Partnerships Resource Centre/SDC-Maastricht School of Management

Project # 594

May 2011

Multi-Stakeholder Platform Contribution

to Value Chain Development

The Edible Oil and Oilseeds Value Chain in Ethiopia

Fenta Mandefro, Addis Ababa University

Sarah Drost, Maastricht School of Management
Jeroen van Wijk, Maastricht School of Management

Final Case Study Report

Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................4
Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................5
Abbreviations and acronyms ...........................................................................................................6
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................7
1.1 Research objective and aims .................................................................................................7
1.2 Theoretical framework ..........................................................................................................8
1.3 Methodology ......................................................................................................................... 11
1.4 Outline of the report............................................................................................................ 13
2. Context of the case study.......................................................................................................... 14
2.1 The Oilseeds Sector ............................................................................................................. 14
2.2 The Edible Oil and Oilseeds Coordination Group ....................................................... 22
3. Oilseeds Coordination Group Dynamics............................................................................... 25
3.1 Basic Collaboration Requirements ................................................................................... 25
3.1.1 Level of engagement .................................................................................................... 26
3.1.2 Jointness ......................................................................................................................... 30
3.1.3 Transparency ................................................................................................................. 38
3.1.4 Goal alignment.............................................................................................................. 39
3.2 Embeddedness ...................................................................................................................... 41
3.3 Involvement .......................................................................................................................... 43
4. Institutional change ................................................................................................................... 48
4.1 Access to knowledge ........................................................................................................... 48
4.2 Access to capital ................................................................................................................... 49
4.3 Access to markets................................................................................................................. 50
4.4 Access to organisation ........................................................................................................ 53
5. The future of the oilseeds CG .................................................................................................. 53
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 54
7. Limitations ................................................................................................................................... 58
8. References .................................................................................................................................... 59
9. Appendices ................................................................................................................................... 61
Appendix 1: Theoretical model ............................................................................................... 62
Appendix 2: Roles of various stakeholders ........................................................................... 62
Appendix 3: Interview schedule/ List of Interviewees for Oilseeds Value Chain........ 63
Appendix 4: Questionnaire ....................................................................................................... 67
2
 Appendix 5: Course ratio oilseeds CG ................................................................................... 74
Appendix 6: Betweenness centrality oilseeds CG ............................................................... 75

Cover page picture (safflower): Derived from the Minutes of the 10th Edible Oil and Oilseeds CG Meeting

3
Abstract
This report investigates the dynamics of a multi-stakeholder platform (named:
Coordination Group, or CG) for stakeholders of the oilseeds and edible oil value chains
in Ethiopia. The CG was initiated by the Dutch development organisation SNV in 2005
as part of a broader programme to improve market access for farmers/producers and
small - and medium-sized edible oil processing companies. To examine the MSP, both
its internal, organisational dynamics and its external dynamics, i.e. the changes brought
about in key areas of the institutional business environment, were analysed. A mixed-
method design was used for the data collection and -analysis, including in-depth
interviews with 18 key representative edible oil and oilseeds stakeholders participating
in the CG meetings, document analysis, and a social network analysis.
Ethiopia has a considerable potential for oilseeds production resulting from its
diverse and favourable climate conditions as well as the existing large size of
uncultivated land. Common and speciality Ethiopian oilseeds (safflower, castor beans
and rapeseeds) are under high international demand due to their organic nature. Despite
its potential and high international demands, the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia is
constrained by several factors that can be grouped into production, processing and
marketing problems. The CG was established to address these major problems.
The dominant impression is that the CG has played a key role in bringing
stakeholders from the three societal sectors (public, private and civil society) together to
participate in a new, loose governance structure that reasonably meets the majority of
collaboration requirements. Assessments of the success factors in collaboration
demonstrate mixed results that range from low-high. Generally, the CG has performed
better in the areas of its internal dynamics than in its external dynamics. Despite the
fact that oilseeds CG lacks an active nucleus-group; it has introduced and maintained a
fairly horizontal discussion structure where each member is free and equal –although
related to capacity differences- to influence and contribute to its internal and external
dynamics. Lack of active participation of key decision and policy makers in the CG
meetings is a limitation of the CG to effectively influence the policy arena.
Assessments revealed that the CG was less successful in terms of its external
dynamics. Except for its role in creating access to knowledge, the CG performed low in
terms of creating favourable institutional business environments for small and medium
sized agri-business players. The CG did not influence access to financing mechanisms.
Despite its efforts to create international market opportunities, there are few alternative
market opportunities created for the oilseeds’ value chain actors in general and for the
farmers in particular.

4
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Jakomijn van Wijk of the Sustainable
Development Centre of Maastricht School of Management and Ralph Besselink of Tien
Vazen Consultancy. Their work was indispensable in the questionnaire preparation and
database analysis. The researchers have benefited greatly from the discussions with
Marc Steen and Piet Visser of SNV Ethiopia during the research design process. The
field research in Ethiopia was also efficiently facilitated by SNV BOAM staff and value
chain advisors. Finally, we thank all interviewees, who kindly provided us with their
insights and who made this case study possible.

5
Abbreviations and acronyms

B2B Business to Business

BCaD Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services
BDS Business Development Services
BOAM Business Organisations and their Access to Markets (programme)
CG Coordination Group
ECCSA Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association
DSA Daily Subsistence Allowance
EPOSPEA Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds, and Spices Processors and Exporters
Association
FBO Farmer Based Organisation
MFI Micro Finance Institution
MoA Ministry of Agriculture
MoTI Ministry of Trade and Industry
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MSM Maastricht School of Management
MSP Multi-Stakeholder Platform
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PrC Partnerships Resource Centre
R&D Research & Development
RTA Round Table Africa
SDC Sustainable Development Centre
SIP Strategic Intervention Plan
SME Small and Medium Enterprises
SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples
SNV Netherlands Development Organisation
VC Value Chain
VCD Value Chain Development
VCF Value Chain Financing

Exchange Rate
Exchange rate of January 24, 2011:
1 Euro(s) = 22.59 Ethiopian Birr (ETB)

6
1. Introduction
Multi-stakeholder platforms1 (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and
practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing
countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or
indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and
cooperation (Vermeulen et al., 2008). An increasing number of non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and private enterprises are participating in such platforms,
however systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce. Therefore,
Maastricht School of Management (MSM) /Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) and
SNV Business Organisations and their Access to Markets (BOAM)-Ethiopia have
embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate a number of MSPs which SNV BOAM
initiated with the aim of developing value chains for the Ethiopian edible oil and
oilseeds, honey and beeswax, dairy, and pineapple sectors. SNV2 is a non-profit,
international development organisation, with extensive hands-on experience in their
value chain approach. MSM’s Sustainable Development Centre3 stands for expertise
on sustainable economic development in emerging markets. MSM is partner in the
Partnerships Resource Centre4, an open centre where academics, practitioners and
students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross sector partnerships for
sustainable development.
1.1 Research objective and aims
This edible oil and oilseeds case study assesses the effects of the multi-stakeholder
platform that was established by SNV BOAM to improve access to (quality) markets for
stakeholders in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain in Ethiopia. The core of SNV
BOAM’s approach is to bring primary and secondary value chain actors and other
stakeholders together to find solutions for identified bottlenecks in the value chain.
These actors join forces in the so-called Coordinating Groups (CGs), which have a
multi-stakeholder nature5.
The overall objective of the study is to gain insight and generate knowledge on
how, and under which conditions multi-stakeholder platforms contribute to the
development of value chains, with a focus on SNV BOAM’s programme (agriculture,
horticulture) value chains in Ethiopia. Critical success factors and main bottlenecks of
MSPs for value chain development in Ethiopia are to be identified. In terms of
contribution the synthesis report of the overall study has three aims. First, the study
should contribute to the learning process of MSP members and other local Ethiopian
stakeholders through verification of results and knowledge dissemination. Second, the
synthesis report should end with recommendations on how SNV BOAM can improve its
multi-stakeholder processes to increase their contribution to value chain development.
1 Comprising of dialogues, policy making, and implementation, the term ‘multi-stakeholder’ is often
attached to, platforms, processes, and partnerships (Warner, 2006). In this research we refer to multi-
stakeholder platforms when discussing MSPs.
2 SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx
3 MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/
4 PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About
5 Website SNV BOAM & Annual Report 2008

7
Finally, the study should contribute to the academic debate on how value chain
partnerships can facilitate sustainable competitiveness in developing countries. This
edible oil and oilseeds case study provides input for all three aims, however, reports only
on the first aim.
1.2 Theoretical framework

Multi-stakeholder initiatives are generally

characterised as horizontally organised, with a greater
degree of flexibility and openness as traditional forms of
governance. In policy-related documents, MSPs are often
considered as highly promising alternative forms of
governance. They are based on the “recognition of the
importance of achieving equity and accountability”, involving
equitable representation of stakeholder views, and are “based
on democratic principles of transparency and participation”
aiming to develop “partnerships and strengthened networks
among stakeholders” (Hemmati, 2002:2).

Institutional theory, social network theory and collaboration literature has been
explored to gain insight and generate knowledge on how, and under which conditions
partnerships (including MSPs) can contribute to changing institutional business
environments to facilitate the inclusion of small and medium agribusiness players into
value chains. The effects of the MSPs are examined in terms of their a) internal
dynamics (basic collaboration, embeddedness and involvement) including a social
network analysis, and b) external dynamics (the changes in key areas of the institutional
business environment). The theoretical model is visualized in appendix 1.

(a) Internal dynamics

From the collaboration literature, the level of engagement of partners, formalized goal
alignment, shared (decision making) processes and activities, and transparency are
among the main basic requirements for successful collaboration (Kolk et al. 2008). A
high level of engagement of stakeholders, proper goal alignment, formalisation, risk-
and resource-sharing, trust and transparency, shared learning, and joint decision
making are critical factors for successful multi-stakeholder platforms, particularly when
these deal with more ambitious and complex issues (Ansell & Gash 2008; Springer-
Heinze 2007, Bitzer et al. 2010, Kolk et al. 2008).
Collaboration presents the highest strategic level of engagement and implies that
the partners share risks, resources and rewards (Austin 2007). This also entails a
formalisation of governance structures, including contractual arrangements to specify
objectives, activities and responsibilities. Moreover, the relationship between actors
refers to the range of actors actually participating in the partnership. The value of
partnerships lies in the potential to create win-win situations if all stakeholders are
willing and able to contribute to the achievement of goals (Bitzer et al. 2010a). Trust,
8
risk- and resource-sharing and transparency are indispensable in here, as well as notions
on power distributions in the value chain MSPs.

In a four-year study of the collaborative activities of as small NGO in Palestine,

Lawrence et al. (2002) found that inter-organisational collaboration leads to the
development of new institutions (new practices, technologies and rules). Collaborations
that are both highly embedded and have highly involved partners, are the most likely to
generate “proto-institutions”. New rules, technologies and practices arise and are
diffused beyond the boundaries of the specific MSP contexts, and adopted by other
organisations in the field: they become proto-institutions. These proto-institutions
“represent important first steps in the process of institution creation, thus potentially
forming the basis for broader, field-level change” (Lawrence et al. 2002: 283). They may
become new institutions if they diffuse sufficiently. Embeddedness describes the degree
to which a collaboration is enmeshed in inter-organisational relationships (Dacin et al.
1999; Granovetter 1985). Highly embedded collaborations involve (1) interactions with
third parties, (2) representation arrangements, and (3) multidirectional information
flows (Lawrence et al. 2002). In order to examine whether the oilseeds CG has brought
about changes in institutional fields we investigate not only the relations among
collaborating MSP members, but also how the collaboration embeds them in the wider
institutional field.

Involvement focuses on the way in which participating organisations relate to

each other. According to Lawrence et al. (2002), high levels of involvement entail “deep
interactions among participants, partnership arrangements, and bilateral information
flows”. A high level of involvement among participants is necessary for institution
creation. The internal dimension of partnerships is also explored in terms of the
intensity of actor involvement. If the involvement of an actor is vital for the functioning
of the partnership, from design to monitoring, we speak of a high degree of
involvement. A medium degree of involvement occurs when an actor only participates
during the implementation stages and fulfils particular tasks. If an actor only
participates sporadically or not at all, we can speak of ‘no involvement’ (Bitzer et al.
2010b).

The internal dynamics are verified and complemented with a social network analysis.
The network approach “allows researchers to capture the interactions of any individual
unit within the larger field of activity to which the unit belongs” (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003:
13). A social network analysis describes network characteristics and concepts such as
embeddedness, social capital, and network centrality. Moreover, a social network
analysis has the ability to address important aspects of the social structure of a network:
the sources and distribution of power (Hanneman & Riddle 2005).

9
In the MSP research, the network analysis enabled the researchers to gain insight on:

• The main (core) organisations, stakeholder groups and sectors participating and
brokering in the MSPs (betweenness centrality);
• The proportion and types of organisations in the three societal sectors: public
and private sector and civil society;
• Visitor patterns (core visitor, regular visitor, irregular visitor, at random visitor);
• The proportion of visitors that left the MSP series early (exits);

The centrality analysis helps us to understand the overall social structure of the MSP
networks. Those organizations having the highest scores on betweenness centralities
(the highest number of ties) in the network are the most central players in the MSP
networks (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003). Moreover, more connections often mean that
individuals are exposed to more diverse information. The more connected actors in the
network are, the higher the likelihood that they are able to mobilize their resources and
to bring diverse and multiple perspectives to solve problems. The number and kinds of
ties actors have determine the range of opportunities, influence and power they have
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). “Actors who have more ties have greater opportunities
because they have choices. This autonomy makes them less dependent on any specific
other actor, and hence more powerful” (Hanneman & Riddle 2005: 61).
Apart from a measure to identify the most central actors, betweenness centrality
is a measure for the degree that actors connect two other actors that do not have a
direct link themselves. In our study it refers to the following illustrative situation: actor
A is present at CG meeting 1 and actor B at meeting 2. If attending both meetings,
actor C connects A with B. The hypothesis is that C is able to facilitate a flow of
information from A to B and vice versa. If actors cannot reach each other, or cannot be
reached by another actor, learning, support or influence between the two is restrained
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). Therefore, the higher the number of network players that
have a high betweenness centrality, the more horizontal the network. Information can
be diffused through multiple paths, through network ‘brokers’ that are in between other
network players. The more network brokers there are, the more likely that actors have
alternative ways of connection to other actors and can by-pass a given (dominant) actor
(Hanneman & Riddle 2005). With smaller numbers of players with a high centrality, the
network becomes more hierarchical as fewer players control intermediary information
diffusion.

(b) External dynamics

The external dynamics refer to the perceived changes in institutional business
environment that facilitate inclusion of small and medium sized agri-business players
into the edible oil and oilseeds value chains. The fragmented nature of Africa’s
agricultural sector is one of the limiting factors to its development. The majority of
farmers and SMEs face huge barriers to link themselves to national and global markets,
while access to these markets is considered critical to growth in developing countries
(OECD, 2006; World Bank, 2008). The most important institutional challenges to
10
inclusion in commercial value chains concern those formal rules, inter-organisational
arrangements, and informal customs that prevent farmers and SMEs from having access
to knowledge & technology, credit, markets, and farmer-based organisations (Bitzer et
al. 2010b; Van Wijk and Kwakkenbos, 2011).
Lack of access to capital or credit is a major constraint for many smallholders
(Altenburg, 2007; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Broader access to financial services
would expand their opportunities for technology adoption and resource allocation
(World Bank, 2008). The lack of access to knowledge often hampers agri-food
enterprises to adopt new practices that build trust and confidence of buyers in the
quality and safety assurance mechanisms for their produce (Henson and Jaffee 2006;
Garcia Martinez and Poole 2004). Farmers are exposed to highly volatile markets,
which hinder investments in the agricultural sector. A more stable market for suppliers
through buyer commitment and price stability would motivate farmers and SMEs to
invest in production capacity and quality improvement (Gibbon and Ponte, 2005).
Finally, chain actors, particularly farmers need to be organized to develop capacity in
terms of supplying volumes and quality, and guaranteeing regular supply. Access to
organisations facilitates risk sharing, the pooling of resources, enable collective
learning, and developing market power (KIT et al., 2006).
1.3 Methodology
Several methods were used for the data collection process: analysis of existing
documents (field documents), in-depth interviews and group discussions with SNV
BOAM in Ethiopia. Both qualitative and quantitative data were gathered. All primary
data were collected in Ethiopia from August to November 2010, both in the Oromia and
Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ (SNNP) Regional States. The research
was executed in collaboration with a team of local consultants that was especially
responsible for the interviews and write up of this oilseeds value chain CG report.
A sample of 18 CG stakeholders was drawn for the interviews in the following manner.
We selected candidates from participant lists of five Coordination Meetings (begin, end
and middle) who played specific roles in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain, such as
chain actors, chain supporters, chain influencers, and chain facilitators6. Some critical and
reluctant stakeholders were explicitly included. Eventually, interviews were held with
all relevant value chain stakeholders (Table 1). For a complete overview of the
interviewees and interview schedule, see appendix 3. For confidentiality reasons, they
are made anonymous in the report.

