The Perception and Evaluation of Visual Art
The Perception and Evaluation of Visual Art
HENRIK HAGTVEDT
University of Georgia, Athens
REIDAR HAGTVEDT
Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta
VANESSA M. PATRICK
University of Georgia, Athens
ABSTRACT
Visual art is a complex stimulus. Drawing on extant theory that the interplay
of affect and cognition evoked by a stimulus drives evaluations, we develop
a generalizable model for the perception and evaluation of visual art. In
three stages, we develop scaled measurements for the affective and cognitive
components involved in the perception of visual art and present a structural
equation model that integrates these components in art evaluation.
The nature of art has been a topic of philosophical interest since the days of the
ancient Greeks. Yet the experience of art, and consequently the perception and
evaluation of art, seems particularly challenging to comprehend within a scientific
framework. Previous research has nonetheless made much progress toward
a psychological understanding of art perception and aesthetic appreciation
(Funch, 1997). The current research builds on this work to develop a struc-
tural model for the perception and evaluation of visual art. Since the visual
experience of art arguably includes both cognitive and emotional components
(Baltissen & Ostermann, 1998; Silvia 2005a), the proposed model incorporates
both these elements.
197
IDENTIFYING ART
An antecedent to the notion of art as a distinct category was merely the
perceived difference between nature and human activity, and throughout much of
history the modern distinction between “art” and “craft” was virtually nonexistent
(Hauser, 1999). During medieval times, painting and sculpture were taught in
artisans’ guilds, music was often placed in the same category as math, and poetry
was grouped with rhetoric and grammar. It was not until the mid-eighteenth
century that Abbé Batteux presented a separate classification of fine arts con-
sisting of music, poetry, painting, sculpture, and dance (Shrum, 1996). One of the
THE PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF VISUAL ART / 199
distinguishing marks of these disciplines was that they had pleasure rather
than utility as the main goal, and their classification as the fine arts came to be
disseminated throughout Europe.
Today the notion of art as a special category of human activity, with a unique
influence on viewers, still remains. However, it seems doubtful whether scholars
will ever agree on a definition for this category. For instance, Wartenberg (2006)
discusses 29 different perspectives on what does or does not constitute art.
He draws on philosophical viewpoints describing art as “imitation” (Plato),
“redemption” (Nietzsche), or “the communication of feeling” (Tolstoy), to more
recent views of art as “fetish” (Adrian Piper) or “virtual” (Douglas Davis).
However, in the current context it seems appropriate to define art from the
viewers’ perspective: that art is that which is categorized by the viewers as
such (Bourdieu & Darbel, 1997; Dewey, 1989).
In a descriptive survey conducted by Hagtvedt and Patrick (2008), 77 par-
ticipants representative of our sample population were given a sorting task and
asked to distinguish art images from non-art images and to describe why they
considered certain images to be art and others to be non-art. A variety of artworks,
ranging from Renaissance to modern works, were used as stimuli. Respondents
consistently asserted that art images are expressive (“emotion,” “expression”),
that the manner of creation is a central feature of an artwork (“talent,” “creativity
and skill,” “I couldn’t do it”), while making a statement without this manner
(“symbol . . . not creativity and skill”) is not enough to constitute art. Based on
these self-reports, on a review of art history (e.g., Tansey & Kleiner, 1996), and
on our own experience and research, we suggest that artworks may be identified
as works perceived as embodying human expression, where a perceived main
feature of the work is the manner of its creation and/or execution rather than
just a concept, idea, or message underlying it or conveyed by it, and where this
manner is not primarily driven by any other contrived function or utility. Other
works may depend on a context, such as being placed in a gallery, for their
impact, but in the current research it seems more useful to focus on works
considered to be art by the viewer whether they are hanging in a museum or
anywhere else.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we discuss the conceptual background for the main components
of the art perception and evaluation process: cognition and affect.
Affect
how positive or negative it is. The influence of affect is typically congruent with
its valence, such that a positive feeling leads to a positive evaluation while a
negative feeling gives rise to a negative evaluation. The arousal potential of
an emotion is defined as a feeling state of activation that varies from drowsiness
to frantic excitement (Mehrabian & Russell, 1974), and LeDoux (1996) dis-
cusses the existence of at least five arousal systems in the brain contributing
to emotional experience. Previous research has established that arousal, in
addition to the valence of emotion, may influence information processing and
evaluation (Sonbonmatsu & Kardes, 1988). Pham, Cohen, Pracejus, and Hughes
(2001) argue that while many studies show that the direction of preferences
may be tied to the valence of feelings toward a given target, the strength of these
preferences may be tied to the level of arousal elicited by that target. Indeed,
a substantial amount of research suggests that the arousal experienced at a
given point in time accentuates or polarizes subsequent affective and evaluative
responses (Reisenzein, 1983).
does not focus on lower-order cognitions, but it investigates how emotions inform
the more detailed cognitive assessment of perceived attributes. We would expect
that while the cognitive assessment of an artwork’s perceived attributes does
not depend entirely on the emotions evoked from viewing it, the evoked emotions
are likely to influence the cognitive judgment to some degree.
