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VOL. 429, MAY 27, 2004 773

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

*
G.R. No. 154674. May 27, 2004.

THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs.

FELICISIMO O. JOSON, JR., in his capacity as former
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA), respondent.

Public Officers; Civil Service; While it is conceded that the

appointment of a particular employee was contractual only, the
fact that the CSC approved the same under a Coterminous-
Temporary status makes the employee’s appointment valid.—With
the foregoing, it can not be said that for want of a college degree
as required under MC No. 38, s. 1993 for confidential/personal
positions, Ong’s appointment was in contravention of the CSC
Law and its rules. While it is conceded that the respondent
intended the appointment of Ong to be contractual only, the
petitioner approved the same in Resolution No. 956978, under a
Coterminous-Temporary status. The appointment of Ong on July
1, 1995, is, therefore, valid.
Same; Same; Statutes; Attrition Law (Republic Act No. 7430);
Words and Phrases; Attrition is defined as the reduction of
personnel as a result of resignation, retirement, dismissal in
accordance with existing laws, death or transfer to another office;
Appointments to newly-created positions are not covered by the
Attrition Law.—But even a cursory reading of Section 3 of Rep.
Act No. 7430 will readily show that it applies only to
appointments to fill vacant position in a government office as a
result of resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to
another office of an officer or employee within five years from the
approval of the law. Under the law, attrition is defined as the
reduction of personnel as a result of resignation, retirement,
dismissal in accordance with existing laws, death or transfer to
another office. The appointment of Ong to the position of the
Executive Assistant IV in the Office of the respondent is not
covered by Rep. Act No. 7430 because Ong was appointed to a
newly-created position as part of the confidential/personal staff of
the respondent. The position was approved by the DBM. The
petitioner attested the appointment as coterminous temporary.
The position to which Ong was appointed was not rendered
vacant as a result of the resignation, retirement, dismissal, death
or transfer of an employee to another office, as provided by the
law. Thus, the petitioner cannot argue that the respondent
violated the Attrition Law in appointing Ong.

_______________

* EN BANC.

774

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774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; It is the

cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute’s clauses and
phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole.—The law must not be read in truncated parts; its
provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is the
cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute’s clauses and
phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious
whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with other parts of the statute and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
Same; Same; Appointments; De Jure and De Facto Officers;
Words and Phrases; One validly appointed to a position is a de
jure officer and not a de facto officer; A de facto officer is one who
is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color
of authority, and by color of authority is meant that derived from
an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.—Having been validly
appointed to the position of Executive Assistant IV in the Office of
the respondent, Ong is a de jure officer and not a de facto officer
as held by the Court of Appeals. The broad definition of what
constitutes an officer de facto was formulated by Lord Holt in
Parker v. Kent, and reiterated by Lord Ellenborough and full
King’s Bench in 1865 in Rex v. Bedford Level, “One who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a good
officer in point of law.” A de facto officer is one who is in
possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of
authority. By color of authority is meant that derived from an
election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that
the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between
the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto
officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may
be likened to the difference between character and reputation.
One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him.” It
is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an
officer de facto from a usurper. Being a de jure officer, Ong is
entitled to receive all the salaries and emoluments appertaining
to the position.
Same; Same; Same; An appointment issued in accordance
with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon
its issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has
assumed the duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive
his salary at once, without awaiting the approval of his
appointment by the Commission.—Irrefragably, Ong assumed the
position and discharged her functions as Executive Assistant IV
on July 1, 1995. Thenceforth, she was entitled to the payment of
her salary, as provided for in Section 10 of Rule V of the Omnibus
Rules of the

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

Civil Service Commission on the matter of Appointments, viz.: An

appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and rules
shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the appointing
authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties of the
position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once, without
awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The
appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the
Commission. In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier
than the date of its issuance.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for petitioner.
     Marilyn V. Gallanosa for respondent.
     Rammex C. Tiglao O.E. Legal Counsel.