6 For a complete overview of stakeholder roles in the value chain, see appendix 2.
11
 Table 1. Interviewees by stakeholder group
Stakeholder Group Interviewees Percentage (%) Type
Chain actors 7 39 Input supplier, exporters, cooperative
unions, and processing companies.
Chain supporters 3 17 Agricultural Research Centre and BDS
providers (CG Facilitators and Local
Capacity Builder).
Chain influencers 6 33 Ministries, government implementing
agencies, consumer protection
association, business representative
associations.
Chain facilitators 2 11 An NGO and a multi-stakeholder
forum (Office for Public-Private
Partnership on Oilseeds)7

Total 18 100

A database was constructed that scores the participation of each organisation in

each Coordination Group meeting (17 in total), the type and subtype of the organisation
and its role in the value chain8. Finally, the Coordination Group meeting was attended
to a) have an idea of the working of the CG in practice, and b) to introduce the
researchers to the relevant stakeholders in order to promote interview response. The
questionnaire can be found in appendix 4.
On the basis of the database, a social network analysis was executed with the
program UCINET 6.303 which is a comprehensive program for the analysis of social
networks and other proximity data. The program contains dozens of network analytic
routines (e.g. centrality measures, dyadic cohesion measures, positional analysis
algorithms, clique finders, etc.). A social network analysis allows for linking micro and

7 The Office of Public-Private Partnership on Oilseeds (PPPO) is a multi-stakeholder platform

established by public and private actors: The Royal Netherlands Embassy; the Ministry of Agriculture;
the Ethiopian Pulse, Oilseeds, and Spice Processors Exporters Association; and the Dutch Product
Board for Margarine, Fats and Oils (a MVO). The partners signed a memorandum of understanding on
March 5, 2008 and the Office started its activities in early 2009. The partnership is usually referred to as
the Ethiopia-Netherlands Public Private Partnership on Oilseeds (interview 18). PPPO is engaged in
high level policy interventions, which are believed to complement the efforts of the CG in implementing
the five SIPs it had indorsed (Minutes of the 13th Oilseeds CG Meeting, March 12, 2009)
8 The classification of organizations in type (private sector, public sector, civil society and education),

subtype (e.g. processing company, producer, consultant, research institute etc.) and value chain role
(chain actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) has to be regarded as an analytical tool. In reality,
there is not such strict distinction, as for example many producer cooperatives (now classified as a
business representative body in the private sector) are also involved in civil society activities. However,
their main aim is to represent an economically active producer group and most of the time, the
cooperatives engage in chain actor activities (e.g. seed production and distribution and buying and
selling of oilseeds). This is the reason to classify them under the private sector. Another example is a
university (classified under Education) that acts as a BDS provider as well.
12
macro levels, and an integration between qualitative, quantitative and graphical data. In
this research, the social network analysis is mainly used to verify the qualitative data. In
the report, qualitative descriptions are presented, and -if applicable- followed by a
quantitative check resulting from the network analysis.
Not all interview questions were propounded to all 18 interviewees. Since we
were interested in the social mechanisms at work rather than in statistical realities, only
those having expertise or being knowledgeable on a certain subject were asked on that
subject. For example, a financial institute might be less knowledgeable on the (technical)
varieties that exist in the value chain product, or a research institute that has no
expertise on the contractual agreements that exist between suppliers and buyers. In
other cases, the respondent had only attended one CG meeting and therefore lacked
knowledge of CG internal processes over time. Moreover, time pressure indicated by
the respondent was taken into account during the interviews that lasted on average 1.5
hours. Although effort was made to propose as many questions as possible to all
stakeholder groups, conclusions are often based on the views of less than the 18
respondents.
The secondary data included content analysis of the BOAM programme, with
relevant documentation including all Coordination Group meeting minutes and impact
data on production, income and employment areas provided by SNV BOAM Ethiopia.
Furthermore, the secondary data include descriptions of the edible oil and oilseeds value
chain markets, the oilseeds sub-sector in Ethiopia, and relevant aspects of collaboration
literature and institutional change theory.
All interviews were summarized and data were analysed with the qualitative
analysis software program MAXQDA. Network analysis has been executed for the two-
mode database containing organisations which have attended the oilseeds CG meetings
in Ethiopia.
Finally, all outcomes are cross checked, compared to and extended with
information provided by several key informants to ensure triangulation (e.g. SNV
BOAM staff, experts, Chain Lead Advisor and Chain CG Leader).
1.4 Outline of the report
The report is structured as follows: chapter 2 clarifies the context of this study by
providing a short background on the oilseeds market and sector, its main constraints
and SNV BOAM’s strategy of establishing the Oilseeds Coordination Group. In chapter
3, the internal dynamics of the oilseeds CG are presented. Chapter 4 analyzes the
perceived changes in the institutional business environment of the edible oil and
oilseeds value chain, as a result of the MSP (external dynamics). Chapter 5 hints at the
future outlook of the MSP and the value chain, while chapter 6 and 7 respectively
conclude with a discussion of results and limitations of the study.

13
2. Context of the case study
2.1 The Oilseeds Sector
This section describes a) the international market for edible oil and oilseeds, b) the
Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds market, c) the Ethiopian oilseeds value chain map, d)
the main constraints in the oilseeds sector and e) SNV BOAM’s strategy to tackle these
problems.

(a) International edible oil and oilseeds market

Edible oil and oil crops are among the widely traded commodities in the world.
Production and export of oilseeds are however, dominated by a group of producing
countries. The United States, China, Brazil, India, Argentina, the EU, and Canada are
the world’s largest producers, which account for about 70 percent of global oilseeds
output (Hoffman et al., 1999). For example, in 2008-09, EU-27 total oilseeds production
stood at 27.2 million metric tons while estimated production for 2009-10 stood at 29.6
million metric tons9 whereas China’s annual total oilseeds production for 2010-11 was
estimated to be 54.6 million metric tons10. Despite increasing production, erratic
climatic conditions in many countries in general, and throughout the South American
continent in particular, have been affecting oilseeds production11. The United States,
Brazil, Argentina and the EU dominate export market, which account for over 80
percent of the world oilseeds exports. Despite substantial growth in oilseeds production
in the past 25 years, and recent gains in export volume, both exporters and importers
have been engaged in trade distorting policies –such as deferential export taxes and
production subsidies. As a result, many attempts have been made to favour domestic
oilseeds production at the expense of imports or to encourage domestic processing of
imported oilseeds versus imports of oilseeds products. Of course, several major
initiatives have been undertaken to reduce trade barriers and other trade-distorting
practices affecting oilseed trade (Hoffman et al., 1999). There are different varieties of
oilseeds produced by different countries. Commodities’ share of world oilseed
production shows that soybeans alone account 53.3 percent followed by rapeseed and
cottonseed each accounting 12.1 percent while peanut and sunflower seed account 10
and 8.7 percent respectively. Other types of oilseeds account only 3.8 percent (Hoffman
et al., 1999).
Demand for vegetable/edible12 oil has consistently been moving up due to
consistent increase in consumption, which is in turn caused by the increasing population
as well as increase in disposable income in developing economies. For example, world’s
vegetable oil production and consumption for 2008-09 stood at around 133 and 130
million tons respectively. Forecast for 2010-11 shows 145 million tons of production
and 144 million tons of consumption. China is the largest consumer (around 25 million

9 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=154
10 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=153
11http://www.oilworld.biz/app.php?fid=1090&fpar=0&isSSL=0&aps=0&blub=99d5d4612ae78dfcf3f26

1cddd2f91a5
12 Edible and vegetable oil are used interchangeably

14
tons in 2008-09) in the world followed by India. The EU, United States, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Brazil are the other large consumers. The international demand for edible
oil in 2008-09 was 56 million tons, which is forecasted to grow up to 60 million tons in
2010-11. Indonesia and Malaysia are the leading exporters of vegetable oil. Argentina,
Ukraine, Canada, United States and Brazil are other suppliers to the world market.
Palm oil is the major export for Asian nations while soybean, sunflower and canola
(rapeseed) oils are major exports for American countries13.
China is the world's biggest importer of vegetable oil followed by India; EU-27,
United States and Asian countries are other major buyers. Commodities’ share of the
world’s edible oil trade shows that palm oil is the internationally most traded vegetable
oil with more than 60% world market share followed by soybean oil. Sunflower,
rapeseed and coconut oil are other oils traded in world market14.

(b) Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds market

Ethiopia consists of different climate zones and a range of altitudes from below sea level
up to more than 4,500 metres above sea level. This enables it to grow a wide range of
oilseeds, in which it has a long tradition (Wijnands et al., 2007). Oil crops are the third
major crops grown with an estimated total cropped area of 740,000 hectares involving
more than three million smallholder farmers15. Linseed, Niger seed, soybeans, cotton
seed, sesame, groundnuts, safflower seed, castor beans, and rapeseed are important types
of oilseeds grown in Ethiopia 16 (Hailegiorgis, 2011). Production is characterized by
labour intensive, low-input and rain-fed cultivation that results in low yield. For most
oil crops, except for soybeans, yields are below one ton/ha. Total annual oilseeds
production is estimated to be only 500,000 - 600,000 tons (Wijnands et al., 2007). There
is however, high potential for improvement; for most oilseeds productivity per ha can be
doubled through the use of improved farm practices at smallholder level. The existence
of large areas of uncultivated and fertile lands offers good opportunities for organic and
sustainable oilseeds production. Demand for oilseeds is not a problem since
opportunities for oilseeds export are not fully exploited yet because of inefficient
marketing, improper cleaning and sometimes poor contract discipline (Wijnands et al.,
2007). Nor have domestic demands been sufficiently met.
Oilseeds constitute an important mainstay of the rural economy. The sector plays
a significant role not only for the rural economy, but also for the national economy at
large as it represents the second largest export earner next to coffee. Table 2 below
shows the increasing volume of oilseeds exports and the earnings thereof.

13 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=244
14 http://www.agricommodityprices.com/futures_prices.php?id=244
15 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
16 The Oilseeds CG has no special interest in a specific type of oilseed; it facilitates improvement in the

production and processing of all types of oilseeds (clarification interview with SNV BOAM Lead
Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 15 March 2011)
15
Table 2 Total volume of oilseeds exports and value of exports (2005-2009)
Year Export (in metric tons) Value of exports (000’s Birr)
2005 170,796 1,082,215
2006 265,649 1,835,270
2007 234,976 1,654,707
2008 152,091 2,037,090
2009 286,987 3.819,429
Source: Hailegiorgis (2011:7)

Exports actually consist of sesame seed and Niger seed (Wijnands et al., 2007). Ethiopia
is the third exporter of sesame seed in the world next to India and Sudan. Ethiopian
sesame seed, which accounts for 75 percent of its total oilseed exports, is well known in
the world market. Other oilseeds however, have not yet penetrated the international
market. For example, Ethiopia is the fifth world producer of linseed, but is negligible as
exporter on the world market17. Nevertheless, it has high potential since linseed and
other oilseeds production in Ethiopia are close to organic standards (Wijnands et al.,
2007). This is expected to have a positive impact on Ethiopian oilseeds to the European
market18.
Moreover, Ethiopia has an attractive portfolio of high value specialty oilseeds
such as safflower seed and castor beans. The growing demand for Ethiopian speciality
oilseeds in the world market and the potential capacity to expand production could turn
oilseeds into one of the engines of economic growth of Ethiopia. As mentioned earlier,
soybeans, cottonseed and rapeseed are also important oilseeds grown in Ethiopia.
However, due to relatively low volumes, low quality and high handling and transport
costs, it would not be easy for Ethiopia to export these oilseeds and compete on the
world market. Nonetheless, these oilseeds are important for local consumption
(Wijnands et al., 2007).
Increasing interest in and attention to the oilseeds value chain by the Ethiopian
government offers another opportunity for the sub-sector to grow. The interest of the
government is reflected by its intensified efforts to come up with a master plan for the
development of the sub-sector. Such attentions are due to the sector’s contribution to
the growing export earnings, sources of food, energy and ingredients of animal feed19.
Generally, the edible oil and oilseeds value chain has a major role in the Ethiopian
economy with links to agriculture, agro industry, trade (import and export) and is
interlinked to the service economy20.
In terms of edible oil, Ethiopia is highly dependent on foreign sources; either
from aid or import21. Palm oil from Malaysia, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates
dominates import markets (Wijnands et al., 2007). Edible oil supply from Ethiopia's oil

17 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009

18 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
19 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009
20 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
21 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009

16
factories is less than 20 percent of the total consumption of the country22. The domestic
edible oil production is characterized by backward technology where most of the
oilseeds are crushed locally without any refining. More than 1,000 small crushers
(mostly with Chinese/Indian machines) are operational on village level. These local
crushers have limited capacity with low hygiene standards. Only a few larger crushing
or refining companies seem to have adequate safety and hygiene standards compared to
European industry standards (Wijnands et al., 2007). Therefore, there exists a huge
potential to work on import substitute activities23.

(c) Oilseeds value chain map

Figure 1 shows the Ethiopian part of the global oil crops value chain, with indicated
intervention areas, as visualized by SNV BOAM. SNV BOAM identified four major
interventions areas that include Seed Supply, Seed Cleaning and “True-to-Type”,
Milling Technology, and Coordination between Oil Millers and Exporters24. These
intervention areas were presented to and adopted by the participants of the first
Oilseeds CG meeting25. From the view point of value chain analysis, the interventions
are comprehensive and cover input, production, processing, and marketing aspects. The
intervention areas mainly address the exporters, processors and farmers’ organisations
with the aim of improving linkages between mid-chain buyers and producers. The value
chain map visualizes options for individual farmers to sell oilseeds directly to retailers,
local (traditional) oil millers, producers’ cooperatives, wholesalers, and even to
exporters.

22 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009

23 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
24 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005
25 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005

17
Figure 1. Edible Oil and Oilseeds products value chain map with indicated intervention
areas
Area III

Village oil Local use Oil cakes

Ploughing mills For animal
Feeds
Service

Seed Input Land Sowing Harvesting Collecting Delivery Extraction Packing

Wholesaler Distribution
Cleaning Supply Preparation Weeding Transporter to oil mill Filtration And sales

Area II Delivery Inspection Import Middle

to exporter Delivery to East for
AREA I Port, export Animal feeds

Delivery Grading and Inspection Import

Area I: Seed Supply to exporter Packing of Delivery to Europe
Food market
Area II: Seed Cleaning and True-to-Type Oilseeds Port, export
Area III: Milling Technology
Area IV: Coordination between Oil-Millers and Exporters
Area IV

Source: Minutes of the First Oilseeds Coordination Group Meeting, 30 September, Addis Ababa

(d) Constraints in the Ethiopian edible oil and oilseeds sector

Despite the vast opportunities and a number of comparative advantages, the edible oil
and oilseeds sector has several constraints to its growth. The constraints are related to
production, processing and marketing issues. Oilseeds production is limited by several
problems that are related to backward agricultural practices; lack of awareness, high
costs and limited accessibility of inputs (particularly improved and variety seeds)26; lack
of credit facilities; and uncertainty about economic returns. The fragmented landholding
system is also a critical problem; there are a limited number of large commercial farmers
(> 100 ha) whose share is less than two percent (Wijnands et al., 2007).
As discussed earlier, processing is dominated by traditional and small crushers
characterized by very inadequate capacity and low hygiene and safety standards
(Wijnands et al., 2007). They are engaged in crude (unrefined) oil production. The
paradox is that oil mills and refining plants are heavily under-utilized; only 30 to 40
percent of their full capacity is used due to the lack of sufficient oilseeds (Wijnands et
al., 2007). Chronic shortages in supply of oilseeds have been known to limit the
operations of the edible oil industry27. The supply of oilseeds is seasonal and hence,
processors are required to procure high stock of oilseeds during peak production season
and store for year round operation. This results in high working capital and makes the
edible oil business expensive28. Moreover, the edible oil industry is confronted with high

26 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009

27 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009
28 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009

18
competition from imported vegetable oils in general and palm oil in particular
(Wijnands et al., 2007).
Market information is not widely available and infrastructure is generally weak
in Ethiopia. The situation for the oilseeds sector, however, is critical. Sixty percent of
the oilseeds is traded by 10 percent of the largest traders and 80 percent of the small
traders have a share of 20 percent (Wijnands et al., 2007). On top of this monopoly by a
few traders, the market is concentrated in Addis Ababa which undermines accessibility
of the market to producers. In 2006, a survey conducted by SNV BOAM in 10 oilseeds
market cities indicated that 50 percent of the major market for oilseeds is in Addis
Ababa, with approximately 50 main traders and over 300 wholesalers. This is three to
four times higher than those in the other nine cities. Many smallholder producers are
located far from Addis Ababa and hence, they depend on brokers29 to sell their produce
(Wijnands et al., 2007). Adulteration of oilseeds is another constraint that has affected
both edible oil processing companies and exporters30.
Primary data collected from the edible oil and oilseeds value chain stakeholders
revealed multiple constraints, which include those discussed above. Table 3 presents a
summary of the main constraints identified by interviewed stakeholders. The
constraints are categorized as general, production related, and processing related issues.
According to the interviewees (Table 3) lack of direct linkage/contractual agreement
and mistrust between producers and processors/exporters is a key constraint. As a
result; the oilseeds’ market is dominated by brokers who deliberately distort prices,
which lead to volatile and unpredictable price structures. Twelve of our interviewees
indicated that producers and processors have insufficient access to affordable capital due
to rigid collateral requirements. This has undermined the opportunities for improving
production and processing technologies. According to the interviewees, low quality
concern among producers and processors is widely prevalent and has affected the
development of the sector. This is aggravated by lack of sufficient attention from
government policy makers. There is general lack of regulatory standards for edible oil
and oilseeds. This has encouraged adulteration of edible oils and oilseeds. Moreover,
lack of policy attention is reflected by the fact that, unlike cereals and other crops, there
is no sufficient research effort to improve the productivity and quality of oil crops
except for sesame that received attention due to its long standing contribution to
foreign earnings (interviews 5, 6, 13, 14, and 16). The government’s policy of duty and
VAT31 free import of vegetable oil (palm oil) is also considered as a bottleneck for the
development of local edible oil processing companies/millers (e.g. interviews 9, 11, 14,
and 17). An expert from the Consumers’ Protection Association however, indicated that
the government has to regulate high price of local edible oil through such policy
because of the limited capacity of local processors to meet domestic demands (interview
8).

29 Brokers are those traders who buy oilseeds from collectors (those buying form farmers) and sell to big
traders and processors
30 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009
31 Duty is a tax imposed on import and export of commodities while VAT is a tax imposed on any value

added transaction in the production and commodity exchange processes

19
 On the production side, the sector is dominated by smallholder farmers who
suffer from low yield/productivity and volatile prices. As a result, oilseeds are
considered as secondary crops among smallholder farmers. Moreover, there is limited
technological support, training and input supply to improve productivity and interests
of the farmers in oilseeds production. Lack of differential farm gate price32 is another
constraint that undermined the need for and effort in improving the quality of oilseeds.
In fact, absence of differential price encourages adulteration of oilseeds (interviews 5 and
16).
Regarding issues related to processing, backward processing technology, duty
and VAT free import of palm oil, shortage and seasonal supply of oilseeds, adulteration
of edible oil, and insufficient training to oil mill workers are the main problems. The use
of backward processing technology has resulted in inefficient production and sub-
standard products/crude oil. Oilseeds are usually available in the market during harvest
season and hence, in non-harvest season processing companies are forced to operate
below capacity.