The current research thus continues an investigation of arts and aesthetics with
roots in Berlyne’s (1971, 1974) tradition of experimental aesthetics; a tradition
that has sparked a variety of debates about alternative theories of aesthetic
experience (e.g., Boselie, 1991; Martindale, Moore, & Borkum, 1990; North
& Hargreaves, 2000; Silvia, 2005b). Indeed, as Cupchik (1988) noted,
Berlyne’s suspicion of cognitive psychology may have hindered the study of
how cognitions and emotions interact in aesthetic contexts. Later work, although
indebted to Berlyne’s pioneering efforts, has reopened this rich and promising
area of research.
An alternative to Berlyne’s psychobiological framework is the prototypicality
model of aesthetic experience (Martindale et al., 1990). According to this model,
preference for an artwork is determined by the work’s perceived typicality
rather than by its collative features. However, as Silvia (2005a) argues, this model
shares many of the arousal model’s limitations, and it does not seem nuanced
enough to capture the complexity of aesthetic experience. For instance, even if
high typicality leads to positive emotions, it seems difficult to predict what kinds
of negative emotions will arise as a result of low typicality, as well as what this
may entail for the overall perception and evaluation of the artwork. This is
arguably also true of a model of aesthetic emotions according to which viewers
deem an artwork beautiful when they find it easy to process (Reber, Schwartz, &
Winkielman, 2004). It seems difficult to explain the diverse emotional reactions
to an artwork with a single cause, that is, ease of processing. A more nuanced
approach to experimental aesthetics is that of appraisal theory (Silvia, 2005a,
2005b), which assumes that evaluations of events, rather than the events
themselves, cause the emotional experience. In this view, artworks may be said
to affect emotions via their influence on appraisals. This diverges from the
Berlyne tradition, in which aesthetic response is tied to objective features of the
art object (Cupchik, 1988).
The interplay of affect and cognition is complex, and neither past research nor
the current research can be said to have captured this interplay fully. While it
seems reasonable that cognitive evaluations may give rise to emotional responses,
as suggested by, for instance, the prototypicality model and appraisal theory, the
current research emphasizes how emotions inform cognitive evaluations. For
instance, a viewer might deem an object fascinating in part because of the
excitement or thrill he feels upon viewing it, whether or not this thrill has yet
been explained by a conscious appraisal. This view is in line with neuropsycho-
logical evidence suggesting that preliminary affective responses precede cog-
nition (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1996).
THE PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF VISUAL ART / 203
Based on the above perspectives, the first step in the empirical investigation
was to generate a list of emotions and perceived attributes involved in the
perception and evaluation of artworks to use in the main studies. The initial stage
of item generation was entirely exploratory, relying on informal interviews with
a convenience sample of five art experts (artists and curators) and ten non-experts
to supply a list of items. Two separate pilot studies were conducted using these
emotions and attributes, with respondents viewing works of art and indicating
on 8-point Likert scales (0 = do not agree at all, 7 = agree strongly) the degree
to which they agreed that the artwork evoked the various emotions in them and
the degree to which they agreed that the various attributes were descriptive of the
artwork. The artworks used were chosen to represent a large range of differences
in style, medium and emotional content. The first pilot study was conducted
with a convenience sample of 11 respondents, aged 22 to 67, each filling out
three separate questionnaires based on three different artworks, resulting in
33 completed questionnaires. The second pilot study was conducted with a
convenience sample of 16 respondents, aged 20 to 68, each filling out four
separate questionnaires based on four different artworks, resulting in 64
completed questionnaires. This preliminary research was not intended to draw
any conclusions, but it supplied enough data to conduct exploratory factor
204 / HAGTVEDT, HAGTVEDT AND PATRICK
analyses and get rough indications of which emotions and attributes to include
for further evaluation.
The next step was to draw on extant literature to refine the list of emotions
(Ekman, 1999) and attributes (Funch, 1997; Tansey & Kleiner, 1996). This
refined list was additionally evaluated by a panel of ten experts: 6 artists, curators,
and/or art professors with higher education in fine arts and/or art theory, and
four PhDs with an interest in art. The resulting list of emotions and attributes was
used as the basis of a larger study in Stage 2.