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

1
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated August 12, 2002 reversing
Resolution No. 002778 of the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) which denied the respondent’s request for payment
of the salary of Priscilla Ong, as Executive Assistant IV in
the Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administrator (POEA) for the period of July 1, 1995 to
October 31, 1995.
The antecedents are as follows.
On July 1, 1995, Respondent Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr.,
then Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) appointed Priscilla
Ong as Executive Assistant IV in his office under a
contractual status. The appointment was made after the
Department of Budget and 2
Management (DBM) thru
Director Miguel B. Doctor approved his request for the
creation of a contractual position of Executive Assistant IV
at the Office of the POEA Administrator, effective not
earlier than July 1, 1995.
Subsequently, respondent Joson wrote the CSC
requesting exemption from the rule requiring appointees to
confidential staff

_______________

1 Penned by Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona with Associate Justices

Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Rodrigo V. Cosico concurring.
2 Rollo, p. 48.

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776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

3
positions to meet the prescribed educational qualification.
The educational requirement for the position of Executive
4
Assistant is a “Bachelor’s degree relevant to the job” and
Priscilla Ong was not a college degree holder.
Acting upon this request, the petitioner CSC issued
Resolution No. 956978 on November 2, 1995, approving the

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appointment of Ong under a Coterminous Temporary

status:

In this case, it is clear that Ong does not meet the educational
qualification for the position of Executive Assistant IV. However,
considering that Ong has to her credit 65 units leading to a
Bachelor’s degree and that the said position is coterminous with
the appointing authority and belongs to his confidential/personal
staff, the proposed appointment of Ong may be allowed under
Coterminous Temporary status.
WHEREFORE, the instant request of Administrator Felicisimo
O. Joson, Jr. is hereby granted. Accordingly, the appointment of
Priscilla E. Ong to the position of Executive Assistant IV,
5
POEA,
may be approved under Coterminous Temporary status.

However, on February 6, 1996, Director Nelson Acebedo of

the CSC National Capital Region (NCR) issued a post audit
report on the issuance of Ong’s appointment made on July
1, 1995, and invalidated the same. A motion for
reconsideration was filed, stressing, among others, that the
Department of Budget Management (DBM) allowed the
POEA to create such a position not earlier than July 1,
1995 and that no less than the petitioner itself approved
the appointment under a coterminous temporary status.
Upon the instructions of Director Acebedo, the effectivity of
Ong’s appointment 6
was changed from July 1, 1995 to
November 2, 1995.
Considering the said adjustment in the effectivity date
of Ong’s appointment, the respondent then requested
approval for the pay-

_______________

3 Item 9(c), Part II, Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993 which
reads:

“Appointees to confidential/personal staff must meet only the educational

requirements prescribed under CSC MC #14, s. 1993. The civil service eligibility,
experience, training and other requirements are dispensed with.”

4 Rollo, p. 33.
5 Id., at p. 34.
6 Id., at p. 35.

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

ment of her salary for services rendered for the period of

July 1, 1995 to October 31, 1995.
The petitioner denied the request for the payment of
Ong’s7 salary in Resolution No. 974094 dated October 16,
1997. Citing Rep. Act No. 7430 also known as the Attrition
Law which, in part, states that no appointment shall be
made to fill up8
a vacancy unless an authority has been
granted by it, the petitioner posited that the authority to
fill the position was granted only on November 2, 1995
when it issued CSC Resolution No. 956978. The request for
the payment of salary referred to the period prior to the
date of authority to fill the position; such claim cannot,
therefore, be allowed. The petitioner concluded that, as the
appointing authority, it is the respondent who shall be

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personally liable for the payment of salaries as provided in

Item 5(a), Part I, CSC MC No. 38, s. 1993, which states:

5. Liability of Appointing Authority and Other

Officers

a. The appointing authority shall be personally liable

for the salary of appointees whose appointments
have been disapproved for violation
9
of pertinent
laws such as RA 7041 and RA 7430.