Table 3. Main constraints in the oilseeds sector in Ethiopia per stakeholder’s group and
number of times indicated by the interviewees (frequency)
Constraints in oilseeds sector Frequency
General
Lack of direct linkages/contractual agreements between producers and 14
processors/exporters
Lack of access to sufficient capital 12
Low quality concern among producers/processors and lack of regulatory 11
standards for edible oil and oilseeds
Lack of sufficient attention by policy makers (except for sesame) 7
Insufficient research efforts 5
Insufficient infrastructure 2
Lack of awareness among consumers about quality of edible oil 1
Production related issues
Oilseeds not a primary crop 14
Volatile and low prices paid to farmers due to broker dominated markets 11
Poor quality and adulteration of oilseeds 8
Lack of technology and input supply 8
Insufficient training 7
Poor agronomy practices 7
Limited commercial farming 2
Lack of price differentiation at farm gate (quality is not rewarded) 2
Poor linkages between seed providers and seed producers 1
Lack of attention by investors 1
Processing related issues
Backward processing technologies 9
Duty and VAT free import of vegetable oil (palm oil) 6

32Farmers are paid the same price regardless of the differences in the quality of the oilseeds they have,
hence, they are not encouraged to invest in quality improvement
20
Shortage and seasonal supply of oilseeds 5
Adulteration of edible oil 5
Insufficient training 2

(d) SNV BOAM strategy in the BOAM framework

To tackle these problems in the oilseeds sector, SNV BOAM developed the ‘Support to
Business Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme33. Under this
programme, a Value Chain Development (VCD) approach was developed that is
“characterized by (i) a combined sector and business to business (B2B) orientation” (IOB
Inception Report, 2009: 27), (ii) a focus on ‘pull’ factors; working from the middle of the
value chain at both ‘up-stream’ and ‘down-stream’ levels (pers. comm. SNV BOAM,
February 2011), (iii) “a firm direction towards the private sector (private businesses) as
the entry point, (iv) the use of multi stakeholder processes in the form of Coordination
Groups as the platform for decision making and anchoring of the local ownership, (v)
the use of local consultants or capacity builders to increase outreach, sustainability and
ownership and (vi) the use of leverage and innovation funds” (IOB Inception Report,
2009: 27). Therefore, the MSP approach is only one part of the whole ‘holistic’ SNV
BOAM value chain approach.
The BOAM programme is based on the idea that change can only be induced if it
builds on knowledge and experience already present in the concerning sectors. 29
agricultural value chains were surveyed on the basis of ‘what was already there in the
sector’. On the basis of a set of criteria, eventually six priority chains were chosen out of
these 29, including the oilseeds and edible oil; dairy; honey and beeswax; and pineapple,
mango and apple value chains. Establishing the CG was only a logical step in the
process of bringing together all the relevant knowledge and experience of stakeholders
in the concerning value chains34.
SNV BOAM sees the CG as the main organ for governance and coordination of
chain activities and stresses the importance of ownership through the formation of
stakeholders’ own network.

33 SNV BOAM’s programme, financed by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Addis

Ababa and until the end of 2009 by the Irish Embassy, contributes to sustainable poverty reduction in
rural Ethiopia through value chain development. The overall BOAM programme period is five years,
and started from September 2005. The programme aims at improving the access to markets for small
and medium agribusiness players along selected value adding chains (SNV BOAM programme proposal
2005-2010). In 2009 a transformation process of the BOAM programme into a centre of excellence for
value chain development has started in the form of BOAM2 scaling up phase. Some key chances are the
emphasis on Business to Business (B2B) value chain development and the up-scaling of both production
as well as a new fund structure. The additional target of the BOAM program up-scaling phase is to
develop, test and introduce innovative approaches that aim to improve business to business relations in
selected value chains (SNV BOAM annual report 2009). A one-year extension of the BOAM programme
was requested and approved, until August 31, 2011, to maximize the results to be obtained from the
BOAM programme (BOAM 2 programme proposal 2010-2011).
34 Clarification meeting SNV BOAM, 8 November 2010

21
 Characterising the CG
The Oilseeds CG is primarily appreciated for
bringing together multiple actors (producers,
processors, exporters, government agencies,
Apart from BOAM, SNV runs consumer protection association, chambers of
2 other value chain programmes commerce, consultants, and experts) representing
(PSNP plus & RAIN)35. Finally, the multiple interests and sectors (public, private and
four case studies under study are civil society).
only part of the impact areas, (sub) The majority of the interviewees describe the
sectors and programs of SNV oilseeds CG as a centre/platform of learning and
BOAM Ethiopia. communication/networking between
participating stakeholders without which they
2.2 The Edible Oil and Oilseeds could hardly meet and engage in common
Coordination Group agendas –identifying problems and seeking
Ethiopia has considerable potential solutions for the oilseeds sector problems.
for oilseeds production for which Members learned not only from the exchange of
their experiences but also from presentations of
there are steady international and
research findings that consist of new and
domestic demands. The sector, innovative ideas. For example, members are
however, suffers from proper exposed to a totally new idea of growing olive
steering mechanisms and key trees and producing olive oil (interviews 8, 12 16,
stakeholders operate in an isolated and 17). Members have exchanged contact
manner. In 2005, the SNV BOAM addresses and established networks to facilitate
program established a forum called the search for inputs and market. For example,
the Edible Oil and Oilseeds cooperative unions have been able to sell their
Coordination Group aiming at produce directly to processors through contacts
addressing the gap in the they established at the CG (interview 5).
governance of the sector. Interviewees generally, believe that the oilseeds
CG has substantially reduced unilateral
From the network analysis we found operations of key stakeholders and fostered
synergetic relations.
that in total 101 different
Interviewees are, however critical on the type and
organisations attended the oilseeds commitment of participants in the CG meeting.
CG meetings 1-17 from 2005- They believe that key government decision
201036. makers are not attending CG meetings and hence,
its policy impact remained low. Moreover,
The CG consists of representatives frequent rotation of participants is common that
of key actors in the edible oil and demanded CG meeting facilitators to make long
oilseeds value chain (regional, briefing before starting new agendas of the day so
national and sporadically that new participants are on board; such a practice
international), including: is however, boring for those who attended
previous meetings (interview 8).
• Farmers’ cooperative unions
such as the Didea Farmers’
Cooperative Union,
Rayawakena Farmers’
Cooperative Union, Ambo

35SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009

36By the end of 2010, already 19 meetings took place for the oilseeds value chain CG. Nevertheless, the
social network analysis was based on 17 meetings due to the participation lists in the meeting minutes
that were made available to the researchers at start of the research project in June 2010.
22
 Farmers’ Cooperative Union, and Biftu Selallie Farmers’ Cooperative Union;
• Processors’ Association that include the Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association;
• Private processing companies for example, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C,
Kana Industry PLC, Samirawit Oil Mill Factory, and Bezu Edible Oil;
• Consumers’ Association that includes the Ethiopian Consumers’ Protection
Association;
• Federal Government authorities, including the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA)
and Ministry of Trade and Industry (MoTI) ;
• Regional Government agencies for example, the Oromia Cooperative Promotion
Bureau and Oromia Seed Enterprise;
• Research institutions such as Holleta Agricultural Research Centre;
• Local Capacity Builders and other BDS providers like Edge Consult and
Agonafir Consult;
• Representatives of private business associations, for instance, the Ethiopian
Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association (ECCSA); Addis Ababa Chamber
of Commerce (AACC); Adama Chamber of Commerce; and the Ethiopian Pulses,
Oilseeds, and Spices Processors and Exporters Association (EPOSPEA);
• Banks and Micro finance institutes (MFIs), for example, Abyssinia and Awash
International Banks and the Dynamic MFI; and
• NGOs such as SNV, Growing Ethiopian Market, Facilitator for Change Ethiopia,
Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance.

Under its BOAM programme, a Value Chain Leader and a Value Chain Facilitator is
selected for each value chain CG. The Value Chain Leader is chosen by the CG and acts
as the focal person who should guarantee the local ownership of the CG and who is
representing the CG. Ideally for SNV BOAM, a Chain Leader represents a key private
sector organisation in the chain. The managing director of Agro Prom International
PLC and ex-President of the EPOSPEA was elected as a leader of the edible oil and
oilseeds CG in 2005 at its first meeting. Until the time of data collection for this
research, he was in this CG leadership position. The Chain Leader is supported by value
chain development advisors or coaches, who add distinct expertise to the program (agro-
processing, organisational strengthening, women entrepreneurship/gender and
monitoring and evaluation). In addition, SNV BOAM makes available a Value Chain
Facilitator to facilitate and activate communication amongst CG members and to
disseminate information. From CG meeting 2-14, the owner and the manager of the
organisation Consulting Management Business Creation and Development Services
(BCaD) served as Chain Facilitators in the oilseeds value chain, next to their facilitation
activities in the honey and pineapple value chain CGs. From meeting 15 onwards, this
role has been taken over by the managing director of Edge Consult. BCaD was replaced
by Edge Consult, among others due to complaints from the Oilseeds Value Chain
Advisor on missing files in the chaos of an overflow in funding applications37.

37 Interview BCaD, August, 2010

23
 The Oilseeds CG conducted its first meeting on September 30, 2005 and since
then the CG has been conducting its meetings on quarterly basis (four times a year). In
general, the meetings have the following pattern: the CG Facilitator and Leader open
the meeting with a recap of the previous meetings, participants introduce themselves,
fund utilization reports are discussed, experts present about new researches and
technologies related to the oilseeds sector and Question and Answer Rounds are held in
between. The first CG meeting started in English, but currently Amharic is the main
language used in the meetings. The Facilitator translates when necessary. A
representative of the Addis Ababa Oil Millers Association however, argues otherwise;
the Facilitators are keen to give attention to foreign participants. They encourage
discussions in English and try to translate into Amharic, which is not in the best
interest of many stakeholders in general and those representing unions in particular
(interview 9).
Following the recommendations of the Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) an
Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes/funding proposals for the
BOAM designated funds was established. Next to this, SNV BOAM has assignment
contracts indicating capacity building interventions with all clients (i.e. processors,
farmer organisations, business associations, and government). Finally, a new funding
structure was introduced.

24
3. Oilseeds Coordination Group Dynamics
This chapter is meant to present the main findings regarding the internal dynamics that
took place within the oilseeds CG meetings 1-17 (2005-2010). The oilseeds CG is
assessed on the basis of basic collaboration requirements, and the levels of
embeddedness and involvement.

Picture: Minutes of the 6th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 12 January 2007, Addis Ababa

3.1 Basic Collaboration Requirements

The extent to which the oilseeds CG meets basic collaboration requirements is
examined by assessing so-called success factors. An overview of all these factors is
provided in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Basic collaboration requirements and their success factors

Basis collaboration Success factors
requirements
3.1.1 Level of engagement (a) Commitment
(b) Motivations
(c) Roles and contributions
(d) Shared resources
3.1.2 Jointness (a) Decision making
(b) Selection of stakeholders
(c) Agenda setting
(d) Distribution of benefits
(e) Risk sharing
3.1.3 Transparency (a) Accountability
(b) Trust building
3.1.4 Goal alignment (a) Clear objectives
(b) Win-win opportunities
(c) Compelling case
Source: Compilation based on Kolk et al. (2008), Van Tulder & Pfisterer (2008) and Bitzer et al. (2010).

25
3.1.1 Level of engagement
Success factors identified in the research for the level of engagement are fourfold: (a) a
high level of commitment, (b) intrinsic motivation, (c) clarity of roles and contributions,
and (d) resource sharing.

(a) Commitment
Establishing the edible oil and oilseeds multi-stakeholder platform is a core component
of SNV BOAM’s program in which SNV BOAM plays a facilitating role38. SNV BOAM
promoted and facilitated the establishment of the oilseeds CG to enable stakeholders to
take the lead in the sector in such a way that internal commitment can be generated for
sustainable development of the sector (interview 17). Table 5 below presents the degree
of commitment of CG members as evaluated by the interviewees.

Table 5. Level of commitment evaluated

Commitment Frequency Percentage
(%)
Low 1 8
Medium 12 92
High 0 0
Total 13 100
Source: interview data

The database shows that, from the sampled interviewees, only SNV BOAM has
attended all the 17 oilseeds CG meetings. A public sector agency was classified as
‘regular’ as it participated in 15 of the 17 CG meetings. Eleven of the sampled
interviewees were classified as ‘irregulars’ (present in at least three meetings with a
maximum presence of 12 meetings) and four as ‘at random visitor’ (participating in 1, 2,
or 3 meetings).
An overwhelming majority rated the degree of commitment of the CG members
as ‘modest’ (92%) while only one interview rated it as ‘low’ (8%) and none of them rated
as ‘high’. This reveals that there is not even a small group of members who is highly
committed; hence, the CG suffers from absence of an active nucleus group. This problem
is attributed to different factors. Absence of a strong and committed private sector
company like that of Beza Mar in the honey CG is a core problem39. Unlike Beza Mar
that invested its time and resources in a synergetic effect in the CG’s activities,
members of the oilseeds CG expect a great deal from SNV BOAM. Another factor is
SNV BOAM’s insufficient attention and support to the oilseeds CG40. Low resource
allocation and delays in fund release procedures are indicators of this. Usually, funds
allocated to the oilseeds value chain are lower than funds allocated for other value
chains such as the honey CG, nonetheless, this is also related to different capacities
among members to articulate their needs (see also section 3.1.2.e) . Fund release

38 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005

39 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
40 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011

26
procedures are characterized by an inordinate delay. For example, there were cases
where stakeholders were only able to receive their funds two years after the concept
papers were approved. This has created discontent among the CG members that
affected their interest and commitment to the CG41. Notwithstanding the satisfaction of
the majority of the respondents with the agenda setting processes, SNV BOAM’s lack of
interest to include agendas other than those stipulated in its programme is another
factor that affected the emergence of highly committed nucleus-group42. A
representative of processors association stated that an “active nucleus-group cannot
surface in a situation where agendas are confined within a pre-defined program that was
designed by a donor –SNV”.43 Moreover, SNV BOAM’s heavy influence in decision
making processes is considered a disincentive for other members in the front to play the
role of an active nucleus-group44. Two of our respondents to this question indicated that
in relative terms, producers, consultants and Chain Lead Advisors are more committed
than exporters, processors and government agencies (interview 10 and 17). Another
interviewee stated that processors are also well committed (interview 4). “In general,
members do not equally value the importance of the CG to the development of the
sector” (interview 18).
According to the overwhelming majority of the interviewees, participation of
members in the CG is characterized by frequent rotation and irregular attendance,
which is an indication of lack of high commitment. This corresponds with the database
analysis which shows that the oilseeds sector scores highest on the number of exits
(71.2 percent). “The oilseeds CG cannot be successful with participants who attend the
CG meeting only once” (interview 16). Many of the oilseeds CG members neither
regularly attend CG meetings nor effectively carry out assigned tasks (interviews, 6, 7, 8,
12 and 18). Several stakeholders, particularly government organizations, usually send
different persons to attend the different CG meetings, which hardly ensure continuity of
ideas and common understanding. Every new participant raises issues that have been
discussed in the previous CG meetings. The briefings absorbs time and ultimately
crowds out the agenda of the day (interviews 6 and 7). The oilseeds CG Leader stated
that the CG is forced to unduly deal with similar unfinished business in every meeting
as a result of lack of commitment among CG members to carryout assigned tasks
(interview 12). Members of the Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee -who have been
assigned to study the impact of VAT and duty free import of palm oil, are good
examples in this regard. The issue has remained a subject of discussion in every CG
meeting since the Committee is not working effectively (interviews 11, 12, and 15). A
business association representative who rated CG members’ commitment as ‘low’ stated
that members are active simply in discussing the problems, but are not active and
committed to seek solutions (interview 9). In the meeting room, members pretend to be
committed; most of them however, do not look back to their assignments after they have
left the meeting room. As result, the CG could not effectively implement its decisions

41 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
42 Clarification interview with a representatives of a processors association , 23/03/2011
43 Clarification interview with a representative of a processors association , 23/03/2011
44 Clarification interview with a representative of a private company, 23/03/20111

27
and plans (interviews 9, 11 and 15). A representative of a private company is in fact, of
the opinion that most of the members do not care about the success of the CG (interview
14). Generally, considerable effort remains necessary from all stakeholders to have the
CG effectively play its role in addressing the problems of the oilseeds sector (interview
4).

(b) Motivations
Responses from interviewees indicate that members were triggered to join the CG
either by one or a combination of the following factors: i) the business opportunities it
provides, such as meeting new buyers and suppliers (interviews 4, 5 and 11); ii) the
incentives provided by SNV BOAM as it has been inviting participants45 and offers
technical and financial assistance (interviews 4, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 14); iii) the learning
opportunities the platform offers and its overall role in promoting the oilseeds sector
(interviews 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16); and iv) personal interest (interviews 6, 12, and
16). An interviewee representing a public-private forum indicated that his organization
was motivated to join the oilseeds CG since the CG’s objectives coincide with its own
objectives (interview 18). The Chain Advisors, the Local Capacity Builder and the CG
Facilitators were contracted by SNV BOAM and their motivations to join were linked
to job opportunity creation (interviews 6, 15 and 17). The Local Capacity Builder
however, indicated that, as a professional, he has always been aspiring for a change in
the oilseeds sector; therefore, he was enthusiastic to join the CG since he believed it
would offer him an opportunity to contribute his best to the sector’s development
(interview 6). Some of the interviewed members pointed out that other organisations
have tipped them to join the oilseeds CG (interviews 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16).
Most of the interviewees were clearly asked whether the DSA paid by SNV
BOAM to CG participants had an influence on their motivation to participate. They did
not consider DSA as a motivational factor. Nevertheless, a couple of interviewees did
not want to rule out its impact on some of the participants (e.g. interview 5). According
to SNV BOAM’s Oilseeds Value Chain Lead Advisor, DSA is an important factor to
ensure participation. Without DSA, members from remote areas will not be able to
attend the CG meetings as they require compensation for transportation and
accommodation costs. He believes that DSA might be crucial not only for those
travelling from remote areas but also for others. For example, after SNV BOAM’s
announcement in the 18th oilseeds CG meeting that it will end DSA contribution (Birr
60) to each participant, the number of participants has sharply declined. The 19th
oilseeds CG meeting was attended by 25 participants (including the first author), which
is less than half of the participants of the previous meeting (54 participants) (interview
17). However, this is probably not related to decrease in DSA but to bad planning of the
meeting.

