Metropolitan Nashville Police Department

Nashville Downtown Bombing

After Action Review Board Report

Background

On the morning of December 25, 2020, a large explosion erupted on 2nd Avenue North
in downtown Nashville that caused extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure,
significant business closures, job losses, and displaced residents from their homes. While
many lives were saved that day as a result of the heroic actions of first responders and
public safety personnel of Nashville and Davidson County, the Metropolitan Nashville
Police Department is committed to learning from the tragic bombing to safeguard the
community from future harms.

In that regard, on January 7, 2021, Metropolitan Nashville Police Chief John Drake
announced the creation of an after-action review to examine events leading up to the
bombing in downtown Nashville, and determine whether any gaps exist from which MNPD
can learn in the future. Specifically, the after-action review focuses on MNPD’s response
to an incident that occurred on August 21, 2019, involving suicide bombing suspect
Anthony Warner. The purpose of the after-action review is to look at what occurred, what
mistakes, if any, were made in the handling of information, and whether changes to policy
or procedures are needed to help keep Nashville safer.

Chief Drake announced that the after action review board shall consist of five persons
including two within the department— Deputy Chief Dwayne Greene and
attorney/Professional Standards Division head Kathy Morante— and three members
outside of the department—Nashville attorney and former United States Attorney for the
Middle District of Tennessee Ed Yarbrough, Community Oversight Board Executive
Director Jill Fitcheard, and Metro Council Member Jennifer Gamble, chair of the Public
Safety Committee.

The after-action review is a process by which organizations reflect upon a project or

monumental event during and after its completion, to assess their performance and
identify and learn from successes and failures. The concept was originally developed by
the U.S. Army in the 1970s to review and improve combat operations and related military
training. It was quickly adopted by business, industry, and other government
organizations. The after-action concept has been modified slightly over the years but still
focuses on making the organization and its operations safer and more efficient.

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 1
Summary

This after-action review includes an analysis of activity and incident reports, email
correspondence and interviews with parties involved regarding the August 21, 2019
incident, when MNPD officers received a 911 call which led to officers being dispatched
to the home of Pamela Perry — friend of suicide bomber Anthony Warner— and the home
of Warner. From January- May 2021, the After-Action Review Board met in person and
corresponded through email, examined multiple MNPD police reports, documents and
911 calls related to the 8/21/19 incident, and conducted interviews with individuals and
officers who were at the scene. This report provides an analysis of what the committee
discovered as well as recommendations for MNPD policies and procedures to improve
public safety from future events.

The After-Action Review Board subsequently undertook a thorough and extensive

examination of the events leading up to the December 25, 2020 bombing in downtown
Nashville and the MNPD officers’ proceeding actions, particularly as they relate to
identifying, interacting with, and investigating suicide bombing suspect Anthony Warner.
The examination was concluded to the satisfaction of all parties involved.
The framework for the after-action review follows guidelines as outlined in the “Guide
to the After-Action Review,” Version 1.1, October 2010. The after-action review is
categorized into two specific areas— what went well and why— what can be improved
and how. Additionally, there are subcategories within the framework to evaluate
separately the patrol response, follow up investigation, and departmental procedure as
related to the after-action review.

The After-Action Review Board concludes that there is no way to know for sure if the
suicide bombing on December 25, 2020 could have been prevented. Law enforcement
followed protocols and procedures regarding the 8/21/19 incident, however deficiencies
were identified in how the follow up investigation was conducted. An after-action report,
by its very nature, invites the examiners to employ hindsight in reaching their
conclusions. But there is danger in that. One must not assume that because certain
good practices were not followed or certain actions were not taken, the outcome would
have necessarily been different had those proper steps been taken. All we can say for
sure is that following the best practices and being diligent creates the best opportunity for
a good result the next time. Following is a comprehensive analysis of the After-Action
Review Board’s evaluation including departmental successes and recommendations for
improvement.

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 2
What went well and why?