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, averring

that Ong was appointed to a newly-created position which
does not require any such authority from the petitioner.
The respondent emphasized in his motion that the DBM
approved the creation of the position for Ong. He asserted
that, if at all, it is the POEA who should be liable under the
principle of quantum meruit since the latter was the one
benefited. Thus:

Admittedly, the herein movant requested an Authority to fill the

said position which was not necessary under the premise since the
position involved was a newly created position. In the first place,
the Department of Budget and Management through the Director
of CPCB granted the request for the creation of said position due
to the dire need and necessity of said provision. POEA could not
have transgressed any provision of RA 7430 and its implementing
rules when POEA appointed Ms. Ong to the said newly created
position on July 1, 1995 . . . .

_______________

7 Id., at pp. 35-37.

8 Id., at p. 36.
9 Id., at p. 37.

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

. . . POEA should pay Ms. Ong for her services since POEA was
the one benefited not the herein movant in his personal capacity.
The principle of quantum meruit dictates that not only is the one
who rendered services who should paid (sic) but equally
important, is that the one benefited from such services must be
the one who should pay the services. If the herein movant would
be made personally liable to pay for her services, just the same, it
is tantamount to unjust enrichment
10
on the part of the government
at the movant’s expense . . .

On June 8, 1998, the petitioner issued Resolution No.

981399 denying
11
the respondent’s motion for
reconsideration. It affirmed its ruling that the effectivity
date of Ong’s appointment should be reckoned from
November 2, 1995 when it granted the authority to the
respondent to fill the position, and not July 1, 1995 as
asserted by the respondent. It also declared that Ong’s
appointment was not included in the POEA’s Report on
Personnel Action (ROPA) submitted to the petitioner for
the month of July 1995:

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POEA, as an accredited agency is mandated by CSC rules to

submit within fifteen (15) days of each ensuing month to the Civil
Service Regional office of Field Office concerned two copies of
Monthly Report on Personnel Action, together with certified true
copy of appointments acted upon (Item, 2.2.7, Rule V, CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1994). In the instant case, POEA
failed to comply with this rule when 12
it did not include the
appointment of Ong in its July ROPA.

The petitioner also held that the POEA only submitted

Ong’s appointment in its ROPA for the month of November
1995. Such belated
13
report rendered the appointment in
July ineffective. The petitioner concluded that there was
clearly no legal basis for the payment of Ong’s salary prior
to November 2, 1995, and that the principle of quantum
meruit invoked by the respondent was not applicable.

_______________

10 Id., at p. 39.
11 Id., at pp. 38-41.
12 Id., at p. 40.
13 Rule V, Item 2.2.9 of the Implementing Guidelines in the CSC
Accreditation Program reads as follows:

“That appointment issued within the month but not listed in the ROPA for the
said month shall become ineffective thirty days from issuance.” (Rollo, p. 40.)

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

The respondent moved for a clarification of CSC Resolution

No. 981399, pointing out that the petitioner did not rule on
the matter of POEA’s alleged violation of the Attrition Law,
particularly on the failure to secure “prior authority to fill.”
The respondent asserted that the POEA’s alleged failure to
include the proposed appointment of Ong in its July 1995
ROPA was justified because Ong’s appointment was still
the subject of a request for exemption from the
requirement of Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 38, s.
1993. The respondent received CSC Resolution No. 956978
approving Ong’s appointment under a coterminous
temporary status only on November 5, 1995; hence, the
appointment was included only in the November ROPA.
The respondent pointed out that the task and duty of
preparing and submitting the monthly ROPA lies with the
officials of the Personnel Department of the POEA. Finally,
the respondent averred, if there was, indeed, a failure to
comply with the CSC Circular No. 27, Series of 1994, it
would be quite unfair and unjust for the petitioner to order
the respondent to pay the salary of Ong out of his (the
respondent’s) personal funds.
The petitioner denied the motion of the respondent in
Resolution No. 991839 dated August 17, 1999. It held that
the respondent as the appointing authority, was
accountable for all the appointments he issued; he cannot,
thus, hide behind the mistakes of his subordinates. The
petitioner also reiterated its ruling that the appointment of
Ong was made in violation of the CSC Law and its rules.
As such, the respondent must assume responsibility for the
payment of Ong’s salary. Thus:
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“WHEREFORE, the CSC Resolution No. 981399 dated June 8,