The objective of this study was to further develop scales for the emotional
and cognitive components involved in the perception of visual art, as well as to
develop a structural equation model that combines these components in the
evaluation process.
Method
Results
Agitation .87
Stress .86
Anxiety .85
Tension .82
Uncertainty .56
Serenity .90
Contentment .89
Happiness .80
Joy .76
Stimulation .84
Eagerness .83
Enthusiasm .79
Excitement .75
Loneliness .87
Melancholy .77
Sadness .75
Despair .70
Imaginative .86
Creative .87
Inventive .80
Innovative .80
Original .75
Novel .66
Distinct .65
Beautiful .95
Aesthetically pleasing .95
Attractive .91
Elegant .62
Symmetrical .88
Rhythmic .79
Patterned .68
Unified .65
Balanced .60
Thought provoking .80
Intellectually stimulating .63
Interesting .53
Figure 1. Intermediate structural model (Stage 2). Please see Tables 1 and 2 for items.
208 / HAGTVEDT, HAGTVEDT AND PATRICK
used for this research: c2/df ratio, the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), the comparative
fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). For
the chi-square test it is difficult to obtain non-significant values in complex
problems (Marsh et al.). However, dividing the chi-square by the degrees of
freedom provides a measure of model fit, sometimes called the normed chi-square,
which is less sensitive to sample size (Kline, 2005). Values of 2.0, 3.0, or even
as high as 5.0 have been recommended as indicating reasonable fit (Bollen,
1989). The TLI was chosen based on Vandenberg and Scarpello (1990) and
on Marsh et al.’s evaluation of commonly used fit indices against the criteria
that ideal indices are ones that (a) are relatively independent of sample size,
(b) correctly mirror differences in fit, and (c) require an appropriate penalty
function for the inclusion of additional parameters. Popular indices such as the
goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted GFI (AGFI) and the root-mean-square
residual (RMSR) performed poorly in light of these criteria, while the TLI
closely meets the ideal criteria. Generally speaking, TLI values of .90 or higher
indicate adequate fit (Vandenberg & Scarpello). The CFI, one of the most widely
used fit statistics in structural equation modeling (SEM), assesses the relative
improvement in fit of the model in question compared with a baseline model.
Values greater than approximately .90 indicate reasonably good fit (Kline).
The RMSEA is a parsimony-adjusted index, with a noncentrality parameter
that reflects the degree of misspecification of the model in question. Values
between .05 and .08 suggest reasonable fit, while RMSEA £ .05 indicates close
approximate fit (Kline). The intermediate structural model resulted in a prom-
ising but inadequate fit (c2/df = 1699.24/759 = 2.24, TLI = .81, CFI = .82,
RMSEA = .09).
Discussion
The fit indices revealed an inadequate model fit. Although the c2/df ratio
was convincing, the other statistics were slightly outside of the acceptable
range. However, the model clearly showed promise, especially given that
it was based on five different stimuli. Recall that this was done to
maximize variability, to help ensure that the model would be generalizable
rather than specific to a particular stimulus. Although this was a reasonable
intermediate step, a fair test of the model must still be conducted with a single
stimulus.
Before conducting the final data collection, the factors were scrutinized,
and final minor adjustments were made in the items. The largest changes
concerned the Creativity factor, where three of the seven items were
deemed as redundant, and the Formal Execution factor, where it was
deemed that this factor only partially reflected a more general aspect of
evaluation, namely the perception of the technical skill with which the
artwork was executed.
THE PERCEPTION AND EVALUATION OF VISUAL ART / 209
Method
Stimulus and Procedure. A figurative painting, Bal du Moulin de la Galette
by Pierre-Auguste Renoir, identified as art in a pre-test with 12 undergraduates
(M = 7.6; 1 = no, 9 = yes), was chosen as the stimulus. Two hundred and eighty-
seven undergraduates participated in the survey. One participant answered with
a single score throughout the survey and was therefore removed. Thus, 286
surveys were included in the analysis. The procedure was the same as in the
previous study, except that this time the survey was completed online.
Results
Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on each individual construct
before combining them in the structural model. See Table 3 for fit indices and
factor loadings.
The structural model was set up following the same pattern as that of the
intermediate model (see Figure 2). As noted above, the only visible difference
between the two models is that the Formal Execution variable from the inter-
mediate model has been replaced with a general Skill variable in the final model.
Further, the same fit indices were used as those chosen for the intermediate model
(c2/df = 1093.82/540 = 2.03, TLI = .93, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .06). See Appendix 1
for the covariance matrix.
