seated at
the victory table where Mexico had a place of honor (figure
29). Manuel Avila Camacho appears alongside Harry Truman,
Clement Attlee, and Vyacheslav Molotov. Winston Churchill
and Franklin Roosevelt appear as portraits on the wall behind
the victors, observing the proceedings below.1
Arias Bernal’s playing cards served as a final metaphor rep-
resenting the importance of the war in Mexico. First, the im-
age in figure 29 illustrated that by the end of the war, Mexico
fig. 29. “Mexico at the victory table” (Arias Bernal print). Courtesy of
U.S. Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division, POS-B-Mex. B26.1.

conc lus i on | 293

had become a major voice in the international arena. Its armed
forces played only a minimal role in direct combat compared
to the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union,
but many other Allied nations sent no troops. Furthermore,
Mexico’s role as a supplier of strategic materials contributed
greatly to the war effort and the eventual Allied victory. Avila
Camacho’s willingness to commit troops and the actions of
Squadron 201 in the Pacific gave the country an enhanced
voice in postwar peace plans. Mexico signed the Charter of
San Francisco in 1945 and became one of the founding mem-
bers of the United Nations. In fact, Latin American countries
made up twenty-one of the original fifty founding nations of
the un. The Mexican delegation, headed by Alfonso García
Robles, led other Latin American nations at the San Francisco
Conference in pushing for concessions that would give the re-
gion a greater voice in the postwar world. They influenced is-
sues such as membership in the un and the role of regional
organizations. Furthermore, Mexican delegates insisted on
enhancing the role of the General Assembly in an attempt to
counterbalance the authority of the Security Council.2 Arias
Bernal’s joker card demonstrates that Mexican leaders be-
lieved they had achieved their diplomatic objectives by the
end of the war.
Arias Bernal’s deck of cards also illustrates how important
the war became in the nation’s internal policies. Between 1933
and 1945 Mexico evolved from a society deeply divided over
its revolutionary past to become a nation more united around
the government’s industrialization and economic moderniza-
tion policies.3 National unity developed by associating the
Allied cause in World War II with the democratic legacy of
the Mexican Revolution. Wartime rhetoric eventually argued

294 | conclusion
that Mexico’s industrial expansion would ensure the Allied
victory and, by extension, guarantee the continuation of the
country’s supposed democratic revolutionary legacy.
During the Cárdenas administration, special-interest groups
on the right and left had dominated the domestic political de-
bate, and the president’s revolutionary reforms had further di-
vided them. Those divisions had intensified as both sides in-
corporated the growing international clash between fascism
and communism into their domestic agendas. The right inte-
grated fascist tenets such as nationalism, anti-Americanism,
and pro-Catholicism into its definition of the revolution. The
left had emphasized fascist cruelties in the Spanish Civil War
and in the precursory events to World War II to promote a
socialist definition of the revolution. As a result of special-
interest-dominated wartime information, international ideol-
ogies had further divided the nation by 1940.
The Avila Camacho administration began using the war to
promote industrialization as a way to modernize the country
and to merge the contrasting definitions of revolutionary leg-
acy. Democracy became the unifying concept that bridged the
gap between the right and the left. After German submarines
sank Mexican oil tankers in the summer of 1942, much of
the country rallied around the president in a widespread dem-
onstration of patriotism. Popular perceptions of the nation’s
role in the conflict began borrowing memories of the 1910
revolution, and many people found similarities between the
authoritarianism of Porfirio Díaz and the totalitarian leaders
of Axis nations in World War II. They understood Mexico’s
entry into the war in those terms, and government rhetoric
quickly adopted those comparisons. First through the Ministry
of the Interior and later through the Ministry of Education,

conc lus i on | 295

the Avila Camacho administration produced wartime infor-
mation that urged Mexicans to support the war through their
production. Government propaganda argued that by industri-
alizing, the country would safeguard the ideals that revolution-
aries fought for by guaranteeing an Allied victory. Eventually,
official rhetoric incorporated other modern features into the
wartime information campaign by promoting a modern mil-
itary structure through the Compulsory Military Service Law
and by endorsing the literacy program as an extension of war-
time measures. Government officials wanted to erase revolu-
tionary factionalism and replace it with national unity based
in democracy and modernization.
At the same time, the Avila Camacho administration played
a diplomatic balancing act with the United States. Conflict
over Cárdenas’s oil expropriation and land-reform policies
had strained relations between the two countries. Exigencies
of the war allowed the government to resolve those conflicts in
a manner that was advantageous to Mexico. Avila Camacho
smoothed over the country’s diplomatic tensions with the United
States and moved the two countries closer together by enter-
ing into trade agreements. Mexico became a principal supplier
of wartime materials for the Allies and an important strategic
partner for the United States.
Mexico’s importance to the United States is illustrated by
many of the activities of the Office of Inter-American Affairs.
The agency devoted substantial resources to its propaganda
campaign in Mexico. It also established specific projects to
encourage the growth of Mexican industries such as the U.S.
Railway Mission and the U.S.-Mexican Commission for
Economic Cooperation. The Avila Camacho administration
welcomed U.S. technical and economic assistance in projects

296 | conclusion
that improved the nation’s infrastructure and encouraged in-
dustrial development. As leaders began to look toward the
postwar, Avila Camacho further clarified his industrial agenda
by moving away from reciprocal trade agreements. Instead, his
administration implemented policies to protect Mexico’s in-
cipient industries and complete the modernization process.
Popular interaction with oiaa wartime information provides
another lens into Mexico’s industrialization project. Much of
the agency’s propaganda promoted the United States as a polit-
ical and cultural model for Latin American nations. En guar-
dia frequently ran stories that emphasized the comforts of the
U.S. middle-class lifestyle. Radio and film propaganda pushed
the message further by portraying the American way of life as
one of the agency’s most important wartime themes.
Mexicans reacted with indignation to many oiaa programs.
They perceived some the agency’s activities as an extension of
goodwill by the United States, but frequently they interpreted
oiaa programs as an effort by the United States to achieve
dominance. As a result, most Mexicans preferred nationally
produced radio programs and films. Responses to oiaa sur-
veys reflect a strong nationalist reaction to U.S. programs,
which promoted Avila Camacho’s domestic wartime goals
of national unity more than U.S. attempts to create hemi-
spheric unity.
A significant consequence of wartime propaganda appears
in Mexican consumer culture. oiaa propaganda aimed to con-
vince Mexicans to adopt a middle-class lifestyle, defined by
the United States, and the agency largely succeeded in that
objective. After the war, people longed for consumer goods.4
They demanded many of the products they saw displayed on
the pages of En guardia, in Hollywood films, and even in the

conc lus i on | 297

department-store advertisements of the nation’s dailies. The
Mexican government used consumer demands to consolidate
support for its industrialization agenda. By restricting the im-
ports of U.S. consumer goods, the government gave people no
other option than to support industrialization, and by 1945,
industrialization and protectionism were virtually synonymous
in public discourse about the war.
In the early years of the so-called Mexican Miracle, few
questioned the industrial turn the Mexican Revolution had
taken. Between 1940 and 1960, revolutionary legacy shifted
away from the social justice agenda of the early years of the
Lázaro Cárdenas administration and instead emphasized the
vague notions of political democracy and economic growth.
As noted in the introduction to this study, Pablo González
Casanova’s La democracia en México challenged the sup-
posed democratic and economic successes of the revolution
in 1965. By that time Mexico had already experienced two
decades of rapid industrial development and impressive eco-
nomic growth. Statistics such as 6.6 percent annual produc-
tivity growth indicated that the country was indeed experi-
encing the Miracle between the 1940s and the 1970s, and
such statistics convinced many within and outside the coun-
try that the revolution had succeeded. Mexico’s involvement
in World War II provided the basis for that economic growth
and brought praise for the revolution. Avila Camacho’s co-
operation with the United States afforded the country many
of the necessary resources to carry out its industrialization
project, and the war provided a foundation for national unity.
Support for industrialization segued into a nationalistic fervor
surrounding protectionist policies after 1945. Supposed polit-
ical democracy, economic growth, and protection of industry

298 | conclusion
all became part of evolving deﬁnitions of the revolution in the
postwar era of the Mexican Miracle. Those deﬁnitions took
root during World War II when the government promoted a
message of production and patriotism in defense of democ-
racy to preserve the legacy of the revolution.

conc lus i on | 299

notes

Abbreviations

agn Archivo General de la Nación, Mexico City

dgi Dirección General de Información
dgrms Dirección General de Recursos, Materiales,
y Servicios
dips Departamento de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociales
nara National Archives and Records Administration,
College Park md
nrp Nelson A. Rockefeller, Personal Papers
oiaa Ofﬁce of Inter-American Affairs
rac Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow ny
rg Record Group
rp/lc Ramo de Presidentes, Lázaro Cárdenas
rp/mac Ramo de Presidentes, Manuel Avila Camacho
sep Secretaría de Educación Pública
sre Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones
Exteriores, Mexico City
udl University of Delaware Library, Newark

Introduction

1. González Casanova, La democracia en México, esp. chapter 8.

2. González Casanova, La democracia en México, 151.
3. For recent studies that outline problems in Mexico’s national de-
velopment after 1940—such as persistent social and economic inequal-
ity and questionable democratic practices—see Joseph, Rubenstein, and
Zolov, Fragments of a Golden Age; Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s; and
Moreno, Yankee Don’t Go Home!
4. Schmidt, “Making It Real,” 44–45.
5. For a recent study of Latin America and World War II that em-
phasizes the global conflict as part of local national trends throughout
the Western Hemisphere, see Leonard and Bratzel, Latin America dur-
ing World War II.
6. For a discussion of the populist movement in Latin America between
1920 and 1960 see Conniff, Latin American Populism; and Weyland,
“Clarifying a Contested Concept.” For a more updated discussion of
early populism and its implications for contemporary political issues in
Latin America, see Conniff, Populism in Latin America.
7. For an analysis of this phenomenon in Mexico see Knight, “Populism
and Neo-Populism.”
8. Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy, 1–10.
9. Beteta, “Mexico’s Foreign Relations,” 170.
10. Beteta, “Mexico’s Foreign Relations,” 170.
11. For a broad examination of the relationship between revolu-
tion and democracy in Latin American see Knight, “Democratic and
Revolutionary Traditions.”
12. The concepts of “right” and “left” are problematic when applied
to 1930s Mexico. Oftentimes, conservative interests on the so-called po-
litical right had little in common ideologically except their ardent oppo-
sition to communism. But leftist interests often conflated disparate con-
servative groups into one overarching opponent and referred to them
as “the right.” I explore these definitions further in chapter 1, and I rely
on the definitions of “right” and “left” being expressed by Mexicans
themselves throughout this study.
13. See Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment, 171–89.
14. Smith, Lasswell, and Casey, Propaganda, Communication, and
Public Opinion, 1.

1. A Propaganda Mosaic

1. Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front, xvii.

2. Benjamin, La Revolución; Alan Knight, “The Rise and Fall of
the Myth of the Mexican Revolution” (paper presented at the Tulane
Conference on Popular Memory and the Ofﬁcial Story in Mexican History,
New Orleans, Tulane University, 2003).

302 | notes to pages 2–14

3. Valadés, Historia general de la revolución, 1–8.
4. European fascism and communism did not meld perfectly with the
so-called right and left in Mexican politics. Nevertheless, spokespersons
on both sides of the political spectrum in Mexico often borrowed the
rhetoric of European ideologies, not in an attempt to define themselves,
but rather as part of a strategy of discrediting the opposition.
5. In this context, “special-interest groups” refers to formal or in-
formal organizations in Mexico that functioned outside official gov-
ernment capacity.
6. Sherman, “Reassessing Cardenismo.”
7. A thorough analysis of Axis propaganda strategies would require
extensive use of German, Italian, and Japanese sources. Since the fo-
cus of this study is Allied propaganda, this section will only provide
background information on pro-fascist propaganda based on U.S. and
Mexican primary sources as well as scholarly works. It is not intended to
be a comprehensive examination of pro-fascist propaganda, but rather
a basic summary of the perceived fascist threat upon which much of the
later Allied propaganda was based.
8. Estimates based on Buchenau, Tools of Progress, 14; and Radkau,
“Los Nacionalsocialistas en México,” 144–45.
9. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 47–49.
10. For an anecdotal account of the impact of the Mexican Revolution
and World War I on one particular German family and its business deal-
ings in Mexico see Buchenau, Tools of Progress, 73–84.
11. Buchenau, Tools of Progress, 115–16.
12. Although technically not synonymous, for the purposes of propa-
ganda many World War II Allies used the terms Nazi, fascist, and Falange
interchangeably. Following those definitions, this study will use the term
fascist to refer collectively to the ideologies of the far right.
13. Von Mentz et al., Los empresarios alemanes, vol. 2. Authors in
this volume have incorporated German sources with the Allied investi-
gations into German activities. See specifically chapters 11 and 12.
14. Friedman, Nazis and Good Neighbors, 21–24.
15. “El nazismo en México por la División de Investigaciones Políticas
y Sociales,” May 23, 1940, agn, Gallery 2, File 10 (2-1/002.4/3 79).
16. “El nazismo en México.” This investigation suggested that money

notes to pages 14–20 | 303

collected by the Centro Alemán may have eventually contributed to
Germany’s war effort.
17. “El nazismo en México”; see also Buchenau, Tools of Progress,
118–22.
18. Buchenau, Tools of Progress, 121.
19. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 45.
20. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 45; Niblo,
“British Propaganda in Mexico,” 119–23; Ortiz Garza, México en
guerra, 21–26.
21. U.S. and Mexican archives do not contain samples of German
propaganda. One interesting explanation circulating in the Mexican ar-
chives is that after the war started British intelligence agents collected
and destroyed all German-produced propaganda in Mexico, leaving
very little for historical record. Nevertheless, various investigations re-
fer to the above activities in evaluating the Nazi threat. For an exam-
ple of the Mexican investigation, see “El nazismo en México.” For ref-
erences to U.S. investigations, see Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s, 327–33;
Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 65–70; Ortiz Garza, México
en guerra, 88–90.
22. Márquez Fuentes and Rodríguez Araujo, El Partido Comunista
Mexicano, 182–220.
23. Lombardo Toledano formed the ctm in 1936 and enjoyed
strong support from the Mexican government. It eventually replaced
the Confederación Regional Obrera Mexicana (Regional Confederation
of Mexican Workers) as the national labor union.
24. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 114.
25. Lenin, Imperialism, 91–99. Lenin laid out this theory to explain
the outbreak of World War I.
26. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 114.
27. A small sample of these broadsides is housed in the Museo Nacional
de Arte in Mexico City.
28. Wright-Rios, “Art and State/Love and Hate.”
29. The description of this image comes from Azuela, “El Machete
and Frente a Frente.”
30. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War, 71–73.
31. De Meneses, Franco and the Spanish Civil War, 91–97.

