PURPOSIVE RULE OF INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

RESEARCH PAPER

SUBMITTED BY: SUBMITTED TO :

RAM KUMAR YADAV DR. RAVINDRA PATHAK
SEMESTER-V ‘B’ (ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR)
ROLL NO- 951

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF STUDY AND RESEARCH IN LAW, RANCHI

 INTRODUCTION

The purposive approach sometimes referred to as purposive construction, purposive

interpretation, or the "modern principle in construction" is an approach to statutory and
constitutional interpretation under which common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a
statute, a part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in light of the purpose for which it
was enacted.

The historical source of purposive interpretation is the mischief rule established in Heydon's
Case. Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of replacement for the mischief rule,
the plain meaning rule and the golden rule to determine cases. Purposive interpretation is
exercised when the courts utilize extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of
legislation, including early drafts, committee reports, etc. The purposive interpretation
involves a rejection of the exclusionary rule.

Critics of purposivism argue it fails to recognize the separation of powers between the
legislator and the judiciary. The legislator is responsible for the creating the law, while the
judiciary is responsible for interpreting law. As purposive interpretation goes beyond the
words within the statute, considerable power is bestowed upon the judges as they look to
extraneous materials for aid in interpreting the law.

There is a wide range of sources that may be considered by a judge to determining the
primary meaning of statutory words and where there is ambiguity, in pointing the way to the
interpretation that is to be preferred. There are many aids to interpretation and it divided into
two:

1. Internal aids to interpretation

2. External aids to interpretation

In internal aids to interpretation, there are few ways to aids the interpretation such as

1. Heading, side notes and punctuation- The judge must be considered as a part of the
context to help the interpretation.

2. Short title- There is some question whether the short title should be used to resolve
doubt.
 3. Preamble- When there is a preamble it is generally in its recitals that mischief to be
remedied and the scope of the Act are describe. It is clearly permissible to have
resource to it as an aid to construing the enacting provision.

External aids to interpretation:

1. Historical setting- A judge must be considering the historical setting of the provision
that is being interpreted.

2. Dictionaries and other literary resource- Dictionary are commonly consulted as a

guide to the meaning of the statutory words. Textbooks in law may also be consulted
in a judgment.

3. Treaty and International Conventions- There is a presumption that Parliament does

not legislate in such a way that the UK would be in breach of its international
obligation.

4. Parliamentary resources- This is for the purpose to connect with interpretation of

statutes. The prohibition covered such resources as a report of debated in the House
and committee, and the explanatory memoranda attached the Bills.

Principles of Interpretation-

Purposive Approach in Halsbury’s Laws of England, it is stated:

"Parliament intends that an 'enactment shall remedy a particular mischief and it is therefore
presumed that Parliament intends that the court, when considering, in relation to the facts of
the instant case, which of the opposing constructions of the enactment corresponds to its legal
meaning, should find a construction which applies the remedy provided by it in such a way as
to suppress that mischief. The doctrine originates in Heydon's case where the Barons of the
Exchequer resolved that for the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in general (be they
penal or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be
discerned and considered:

1. What was the common law before the making of the Act;
2. what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide;
3. what remedy Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth;
4. the true reason of the remedy, end then the office of all the judges is always to make such
construction as shall

a. suppress the mischief and advance the remedy; and

b. suppress subtle inventions and evasions for the continuance of the mischief pro private-
commode (for private benefit); and

c. add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the true intent of the makers of the
Act pro publico (for the public good)."

The principles of statutory interpretation are well settled. Where the words of the statute are
clear and unambiguous, the provision should be given its plain and normal meaning, without
adding or rejecting any words. Departure from the literal rule, by making structural changes
or substituting words in a clear statutory provision, under the guise of interpretation will pose
a great risk as the changes may not be what the Legislature intended or desired. Legislative
wisdom cannot be replaced by the Judge's views.

As observed by the Supreme Court in somewhat different context: "When a procedure is

prescribed by the Legislature, it is not for the court to substitute a different one according to
its notion of justice. When the Legislature has spoken, the Judges cannot afford to be wiser."
There is however an exception to this general rule. Where the words used in the statutory
provision are vague and ambiguous or where the plain and normal meaning of its words or
grammatical construction thereof would lead to confusion, absurdity, repugnancy with other
provisions, the courts may, instead of adopting the plain and grammatical construction, use
the interpretative tools to set right the situation, by adding or omitting or substituting the
words in the Statute. When faced with an apparently defective provision in a statute, courts
prefer to assume that the draftsman had committed a mistake rather than concluding that the
Legislature has deliberately introduced an absurd or irrational statutory provision. Departure
from the literal rule of plain and straight reading can however be only in exceptional cases,
where the anomalies make the literal compliance of a provision impossible, or absurd or so
impractical as to defeat the very object of the provision. It may also be mention.

Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (12th Edn., page 228), under the caption 'modification
of the language to meet the intention' in the chapter dealing with 'Exceptional Construction'
states the position succinctly:
Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads
to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some
inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, which can hardly have been intended, a
construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the
structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by
giving an unusual meaning to particular words, or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground
that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and that the
modifications made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true
meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to
a nullity by the draftsman’s unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of
necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used.