1998 is hereby clarified. Accordingly, the payment of salaries,
benefits and other emoluments from July 1, 1995 to October 30,
1995 of Priscilla Ong, whose appointment was in violation of R.A.
7430 (Attrition Law), shall be the 14
personal liability of then
Administrator Felicisimo O. Joson.”

The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the

resolution. The petitioner treated the pleading as a second
motion for reconsideration, and denied the same in
Resolution No. 001956 dated August 30, 2000, in this wise:

_______________

14 Rollo, p. 45.

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780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

“WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration of

Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr. is hereby DENIED. Accordingly,
15
the CSC
Resolution No. 974094 dated October 16,1997 stands.”

The petitioner filed another motion seeking for the

reconsideration of the CSC Resolution No. 991839 pointing
out that Ong may be considered a de facto public officer
who is entitled to the payment of salaries for actual
services rendered. The CSC outrightly denied the motion in
CSC Resolution No. 002778 dated December 13, 2000:

“WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, CSC Resolution No.
991839 dated August 17,16
1999 stands. This case is considered
closed and terminated.”

Unfazed, the respondent appealed the CSC resolutions to

the Court of Appeals. On August 12, 2002, the CA rendered
the assailed judgment in favor of herein respondent, ruling
that Ong was considered a de facto officer and is entitled to
the payment of her salary. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for

review is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 002778 dated 13
December 2000 rendered by public respondent Civil Service
Commission, denying payment of Miss Priscilla Ong’s
compensation
17
from 1 July 1995 to 31 October 1995, is hereby SET
ASIDE.”

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the lone

issue that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING

THAT PRISCILLA ONG IS ENTITLED TO PAYMENT OF HER
SALARIES FROM THE GOVERNMENT FOR BEING A DE
FACTO OFFICER.

The petitioner maintains that Ong cannot be entitled to the

payment of salary prior to November 2, 1995 because of the
following: (a) Ong did not possess the necessary
qualification for the position; (b) her appointment was

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made in violation of the Civil Service Law and its rules; (c)
there was no prior authority to ap-

_______________

15 Id., at p. 47.
16 Id., at p. 50.
17 Id., at p. 32.

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

point, in violation of Rep. Act No. 7430; and, (d) the

appointment was not reported in the July ROPA, making
such appointment ineffective.
We rule for the respondent.
The records show that the position of Executive
Assistant IV in the POEA Administrator’s office was
created with the approval of the DBM on July 1, 1995. This
was pursuant to a request made by the respondent for a
position in his office under a contractual status. It is quite
apparent that the respondent intended the position for his
confidential assistant, Priscilla Ong, whom he considered
efficient and competent on the job, albeit without a college
degree. The respondent was aware of the appointee’s lack
of qualification which is precisely the reason why he
requested for an exemption from the requirements of the
MC No. 38 s. 1993, particularly on the educational
requirement of appointees to confidential staff positions.
On November 2, 1995, the petitioner granted the
respondent’s request and stated that the appointment of
Ong may 18
be approved under a coterminous temporary
status.

_______________

18 Chapter II, Section 6 (2) of the Civil Service Law provides that
service in the government is classified under career or non-career.

Section 9. Non-Career Service.—The Non-Career Service shall be characterized by

(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified
by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to
his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made.