304 | notes to pages 21–26

32. The connections between the Mexican Revolution and the Spanish
Civil War through memory are outlined in Linhard, Fearless Women, 223–
29. See also Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 55–56.
33. Matesanz, Las raíces del exilio, 55–56. The diverse nature of
Spain’s Popular Front meant a wide array of leftist and moderate ideo-
logical affiliations on the Mexican left supported it.
34. “Los radicals de México votaron ayer en un mitín varios acuer-
dos para ayudar al gobierno Español,” Excelsior, September 7, 1936.
35. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 55–56.
36. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 127.
37. “Los radicals de México.”
38. The best secondary account of the tgp’s origins, members, and
activities is Prignitz’s El Taller de Gráfica Popular. The tgp still oper-
ates a workshop in Mexico City, but its archives have been moved to
storage and there is no longer public access. Many of the archival docu-
ments were microfilmed and are available at the United States Library of
Congress. Original prints of many tgp graphics are held at the Library
of Congress Prints and Photographs Division and at the Museo Nacional
de Arte in Mexico City.
39. Mexican workers received significant wage increases during the
Cárdenas administration, due in part to Lombardo Toledano’s close
relationship with the Mexican government. Lombardo Toledano fre-
quently pointed to increases in workers’ wages to justify his position as
labor leader and to convince workers that he was acting in their best in-
terest. In reality, real wages in Mexico fell during the late 1930s as wage
increases failed to keep pace with inflation.
40. For a complete account of Comintern activity in the Spanish Civil
War see Richardson, Comintern Army; and Carr, The Comintern and
the Spanish Civil War.
41. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 103–6.
42. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 103–6.
43. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, “Civilización e imperialismo,” El
Universal, May 13, 1936.
44. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, “Evolución y revolución: Creación
y dogma,” El Universal, June 19, 1936.

notes to pages 26–31 | 305

45. El Popular, July 19, 1938, quoted in Powell, Mexico and the
Spanish Civil War, 130.
46. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 114.
47. Sherman, The Mexican Right. Sherman’s analysis goes beyond
the traditional members of the conservative camp, suggesting how di-
vided the country was until World War II.
48. “Sangrientos desordenes se registraron en España,” El Universal,
May 26, 1936; “Han continuado los desordenes en España en vísperas
de la elección,” Excelsior, May 9, 1936; “Hubo en España más desor-
denes por las huelgas,” Excelsior, June 9, 1936.
49. Querido Moheno Jr. “¿España o Francia?” Excelsior, June 8,
1936.
50. Babb, Managing Mexico, 69–73, refers to capitalists and indus-
trialists in the late 1930s as “conservative” and “rightist” from an eco-
nomic perspective. See also Michaels, “Crisis of Cardenismo.”
51. “Falange Española,” Excelsior, September 2, 1936.
52. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 113–15.
53. For a recent discussion of both movements see Faber, “‘La hora
ha llegado’ Hispanism.”
54. This argument was made clearly by the Spanish Falange in Mexico,
in “Falange Española,” Excelsior, September 2, 1936. It was also re-
ported later in U.S. newspapers, “Spain and Mexico: The Falangists Seek
a Wedge,” Washington Post, August 13, 1939. For a classic history of
Pan-Americanism, with a particular focus on its evolution between 1920
and 1930, see Aguilar Monteverde, El Panamericanismo.
55. Pike, Hispanismo, 1989–1936, 30–45.
56. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 62.
57. For a thorough history of the Unión Nacional Sinarquista and
an analysis of the group’s activities, see J. Meyer, El sinarquismo. For a
contemporary account see Gill, El sinarquismo.
58. “Summary of Investigative Activities of the fbi,” January 22,
1943, nara, rg 65, Entry World War II, hq Files 123.
59. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 134–35.
60. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 134–44. Powell gives a
thorough account of the national press and coverage of the Civil War.

306 | notes to pages 31–36

61. “Los veteranos están contra el comunismo,” Excelsior, May 3,
1936.
62. “Viva la dictadura,” Excelsior, May 12, 1936.
63. “España y México unidos por un mutuo destino historico y por
una gran obra social,” Excelsior, June 10, 1936. Lawson, Building the
Fourth Estate, 55–56, argues that we must consider the placement of
stories in a newspaper when evaluating bias and “propaganda.” Lawson
demonstrates that there was often an enormous disparity between the
nature of stories on the front page of newspapers and those hidden in
back sections.
64. See Pedro Serrano, “El momento español,” Excelsior, June 30,
1936; and Rubén García, “Contrastes del triunfal socialismo en España
y Francia,” El Universal, July 28, 1936.
65. Tibol, José Chavez Morado, 17–18.
66. For example, see the print entitled “Bombardeo” in Tibol, José
Chavez Morado, 71.
67. Powell, Mexico and the Spanish Civil War, 157–59.
68. Sherman, “Reassessing Cardenismo,” 368–70.
69. Michaels, “Crisis of Cardenismo,” 73–76. The extent to which
Cárdenas’s refugee policy may have swayed some of the moderate mid-
dle class into the far-right camp is unclear, but clearly the middle class
was feeling greatly threatened by many of the administration’s policies.
Michaels outlines the culmination of these problems as the “Crisis of
Cardenismo.”
70. See Lida and García Millé, “Los españoles en México”; José
Antonio Matasanz, Las raíces del exilio: México ante la guerra 1936–
1939 (Mexico City: El Colegio de Mexico, 2000); Camp, Mexico’s
Mandarins, 116–18; Lida et al., La Casa de España y el Colegio de
México, 89–112.
71. The Anschluss also diverted U.S. and British attention away from
Mexico and allowed Cárdenas to expropriate foreign-owned oil com-
panies one week later.
72. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 252–300.
73. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 54–55. These
suspicions were documented by numerous contemporary observers in
Mexico. See Plenn, Mexico Marches, 70–75; and Prewett, Reportage on

notes to pages 36–41 | 307

Mexico, 303–5. U.S. newspapers also reported concerns of Nazi activities
in Mexico. See “State Department Queried on Mexico: Representative
Kennedy Asks It to Lay Full Correspondence on Seizures before House
Inquiries on Fascist Ties; Resolution Also Seeks Replies Concerning
Expropriations and Daniels’s Activities,” New York Times, February
2, 1939; and Betty Kirk, “Trouble Brewing in Mexico: Intense Nazi
Activity below Rio Grande Is Reported,” Washington Post, September
29, 1939.
74. Throughout this study, I refer to these two newspapers as the
“mainstream” press and the “independent” press interchangeably.
75. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 54–55; see
also Sherman, “Reassessing Cardenismo,” 367–70.
76. Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate, 55. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican
Military Collaboration,” 52.
77. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 259.
78. Michaels, “Crisis of Cardenismo,” 61.
79. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 259.
80. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 275; see also El Universal,
March 18, 1938.
81. Soviet leaders had made earlier attempts to form an alliance, but
to no avail. Great Britain and France rejected their proposals, and an
alliance between the nations did not occur until after Germany invaded
the Soviet Union in 1941.
82. El Universal, March 19, 1938.
83. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 109.
84. Lombardo Toledano defined the “Mexican right” broadly as rep-
resentatives of the Catholic Church, Acción Nacional, Sinarquists, and
illegal Nazi parties. He did not specifically name business leaders or in-
dustrialists in his diatribes against fascism. This allowed him to promote
national unity and blame outsiders and a small segment of the Mexican
population as the root of the fascist threat.
85. An example of one speech given in 1939 can be found in Lombardo
Toledano, Cómo actuan los Nazis en México.
86. A complete account of the Liga’s first-year activities can be found
in Liga Pro-Cultura Alemana en México, “Actividades desarrolladas

308 | notes to pages 41–44

en el primer año de nuestra existencia,” May 22, 1939, agn, rp/lc
135.2/335.
87. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 140.
88. Plenn, Mexico Marches, 78–80.
89. Liga Pro-Cultura Alemana, “Actividades.”
90. Maya Nava, La Segunda Guerra Mundial, 155–57.
91. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 262–63.
92. El Universal, October 1, 1938.
93. El Universal, October 27, 1938, quoted in Rodriguez, “La prensa
nacional,” 263.
94. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 262–64.
95. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 109.
96. This image is stylistically similar to the Revolutionary Trinity of
Mexican muralist José Clemente Orozco, which sends a similar message
of the blinding nature of propaganda. See Rochfort, Mexican Muralists,
42.
97. La verdadera cultura alemana: 6 actos culturales organizados por
la Liga Pro-Cultura Alemana en México, Ediciones Liga Pro-Cultura
Alemana en México, 1939, agn, rp/mac 704/297.
98. Freiherr Rüdt von Collenberg to Eduardo Hay, April 22, 1939,
sre, III-1703-8. See also La verdadera cultura alemana.
99. Eduardo Hay to Secretary of Education, October 11, 1939, sre,
III-1703-8; Liga Pro-Cultura Alemana, “Actividades.” Von Collenberg’s
letter is quoted in this letter.
100. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 140–41.
101. Maya Nava, La Segunda Guerra Mundial, 153–62.
102. El Nacional, March 13, 1939.
103. El Popular, March 16, 1939.
104. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 109–10.
105. No sources from the Liga appear in the archival record be-
tween 1940 and 1942.
106. Prignitz, El Taller de Gráﬁca Popular, 67–72.
107. This argument challenges the analysis of wartime propaganda
made by Stephen Niblo and José Luis Ortiz Garza. This debate is cov-
ered in greater detail in chapter 2.

notes to pages 44–55 | 309

108. El Universal, September 2, 1939, quoted in Rodriguez, “La
prensa nacional,” 265.
109. El Universal, August 24, 1939, quoted in Maya Nava, La Segunda
Guerra Mundial, 194–95.
110. Maya Nava, La Segunda Guerra Mundial, 196.
111. Maya Nava, La Segunda Guerra Mundial, 207.
112. Maya Nava, La Segunda Guerra Mundial, 196–97.

2. A Blueprint for Propaganda

1. An executive order on July 30, 1941, reorganized the Ofﬁce

for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations between the
American Republics and renamed it the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs. It was reorganized again in March 1945, and the
name was changed to the Ofﬁce of Inter-American Affairs. It maintained
as its primary objective the coordination of the cultural and commercial
relations of the United States affecting hemispheric defense. For consis-
tency, I will refer to the agency as the oiaa throughout this study.
2. Beginning in 1941, the agency used the term “propaganda blue-
print” regularly in internal correspondence.
3. Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s, 329–33; Ortiz Garza, México en
guerra, 83.
4. Hemispheric security became a top concern among U.S. govern-
ment and business leaders. See “Red-Nazi Plotting in Mexico Charged,”
New York Times, April 14, 1940; “Plot to Divert U.S. Reported in
Mexico,” New York Times, April 17, 1940; “Nazis Active in Mexico
City,” Washington Post, April 30, 1940; “Would Take Over Mexico,”
New York Times June 9, 1940; “Japanese Activity in Mexico Growing,”
New York Times, July 7, 1940; “Cold Terror by Mexico’s Nazis Charged,”
Washington Post, August 30, 1940; “Germans Developing Fifth Column
Which Is Serious Threat to U.S. Security,” Washington Post, September
1, 1940.
5. “Nazi Activity Threatens U.S.-Mexican Trade,” Washington Post,
August 4, 1940.
6. oiaa, “Latin America: Its People, Resources, Problems, and Share
in the War” (Washington dc: oiaa, 1942). In this pamphlet the U.S.

310 | notes to pages 55–59

government defined the American republics as the United States plus
all independent Spanish-, Portuguese-, and French-speaking nations in
the Americas with the exception of Canada. The term will be used in
the same way throughout this study.
7. Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 79–86.
8. Rowland, History. This is the only published work available on
the agency.
9. U.S. diplomats in Mexico and policy makers in Washington dc
were divided over the implementation of the Good Neighbor policy. See
Cronon, Josephus Daniels in Mexico, 66–67.
10. Ambassador to Mexico Josephus Daniels cites concerns over
his role in sanctioning the U.S. intervention at Veracruz in 1914 that
nearly derailed his appointment as ambassador. Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve
Diplomat, 3–6.
11. Langley, Mexico and the United States, 21–25; Zoraida Vázquez
and Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 153. Zoraida Vázquez and
Meyer argue that strong nationalism was directed against U.S. influence
in Mexico during World War II.
12. For a classic overview of the creation and implementation of
the Good Neighbor policy see Wood, Making of the Good Neighbor
Policy.
13. For accounts of the application of the Good Neighbor policy spe-
cifically in Mexico see Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt;
and Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies.
14. Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 67–69.
15. For studies arguing that U.S. diplomatic strategies in Latin America
were motivated by economic concerns see Garner, Economic Aspects of
New Deal Diplomacy; and Green, Containment of Latin America. For
studies emphasizing the need for hemispheric security see Bemis, Latin
American Policy; and Mecham, The United States and Inter-American
Security. One of the most recent studies argues that U.S. core national
values—made up of both economic and security interests—motivated
foreign-policy decisions. See Pike, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy.
16. Rowe and de Alba, The War and the Americas, 8–9; “Declaration
of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity.”
17. The Americas Cooperate for Victory, 2–4.

notes to pages 60–65 | 311

18. Mulcahy, “Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs,”
11; Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 79–86.
19. Quoted in Cummings, “Cultural Diplomacy and the United States
Government.”
20. Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 84.
21. Rowe and de Alba, The War and the Americas, 10.
22. “Hull Trade Policy Is Adopted for All Americas,” New York
Times, December 17, 1938; “Anti-Fascist Pacts Gains in U.S. Favor,”
New York Times, December 25, 1938.
23. Haines, “Under the Eagle’s Wing.”
24. Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 112–13.
25. Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings, 132.
26. See L. Meyer, México y los Estados Unidos, 231–34; and Jayne,
Oil, War, and Anglo-American Relations, 25–37. For a history of the
oil industry leading up to the era of expropriation see Brown, Oil and
Revolution in Mexico.
27. James, Mexico and the Americans, 281.
28. Wood, Making of the Good Neighbor Policy, 203. This statis-
tic was also reported regularly in U.S. press coverage of the oil contro-
versy throughout 1938 and 1939. The largest share of the industry be-
longed to British ﬁrms. U.S. companies approximated the value of their
interests the hundreds of millions of dollars. See also Jayne, Oil, War,
and Anglo-American Relations, 46.
29. Knight, “The Politics of Expropriation,” 91–92.
30. James, Mexico and the Americans, 307.
31. Schuler, Mexico between Hitler and Roosevelt, 97–104.
32. See Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional.” For a journalist’s account
of Mexico during this time, see Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front, 156–
86.
33. J. H. Carmical, “Mexico’s Oil Move Hits U.S. Policies,” New
York Times, March 27, 1938; “Japanese Offer for Seized Oil in Mexico
Reported,” Washington Post, March 26, 1938.
34. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar, 249.
35. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar, 262; “Mexico’s Sale of Oil to Nazis
Arouses U.S. Concern,” New York Times, December 10, 1938.

