r

f - 78 -

CHAPTER 4

THE IMPACT OF THE MINERAL REVOLUTION, 1870-1936

In concluding chapter three the opinion was given that the development
of a particular Black perception of South African history was directly
linked to the writer's current situation. By their references to the
early phases of colonization through to the Great Trek and its after-
math a foundation was laid for the next phase of Black history. It
would be far-fetched to suggest that the events preceding the discovery
of diamonds were deliberately planned in anticipation of the revelation
of wealth that followed on the chance discovery of diamonds in 1867. It
would, however, be correct to say, in the view of the works consulted,
that with the development of the diamond and gold fields, a far more
deliberate policy in regard to the indigenous peoples was followed. Ir-
respective of the ultimate views of the individual authors all sought
significance in the motives, aims and consequences of the policies that
flowed from the first mineral finds.

It might be expected that those writers who wrote at the time that the
mineral re~olution gained momentum, would be the most vociferous in the
.condemnation of the upheaval in their lives. And yet, as will become ap-
parent, they were not. It was left to the post-World War II generation
to vent their anger over their condition in particularly virulent
terms. In part this can be ascribed to the fact that the contemporary
writer was stating his views in the realization that this was virtually
the only way of publicly expressing his opinion. They saw, with hind-
sight, what they regarded as the ultimate dehumanization of Blacks to
be the result of the policies followed by White authorities after the
discovery of minerals.

Unlike the early phases of colonization, the period which followed on

the mineral discoveries is generally seen as a time when a "native poli-
cy· was implemented that had specific objectives in mind. These aims
were not merely. to regulate'relations .between colonized and colonist or
 - 79 ­

to sa1:;isfythe prejudices or needs of the latter. Increasingly the for­

mulation and implementation of "native policy· was seen as being at the
behest of vested interests, and then more specifically of the mining
magnates.

In looking back on the mineral revolution a modern author perceives it

to have changed every facet of South African society. And, in particu­
lar, to have made the intentions of British imperialism starkly appar­
ent to both African and Afrikaner. 1 It is interesting that Magubane
should bracket Black and Boer together in this context. Early writers
generally tended to apportion much of the blame for the South African
malaise to the Afrikaner and his antecedents. Magubane instead sees im­
perialism and the capitalist interests it represented as the motive
force behind the post-mineral discovery developments. And he is, in
this regard, representative of a mainstream in Black historiography.
The evolution of this perception and its implications must now be
considered.

A consistent feature of the spectrum of sources consulted is that all

attribute a major significance to the initial discovery of diamonds in
the Hopetown district and the development of the Kimberley diamond­
fields. Even if early writers might be hesitant in discerning a motive
behind the changes that were wrought by the discoveries they do reso­
nate with their successors in that fundamental changes took place.
These changes were reflected in the material, social, political, cultur­
al and physical spheres of society. These changes were most acutely
felt by the Blacks on whose land the minerals were discovered. In the
context of this chapter "Blacks" has been used to denote the Griqua as
well, as their territory. Griqualand West. was to become the focal
point of the early disputes surrounding ore-bearing land. In addition
the dispute and its handling were seen as the forebears of later dis­
putes and their resolution.

1
BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
~, pp. 102-103.

I
 - 80 ­

An important outflow of the mineral discoveries was the evoiution of

migrant labour. That is why. as discussed in preceding c,hapters. so
many writers laid such emphasis on the question of dispossession. The
refinement of the argument linking dispossession and labour coercion
becomes increasingly apparent over the decades. It is perhaps under­
standable that early writers should not be as concerned about the ques­
tion of the mineral finds and their ramifications. T~ey were after all
not as adversely affected as their successors and did not feel the
brunt of legislative measures used to confirm the situation created by
the diamondfields. goldfields and industrialization. Nor could they see
the relationship between the minerals and broader historical develop­
ments in South Africa. such as the South African War between 1899-1902
and the unification of South Africa in 1910.

Initially there is little to suggest that Blacks saw their role in the
mineral discoveries as other than wage earners. The wage-earning poten­
tial of. the diamondfields at Kimberley was welcomed as it gave the la­
bourer the chance to earn enough to buy those goods that the traders in­
troduced amongst the Blacks in the hinterland of the diamondfie1ds. In
the early stages of labour recruitment competition was strong enough to
ensure fair wages. Thus to have been a worker at Kimberley was consider­
ed an elevation of social status measured in material terms, as the mi­
grant earned enough to gain a measure of wea1th. 2 It was not yet seen
that the mineral finds quickened British interest in the interior
leading to the expropriation of both Boer and Griqua. 3 Until the
1860s Britain had been content to contain the Afrikaners and pacify the
African chiefdoms of the interior. After the diamond finds she had to
open the way for finance capital. 4 Subsequently the capital gener­

2 N Mokgatle, The Autobiog ra12h! of an Unknown South African, pp.

44-45 and p. 36.
3 WM Tsotsi. From Chattel to Wage Slaver!_ .. , p. 36.
4 WM Tsotsi. From Chattel to Wage Slaver! ...• p. 40.
 - 81 ­

ated by the diamond'and later the gold mines provided. to quote Maguba­
ne, a "poisonous nourishment" that nurtured the South African economy
into the "deformed' monster 'that i,t is today. ,,5 'Thiscpmment must be
seen in the light of Magubane's view that society evolves from the eco­
nomic relations at its base. If the economic system is distorted then
it must follow that the social system and social relations are also mal­
formed. Thus to him apartheid is not so much a socio-political order
but an economic one
that is modelled on the production relationships
that developed on the mines. 6

A similar materialist stance is taken by Modisane who is otherwise far

more concerned with the human condition. Modisane can see the irony in
Blacks "scratching into the bowels of the earth for gold which is the
symbol of South Africa's white prosperity, and the fundamental greed
that oppresses them.,,7

Many of the early writers realized that the mineral discoveries caused
major socio-economic, political and cultural changes. These writers,
however, did not always suggest that there was a correlation between
the changes mentioned. A central issue is that of the evolution of mi­
grant labour. Virtually all the writers are agreed that the evolution
of this system was a major cause of change. Most writers are also
agreed that coercive measures were applied to force the migrant into
the labour market.