The After-Action Review Board completed an in-depth review of events that occurred
on August 21, 2019, particularly as they pertain to the 911 call regarding Atty. Raymond
Throckmorton, Ms. Pamela Perry and suspected bomber Mr. Anthony Warner. A 911 call
was made on 8/21/19 by Atty. Throckmorton, personal attorney of Pamela Perry, to
respond to a suicidal threat made by Ms. Perry. Several officers were dispatched to
Perry’s home at 3816 Syfert Ln including Officer Gerald Gomes, Officer Joseph Simon,
and Sergeant Scott Carter.

Upon arriving at the scene, officers stated that Ms. Perry was sitting on the porch and
there were two firearms sitting next to her. She was adamant about getting rid of the
firearms that she said belonged to Anthony Warner. Once the firearms were secured,
officers began to talk to Ms. Perry. The officers stated that Ms. Perry seemed paranoid
when they talked to her and she rambled about her friend (Anthony Warner) ruining her
life. In addition, she showed signs of mental distress and she complained of physical
distress. She said on several occasions that she felt like she was dying. She also stated
that she believes Anthony Warner is making bombs in his RV at his home and she couldn’t
die until she saved the “innocents” from Mr. Warner. At that time, officers began to focus
on Ms. Perry’s mental health and mobile crisis was dispatched. Ms. Perry voluntarily went
with the Nashville Fire Department to Southern Hills Hospital for evaluation.

Atty. Throckmorton was also at the scene at 3816 Syfert Ln. While at the scene, he
told officers that he is the personal attorney of Anthony Warner as well as Ms. Perry, and
that Mr. Warner frequently talked about the military and making bombs. Atty.
Throckmorton also stated that he believes Mr. Warner is capable of making a bomb but,
he has never seen Warner with a bomb.

Upon receiving the allegation from Ms. Perry about Anthony Warner making a bomb
and Atty. Throckmorton’s statement that Mr. Warner is capable of making a bomb, Sgt.
Carter who was the supervisor on duty told officers to leave Perry’s home and follow up
on the allegation at Anthony Warner’s residence at 115 Bakertown Ln. Several officers,
including Sergeant Cater, Officer Gomes, Officer Simon, Officer Williams, and later,
Officer Pollard from the SOD Bomb Squad went to the Warner residence. They knocked
on the door but did not get an answer. They observed that there was an RV trailer in the
back yard but the yard was fenced off and they could not see inside the RV. The officers
also observed that the location had several security cameras and wires attached to an
alarm sign on the front door. They knocked on the door several times but Mr. Warner
never opened the door and the officers did not have contact with him.

It is determined that the patrol response was handled appropriately and all response
policies and procedures were followed successfully.

1. Patrol officers on the scene acted appropriately to a 911 call that a potentially
suicidal person had access to weapons. They contacted their supervisors, tried to
assist Ms. Perry, took into consideration her condition, removed the weapons from

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 3
 the area to ensure she could not harm herself or others. They spoke at length with
Ms. Perry before convincing her to be transported for medical assistance. The
officers on the scene appropriately documented the facts of their interaction with
her.

2. The officers and supervisors at the scene were appropriately concerned about the
information given by Ms. Perry that Mr. Warner might be building a bomb. Several
officers and supervisors immediately went to Warner’s home to investigate. Upon
their arrival at the location, Mr. Warner did not appear to be at the residence. The
shades were drawn, and the doors and security fence locked. Officers observed a
vehicle in the side yard matching the description of the RV that Ms. Perry
described. Officers knocked on the door and side gate of Mr. Warner’s residence
but did not get an answer. Officers stated they also knocked on the adjoined
apartment but did not get a response. While they noticed extensive security
cameras, there appeared to be nothing to indicate criminal activity. All of the
activity at Mr. Warner’s home was well-documented by the appropriate personnel.

3. All of the officers and supervisory personnel were of the belief that they had
insufficient probable cause to enter the property or seek a search warrant. The
information about their concern that the suspect might be building a bomb was
relayed to the appropriate unit, the Hazardous Device Unit, also known as the
Bomb Squad. The HDU officer sent an inquiry to the FBI on August 22, 2019, to
determine if Mr. Anthony Warner had a prior history or connection to explosives,
and the agent responded that there were no records showing that Mr. Warner was
in their database. The request to check military records was mentioned and that it
would take several days to get that information back. On August 28, 2019 the FBI
agent sent notification that the Department of Defense checks were all negative.