312 | notes to pages 65–70

36. “Nazi Spy Activity in Mexico Charged,” New York Times, June
28, 1938.
37. Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 83.
38. Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front, 301.
39. “Fascist Inﬂuence Growing in Mexico; U.S. Trade Suffers,” New
York Times, August 15, 1938; Duggan, The Americas, 71–72.
40. James, Mexico and the Americans, 293.
41. “El nazismo en México por la División de Investigaciones Políticas
y Sociales,” May 23, 1940, agn, dips, Gallery 2, Box 83, Folder 10 (2-
1/002.4/3 79).
42. Knight, “The Politics of Expropriation,” 107–9.
43. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 270–73.
44. See Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies.
45. Plenn, Mexico Marches, 49.
46. Daniels, Shirt-Sleeve Diplomat, 248–50.
47. McConnell, Mexico at the Bar, 259.
48. See El Universal, April 17, 1940; Rodriguez, “La prensa nacio-
nal,” 271–72.
49. “El nazismo en México.”
50. Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front, 275–88.
51. “Havana Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American
Republics, July 21–30, 1940,” in A Decade of American Foreign Policy
(Washington dc: Department of State), 411–12.
52. For the most complete account of the activities of this ofﬁce, see
Niblo, “British Propaganda in Mexico.”
53. Niblo, “British Propaganda in Mexico,” 121–22.
54. Rubenstein, Bad Language, 16–17.
55. Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 108.
56. For a thorough discussion of Roosevelt’s concerns over anti-U.S.
sentiments in Latin America, see Humphreys, Latin America and the
Second World War, 1:1–14.
57. Erb, “Rockefeller and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” 17–23.
58. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Secretary of State, June 15, 1940, in
Rowland, History, 279.
59. Stiller, George S. Messersmith, 180.
60. Stiller, George S. Messersmith, 180–81.

notes to pages 70–79 | 313

61. Roosevelt to Secretary of State, June 15, 1940.
62. Rowland, History, 11.
63. Rowland, History, 11. The Inter-American Development
Commission was created on June 17, 1940, to promote industrial develop-
ment and economic cooperation throughout the Western Hemisphere.
64. Rowland, History, 11–12.
65. See Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 15–16.
66. Rowland, History, 13.
67. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, 274.
68. “Nazi Activity Threatens U.S. Mexican Trade: Germans Promise
90-Day Delivery or Cash Penalty,” Washington Post, August 4, 1940.
69. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 42.
70. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 46.
71. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 47.
72. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 61.
73. “Señalamiento de objetivos para la industrialización,” El Nacional,
March 17, 1941.
74. “Gran oportunidad para la industria de México,” Novedades,
November 10, 1941; “Oportuna industrialización,” Excelsior, October
31, 1941.
75. “Negro Workers: Latin American Suspicions,” Washington Post,
June 26, 1941.
76. Rowland, History, 245–51.
77. In a 1942 reorganization of the oiaa, the Communications Division
was abolished and replaced with the Department of Information.
78. Rowland, History, 41.
79. Rowland, History, 45.
80. Erb, “Rockefeller and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” 112–
13; Lawson, Building the Fourth Estate, 15–16, labels this practice
“rent seeking” and points out that the custom of subsidizing print me-
dia started in the 1930s.
81. Rowland, History, 45.
82. McGurk to Secretary of State, October 15, 1941, nara, rg 59,
812.911/333.
83. For a chart outlining the results of the embassy’s research see
Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 83.

314 | notes to pages 80–88

84. Robert S. Cramer, “Propaganda Broadcasts Make Radio an
International Problem,” Washington Post, June 5, 1938.
85. Rowland, History, 57–58.
86. Rowland, History, 59.
87. Radio programs broadcast in Mexico are covered in chapter 4.
88. For a brief synopsis of the development of Mexico’s national ra-
dio industry, see Hayes, “National Imaginings on the Air.”
89. Hayes, Radio Nation, 35.
90. Hayes, Radio Nation, 36–37.
91. Aylesworth to Nelson Rockefeller, December 20, 1941, nara,
rg 229, e1-3, Information, Radio, Mexico, Box 343.
92. Don Francisco, “Field Inspection Report on Mexico” May 17,
1942, nara, rg 229, e1-3, Information, Radio, Mexico, Box 345.
93. For a good overview of the development of Mexico’s national film
industry see Hershfield, “Screening the Nation”; see also Fein, “Myths
of Cultural Imperialism.”
94. For a discussion of the oiaa’s role in Mexico’s emerging film in-
dustry, see Fein, “Hollywood and U.S.-Mexico Relations,” 296–335;
and Peredo Castro, Cine y propaganda, 114–29.
95. El Universal, January 15, 1941.
96. El Universal, January 4, January 11, 1941.
97. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 273–74.
98. Ezequiel Padilla to Congress, March 8, 1941, in Padilla, Continental
Doctrines, 31–39.
99. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 283–84.
100. Excelsior, April 2, 1941.
101. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 282–84.
102. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 75.
103. Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies, 61–66.
104. “Barbarie contra civilización, el discurso de Lombardo Toledano,”
Futuro 1941.
105. Millon, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, 112–13.
106. El Universal, June 25, 1941, quoted in Rodriguez, “La prensa
nacional,” 285.
107. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 286–87.
108. Buchenau, Tools of Progress, 130–31.

notes to pages 88–98 | 315

109. The Mexican government’s ambivalent attitude toward the black-
lists caused consternation among U.S. diplomatic leaders. Buchenau,
Tools of Progress, 130–31.
110. Torres Bodet, Memorias: Equinoccio, 268.
111. Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies, 129–31.
112. Rodriguez, “La prensa nacional,” 289–91.
113. The text of the Global Settlement can be found in Department
of State Bulletin, 399–403 (November 22, 1941). For a discussion of ne-
gotiations leading up to the agreement, see Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican
Relations,” 47–54.
114. Stiller, George S. Messersmith, 172.
115. Torres Bodet, Memorias: Equinoccio, 277–79.

3. A Revolutionary Mural of Propaganda

1. Folgarait, Mural Painting and Social Revolution; Rochfort, “The

Sickle, the Serpent, and the Soil.”
2. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 75–77.
3. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 124.
4. El Universal, December 7, December 9, 1941. Headlines report-
ing the attack on Pearl Harbor came exclusively from United Press wire
service.
5. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 124.
6. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 128–32; Paz
Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies, 110–11.
7. Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, 338–
43.
8. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 144.
9. James, Mexico and the Americans, 354–56.
10. For a brief account of this office, see Mejía Barquera, “El
Departamento Autónomo de Prensa y Publicidad.”
11. Manuel Avila Camacho to Los Ciudadanos Gobernadores de
Estado, December 12, 1941, agn, rp/mac 550/44-8-33.
12. Avila Camacho, La participación de México.
13. Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 179–80.
14. Comité Contra la Penetración Nazi-Facista en México to Manuel
Avila Camacho, August 19, 1941, agn, rp/mac 550/9.

316 | notes to pages 98–113

15. Florencio Avila to Manuel Avila Camacho, August 26, 1941,
agn, rp/mac 550/9.
16. Servicios Secretos de Veracruz to Manuel Avila Camacho, various
reports December 12, 1941–March 25, 1943, agn, rp/mac 606.3/17.
17. Servicios Secretos de Veracruz to Manuel Avila Camacho, n.d.,
agn, rp/mac 606.3/7.
18. Luis Audirac to Manuel Avila Camacho, December 24, 1941,
agn, rp/mac 545.3/75.
19. El Universal, May 16, 1942.
20. Excelsior, May 18, 1942.
21. La Prensa, May 16, 1942; Novedades, May 16, 1942.
22. El Universal, May 22, 1942.
23. La Prensa, May 18, 1942; Novedades, May 22, 1942; Excelsior,
May 18, 1942.
24. El Popular, May 16, 1942.
25. El Popular, May 18, 1942.
26. El Popular, May 18, 1942.
27. El Popular, May 23, 1942.
28. La Prensa, May 23, 1942.
29. Novedades, May 23, 1942.
30. La Prensa, May 25, 1942; Novedades, May 23, 1942; El Universal,
May 25, 1942; Excelsior, May 25, 1942.
31. El Universal, May 23, 1942; Excelsior, May 25, 1942; La Prensa,
May 25, 1942; Novedades, May 23, 1942.
32. El Universal, May 23, 1942.
33. El Universal, May 28, 1942.
34. Avila Camacho, Ideario de la nación mexicana.
35. El Universal, May 29, 1942.
36. El Universal, May 23, 1942.
37. Excelsior, May 29, 1942.
38. La Prensa, May 27, 1942.
39. La Prensa, May 29, 1942; Excelsior, May 29, 1942; Novedades,
June 1, 1942.
40. El Popular, May 29, 1942.
41. Novedades, June 3, 1942.
42. El Universal, June 1, 1942.

notes to pages 114–119 | 317

43. Excelsior, June 1, June 2, 1942.
44. Resumen Diario de la Prensa, May 16 to June 13, 1942, agn,
rp/mac 550/44-16-33.
45. José Altamirano to Secretaría de Gobernación, May 25, 1942,
agn, rp/mac 545.2/99.
46. “Plan General de Trabajos de las Cuatro Organizaciones
Fundamentales de la acm en Relación al Estado de Emergencia en que
se Encuentra el País,” June 1943, Archivo Histórico del Arzobispado
de México, Box 74-II (1938–45).
47. El Universal, May 31, 1942.
48. Altamirano to Secretaría de Gobernación, May 25, 1942.
49. Altamirano to Secretaría de Gobernación, May 25, 1942.
50. Adolfo Ruiz Cortines to El Universal, June 22, 1942, and Adolfo
Ruiz Cortines to La Prensa, June 22, 1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 300
(s-1)/5.
51. Various letters and invoices, June 22, 1942, to May 13, 1943,
agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 300(s-1)/5.
52. El Universal, May 31, 1942.
53. Radio spots, summer 1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 301.2/283.
54. Radio spots, summer 1942.
55. Martha Rivero, “La política económica durante la guerra,” in
Loyola, Entre la guerra, 24–27.
56. Radio spots, summer 1942.
57. Radio spots, summer 1942.
58. Radio spots, summer 1942.
59. Peredo Castro, Cine y propaganda, 223–25.
60. Soy puro mexicano, Centro de Documentación e Investigación:
Ficha de Filmes Nacionales, Cineteca Nacional, a-00124.
61. García Riera, Historia documental del cine mexicano, 2:270–
72.
62. Mora, Mexican Cinema, 74.
63. Fein, “Myths of Cultural Imperialism,” 177–81; and Peredo
Castro, Cine y propaganda, 227–28.
64. Peredo Castro, Cine y propaganda, 225–26.
65. Fein, “Myths of Cultural Imperialism,” 172–77.
66. For a ﬁrsthand account of this process see Cerwin, These Are

318 | notes to pages 120–141

the Mexicans, 281–82. A scholarly examination of the relationship
between Mexico and the United States in the film industry can be
found in Peredo Castro, Cine y propaganda, 75–130; Fein, “Myths of
Cultural Imperialism,” 164–66; and Fein, “Hollywood and U.S.-Mexico
Relations,” 296–422.
67. Adolfo Fernandez Bustamante to José Altamirano, June 24, 1942,
agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 300(s-1)7.
68. Presupuesto para 1942, June 1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 300
(s-1)7.
69. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 268.
70. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 268–69.
71. Paz Salinas, Strategy, Security, and Spies, 121–45.
72. Niblo, “British Propaganda in Mexico”; Ortiz Garza, México
en guerra, 26–28.
73. Baker and Oneal, “Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?”
74. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, 70–71. Mueller
coined the phrase “rally around the flag effect.” He argued that a pop-
ulation will present a united front behind its leader to improve the na-
tion’s chance of success in an international conflict. Although his re-
search focused on U.S. patriotism, the sociological theories he applied
to the United States can also be applied to Mexico.
75. This argument does not suggest that the nation did not retain mem-
ories and resentment toward foreign intervention by the United States
and European power, especially dating back to the nineteenth century,
but rather that the most recent wartime enemies in living memory for
many were competing factions of the 1910 revolution.
76. Several scholars make similar arguments about the unifying effect
of the Spanish-American War on the U.S. population decades after the
American Civil War. See O’Leary, “‘Blood Brotherhood,’” 60–61; and
Pease and Kaplan, Cultures of United States Imperialism, 232.
77. Michaels, “Crisis of Cardenismo,” 70–72.
78. See Adhesiones (agn, rp/mac, Box 835-840). Letters are from
individuals, political groups, local politicians, and other special inter-
ests. This study is limited to those letters from individual citizens with
no apparent affiliation with special interests.