The Non-Career Service shall include:

(1) Elective officials and their personnel or confidential staff;

(2) Secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal or confidential staff(s);

(3) Chairmen and members of commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;

(4) Contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in

accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job, requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished
within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and performs or
accomplishes

782

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782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

The task of the petitioner is to insure that the appointee

has all the qualifications for19 the position; otherwise it
disapproves the appointment. In this case, the petitioner
approved the appointment of Ong under a coterminous
temporary status; coterminous, because the appointment
shall only be during the tenure of the appointing power;
and temporary, because the appointee did not meet all the
requirements for the position. As such, the appointment
could be recalled anytime. The petitioner took into account
the fact that Ong was then enrolled in CAP College, Makati
City and had 65 units credited to her leading to a four-year
course in Bachelor of Science in Business Administration,
and that she just needed 61 units more to complete the
same.
Under Section 4, Rule V of the Omnibus Rules, Ong’s
appointment is in order, viz.:

_______________

the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction
and supervision from the hiring agency;
(5) Emergency and seasonal personnel.

Sec. 27. Employment Status.—Appointment in the career service shall

be permanent or temporary.

1) Permanent appointment.—A permanent appointment shall be

issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position
to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate
eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law,
rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof.
2) Temporary appointment.—In the absence of appropriate eligibles
and it becomes necessary on the public interest to fill a vacancy, a
temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed
except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such
temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the
appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible
becomes available.

Section 14. An appointment may also be coterminous which shall be

issued to a person whose entrance and continuity in the service is based
on the trust and confidence of the appointing authority or that which is
subject to his pleasure, or co-existent with his tenure, or limited by the
duration of project or subject to the availability of funds. (Rule V, of the
Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and other
pertinent Civil Service Laws).
19 See Mathay v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 703 (1999).

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

Except as otherwise provided herein, a person who meets all the

requirements of the position including the appropriate civil
service eligibility shall be appointed to a position in the first and
second levels. However, when the immediate filling of a vacancy
becomes necessary, taking into account the public interest, and a

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person with an appropriate civil service eligibility is not actually

and immediately available, a person without the appropriate civil
service eligibility but who meets the other requirements of the
position may be appointed. His appointment shall be temporary for
a period of not more than twelve (12) months and he may be
replaced at any time with one who has an appropriate civil service
eligibility.

In approving the appointment of Ong, the petitioner took

into account the exigency and urgency of filling up the
position of Executive Assistant, as embodied in the letter of
the respondent for exemption from MC No. 38:

Our request for exemption from MC #38 series of 1993 is

anchored on the fact that I have no regular holder of an Executive
Assistant, although it is included in the POEA budget. As earlier
mentioned in our letter-request, as the administrationship of
POEA keeps on changing, the Executive Assistant post remains
attached to another employee who can not be asked to vacate the
post because of the security of tenure of the incumbent at the time
the Executive Assistant post was declared confidential in nature.
We recognize and support the reason behind the promulgation of
CSC MC #38 series 1993. However, please consider the
circumstances behind this request for exemption. Ms. Ong has
been the holder of the position since my appointment last July
1992 under the Ramos government.
May I reiterate that the position of Ms. Ong is temporary in
nature and co-terminous with my term. Moreover, she is now
enrolled at the 20
CAP College taking up BS in Business
Administration.

The respondent reiterated the urgency of Ong’s

appointment in his letter-request for the payment of Ong’s
salary:

. . . Please note that the Office of the Administrator is the center

of all communications coming in and out of POEA as well as the
focal point of all major activities whether internal or external
concerns. As such, the smooth operations of this office would not
have been possible without the able and dedication of Ms. Ong
who faithfully discharged her gargantuan duties as Executive
Assistant to the highest official of POEA. It would be

_______________

20 Rollo, p. 32.

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

an injustice to Ms. Ong if she is not properly compensated 21

for a
job very well done especially in such a sensitive position.