What can be improved and how?

While the After-Action Review Board’s examination concludes that the patrol response
was handled appropriately and activity regarding the patrol response was well-
documented by all appropriate personnel, there is room for improvement in the reporting
process. Although the current reporting process calls for multiple patrol responders on
the scene of an incident to contribute information to one matter of record report, having
different perspectives on one report may cause inconsistencies in the report. For
example, in the matter of record report taken on 8/21/19 by Officer Williams regarding the
scene at the home of Pamela Perry, Anthony Warner is identified as the “boyfriend” of
Ms. Perry, an assertion she adamantly denied to the panel during an interview. The board
recommends that each responder prepare their own individual supplement when
responding to mental health calls, high priority calls or when directed by a Sergeant, to
ensure more accuracy of reporting in the future.

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 4
 In addition, the board identified deficiencies in the follow up investigation and
documentation as it relates to the 8/21/19 incident. For example, there was insufficient
follow up with Ms. Perry after she received medical assistance, to discuss further her
allegation about Anthony Warner making a bomb. Officer Pollard, the Hazardous Device
Unit detective on the case, stated in an interview that he attempted to contact Ms. Perry
several times in the weeks after the August 21, 2019 incident but was unable to reach
her. There is no record of Officer Pollard’s attempts to contact Ms. Perry.

Also, Officer Pollard stated that he went by Anthony Warner’s house several times after
the incident report on 8/21/19, but did not have contact with him. There is no record of
Officer Pollard’s attempts to contact Mr. Warner. Furthermore, Officer Pollard stated that
there was no attempt at any time to contact Anthony Warner’s employer, family members,
or the neighbors near Warner’s home. He stated that at the time of the bombing on
December 25, 2020, the case was not closed but it was not active. He stated that cases
like that often lay dormant unless another lead or complaint comes in.
The board recommends that all bomb-related incidents be investigated by the precinct
detectives in conjunction with the Hazardous Device Unit (HDU) technicians to ensure
that information doesn’t fall through the cracks. Also, the latest investigative techniques
and equipment can be effectively utilized with the latest explosive device render safe
techniques and equipment. As an existing precursor, HDU already conducts Molotov
cocktail investigations jointly with the Nashville Fire Department (NFD) when the devices
burn structures.
Furthermore, the board recommends that the position of a Joint Terrorist Task Force
Officer in the Special Investigations Division (SID) be reinstated to serve as a liaison and
conduit between the Emergency Contingency Section (ECS) and the SID, specifically in
the counterterrorism intelligence subcomponent of SID. The after-action review exposed
a deficiency in communication between the HDU and the SID charged with gathering
intelligence. Within SID, there should be a differentiation between the two principal
components of intelligence, those dealing with criminal and counterterrorism intelligence
to ensure adequate communication vetting and dissemination of both specific types of
intelligence.

Lastly, the board recommends that executive staff be updated immediately about any
significant investigations surrounding viable threats or counterterrorism, and that
leadership receive quarterly briefings from the Emergency Contingency Section as it
relates to case status. It is not clear if intelligence regarding the status of the investigation
into Anthony Warner was flagged and passed along to MNPD leadership during
COMPSTAT or at staff meetings. Cases that have questionable or peculiar status should
be discussed in MNPD staff meetings to ensure that questions are addressed, and
assistance is obtained. Following is an organizational chart to show the recommended
chain of communication and flow of information regarding criminal and counterterrorism
intelligence, and a breakdown of deficiencies identified in the follow up investigation and
departmental structure with recommendations for improvement.