A most significant development in this regard was the Cape Colony's

Glen Grey Act of 1894. Molema concedes that there was a coercive labour
element in this Act. The clause requiring able-bodied young men to per­

5
BM Magubane, The Political EconomI of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, p. 10.3.
6 BM Magubane, The Political Econo!nI of Race and Class in South Af­
rica. p. 117.
7 B Modisane. Blame Me On Histor:t. p. 28.3.
 - 82 ­

form tl)ree months labour was a source of much resentment, but Mo1ema al­
so saw the Act as an outstanding example of British paterna1ism,8 of
which he was a devout admirer. He did not see, as Ngubo did, that by
levering labour out of the reserves the Glen Grey Act was violating
"the familial and community nature of the African economic system. u9
Nor did Mo1ema concede, as Mbeki alleged, that the Act aimed at the de­
struction of the power of the Xhosa chiefs and the integration of their
subjects into the mining and industrial economy.l0 By preventing ac­
cess to land and restricting ownership a landless class developed which
had to sell its labour in the industrial and agricultural centres. 11
Perhaps the need for labour coercion is in part to be explained by the
self-justifying myth of the "'lazy Kafir'", even though it is abundant­
ly clear that without Black labour the economy would have
collapsed. 12 Excluding the variations in the final conclusions of the
writers it is clear that minerals "gave a new complexion to almost eve­
ry feature of South African life" and "brought into silent relief the
intentions of British imperialism vis a vis the Afrikaner and the Afri­
cans." 13 A change in values and systems took place that left Blacks
feeling that
they were at the mercy of some amorphous and remorseless
entity that totally dominated their lives. 14

The question arises as to what the intentions of British imperialism

8 SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 257 and p. 240.

9 A Ngubo, ftThe Development of African Political Protest in South
Africa, 1882-1910: An Analytical Approach", p. 44.
10 G Mbeki, South Africa The Peasants' Revolt, p. 33.
11 A Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South
Africa, 1882-1910: An Analytical Approach", p. 45.
12 SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, pp. 244-245.
13 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, pp. 102-103.
14 E Mphahlele, Father Come Home, p. 58.
 - 83 ­

were? The most prominent manifestation of British imperialism was the

South African War of 1899-1902. Over the decades. the perceptions on
what caused the war have changed. There is a correlat,ion between the
writer's political convictions and aims and the causes that he/she at­
tributes to the South African War. Similarly there is a consistency be­
tween the political climate in which the writer functioned and the
perceptions he/she formulates in regard to the war.

Initially it was believed that Britain had gone to war to protect the
rights of British subjects in the Transvaal. By implication the South
African War was also fought on behalf of Blacks because they were al­
lowed to fight on the British side to redress suffering inflicted on
them by the Boers. 15 Magubane, in contrast to the preceding views,
ques~ions British motves and contends that Britain refrained from using
Blacks on her side. 16 Britain was indeed. reluctant to see arms pass
into Black hands. Early writers might have had some initial confidence
in Britain's motives for launching a war against the Republics. But
even Molema and Plaatje, who had a virtually blind belief in Britain
and the principles of trusteeship, were ultimately to express some
doubt about Britain's intentions for precipitating the war. Many Blacks
had fondly believed that war had overtaken the country in their inter- .
ests, but
postwar developments showed that Britain had acted for self­
protection. 17 A similar view is expressed by Matsetela when he argues
that because of the potential wealth of the Republics they might
achieve true independence. As independent states they might invite ex­
ternal intervention. Thus Britain had to act to prevent this develop­
ment. 18

15 SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, pp. 242-243 and p. 290.
16 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, p. 51
,... ­1
SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, pp. 290-292.
18 T Matsetela, "Uprootal and its Effects", in M Mutloatse (ed),
Umhlaba Wethu ... , pp. 29-30.
 - 84 -

Plaatje was even more outspoken. According to him Blacks had paid the
ultimate price to see the banner of freedom unfurled. but all they had
seen was the flag of Union waving. in the winds of political change that
swept over the subcontinent after peace was concluded. 19 Peace and
unification left a bitter taste in the mouths of Black participants. In­
stead of enjoying the fruits of victory. they became serfs in their
homeland. overseen by an imperial government that was deaf to their en­
treaties. 20

Manipulation by vested capitalist interests is seen as the cause by mod­

ern writers. Some believed that the war broke out at the behest of
Rhodes who wished to dispossess the Boers of what they had obtained
through "fraud and subterfuge".21 In addition the war was launched to
replace a "feudalistic slavery" with a "more benefitting [sic] wage lab­
our". The intention _ was to increase British settlement. While the new
settlers would be "anti-fascist" they would be ·pro-imperialist".22
By extension the latter also implied pro-capitalist. In the same vein
the Boer republics were seen as an obstacle to a national labour re­
cruitment policy which finance capital needed to exploit the mineral
resources. 23

Even if there is divergence on the causes most writers devote some time
to the role Blacks played in the war itself. They approach the war from
two positions. Firstly there is the question of motives for Black par­
ticipation. Secondly there is the question of whether the expectations

19 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ..• , p. 125.

20 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 292.
21 A Nzo. "Our Anti-Imperialist Conmitment". An article by Alfred
Nzo. Secretary-General of the ANC. in Sechaba, February 1970,
quoted in ANC, ANC Speaks ..• , P.' 77.
22 D Dube. The Rise of Azania ...• pp. 36-37.
23 WM Tsotsi. From Chattel to Wage Slavery ...• p. 54.
 - 85 ­

of participation were met.

Some Blacks entered the war on the British side because they believed
in the justness of the war. They believed that they could, in the after­
math of the engagement, confidently leave their cause in the hands of
the imperial power "in its anxiety to do the best for all classes. n24
Participation, it was believed, had "its moral and material value·. 25
In retrospect Msimang claimed that Blacks "were made to understand and
sincerely believed that the war was being fought for their liberation
from Boer domination" and many
"lost their lives in the belief that
they were making sacrifices for their liberation.· 26

Plaatje records a sermon held by Mr Lefenya during the siege of Mafi­

keng. What Plaatje considers notable is that the preacher reminds the
congregation that its God is also the God of the adversary. Therefore
Britain has no exclusive right to call in divine aid or sanction. The
moral grounds are to be found in that neither Britain nor her allies
had raised a finger against the Republics, while the latter had been
guilty of all manner of depredations against the Blacks and their
stock. Subsequently he quotes an entire letter from Col Baden-Powell to
General Snyman which, inter alia, states that Blacks are becoming in­
creasingly incensed at the Boer attacks on their people and their
herds. 27 Nevertheless Blacks were confronted by the "uncanny white
man's mode of reasoning" which argued that the war ·was a white man's
business". Nevertheless a chief, like Lentswe of the Bakgatla, would
say that Blacks were part of the British empire, and were thus obliged

