1.

Salus populi est suprema lex

The english interpretation of this maxim is “the voice of the people is the supreme
law.”
In the case of JMM Promotion and Management, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals ,1 the
Court explained that “the latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the
character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare
of the people under the State’s police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty
which virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of governmental
powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae
gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers.”
2. Expressum facit cessare tacitum or expressio unius est exlusio alterius
Expressum facit cessare tacitum means that what is expressed puts an end to that
which is implied. This form of construction is used while interpreting statutes, contracts
and deeds. When a matter is clearly provided in a document, the clear and precise
meaning is to be adopted. The implied meaning need not be adopted when a clear
meaning is provided.2
This rule of statutory construction is a variation of the legal maxim expression unius
est exlusio alterius which means “the express mention of one person, thing or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.” The rule of expressio unius est
exclusio alterius and its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation. They are
based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. They are
predicated upon one's own voluntary act and not upon that of others. They proceed
from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a
statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.3

1
G.R. No. 120095, August 5, 1996.
2
A. Claridades, (2013). “Expressium facit cessare tacitum” [Online]. Available:
https://attyalvinclaridades.wordpress.com/2013/06/09/expressium-facit-cessare-tacitum/ [2021, April].
3
De La sale Araneta University vs. Bernardo, G.R. No. 190809, February 13, 2017.
 3. Dissimilum dissimilis est ratio
In its plain interpretation, this maxim means “of things dissimilar, the rule is
dissimilar.” But the Courts has defined this maxim as “the courts may distinguish when
there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction or
qualification.”
In a question on whether a 21 year old candidate for SK Elections may still hold a
position where she is more than 21 years of age and less than 22 years of age on the
date of the election, the Court said that the Local Government Code will reveal a
distinction between the maximum age of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and
the maximum age of an elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's
maximum age at 21 years only. There is no furth er provision as to when the member
shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides that the
maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day of his election." The
addition of the phrase "or the day of his election" is an additional qualification. The
member may be more than 21 years of age on election day or on the day he registers
as member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be
more than 21 years old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable
considering that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official
than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. 4

4. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus

This maxim is the opposite of dissimilum dissimilis est ratio . The interpretation of
this maxim is “where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.”
Act No. 1874, as the Court explained, uses the term "employee" without any
distinction between occasional or permanent employees. It is significant that while the
Workmen's Compensation Act (No. 3428) specifically excludes purely casual
employment, Act No. 1874 on the other hand does not. It is thus plain that Act No.
1874 which applies only to mishaps in small industries and other activities in which the
gross annual income is less than P20,000, is intended to safeguard all laborers,

4
Garvida vs. Sales, Jr., G.R. No. 124893, April 18, 1997
regardless of the duration or character of their employment. Finespun distinctions
would fritter away the salutary substance of this law. 5

5. Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea

This is a criminal law doctrine which translates to “an act does not make a person
guilty unless the mind is also guilty.”
The Court, in Atty. Manzanaris vs. People, 6 explained that “actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea," which expounds a basic principle in criminal law that a crime is not
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of be innocent.
Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by
statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent. It is true that a presumption of criminal
intent may arise from proof of the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is
that if it is proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention and that it is for the accused to
rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind that the act from which such
presumption springs must be a criminal act.
6. Actus me invito facturs non est meus actus
This is another criminal law doctrine which means “an act done by me against
my will is not my act.”
The Court has expressly stated that a person who acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with
freedom. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a
mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force,
fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a

5
Daes, et. al., vs. We Ko, G.R. No. L-48817, January 22, 1943.
6
Atty. Manzanaris vs. People, G.R. No. L-64750, January 30, 1984.
character as to leave no opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal
7
combat.
7. Strictissimi juris
The plain and simple interpretation of this maxim is “follow the law strictly.”
8
The Court has ruled in Catholic Church vs. Hastings and reiterated in Esso
9
Standard Eastern, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs that exemption from
taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly
construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from
taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris.
Justice Sanchez, in the Esso Standard case, said that “the drive of petitioner's
argument is that marketing of its gasoline product 'is corollary to or incidental to its
industrial operations.' But this contention runs smack against the familiar rules that
exemption from taxation is not favored, and that exemptions in tax statutes are never
presumed. Which are but statements in adherence to the ancient rule that exemptions
from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority.”
8. Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege
Another criminal law doctrine is nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege
which means that “there is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a
law.” The term “punished by law” should be understood to mean “punished by the
Revised Penal Code.” 10
The maxim nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It is in
accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an
indispensable corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the
essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear
definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be imposed-a
penalty, to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body

7
People vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999.
8
5 Phil 701.
9
G.R. No. L-21841, October 28, 1966.
10
L. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code: Criminal La w, Book One Articles 1-113, p. 36.
alone. So constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdiction rather than
guvernaculum. The judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must be aware of
the limitation on its own power. 11
9. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat
This maxim is found under the Civil Code12 which translates to “ignorance of the
law excuses no one.”
In the case of Ocampo vs. Judge Arcaya-Chua,13 the respondent Judge issued a
Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan. But under
the laws, a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a husband against his wife. Ocampo
charges respondent Judge herein of gross ignorance of the law.
The Court ruled in favor of Ocampo and said that under the VAWC law, a TPO
cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife. It was further said that When the
law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less
than that would be constitutive of gross ignorance of the law. Respondent Judge is not
excused from ignorance of the law.

10. Cessante rationi legis, cessat et ipsa lex

This maxim means “when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.”

In the case of People vs. Fronda, 14 The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded
the Agricultural Tenancy Law (except as qualified in sections 4 and 35 of the Code).
The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished share tenancy subject to
certain conditions indicated in section 4 thereof. It is significant that section 39 is not
reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals "all laws or
part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.

Under the leasehold system the prohibition against pre-threshing has no, more
raison d'etre because the lessee is obligated to pay a fixed rental as prescribed in
11
People vs. Cabural, G.R. No. L-34105, February 4, 1983.
12
Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Philippines – Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
13
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2630-RTJ, April 23, 2010
14
G.R No. L. 26551, February 27, 1976.
section 34 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, or the Code of Agrarian Reforms, as
redesignated in Republic Act No. 6389 which took effect on September 10, 1971. T hus,
the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex applies to this case.