With the foregoing, it can not be said that for want of a

college degree as required under MC No. 38, s. 1993 for
confidential/personal positions, Ong’s appointment was in
contravention of the CSC Law and its rules. While it is
conceded that the respondent intended the appointment of
Ong to be contractual only, the petitioner approved the
same in Resolution No. 956978, under a Coterminous-
Temporary status. The appointment of Ong on July 1,
1995, is, therefore, valid.
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We reject the petitioner’s contention that Ong’s

appointment was invalid since the respondent appointed
her to the position without first securing an “authority to
fill” as mandated by the second to the last paragraph of
Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7430. The said provision reads:

SECTION 3. Attrition.—Within five (5) years from the approval of

the Act, no appointment shall be made to fill vacated
positions in any government office as a result of
resignation, retirement, dismissal, death or transfer to
another office of an officer or employee: Provided, however,
That this prohibition shall not apply in the following instances:

(a) Where the position is head of a primary organic unit such

as chief of division;
(b) Where the position is the lone position in the
organizational unit and it corresponds to a particular
expertise that is intrinsic to the desired basic capability of
the unit concerned;
(c) Where the positions are basic positions for the initial
operations of newly created or activated agencies or, in the
case of other agencies, where the positions are vital and
necessary for the continued and efficient operation of said
agencies;
(d) Where the positions are difficult to fill considering the
qualifications required therefore, as in the case of doctors,
lawyers and other professionals;
(e) Where the positions are found in agencies declared to be
understaffed;
(f) Positions in Congress or in the Judiciary;
(g) Appointments or designations extended by the President;

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21 Id., at p. 35.

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

(h) Where the positions are found in local government units;

(i) Teaching personnel; and
(j) Where the replacement come from existing employees.

Provided, further, That the exemptions from this prohibition

shall require authorization by the Civil Service Commission;
Provided, finally, That no appointment shall be issued by the
appointing authority nor approved by22 the Civil Service
Commission without said authorization.
Appointments made in violation of this Act shall be null and
void.

In CSC Resolution No. 974094, the petitioner denied the

respondent’s motion for the POEA to pay Ong’s salary
based on the second to the last paragraph of Section 3, viz.:

The Commission further finds no merit in the request because of

the mandatory provision of Republic Act 7430 (Attrition Law)
which states as follows:
No appointment shall be made to fill up a23vacancy unless an
authority has been granted by the Commission.

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But even a cursory reading of Section 3 of Rep. Act No.

7430 will readily show that it applies only to appointments
to fill vacant position in a government office as a result of
resignation, retirement, dismissal, death, or transfer to
another office of an officer or employee within five years
from the approval of the law. Under the law, attrition is
defined as the reduction of personnel as a result of
resignation, retirement, dismissal in accordance 24
with
existing laws, death or transfer to another office.
The appointment of Ong to the position of the Executive
Assistant IV in the Office of the respondent is not covered
by Rep. Act No. 7430 because Ong was appointed to a
newly-created position as part of the confidential/personal
staff of the respondent. The position was approved by the
DBM. The petitioner attested the appointment as
coterminous temporary. The position to which Ong was
appointed was not rendered vacant as a result of the
resignation, retirement, dismissal, death or transfer of an
employee to another office, as provided by the law. Thus,
the petitioner cannot

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22 Emphasis supplied.
23 Id., at p. 36.
24 Section 2, R.A. 7430.

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786 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

argue that the respondent violated the Attrition Law in

appointing Ong.
The law must not be read in truncated parts; its
provisions must be read in relation to the whole law. It is
the cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute’s
clauses and phrases must not be taken as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof
must be considered in fixing the meaning25 of any of its parts
in order to produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context,
i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered
together with other parts of the statute and kept 26
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
We find the respondent’s justification for the failure of
the POEA to include Ong’s appointment in its ROPA for
July 1995 as required by CSC Memorandum Circular No.
27, Series of 1994 to be in order. The records show that the
POEA did not include the contractual appointment of Ong
in its July ROPA because its request for exemption from
the educational requisite for confidential staff members
provided in MC No. 38 had yet been resolved by the CSG.
The resolution of the petitioner granting such request was
received only in November, 1995. The POEA, thereafter,
reported the appointment in its November, 1995 ROPA.
Having been validly appointed to the position of
Executive Assistant IV in the Office of the respondent, Ong
is a de jure officer and not a de facto officer as held by the
Court of Appeals. The broad definition of what constitutes
an officer
27
de facto was formulated by Lord Holt in Parker v.
Kent, and reiterated by Lord Ellenborough and full King’s
28
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28
Bench in 1865 in Rex v. Bedford Level, “One who has the
reputation of being the officer he assumes and yet is not a
good officer in point of law.” A de facto officer is one who is
in possession of the29 office and discharging its duties under
color of authority. By color of authority is meant that
derived from an election or appointment, however irregular
or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer.
The difference between