Discussion
All fit indices confirmed adequate fit for the final structural model. It
should be noted that any structural equation model is one of several possible
solutions, and that there may be alternative models which could conceivably
explain the same data. For instance, one might argue that there may be more
direct effects on overall evaluation, or that certain variables may correlate.
However, the current results represent strong support for the underlying theory
and the proposed model.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research develops scales for the emotional and cognitive components
involved in the perception of visual art and presents a structural equation model
that integrates these components in the evaluation process. Drawing on extant
theory regarding the interplay of affect and cognition, we develop a theoretical
210 / HAGTVEDT, HAGTVEDT AND PATRICK
Figure 2. Final structural model (Stage 3). Please see Table 3 for items.
212 / HAGTVEDT, HAGTVEDT AND PATRICK
perceived and judged. Future research may also expand on the current findings
by investigating how the perception and evaluation of visual art differs from
that of other arts. Further, within the category of visual art there are many
subcategories, in terms of for instance styles and time periods. Future research
may focus on differences in perception for the various categories. Finally, while
the current research focuses on untrained viewers, future research may investi-
gate more closely how training and expertise affect the perception and evaluation
of visual art.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank the editor and the reviewers for their helpful
insights on improving the manuscript and Robert J. Vandenberg and George M.
Zinkhan for their valuable comments.
APPENDIX 1: Covariance Matrix (Stage 3)
Ser Hap Joy Glad Lone Desp Sad Gloo Enth Exci Thri Anx Unce Unea Disq
Ser 3.51
Hap 1.32 2.72
Joy 1.12 2.34 2.77
Glad 1.00 2.03 2.04 2.94
Lone 0.32 –0.61 –0.42 –0.50 3.23
Desp 0.21 –0.67 –0.50 –0.57 1.60 2.16
Sad 0.12 –0.65 –0.45 –0.55 1.64 1.68 1.88
Gloo –0.05 –0.77 –0.58 –0.64 1.55 1.55 1.68 2.05
Enth 0.28 1.54 1.66 1.50 –0.35 –0.20 –0.33 –0.38 3.50
Exci 0.32 1.67 1.74 1.62 –0.62 –0.27 –0.45 –0.54 2.78 3.59
Thri 0.23 1.33 1.54 1.48 –0.43 –0.01 –0.07 –0.20 2.21 2.62 4.21
Anx –0.39 –0.63 –0.50 –0.51 1.45 1.41 1.41 1.61 0.06 –0.12 0.29 3.00
Unce –0.03 –0.81 –0.71 –0.56 1.74 1.58 1.56 1.64 –0.48 –0.48 –0.17 2.23 4.09
Unea –0.55 –1.03 –0.82 –0.84 1.53 1.55 1.51 1.62 –0.44 –0.44 –0.11 2.38 2.62 3.19
Disq 0.05 –0.51 –0.42 –0.45 1.43 1.40 1.42 1.56 –0.21 –0.29 –0.08 1.77 2.02 1.96 3.02
Inve 0.82 1.05 1.07 1.20 –0.01 1.18 0.10 –0.06 0.94 1.24 1.28 –0.09 0.05 –0.18 –0.30
Orig 0.55 0.87 0.82 0.81 –0.19 0.06 –0.06 –0.24 0.65 0.82 0.68 –0.36 –0.22 –0.29 –0.48
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Dist 0.69 0.84 0.92 0.83 –0.13 0.04 –0.01 –0.18 0.68 0.92 0.77 –0.26 –0.13 –0.14 –0.54