notes to pages 143–147 | 319

79. César Julio Herrera to Manuel Avila Camacho, September 2,
1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 836, 550/44-16-8 leg. 14 and 15.
80. Héctor Chacón Prego to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 28, 1942,
and Ruperto Verdejo Canul to Manuel Avila Camacho, July 25, 1942,
agn, rp/mac, Box 835, 550/44-16-3.
81. See, for example, Edmundo Perón Caballero to Manuel Avila
Camacho, June 3, 1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 836, 550/44-16-8 leg. 2.
82. A sample of regional distribution includes 5.9 percent from
Coahuila, 3 percent from Guerrero, 2 percent from Jalisco, 3.8 percent
from Nuevo Leon, 3 percent from Oaxaca, 6.2 percent from Puebla, 3.8
percent from Tamaulipas, and 10.1 percent from Veracruz.
83. Approximately 11.5 percent of letter writers indicated a skilled
occupation requiring literacy. Occupations such as agriculture worker,
miner, soldier, and prisoner are not included in this statistic.
84. See Benjamin, La Revolución, 13.
85. Alberto Salgado to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 25, 1942, agn,
rp/mac, Box 837, 550/44-16-11.
86. Pedro Cananas to Manuel Avila Camacho, June 19, 1942, agn,
rp/mac, Box 837, 550/44-16-11.
87. Roberto Gardia de León S. to Manuel Avila Camacho, June 4,
1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 838, 550/44-16-18.
88. Felipe Gutiérrez to Manuel Avila Camacho, June 9, 1942, agn,
rp/mac, Box 839, 550/44-16-29.
89. Alberto Weissman to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 29, 1942,
agn, rp/mac, Box 837, 550/44-16-13.
90. J. José Luís Rodríguez Mata to Manuel Avila Camacho, July 6,
1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 840, 550/44-16.
91. Miguel L. Giordani González to Manuel Avila Camacho, June
4, 1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 836, 550/44-16-8 leg. 9-21.
92. Eusebio Nieto Cervantes to Manuel Avila Camacho, June 12,
1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 837, 550/44-16-15.
93. See letters from Mexican consulates in Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Washington dc, Texas, and New Orleans to Avila Camacho (agn, rp/
mac, Box 840, 550/44-16-32). These letters provide names of Mexican
citizens in the United States who had offered their services to Mexico.
See also Torres Bodet, Memorias: Equinoccio, 297–98.

320 | notes to pages 148–151

94. Román Campos Viveros to Manuel Avila Camacho, May 30,
1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 836, 550/44-16-8 leg. 9-21.
95. Enrique Arévalo to Manuel Avila Camacho, December 24, 1943,
agn, rp/mac, Box 839, 550/44-16-29.
96. El Universal, September 16, 1942.
97. Elías I. López to Manuel Avila Camacho, June 27, 1942, agn,
rp/mac, Box 836, 550/44-16-8.
98. Trivinio Valdéz to Manuel Avila Camacho, June 26, 1942, agn,
rp/mac, 704/96-1.
99. See Mendoza, La lírica narrativa de México, 82–95; Simmons,
The Mexican Corrido, 35–40.
100. Avitia Hernández, Corrido histórico Mexicano, 45–55.
101. Avitia Hernández, Corrido histórico Mexicano, 58–59.
102. “Corrido del Potrero del Llano” by Daniel Muñiz C., in Avitia
Hernández, Corrido histórico Mexicano, 64.
103. “Corrido del Potrero del Llano” by Florencio Salazar, in Avitia
Hernández, Corrido histórico Mexicano, 65.
104. “Corrido del Barco Faja de Oro” by Daniel Muñiz C. in Avitia
Hernández, Corrido histórico Mexicano, 67.
105. Hediger, “Mexico’s Corrido Goes to War.”
106. Hediger, “Mexico’s Corrido Goes to War.”
107. Chamberlain, “The Mexican Corrido,” 79.
108. Héau, “El corrido y la Bola Suriana,” 105.
109. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion, 143.
110. Bar-Tal, Shared Beliefs, 79.

4. Soup Can Propaganda

1. For a discussion of how Warhol’s paintings critiqued U.S. con-

sumer culture, see Veyeler, Andy Warhol; Warhol, Philosophy of Andy
Warhol.
2. The oiaa and the State Department used this phrase repeatedly
during World War II. It is the basis for the arguments about American
advertising made in Fox, Madison Avenue Goes to War; see also Ortiz
Garza, México en guerra, 28–30.
3. Philosophy and Organization of the Ofﬁce of the Coordinator

notes to pages 152–162 | 321

of Inter-American Affairs, n.d., rac, nrp, Washington Files, rg-III 4 0,
Box 8, Folder 61, Philosophy and Objectives, 1942–1943. Although the
document is not dated, correspondence suggests it was written between
September and December 1941.
4. Philosophy and Organization also outlined a plan for winning sup-
port for Latin America among U.S. citizens. The agency’s programs de-
signed to promote Latin America in the United States make up an im-
portant part of its history but are beyond the scope of this study.
5. Philosophy and Organization, 2.
6. Philosophy and Organization, 4–7.
7. Philosophy and Organization, 4.
8. Philosophy and Organization, 4.
9. Philosophy and Organization, 4.
10. Philosophy and Organization, 4.
11. Erb, “Rockefeller and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” 99–
101.
12. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943, nara, rg 229, Entry 3, Box 513.
13. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
14. “Summary, Motion Picture Division, Office of Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,” n.d., rac, nrp, Washington Files, rg-III 4 0,
Box 7, Folder 56.
15. “Summary, Motion Picture Division, Office of Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,” n.d.
16. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
17. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
18. My classification of these films as military and civilian defense
themes is based on subject-matter codes established by the oiaa and in-
cluded in agency reports. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American
Affairs in Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
19. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
20. Other film subjects included medicine, health, and agricultural

322 | notes to pages 163–169

themes, which included less propaganda than the films discussed
above.
21. Data were compiled from the following oiaa reports: “Universal
Shorts Released in the Republic of Mexico during the Period of July 1,
1942 to January 1, 1943,” “rko Radio Pictures de México sa. Shorts
Released in the Republic of Mexico during the Period of July 1, 1942
to January 1, 1943,” “Warner Bros. First National Pictures sa. Shorts
Released in the Republic of Mexico during the Period of July 1, 1942 to
January 1, 1943,” “Columbia Shorts Released in the Republic of Mexico
during the Period of July 1, 1942 to January 1, 1943,” “Paramount Shorts
Released in the Republic of Mexico during the Period of July 1, 1942
to January 1, 1943,” “United Artists Shorts Released in the Republic
of Mexico during the Period of July 1, 1942 to January 1, 1943,” “Fox
Shorts Released in the Republic of Mexico during the Period of July 1,
1942 to January 1, 1943,” and “Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Shorts Released
in the Republic of Mexico during the Period of July 1, 1942 to January
1, 1943,” n.d., nara, rg 229, Information, Motion Pictures, Mexico,
Films Misc 1943.
22. “Summary, Motion Picture Division, Office of Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,” n.d.
23. “Summary, Motion Picture Division, Office of Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,” n.d.
24. “Summary, Motion Picture Division, Office of Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,” n.d.
25. Rowland, History, 77.
26. Fein, “Hollywood and U.S.-Mexico Relations,” 342; Lew B.
Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” June 10, 1942, rac, nrp,
Washington Files, rg-III 4 0, Box 7, Folder 56.
27. “Summary, Motion Picture Division, Office of Coordinator of
Inter-American Affairs,” n.d.
28. Rowland, History, 79.
29. Fein, “Hollywood and U.S.-Mexico Relations,” 342–43.
30. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 50.
31. Mora, Mexican Cinema, 73.
32. Both films were released in 2003 in a Golden Anniversary dvd
edition.

notes to pages 170–174 | 323

33. Mora argues that the theme of Pan-Americanism was quite ef-
fective in this film. He also lauds Disney’s attention to detail and accu-
racy in the film. Nevertheless, he explains that many Latin Americans
responded positively to the film simply because it was one of the first
Hollywood attempts to portray Latin Americans in a benign light. Mexican
Cinema, 73–74.
34. “Camacho Honors Disney,” New York Times, August 16,
1943.
35. Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 122.
36. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 27–195.
37. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 69.
38. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 94.
39. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 76.
40. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 93.
41. Clark, “Motion Picture Business in Mexico,” 121.
42. Loth, “Pardon Our Propaganda.”
43. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
44. For a contemporary account of U.S. involvement in the Mexican
radio industry after the attack on Pearl Harbor, see Cerwin, In Search
of Something, 205–17.
45. Rowland, History, 65.
46. El verdadero enemigo, Program no. 39, July 13, 1943, nara, rg
229, Entry 3, Radio, Scripts, Box 252, Folder, b-ra-1481.
47. Espíritu de victoria, November 20, November 27, 1942, nara,
rg 229, Entry 3, Radio, Scripts, Box 252, Folder b-ra-4015.
48. La marca del jaguar, July 2, 1943, nara, rg 229, Entry 3, Radio,
Scripts, Box 252, Folder b-ra-4015.
49. El prólogo de la invasión, November 18, 1942, nara, rg 229,
Entry 3, Radio, Scripts, Box 246.
50. El Barón Eje, Program no. 32, June 4, 1943, nara, rg 229, Entry
3, Radio, Scripts, Box 252, Folder b-ra-1429.
51. “Nuestros aliados,” n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 3, Radio, Scripts,
Box 276.
52. Announcements, n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 3, Radio, Scripts,
Box 276.

324 | notes to pages 174–179

53. Erb, “Rockefeller and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” 129.
54. Don Francisco to James Woodul, May 6, 1942, nara, rg 229,
Entry 1-3, Radio, Mexico, Box 343.
55. Women’s Magazine of the Air, #3, n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 1-3,
Radio, Mexico, Box 343.
56. Women’s Magazine of the Air, #2, n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 1-3,
Radio, Mexico, Box 343.
57. Women’s Magazine of the Air, n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 1-3,
Radio, Mexico, Box 343.
58. Women’s Magazine of the Air, n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 1-3,
Radio, Mexico, Box 343.
59. MacLachlan and Beezley, El Gran Pueblo, 378. This trend is
clearly visible in the fashion pages and department store advertisements
in Mexican newspapers and graphic magazines beginning in 1941.
60. Herbert Cerwin to Nelson Rockefeller, February 18, 1943, nara,
rg 229, Entry 1-3, Radio, Mexico, Box 344.
61. Herbert Cerwin to Nelson Rockefeller, March 10, 1943, nara,
rg 229, Entry 1-3, Radio, Mexico, Box 344.
62. Cerwin to Rockefeller, March 10, 1943.
63. Cerwin to Rockefeller, March 10, 1943.
64. Herbert Cerwin, “Radio Survey Results,” 1943, nara, rg 229,
Entry 1-3, Radio, Mexico, Box 346. This report gave results for the
oiaa’s second ofﬁcial radio survey conducted in Mexico. Interior cities
included in Cerwin’s report are Veracruz, Orizaba, Cordoba, Ciudad
Victoria, Tampico, Queretaro, Celaya, Irapuato, Leon, Zacatecas,
Fresnillo, Durango, and Aguascalientes. Surveys of interior cities were
conducted from October to December 1943. Cerwin’s report also in-
cludes a second series of surveys carried out in Mexico City from July
12 to September 12, 1943.
65. Herbert Cerwin, “Second Radio Survey of Mexico, df,” 1943,
nara, rg 229, Entry 1-3, Radio, Mexico, Box 345.
66. Don Francisco, “Field Inspection Report on Mexico, May 10th
to 17th,” 1943, nara, rg 229, Entry 1-3, Radio, Mexico, Box 345. La
interpretación mexicana de la guerra was a propaganda tool of the oiaa
in which a notable Mexican, Felix Palaviccini reported war-related news
with a patriotic tone.

notes to pages 180–182 | 325

67. Erb, “Rockefeller and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” 113.
68. Excelsior, January 1, 1944.
69. Excelsior, January 2, 1944.
70. Erb, “Rockefeller and U.S.–Latin American Relations,” 114.
71. See, for example, El Universal, September 2, 1942.
72. “La influencia de la Segunda Guerra Mundial,” Hoy, October
17, 1942.
73. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943. Archival documentation does not give spe-
cific results for these trips, such as numbers and types of stories pub-
lished in Mexican newspapers. Since many articles did not include by-
lines, the overall effect of this strategy is unknown.
74. Rowland, History, 46–48.
75. “Activities of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in
Mexico,” April 21, 1943.
76. See “Las Américas en acción: La Conferencia de Río define la
política del hemisferio,” En guardia, June 1942; “Aviadores vecinos,”
En guardia, July 1942; “México entra en la guerra,” En guardia, August
1942; “Brasil,” En guardia, August 1942; “El Brasil entra en la guerra,”
En guardia, December 1942; “Las fuerzas armadas de México,” En
guardia, December 1942, “México en pie de guerra,” En guardia, July
1943.
77. “Café, la bebida nacional,” En guardia, January 1944.
78. Rowland, History, 55.
79. Rowland, History, 55.
80. No distribution information is available for this poster.
81. “Distribution List for ‘Union Is Strength’ Poster,” n.d., nara, rg
229, Entry 127, Box 1467.
82. “Summary of Pamphlet and Poster Distribution, July 1, 1943–
July 1, 1944,” n.d., nara, rg 229, Entry 127, Box 1467.
83. Schuyler Bradt to Harry Frantz, Subject: Printed Literature
Campaign for the Other American Republics, February 23, 1942, nara,
rg 229, Entry 127, Box 1467.
84. “Summary of Pamphlet and Poster Distribution, July 1, 1943–
July 1, 1944,” n.d.