_______________

25 Yamaoka v. Pescarich Manufacturing Corp., 361 SCRA 672 (2001).

26 Paras v. Commission on Elections, 264 SCRA 49 (1996).
27 Ld. Raymond 652, 12 Mod. 467.
28 6 East, 376.
29 State v. Dates, 57 N.W. 296 (1983).

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Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a

de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on
reputation. It may be likened to the difference between
character and reputation. One is the30 truth of a man, the
other is what is thought of him.” It is the color of
authority, not the color of31title that distinguishes an officer
de facto from a usurper. Being a de jure officer, Ong is
entitled to receive all the 32
salaries and emoluments
appertaining to the position.
Irrefragably, Ong assumed the position and discharged
her functions as Executive Assistant IV on July 1, 1995.
Thenceforth, she was entitled to the payment of her salary,
as provided for in Section 10 of Rule V of the Omnibus
Rules of the Civil Service Commission on the matter of
Appointments, viz.:

An appointment issued in accordance with pertinent laws and

rules shall take effect immediately upon its issuance by the
appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the duties
of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once,
without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the
Commission. The appointment shall remain effective until
disapproved by the Commission. In no case shall 33
an appointment
take effect earlier than the date of its issuance.

MC No. 38, s. 1993, likewise reads:

7. Effectivity of Appointment

a. The effectivity of an appointment shall be the date

of actual assumption by the appointee but not
earlier than the date of issuance of the
appointment, which is the date of signing by the
appointing authority.
b. No appointment shall be made earlier than the date
of issuance, except in the case of change of status in
view of qualifying in written examination, the
effectivity of which is the date of release of the
result of the examination. However, the issuance of
such appointments shall be within the period of the

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temporary appointment or provided the temporary

appointment has not yet expired. . .

Moreover, the Court of Appeals took note of CSC

Resolution No. 953263 dated May 23, 1995 which states,
thus:

_______________

30 Ridout v. State, 30 S.W. 2d. 255 (1930).

31 Ekern v. McGovern, 142 N.W. 595 (1913).
32 Lecaros v. Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA 407 (1999).
33 Italics supplied.

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788 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Civil Service Commission vs. Joson, Jr.

. . . If the appointment was disapproved on grounds which do not

constitute a violation of the civil service law, such as the failure of
the appointee to meet the Qualification Standards (QS) prescribed
for the position, the same is considered effective until
disapproved by the Commission or any of its regional or
field offices. The appointee is meanwhile entitled to
payment of salaries from the government. Furthermore, if a
motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the disapproval is
seasonably filed with the proper office the appointment is still
considered to be effective. The disapproval 34becomes final only
after the same is affirmed by the Commission.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is

DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals,
insofar as it is consistent with this Decision, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

          Vitug (Actg. C.J.), Panganiban, Quisumbing,

Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna and Tinga, JJ.,
concur.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.) and Puno, J., On Official Leave.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Notes.—Compliance with the legal requirements for an

appointment to a civil service position is essential in order
to make it fully effective, and until an appointment has
become a completed act, it would be precipitate to invoke
the rule on security of tenure. (Tomali vs. Civil Service
Commission, 238 SCRA 572 [1994])
There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure
office, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure
office. (Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan, 249 SCRA 342 [1995])

——o0o——

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34 Id., at p. 31 (emphasis supplied).

789

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