Generally, motivations of the members to participate are related to both intrinsic

and extrinsic factors, but mainly extrinsic related to SNV BOAM’s invitation to attend

45 About 66% of the interviewees learned about the CG from SNV BOAM’s invitation
28
and aspirations for business opportunities and incentives provided by SNV BOAM. The
dominant perception is that the DSA could be considered as precondition to sustain
participation, but not a fundamental triggering factor for members to join the oilseeds
CG.

(c) Roles and contributions

The CG has defined its roles and contributions to the oilseeds sector in its first meeting,
based on the first Strategic Intervention Plans (SIPs) presented by SNV BOAM46. The
CG however, did not clearly define the roles and responsibilities of each and every
individual member. Moreover, the CG suffers from absence of accountability
mechanisms (see section 3.1.3). Besides, due to the high number of participating
organisations (101 organisations in total in all oilseeds CG meetings) and the high
rotation of members and organisations, operational plans agreed in several CG meetings
are not representing all participating parties. A representative of a private company
argued that operational plans do not represent the interests of all parties not merely
because of large number of participants but also due to the dominance of SNV BOAM in
the planning process. No matter how actively stakeholders participate, “key decisions
are in the hands of SNV BOAM” (interview 14).

(d) Shared resources

It can be concluded that resources are shared in the sense that each CG member has an
equal opportunity to have access to financial and technical support delivered through
the SNV BOAM funding programme47. However, the benefits to be obtained from this
support are not equal (see next section).
The oilseeds CG represents multiple sector (public, private and civil society)
actors whose degree of engagement to the CG appears to be homogenous. As discussed
earlier, an overwhelming majority (92%) of the interviewees indicated that members are
only ‘modestly’ committed while the remaining interviewees rated it as ‘low’; hence, the
oilseeds CG lacks an active nucleus- group (for reasons discussed in section 3.1.1./a) to
play a ‘steering role’. Participation of the members in the CG can be attributed to both
intrinsic and extrinsic factors, but largely to the latter. DSA is not a decisive
motivational factor for members to join the CG, but necessary precondition for poorly
capacitated regional organisations.

In the network analyses on course ratio these findings on stakeholder engagement were
verified. To analyse the course ratio of the oilseeds CG participation database four
categories of visiting frequency of organisations have been determined (core visitor,
regular visitor, irregular visitor, random visitor) as well as four categories of entry and
exit behaviour of the organisations (present & stay, present & exit, entry & stay, and

46Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September 2005

47In the beginning of the SNV BOAM programme (2005) the three types of funds accessible were the
leverage fund, the research and study fund, and the financial intermediation fund. In line with the
recommendations of the Mid-Term Review in 2008, the three new types of funds are the Sector
Development Fund, the Pilot B2B Fund, and the Up-scaling Support Fund.
29
entry and exit). The descriptive statistics of both categories are calculated for the
oilseeds CG participation database and displayed in Appendix 5. A legend is attached. In
Table 6, the visitor frequency in the oilseeds CG is presented. In Table 7 the total of
exits from the oilseeds CG is demonstrated.

Table 6 Visitor frequency in the oilseeds CG (%) Table 7 Total of exits48

Sector Core Regular Irregular At
Sector %
visitors visitors visitors random
Oilseeds 71,2
visitors
Oilseeds 1,0 2,0 44,6 52,5

The social network analysis confirms that:

There is irregular attendance of organisations in the oilseeds CG meetings
(Table 6). The proportion of core visitors (present at all meetings) and
regular visitors (present at 14, 15 or 16 meetings) is modest. Only SNV
BOAM represents a genuine core visitor (present at all 17 meetings);

There is high rotation of organisations in the oilseeds CG meetings. With
71.2 percent, the oilseeds sector scores highest on the number of exits
compared to the other CGs (Table 7 and synthesis report);

In the oilseeds CG, the percentage of at random visitors (present at 0, 1, or
2 meetings) is high (52.5 percent) (Table 6). Rotation of organisations and
participants was especially underlined by the interviewees in the oilseeds
value chain CG.

3.1.2 Jointness
The success factors identified in this case study to measure the level of ‘jointness’ in the
CG meetings are: (a) decision making, (b) leadership, (c) selection of stakeholders, (d)
agenda setting, (e) distribution of benefits, and (f) risk sharing.

(a) Decision making

The degree to which decisions are jointly made in the oilseeds CG was difficult to
measure, as formal decisions are rarely made in the CG (see also section 3.1.3). Only a
few moments of more formal decision making could be identified, and all were related to
electing the nominees for certain positions in established committees. Examples are the
election of the CG Leader in meeting one, the election of members of the Ad hoc
Committee for Policy Issues in meeting 8, and the elections of members for the Oilseeds
CG Executive Committee in meeting 12. All interviewees pointed out that every CG
member has a free and equal vote in such decisions.
Interviewees were asked whether all members have an ‘equal say’ not only in the
committee election processes, but also in all discussions in the CG, or whether some
members are ‘more equal than others’? All of them (Table 8) stated that every member
has an equal chance and is free to express his/her opinion in the CG meetings, ensured

48 Total exits = present & exit + entry & exit (see also Appendix 5)
30
by the proper steering activities of the Facilitators. Nor is there any entry barrier to join
the CG (interview 12). A representative of a processing company described the CG as
“the most democratic forum where each and every member is free and equal” (interview
11). Nonetheless, interviewees revealed that participants with profound knowledge and
expertise capture larger shares of the discussions time in the CG meeting. For example,
quite often, researchers, advisors, consultants, and experts take more time from which
other members learn (interview 17). None of the interviewees has complained about such
practices as the learning processes benefit all.
All interviewees except one believed that planning and other issues that involve
decision making are based on ‘consensuses’. A representative of a private company who
had different view in this regard stated that though every member has an equal chance
to speak out in the CG, “decisions are influenced by the ideas of SNV BOAM” (interview
14).

Table 8. Equal say

Equal say Frequency Percentage
(%)
Yes 15 100
No 0 0
Total 15 100
Source: interview data

SNV BOAM has made attempts to share some of its own responsibilities in respect of
the edible oil and oilseeds value chains to create more ‘ownership’ of the CG process
with stakeholders. Such an initiative emanated from the Midterm Review of the SNV
BOAM Program (Aleme et al., 2008). Its main initiatives were the establishment of the
Executive Committee for the evaluation of concept notes regarding BOAM designated
funds and the assignment of contracts between SNV BOAM and its clients (including
CG members) on capacity building interventions. In the meetings, joint Strategic
Intervention Plans49 and operational plans were formulated. According to what was
recommended in the MTR the CG’s Executive Committee should empower the sector in
general and the CG in particular by giving stakeholders a say in the allocation of its
oilseeds sector related funding. Moreover, the establishment of the Executive
Committee helps to strengthen the relationship between the various stakeholders within
the sector, and also serves as a phasing out strategy for SNV BOAM50.

49The following Strategic Intervention Plans were agreed with the oilseeds CG members in meeting 12:
1) improved seed multiplication for planting material at farmers’ level; 2) training on good agricultural
practice in oil crops (GAP) and food oil processing; 3) promoting value addition on local processing
industries with refining, bottling and processing of more valuable products like shortenings and
margarine; 4) improving market information system through networking; 5) and fight adulteration of
oilseed from inert materials
50 Minutes of the 12th CG Meeting, 9 December 2008

31
 Financial ownership was created, to variable degree, in the following ways. First,
the Executive Committee has full authority to evaluate, approve or reject funding
proposals where SNV BOAM’s role would be limited to give technical advice on concept
notes that have been accepted by the executive body51. Second, the SIPs and operational
plans were adjusted in response to CG members at least two times, but that was already
prepared in a preliminary stakeholder workshop with oilseeds value chain
representatives identified by SNV BOAM. A representative of a private company is of
the opinion that SNV BOAM is less ready to compromise the contents of its programs;
therefore, the role of CG members in the formulation of SIPs and other operational
planning is mainly limited to an act of endorsement (interview 14). Third, the oilseeds
Executive Committee was effective only for a very limited time period (only since 2009)
(interview 17). Fourth, SNV BOAM itself remains modest about the ownership that was
created in this way. “Having the Executive Committee decide on fund proposals was
only a ‘cosmetic measure’: a small shift of ownership” (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, August
2010). Finally, as the CG meetings were not formally required under the MSP, there
was no formal joint decision making on financial issues.
In sum, although it was always SNV BOAM that decided on the final budget
spending, decisions made in the CG or by its Executive Committee were never bypassed
by SNV BOAM (pers. comm. SNV BOAM, January 2011). After the Mid-Term Review in
2009, SIPs were revised and oilseeds stakeholders were slowly able to change the SIPs
in the direction they preferred.

b) Leadership
The majority of our interviewees believe that the CG Leader is strong and visionary. He
is acquainted with the sector both as a professional and as a businessman (interview 17).
The CG Leader confirmed that he has both professional and business interest and
knowledge to lead the CG (interview 12). “Without the CG Leader who volunteered and
committed himself to lead the CG ever since its establishment in 2005, the oilseeds CG
would not have reached the stage where it is now.”52 The CG Leader however, was not
able to direct the sector towards modernization compared to that of the honey CG
Leader. In spite of his professional and business interest, he did not invest sufficient
time and resources to explore alternatives for the development of the sector other than
SNV BOAM’s support (anonymous). The honey CG Leader had exerted efforts to
explore possibilities for support beyond the SNV BOAM program. For example, the
establishment of Ethiopian Apiculture Board and EU accreditation of Ethiopian honey
are primarily his own initiatives to which he had invested his time and resources
(anonymous). The oilseeds CG Leader stated that neither CG members are highly
committed to carry out assigned responsibilities effectively, nor are EPOSPEA and the
Oil Millers’ Association strong and active to support the CG. For him, these are
disincentives to exert extra efforts. Many of the respondents shared the view that these
associations are weak to provide leverage to the CG.

51 Minutes of the 12th CG Meeting, 9 December 2008

52 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
32
(c) Selection of stakeholders
Except for the beginning, stakeholders are not randomly selected. Their profession
(processor, producer, exporter, researcher, BDS provider, etc.) and their possible
contributions (e.g. input supply, processors with good relations with farmers etc.) to the
CG are important criteria in the selection procedure (interview 17). Participants are
mainly selected and invited by SNV BOAM in collaboration with the Chain CG Leader
and Facilitator. The CG Facilitator is mostly active in facilitating the selection
processes (correspondence) than in actual selection (identification of participants) as the
latter is mostly performed by the SNV BAOM Chain Lead Advisor (interview 15). The
SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor however, discusses and decides with the CG Leader or
at least the Chain Lead Advisor informs the CG Leader about newly identified
participants before the invitation is sent (interview 12). Most of the interviewees
indicated that they learned about the CG from SNV BOAM, who invited them to
participate through the CG Facilitator (e.g. interviews 2, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13).
Organizations tipped by other organizations on the CG, were able to secure their
invitation after a discussion on their interests with the SNV BAOM Chain Lead Advisor
(interviews 4, 7, 10 and 14). The invitation database builds on the previous meetings
attendances (interview 15).
Almost all interviewees indicated that the CG Facilitator sends invitations to
members at least one week in advance of the next CG meeting (next meeting date is
usually fixed by CG members in the previous meeting) via e-mail, fax or telephone. The
CG Facilitator sends out a package per email or fax (no regular post mail) to each
participant that includes the invitation letter, the agenda of the meeting, and a summary
of about two pages on the previous meeting (not the full meeting minutes). Though the
CG Facilitator reminds participants by telephone on the meeting dates, participants that
have no email or fax addresses to receive the meeting agenda in advance miss the
opportunity to anticipate and prepare on the meetings’ agenda. This is quite common
for producers’ cooperative unions, which have neither easy access to e-mail nor to fax
services (interviews 4 and 5). An interviewee missed one meeting as a change in the CG
meeting date was not well communicated to every participant (interview 9)
Changes in the SNV BOAM programme coordinating staff considerably
influenced the new CGs invitation policy. “The first CG was developed from scratch
and it was SNV BOAM who gathered all relevant stakeholders together”53, and the first
BOAM coordinator insisted the number of participants should not exceed 30-35.
However, from meeting nine (end of 2007/beginning of 2008) the value chain Lead
Advisors -headed by the second BOAM coordinator- started inviting many participants
(often over 60 participants), aiming at broad based information dissemination. This
prompted SNV BOAM to look more critical at the engagement processes within the
coordination group54. Invitation became more regulated with only one participant from
each organisation receiving DSA. Less relevant and non-motivated participants were

53 Discussion group SNV BOAM, August 12, 2010.

54 SNV BOAM Annual Report 2009
33
removed from the participation lists, although this did not happen often according to
the CG Facilitators.

(d) Agenda setting

The SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor, the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator are key
players in the agenda setting processes. Most agendas are drawn from the previous CG
meeting agendas. According to the Chain CG Leader and Facilitator, members can
incorporate issues in the CG meeting agendas only if supported by the majority of the
CG members. This is, however, not explicitly stated in the invitation letter nor is there
any practical exercise that could be referred to in this regard (interviews 12 and 15). A
representative of a business association has his reservations; organizers (Chain Lead
Advisor, Chain CG Leader and Facilitator) do not include agendas other than those
stipulated in the SNV BOAM programme. For example, access to large investment
capital (foreign loans) and technological support to the processing industry (modern oil
refinery) were important agendas his organization brought in, but were not accepted by
organizers. This was merely because the agendas were considered to be beyond the
SNV BOAM program. In his opinion, the CG has only addressed issues that fall within
the SNV BOAM framework (interview 9). Another interviewee had another concern
related to the agenda; often discussions are pre-occupied with one of the agenda items
and moderators are incapable to cover the whole agenda (interview 18).

Table 9. Agenda setting evaluated

Satisfaction Frequency Percentage
(%)
Low 0 0
Modest 2 14
High 12 86
Total 14 100
Source: interview data

Interviewees’ overall evaluation of the agenda setting processes shows that an

overwhelming majority (86%) is highly satisfied. Insufficient capacity of the CG
Facilitator to guide though agenda items and lack of interest from organizers to include
agenda items that go beyond the SNV BOAM framework were critical limitations
identified by interviewees (interviews 9 and 18).

(e) Distribution of benefits

In its first meeting, the oilseeds CG explicitly identified the benefits expected from the
joint forum and efforts. The benefits are streamlined into five key result areas55 from
which the main stakeholders (producers, processors and exporters) would directly and

55The key result areas include the quality of the existing supply is improved; yield potential of oil seed
crops under production improved; oil extraction and refining process is improved; the use of edible oil at
rural level improved through small micro oil extraction enterprises; and coordination within the value
chain is improved
34
indirectly benefit56. All respondents to this question indicated that, in principle, every
CG member has equal access to all types of benefits (the benefits interviewees are
referring to are mainly related to SNV BOAM’s financial and technical supports).
Nevertheless, interviewees’ overall assessments of benefits and the way they are
distributed among CG members show that none of them believe that benefits are
distributed equally (Table 10). Practical benefits depend predominantly on the capacity
of each CG member to bring forward a concept paper or funding proposal that meets
the requirements of the SNV BOAM program (e.g. interviews 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 15).
Members who actively participate in the CG meetings create fertile grounds for
enhanced benefits (interviews 6). The majority of the interviewees believed that members
with greater capacity and an active participation attitude have benefited to greater
extent whereas members with frail capacity have benefited little or none.
An interviewee -who is member of the Executive Committee-argued that
available funds were not optimally utilized due to low capacity of the majority of the CG
members to prepare proposals that could meet with SNV BOAM’s criteria (interview 16).
Other interviewees confirmed that available funds were not fully utilized. This is
however not only due to weak capacity of the CG members, but also due to rigid and
slow bureaucratic fund release procedures of SNV BOAM (interviews 12, 14 and 18).
One interviewee for example, stated that “it is close to one year that the proposal
submitted by his company was approved by the Executive Committee of the CG, the
fund however, has not yet been released” (interview 14). SNV BOAM’s Chain Lead
Advisor confirmed that delays are common (up to two years)57.
Inconsistent proposal assessment procedures are other bottlenecks for an equal
distribution of the benefits. The Chain Leader had received complaints from several
members that requirements or conditions for the SNV BOAM capacity building support
proposal are not uniformly applied, i.e. some proposals have been accepted on the basis
of a bare minimum requirements while others have been required to fulfil all the
requirements stringently (interview 12). Another interviewee shared the CG Leader’s
observations. He stated that the Executive Committee and SNV BOAM did not apply
uniform standards/requirements for accepting or rejecting funding proposals. Members
that have good relationships with SNV BOAM have been able to easily secure grants no
matter what the quality of the proposals was (interview 18).
According to the Chain Lead Advisor, the CG cannot be responsible or credited
for ensuring ‘equal distributions of benefits’. It was only recently that the CG, through
its Executive Committee, began to exercise decision making that involves allocation of
benefits (appraising and deciding on funding proposals). Before the Executive
Committee, such decisions were under SNV BAOM’s mandate. Hence, so far, the CG’s
role in distribution of benefits was marginal. For the Lead Advisor, in the context of
SNV BAOM, distribution of benefits does not depend on the decision making body but
on the capacity of the beneficiary. The program is basically demand driven; hence, the

56 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September, 2005

57 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011

35
benefits depend on the capacity to demand and to meet clearly stipulated requirements
(interview 17).

