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Chapter No.10 MSDS & HAZOP

The document discusses HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies, which is a systematic qualitative hazard analysis method used to identify potential hazards in processes and facilities. It involves applying guide words to process parameters to analyze possible deviations. The objectives of a HAZOP study are outlined, including identifying areas of significant hazard potential and ensuring a systematic review. The HAZOP method flow diagram shows the step-by-step process. An example HAZOP study is provided for a storage tank handling toluene diisocyanate, applying guide words to parameters like level, temperature, and identifying potential consequences of deviations.

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112 views

Chapter No.10 MSDS & HAZOP

The document discusses HAZOP (Hazard and Operability) studies, which is a systematic qualitative hazard analysis method used to identify potential hazards in processes and facilities. It involves applying guide words to process parameters to analyze possible deviations. The objectives of a HAZOP study are outlined, including identifying areas of significant hazard potential and ensuring a systematic review. The HAZOP method flow diagram shows the step-by-step process. An example HAZOP study is provided for a storage tank handling toluene diisocyanate, applying guide words to parameters like level, temperature, and identifying potential consequences of deviations.

Uploaded by

Ali Ahsan
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

HAZOP STUDY

10.1: INTRODUCTION

A HAZOP survey is one of the most common and widely accepted methods of
systematic qualitative hazard analysis. It is used for both new or existing facilities
and can be applied to a whole plant, a production unit, or a piece of equipment It
uses as its database the usual sort of plant and process information and relies on
the judgment of engineering and safety experts in the areas with which they are
most familiar. The end result is, therefore reliable in terms of engineering and
operational expectations, but it is not quantitative and may not consider the
consequences of complex sequences of human errors.
The objectives of a HAZOP study can be summarized as follows:
1) To identify (areas of the design that may possess a significant hazard
potential.

2) To identify and study features of the design that influence the


probability of a hazardous incident occurring.

3) To familiarize the study team with the design information available.

4) To ensure that a systematic study is made of the areas of significant


hazard potential.

5) To identify pertinent design information not currently available to the


team.

6) To provide a mechanism for feedback to the client of the study team's


detailed comments.

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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

10.2: HAZOP METHOD FLOW DIAGRAM


A HAZOP study is conducted in the following steps:

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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

Table 7.1: HAZOP Guide Words and Meanings

Guide Words Meaning


No Negation of design intent

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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

Less Quantitative decrease


More Quantitative increase
Part of Qualitative decrease
As well as Qualitative Increase
Reverse Logical opposite of the intent
Other than Complete substitution

10.3: HAZOP STUDY OF STORAGE TANK FOR TDI

A HAZOP study is to be conducted on ethylene oxide storage tank, as presented


by the piping and instrumentation diagram shown in fig. In this scheme, toluene
diisocyanate is unloaded from tank trucks into a storage tank maintained under
pressure until it is transferred to the process. Application of the guide words to
the storage tank is shown in Table along with a listing of consequences that
results from process deviation. Some of the consequences identified with these
process deviations have raised additional questions that need resolution to
determine whether or not a hazard exists.

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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

TDI Storage
Tank

Figure: 10.1

Piping and instrumentation diagram

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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

Deviations Consequences of Proces


from What event could this deviation on item s
operating cause this deviation of equipment under indicati
conditions consideration ons
Level:
Less Tank runs dry Pump cavitates LIA-1
FICA-1
Rupture of discharge Reagent released LIA-1,
line FICA-1
V-3 open or broken Reagent released LIA-1
V-1 open or broken Reagent released LIA-1
Tank rupture (busting Reagent released LIA-1
of vessel)
More Unload too much Tank overfills LIA-1
from column
Reverse flow from Tank overfills LIA-1
process
Temperature
: Temperature of inlet
is colder than normal Possible vacuum
Less Temperature of inlet
is hotter than normal Region released
More External fire
Tank fails

10.4: REFERENCES

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Chapter 10 HAZOP study

1: Callahan et al., 1979; Cupitt, 1980;Edney et al., 1982; Howard, 1989;


Grosjean,1990; Kelly et al.,1994).

2: Tabak et al., 1980; Kincannon etal., 1983; Stover and Kincannon, 1983;
Freeman and Schroy, 1984; Watson, 1993.
3: http://ecb.jrc.it/DOCUMENTS/Existing

Chemicals/RISK_ASSESSMENT/DRAFT/R029_0104_env_hh.pdf

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