24
"Questions Affecting the Natives and Coloured People Resident in
British South Africa." Statement by the Executive of the South Af­
rican Native Congress, 1903(1]. quoted in T Karis and GM Carter
(eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1. p. 18.
25 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ...• p. 275.
26 HS Msimang. H Selby Msimang Looks Back, p. 4.
27 JL Comaroff (ed) , The Boer War Diary of Sol T. Plaatje. An Afric­
an at Mafeking. p. 11 and pp. 33-35.
 - 86 ­

to fight. 28

The vast majority of Blacks remained loyal to Britain throughout the

war although it is conceded that there were times when loyalty wavered ..
Black leaders travelled the country at their oWn expense to dissuade
those who might seek to exploit the situation to regain their indepen­
dence. 29

On the other hand there was also the eminent and respected voice of JT
Jabavu that cautioned against both the war and Black participation.
Ngcongco ascribes this call to Jabavu's involvement with men like Sauer
and Merriman with their Afrikaner Bond connections. But 3abavu also de­
murred from personal conviction. He was against military solutions to
diplomatic problems in addition to being a pacifist at heart. Unlike
his immediate successors he was able to discern a motive for the South
African War that underlay the ostensible reasons. Ultimately 3abavu's
newspaper Imvo Zabantsundu was silenced under martial law regulations.
In conclusion Ngcongco says that Jabavu paid dearly in material and per­
sonal terms for what he perceived to be a principled stand. 30 Warwick
comes very much to the same conclusion but adds that there was consider­
able fear amongst Whites that Blacks would seize the opportunity offer­
ed by the war to regain independence. S1

Apart from the loyalist sentiment Black motives for participation were
also practical. While Plaatje maintains that Lentswe was moved by a
sense of imperial identity. Mohlamme feels that Lentswe was also moti­

28 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ...• p. 276.

29 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ...• p. 245.
30 LO Ngcongco. ft3abavu and the Anglo-Boer War ft
, in Kleio, Vol II.
#2. October 1970, 6-18.
31
P Warwick. "Black People and the War", in P Warwick (ed). ~
South African War. The Anglo-Boer War, 1899-1902, pp. 190-191.
 - 87 ­

vated by revenge and the need to .protect his people's herds. 32 Simi­
larly Blacks in Natal hoped to get increased land allocations in Trans­
vaal territory a British victory.33 Other Blacks
after wer~ persuaded
to join British ranks through financial inducements. 34

The fact that a number of Blacks joined Britain's war effort does not
imply that they totally avoided enlisting with the Boers. The enlist­
ment was in some cases carried out under duress and was thus also coun­
terproductive, as some chiefs reacted by allying themselves with Brit­
ain. 35 The invidious position of Blacks in the South African War is
apparent in the development of schisms amongst the Basotho. The divi­
sions arose over who the likely victor of the conflict would be. 36 It
could therefore be concluded that Blacks' reasons for participation are
also to be found in a concern over the postwar situation. When it came
to evaluating their role in support of the victor they did not want to
be found wanting. Therefore self-interest was also a consideration. An
indication of what would be·fall those who opted for the wrong side was
already evident during the war when Britain encouraged pro-British
Blacks to attack pro-Boer elements. 37 Divisions amongst Blacks over
the participation issue continued into the postwar period. Members of

32 JS Mohlamme, "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in

the Aftermath of the South African War of 1899-1902", p.34
33 ·Statement #32, Kurnalo, John", in C de B Webb and JB Wright (eds
and translators), The James Stuart Archive of Recorded Oral Evi­
dence Relating to the HistorY of the Zulu and Neighbouring
Peoples, Volume 1, p. 259.
34 JS Mohlamme, "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in
the Aftermath of the South African War of 1899-1902", p. 99.
35 JS Mohlamme, "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in
the Aftermath of the South African War of 1899-1902", p. 99.
36 JS Mohlamme, "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in
the Aftermath of the South Africa~ War of 1899-1902", pp. 70-72.
37 JS Mohlamme, "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in
the Aftermath of the South African War of 1899-1902", p. 149.
 - 88 ­

the same tribe were given differentiated treatment in the settlement,

depending On where their allegiance had lain'.38 Overall Mohlamme con­
cludes that most Blacks had done enough to expect a better deal from
the British after the war. 39

It was only in the postwar period that the harsh reality of British in­
tentions became apparent. The belief in a benevolent colonial power tak­
ing up the cudgels on their behalf. and thus meriting support. soon dis­
integrated. In retrospect the South African War was aimed at "African
labour. African land. and the gold that had been found in the country's
bowels. ,,40 It is understandable that Plaatje expressed dismay at the
lack of appreciation shown by the Boers towards Blacks who had support­
ed their families while they were on campaigns. Particularly when this
support was given while the commandos were fighting to ensure that the
status guo for Blacks was maintained. 41 ~lacks suffered harshly at
the hands of the Boers at the end of the war as a result of their sup­
port for the British. 42 Perhaps Matthews's views were shaped by what
was seen as a deliberate policy on the part of the British to rehabili­
tate the Boers on their farms. Some of these farms had been successful­
ly taken over by Blacks during the war. To evict these squatters. War­
wick says. ex-commandos were re-armed and allowed to use force to evict
the new inhabitants of the farms. The struggle for the control of the
stock that had come into African hands during the course of the war for

38 JS Mohlamme, "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in

the Aftermath of the South African War of 1899-1902". p. 122.
39 JS Mohlamme. "Black People in the Boer Republics During and in
the Aftermath of the South African War of 1899-1902". pp. 160­
161.
40 BM Magubane. The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica. p. 47-48.
41 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ...• p. 147.
42 ZK Matthews, Freedom For My People ...• p. 5.
 - 89 ­

a variety of reasons was also a source of much acrimony.43

The question arises as to how the vanquished came to flout the prin­
ciples for which the victors allegedly went to war? How was it possible
for the Boers (who had suffered such galling losses that they continued
an "anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle in South
Africa"44) to achieve such power that they could still implement the
policies that war was supposed to eliminate? It was soon apparent that
the Republican "Grondwet" would be the basis for future
legislation. 45

To modern commentators this is no major conundrum. British imperialism

had achieved its economic aims in victory and could now leave the coun­
try to the political stewardship of the Boers and other Whites. The new
political masters of the country could be relied upon to act as the
agents of "the most ruthless deprivation of the land of our
people. n46 Thus it is not surprising that Britain should have neglect­
ed to exploit the opportunities for giving Blacks a new deal between
1902 and 1910. Instead Britain "rationalized human hatred and entrench­
ed it in the constitution.· 47 The war had been fought to unite Boer
and Briton to ensure that Blacks received no say in government. 48