Table 10. Equal benefits

Equal Frequency Percentage (%)
benefit
Yes 0 0
No 14 100
Total 14 100
Source: interview data

(f) Risk sharing

The last indicator of jointness in the CG, the extent to which risks are shared between
CG members in the meeting, appeared not very relevant, as resources are mainly brought
in by SNV BOAM. CG members risk little in the meetings except their own time. In the
edible oil and oilseeds value chain, uncertainties and transaction costs in production and
marketing that members have to endure due to lack of information might have been
diminished as a result of relationships created in the CG (see also next section).

The degree of jointness of the CG members and the mutual independence among them
are important measures for the level of ‘jointness’ in the MSP. Despite an interviewee’s
criticism on SNV BAOM’s dominance in decision making, the overall data gave the
impression that the CG leadership at least intends to let the MSP function in a
horizontal manner. In the meetings, members have an equal chance to speak out. Except
for one interviewee the remaining interviewees are satisfied with CG governance. The
majority of the respondents believe that decision making is on the basis of consensus.
Nonetheless, not all stakeholders have the ability to articulate their needs/demand; only
those who push their issues through in previous meetings can influence the CG agenda
and the benefits thereof. The CG’s centre of gravity remains with the leading trio
including the Chain CG Leader, CG Facilitator and the SNV BOAM Lead Chain
Advisor, with the sitting SNV BOAM programme coordinator as a significant
influencer at the background. Findings revealed that not only the CG’s centre of
gravity remains with the leading trio, but also prevalence of unequal power distribution.
The fact that some agenda points forwarded by members were not accepted, and that
proposal requirements were not uniformly and equally applied demonstrate lack of
unequal power distribution.

In the social network analysis, betweenness centrality was among others used to
identify the most central actors in the network. As stated before, those organizations
having the highest scores on betweenness centralities in the network are the most
central players in the MSP networks. In Appendix 6, the top-10 central network players
of the oilseeds CG are presented in tables. Their organisational type (private sector,
public sector, civil society, or education), subtype (i.e. processor, producer, financial
institute, business association, implementing agency etc.) and their stakeholder role

36
(actor, supporter, influencer and facilitator) in the value chains were taken into account.
The following regarding jointness was confirmed in the social network analysis:

SNV BOAM is a central network player in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6).

This corresponds with their leading role as an initiator of the whole
program and the oilseeds CG; their involvement in agenda setting and
selection of stakeholders, and their final decision in financial affairs;

The oilseeds Chain Leader is visible as a central player in the oilseeds CG
(Appendix 6). This confirms his active position in the oilseeds network;

The Chain Facilitator is visible as a central player in the oilseeds CG
(Appendix 6);

In the first nine meetings (till January 2008), about 25-35 participants can
be observed in each meeting (participation databases), corresponding with
the invitation policy of the first BOAM coordinator. After meeting nine,
often over 50 participants -including several members of the same
organisation- can be observed (participation databases). This corresponds
with the invitation policy of the value chain Lead Advisors headed by the
second BOAM coordinator.

To identify and compare the genuine ‘information brokers’ –who are in between other
network players and control information diffusion- in the oilseeds network, only those
organisations with a normalized betweenness centrality higher than 2, 3 and 4 were
taken into account in this part of the analysis58. In Appendix 6 the central players with a
betweenness centrality higher than 2, 3 and 4 are presented.

Regarding ‘information brokerage’, the network analysis confirms and complements

that:

SNV BOAM plays the role of information broker in the oilseeds CG,
confirming its dominant position as MSPs initiator (Appendix 6);

Differences in the absolute and relative numbers of ‘information brokers’
are not spectacular, nevertheless, we can derive that the oilseeds network
is relatively more horizontal compared to the other CGs as relatively more
participants control information diffusion (synthesis report)

Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 2, the oilseeds CG is most
horizontal compared to the other CG’s; information is diffused through ten
identified information brokers, almost 10 percent of all participating
organisations (synthesis report);

Measuring a betweenness centrality higher than 4, both SNV BOAM and
the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia are central network players in
the oilseeds network (Appendix 6).

58 The cut-points 2, 3 and 4 are arbitrary

37
3.1.3 Transparency
The degree of transparency of the CG in undertaking its activities is modestly high, as
reflected by the views of our interviewees. The meetings are open to public (although
more restricted towards the 18th meeting), and meeting summaries, agendas and other
documents are shared with stakeholders. All CG documents could be downloaded from
the former SNV BOAM website, although several links appeared to be dead and not all
documents were available. Not only its current activities but also the future of the CG is
openly discussed. The issue of succession or handing over the CG from SNV BOAM to
stakeholders has been discussed since meeting 14. In this meeting, four candidates -the
Ethiopian Pulse, Oilseed and Spice Exporters Association; Addis Ababa Oil Millers
Association; Oil Board; and Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce and Sectoral Association-
were nominated by the CG meeting participants to take over the responsibility59. The
Oil Board did not exist at that time and hence, was eliminated from the candidacy. The
three remaining candidates were assessed based on a matrix of criteria identified by the
CG meeting participants. The evaluation revealed that ECCSA fulfilled most of the
criteria and was selected to take over the responsibility60. The ECCSA accepted this role
and declared its commitment and readiness. Though SNV BOAM planned to handover
the responsibility from the 15th CG meeting, no concrete steps have so far been taken by
the ECCSA towards assuming its role61. A representative of the ECCSA indicated that
his organization is still willing to take over and has started the necessary preparations.
Success factors assessed under transparency were (a) accountability, and (b) trust
building.

(a) Accountability
Formal accountability mechanisms are absent in the oilseeds CG. Except for the Chain
Leader, Chain CG Facilitator and other contractors with SNV BOAM (i.e. Local
Capacity Builders and other BDS providers) none of the stakeholders participating in
the CG has been assigned formal duties and responsibilities. Due to the lack of formal
task assignments and accountability mechanisms, the majority of members working in
different committees of the CG did not carry out their responsibilities effectively. After
they left the CG meeting, they ’forget’ on their assignments; consequently, the next CG
meeting is preoccupied with the same issue. Therefore, the CG could not move forward
in discussing new agendas (interviews 11, 12, and 15).
Nevertheless, several forms of informal accountability are present (pers. comm.
SNV BOAM, February 2011). For example CG members only receive SNV BOAM
funds if their proposals are in line with the SIPs identified by stakeholders in the
oilseeds value chain. In addition, members need to present their fund utilization reports
in the CG meetings, in front of all other critical and reflecting stakeholders.

(b) Trust building

59 Minutes of the 14th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 11 June 2009

60 Minutes of the 14th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 11 June 2009
61 Minutes of the 16th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 17 December 2009

38
Without the oilseeds CG, the multiple stakeholders (processors, producers, exporters,
experts, consultants, and researchers) brought together would experience difficulties to
discuss the oilseeds’ problems and search for solutions. On top of the plenary
discussions, the CG organizes and facilitates working groups (e.g. meeting 1, 3 and 12)
and bilateral discussion forums to improve stakeholders’ involvement and to foster
communication and networking. Working groups were assigned to discuss on specific
issues (how to promote value addition, market information and networking, fight
adulteration of oilseeds and edible oil, etc.) and to present plenary on their results. CG
members are also deliberately encouraged by the Facilitators and Chain Advisors to
have bilateral discussions and to exchange contact addresses (e.g. between producers
and processors, producers and exporters, producers and experts, processors and experts,
etc.) during lunch and coffee breaks. Interviewees appreciated the role of these
interactive processes in promoting trust and a ‘sense of complementarities’ between
stakeholders (e.g. interviews 5, 9, 10, and 12).
Only occasionally exchange of contact addresses and the network thereof have
resulted in direct transactions between producers and processors (interviews 5 and 9).
Nevertheless, the degree of trust is no yet sufficient for efficient transactions between
the chain actors. Cooperative unions, processors and exporters are not comfortable yet
with farmers. They are of the opinion that farmers are not loyal to buyers (interviews 4, 5
and 14). “Though the Union is trying its best to help farmers through the provision of
inputs (improved seeds), farmers scarcely remain trustworthy to the Union” (interview
5).

3.1.4 Goal alignment

Goal alignment by stakeholders is considered to contribute to the effectiveness of
collective goal-setting processes, which, in turn, positively influences the success of the
MSP. Strong goal alignment and goal visibility allows for more effective execution of
the SIPs identified in the process. Goal alignment is measured by assessing the success
factors (a) ‘clear objectives’, (b) ‘win-win opportunities’, and (c) a ‘compelling case’ as
driver of the MSP.

(a) Clear objectives

The primary objective of the CG is to serve as a platform for discussion, dialogue,
capacity building, information exchange, and knowledge transfer between stakeholders
in the edible oil and oilseeds value chain62. SNV BOAM has broadly defined the formal
objective of the CG as promoting efficient and equitable linkages for the economically
active poor along the agricultural value chain63.On top of this, the CG helps participants
to identify needs and with formulating requests for support from SNV BOAM. Based on
the experiences gained during the pilot phase, SNV BOAM identified the following

62 Minutes of the 1st Oilseeds CG Meeting, 30 September, 2005

63 An observation out of the secondary data is that the aim has gradually been shifting from ‘creating
linkages’ towards ‘creating ownership in the sector’. The third BOAM program coordinator endorses
this strategy towards a long term vision for the CG.
39
important SIPs for the scaling up phase64: improved seed multiplication for planting
material at farmers’ level; training on good agricultural practice in oil crops and food oil
processing; promoting value addition on local processing industries with refining,
bottling and processing of more valuable products like shortenings and margarine;
improving market information system through networking; and fight adulteration of
oilseeds from inert materials. In order to promote the shared objective and as well as to
create ownership, SNV BOAM presented these SIPs to members at the 12th CG meeting
for approval65. Though members had little input into the SIPs, they had indorsed them
and expressed their commitment to effective implementation (interview 17). With the
above SIPs, SNV BOAM fine-tuned its program and the CG’s overall focus on
improving the scarcity of improved seeds and supply of oilseed for oil extraction and
export business66.

(b) Win-win opportunities

Do the members feel that the CG facilitates a win-win situation for all? Previous
discussions (in the section on risk sharing) revealed that CG members risk little except
their time whereas opportunities in principle (in the section distribution of benefits) are
equal for every member. Actual benefits however, depend on the capacity of each
member and those members with limited capacity have less chance to benefit from SNV
BOAM’s capacity building support. Previous discussions however, revealed that benefits
depend not only on the capacity of members, but also on the nature of their
relationships with SNV BAOM, i.e. members who have good relationships with SNV
BOAM are said to have had secured benefits despite the quality of their funding
proposals. Nevertheless, the win-win opportunity of participation in the oilseeds CG is
not restricted to SNV BOAM’s support; learning and networking are also important
objectives from which every member could benefit.

(c) Compelling case

Is the edible oil and oilseeds CG driven by a ‘compelling case’, i.e. an important need
that can be best fulfilled through an MSP and that is recognized and accepted by all
members?
Almost all interviewees indicated that the edible oil and oilseeds sector was in
complete ‘disarray’ before the establishment of the CG. It was characterized by
fragmented and backward production, processing and marketing systems. A
representative of a government implementing agency stated that “change in the
performance of the oilseeds sector is only possible through multi-stakeholder process
that assembles all relevant actors” (interview 16). One of the greatest contributions of
the CG recognized and appreciated by all interviewees is the opportunity it has created
for stakeholders in the sector to unite and identify, discuss and seek solutions for the
problems that have been affecting the development of the sector (e.g. interviews, 6, 8, 10,
11, 12, 15, and 17). “The CG created an opportunity of which I dreamed for long, both as

64 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009

65 Minutes of the 12th Oilseeds CG Meeting, December 9, 2008
66 SNV BOAM2 Program Proposal, 2009

40
a professional (agronomist) and as a businessman (exporter)” (interview 12). “Before the
CG, many of our research results were shelved as there was little or no forum to share
and disseminate the results. Indeed, forums like the CG are indispensable in
disseminating research results to organized farmer representatives and the farming
community at large” (interview 13).
Therefore, stakeholders in the oilseeds sector were eager to have access to
forums like the CG. Nonetheless, the CG by itself can barely address the substantial
problems of the sector and the high expectations of the stakeholders. Processors for
example, expect the CG to play a key role in technological transfer (financial support to
buy a modern edible oil refinery) while producers expect the CG to create sufficient
access to improved seeds and market opportunities (domestic and international).
Paradoxically, CG members do have neither sufficient resources nor commitment to
improve the performance of the CG in meeting their expectations67.
3.2 Embeddedness
To assess the degree to which the oilseeds MSP is enmeshed in third organisations, we
assessed its inter-organisational relationships through (a) the origin of the participants’
link with the CG (was the motivation to join brought about by another organisation?),
(b) the extent to which the MSP contributed to new professional organisations’
memberships, (c) the involvement of participants in multiple MSPs, (d) relations with
the government, and (e) SNV BOAM’s inter-organisational embeddedness as a result of
its MSP activities.

(a) The original link to the oilseeds CG

About one third of the interviewees identified that inter-organisational relationships
have been supportive in linking and motivating them to become a member of the CG for
the oilseeds value chain (interviews 4, 7, 10, 14, and 16). The following examples
illustrate the role of inter-organizational relationships in linking members with the CG.
Rayawakena Farmers’ Cooperative Union was motivated to join the CG through the
information it obtained from the Ambo and Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Unions
(interview 4). Addis Alem Trading learned about the CG from the Women’s Exporters
Forum (interview 10) while ERA Agrolink PLC joined the CG through information
obtained from another organization, i.e., the Office of Public Private Partnership on
Oilseeds (interview 14). The Oromia Cooperative Promotion Bureau was linked to the
CG through a consultant who had worked with SNV BOAM (interview 7).

(b) Access to new professional organisations’ memberships

The majority of the interviewed participants believed the CG did not support members
to access new professional organisations (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, and 11). Two of the
interviewees however, pointed out the active role of the CG in the establishment of the
Office of PPPO in which several CG members (such as ECCSA, MoTI, EPOSPEA, and
MoA) are participating (interviews 2 and 18).

67 Clarification interview with SNV BOAM’s Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 22/03/2011
41
(c) Involvement in multiple MSPs
Several organisations are active in multiple MSPs. They are members of the four value
chain CGs (honey, dairy, oilseeds, and pineapple). The Chamber of Commerce and
Sectoral Association, Bank of Abyssinia, Consulting Management Business Creation and
Development Services, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Agriculture and
Rural Development, and the Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia are good examples.
The actors involved in multiple MSPs transfer information and contacts from one MSP
to the other to the benefit of the members, and enhance the general networking
opportunities for them. In this way they contribute to the effects of each MSP.

(d) Relations with the government

In spite of the fact that oilseeds are the third major crops grown in Ethiopia and
constitute the second most important source of foreign earnings, the sector did not
receive sufficient policy attention. Unlike cereal crops, there has been no sufficient
research in the sector (interviews 13). The CG however, has promoted and demonstrated
the role of the sector in the fight against poverty and in ensuring sustainable
development. This encouraged policy makers to increase interest and attention to the
sector (interviews 1 and 3). The PPPO has improved the interest in and attention given
to the oilseeds sector as well (interview 18). MoTI and MoA for example, have shown
their keen interests to support the sector through market promotion and research
respectively. MoTI’s primary attention is however, directed towards export than the
overall development of the sector (interview 3). Due to an increasing interest in and
attention to the oilseeds sector created by the CG and the PPPO, the Ethiopian
Government has come up with a master plan (covering the period 2008-2015) for the
development of the sub-sector68.

(e) SNV BOAM’s network

SNV BOAM is not the sole donor involved in the VCD approach, but is embedded in a
broader international development network. The most prominent organisations with
value chain development programmes are the German GTZ, Oxfam GB, and the Royal
Netherlands Embassy (RNE), which support the dissemination of best practices among
donors, government institutions and practitioners. The Government of Ethiopia has
also adopted the sectoral and value chain approach. Growing Ethiopian Market,
Facilitator for Change Ethiopia, and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance are
other NGOs which are linked with SNV BOAM through the CG. These links of SNV
BOAM embed the CG members in the wider institutional field.

Discussions in this section revealed that the oilseeds CG is fairly embedded in inter-
organisational relationships. Interactions with third parties are evident, resulting in
multidirectional information flows facilitated through the identified brokers of the
network. Moreover, the oilseeds CG has played an important role in the establishment

.68 SNV BOAM Annual Report, 2009

42
of a parallel MSP –PPPO, which is involving multiple organizations. This enhances
public-private partnerships in the oilseeds sector.

In the social network analysis, the following regarding relations established with the
government were confirmed:

The Ministry of Trade and Industry is among the central network players
in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6), confirming MoTI’s interests to support
the sector (through market promotion and research);
3.3 Involvement
In this case study, the intensity of actor involvement was assessed through (a)
individual/sector representation in the CG and (b) participation in CG-related
committees. The findings were verified in the social network analysis.

(a) Representation
The question whether all relevant stakeholders are represented in the oilseeds CG was
forwarded to 15 of the 18 interviewees. The majority of them (87%) believed that
representation in the edible oil and oilseeds CG was incomplete (Table 11).
Three of the interviewees (interviews 5, 14 and 11) indicated that regional and
federal research institutions are not sufficiently represented; only recently (2009) one
research institute - Holleta Agricultural Research Centre - has started participating in
the CG. In addition, Federal Cooperative Unions and brokers are important
stakeholders that have not been included (interviewees 8 and 17).
Eight out of the 15 interviewees replied yes and no to the question (interviews 6,
7, 10, 13, 15, 16, and 18). Yes, because, institutionally, all relevant stakeholders are
represented in the CG. No, because government agencies are represented by frequently
rotating experts who do have little or no leverage in government decision making and
policy processes. Their overall assessment is that the CG is not complete in the real
sense of representation.
The lack of government involvement is a specific issue that SNV BOAM
considered from the outset. The Mid Term Review (Aleme et al. 2008) states:
“involvement and commitment from the public sector is crucial in order to achieve the
strategic objectives of the BOAM programme. The public sector is already involved and
experienced the positive effects of the BOAM approach and is interested to continue
with the practical relation. The rejection of the public development program69 however,
hinders the development of better and more structural relationships. More importantly,
the connection with the higher forums and senior management of relevant public
agencies and departments needs to be structured for which new arrangements are
necessary.” Discussions in section 3.2(d) revealed that the Ethiopian Government has
started to develop an interest in the oilseeds sector due to the CG’s efforts to

69The public component of the BOAM program (to be implemented by the Bureaus of Finance and
Economic Development never took off (source: Mid Term Review, 2008)
43
demonstrate the role of the sector in the overall economic development in general and
in poverty reduction in particular.