INDIAN APPROACH

Supreme Court in Tirath Singh v. Bachittar Singh1 approved and adopted the said approach.
In Shamrao V. Parulekar v. District Magistrate2, Thana, Bombay the Court reiterated the
principle from Maxwell:

“if one construction will lead to an absurdity while another will give effect to what common
sense would show was obviously intended, the construction which would defeat the ends of
the Act must be rejected even if the same words used in the same section, and even the same
sentence, have to be construed differently. Indeed, the law goes so far as to require the Courts
sometimes even to modify the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words if by doing so
absurdity and inconsistency can be avoided.”

In Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd 3, Court while reiterating that courts will have to
follow the rule of literal construction, which enjoins the court to take the words as used by the
Legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies, held that there is an exception
to that rule. This Court observed:

1
1955 AIR 830, 1955 SCR (2) 457.
2
1952 AIR 324, 1952 SCR 683.
3
(1998) 120 PLR 579.
“That exception comes into play when application of literal construction of the words in the
statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when it is shown that the legal context in which
the words are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning.”

In Mangin v. Inland Revenue Commission4the Privy Council held:

The object of the construction of a statute, be it to ascertain the will of the legislature, it may
be presumed that neither injustice nor absurdity was intended. If, therefore a literal
interpretation would produce such a result, and the language admits of an interpretation
which would avoid it, then such an interpretation may be adopted.

A classic example of correcting an error committed by the draftsman in legislative drafting is

the substitution of the words 'defendant's witnesses' by this Court for the words 'plaintiff's
witnesses' occurring in Order VII Rule 14(4) of the Code, in Salem Bar-II:

Justice G.P. Singh extracts four conditions that should be present to justify departure from the
plain words of the Statute, in his treatise "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" (12th Edn. -
2010, Lexis Nexis - page 144) from the decision of the House of Lords in Stock v. Frank
Jones (Tipton)Ltd.:

“...a court would only be justified in departing from the plain words of the statute when it is
satisfied that (1) there is clear and gross balance of anomaly; (2) Parliament, the legislative
promoters and the draftsman could not have envisaged such anomaly and could not have been
prepared to accept it in the interest of a supervening legislative objective; (3) the anomaly can
be obviated without detriment to such a legislative objective; and (4) the language of the
statute is susceptible of the modification required to obviate the anomaly.”

It is now well-settled that for the purpose of interpretation of statute the same has to be in its
entirety. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, principles of purposive construction must come
into play. In Chief Justice of A.P. v. L.V.A. Dikshitulu , the Court observed:

“The primary principle of interpretation is that a Constitutional or statutory provision should

be construed "according to the intent of they that made it" (Coke). Normally, such intent is
gathered from the language of the provision. If the language, or the phraseology employed by
the legislation is precise and plain and thus by itself proclaims the legislative intent in
unequivocal terms, the same must be given effect to, regardless of the consequences that may

4
[1971] AC 739.
follow. But if the words used in the provision are imprecise, protean or evocative or can
reasonably bear meanings more than one, the rule of strict grammatical construction ceases to
be a sure guide to reach at the real legislative intent. In such a case, in order to ascertain the
true meaning of the terms and phrases employed, it is legitimate for the Court to go beyond
the arid literal confines of the provision and to call in aid other well-recognised rules of
construction, such as its legislative history, the basic scheme and framework of the statute as
a whole, each portion throwing light, on the rest, the purpose of the legislation, the object
sought to be achieved, and the consequences that may flow from the adoption of one in
preference to the other possible interpretation.

In Kehar Singh v. State5 (Delhi Admn.) Court held:

"...But, if the words are ambiguous, uncertain or any doubt arises as to the terms employed,
we deem it as our paramount duty to put upon the language of the legislature rational
meaning. We then examine every word, every section and every provision. We examine the
Act as a whole. We examine the necessity which gave rise to the Act. We look at the
mischiefs which the legislature intended to redress. We look at the whole situation and not
just one-to-one relation. We will not consider any provision out of the framework of the
statute. We will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive
force, behind. We will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their
origin. We will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as
a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences."

Supreme Court stated that:

"The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the legislature based on
information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by us a of
general words to cover similar problems arising in future. But, from the very nature of things,
it is impossible to anticipate fully in the Varied situations arising in future in which the
application of the legislation in hand may be called for and words chosen to communicate
such indefinite referents are bound to be in many cases, lacking in clarity and precision and
thus giving rise to controversial questions of construction. The process of construction
combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention i.e.
the true or

5
1988 AIR 1883, 1988 SCR Supl. (2) 24.
legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the
enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief
and its remedy to which the enactment is directed.”6

t is well known that an interpretation of the statute which harmonizes with its avowed object
is always to be accepted than the one which dilutes it.

INTERNATIONAL APPROACH

The purposive approach to statutory interpretation is used in the European Court of Justice.
The literal rule would be of little use in the European Courts since there are several languages
in operation and translation is not an exact science. Domestic judges are required to apply the
Purposive approach whenever applying a piece of EU law.