43 P Warwick, Black People and the South African War, pp. 164-166.
44 WM Tsotsi, From Chattel to Wage Slavery .•.• pp. 43-45.
45 AB Xuma, "Bridging the Gap Between White and Black in South Afri­
ca." Address by Dr AB Xuma at the Conference of European and Ban­
tu Christian Student Associations at Fort Hare, June 27 - July 3,
1930, [Extracts]. quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Pro­
test to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 220.
46 A Nzo. "Our Anti-Imperialist Commitment". An article by Alfred
Nzo, Secretary-General of the ANC, in Sechaba, February 1970,
quoted in ANC, ANC Speaks ... , p. 78 and JK Ngubane, Ushaba: The
Hurtle to Blood River, p. 282. ~

47 BM Magubane. The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­

rica, p. 48.
48 AWG Champion, "Repetition and Indication of Years·, in M Swanson
(ed). The Views of Mahlathi ...• pp. 67-68.
 - 90 -

SimIlarly the Afrikaner was deluding himself i f he believed that the

conflagration was a war of national liberation, a.s it was a war of
White integration. 49

To an extent it might be argued that the views expressed in the preced­

ing paragraph had the benefit of the perspective of time. The passage
of time and developments during this period appear to give substance to
their perceptions. But this is not to suggest the early writers did not
also realize that there was a contradiction between stated aims and fin­
al result. Where they differ is, to some extent, in the reasons behind
the gap between the ideal and reality.

Molema and Plaatje show the divergence between promise and realization.
A consistent aim in Plaatje's work, Native Life in South Africa. Before
and Since the Great War and the Boer Rebellion, is to demonstrate Black
loyalty which he felt should be properly rewarded: A loyalty based on
the love of the principles that Britain was believed to espouse. In con­
trast he shows the Boers to be perfidious, if not treacherous. Against
this background he repeatedly expresses his consternation at Britain's
continued connivance with Boer policy. Implicit in Plaatje's argument
is that as soon as Britain realizes her betrayal of her loyal subjects,
the Blacks, she will repeal the unjust legislation, such as the Nativ­
es' Land Act of 1913, a law that was passed in her name. As examples of
Boer betrayal of British ideals he cites the Great Trek, the South Afri­
can War and the 1914 Rebellion. All three examples he sees as part of a
continuous pattern of betrayal, which is a point that he continually re­
fers to in Native Life in South Africa .... It must be remembered that
this book was written as part of a propaganda campaign of the South Af­
rican Native National Congress against the Natives' Land Act and was
published in London to appeal to the British public.

As early as 1903 there is an indication that Blacks had come to realize

49 WM Tsotsi, From Chattel to Wage Slavery ...• p. 45.

 - 91 ­

that inst,ead of the warsup!>lanting Republican government with that of

the British the reverse had happened. 50 It appears that the .straws of
discontent and disillusionment were already blowing in the wind at this
stage. Confirmation of the deceit that Blacks were to experience in lat­
er years would account for the completely different perceptions express­
ed by modern writers. If the war had not satisfied Black expectations
then the probability existed that it was fought for entirely different
reasons. Thus one finds that. as indicated above, the modern writers ar­
gue that the war was conducted under the aegi.s of capitalist interests.

The disquiet expressed by the South African Native Congress would gain
further momentum with the appointment of the Lagden Commission that pro­
duced the Native Affairs Commission Report of 1905. Plaatje was alarmed
that the Report should have been ignored by successive legislatures,
and believes that the Report was shelved because it advocated a fran­
chise similar to that advocated for the Maoris in New Zealand. 51
Plaatje did not see the Lagden Report in the same light that Ngubo did
in later years. The latter maintains that the recommendations aimed at
maintaining White political supremacy and. as a result.
colonialism. 52 Magubane also contradicts Plaatje in that he contends
that the Lagden Report was used and became the basis for territorial
segregation. 53 Thus the Lagden Commission Report was not the benign
document that Plaatje believed it to be.

50 "Questions affecting the Natives and Coloured People Resident in

British South Africa," Statement by the Executive of the South Af­
rican Native Congress. 1903 [7]. quoted in T Karis and GM Carter
(eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 21.
51 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa .•• , p. 237.
52 A Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South
Africa,' 1882-1910: An Analytical Approach", . pp. 53-54 and pp.
119-120.
53 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica. p. 80.
 - 92 ­

If . there was some doubt about British lntentio,ns in the seven years im­
mediately after the waI:'. then events from 1909 confirmed the hint of be­
trayal.

In some respects Molema presaged later perceptions in that he evaluates

unification as surrendering to the Boer mentality that echoed the Mid­
dle Ages and "a feeling of some oblique "divine mission- to exploit the
Bantu.· 54 Unification .was merely part of a relentless historical pat­
tern that saw the triumph of a "gross. brute spirit.- 55 The spirit
that Plaatje refers to is the racial prejudice of the Boers. He feels
embittered that the vanquished. who had supposedly suffered defeat be­
cause of their policies. should be presented with the gift of Union.
This magnanimity
not only allowed them to continue their much maligned
racial policies. but also to extend them to the Cape and Natal. 56

Union was seen as 'a fusion of White interests dedicated to "white supre­
macy which was to rest on the pillars of black serfdom.- 57 Equally im­
portant was that Africans had come to see that Union meant that Whites
had optedfor permanent settlement based on the hegemony of political
institutions. 58 Political debates amongst Whites made it clear to
even the most superficial observer that the future of Blacks in the new
dispensation was to be bleak .59 The worst fears were confirmed when
Britain abdicated her responsibilities towards and her protection of
Blacks "by some unexplained contingency and ever-to-be-regretted mis­
chance".50 If Union had been the child of the chance confluence of

54 SM Molema. The Bantu Past and Present. p. 247.

55 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ...• p. xii.
56 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ...• p. 391.
57 E Mphahlele. The African Image. pp. 202-203.
58 E Mphahlele. The African Image, p. 51.
59 SM Molema. The Bantu Past and Present, p. 244.
50 SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 245.
 - 93 ­

circumstances then what were the consequences?