Table 11. Representation oilseeds CG

Representation Frequency Percentage
(%)
Complete 2 13
Not complete 13 87
Total 15 100
Source: interview data

(b) Participation in CG related committees

The establishment, membership and participation in (steering, ad hoc) committees and
working groups are indicators of actors’ involvement. The participants of the oilseeds
CG have established several spontaneous working groups on several issues in the
meetings (meetings 1, 3 and 12) (see also section 3.1.3 b). The CG has also established the
Policy Issues Ad hoc Committee (meeting 8) and an Executive Committee (meeting 12).
The two committees have created opportunities for members to engage in the CG
activities. Despite serious limitations in achieving its objectives, the Policy Issues Ad
hoc Committee consists of public, private and civil society sector representatives,
including MoTI, MoA, the Bankers’ Association, ECCSA, the Oil Consortium, and SNV
BOAM70. The Oilseeds CG Executive Committee also involves a number of
participants. Three of the members represent federal and regional government agencies
while four of them represent private organizations and business associations71.

The social network analyses on sector representation and central network players
generally support these findings (derived from Appendices 5 and 6). In Table 12 and 13
respectively the sector representation in the oilseeds CG and the number of central
network players from each sector are represented. Finally, in Table 14, the central
network players per stakeholder role in the oilseeds value chain are displayed.

Table 12. Sector representation in the oilseeds CG in percentages (%)

Sector Private Public Education Civil Unknown
sector sector society
Oilseeds 60,4 17,8 6,9 14,9 0,0

70 Minutes of the 8th Oilseeds CG Meeting, 13 July 2007

71 Minutes of the 12th Oilseeds CG Meting, 9 December 2008
44
Table 13. Top-10 central network players in the oilseeds CG per societal sector
Oilseeds
Private 5
Public 4
Civil Society 1
Education 0
Total 10

Table 14 Top-10 central network players per stakeholder role in the oilseeds value chain
Oilseeds
Actor 2
Supporter 3
Influencer 4
Facilitator 1
Total 10

From the network analysis, the following was confirmed:

SNV BOAM’s private sector approach is evident; the majority of the

participants in the oilseeds value chain CG represent private sector
organisations (Table 12). Moreover, half of the central network players are
representatives of the private sector (Table 13). ;

All stakeholders’ roles in the value chains are represented in the lists of
central network players of the oilseeds CG (Table 14). This indicates that
value chain roles (chain actors, -supporters, -influencers and -facilitators)
of the whole chain approach are represented in the networks;

Financial organisations (i.e. banks, MFIs) are absent as central network
players in the oilseeds CG (Appendix 6).

The Quality Standard Authority of Ethiopia is among the central network
players in the oilseeds CG (see also section 4.3).

45
 Table 15. Oilseeds CG Ethiopia: internal and external dynamics
Internal dynamics
I. Collaboration
1.1 Engagement
Commitment Homogenous group of medium committed members. Absence of active
nucleus- group to ‘steer the wheel’ is a critical problem. There is no strong
private company to take the lead nor do members invest sufficient time and
resources to effectively carry out their tasks in the CG. Critique that SNV
BOAM’s low resource allocation to the oilseeds value chain, inordinate
delays in fund release procedures, influence in the CG decision making, and
lack of interest to include agendas other than those in the BAOM framework
have affected members’ interest and commitment to play a role of active
nucleus-group. High exit and rotation.
Motivation Fourfold: 1) the business opportunities it provides, such as meeting new
buyers and suppliers (extrinsic); 2) the incentives provided by SNV BOAM
as it has been inviting participants and offers technical and financial
assistance (extrinsic); 3) the learning opportunities the platform offers and
its overall role in promoting the oilseeds sector (both extrinsic and intrinsic
); and 4) personal interests (intrinsic). DSA not objective in itself, but
necessary precondition for poorly capacitated regional organisations.
Roles & Contrib. No. Except for those contracted by SNV BAOM, formal duties and
responsibilities of each CG member not specified.
Shared resources No, but equal access to third (SNV BOAM) funds.
1.2 Jointness
Decision making Joint, to variable degrees. Stakeholders can adapt SIPs. For a limited period,
stakeholders had a say in oilseeds allocated funding. Nevertheless, SNV
BOAM influential in decision making. Equal opportunity to speak out for all,
but more knowledgeable and well informed participants take advantages in
the CG meetings.
Leadership Stable and committed leadership; the Chain Leader elected at the first CG
meeting is still willing and committed to lead the CG. He has good
knowledge and vision for the sector. Nonetheless, he did not initiate and
invest his time and resources to explore alternatives to promote the
development of the sector. Disincentive due to absence of highly committed
CG members’ and weak associations.
Selection of Profession and potential contributions to the CG are basic selection criteria.
stakeholders Leading Trio of SNV BOAM (centre of gravity), Chain Facilitator & CG
Leader. Members modestly satisfied with selection.
Agenda setting Leading Trio of CG Leader, Chain Facilitator, & SNV BOAM Chain Lead
Advisor. Influencing agenda by others is difficult. Critique that agenda
points are not accepted if not in line with SNV BOAM. Members modest-
highly satisfied with agenda.
Benefits distribution In principle, all have equal access. But actual benefits depend on capability to
articulate interests, and capabilities are not equally distributed among
members. Critique that application procedures for project funding are not
uniformly applied to all members.
Risk sharing No risk members in meetings – not relevant.
1.3 Transparency
Accountability Formal accountability mechanisms absent. Nevertheless, several forms of
informal accountability are present.
Trust-building Yes; regular and direct communication and dialogue between stakeholders in
the CG meetings have generally improved trust among stakeholder in and
along the chain. More information on who does what and how to create
business between chain actors. However, processors and exporters still
distrust farmers. The CG had only little influence in this regard.
1.4 Goal alignment

46
Objectives clear Yes, CG members have commonly shared objectives on promoting linkages
between stakeholders in the oilseeds value chain. Objectives initially drafted
by SNV BAOM.
Win-win In principle. Win-win opportunities are equal but members need capabilities
to gain from the MSP, and some are more capable than others.
Compelling case Yes. The sector was in complete disarray due to lack of policy attention and
disorganized chain actors. NGO successfully facilitated tri-sector approach.
II. Embeddedness
Link to CG Yes, pre-existing inter-organizational links have also helped to find new
participants. Most of the participants however, were invited to the CG
through SNV BAOM.
Membership to new No, the majority believed that the CG did not play any role in this regard. A
organization few emphasised the role of the CG in establishing a complementary public-
private partnership on oilseeds.
Multiple MSPs Yes, several members involved in other (BOAM) MSPs and PPPO. This
improves network opportunities for CG members.
Relations with Yes, though key decision and policy makers are not yet attending the CG
government meetings, the CG has generally increased government’s interest in and
attention to oilseeds sector.
SNV BOAM Yes, SNV BOAM embedded into several international development
embeddedness networks that also linked the CG members in a wider institutional field.
III. Involvement
Representation Incomplete. Not all key stakeholders are represented. Government
institutions are represented by frequent rotating experts; key decision and
policy makers are not participating in the CG meetings.
Participation CG sub Yes, notwithstanding the limitations in carrying out assigned
committees responsibilities, several members are participating in different committees
(spontaneous, ad hoc and standing).
External dynamics
IV. Institutions
Access to knowledge Yes, in respect of training, information and access to improved seeds,
awareness on quality issues. No, in respect of making available new means of
production and processing technology.
Access to capital No, no changes achieved. Commercial Banks offer no accessible loans while
MFIs charge exorbitant rate. Major limitation of CG. Increased attention to
oilseeds sector (and government interest) may improve creditworthiness
oilseeds chain actors.
Access to markets Limited. Few direct linkages between producers and processors; domestic
market is still broker dominated. Efforts of CG and PPPO to promote
Ethiopian oils in Europe and Middle East, but no concrete result.
Access to (third) Limited. CG helped establishment of parallel public private partnership
organisations forum on oilseeds.

47
4. Institutional change
This chapter elaborates on the CG’s external dynamics, the institutional changes in the
value chain’s business environment brought about by the CG. We address the question
to what extent the CG has been effective in improving the conditions for upgrading for
farmers and SMEs in the oilseeds and edible oil value chain, in the perception of the
interviewees. The focus is on opportunities for value chain actors to acquire knowledge
and technology, capital or credit, opportunities to stabilize markets, and to become part
of professional associations. Table 16 below presents an overview of perceptions by
knowledgeable interviewees.

Table 16. Perceived changes in the institutional environment, in % and number of

interviewees
- % +/- % + % Total
4.1 Access to knowledge and technology
Training in good agricultural & manufacturing 0 0 11 92 1 8 12
practices
Farmers’ awareness on quality 2 22 4 45 3 33 9
Oil millers’ awareness on quality 6 75 2 25 0 0 8
Availability of improved seeds 0 0 13 100 0 0 13
Availability of new technology 4 40 6 60 0 0 10
Reduction in adulteration (oilseeds and edible oil) 7 64 4 36 0 0 11

4.2 Access to capital - % +/- % + % Total

Willingness of banks/MFI’s to finance 11 76 3 24 0 0 14

4.3 Access to markets - % +/- % + % Total

Increased prices paid by buyers 9 69 3 23 1 8 13
Advance payment 8 73 3 27 0 0 11

4.3 Access to organisation - % +/- % + % Total

Access to new organisation 11 85 2 15 0 0 13
Key: - No effect of CG, -/+ Limited positive effect of CG, + Considerable positive effect of CG

4.1 Access to knowledge

Access to knowledge refers to market, technical, and/or organisational information that
value chain actors can acquire either by themselves or by hiring affordable service
suppliers. To what extent have the CG meetings facilitated oilseeds chain actors in their
access to such knowledge? Has the CG been indispensible in this respect?
The CG has created access to technical, market and organizational information in
several ways. All interviewees pointed out that the CG has facilitated training
opportunities for farmers and oil mill workers to some extent. Farmers have been
trained in good farming practices as well as on product diversification. Good farming
48
practices included trainings on land preparation, sowing, weeding, harvesting, and store
management aimed at improving quality and productivity of oilseeds cultivation
(interviews 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17). The introduction and training of 5,000 farmers in
growing olive trees and producing olive oil was the first set of activities related to
product diversification (interviews 12, 16 and 17). The training of farmers in growing and
collecting petal from safflower is another important activity in this regard. Safflower’s
petal is a high value export product from which farmers can make a proper living.
Farmers who grow safflowers benefit not only from the petal but also from the seeds
(interviews 10, 12, and 17). Training of oil mill workers in improved manufacturing
practices is another opportunity the CG has created (interviews 9, 11, 12, and 17).
Interviewees however, have emphasized the limited scale of the trainings provided and
hence, its limited impact on quality and productivity of oilseeds and edible oil. For
example, a representative of a farmers’ cooperative union stated that only 2,400 out of
the 19,000 members of a Farmers’ Cooperative Union, had a chance to be trained
(interview 5).
The CG has also been criticised for its weak effort in facilitating technological
transfer to the processing industries (interview 9). On the production side however, it
has facilitated access to improved seeds. Farmers’ cooperative unions are provided with
information where and how to obtain improved seeds for their members. Training
opportunities for farmers on informal seed multiplications72 is another important role of
the CG (interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 16, and 17). Exchange of contact addresses between CG
members has also facilitated access to technical information. For example, the Local
Capacity Builder contracted by SNV BOAM has provided technical advisory services to
cooperative unions whom he met in the CG meetings (interview 6).
On top of these, presentations of research findings and good practices have
played important roles in creating access to technical and organizational information
(e.g. interviews 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, and 13). For example, Addis Mojo Edible Oil Complex S.C
presented on how to produce different varieties of edible oil using different processing
technologies (interview 11). Reviews of the minutes of the oilseeds CG meetings
generally indicate that presentations on research findings and sharing of good
(agricultural and manufacturing) practices are among the most important agenda items
of the CG meetings. These items were absent in just two of the seventeen meetings.
4.2 Access to capital
Access to capital involves the possibilities for oilseeds value chain actors to acquire
credit, loan or budget for their commercial activities. Access to capital was assessed
through interest rates, duration, collateral requirements, pay-back conditions, and
characteristics of the funding organisation. It was also verified whether the CG was
indispensable in influencing the stakeholders’ opportunities to access capital/credit.
Almost all interviewees pointed out lack of access to capital or credit services as a
major bottleneck to the development of the oilseeds’ sector. Neither producers nor
processors have enough collateral to secure loans from the Banks. In fact, most farmers
do not have the collateral Banks require; hence, they heavily depend on MFIs (interview
72 Informal seed multiplication refers the non-laboratory based multiplication of seeds by farmers
49
 4, and 5). Interviewees specified that farmers’ cooperative unions have better access to
credit than individual farmers. Cooperative unions in Oromia for example, can borrow
from the Oromia Cooperative Bank without collateral since they are shareholders of the
Bank. Unions borrow from the Bank at the rate of 7.5 percent per annum and lend73 to
their members (farmers) at the rate of 8.5 percent (1 percent administrative cost).
Interviewees however, believe that unions receive insufficient credits from the
Cooperative Bank to meet the demands of their members. Hence, both individual
farmers as well as cooperative members are exposed to exorbitant interest rates (16-20
percent) charged by MFIs (interviews 4 and 5). A representative of the processors’
association stated that processors are in quest of large
investment capital to upgrade the backward processing
technologies, but Bank credit services are inaccessible
SNV BOAM aims at due to collateral requirements. In addition, MFIs refuse
delivering B2B support to to provide large amounts of credits (interview 9).
guarantee that a reliable Reviews of minutes of the oilseeds CG meetings
supply and market outlet is show that Banks and MFIs have been participating since
assured. In their opinion, meeting 7 and 13 respectively. This shows that the CG
facilitating the members have been aware of the problem and the need
development of business for facilitating access to credit services. Generally,
relationships and interviewees are very critical of the CG’s role in this
arrangements between regard. Many agree that the issue has been raised and
downstream traders, discussed several times, but the CG’s role did not go
processors and farmer beyond “talking”. Neither Banks nor MFIs have changed
organizations on one side their polices and conditions for acquiring loans. The
and small farmers and their overall evaluation shows that eleven out of the fourteen
organizations on the other interviewees with whom the issue was discussed said the
side is essential for CG did not positively affect the willingness of Banks and
business development. MFIs in Ethiopia to lend any money to stakeholders in
Source: SNV BOAM’s value chain
approach. the oilseeds value chain (Table 16).
4.3 Access to markets
Access to markets was examined by gathering information on (alternative) market
opportunities, prices, and buyer and farmer commitments (advance payments,
contractual arrangements, and quality standards).
In terms of creating (alternative) market opportunities and B2B relationships, the
CG has facilitated access to market and business information by creating opportunities
for exchange of contact and communication between producers and
processors/exporters. For example, Didea Farmers’ Cooperative Union has been able to
establish direct connections with processors through the contact it established with the
Addis Ababa Oil Millers’ Association. Didea was also able to establish linkages with an
international company (based in London) to export linseed. The relationship however,
did not materialize into concrete business due to the high local prices and low

73 Cooperative unions provide the loan to farmers in kind (seeds)

50
international prices for linseed74. The provision of technical advisory services to unions
by the Local Capacity Builders is another good example of the role of the CG in creating
business relations (interview 5 and 6). On top of creating a contact platform, the CG has
also facilitated international market access. An attempt was made to link Ethiopian
companies with Dutch companies operating in the oilseeds value chain to facilitate
access to market and technology information (interviews 16 and 17). The CG’s effort in
exploring and securing markets (in China) for rapeseeds bi-products (cake) is worth
mentioning as well. Samirawit Oil Mill Factory has already started exporting rapeseed
cake to China (interview 17). The CG and the PPPO are closely collaborating with the
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Agency in promoting Ethiopian oilseeds to foreign
markets (e.g. Europe and Middle East) (interview 12). Regardless of these efforts, many
of our interviewees believe that the CG’s role in influencing prices through improved
market information is minor (Table 16). The facilitation of access to market information
is limited in scope and hence, direct exchange of market information and contact
between producers and
processors/exports is not yet
effective; the oilseeds market is still Prices in the oilseeds sector are defined by
dominated by brokers. Therefore, seasons and brokers. Usually, price diminishes
farmers have limited alternative during peak production season (November –
markets (interviews 5, 6, 7, and 10). March) and tends to increase in the months of
“Generally, the CG focused more on April –June. It increases sharply in the months of
the production side, but little on the July-October (interview 4, 5 and 9). In spite of
marketing aspects” (interview 11). these general trends, brokers cause an increase in
Interviewees’ evaluate the impact of price by hording oilseeds (interviews 4, 5, 9, 11, 12,
and 14). They also use new economic or policy
the CG on prices paid to farmers as
measures as pretext to increase price above the
minimal (Table 16). real impact of the measures taken. For example,
The oilseeds market is in August 2010, the value of the US $ has
characterized by a high degree of price increased up to 22 percent due to the devaluation
fluctuation (e.g. interviews 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, of the Ethiopian Currency (Birr). Immediately,
11, and 12, see also textbox). Seasonal the price for oilseeds increased up to 40 percent
supply of oilseeds, extended supply (interview 12). Brokers can also cause a decline in
chains characterised by few direct price. They usually collide to fix the farm gate
linkages between producers and price at low levels (particularly during peak
processors/exporters, and speculative production season) (interviews 4 and 5). In 2009, a
and dominant brokers are the main cooperative union bought a quintal of rapeseed
causes of price fluctuations. Lack of for Birr 470 which declined to Birr 370/quintal
in one month time. This forced the union to store
infrastructure to reach its products until prices reach at least the buying
producers/farmers also causes a major level (interview 4). More than competitive market
problem (interview 12). Speculative forces, such ups and downs are caused by brokers
brokers cause artificial (not dictated (interviews 4 and 12). Of course, price generally
by actual demand and supply) price increases from year to year due to inflation as
fluctuations. Almost all interviewees well (interviews 11 and 12).

