Scribd
Upload
69 views2 pages

The Domestic Politics Model: Nuclear Pork and Parochial Interests

The document discusses how domestic political factors can influence a state's pursuit of nuclear weapons according to the Domestic Politics Model. Three main domestic actors that sometimes form coalitions to advocate for nuclear weapons are the nuclear energy establishment, military units interested in nuclear technology, and politicians supportive of nuclear acquisition. During the Cold War, these bureaucratic actors in countries like the US and Soviet Union encouraged perceptions of threats to promote defense spending benefits. For example, in India in the 1970s, Prime Minister Gandhi developed an alliance with nuclear scientists and used a peaceful nuclear test to boost declining public support for her government. Thus, the model argues that security threats are not always the primary cause of nuclear decisions but can open opportunities for political interests to be

Uploaded by

hakseng ly
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
69 views2 pages

The Domestic Politics Model: Nuclear Pork and Parochial Interests

The document discusses how domestic political factors can influence a state's pursuit of nuclear weapons according to the Domestic Politics Model. Three main domestic actors that sometimes form coalitions to advocate for nuclear weapons are the nuclear energy establishment, military units interested in nuclear technology, and politicians supportive of nuclear acquisition. During the Cold War, these bureaucratic actors in countries like the US and Soviet Union encouraged perceptions of threats to promote defense spending benefits. For example, in India in the 1970s, Prime Minister Gandhi developed an alliance with nuclear scientists and used a peaceful nuclear test to boost declining public support for her government. Thus, the model argues that security threats are not always the primary cause of nuclear decisions but can open opportunities for political interests to be

Uploaded by

hakseng ly
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 2

The Domestic Politics Model: Nuclear Pork and Parochial Interests

It is the second theoretical framework which tell us that why state build nuclear weapon.
State visualize that nuclear weapon as a political tool that can use to increase domestic and
bureaucratic interests. This second model of nuclear weapons proliferation focuses on the
domestic actors who encourage or discourage governments from pursuing the bomb.
So, … there are three main actors commonly appear in the historical case-studies of nuclear
proliferation: First, state's nuclear energy establishment, it is included the officials in state-run
laboratories as the civilian reactor facilities. Second, the important military units often within
the air force and sometimes in navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear propulsion. Third,
Politicians in state in which individual parties or the mass public or people who strongly favor
nuclear weapons acquisition.

 Actors form coalition: When the they form coalitions that are strong enough to control
the government's decision-making process, either through their direct or indirect political
power and through their control of information-nuclear weapons programs are likely to
develop.

During the Cold War, states have been influenced by the different of perspectives on
bureaucratic politics and the social construction of technology concerning military procurement
in the United States and the Soviet Union. First, if we take a look to Bureaucratic Actors, they
are not seen as the passive recipients of top-down political decisions because they create the
conditions that favor weapons acquisition by encouraging irrational perceptions of external
threats, promoting supportive politicians, and actively lobbying for increased defense spending.
Second, Scientific-Military-Industrial Complex, it is the initial ideas for individual weapons
innovations are often developed inside state laboratories, where scientists favor military
innovation because it is technically exciting and keeps the money and the prestige flowing to
their laboratories. Last but not least, Political Coalition, the coalition builds broader political
support within the executive or legislative branches by shaping the perceptions about the costs
and benefits of weapons programs.

For realists recognize the domestic political actors that they have political interests, and
those interests have only a marginal influence on the crucial national security issues due to
bureaucratic battles may determine if a state should build 500 or 1000 ICBMs (Intercontinental
ballistic missile). However, based on this second model, Security threats are not the central cause
of weapons decisions, but merely open the opportunity to gain their political interests.

Proliferation Revisited: Addressing the India Puzzle


After the 1964 Chinese nuclear test, there was no consensus among officials in New Delhi
that there was necessary to have a nuclear deterrent as a response to China because in the
historical case of Indian nuclear weapon reveal the bureaucratic battle in New Delhi did not
encourage India to get nuclear weapons. It means that, New Delhi should make a concert effort
to seek nuclear guarantees from the US, the Soviet Union, or other nuclear power.
However, 1971, the first female Indian Prime Minister Gandhi developed an alliance with the
defense laboratories to build and test a “peaceful” Indian Nuclear device. Unfortunately, the
device does not exist.
If we take a look to Domestic Political Concerns, there are three issues in hand: First, the
decision to test was made in a very small circle of personal advisers and scientists from the
nuclear establishment. For example, the defense and foreign affairs officials in India were not
involved in the initial decision to prepare the nuclear device for the testing. Second, the absence
of a systematic program for nuclear weapons because the New Delhi did not prepare on the
Canada's immediate termination of nuclear assistance. In this scenario that Canada has terminate
the nuclear assistances from India because New Delhi under prime minister Gandhi focus on
political concerns more than security interest or external threats. Last, Domestic support for
Gandhi was at an all-time low, because the prolonging and severing of domestic recession, the
outbreak of large-scale protests in countries, and the residual consequences of the ruling
Congress Party. Therefore, the PM Gandhi already realize that what she has to resist the crisis,
then increase her opportunity in public opinion polls and to resolve a problem about which she
had been criticized by her domestic opponents. Indeed, the nuclear detonation occurred and it
contributed to a major increase in support for her government. Surprisingly, the public support
for Gandhi increased by one-third in the month after the nuclear test in 1974 and 90% of
individual answered in the affirmative if they were personally proud of this achievement.
Therefore, PM Gandhi, acknowledge that the nuclear test would have been useful for elections.
So, we can see that, Nuclear weapons are more than tools of national security, but Nuclear
weapons are also the political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and
internal bureaucratic battle in a state for other reasons.

You might also like