It appears that events after Union tend to favour the·views of those

writers who discerned a deliberate policy behind the South African War
and its aftermath until 1910. This policy was not to let the benevolent
sun of imperialism shine on all the inhabitants of the country. The war
was seen as a necessary prelude to Union, which in turn was a prerequi­
site to the "proper" coordination of labour and legal confirmation of
the practices and customs, including those of land distribution, that
had developed since the beginning of the nineteenth century. By 1920
the Rev Mahabane stated that the exclusion was not providential. He
cites a letter from Lord Kitchener to answer Boer concerns on the Af­
rican franchise. Kitchener is quoted as saying that Africans would not
be granted the vote in the new colonies until responsible government
had been attained in them. And. more significantly in this context, the
vote "will be so limited as to ensure the just predominance of the
white race." This letter was written during the negotiations leading up
to the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging at the end of the South Af­
rican War in 1902. 61

Every writer who is concerned with the first few decades of the twenti­
eth century not only reflects on the South African War and unification,
but also on subsequent events. Even if the perceptions surrounding caus­
es. objectives and consequences of the war and unification differ. some
substantiation for these viewpoints has to be offered. Virtually all of
the writers take the Natives Land Act of 1913 as the beginning point of
the confirmation of their perception. Those writers who believed that
Britain had gone to war for altruistic motives. and then betrayed her
principles to allow unification, see this belief confirmed in British
reaction to the Natives' Land Act. Those writers who perceived of the

61 "The Colour Bar". Presidentia~ Address. Delivered by the Rev Z R

Mahabane at the Cape Province Native Congress. Queenstown. May
1920, quoted in GM Carter and SW Johns III (eds). The Good
Fight .•.• pp. 2-3.
 - 94 ­

South African War as being based on a "hidden agenda" to satisfy capi­

talist interests also poin~ to the Land Act to, justify their conten­
tion.

Previously Molema had found some qualified justification for disposses­

sion, but on the issue of the Natives' Land Act he had no hesitation in
condemning it. In this instance Molema does not only foreshadow later
perceptions, but forms a viewpoint that pre-empts those of his succes­
sors. He considers three options for labour coercion: The first was
press ganging which had been rejected by Britain because she would not
countenance this practise in the Portuguese colonies. A second alter­
native was to levy such high taxes as to force Blacks to enter the
labour market. In this way they would earn enough to meet their state­
imposed obligations. This was rejected on the grounds of its being eco­
nomic slavery. The last option was to limit the land available for Afri­
can occupation. thus
forcing Africans to enter into the labour market
to earn a living. The Natives' Land Act met the last objective. 62 The
only curious aspect of Molema's view is, that, while he considers the
second option a form of economic slavery, he does not see the Natives'
Land Act in this light. In the context of this reference he does not
see the limitation on the means of subsistence, that is land, as a
means of economically based labour coercion. At the same time he states
that the migrant worker is reluctant to enter into a labour contract
for longer than three to six months, as this will take them away from
their pastoral and agricultural commitments in the rural areas. 53 How­
ever it should be remembered that the rural areas and the reserves were
not yet exposed to the smothering pressures resulting from population
growth and forced removals.

With the benefit of hindsight Msimang says that the Natives' Land Act
originated from the South African War. He says that the success of

62 SM Mo1ema, The Bantu Past and Present, pp. 256-257.

63 SM Mo1ema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 256.
 - 95 ­

Black farmers on abandoned White farms was such as to cause alarm

amongst White politicians, particularly in the light of the·poor-White
problem. Circumstances thus allowed Gen Hertzog to raisetlle spectre of
the "Black Peril". So successful was Hertzog, who had been excluded
from Botha's new cabinet in 1912. that he was able to panic Louis Botha
into passing the Land Act. It is further claimed that the Minister of
Native Affairs, JW Sauer. died as a result of his remorse over the Act.
Nevertheless it was inexplicable to Msimang how a professedly Christian
people could enact such an inhuman Act. In the final analysis Msimang
believed that the Act "was conceived in fear and without thought of
what repercussions it would have on the South African situation, moral­
ly. economically and even psychologically.n64

No doubt the most voluble perceptions of the Natives' Land Act were ex­
pressed by ST Plaatje. His work Native Life in South Africa. Before and
Since the Great War and the Boer Rebellion, which is one of many to his
credit. was primarily aimed at persuading Britain to intervene in Union
legislation and rescind the Natives' Land Act. The whole thrust of his
work is that the Act was an abomination borne of the Boer mentality.
That is why he was anxious to trace Boer history and show it to be
steeped in racial prejudice. At the same time he had to demonstrate
that the British were the antithesis of the Boers and their values.
This contrast was essential if he was to persuade the British that they
were surrendering their benevolent colonial principles by countenancing
legislation such as the Natives' Land Act. It is against this back­
ground that he created his perceptions of the Land Act.

Early writers see a variety of motives for the passage of the Natives'
Land Act. Plaatje appears bemused by the viewpoint of an Afrikaner po­
liceman in the Orange Free State who states that Blacks were getting
their just desserts for aiding Britain in the South African War. Said
policeman did not answer Plaatje's que~y as to why, if his view was cor-

64 HS Msimang, H Selby Msimang Looks Back. pp. 5-7.

 - 96 ­

rect, Blacks in the. Cape and Natal should also suffer under the
Act. 65 This report seems to confirm the conunent of Mcitthews that was
cited previously.66

The obligatory sale of crops forced the Black into selling his labour
and reduced him to "serfdom" and a "veritable bondman."67 The Act
would also be seen as a means to limit African bargaining power in two
important areas. The first in that Black participation in land alloca­
tion decisions was denied. The second which, significantly, is seen to
arise from the first was to limit the ability of Blacks to sell their
labour on a market determined by the natural forces of supply and
demand. The forced eviction from the farms, and the need to obtain domi­
cile on farms was seen as a distortion of market forces. 68 While stop­
ping short of genocide, the Act ~imed to enslave Blacks and conunitted
them to perpetual bondage in the agricultural sector or to a ·'sunless
life in the unwholesome mines·".69

The coercion of agricultural labour was seen to function through the

limitation of available land. Those tenant farmers who could no longer
practise their livelihood and could not get land in the reserves were
obliged to enter into an annual three month labour contract with the
farmer on whose land they were domiciled. 70 Thus from the earliest

65 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ...• pp. 85-86.