Crea 0.64 1.10 1.14 0.99 –0.42 –0.38 –0.29 –0.41 0.73 0.99 0.74 –0.63 –0.42 –0.59 –0.71
Beau 1.15 1.53 1.43 1.36 –0.63 –0.64 –0.59 –0.72 0.88 1.15 0.73 –1.25 –0.91 –1.41 –0.97
Aest 1.18 1.52 1.39 1.41 –0.47 –0.68 –0.64 –0.80 1.07 1.13 0.82 –1.23 –0.84 –1.40 –1.00
Attr 1.07 1.45 1.35 1.28 –0.55 –0.72 –0.62 –0.78 0.95 1.10 0.82 –1.20 –0.92 –1.36 –0.93
Appe 1.19 1.30 1.20 1.28 –0.39 –0.59 –0.50 –0.66 1.18 1.25 0.91 –0.90 –0.82 –1.14 –0.80
Intl 0.97 0.72 0.62 0.56 –0.10 –0.09 0.01 –0.19 0.67 0.73 0.78 –0.41 –0.42 –0.55 –0.43
Intr 0.61 1.11 1.06 1.03 –0.50 –0.58 –0.41 –0.50 0.85 0.96 1.01 –0.63 –0.59 –0.74 –0.66
Cur 0.53 0.96 0.96 0.94 –0.40 –0.36 –0.16 –0.25 0.85 1.10 1.18 –0.42 –0.19 –0.45 –0.49
Fasc 0.98 1.17 1.31 1.15 –0.20 –0.08 –0.06 –0.19 1.01 1.33 1.70 –0.33 –0.35 –0.46 –0.45
Skil 0.58 0.99 0.87 0.87 –0.37 –0.51 –0.37 –0.46 0.82 0.89 0.63 –0.51 –0.58 –0.61 –0.64
Work 0.74 1.18 1.12 1.10 –0.39 –0.51 –0.47 –0.53 0.82 0.91 0.59 –0.60 –0.72 –0.71 –0.61
craf 0.72 1.21 1.16 1.14 –0.39 –0.57 –0.49 –0.60 0.87 0.92 0.65 –0.73 –0.78 –0.82 –0.68
Fav 1.12 1.63 1.49 1.46 –0.57 –0.66 –0.48 –0.64 0.93 1.10 0.77 –0.89 –0.76 –1.01 –0.74
Pos 0.99 1.64 1.53 1.43 –0.71 –0.69 –0.66 –0.81 1.07 1.33 1.00 –1.00 –0.93 –1.18 –0.81
Good 0.98 1.44 1.28 1.32 –0.49 –0.51 –0.47 –0.62 0.87 1.08 0.84 –0.71 –0.63 –0.86 –0.54
Plea 1.13 1.53 1.41 1.44 –0.51 –0.65 –0.58 –0.71 0.87 1.03 0.75 –1.03 –0.77 –1.18 –0.68
Like 1.11 1.61 1.46 1.46 –0.53 –0.58 –0.51 –0.66 0.99 1.21 0.90 –1.09 –0.92 –1.25 –0.83
APPENDIX 1: (Cont’d.)
Inve Orig Dist Crea Beau Aest Attr Appe Intl Intr Cur Fasc Skil work craf Fav Pos Good Plea Like
Inve 3.46
Orig 2.10 3.50
Dist 1.87 2.46 3.39
Crea 1.83 1.98 1.93 2.98
Beau 1.26 1.16 1.24 1.76 3.39
Aest 1.15 1.11 1.18 1.50 2.81 3.45
Attr 1.26 1.06 1.16 1.48 2.63 2.93 3.14
Appe 1.21 1.14 1.17 1.41 2.25 2.41 2.36 3.30
Intl 1.05 0.82 0.84 1.11 1.07 1.07 1.02 1.33 3.17
Intr 1.13 1.16 1.11 1.49 1.63 1.55 1.49 1.51 1.86 2.63
Cur 1.19 1.20 1.12 1.52 1.43 1.43 1.42 1.41 1.92 2.14 3.13
Fasc 1.66 1.28 1.21 1.69 1.73 1.56 1.54 1.62 1.89 1.99 2.04 3.54
Skil 0.80 1.05 1.04 1.30 1.49 1.61 1.63 1.51 0.87 1.34 1.21 1.23 2.39
work 0.94 1.02 1.00 1.29 1.72 1.73 1.73 1.54 0.88 1.32 1.21 1.30 1.87 2.40
craf 1.06 1.15 1.13 1.32 1.82 1.80 1.78 1.66 0.81 1.36 1.27 1.26 1.81 2.17 2.54
Fav 1.27 1.11 1.05 1.48 2.17 2.06 2.07 1.91 1.15 1.58 1.37 1.58 1.44 1.60 1.60 2.65
Pos 1.15 0.98 0.97 1.45 1.88 1.82 1.83 1.69 1.02 1.42 1.20 1.50 1.28 1.43 1.39 2.13 2.42
Good 1.08 0.99 0.96 1.33 1.77 1.75 1.78 1.49 0.92 1.35 1.11 1.35 1.29 1.39 1.36 2.03 1.96 2.23
Plea 1.06 0.93 0.85 1.25 1.90 1.93 1.89 1.73 1.07 1.33 1.18 1.37 1.27 1.38 1.37 1.96 1.95 1.88 2.31
Like 1.41 1.24 1.12 1.67 2.40 2.32 2.29 2.00 1.19 1.68 1.49 1.75 1.48 1.69 1.65 2.39 2.22 2.16 2.11 3.25
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