326 | notes to pages 183–198

85. El pueblo y su triunfo (Washington dc: Office of Inter-American
Affairs, n.d.).
86. Loth, “Pardon Our Propaganda.”
87. Hombres de las Americas que lucharon por la democracia
(Washington dc: Office of Inter-American Affairs, n.d.).
88. Some of these products came from Central American coun-
tries and were shipped through Mexico to the United States. Rowland,
History, 32.
89. Rowland, History, 33.
90. For a description of the poor conditions of Mexico’s rail in-
dustry and the oiaa’s railway mission, see Spears, “Rehabilitating the
Workers.”
91. For a discussion of the railway mission’s accomplishments and its
implications for U.S.-Mexican relations, see Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican
Relations,” chapter 5; Tercero, “Rehabilitation of the National Railways
of Mexico”; Klingman, “Cooperation and Conflict.”
92. For a discussion of the impact of the Colorado River controversy
on U.S.-Mexican relations, see Hundley, Dividing the Waters.
93. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 68.
94. The states in the Colorado River basin are Wyoming, Colorado,
Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. Wood Clash,
“U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 69.
95. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 71.
96. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 209.
97. Hundley, Dividing the Waters, 130–32; “The Mexican Water
Treaty,” February 3, 1944, United States Treaty Series, no. 994
(Washington dc: U.S. Department of State, 1946).
98. Nelson Rockefeller, “Information on Mexican Waterway Treaty,”
January 23, 1945, rac, nrp, Washington Files, rg-III 4 0, Box 7, Folder
55, Mexican Water Treaty, 1944–1945.
99. Nelson A. Rockefeller to Donald Rowland, February 13, 1945,
rac, nrp, Washington Files, rg-III 4 0, Box 7, Folder 55, Mexican Water
Treaty, 1944–1945.
100. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 214–15.
101. Rockefeller to Rowland, February 13, 1945.

notes to pages 198–205 | 327

5. A Propaganda Chalkboard

1. Tiempo, no. 271, July 11, 1947; Cline, The United States and
Mexico, 285.
2. Markiewicz, Mexican Revolution, 125–30.
3. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 391–94.
4. Craig, The Bracero Program, 18–19; Herrera-Sobek, The Bracero
Experience, 13–15.
5. Reform efforts came about as a response to the growth of the rev-
olutionary military prior to 1940. See Lieuwen, Mexican Militarism,
125–40. For a broad account of military modernization and reform
efforts throughout the twentieth century, see Camp, Generals in the
Palacio. These two works are the classic studies on the military in twen-
tieth-century Mexico, but neither addresses the Compulsory Military
Service Law in detail.
6. Rath, “El Servicio Militar Obligatorio,” chapter 1.
7. Cline, The United States and Mexico, 276–77.
8. “Reglamento de la Ley del Servicio Militar,” Diario Oﬁcial, Ch.
XIX, art. 191, November 1942.
9. Torres Ramirez, Historia, 113–21.
10. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 77.
11. Rath, “El Servicio Militar Obligatorio,” 30.
12. See correspondence from various Mexican citizens to Manuel
Avila Camacho, agn, rp/mac 545.2/14.
13. Rath, “El Servicio Militar Obligatorio,” 33–36.
14. “Informa sobre investigación practicada en Huamantla, Tlaxcala,”
January 25, 1942, agn, dips, Gallery 2, Box 70, 130-553.
15. Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 197; Rath, “El Servicio Militar
Obligatorio,” 57.
16. Ortiz Garza, México en guerra, 199.
17. Niblo, Mexico in the 1940s, 117; Rath, “El Servicio Militar
Obligatorio,” 54–55.
18. Rath, “El Servicio Militar Obligatorio,” 55.
19. Valadés, Historia general de la Revolución, 37–38.
20. Rath, “El Servicio Militar Obligatorio,” 54.
21. El Tiempo, January 8, 1943; Ortiz Garza, México en guerra,
199.

328 | notes to pages 210–216

22. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 98.
23. Zorilla, Historia de las relaciones, 487–89.
24. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 99.
25. Luiz Araiza to C. Secretario de la Comisión Coordinadora de
la Propaganda Nacional, July 26, 1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, Box 47,
300(s-1)/7.
26. Adolfo Fernández Bustamante to José Altamirano, August 17,
1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, Box 47 (300(s-1)7).
27. “Abanderado de la Libertad,” August 17, 1942, agn, dgi, Gallery
2, Box 47 (300(s-1)7).
28. “Abanderado de la Libertad,” August 17, 1942.
29. “Abanderado de la Libertad,” August 17, 1942.
30. See various letters to ccpn, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, Box 146, 301
(s-7)/1.
31. Comité Director de Acercamiento Nacional, 1942, agn, dgi,
Gallery 2, 301.2/296.
32. Elías Alvarez del Castillo to Radio Gobernación, September 1,
1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, Box 154, 301.2/296.
33. Torres Ramirez, Historia, 130.
34. Manuel Avila Camacho, “Pueblo de México,” September 16,
1942, agn, rp/mac, 135.21/18-8.
35. “Defendamos la patria,” 1942, agn, rp/mac, Box 66, 71-
1561.
36. Paxton Haddow to José Altamirano, July 1, 1943, agn, dgi,
Gallery 2, 301.2 (s-1)/3.
37. Lídice: Historia de una pequeña población (Washington dc:
Ofﬁce of Inter-American Affairs, 1942).
38. Memorandum: Dirección General de Información, August 27,
1942, agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 301.2 (s-1)/3.
39. Memorandum: Dirección General de Información, August 27,
1942.
40. “Programa radiodifundido con motivo del cambio del nombre
de la Villa de San Jerónimo, Distrito Federal, por el de Lídice, el dia 30
de agosto de 1942,” n.d., agn, dgi, Gallery 2, 301.2 (s-1)/3.
41. Leyva, Política educativa, 62–63.
42. For the most complete source on Palavicini’s life during and

notes to pages 216–227 | 329

immediately after the revolution, see his autobiography, Mi vida rev-
olucionaria.
43. Félix Palavicini to J. Jesús González, June 2, 1941, agn/ac-g2
704/159.
44. Leyva, Política educativa, 64.
45. Leyva, Política educativa, 63.
46. Amable auditorio, vol. 1 (November 16, 1942), Centro de Estudios
sobre la Universidad (unam), Fondo Félix Palavicini.
47. Amable auditorio, vols. 1–2 (November–December 1942).
48. Amable auditorio, vols. 4 (April 1943) and 20 (July 1944).
49. Leyva, Política educativa, 107.
50. Amable auditorio, vols. 8 (July 1943) and 22 (September
1944).
51. Leyva, Política educativa, 109.
52. Amable auditorio, vol. 28 (March 1945).
53. No documentation exists explaining the end of this office, but it
disappears from the official archives after September 1942.
54. See figures 6 and 7 in chapter 3.
55. For a basic overview of these artistic styles see Weiss, The Popular
Culture of Modern Art.
56. For a recent overview of primitivism and modernity in artistic ex-
pression see Flam and Deutch, Primitivism and Twentieth-Century Art.
For a discussion of how primitivism and modernity often bridged U.S.
and Mexican artistic movements in the 1930s and 1940s see Rushing,
Native American Art, 103–4.
57. Doremus, “Indigenismo, Mestizaje, and National Identity”;
Dawson, “From Models for the Nation to Model Citizens”; and Brading,
“Manuel Gamio and Official Indigenismo.”
58. Informe bimestral correspondiente a abril y mayo 1942 por
Profesor e Inspector Epigemenio de León C., sep, dgrms, 5581-3530;
Reportes, Escuela Rural Federal de Chiapas, June 14 and June 18, 1943,
sep, dgrms, 5581-3530.
59. Dominguez and Enriqueta, Mi nuevo amigo, 121–43.
60. A. R. Robles, Un gorrion, back cover.
61. Torres Bodet, Memorias: Años contra el tiempo, 17.

330 | notes to pages 228–243

62. Vazquez de Knauth, Nacionalismo y educación en México,
229.
63. Johnston, Education in Mexico, 50–52.
64. Campaña Nacional contra el Analfabetismo, 82–83.
65. “Subjective Report on Health and Literacy Film Testing Trip,
July 16–November 17, 1944,” pp. 5, 6, 1944, nara, rg 229, Entry
127, Box 1464.
66. In later years, Guzmán was also involved in a controversy over
the supposed discovery the bones of Aztec emperor and national hero
Cuahtémoc. See Johnson, “Digging up Cuauhtémoc.”
67. “Subjective Report on Health and Literacy Film Testing Trip,
July 16–November 17, 1944,” 10.
68. oiaa Translation no. 34051, clipping from Ultimas Noticias,
September 15, 1944, nara, rg 229, Entry 127, Box 1464.
69. oiaa Translation no. 34049, clipping from El Universal Graﬁco,
October 24, 1944, nara, rg 229, Entry 127, Box 1464.
70. oiaa Translation no. 34051, clipping from Excelsior, October
6, 1944, nara, rg 229, Entry 127, Box 1464.
71. oiaa Translation no. 34051.
72. “Subjective Report on Health and Literacy Film Testing Trip,
July 16–November 17, 1944,” 23–24.
73. For a thorough history of Avila Camacho’s wartime food poli-
cies, see Ochoa, Feeding Mexico, chapter 4.
74. Ochoa, Feeding Mexico, 78.
75. For statistics on corn and wheat subsidies, see Ochoa, Feeding
Mexico, 87.
76. See “Campesino de Jalisco,” dlcpp-1997.067h, and “Campesino
de Coahuila,” dlcpp-1997.067i, loc.
77. Kirk, Covering the Mexican Front, 45–47.
78. Manuel Avila Camacho, “México pelea por la libertad y deﬁende
su honor y su vida,” September 1942, agn, rp/mac, 550/44-32.
79. Fabela, “La Revolución Mexicana,” 100.
80. Avila Camacho, “La educación en un pueblo libre.”
81. Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution, 56–67.
82. Sanchez Pontón, Guerra y revolución, ix–xix, 13–16.

notes to pages 243–253 | 331

6. A Propaganda Billboard

1. El Popular, May 29, 1944; and El Universal, August 24, 1944.

2. El Universal, November 18, 1942; and Excelsior, October 17,
1943.
3. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 223.
4. Excelsior, May 27, 1943.
5. Excelsior, September 21, 1943.
6. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 97.
7. Torres Ramirez, Historia, 144.
8. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 96–97.
9. Excelsior, September 21, 1943.
10. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 223–24.
11. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” 31–35. This is the most comprehensive
study available of Mexico’s expeditionary force that fought in World
War II. The only other published study is available through Mexico’s
secretary of defense. See Castarrica, Historia oﬁcial de la Fuerza Aerea
Expedicionaria Mexicana.
12. Vicente Lombardo Toledano, “El por qué del hambre del pueblo,”
El Popular, June 20, 1944. Lombardo Toledano’s opinion piece outlines
arguments put forth the by war opponents and calls for the public to be
patriotic and stand up to internal opposition.
13. Excelsior, October 16, 1943; El Popular, October 18, 1943; El
Universal, October 23, 1943: Excelsior, October 23, 1943; Novedades,
October 26, November 4, 1943.
14. New York Times, December 10, 1943.
15. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 230–31.
16. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” 31–34.
17. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” 35–39.
18. La Prensa, March 15, 1944.
19. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 230–31; Tudor,
“Flight of Eagles,” 46.
20. El Nacional, July 22, 1944.
21. Novedades, July 25, 1944.
22. El Nacional, July 25, 1944; Novedades, July 25, 1944.
23. El Nacional, July 25, 1944.

332 | notes to pages 259–266

24. El Nacional, July 25, 1944.
25. Hugo Sansón Jiménez, “Canto bélico al nuevo escuadrón,” July
7, 1944, agn, rp/mac 161.1/81-1.
26. Excelsior, July 28, 1944.
27. Novedades, August 2, 1944; El Nacional, August 22, 1944; and
Excelsior, December 30, 1944.
28. Harrison, “U.S.-Mexican Military Collaboration,” 236.
29. Baldomero Ibarra Herrera to Manuel Avila Camacho, “Corrido al
Escuadrón de Aviadores 201,” March 1945, agn, rp/mac, 550/44-2.
30. El Universal, June 23, 1945.
31. Novedades, June 9, 1945; El Universal, June 10, 1945.
32. For a thorough discussion of Squadron 201’s combat activities in
the Philippines see Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” chapters 9 and 11.
33. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” 286–88.
34. Sara Malfavó to Manuel Avila Camacho, November 15, 1945,
agn, rp/mac 161.1/81-1.
35. Enrique de Avila y Villaluazo to Manuel Avila Camacho, November
1945, agn, rp/mac 161.1/81.
36. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” 285.
37. Tudor, “Flight of Eagles,” 287–88.
38. Loth, “Pardon Our Propaganda.”
39. Duggan, The Americas, 102.
40. Lawrence Duggan to Nelson A. Rockefeller, August 3, 1943,
nara, rg 229, Entry 126, Content Planning, Box 1459.
41. See Thorp, “Import Substitution”; Franko, The Puzzle of Latin
American Economic Development, 49–51; and Frieden, Modern Political
Economy and Latin America, 96.
42. Duggan to Rockefeller, August 3, 1943.
43. Duggan to Rockefeller, August 3, 1943.
44. Minutes of Content Committee Meeting, October 12, 1943,
nara, rg 229, Entry 126, Content Planning, Box 1459.
45. Paul Jones to Charles K. Kline, September 21, 1943, nara, rg
229, Entry 126, Content Planning, Box 1459.
46. Public Opinion Memo, May 1944, nara, rg 229, Entry 126,
Content Planning, Box 1459.
47. Frank Waters to William Clark, September 7, 1943, nara, rg

notes to pages 266–277 | 333

229, Entry 126, Content Planning, Box 1459. Waters made speciﬁc ref-
erence to concerns expressed regarding Chile in his memo.
48. Public Opinion Memo, May 1944.
49. Propaganda Objectives of the Radio Division, May 1944, nara,
rg 229, Entry 126, Content Planning, Box 1459.
50. El Nacional, August 16, 1943; El Universal, October 1, 1943;
Excelsior, December 17, 1943, February 21, 1944.
51. El Universal, January 27, 1944.
52. El Universal, February 23, 1944.
53. Gustavo Salinas had also been present at the Battle of Trinidad
on June 3, 1915, where revolutionary leader and future president
Alvaro Obregón lost his arm in combat against Pancho Villa’s forces.
See Buchenau, “Arm and Body of the Revolution.”
54. El Universal, August 16, 1944.
55. “Estos son los que regresaron,” En guardia, February 1945.
56. “Cartas del soldados,” En guardia, February 1944.
57. “Las Islas Gilbert,” En guardia, April 1944; “Tropas para la
invasión,” En guardia, May 1944; “Una gran cruzada,” En guardia,
October 1944.
58. “La necesidad de rehabilitación después de la guerra,” En guar-
dia, March 1945.
59. “Por valor y heroísmo,” En guardia, September 1944.
60. “El baseball: Estimula la amistad,” En guardia, November
1944.
61. “Las mujeres de México,” En guardia, January 1944.
62. “Las peliculas mexicanas,” En guardia, April 1944.
63. “Victoria brasileña en Italia” and “Los aviadores mexicanos,”
En guardia, August 1945.
64. “Las que esperan en casa,” En guardia, February 1945; “Nuevas
mejoras sociales” and “La moda entre buenos vecinos,” En guardia,
November 1945; “La ciencia ayuda al ama de casa,” En guardia,
December 1945.
65. “La vida escolar,” En guardia, August 1944.
66. “El ballet en los Estados Unidos,” En guardia, September 1944;
“La opera,” En guardia, May 1944.