66 See footnote 142 above.
67 SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 249 and DDT Jabavu, "Na­
tive Unrest: its Cause and Cure", in DDT Jabavu, The Black Pro­
blem... , p. 5.
68 "Resolution against the Natives Land Act, 1913 and the Report of
the Natives Land Conunission", by the South African Native Nation­
al Congress, October 2, 1916, quoted in T Karis and GM Carter
(eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 87.
69 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 159.
70 ·Petition to King George V, from the South African Native Nation­
al Congress, July 20". 1914, [Published in The Cape Argus], quot­
ed in T.Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol
1.. p. 129.
 - 97 ­

perceptions, of the Act it-is clear that the Act was widely interpreted
as a measure of labour'coercion. Nevertheless early writers were of the
opinion that in essence the law was formulated and promulgated in re­
sponse to Afrikaner political concerns and racial prejudice, which fear­
ed that Cape liberalism would be enforced in the northern
provinces. 71

Plaatje is at his most scathing when he highlights what he perceives to

be Boer double standards. He finds it incomprehensible that aparliamen­
tarian, Grobler, who was also a prime mover behind the Act, should
quote the Bible to show that the Boers should not invade German South
West Africa. Grobler refers to Deuteronomy 19:14, which he claims is a
divine injunction on the Boers not to move the beacons of others. "But
strange to say, the religious scruples of these pious objectors never
revolted against removing the landmarks of their native neighbours and
appropriating, not only their land and their labour, but even the per­
sons of these neighbours. n72 In a similar vein the Dutch Reformed
Church is warned that one day it would be called to account for its en­
dorsement of the Act, by failing to object to it. 73 The DRO through
its own discriminatory practises might be creating the impression
amongst the Boers that the church sanctioned the application of the
Act. 74 In Plaatje's view the Act was a heresy that penalized even the
livestock of Blacks on account of their owners' pigmentation. 75 In
keeping with Plaatje's contrasting themes of loyalty and disloyalty he
comments that it must be a SOurce of satisfaction to Grobler that,

71 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 25.

72 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 390.
73 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 151­
74 ,
ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 148.
75 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ...• pp. 95-96.
 - 98 ­

while he languished in· jail for participat~ng in the 1914 Rebellion.

his loyal Black
countrymen were being persecuted in teims of law that
he had rebelled to maintain. 76 ·

A broader vision is that the Act mer:ly legalized a situation that had
pertained
., since the last war for African independence had been
lost. 77 The latter perception does not make it clear who was behind
the legislation. unlike Plaatje's view which is adamant that the
parentage of the Act is to be found in the racial attitudes of the
Boers.

In contrast to the previous perception of Plaatje Magubane supports the

inclinations of A Lerumo (pseudonym of Michael Harmel. "member of the
Central Committee of the South African Communist Party and first editor
of The African Communist ft ).78 Lerumo contends that the Natives Land
Act was a double-edged sword. On the one hand it halted class formation
amongst the Afrikaner. On the other hand the deal that Smuts had struck
with imperialism and capitalism led to the collapse of the ·semi-patri­
archal. self-contained economy of Boer agriculture." In this way the
successful farmer gained the
ascendancy which satisfied the needs of
the developing mining and industrial centres. 79 It also protected the
burgeoning White commercial
farming sector from competition by Blacks
and met the labour demands of the former. 80

The coercion of labour to the urban areas through the Natives' Land Act
did not go unnoticed even among the earlier writers. The Act was criti­

76 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa •..• p. 393 and p. 433.

77 G Mbeki. South Africa The Peasants' Revolt. p. 68.
78 A Lerumo (M Harmel). Fifty Fighting Years. The Communist Party of
South Africa, 1921-1971. p. vi.
79 BM Magubane. The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica. p. 121.
80 ANC, Sechaba, October 1980. pp. 24-25.
r
, - 99 ­

cized for creating an unprotected class of labourers on White farms.

The second generation under this legislation did not have the patience
of the first generation, and f1~d to the urbanareas. 81 The loss of
land, stock and the poverty occasioned by the Land Act forced an urban
migration. 82 In a variety of ways Blacks came to concur with the view
that the Act had closed "all doors to freedom and independence" and
"-
forced them into "bondage".83

Ngubo argues that the disillusionment in White intentions in the after­

math of the South African War, Union and the Natives' Land Act gave
rise to a "sustained Zionism".84 This comment is significant for seve­
ral reasons. Firstly it connects with the perception that the Act was
the portent of worse to come. 8S Secondly it shows a close linkage be-.
tween Christianity and politics, which is a recurrent theme amongst all
of the authors and spokespersons. Frequently the portrayal of historic­
al events attempts to show that the lot of Blacks is a violation of
Christian principles. By extension the failure to rescind the legisla­
tion is in effect the sacrifice of the same Christian ethic. Thirdly
the Zionist movements were also a rejection of missionary tutelage. On
the one hand this rejection suggested a criticism of the established
Christian churches for failing to comply with what the Zionists per­

81 AWG Champion, et al, Evidence Given Before Penal and Prison Re­
form Commission. 6 July 1946, p. 3.
82 AB Xuma, "Bridging the Gap Between White and Black in South Afri­
ca." Address by Dr. A. B. Xuma at the Conference of European and
Bantu Christian Student Associations at Fort Hare, June 27 - July
3, 1930, [Extracts], quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds), From
Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 221.
83 SM Mo1ema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 249.
84 A Ngubo, "The Development of African Political Protest in South
Africa, 1882-1910: An Analytical Approach", p. 60.
85 "Petition to King George V, frpm the South African Native Nation­
al Congress, July 20", 1914, [Published in The Cape Argus], quot­
ed in T Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol
1., p. 129.
 - 100 ­

ceived to be the tenets of Christian faith. On the other hand this

declaratiop .. of independence also implied .a move towards freedom in
political action. At the time of the Land Act this assertion of
independent political action was not yet part of the mainstream of
Black politics, but the indications were already present. This latter
remark must be tempered with the view of Beinart who contends that the
millenial movements in fact had a very strong political content that.
in effect, the re-application of Christianity was also an assertion of
political independence. 86

(It is not the intention to outline the evolution of Black political

thought. Nevertheless it is relevant to briefly outline a development
of this nature because of the influence it would have on the growth of
Black historical perceptions.)

Increasingly events of the past would be brought into relationship with

the present. to demonstrate that the present was consonant with the
past. and not just an aberration. Instead the present was and is seen
as confirmation of what had preceded. Equally important was to project
the past and present into the future. based on the paradigm of the
past. Through this projection a cataclysmic future was foreseen unless
fundamental changes were brought about and heed given to Black demands
for redress of their grievances.

The sense of grievance and betrayal that manifested itself over events
culminating in the Natives Land Act of 1913 became even more pronounced
subsequently. The feeling that the injustices of the past would recede
gave way to the feeling that the current developments were to be expect­
ed in the light of what had preceded. Despite this change in and in­
creasing unanimity of perceptions a major distinction remains between
the reactions and prescriptions of early and modern writers based on

86 W Beinart. "Amafelandawonye [the Die-Hards]". in W Beinart and C

Bundy (eds). Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa ...• pp. 253­
254.
 - 101 ­

their perceptions.