74 Clarification interview with the SNV BOAM Lead Advisor for Oilseeds Value Chain, 15 March 2011
51
indicated that brokers, who muddle between producers and processors/exporters, are
price makers at all times. The CG had played a limited role in addressing considerable
constraints such as limited direct market information and absence of linkages between
producers and processors/exporters. Processors and exporters heavily depend on
brokers since they still distrust smallholder producers and cooperative unions in
ensuring predictable and regular supply of oilseeds (interviews 4, 9, 11, and 12).
As stated above, the CG in collaboration with the PPPO is exerting its effort to ensure
that the oilseeds pass through the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange market system,
which is believed to improve the prices paid to farmers by improving market
information as the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Agency provides daily updated
information via television and radio. Sesame has already started going through such a
market system (interviews 12 and 18).
In terms of contractual agreement, the majority of the interviews pointed out
that the issue has been raised and discussed in the CG meetings, but no concrete result
has so far been achieved. The Lead Chain Advisor stated that there was an initiative of a
formal contractual agreement between the Ambo Farmers’ Cooperative Union and the
Samrawit Oil Factory, but it did not materialize due to the Union’s failure to supply the
required amount of oilseeds (interview 17). Buyers generally distrust suppliers since the
latter have no capacity to ensure predictable and regular supply (interviews 4, 5, 9, 10, 11,
12, 15, and 16). Three of our interviewees pointed out the existence of contractual
agreements between farmers and seed suppliers, but not attributed to the CG.
Cooperative unions supply improved seeds to farmers and the latter pay back the
equivalent value in kind (seed) during harvest season (interviews 4 and 5). ERA Agrolink
PLC has also been engaged in similar arrangements (interview 14). Nevertheless, the
contracts are challenging since numerous farmers break the contract (they do not
supply as per the agreement) and it is difficult to enforce the contracts (legal procedures
endure endlessly) (interviews 4, 5 and 14). Despite the challenges, the majority of our
respondents believe that direct linkages and contractual agreements between producers
and processors/exporters “are the only way out” in improving broker dominated
oilseeds markets. The paradox is that farmers/suppliers receive insufficient payments in
a situation where there is critical shortage of supply. Processors pointed at inadequate
amounts of oilseeds supply throughout the year. As a consequence, they procure large
stocks of oilseeds during the peak harvest season resulting in high holding costs. Even
with this strategy, numerous processors still suffer from critical shortages and some
“have been forced to engage in commercial oilseeds farming while others are forced to
operate below their capacity” (interviews 10 and 11). Processors’ engagements into
commercial farming would stretch their resources and capacity which in turn would
undermine their capacity to invest and specialise in processing.
Processors and exporters suffer from poor quality of oilseeds. Nor are there
efficient quality standards to control quality (interviews 9, 10, 11 and 12). Although the
QSAE was identified as a top-10 central player in the social network analysis,
interviewees did not recognize the indispensability of QSAE, nor did SNV BOAM.
Quality problems are not limited to oilseeds but also to vegetable/edible oils. Most of
the local oil millers produce crude oil and on top of this, adulteration is a common

52
practice (interview 8). Therefore, the processing industry is less competent in the
domestic market let alone to the export market. The CG has been promoting the
concept and practice of quality for a better market share. Related to the limited capacity
of domestic processors, no concrete results were booked yet in an attempt to create
linkages with Dutch Processing Companies from whose experiences local producers
could benefit (interviews 16 and 17). The CG has also promoted consumers’ awareness on
the quality of edible oils through the involvement of an active Consumers’ Protection
Association (interview 17).
4.4 Access to organisation
As already discussed in section 3.2(b), most of the interviewed participants indicated that
the CG did not contribute to members’ access to new professional/sectoral
organisations. Few believed that the CG has played an active role in establishing a
parallel public private partnership on oilseeds. Eighty five percent of the interviewees
believe that the CG has no contribution in this regard (Table 16).

5. The future of the oilseeds CG

The interviewees believe that the CG has been effective in bringing multi-stakeholders
together and to identify and discuss major problems and policy gaps in the oilseeds
value chain. As discussed in section 3.1.3, the issue of succession or handing over the CG
from SNV BOAM to stakeholders has been discussed since meeting 14. Accordingly,
though no practical activity can be observed so far, ECCSA had been assigned to take
over responsibility. The majority of the interviewees however, are doubtful on ECCSA’s
capacity to effectively perform this responsibility. Hence, the CG is unlikely to sustain
its functions without SNV BAOM support (interviews 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, and 15).
The SNV BOAM’s Chain Lead Advisor confirmed these statements. He doubts whether
the CG has a chance to continuation without SNV BOAM’s support. For example, many
CG members from remote areas will not be able to attend the CG meeting as they do
not have financial capacity to cover transportation and accommodation costs nor is the
ECCSA capable of covering their costs (interview 17).

53
6. Conclusions
Ethiopia has a considerable potential for growing different types of oilseeds, including
linseed, Niger seed, soybeans, cotton seed, sesame, groundnuts, safflower seed, castor
beans, and rapeseed. Most of these general and speciality oilseeds (safflower, castor
beans and rapeseeds) have high international demand due to their organic nature. The
oilseeds sector in Ethiopia is however, constrained by several factors which could be
grouped into three (production, processing and marketing) areas. First, production is
dominated by smallholder farmers who suffer from lack of inputs and low yields; hence,
they have low economic incentives to invest in oil crops. Nor is there sufficient
government attention and interest in the oilseeds sector to support farmers through
research and supply of inputs. Second, the processing industry suffers from backward
technologies and critical shortages of supplies (oilseeds). The majority of the local edible
oil processing companies have no refinery systems and are predominantly characterized
by inefficient and poor quality (crude oil) production. Regrettably, many of the local oil
millers operate below 40 percent of their capacity due to the critical shortage of oilseeds.
Next to quality problems, domestic production covers only 20 percent of the total
domestic demand for edible oil. As a result, the local market is dominated by imported
palm oil, which further undermines the competitiveness of the local processing
companies. Third, the oilseeds markets in Ethiopia are characterized by absent
competitive environments resulting in prices being determined by speculative brokers
rather than by buyers and suppliers (producers). Absence of direct linkages and
communication between buyers and suppliers (producers) due to lack of efficient market
information and trust are key problems.
The oilseeds CG, which involved actors from the three different societal sectors
(public, private and civil society), was established in 2005 by the NGO –SNV to address
the above constraints through joint efforts. This case study assessed the effects of the
oilseeds CG in improving the situation related to major problems in production,
processing and marketing. Up to 101 organisations participated in at least one of the 17
CG meetings that were held in the period of 2005-2010. To examine the MSP’s success,
the researchers analysed both its internal, organisational dynamics and its external
dynamics, i.e. the changes brought about in key areas of the institutional business
environment.

Establishing the oilseeds Coordination Group under SNV’s Support to Business

Organisations and their Access to Markets’ (BOAM) programme was a timely and
relevant response to pressing issues in the oilseeds sector. There was a need for an
instrument that could facilitate public-private dialogue and strengthen the capacity of
the sector. Contact building and networking among chain stakeholders is a necessary
condition for a value chain to develop. The CG under study served as a new, horizontal
platform and has played a significant role in creating opportunities for stakeholders in
the edible oil and oilseeds value chains to unite and discuss on problems in the sector.
The process of setting up the multi-stakeholder platforms was thoroughly
considered: SNV BOAM has specified a vision on why and how private sector
development can stimulate economic growth that reduces poverty; the oilseeds CGs

54
devoted proper attention to a collective goal setting process and CG participants could
adjust common objectives, strategic intervention- and operational plans; the CGs are
horizontally organised and from 2009, stakeholders had a say in the sector allocated
funding through the CG Executive Committees. Moreover, a number of SNV BOAM
initiatives have been supportive in ‘levelling the playing field’ for stakeholders. First,
the meetings are currently in Amharic, the language that all stakeholders understand.
Therefore, all stakeholders, including farmers, had a (equal) say in the meetings. Second,
the DSA reimbursement has been functional in ensuring participation of poorer
organisations and actors from remote areas for whom travel and accommodation costs
were a real barrier to participation. Finally, in principle, every stakeholder is welcome to
participate in the open and transparent CG meetings.

In-depth analyses on the internal dynamics of the oilseeds CG demonstrate

mixed results in the areas of important collaboration requirements and success factors.
Motivations to engage in the CG are diverse, nonetheless, often related to financial and
technical incentives (extrinsic) provided by the SNV BOAM’s broader programme. DSA
coverage (transport and accommodation) is a necessary precondition to sustain
participation from less capacitated organisations, but is not considered to be a
motivational factor in itself.
The general level of engagement of the CG members was rated modest. Except
for those contracted by SNV BAOM, participants do not have clearly defined roles nor
are they highly committed. An active and highly committed nucleus-group of
participants is absent in the oilseeds CG. Absence of strong private company to take the
lead is one of the factors that affected the emergence of an active nucleus-group. The
CG members’ lack of interest and effort to invest sufficient time and resources as
revealed by high exit and rotation of participants and weak performance of assigned
tasks is another problem. SNV BOAM’s low resource allocation to the oilseeds value
chain, inordinate delays in releasing funds to beneficiaries, influence in the CG decision
making, and its refusing to include agendas other than those in the BAOM framework
have affected members interest and commitment to play the role of an active nucleus-
group.
Most of the respondents believe that decisions made are based on consensus.
Nevertheless, one interviewee disagrees. Despite this, the CG has emerged as a
democratic platform that basically functions on the principles of lateral relationships
where each member is free and equal to participate. The CG operates under the
leadership of a trio consisting of the CG Leader, the SNV BOAM Chain Lead Advisor
and the CG Facilitator. They play a key role in identifying and inviting new
participants, agenda setting and overall facilitation of the CG activities. But findings
also revealed a prevalence of unequal power relationships. The fact that some agenda
points forwarded by members were not accepted, and that proposal requirements were
not uniformly and equally applied reflect unequal power relationships. A representative
of a processors association believes that SNV BAOM has the upper hand in setting
agendas while other members are mainly on the ‘receiving end’. Such experiences
undermine a sense of ownership. . In terms of distributions of benefits, information from

55
most of our respondents reflected that benefits are related to the capacity of each
member to articulate its needs. This has affected equitable distribution of benefits
resulting in marginal benefits for incapacitated members. Moreover, some of the
respondents revealed lack of consistency in reviewing and approving funding
applications, which could have had an effect on the equitable distribution of funds.
Assessments showed that the degree of transparency in the oilseeds CG is
modestly to high. Members are clearly informed in advance of every meeting about
agendas to be discussed. Moreover, meeting summaries and other documents of the CG
(presentation materials and research findings) are shared with stakeholders. Formal
accountability mechanisms however, are missing as there are no formal duties and
responsibilities assigned to members. Nonetheless, informal forms of accountability
were apparent. The CG has created an important opportunity for the multiple
stakeholders to meet and discuss on common interests for improving the performance of
the oilseeds sector. In addition to discussions in the meeting, CG members also have
opportunities for bilateral discussions (e.g. between producers and processors, producers
and exporters, producers and experts, processors and experts, etc.). Such interactive
opportunities promoted trust and a ‘sense of complementarities’ between stakeholders,
which were previously operating in a state of complete disarray. Next to this, processors
and exporters do not yet have sufficient trust in the producers (farmers) due to the
latter’s inability to ensure reliable and regular supply of oilseeds.
There was a compelling cases for the oilseeds CG on the basis of which its
objectives were defined. Win-win opportunities for all exist only in theory. Practically,
members have different capabilities upon which benefits depend; some are more capable
than others. Lack of uniform assessment of funding applications is another factor, which
could undermine the win-win scenario. If members who invested less time and resources
have the chance to qualify for the SNV BAOM’s support (due to their good
relationships) compared to those who invested more time and resources in the
preparation of concept proposals, the latter are on the ‘losing side’.
In the social network analysis the major rotation in the oilseeds CG (70,2 %
exits), the central roles of the leading trio (SNV BOAM, CG Leader, and CG
Facilitator), the active involvement of the government and SNV BOAM’s private sector
approach was confirmed.

Regarding external dynamics, a considerable contribution of the CG is that it

enabled the creation of linkages between organisations that did not exchange
information before the start of the meetings. SNV BOAM played the role of independent
‘network broker’ and facilitated the establishment of Business to Business relations
between stakeholders in the Ethiopian context. Moreover, it created a learning platform
generating general and sector specific technical- and market information. The oilseeds
CG was mainly credited for this role in creating access to knowledge. The training
opportunities (for farmers and oil mill workers) and facilitation of access to improved
seeds are among the most important contributions of the CG. Impact on productivity
and quality however, is not evident yet due to the limited scope of the training
opportunities.

56
 Lack of access to capital or credit services is one of the major bottlenecks for
producers, processors and exporters of oilseeds. Farmers and small scale producers do
not have easy access to Banks due to rigid collateral requirements; therefore, MFIs are
the only options resulting in dependence on the exorbitant interest rates they charge.
The CG has achieved little or none to change the situation. Studies and discussions
between participants of the oilseeds CG demonstrated the role of the oilseeds sector in
the national economic development in general and poverty reduction in particular. This
has generated increased government attention to and interest in the sector. This may in
the future create opportunities for devising a new financing strategy to the sector. As
regards to market opportunities, overall evaluations of the interviewees pointed out that
the CG’s effort in improving access to alternative markets was insufficient. Effective
linkages and contractual agreements between producers and processors/exporters do
not exist yet. The market is still dominated by speculative brokers who deliberately
distort prices in favour of them; producers are not paid yet sufficiently and hence,
incentives to invest in quality and productivity are absent.
Generally, the success of the oilseeds CG in providing practical solutions to the
problems that called for its establishment is not yet satisfactory. Nevertheless,
institutional change has to be seen in terms of larger and longer term transition
processes and interviewees have clearly indicated that the CG is a vital platform to
address the multiple constraints of the oilseeds sector and hence, has to continue.
However, interviewees expressed their concerns on the oilseeds CG future without SNV
BOAM’s support since there is neither an active nucleus-group nor is the stakeholder
ECCSA –that was assigned to take over- seen as an organisation that possess the
requisite capacity.

57
7. Limitations
As is the inherent problem with any investigation of short duration into a complex
subject, choices had to be made regarding what to take on board and what not. We
experienced a challenge to separate the impact of the multi-stakeholder platform on any
changes in the institutional business environment, apart from the SNV BOAM
programme as a whole or from any other (policy) interventions. Especially when
organisations already have established long term relationships with SNV BOAM, the
clear cut distinction between services provided by SNV BOAM or through the CG is
not easy. This ‘attribution problem’ is a limitation. It was crucial that we remained
conscious on this challenge during all the interviews by probing and making
assumptions explicit; however –as expected- some interviewees remained having
troubles in making this distinction. In addition, it was questioned whether, for example,
the acquired technology services or credit services were being made available from
‘inside the chain’ (by chain actors) or ‘outside the chain’ (e.g. chain supporters).
Second, during the field work the researchers operated in close collaboration
with SNV BOAM and were partly dependent on SNV BOAM for their selection of
interviewees. Though this substantially facilitated logistics and minimized non-
response, such embeddedness holds the risk of losing independency in the eyes of
interviewees. Organisations might shy away from reflecting critically on the oilseeds
CG as they fear the continuity of their good relationship with SNV BOAM. To avoid
bias, a stakeholder exiting the CG as a result of a conflict was explicitly incorporated in
the interview sample. Furthermore, the researchers constructed a list of relevant
stakeholders in advance to ensure independent sampling. Finally, in the beginning of
each interview the independent status of the researchers was emphasized.
Finally, the political context of Ethiopia was not explicitly taken into account in
the primary (interviews) and secondary data collection (desk review), despite its
importance in understanding how MSPs are organised and functioning. Secondary
source indicate that there is no genuine multi-party democracy and tensions and
pressures in Ethiopia’s polities are growing (International Crisis Group report, 2009).
Furthermore, Human Rights Watch research (2010: 4) reports that “development aid
flows through, and directly supports, a virtual one-party state with a deplorable human
rights record” and that “the government has used donor-supported programs, salaries,
and training opportunities as political weapons to control the population, punish
dissent, and undermine political opponents—both real and perceived. Local officials
deny these people’s access to seeds and fertilizer, agricultural land, credit, food aid, and
other resources for development”. The researchers however, have not researched
whether such political situations exist or not, and as well as the impact of the prevailing
political situation on the data found.

58
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9. Appendices

61
Appendix 1: Theoretical model

MSP VCD

Involvement
Access to capital

Collaborative Access to technology

variables Impact
Access to markets

Access to organisation
Embeddedness

MSP VCD

Appendix 2: Roles of various stakeholders

Source: (based on) Hans Posthumus Consultancy, 2008

62
In general we distinguish four types of stakeholders:

1) Chain actors

Chain actors are the prime stakeholders who, at some point in the chain, own the
product that is being created. They commonly buy a semi-finished product from chain
actors upstream, add a certain value to it, and sell the enhanced product to buyers
downstream. In the research farmers, producer firms, cooperatives, processing firms,
collectors, traders, exporters etc. are included.

2) Chain supporters

Chain supporters are those that are outside the chain. They supply goods or services to
the chain actors, often they are distinguished as either financial providers (e.g. banks
providing loans)
or non-financial service providers (e.g. accountants or transporters). In the research
consultants, BDS providers, quality and standard institutes, microfinance, banks, funds
(IMF), and agricultural research centers (not only temporary, but years of input,
extension services, seed inputs etc.) are included.