334 | notes to pages 277–280

67. “Televisión: Los adelantos de una nueva industria,” En guar-
dia, May 1944.
68. “Energía atómica,” En guardia, October 1945.
69. For a discussion of Avila Camacho’s industrialization plans in
the context of World War II, see Rankin, “Mexico: Industrialization
through Unity.”
70. Valadés, Historia general de la Revolución, 4–5.
71. A. G. Robles, México en la postguerra, 10–11.
72. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, 24–27.
73. Raat, Mexico and the United States, 126–47.
74. Valadés, Historia general de la Revolución, 84–85.
75. Mosk, Industrial Revolution in Mexico, 33.
76. See, for example, “Industrializar al país, una tarea de la pos-
guerra,” Novedades, September 11, 1944; and “La industrialización
de México durante la paz, es el camino más indicado,” Novedades,
November 12, 1944.
77. “Un peligro para nuestra industria,” El Nacional, November
25, 1944.
78. “Nuestra industria y los ee.uu.,” Novedades, October 17,
1944; and Eduardo Hornedo, “Nuestra industrialización,” Novedades,
December 13, 1944.
79. “Nuestra industria y el imperialismo,” Excelsior, August 10,
1943; “Defendamos la industria,” Excelsior, September 7, 1943; and
“En defense de lo nuestro,” Novedades, July 10, 1944.
80. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” chapter 4.
81. “Report of Mexican-American Commission for Economic
Cooperation,” Bulletin of the Pan-American Union (Washington dc,
December 1943).
82. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 116.
83. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 126.
84. George Messersmith to Harry Hawkins, July 9, 1944, udl, George
S. Messersmith Papers, 1605.
85. “Tug-of-War Foreseen in Regulating Tariffs,” Washington Post,
December 10, 1944.
86. George Messersmith Memorandum of Conversation, December
29, 1944, udl, Messersmith Papers, 1668.

notes to pages 280–284 | 335

87. Alfonso Pulido Islas, Reporte: Ciclo de Conferencias de
Economía de Guerra en México, October 19, 1942, agn, dgi, Gallery
2, 301.2/306.
88. Comisión Nacional de Planación para la Paz, Decree, July 1942,
agn, rp/mac, 433/310.
89. Octavio Véjar Vázquez, El mundo de la postguerra: Speech to
Club Rotario y Cámara de Comercio de la Ciudad de Guadalajara,
September 26, 1944, agn, rp/mac 433/310.
90. Primer Congreso Nacional de Economía de Guerra del Proletariado
Mexicano: Problemas Económicos de la Post-Guerra, December 1942,
agn, rp/mac 433/310.
91. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 13–15; and Moreno,
Yankee Don’t Go Home!
92. Wood Clash, “U.S.-Mexican Relations,” 227.
93. “Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and Solidarity.”
94. Green, Containment of Latin America, 175, 203–5.

Conclusion

1. The personalities depicted in the ﬁnal playing card were named by

Arias Bernal himself in the descriptors accompanying the cards. Placing
the lesser-known leaders at the victory table and positioning Churchill
and Roosevelt in the background was most likely a commentary on
personalities.
2. For a discussion of the negotiations at the San Francisco Conference,
see Bruno and Mosler, The Charter of the United Nations; Goodrich
and Hambro, Charter of the United Nations; Russell, A History of the
United Nations Charter. The Dag Hammarskjöld Library at the United
Nations and Yale University’s Sterling Memorial Library house collec-
tions of Oral Histories of the United Nations that provide insight into
the negotiations of the original charter. See Krasno, The Founding of
the United Nations, for a history of the founding of the United Nations
based on historical documentation and oral histories.
3. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 15.
4. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 13.

336 | notes to pages 286–297

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index

Page numbers in italic indicate Arenal, Luis, 23

illustrations. Argote, Guillermo, 154
artists: anti-fascist propaganda by, 23–24;
Abanderado de la Libertad campaign, and Spanish Civil War, 36–37. See also
218–20 Bernal, Antonio Arias; posters; Taller de
Acción Católica Mexicana (acm), 123–24 Gráfica Popular (tgp)
Acción Nacional and Mexican neutrality, Atlas sinking incident, 94–95
112 Audirac, Luis, 114
agrarian reform, 42, 48, 99–100, 138, Austria, annexation of, 39–40, 43
210–11, 252, 296 Avila Camacho, Manuel: attitude toward
agricultural sector: conversion to wartime U.S. of, 61; breaking relations with Axis
production, 207, 210–12; food short- powers, 93, 102–3; cooperating with
ages and price controls, 248–49; under U.S., 7, 94–95, 98, 208, 222–26, 254,
industrialization policy, 137–39, 225; 298; declaring war on Axis powers,
and productivity, 105, 112, 122, 129, 117–18, 222; diplomatic objectives of,
133; radio broadcasts to, 138; and water 294, 296; fearing divisiveness in Mexico,
dispute, 204. See also campesinos and 105–6; and filmmakers, 174; greeting
peasants; rural areas returned airmen, 271–72; Independence
air bases, 95, 109–10 Day celebrations, 221–22; as world
Air Force Squadron 201. See Squadron leader, 259, 290, 292, 293, 294
201 Avila Camacho administration: agricultur-
Alemán, Miguel, 2, 121, 226 al policies of, 210–11; and compulsory
Allied propaganda agencies, 92–100 military service, 208; and food shortages,
Alstock, Francis, 174 248; industrialization policies of, 4–5,
Altamirano, José, 120–25 82, 281–89; modernization agenda of, 2,
Alvarez del Castillo, Elías, 221 210, 286; national unity campaigns of,
American propaganda. See propaganda 146; propaganda agency of, 107, 241,
Anta news agency, 75 243; protectionist policy of, 258, 259,
anti-Americanism, 54–55, 62, 68, 70–71 297; public support for, 147–52; and
anti-communism, 15, 42–43, 53, 96–97 response to Pearl Harbor, 101, 157–58;
anti-fascism, 15, 16, 18, 22–25, 31, 43–44, use of revolutionary legacy, 251–53,
113 295; and water dispute negotiations,
anti-imperialism, 15, 56. See also imperial- 204–5. See also Comisión Coordinadora
ism; U.S. imperialism de Propaganda Nacional (ccpn)
anti-Mexico campaign in U.S. press, 71 Avila y Villaluazo, Enrique de, 271
Axis atrocities. See Nazi atrocities Cárdenas, Lázaro: as secretary of National
“Axis Menace to Freedom” theme, 165 Defense, 107–8; and fascist propaganda,
Axis powers: as danger to Latin America, 22, 70, 73, 93; and fears of middle class,
163, 165; as danger to Mexican de- 42–43, 307n71; and response to draft
mocracy, 252; in events leading to war, protests, 215–16; and Spanish Civil War,
39; and hostilities with Mexico, 93, 94; 30–31, 37
pressure to cease trading with, 84–85, Cárdenas administration: agricultural
97–98; sale of oil to, 70. See also Nazi reforms of, 210–11, 296; definition of
and fascist propaganda nation during, 14; factionalism in, 4,
Axis spies (prewar), 71–72. See also 295; fiscal and monetary policies of,
Dietrich, Arthur 83; government propaganda under, 52,
Azcárraga, Emilio, 90, 91, 182, 229 111–12; and national unity campaigns,
146; and nationalization of industries,
El Barón Eje (radio broadcast), 178 32–33, 62, 68–70, 296, 307n71; and
baseball in En guardia, 279 stance against Nazi aggression, 46–47
Bernal, Antonio Arias, 188–89, 189, Cárdinez Rodríguez, Antonio, 269
190–93, 191, 192, 194, 292, 293, 294, Caribbean basin, fears of Nazi bases in, 74
336n1 Carranza, Jésus, 266
Beteta, Ramón, 3 Carrillo, Alejandro, 223–26
blacklists. See embargos Catholic Church: on ideological right,
blockade of Latin American exports, 82 15; and Liga ProCultura propaganda,
boycotts: of Mexican oil, 69–70; of trade 49, 49–50; and Spanish Civil War, 32,
with Axis, 102. See also embargos 33; support for wartime government,
bracero program, 211–12 123–24
Brazil, in oiaa propaganda, 164, 173–74 ccpn. See Comisión Coordinadora de
British government. See Inter-Allied Propa- Propaganda Nacional (ccpn)
ganda Committee (iapc) Cedillo, Saturnino, 251
broadsides in lear propaganda, 24 censorship: acceptance of during wartime,
Buenos Aires conference (Inter-American 119; of film industry, 140, 175–76; and
Conference for the Maintenance of press sympathy for U.S., 108; by U.S. of
Peace), 65–66, 67, 68 Mexican press, 115
businessmen, 32, 85 Centro Alemán, 20–21, 25, 303n16
Chapultepec, Act of, 288–89
Cabada, Juan de la, 23 Chávez Morado, José, 37
Calles, Plutarco Elías, 24 cinema. See motion pictures
campesinos and peasants: appeals to pa- civilian defense, 169
triotism of, 138; and Confederación Na- cnc. See Confederación Nacional de
cional de Campesinos, 248–49; defensive Campesinos (cnc)
leagues of, 106, 121; and fear of Spanish cnpp. See Comisión Nacional de Planación
exiles, 38; messages aimed at, 123–25; para la Paz (cnpp)
and military service, 215; in national Colegio Alemán, 20
unity campaigns, 225; in posters, 45, 46, Colorado River Water Treaty, 204–5
133, 135, 189, 190, 191, 195, 195, 249, Comisión Coordinadora de Propaganda
250. See also agricultural sector Nacional (ccpn): cooperating with
Canada, omission from oiaa propaganda, oiaa, 222–26, 227–30; industrialization
164, 195, 311n6 policy in, 157, 281; and national unity

356 | index
programs, 217–20; propaganda strategy 268–69, 270–71; as news medium,
of, 142–43, 217 153–57, 156
Comisión Nacional de Planación para la corruption in military service program,
Paz (cnpp), 285 214
Comité contra la Penetración Nazi-Facista ctm. See Confederación de Trabajadores
en México (Committee against Nazi- de México (ctm)
Fascist Penetration in Mexico), 112 cubism in poster art, 233, 234, 235, 236,
commercial bonds. See economic and trade 237
agreements with U.S.; trade relationships cultural aspirations of U.S. and Latin
Committee for National Rapprochement, America, 276–77
220–21 cultural campaign (1940), 77
Committee for National Unity, 146 cultural exchanges, 62, 63–67
Committee on Inter-American Affairs, Czechoslovakia: invasion of, 39, 52;
79–80 Mexican response to Lídice attack,
communist groups and Spanish Civil War, 223–26, 254
28–30. See also Partido Communista
Mexicana (pcm) Daniels, Josephus, 72, 311n10
Compulsory Military Service Law: criti- declaration of war, 107, 115–20, 222
defensive leagues, 106, 113–15, 123, 152
cism of, 207–8, 212, 239, 241; and mod-
democracy: revolution as symbol of, 5,
ernization of military, 212, 296, 328n5;
158, 209, 251, 295; as theme of wartime
and planning for combat overseas, 263.
propaganda, 2; U.S. as model of in oiaa
See also military service
propaganda, 164–65, 198–99, 200. See
Confederación de Trabajadores de México
also Mexican Revolution (1910)
(ctm): background, 304n23; call for
Diario de la Guerra, 41, 71
declaration of war, 116; and nonaggres-
Díaz, Porfirio, overthrow of, 152, 158,
sion pact, 53–54; opposing pro-German
249, 255, 295
propaganda, 44; and Spanish Civil War,
Dietrich, Arthur (German propaganda
16, 27, 31
minister): and anti-Americanism, 54–55;
Confederación Nacional de Campesinos
and German propaganda office, 21,
(cnc), 248–49. See also campesinos and
40–41, 43, 54; spying and expulsion of,
peasants; rural areas
71, 74, 93, 112
Confederación Regional Obrera Mexi-
Disney (Walt) studios, 172–74, 245–47
cana, 304n23 Division of Cultural Relations, U.S. State
consumer goods: anticipated postwar Dept., 67, 77, 78–79
shortages of, 275; availability of dur- Douglas-Weichers Agreement, 96, 112
ing war, 207, 210; demands for and Duggan, Lawrence, 273–75
industrialization, 298; Mexico as market
for, 183–84, 282–83; promoted by U.S. economic and trade agreements with
propaganda, 257–58, 297–98; shortages U.S.: and Coordinating Committee for
and war support, 273–74 Mexico, 167; Douglas-Weichers Agree-
Convention for the Promotion of Inter- ment, 96; emphasis on late in war, 258;
American Cultural Relations, 65–66 posters supporting, 129, 133, 136; post-
Coordinating Committee for Mexico, 86, war, 284–85; and Railway Mission, 161,
91, 166–68. See also Office of Inter- 201–3; Reciprocal Trade Treaty (1942),
American Affairs (oiaa), U.S. 100, 285, 288; in U.S. propaganda, 7.
corridos: in honor of Squadron 201, See also trade relationships