Initially participation in World War I was argued to be co;nsistent with

the idea thit, for instance in the case of the Basotho , they could not
stand by while their king's, the British monarch's, house was
ablaze. 87 This was an indication of the acceptance of British suzer­
ainty. Implicit in this was that the monarchy also had an obligation to
the people over which it held sway. At the same time those differences
that existed between Black and.White should be held in abeyance until
the war was over. By easing the pressure on the British government over
"reactionary legislation and unpopular one-sided laws", a total commit­
ment was given to achieving the aims of the war. With peace settled,
Britain should strive to apply the principles in the Union that she was
believed to have fought to protect. In many respects the arguments sur­
rounding participation in World War I paralleled those given in favour
of support for Britain in the South African War. Britain's "love for
the free institutions K should be applied to allow Blacks Ua voice in
the affairs of the countryU and provide protection for the "aboriginal
national institutions".88 In contrast to these professions of loyalty
and expectations it was held that the Afrikaners hoped for a German
victory.

A German success would allow for the extension of German colonial rule
to the Union. German rule would be akin to the Boer rule in the previ­
ously independent Orange Free State. Thus the Afrikaner would be allow­
ed to rule without the threat of legal intervention. 89 And while
Blacks had declared a moratorium on protests against laws such as the
Natives' Land Act the government was selective in the suspension of its

87 SM Molema, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 63.

88 "Petition to King George V, from the South African Native Nation­
al Congress. December 16, 1918.". quoted in T Karis and GM Carter
(eds). From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 141.
89 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ...• p. 306.
 - 102 ­

activitie\S. It suspended the investigations of the Beaumont Commission,

which was to investigate land allocations for Blacks. This suspension
was not matched by a halt in the application of the Natives' Land Act
itself. 90

Even though Blacks were prepared to give unstintingly of their services

these were rejected. Blacks were relegated to a noncombatant status and
this "prohibition surely carries the conviction that the native com­
plaint against the South African constitution is something more than a
mere sentimental grievance. n91 In other words Britain was nullifying
the reasons for Black support. By accepting Black commitment to the war
effort Britain would have had to accept satisfying Black expectations
of support and the arguments that underlay them. Plaatje contends that
the anomaly of Black taxpayers being denied the vote compared to tax­
evading. noncombatant and rebellious Whites had been avoided by denying
Blacks combatant status. 92 In some instances Blacks felt so aggrieved
about being denied
"the dignity of bearing arms" that they refused to
enter non-combatant· service. 93 Grundlingh explains the non-combat­
ants' decision in another way. He believes that some chose not to en­
list as an act of protest. Thus they were fighting their own war by not
fighting. In dealing with those that enlisted Grundlingh shows that
they were not always driven by ideological considerations. Some men who
Utook the shilling" were virtually press ganged into enlisting. Yet oth­
ers saw service as a form of adventure. while there were those who saw
enlistment as an escape hatch from the long arm of the law. By enrol­
ling under pseudonyms the latter managed to hide their nominal identity
and· physical presence from the law. Some fled from financial

90 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 246.

91 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South Africa •..• p. 399
92 ST Plaatje. Native Life in South. Africa ...• p. 30.8.
93 ZK Matthews, Freedom For My People ...• p. 60.
 - 103 ­

exigi'encies. 94

The motives for participatiorior non-participation migh,t have varied

but a greater uniformity of perceptions on the impact on and the conse­
quences of the war for the broader society emerges after the war. Brit­
ain was seen to abandon the principles that she was held to maintain in
surrendering to "the Afrikander Party of Generals Botha and Smuts. ft95

The parting of the ways between Black and Briton and the hardening of
condemnation of the Boer by Blacks that had shown itself between 1899
and 1913 became more pronounced after the war of 1914-1918. Blacks who
returned from the campaigns overseas came back with a dedication to
Black solidarity. Unfortunately this unity was founded on the unhealthy
basis of "anti-white sentiment. ft96 In addition Blacks who had served
overseas came
to realize that beyond the frontiers of South Africa ra­
cial discrimination did not exist. 97

Until the Great War there appears to be a note of fatalism and resigna­
tion to their lot amongst Blacks. They had fought for and lost their
heritage. They appeared to have become reconciled to their fate. Brit­
ain's ultimate success in the South African War over the Boers' at­
tempts to retain their independence had been an adequate demonstration
that armed resistance was futile. Therefore the only alternative was to
offer their lives for their 'colonial protector'. in the belief that
Britain would reciprocate by redressing previous sacrifices. The desper­

94 AM Grundlingh. Fighting Their Own War ..•• pp. 167-171 and pp. 57­
79.
95 ftTo the Native Conference at Queenstown. M Address by Meshach Pel­
em, President Bantu Union. February 26, 1919 [Extracts], quoted
in T Karis and GM Carter (eds). From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1,
pp. 101-102.
96 DDT Jabavu, "Native Unrest: i·ts Cause and Cure", in DDT Jabavu,
The Black Problem ...• p. 17.
97 ZK Matthews, Freedom For My People .. " pp. 60-61.
 - 104 ­

ate cry of "Abatwana bam, Abatwana bam" ("Oh, my children. my chil­

dren") of· one going down on the "Mendi" gave Blacks "re8sonto believe
that his cry was a testimony of hope that the man had fought a good
fight for a good cause and better things awaited their children."98

While the voices of those who had served in the war was being rejected,
"the appeals of the chattels who render service" to keep disgorging the
wealth of the Witwatersrand gold mines that maintained "the credit of
the Empire" were also falling on deaf e~rs.99 A South African Native
National Con&ress deputation that had gone to Paris to exploit the per­
ceived sense of obligation that Britain was supposed to have, found
General Hertzog at Versailles lobbying for the restoration of a Boer re­
public, while "Africans were looking for access to their
homeland. ,,100 Black expectations of Wilson's programme for the
self-determination for all nations flickered briefly. Blacks were,
however, soon made to realize that they were not considered a nation,
but a tribe, and thus precluded from the application of Wilson's
Fourteen Points to them. 10l The world powers were deluding themselves
if they believed that Blacks were content to submit to White tutelage
in South
Africa. Indeed it was a "few swashbucklers like our statesman
soldier, Smuts", who remained under this delusion. 102

98 CMC Ndamse, "The New Day", in S Biko(ed), Black Viewpoint, pp.

39-40 and AB Xuma, "An Address at the Mendi Memorial Celebration,
Bantu Sports Grounds, Johannesburg February 23, 1941, quoted in
ft
,

T Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 2, p.