3) Chain influencers

Chain influencers are those that influence the performance of the sub sector, its actors
and their supporters. They influence the entire sub sector (and beyond) without
performing an actor or supporters role: influencers (such as the ministry of commerce)
determine (partly) the factors (such as investment climate). In the research business
representative associations, Ministries, Chamber of Commerce, media, government
implementing agencies (e.g. Cooperative Bureau, BoFED etc.) are included.

4) Chain facilitators
A temporary (catalyst) role by an organisation (often a donor funded project) to “grease”
the chain machinery, either between the actors at the various levels or between the
actors and their supporters, with objective to improve the performance of the entire
chain and its actors (also commercially). Often NGOs with donor funding that finance a
diversity of capacity building activities. In the research SNV BOAM, NGOs, University,
and multilateral agencies (UN, WB) are included.

CODING FOR EXCEL

1=chain actor, 2 = chain supporter, 3 = chain influencer, 4 = chain facilitator

Appendix 3: Interview schedule/ List of Interviewees for Oilseeds Value Chain

63
General

June 9 & 10, 2010 Orientation visit75: Mr. Marc Steen, National Portfolio
Coordinator and Head Value Chain Development, Mr. Piet
Visser, learning coordinator for VCD and Mr. Mugessie
Fikri, Monitoring & Evaluation and Documentation, SNV
BOAM Ethiopia, Addis Ababa

August 12, 2010 Discussion Group76: SNV BOAM Ethiopia staff:

presentation research and discussion with Mr. Piet Visser,
learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple
chain, Mr. Carlo Kuepers, Lead Advisor honey chain &
Senior Advisor Market Linkages & Value Chain
Development, Mr. Mugessie Fikri, Monitoring and
Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Advisor oil seeds
chain, Mrs. Mahlet Yohannes, Lead Advisor dairy chain,
Nicholas Nyathi, program coordinator PSNP Plus program,
Meskerem Shifera, BDS Development and Elenie Abraham,
junior advisor, oil seeds and VCF

September 9, 2010 Short progress discussion with SNV BOAM staff: Mr. Piet
Visser, learning coordinator for VCD, Mr. Juergen Greiling,
Senior Advisor Agroprocessing, Mr. Mugessie Fikri,
Monitoring and Evaluation, Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead
Advisor oil seeds chain, and Meskerem Shifera, BDS
Development

November 8, 2010 Clarification meeting and feedback from Mr. Piet Visser,
learning coordinator for VCD and Lead Advisor pineapple
chain

March 15 and 22, 2011 Clarification meeting with Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead
Advisor oil seeds chain

March 23, 2011 Clarification interview with a representative of processors

association (anonymous)

March 23, 2011 Clarification interview with a representative of a private

company (anonymous)

75By Mr. Jeroen van Wijk (MSM) at SNV BOAM head office (Addis Ababa).
76By Ms. Sarah Drost (MSM) & Mr. Fenta Mandefro Abate (Addis Ababa University) at SNV BOAM’s
head office (Addis Ababa) (continuing for all interviews).
64
September 28, 2010 19th Coordination Group Meeting OS VC

Interviews
Mr. Yohannes Agonafir, Lead Oilseed Value Chain Advisor,
SNV BOAM Ethiopia, November 5, 2010

Mr. Dereje Chanie, Program Coordinator, Public Private

Partnership on Oilseeds, November 5, 2010

Mr. Dendena Chemeda, Head of the Agro-Processing

Industry Development Department and Mr. Zergaw Zeleke,
Team Coordinator of the Agro-Processing Industry
Development Department, the Ministry of Industry and
Trade (MOTI), August 30, 2010

Mr. Abreham Dagne, Operation manager, Addis Mojo Edible

Oil Complex S.C, October 21, 2010

Mr. Lemma Gebeyehu, Private Consultant/ SNV BOAM

Local Capacity Builder, October 18, 2010

Mr. Tefera Geletu, Training Officer, Oromia Cooperation

Promotion Bureau, October 18, 2010

Mr. Elias Geneti, Managing Director, Agro prom

International PLC, and CG leader, OS VC, October 22, 2010

Mr. Kassa Getu, General Manager, ERA Agrolink PLC,

October 22, 2010

Dr. Girma G/Medhin, Managing Director, EDGE Consult,

and CG facilitator, OS VC, October 25, 2010

Mr. Kedir Neffo, General Manager, Oromia Seed Enterprise,

November 4, 2010

Mr. Kebede Seifu, General Manager, Didea Farmers’

Cooperative Union, September 28, 2010

Mrs. Addisalem Shitaye, Owner, Addisalem Trading,

October 20, 2010
Mr. Gezahegn Tadesse, Senior Apiculturist and Livestock
Expert of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural

65
 Development (MoA) & President of the Ethiopia Beekeepers
Association (EBA), August 17, 2010

Mr. Mulugeta Tegegn, Secretary, Addis Ababa Oil Millers’

Association, October 20, 2010

Mr. Endale Tekalign, Food Safety Expert, Ethiopian

Consumers’ Protection Association, October 19, 2010

Dr. Bulcha Woyessa, Highland Oil Crops Coordinator

Holleta Agricultural Research Centre, October 22, 2010

Mr. Tamiru Wubie, Research and Advocacy Specialist,

Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce Sectoral Association
(ECCSA), August 19, 2010

Mr. Mohammed Yousuf, General Manager, Raya Wakena

Farmers’ Cooperative Union, September 28, 2010

Note: MOTI, MoA and ECCSA were interviewed for all value
chains under study (oilseeds, pineapple, dairy and honey)

66
Appendix 4: Questionnaire

Context
Multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are increasingly recognized by researchers and
practitioners as promising mechanisms for stimulating economies in developing
countries. The so-called chain platforms can help to bring actors, operating directly or
indirectly in the chain, together and realise common objectives through dialogue and
cooperation. However, systematic research on their effectiveness and impact is scarce.
Therefore, SNV BOAM Ethiopia and the Maastricht School of Management (MSM) /
Partnerships Resource Centre (PrC) have embarked on a collaborative effort to evaluate
a number of MSPs in which SNV BOAM Ethiopia is involved. MSM carries the
responsibility for the research and final report.
SNV77 is a non-profit, international development organisation, with extensive
hands-on experience in their value chain approach. MSM’s Sustainable Development
Center78 stands for expertise on sustainable economic development in emerging
markets. MSM is partner in the Partnerships Resource Centre79, an open centre where
academics, practitioners and students can create, retrieve and share knowledge on cross
sector partnerships for sustainable development.

Interview objectives
This questionnaire serves to structure a series of interviews that will be conducted with
actors in a selection of value chain Coordination Groups (CGs) in Ethiopa. Selected are
CGs in four chains: honey & beeswax, dairy, oilseeds, and pineapple. The interview
results will serve as the main input for an evaluation report that is due for 1st of
February 2011. The results will be presented and discussed during a workshop in
spring 2011.

About the questionnaire

The interview consists of three parts. Section A focuses on the (meetings of the)
Coordination Group itself. Section B concentrates on the institutional changes brought
about by the CG, whereas the last section C asks about your overall opinion of the CG.

Contact:
For questions and additional information please contact
Ms. Sarah Drost, MSc.
Sustainable Development Center
Maastricht School of Management
Email: [email protected]

77 SNV BOAM Ethiopia: www.SNV BOAMworld.org/en/countries/ethiopia/Pages/default.aspx

78 MSM - SDC: www.msm.nl/1/1/uk/research/sustainable_development_center/
79 PrC: www.erim.eur.nl/ERIM/Research/Centres/SCOPE/Partnerships_Resource_Centre/About

67
Identification

Name interviewee(s):
Organisation:
Position:
Location:

Interviewer:
Date of interview:
Place of interview:

What are the main activities of your organisation in this value chain?

68
A Coordination Group (CG)

A1. General introduction

1. What is the main problem in the apiculture/dairy/fruit/oilseeds sector, according to
you?

A2. Engagement
2. In what way are you/is your organisation engaged in the CG? (describe activities and
roles: e.g., Facilitator, Leader, advisor, member of committee/working group)

3. Since when are you involved in the CG meetings? (reasons for prolonged stay or exit)

4. What motivated your organisation to join the CG? (e.g. daily allowance, influence,
networking opportunities?)

5. Do you feel all relevant stakeholders are represented in the CG? Why?

6. How would you evaluate the level of commitment of CG members?

A. Low
B. Modest
C. High
Please explain

A3. CG Governance
7. Do you feel all CG members have an equal say during the CG meetings?
A. Yes
B. No. Who are the dominant members?)

8. Do you feel that all members benefit equally of the CG interventions? (win-win
situation or not?
A. Yes
B. No. Who gains most?).

9. Are you generally satisfied with the way the CG meetings are being governed?
A. No
B. Yes, but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain. What should change?

[Honey]
H.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Apiculture Board (EAB) and its regional
chapters?

69
[Dairy]
D.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Milk and Milk Products Association
(EMMPA)?
D.2 What is your opinion about the Dairy Business Hub Model established in meeting
16?

[Oilseeds]
O.1 What is your opinion about the Ethiopian Pulses, Oilseeds, and Spices Processors
Exporters Association (EPOSPEA)?

B Issues addressed by the CG

10. Did you exchange contact information with other CG members? Has this lead to
concrete actions/funding/other opportunities in your field of activities?

B1. Access to services

11. Do you require specific information, technology or organisational services, for
example to meet quality standards, to increase productivity, or to improve your
management skills?
A. No
B. Yes, but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain what type of services.

12. Have you been able to acquire sufficient service support?

A. No
B. Yes, but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain by whom and in what form?

13. Did the CG improve the availability of these services to you?

A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

B2. Access to capital/credit

14. How difficult is it for you to acquire a loan/credit/budget for making investments in
your organisation (e.g. through financial institute or through B2B relations).
A. Not difficult
B. Sometimes difficult
C. Very difficult
Please explain.

15. Did the CG influence your opportunities to obtain a loan, credit, or additional
budget?
A. No or almost not

70
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.
B3. Access to markets

(a) Prices
15. How would you evaluate prices paid to the producers in the last 3 years (stability,
highness, pre-harvest price set)?

16. Did the CG influence prices (stability and level) paid to farmers?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

(b) Buyer / producer commitment

17. Do buyers commit themselves to producers to buy their produce in advance of the
production cycle (provided that quality conditions are met)?
A. No
B. Yes
Please explain.

18. In case of a contractual arrangement, do you think producers perform well in

responding to buyer’s requirements in terms of: delivery, punctuality of delivery,
quality, and flexibility?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

19. Do producers have alternative market opportunities? Which ones?

If yes, what are the benefits of these alternatives for producers?

20. Did the CG contribute to improvement of contractual arrangements between

producers and buyers?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

B4. Access to organisation

21. Are you a member of a professional organisation/platform? If yes, which?

22. Did the CG contribute to the formation of this professional organisation?

A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

71
23. Did the CG contribute to your access to your professional organisation?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.
B5. Institutional environment (legal, government policy)

24. Which are the (three) main legal/policy constraints that you have to cope with in
the supply chain?

25. Did the CG contribute to solve these constraints?

A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain.

C. Future and overall opinion of the CG

26. In your opinion, has the CG, overall, been a success?

A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain (which are the main successes, failures, weaknesses, strengths)?

27. How could the CG play a bigger role for you? (i.e. really addressing their
issue?/partnerships possibilities).

28. Do you feel that CG is recognized as an important governance mechanism by the

stakeholders in this value chain?
A. No or almost not
B. Yes but only modestly
C. Yes, significantly
Please explain

29. Future scenario: What are, in your opinion, the future prospects of the CG after the
BOAM programme has finished?

30. What would be necessary, apart from the CG, to tackle the problems in your sector?

Thank you for your time and collaboration.

72
Appendix Questionnaire: Conditions for upgrading (scored by the respondent)

- No effect of CG
-/+ Limited positive effect of CG
+ Considerable positive effect of CG

Access to knowledge & technology

Training in good agricultural & manufacturing practices
Farmers’ awareness on quality
Oil millers’ awareness on quality
Availability of improved seeds
Availability of new technology
Reduction in adulteration (oilseeds and edible oil)
Other (please fill in)

Access to affordable credit

Willingness of banks/MFI’s to finance
Buyer firms (B2B) are more willing to lend
Other institutes more willing to lend
Other (please fill in)

Access to markets
Increased prices paid by buyers
Advance payment/contractual agreement
Other (please fill in)

Access to organisation
Access to organisation (e.g. FBO, forum, representative agency)
Other (please fill in)

73
Appendix 5: Course ratio oilseeds CG
category frequence of meeting visits type of organisation present & stay present & exit entry & stay entry & exit
type number % number % number % number % number %
Private sector 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Government 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
core visitor Education 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Civil Society 1 1,0 1 1,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Unknown 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
total core visitors 1 1,0 1 1,0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Private sector 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0

Government 2 2,0 2 2,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
regular visitors Education 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Civil Society 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
Unknown 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
total regular visitors 2 2,0 2 2,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0

Private sector 31 30,7 2 2,0 6 5,9 15 14,9 8 7,9

Government 7 6,9 2 2,0 2 2,0 2 2,0 1 1,0
irregular visitors Education 2 2,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 1,0 1 1,0
Civil Society 5 5,0 0 0,0 2 2,0 2 2,0 1 1,0
Unknown 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
total irregular visitors 45 44,6 4 4,0 10 9,9 20 19,8 11 10,9

Private sector 30 29,7 0 0,0 3 3,0 0 0,0 27 26,7

Government 9 8,9 0 0,0 2 2,0 1 1,0 6 5,9
at random visitors Education 5 5,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 5 5,0
Civil Society 9 8,9 0 0,0 1 1,0 1 1,0 7 6,9
Unknown 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
total at random visitors 53 52,5 0 0,0 6 5,9 2 2,0 45 44,6

total private sector 61 60,4 2 2,0 9 8,9 15 14,9 35 34,7

total government 18 17,8 4 4,0 4 4,0 3 3,0 7 6,9
total education 7 6,9 0 0,0 0 0,0 1 1,0 6 5,9
total civil society 15 14,9 1 1,0 3 3,0 3 3,0 8 7,9
total unknown 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0 0 0,0
total all categories 101 100,0 7 6,9 16 16 22 21,8 56 55,4

Oil Seeds: category timing of visits

present & stay = present at CG1 and/or CG2 AND CG16 and/or CG17
present & exit = present at CG1 and/or CG2; last visit at CG15 or earlier
entry & stay = first visit CG3 or later; present at CG16 and/or CG17
entry & exit = first visit at CG3 or later; last visit at CG15 or earlier
Oil Seeds: category frequency of meeting visits
core visitor = present at all meetings (17)
regular visitor = present at 14, 15 or 16 meetings
irregular visitor = present at least at 3 meetings with maximum presence of 13 meetings
at random visitor = present at 0, 1 or 2 meetings

74
Appendix 6: Betweenness centrality oilseeds CG

Table 1 Top-10 central players in the oilseeds CG

Name Normalised Type of Subtype Stakeholde
Betweenness Organisation r role
Centrality within VC
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO Facilitator
network
(89) Quality 4.453 Government Implementing Supporter
Standard Authority agency
of Ethiopia (QSAE)
(74) Ministry of 3.994 Government National Influencer
Trade and Industry government /
(MOTI) Ministry
(6) Addis Ababa Oil 2.744 Private sector Business Influencer
Processing Mill representative
Owners body /
Association Association
(79) Oromia 2.652 Government Regional / Influencer
Cooperative Local
Promotion government
Commission
(OCPC)
(48) FFARM 2.589 Private sector Consultant / Supporter
Organic PLC Consultancy
(34) Didea 2.581 Private sector Business Actor
Farmers' representative
Cooperative Union body /
Cooperative
(23) BCaD 2.505 Private sector Consultant / Supporter
(Chain Consultancy
Facilitators)
(5) Addis Ababa 2.484 Government Chamber of Influencer
Chamber of commerce
Commerce Sectoral
Association
(AACCSA)
(15) Agro Prom. 2.409 Private sector Commercial Actor
International PLC enterprise
75
(Chain Leader)

Table 2 Central players in oil seeds CG with betweenness centrality > 2

Name Normalised Type of Subtype Stakeholde
Betweenness Organisation r role
Centrality within VC
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO Facilitator
network
(89) Quality 4.453 Government Implementing Supporter
Standard Authority agency
of Ethiopia (QSAE)
(74) Ministry of 3.994 Government National Influencer
Trade and Industry government /
(MOTI) Ministry
(6) Addis Ababa Oil 2.744 Private sector Business Influencer
Processing Mill representative
Owners body /
Association Association
(79) Oromia 2.652 Government Regional / Influencer
Cooperative Local
Promotion government
Commission
(OCPC)
(48) FFARM 2.589 Private sector Consultant / Supporter
Organic PLC Consultancy
(34) Didea 2.581 Private sector Business Actor
Farmers' representative
Cooperative Union body /
Cooperative
(23) BCaD 2.505 Private sector Consultant / Supporter
(Chain Consultancy
Facilitators)
(5) Addis Ababa 2.484 Government Chamber of Influencer
Chamber of commerce
Commerce Sectoral
Association
(AACCSA)
(15) Agro Prom. 2.409 Private sector Commercial Actor
International PLC enterprise
(Chain Leader)

Table 3 Central players in oilseeds CG with betweenness centrality > 3

Name Normalised Type of Subtype Stakeholde
Betweenness Organisation r role
76
 Centrality within VC
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO Facilitator
network
(89) Quality 4.453 Government Implementing Supporter
Standard Authority agency
of Ethiopia (QSAE)
(74) Ministry of 3.994 Government National Influencer
Trade and Industry government /
(MOTI) Ministry

Table 4 Central players in oilseeds CG with betweenness centrality > 4

Name Normalised Type of Subtype Stakeholder
Betweenness Organisation role within
Centrality VC
(96) SNV BOAM 4.626 Civil society NGO / NGO Facilitator
network
(89) Quality 4.453 Government Implementing Supporter
Standard Authority agency
of Ethiopia (QSAE)

77