index | 357
economic modernization. See moderniza- fascism. See anti-fascism; Axis powers;
tion Nazi and fascist propaganda
economic welfare of postwar Latin feature films in oiaa propaganda, 172–74
America, 274–75 Fernández Bustamante, Adolfo, 217–18
Education, Ministry of: cooperating with festivals: in Abanderado de la Libertad
oiaa, 223; posters, 231–37, 232, 233, campaign, 218–20; in ofp propaganda
235, 236, 242, 243, 244, 249, 250; effort, 125, 140
shift of propaganda campaign to, 208, film industry. See motion pictures
230–45, 254 food shortages, response to, 248
education system in propaganda efforts, Foreign Affairs, Ministry of, 74, 223
217–18 Francisco, Don, 88–89, 176
embargos: of Axis powers, 61, 97–98, freedom in Ministry of Education propa-
316n109; against Japan, 99. See also ganda, 218, 231. See also democracy
boycotts French government. See Inter-Allied Propa-
En guardia magazine, 160–61, 184–88, ganda Committee (iapc)
279–80, 290, 297
enemies, Mexicans as vs. outsiders as, 145 García Robles, Alfonso, 294
El espectador (radio broadcast), 182 General Information Division (Dirección
espionage: by Axis spies, 71–72, 74, 93, General de Información) of the Ministry
112; law against, 98–99 of the Interior, 112–13, 120–44, 136
Espíritu de victoria (radio broadcast), General Press and Propaganda Office (Di-
177–78 rección General de Prensa y Publicidad),
Estudios Aztecas, 140–41 111–12
ethnicity. See indigenous heritage of German embassy, 41, 50–52, 98. See also
Mexicans Nazi and fascist propaganda
Europe, ideological conflicts in, 13 German nationals in Mexico, 17–18
Excelsior: after declaration of war, German submarine attacks: Atlas sinking
119–20, 136, 184; in early war period, incident, 94–95; corridos about, 154;
61, 72; in late war period, 260, 267; in and declaration of war, 115–20; effect
prewar period, 32, 36, 41–42, 52, 55 of, 61, 99, 157; and modernization of
Export-Import Bank, 81–82, 100 military, 212–13; posters about, 125–29,
127, 128, 233, 234; public response to,
Fabela, Isidro, 252 106–7, 143, 144–57; in school readers,
factionalism and special interest groups: 241; sinking of Potrero del Llano,
campaign against, 207–8, 296; in 115–16, 154, 233, 234
Cárdenas administration, 4, 295; fears of German Transocean Agency, 88
inciting, 251; prevention of propaganda González Casanova, Pablo, 1, 12, 298
from, 217; in prewar period, 8, 14–15, Guerra y revolución (Sanchez Pontón),
22, 303n5; and support for Avila Cama- 253–54, 255
cho administration, 221–22 Gutiérez, Max, 266
Faja de Oro, 116, 154 Guzmán, Eulalia, 246, 331n66
Falange: alliance of conservative Mexicans
with, 15, 32; as alternative to fascism, Havana Conference, 74–75, 101
34; dividing the nation, 35; and Mexican hemispheric defense and Rio de Janeiro
neutrality, 112; and Mexican press, 33, summit, 110
41; and Spanish Civil War, 25–26 hemispheric unity: defined by U.S. cultural

358 | index
leadership, 161, 164, 168, 179, 187–88, after breaking of Nazi-Soviet pact,
193, 194, 195, 196, 201; versus nation- 92–93; cooperating with oiaa, 88; estab-
alism, 272; in posters, 134, 135, 136; in lishment of, 75–76; inﬂuence on press
radio broadcasts, 228; and response to by, 87, 94, 95; after Pearl Harbor, 108
Pearl Harbor attack, 107–11; at Rio de Inter-American Conference for the Main-
Janeiro conference, 105; in U.S. propa- tenance of Peace (Buenos Aires), 65–66,
ganda, 7, 169 67, 68
Herrasti Dondé, Pablo, 266 Inter-American Conference on Problems of
highway infrastructure, 100 War and Peace, 288–89
Hispanidad, 34–35 Inter-American Defense Council, 110
Hitler-Stalin pact. See Nazi-Soviet nonag- Inter-American Development Commission,
gression pact 81, 314n63
Hombres de las Américas que lucharon Inter-American Monthly, 155
por la democracia (pamphlet), 200–201 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance and
La hora nacional, 90, 101, 137 Solidarity (Act of Chapultepec), 288–89
Hull, Cordell, 66 Interior, Ministry of: cooperating with
humor and lighthearted propaganda oiaa, 223; posters by, 125–36, 127,
themes, appeals of, 173 128, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 231;
propaganda from, 74, 112, 295; and
Ibarra Herrera, Baldomero, 268–69 transfer of propaganda responsibility,
imperialism: German, 93; in propaganda 208, 254, 259
during Spanish Civil War, 34–35. See International Conference of American
also anti-imperialism; U.S. imperialism States, Eighth (Lima), 66–67, 68
Independence Day celebrations, 220–22 internationalism and nationalism, 2–3
indigenous heritage of Mexicans: and Nazi international trends incorporated into
policies, 51–52, 94; in posters, 45, 208; domestic agenda, 5
pride in, 270–72; U.S. ﬁlms accused of La interpretación mexicana de la guerra
ridiculing, 246 (radio program), 182, 227–30, 254,
indirect propaganda: railway mission and 325n66
water dispute, 161, 201–5; in schools,
230 Japan: defenses against, 108, 213; oil
industrialization: as mechanism for healing embargo against, 99
factionalism, 4–5; in Mexican postwar Joint United States-Mexican Defense Com-
planning, 281–89; in modernization mission (jusmdc), 108–9
agenda, 210, 231; oiaa support for, journals and lear propaganda, 24
296–97; promotion of, 85, 112, 137–38, Juárez, Benito, as symbol of Mexico, 195,
229; relationship of freedom and democ- 195, 200, 224, 245, 270
racy to, 11–12; and revolutionary legacy, Juventudes Hitleristas (Hitler Youth), 20
258, 282, 296; subtlety of propaganda
for, 286–88; support for U.S. and Allied Kirk, Betty, 13, 56
effort, 82; in wartime propaganda, 105,
208 labor movement: anti-fascism in, 16, 18,
industrial workers: in national unity cam- 43–44; defensive leagues of, 106; and
paigns, 225; in posters, 132, 133, 134, oiaa pamphlets, 200; in prewar period,
135, 136, 192, 193 14, 38; support for U.S.-Mexico indus-
Inter-Allied Propaganda Committee (iapc): trial relationship, 85; wartime propa-

index | 359
labor movement (continued) López, Elías I., 152–53
ganda by, 123. See also Lombardo Tole-
dano, Vincente macec (Mexican-American Commission
Latin America: cooperation among nations for Economic Cooperation), 284–85
in, 63–65; relation between national- machismo in propaganda film, 141
ism and internationalism, 2–3; relations Malfavó, Sara, 271, 333n34
with U.S., 62, 67; role in postwar world, La marca del jaguar (radio broadcast), 178
274–75; support for U.S. by in oiaa La marcha del tiempo (radio broadcast),
propaganda, 163–65 177
lear (Liga de Escritores y Aristas Revolu- Martínez, Luís María, 123–24
cionarios), 23–24, 27 mass media infrastructure, 2, 87
left, ideological: and breaking of Nazi- McConnell, Burt, 71
Soviet pact, 61, 92–93, 96; definition Méndez, Leopoldo, 23
of, 302n12; international ideologies in Messersmith, George, 79, 205, 285, 288
domestic platform, 15–16, 295; reaction mestizos. See indigenous heritage of
to Nazi-Soviet pact, 53–54; and refugee Mexicans
policy, 38; support for Soviet Union, 111 Mexican-American Commission for Eco-
Lend-Lease military aid program, 109,
nomic Cooperation (macec), 284–85
221, 260–61, 263
Mexican government: actions against Axis
letters of wartime support: for Aban-
interests, 94–95, 98, 316n109; and radio
derado campaign, 220; parallels between
industry, 90. See also Avila Camacho
revolution and WWII in, 209, 249, 251,
administration; Cárdenas administration
255; response to declaration of war,
Mexican military leaders, 259–60, 278
147–52
Mexican Miracle, 12, 298–99
Lídice, Czechoslovakia, response to attack
Mexican Revolution (1910): association
on, 223–26, 254
with anti-fascism, 31; and definitions
Liga de Escritores y Aristas Revoluciona-
of legacy, 295; as fight for democracy,
rios (lear), 23–24, 27
158; influence of on public opinion, 145,
Liga Pro-Cultura Alemana, 38, 43–46,
146–47; and legacy of political democ-
47–52, 54
racy and economic growth, 258, 282,
Lima conference (International Conference
296, 298; and parallels with WWII, 118,
of American States), 66–67
Lincoln, Abraham, 195, 195 149–51, 152, 158, 209–10, 247–54,
literacy: appeal of films to illiterate, 172, 255, 294–95; redefined according to
173, 188; and corridos, 153, 156; and European ideologies, 56–57
films from oiaa, 246–47; prewar, 25; in Mexicans residing in U.S.: drafted into
rural areas, 124; among support-letter U.S. military, 151, 212, 216; letters of
writers, 148, 149, 320n83. See also support from, 151
National Campaign against Illiteracy Mexican Women’s Magazine of the Air,
Lombardo Toledano, Vincente: anti- 180
fascist propaganda by, 23; on Munich Mexico at the Bar of Public Opinion, 71
agreement, 47; and nonaggression pact, Mexico City, 114–15, 148
53–54; on oil sales to Axis powers, 70; middle-class lifestyle, U.S.: in En guardia,
promotion of national unity by, 44, 279; promotion of to Mexican women,
308n84; and Spanish Civil War, 27, 180; in U.S. propaganda, 10–11, 161,
31–32, 33, 36; supporting Mexican 166
involvement in war, 96 middle-class Mexicans: alienated by

360 | index
Cárdenas, 33; and fascism, 32, 42–43; promotion of domestic agenda, 209,
in national unity campaigns, 225; and 254, 296; and propaganda in schools,
refugee policy, 38, 307n69; support- 230, 243. See also literacy
ing industrialization policies, 287–88; national identity: and campaign against
supporting U.S., 82; as target of radio factionalism, 207–8; and cooperation
broadcasting, 89 with other nations, 237–39, 238; derived
military, Mexican, 259–62, 278. See also from indigenous past, 271; influencing
Squadron 201 foreign policy decisions, 3; and social
military, U.S. See U.S. Military response, 157–58; as theme of wartime
military modernization: and direct military propaganda, 2, 107. See also national
involvement, 260–61; and German unity
submarine attacks, 212–13, 328n5; in nationalism: in Latin America, 2–3; and
modernization agenda, 296; as theme of nationalization of oil industry, 100; as
propaganda, 208, 221 response to U.S. propaganda, 7, 297; as
military service, 212–16; plans to send threat to U.S. hegemony, 176, 200–201,
troops overseas, 263; posters promot- 272, 273, 274
ing, 231–37, 232, 233, 235, 236; in U.S. national politics, European ideologies in,
military, 151, 212, 216; volunteers for, 14, 303n4
141, 147–48, 212, 216, 264–65. See also national pride in Squadron 201, 266–67
Compulsory Military Service Law national security, 105, 137–38
mining and mineral industry, 69, 72, 96 national unity: and Abanderado de la
Ministry of Communications and Public Libertad campaign, 218–20; in corridos,
Works, 91 155; and declaration of war, 118–19,
Ministry of Education. See Education, 222; defining revolutionary past as pro-
Ministry of democracy, 4; and Independence Day
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 74, 223 celebrations, 220–22; and industrializa-
Ministry of Interior. See Interior, Ministry tion policy, 138–39, 282; and military
of modernization campaign, 213; parallels
modernization: as government policy, 2, between revolution and WWII, 150–51,
210, 286; industrialization in, 210, 231; 249, 251, 294–95; in posters, 45, 46,
and propaganda in schools, 230–31; tied 126, 129, 130, 131; as response to
to military service, 233, 234, 235, 236. international crises, 145–46, 225; as
See also military modernization theme of wartime propaganda, 121, 208,
motion pictures: and Oficina Federal de 216, 217–20, 230–31. See also national
Propaganda, 140; and oiaa, 87, 160, identity
168–76, 174–75, 279–80; in prewar naturalism in poster art, 237
period, 91. See also feature films in oiaa Nazi and fascist propaganda: aimed
propaganda; newsreels in oiaa propa- at Mexican public, 6–7, 21–22, 25;
ganda; short subjects films anti-American messages in, 70–71;
Munich agreement, 39–40, 47, 52 censuring of, 9; in events leading up to
WWII, 17–22, 40–41, 73–74; among
El Nacional, 52, 184, 265–66 Germans living in Mexico, 19–21; oiaa
Nacional Distribuidora y Reguladora suppression of, 87–88, 171, 175–76. See
(nadyrsa), 248–49 also anti-fascism; Axis powers; German
National Campaign against Illiteracy: embassy
posters supporting, 242, 243, 244; and Nazi atrocities, 177–78, 179, 198, 223–25

