SUBJECT: Constitutional Law 1
TOPIC: Power of Control
TITLE: Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc v. Pano, et al.
CITATION: G.R. No. L-27811, 27 November 1967
FACTS:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-
hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan,
Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a
portion (392.7569 hectares) of the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially
released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural
land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants 2 applied
for the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose
Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are
actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales
application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict,
rendered a decision on July 31, 1956, giving due course to the application
of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his
companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on
appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the
appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b] y authority of the
President," decided the controversy, modified the decision of the
Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for
their very existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made
improvements"; and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern
portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with
Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to
the corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this
portion."
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not plaintiff is correct the decision of Director of Lands is
conclusive if approved by Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
2. Whether or not the decision of the Executive Secretary is an undue
delegation of presidential power.
3. Whether or not Executive Secretary, of equal in rank to other
department head, can intrude into the zone of action allocated to
another department head.
RULING:
1. Plaintiff’s position is incorrect.
The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So,
too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that
department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint
them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he
controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over,
confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department
secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot
rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to the Office of
the President. This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In
one, the decision of the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was
considered superseded by that of the President's on appeal. In other
cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was
considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-
exhaustion of all administrative remedies.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President
reposes upon the President's power of control over the executive
departments. 8 And control simply means "the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter."
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot
undo an act of his department secretary.
2.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the
President must exercise in person. 10 Not as correct, however, is it to say
that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary acts
which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. 11
Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to
perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which
assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that
"under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and
in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may
issue.
3. Yes.
This argument betrays lack of appreciation of the fact that where, as in
this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President,"
his decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive
Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may rightfully say
that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless
the action taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"
that remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully
assailed. No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the
record of this case.