Lord Simon explained the purposive approach in Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373

“The first task of a court of construction is to put itself in the shoes of the draftsman – to
consider what knowledge he had and, importantly, what statutory objective he had …being
thus placed…the court proceeds to ascertain the meaning of the statutory language.”

Thus the purposive approach to statutory interpretation seeks to look for the purpose of the
legislation before interpreting the words. It has often been said that the purposive approach is
a mixture of the domestic rules, however, whereas the domestic rules require the courts to
apply the literal rule first to look at the wording of the Act, the purposive approach starts with
the mischief rule in seeking the purpose or intention of Parliament.

It is therefore a much more flexible approach giving judges greater scope to develop the law
in line with what they perceive to be Parliament's intention. The purposive approach more
readily embraces the use of extrinsic aids to assist in finding Parliament's intention. For
example, in relaxing the rule on reference to Hansard in Pepper v Hart 7the House of Lords
adopted a purposive approach.

6
District Mining officer v. Tata Iron & Steel Co.
7
[1992] 3 WLR 1032.
In the case Pepper v Hart, The House of Lords had to decide whether a teacher at a private
school had to pay tax on the perk he received in the form of reduced school fees. The teacher
sought to rely upon a statement in Hansard made at the time the Finance Act was passed.

Held:

The House of Lords departed from Davis v Johnson and took a purposive approach to
interpretation holding that Hansard may be referred to and the teacher was not required to pay
tax on the perk he received.

Lord Griffiths on the purposive approach:

"The days have passed when the courts adopted a literal approach. The courts use a
purposive approach, which seeks to give effect to the purpose of legislation and are prepared
to look at much extraneous material that bears upon the background against which the
legislation was enacted."

The courts are required to apply the purposive approach when interpreting EU law. The
courts have used it when interpreting domestic legislation to give an interpretation in line
with EU law

In the case of Pickstone v Freemans plc8, Miss Pickstone brought a claim against her
employer under the Equal Pay Act 1970. She was employed as a warehouse operative and
was paid the same as male warehouse operatives. However, Miss Pickstone claimed that the
work of the warehouse operatives was of equal value to that done by male warehouse
checkers who were paid £1.22 per week more than she was.

The House of Lords decided that the literal approach would have left the United Kingdom in
breach of its Treaty obligations to give effect to an EU directive. It therefore used the
purposive approach and stated that Miss Pickstone was entitled to claim on the basis of work
of equal value even though there was a male employee doing the same work as her.

The purposive approach has been highly influential and judges have applied it when
interpreting domestic legislation which has no connection with EU law:

R v S of S for Health ex parte Quintavalle9 (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance)

8
[1989] AC 66 House of Lords
9
[2003] 2 WLR 692 House of Lords
Held:

The House of Lords held that the cloned embryos were covered by the statute taking a
purposive approach to statutory interpretation.

Lord Bingham:

"The court's task, within the permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to
Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context of the
statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in the historical context of the
situation which led to its enactment….While it is impermissible to ask what Parliament
would have done if the facts had been before it, there is one important question which may
permissibly be asked: it is whether Parliament, faced with the taxing task of enacting a
legislative solution to the difficult religious, moral and scientific issues mentioned above,
could rationally have intended to leave live human embryos created by CNR outside the
scope of regulation had it known of them as a scientific possibility. There is only one possible
answer to this question and it is negative."

Advantages of the purposive approach:

 It is a flexible approach which allows judges to develop the law in line with
Parliament's intention (eg Maunsell v Olins).

 It allows judges to cope with situations unforeseen by Parliament (eg Quintavalle).

 It allows the law to develop to cover advances in medical science (eg Quintavalle).

 It allows the courts to give effect to EU Directives (Pickstone v Freemans).

 Allowing reference to Hansard makes it easier for the courts to discover Parliament's
intention (Pepper v Hart).

Disadvantages of the purposive approach:

 Judges are given too much power to develop the law and usurping the power of
Parliament

 Judges become law makers infringing the Separation of Powers (Montesquieu).

  There is scope for judicial bias in deciding what Parliament intended.

 It assumes Parliament has one intention and ignores the fact that Parliament is divided
on party lines.

 Allowing reference to Hansard may lead to prolonged examination of irrelevant

material by lawyers which adds to the cost and length of litigation.

CONCLUSION

We have experienced significant changes over the interpretation of statutes. This change from
literal to purposive approaches has had significant effect on our legal system. So much so that
the powers of the legislative and judicial arms are beginning to converge. Parliament has
enacted laws telling the judicial branch how they must interpret legislation, and the judicial
arm can read words into legislation to promote what they believe is the apparent purpose of
the legislature, when, in fact, unrestrained by obedience to the specific words of the statute,
they could be promoting their own policy agenda. In relation to statutory interpretation and
the purposive approach, ‘what is at stake is the separation of powers and respect by the
judicial branch of government for the powers of the legislative branch.’ It is clear that
although the purposive approach may result in some benefits, its application brings with it
significant difficulties and problems.