index | 361
Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact: as defin- Mexican economic problems, 283–84;
ing moment, 39, 308n81; effects of Mexican response to propaganda of, 11;
breaking of, 61, 92–100; and propa- Motion Picture Division, 91, 168–76;
ganda in Mexico, 52–56 Pearl Harbor attack and anti-Axis
neutrality, Mexican, 110–11 campaign of, 105, 108; and propaganda
newspaper editorials: relating revolution strategy, 86–92, 162–66, 273–75, 290.
and WWII, 152; about U.S. in prewar See also Press and Publications Division,
period, 85, 88. See also press coverage ioaa; Radio Division, oiaa; Rockefeller,
newspapers, subsidies for: from Nazi Ger- Nelson A.
mans, 40–42; and pro-Allied sentiments, Office of the Coordinator for Inter-Ameri-
75, 87, 94; refusal of Axis subsidies, can Affairs, U.S., 58, 102. See also Office
182–83; tradition of, 314n80 of Inter-American Affairs (oiaa), U.S.
newsprint supply, control of: by oiaa, 87, Oficina Federal de Propaganda (ofp):
92, 94, 108; by pipsa, 76 Conference and Competition Division,
newsreels in oiaa propaganda, 170–72 142; founding of, 121–22, 124–25,
news services, Allied, 75, 183, 228, 278 136, 157; Printed Propaganda Division,
news services, Axis, 55, 87–88, 182 125–36; Radio Division, 136–37; The-
nonintervention and Good Neighbor ater and Cinema Divisions, 140. See also
policy, 64 Comisión Coordinadora de Propaganda
Northe, Heinrich, 19–20 Nacional (ccpn)
Novedades, 117, 119, 136, 184 O’Higgins, Pablo, 23
oiaa. See Office of Inter-American Affairs
Office for Coordination of Commercial (oiaa), U.S.
and Cultural Relations, 77, 310n1. See oil industry, nationalization of: effect on
also Office of Inter-American Affairs U.S.-Mexico relations, 60, 72–73, 83,
(oiaa), U.S. 296; resolution of controversy, 61–62,
Office of Inter-American Affairs (oiaa), 68–75, 99–100
U.S.: and best interests linked with Orozco, José Clemente, 309n96
U.S. theme, 163, 186, 229–30, 277; Ossietzky, Carl von, 45–46
blueprint period, 162–63; after breaking
of Nazi-Soviet pact, 92–100; censorship Padilla, Ezequiel, 98, 101, 105, 110, 260
of Mexican press, 115, 119; Commercial Palavincini, Félix Fulgencio, 227–30
and Financial Division, 80–85; Com- pamphlets, 222, 231
munications Division, 86–87; Content Panama Canal, 74, 84
Planning Division, 273–76; contrasted Pan-Americanism: in Disney films,
with Mexican government propaganda, 324n33; versus Hispanidad, 34–35;
201; cooperating with Avila Camacho as Latin American unity, 174, 201;
administration, 222–26, 254; cooperat- Mexican responses to, 72, 228–29, 237,
ing with ccpn, 227–30; cooperating 252, 254; nationalism as threat to, 274;
with ofp, 137, 140, 141; and corridos, in oiaa propaganda, 164–65, 174, 206,
155; and economic agreements, 9; 254, 274; rejection of oiaa propaganda
founding and purposes of, 58–59, 60, on, 201
77–78, 310n1; implementation of plans, Partido Communista Mexicana (pcm), 16,
162–66; and importance of Mexico to 18, 22–23, 25, 27, 31
U.S., 296–97; and Lídice attack, 223–25, patriotism: in Abanderado campaign,
254; literacy experiment of, 245–47; and 218; in letters of support, 150; linked

362 | index
with production, 112; in posters, 126, 95; in government propaganda strategy,
127, 129, 130, 131, 240; and support 136; of industrialization, 283–84; of
for Squadron 201, 265, 267, 289; as Nazi-Soviet pact, 53–54, 96–97; place-
theme in wartime propaganda, 5, 216, ment of stories in, 307n63; of Spanish
295; and threat of totalitarianism, 144; Civil War, 32, 35–37; U.S. influence on,
and young people, 239, 240. See also pre–Pearl Harbor, 99. See also newspa-
national identity per editorials; print media
pcm (Partido Communista Mexicana), 16, press subsidies. See newspapers, subsidies
18, 22–23, 25, 27, 31 for
peace plans, Mexican involvement in, 261 primitivism in poster art, 237–39, 238
Pearl Harbor attack, effect on U.S.-Mexico “principle of consultation,” 65
relations, 61, 100–101, 104–5 print media: Nazi propaganda in, 21–22;
peasants. See campesinos and peasants ofp strategy for, 125–36; promoting na-
Philippines, Mexican military service in, tional unity campaign, 222; targeted by
267–68 oiaa activities, 87. See also pamphlets;
“pioneering spirit” of U.S., 277 posters; press coverage
pipsa (Productora e Importadora de private sector: in cultural exchanges in
Papel), 76, 88 Good Neighbor policy, 66; and defini-
El Popular, 44, 47, 52, 53–54, 116, 119, tion of financial security, 137–38; in ofp
136, 184 strategy, 123; oiaa relationships with,
popular opinion. See public opinion 92, 102
posters: by Bernal, 188–89, 189, 190–93, productivity: as patriotism, 5; posters
191, 192, 194, 292, 293, 294, 336n1; about, 129, 132, 133, 134, 136; in
government propaganda (Ministry of radio broadcasts, 137, 229; as theme of
Interior), 125–36, 127, 128, 130, 131, wartime propaganda, 2, 117, 122–23,
132, 134, 135; for Liga Pro-Cultura 210, 296
Alemana, 44–45, 46, 48, 49; from Productora e Importadora de Papel
Ministry of Education, 231–37, 232, (pipsa), 76, 88
233, 235, 236, 242, 243, 244, 249, 250; Prólogo de la invasión (radio broadcast),
from oiaa, 188–97, 189, 191, 192, 194, 178
195, 196; by tgp artists, 29, 30, 44, 46, propaganda: oiaa campaign in Mexico,
47–48, 48, 49, 52 10–11, 102, 160–61, 162, 165, 169,
postwar era, planning for, 165–66, 183, 185–87, 206, 257–58, 277–78, 297,
257, 258, 274–75 321n2; reception of, 6
Potrero del Llano, attack on, 115–16, 154, protectionism: as Avila Camacho policy,
233, 234. See also German submarine 297; and industrialization, 283–84, 298;
attacks and national unity and patriotism, 5; in
La Prensa, 117, 118, 136, 184 postwar policies, 12, 286; U.S. response
Press and Publications Division, oiaa, to, 288
182–201; cooperating with ccpn, 226; public opinion: ambivalence toward
pamphlets, 197–201; posters from, WWII, 106; attempts to monitor,
188–97, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196 143–44; and declaration of war, 107,
press coverage: of attack on Protrero 147–52; and deteriorating standard of
del Llano, 115–16; of boycott, 98; in living, 261–62; government attempts to
cultural exchanges in Good Neighbor influence, 108–9, 120; and opposition
policy, 66; during early war period, 94, to formal alliance with U.S., 110–11;

index | 363
public opinion (continued) 77; and radio interests, 88–89; in water
and Pearl Harbor attack, 108; on U.S. in dispute negotiations, 205. See also Office
Mexico and literacy campaign, 247 of Inter-American Affairs (oiaa), U.S.
El pueblo y su triunfo (pamphlet), Rodríguez, Abelardo, 220
198–200 Rodríguez, Luis I., 51
Rojo Gómez, Javier, 223
racism and German racial policies, 51–52, Roosevelt (Franklin D.) administration,
94 62, 76–77, 216
radio broadcasting: in Abanderado cam- Rüdt von Collenberg, Freiherr (German
paign, 220; ccpn cooperating with oiaa, ambassador), 50–52, 98
227–30; in cultural exchanges in Good rural areas: animated films for, 173; cor-
Neighbor policy, 66; of Independence ridos as news medium for, 153–55; en-
Day celebrations, 221; of Liga confer- couraging food production in, 249, 250;
ences, 44; and ofp, 136–37; and oiaa and military service program, 213–15;
activities, 87, 88–91; in rural areas, Ministry of Education propaganda in,
124–25 230, 239; newsreels for, 171–72; ofp
Radio Division, oiaa: cooperating with policies on, 124–25; in posters, 189,
ccpn, 227–30; establishment of, 88–89, 190, 250; surplus of workers in, 211–12.
176; on military strength of U.S., 160, See also agricultural sector; campesinos
178; scripts for dramatic programs, and peasants
177–79; shortwave broadcasts, 176–77;
spot announcements, 179–80; surveys of sacrifice and mourning in posters, 126,
listeners, 180–82 128
Railway Mission, 161, 201–3 sacrifices: of Allies in oiaa propaganda,
“rally around the flag” effect, 144–45, 274, 276, 278; of Mexicans in overseas-
319n74 forces propaganda, 268–69
raw materials, concerns about, 59, 163, Salinas, Gustavo, 278, 334n53
201–3 Saludos amigos (animated film), 173
Reciprocal Trade Treaty (1942), 100, 285, Sanchez Pontón, Luis, 253–54
288 San Jerónimo de Lídice, 223–26
“Relations of the Americas” theme in oiaa Sansón Jiménez, Hugo, 266
propaganda, 164 school readers, 241, 243, 245
revolution (1910). See Mexican Revolu- ship seizures, 102
tion (1910) ship sinkings. See German submarine
right, ideological: associated with interna- attacks
tional fascism, 24, 295; capitalists on, short subjects films, 169–70
15, 32; definition of, 302n12; prior to shortwave broadcasts, 176–77
WWII, 15, 295; and Spanish Civil War, Sinarquista movement, 14, 35, 112, 215
32–35, 38, 307n69 social response theory, 157–58
Rio de Janeiro conference (1942), 105, Sollenberger, W. S., 167
110–11 songs and poetry, patriotic sentiments in,
Rockefeller, Nelson A.: changing oiaa 152–53. See also corridos
approach, 275–76; and Coordinating Soviet-German nonaggression pact. See
Committee for wartime propaganda, 86; Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact
economic motivations of, 80, 91–92; Soviet Union, 56, 67
and film industry, 91; as head of oiaa, Soy puro mexicano (film), 140–41

364 | index
Spanish Civil War, 25–38; background Urias, Franco, 260
of, 25–26; corridos about, 154; and Urquizo, Francisco, 266
factionalism in Mexico, 4, 16–17, 68; U.S. advertising in Mexican newspapers,
leftist position on, 27–32; and Mexican 183–84
Revolution, 295; posters about, 28–30, U.S. as hemispheric leader in oiaa propa-
29, 30; press coverage of, 35–37; refu- ganda, 7, 59, 161, 187–88, 189, 190,
gees from, 33, 37–38; rightist position 197, 201
on, 32–35 “U.S. Credo for the Individual Citizen of
special interest groups. See factionalism Latin America,” 163–64
and special interest groups U.S. economic concerns: as goal of oiaa,
Squadron 201: in combat, 269–72; plan- 160; and need for new markets, 76–77;
ning of, 262–65; and postwar peace prewar, 59; and Railway Mission, 161,
planning, 294; in propaganda efforts, 201–3
286, 289 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 35,
72
Taller de Gráfica Popular (tgp): posters, U.S. Good Neighbor policy: as attempt
28–30, 29, 30, 47–48; reaction to Nazi- at hemispheric cooperation, 63–64;
Soviet pact, 54; and Spanish Civil War, cultural exchanges in, 66; and indirect
27–28, 28–30, 37 propaganda, 161, 203, 205; oiaa post-
theater and Oficina Federal de Propa- ers about, 195, 195; revival of, 276–77,
ganda, 140 297; U.S. diplomats divided over, 311n9
The Three Caballeros (animated film), U.S. imperialism: fears of, 276–77, 283;
173–74, 324n33 Mexican resistance to, 7; and Mexican
Tiempo, 144–45 suspicions of oiaa propaganda, 246–47,
Torres Bodet, Jaime, 101, 243, 245, 247 254; in pro-fascist propaganda, 42, 98
totalitarianism identified with Díaz regime, U.S. interventionist policies, 62–63
152, 158, 249, 255, 295 U.S. Latin American policy: and goals
trade relationships: anticipating postwar, and commonalties with Latin America,
280–81, 282; diverging goals in during 67; and diplomatic relations with Latin
WWII, 290–91; in Good Neighbor America, 62; and revival of Good Neigh-
policy, 64; negotiated by Avila Camacho, bor policy, 276–77, 297
296; and oiaa, 81–82; and programs to U.S. Military: deemphasis of strength of,
purchase Latin American goods, 82–83; 258, 278; effect of perceived strength on
strengthening of, 161. See also economic Latin America, 272–73, 276; Mexicans
and trade agreements with U.S. drafted into, 151, 212, 216; in oiaa
transportation infrastructure, 84 propaganda, 160, 165, 168, 178–79;
and plans to send Mexican troops
Unión Nacional Sinarquista de México, overseas, 263
35, 215. See also Sinarquista movement U.S. Office of Inter-American Affairs. See
United Nations, 193, 194, 289, 294 Office of Inter-American Affairs (oiaa),
El Universal: after declaration of war, U.S.
117, 118, 119, 123, 136, 184; in early U.S. Office of Military Intelligence, 72
war period, 61, 72, 96–97; in late war U.S. Office of Strategic Services, 72,
period, 269, 278; in prewar period, 32, 174–75
36, 41–42, 47, 52, 55–56 U.S. security concerns, 18–19, 63, 160
urban areas, response to propaganda, 124 U.S. victory certain: effect of theme

index | 365
U.S. victory certain (continued) Welles, Orson, 172
on Latin American popular support, “We Will Win the Peace” theme, 165–66
272–74; as theme in oiaa propaganda, “We Will Win the War” theme, 165
163–64, 186, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194 wire services. See news services, Allied
women: articles on in En guardia, 186,
Vasconcelos, José, 71, 104 279–80; in national unity campaigns,
Villa, Pancho, 62 225–26; radio broadcasts for, 180
volunteerism: by letter writers, 148; for Woodul, James R., 167
military service, 141, 147–48, 212, 216, working class, 27, 44
264–65; in ofp strategy, 123 World War I, Mexican neutrality in, 63

war, declaration of, 107, 115–20, 222 xeb (radio station), 227
war effort: promotion of, 221; wavering xeoy (radio station), 227
public support of, 261–62, 273–74 xew (radio station), 90, 182
Warhol, Andy, 159–60, 162, 206
war materiel, 82–84, 294 young people: and Nazism, 48, 48–49;
wartime emergency, declaration of, 119 propaganda directed toward, 239, 240
water disputes, resolution of, 161, 204–5

366 | index
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Pistoleros and Popular Movements:

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