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 5
Organizational Chart for Criminal and Counterterrorism Intelligence Dissemination

Chief of Police

Support
Services Bureau
Deputy Chief

Special
Investigative Operations
Services Bureau Division
Captain

Specialized Emergency
Investigations Contingency
Division Section Chief

Emergency
Criminal Counterterrorism Contingency
Intelligence Intelligence Section
Lieutenant

Joint Terrorism Emergency

Hazardous
Task Force Contingency
Device Unit
Officer Section
Sergeant
Sergeant

Police Urban
Incident
Search and
Management
Rescue
Support VCC
Sergeant

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 6
Follow up Investigation Deficiencies Recommendations for Improvement

The HDU officer made several attempts to contact Require that all efforts to follow up with any individual
Ms. Perry by phone and went to the residence of Mr. regarding an HDU investigation be documented, even
Warner on numerous occasions to follow up on the if the efforts do not result in progress or contact. Such
investigation, but the dates, times and outcomes of actions should include but are not limited to attempts
the attempts were not documented. to call, attempts to contact, number of times we
knocked on the suspect’s door, computer checks, data
base checks, etc.

The HDU case was not closed and remained open Conduct random quarterly audits of HDU case files to
for over a year without any updated investigation or ensure that the best investigative practices are being
documentation. used and all documentation is being properly
completed.

The HDU officer’s supervisor did not document or Conduct monthly reviews of all cases received by HDU
escalate the case status or follow up with detectives and ECS and by all HDU and ECS Technicians, SID
regarding the open case. representatives, ATF representatives, FBI
representatives, and TDHS representatives in the
Explosive Summit. The Explosive Summit is similar in
construction to the Homicide Summit. During the
Explosive Summit, which is typically held on the third
Thursday of each month, the attending representatives
determine what analyses and investigations have
occurred and what analyses and investigations shall
follow. Additionally, the summit’s representatives will
recommend Case Status changes, including but not
limited to Closed Due to Arrest.
There is not a process in place regarding case Initiate a four-part confirmative closure prior to officially
closure and criminal and counterterrorism cases can marking a case Inactive so as to ensure the original
remain open without follow up. information has not changed.
1. A reasonable attempt shall be made to follow up
with the reporting person, complainant, or those
who have information related to the
allegation/incident.
2. Federal database checks shall be conducted
through the FBI, ATF, DEA, DHS, and other
applicable agencies.
3. State and local database checks shall be
conducted through the MNPD, ARMS, State, JTTF,
and other applicable components.
4. SID shall be contacted for a final database and
online check, and if an investigation is halted due
to a lack of probable cause or other legal reason,
then Case Prep, the legal advisor, and/or the
District Attorney’s Office should be contacted to
discuss the full scope of options.

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 7
Departmental Procedure Deficiencies Recommendations for Improvement

Although probable cause to search Anthony Remind officers, through a roll call training, of the legal
Warner’s home and RV may have not been resources available to assist them in determining if
established by the patrol officers on the day of the there is sufficient probable cause to seek a search
8/21/19 incident, the HDU officer could have sought warrant. It should be emphasized that the greater the
legal advice about getting a search warrant during potential danger to the community and its citizens, the
the follow up investigation. more likely they should be to seek legal consultation.

Clearer guidelines are needed for counterterrorism Submit a State of Tennessee ‘Suspicious Activity
intelligence sharing and HDU investigative and Report’ (SAR) on all HDU calls where the totality of the
operating procedures. circumstances would lead an investigator to
reasonably believe that more investigative efforts
would be needed or if the HDU technician believes the
information could assist with other investigative efforts.
The SAR report is designed to distribute information
regarding suspicious activity throughout an established
distribution network that includes the Joint Terrorism
Task Force, the Tennessee Fusion Center, and other
state and federal partners. All acquired information is
then analyzed and compared with other information
from around the country to determine if the respective
data—when correlated with additional data via
integrative analysis—can assist in finding and defining
larger criminal frameworks.

A procedure is needed that requires intelligence Subsequent to the conclusion of the Explosive Summit,
regarding the status of HDU or SID investigations to have the Captain of Special Operations Division or his
be flagged and passed along to MNPD leadership. appointed representative send out an email log to the
impacted commanders in order to keep them updated
on respective situations within their precincts that could
impact their personnel.

MNPD After Action Review Board Report, Submitted May 26, 2021 Pg. 8