163.
99 ST Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa ... , p. 20.
100 A Luthuli, Let My People Go ... , p. 83.
101 ZK Matthews, Freedom For My People ... , p. 62.
102 "To the Native Conference at Queenstown." Address by Meshach Pel­
em, President, Bantu Union, February 26. 1919. [Extracts], quoted
in T Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1,
p. 102.
 - 105 ­

Instead of Blacks receiving the kudos for commitment, Afrikaner 'loyal­

ty' was rewarded by the passage of the Statute of Westminster through
the British parliament in 1931. A significant aspect of the Statute was
that it repealed the Colonial Laws Validity Act. The latter law allowed
British intervention in a colony's legislative process should its laws
be repugnant to British principles. Simultaneously the Statute denied
the automatic applicability of British law in her colonies. 103 The
implications of this perception were important because Bla~ks would now
come to realize that there was no gain to be had from appeals to Brit­
ain to exercise her powers. Which, in turn, would have great implica­
tions for Black perceptions of South African history.

Many writers saw the government's policy and its implementation through
legislative measures as confirmation of the trends that they had per­
ceived developing since 1899.

By 1917 General Smuts had indicated what lay ahead for Blacks. Two as­
pects of Smuts's speech at the Savoy Hotel in London are highlighted as
significant. According to Thaele, Smuts "made a speech devoid of all
common sense and unbecoming of any Christian" when he said that "the
early Christians made a mistake in putting into practice the principles
of brotherhood. "104 Smuts's speech was criticized by Molema for its
statement of regret that Whites had not yet made "Africa a white man's
country".105 This was taken to be particularly applicable to South Af­
rica. DDT Jabavu saw this speech as representing an enigma to Blacks in
South Africa. 106 Jabavu appears to have been the only one who viewed

103 WM Tsotsi, From Chattel to Wage Slavery ...• pp. 115-116.

104 JS Thaele, "Christianity, Basis of Native Policy?", in Workers'
Herald, December 21. 1923, quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds),
From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 215.
105 SM Molew~, The Bantu Past and Present, p. 353.
1

106 DDT Jabavu, "Native Unrest: its Cause and Cure", in DDT Jabavu,
The Black Problem.•. , p. 7.
 - 106 ­

the speech as enigmatic, i f one .considers, the earlier perceptions of

Smuts's· Savoy address and the previous refer.ences of Pelem.

The subsequent comment on further legislative measures by Smuts appears

to confirm those already stated and suggest that if Smuts expressed re­
gret about his failure to make the Union a "white man's country· then
he was soon to act to remedy this omission. Blacks came to see Smuts's
legislative programme as the first instalment of redressing previous
failures. Making South Africa a White-dominated state was achieved
through a number of legislative measures that legalized some of the
philosophy underlying the Natives' Land Act. Passage of the latter Act
had been achieved through minimal and token negotiation with Blacks.
The tendency to discard Black opinion was confirmed by the Native
Affairs Act No. 23 of 1920.

The passage of this Act legalized ·political segregation ••. for the
right honourable gentleman [Smuts] had said that he could not allow
black men to sit in the white man's Parliament. ft107 Even if Smuts
were given the benefit of the doubt, and the native commissioners
appointed in terms of this Act were competent men. what guarantees
could be given by Smuts that his successors and their appointees would
be equally able?108 Here again Jabavu was out of step with his
contemporaries. who rejected the Act because it was drawn up by a
parliament that was exclusively White, and because it only allowed for
the appointment of White commissioners. 109 By his own admission

107 "Exclusion of the Bantu." Presidential Address by the Rev Z R Ma­

habane, to Cape Province Native Convention, May 1921, in GM Cart­
er and SW Johns III (eds), The Good Fight ...• p. 16.
108 DDT Jabavu, "The Native Affairs Act. Views of Natives". in DDT Ja­
bavu, The Black Problem...• pp. 22-23.
109 "Testimony of JT Gumede Before the Select Committee on Native Af­
fairs, June 15 and 18, 1917, "[Extracts], Published in Minutes of
Evidence, Select Committee on Native Affairs [4639]". quoted in T
Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p.
98.
 - 107 ­

Smuts, dl.lring the second reading of the Na,tive Affairs Bill. agreed
that Blacks were ~osing confidence in 'Whites, and the proposed law was
doing little to restore the lost trust. 11O A further breach of
confidence was to follow with the Native Urban Areas Act of 1923. The
perceptions with regard to the aims and consequences of colonization
were starting to crystallize in the perceptions of the legislation that
was passed after 1910. The Natives' Land Act introduced formal
territorial segregation in the rural areas. The Native Affairs Act laid
the foundations of formalized political exclusion. The Native Urban
Areas Act would be seen as the extension of the Natives' Land Act to
the urban areas.

The Urban Areas Act was seen as part of the "lunatic dilemma" of
'Whites. 'Whites wished to employ Black labour in the urban areas. but re­
fused them domicile at the workplace. 111 The reference to the
"lunatic dilemma" is made despite the belief that the law originated in
the aftermath of the influenza epidemic of 1918. which prompted the
need to create more sanitary conditions in the urban areas. 112
Significantly. contemporary terminology is applied to explain another
notion of the Act. Mokgatle believes that the Urban Areas Act directly
gave rise to municipal hostels and reception depots for single Black
male workers. which "are instruments designed purely to put into
operation the doctrine of Apartheid. ,,113

With the passage of time ,the legislative process leading to the segrega­
tion and exclusion of Blacks from full participation in the economy and

110 "Exclusion of the Bantu." Presidential Address by the Rev Z R Ma­

habane. to Cape Province Native Convention. May 1921, in GM Cart­
er and SW Johns III (eds), The Good Fight •..• p. 16.
111 ZK Matthews. Freedom For My Peo12le ...• p. 61.
112 ZK Ma t thews, Freedom For Mv Peo.:Qle .•.• p. 61.
113 N Mokgatle. The Autobiogra12hy of an Unknown South African. p.
174.
, political activity
- 108 ­

was seen to gain momentum. Aside from the making of

laws and' their impact several major events after World 'War I attracted
the comment of various writers. Two of these directly co~cerned Blacks.
These were the labour riots in Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg and the
Bulhoek massacre. Another event would elicit a resp'onse from Black com­
mentators dealing with the period under discussion. even though there
might not have been an activistic Black involvement. This event was the
Rand Revolt of 1922.

The Bulhoek massacre of 1921 was seen as the manifestation of the rela­
tionship between land legislation and labour, and thus between coloniza­
tion and dispossession. While Luthuli ascribes no reasons for the
events of 1921 when "163 people were wantonly massacred by the police
. 114
at Bulhoek" . a more detailed comment is forthcoming from H Selby
Msimang. Msimang sees the killings as part of an attempt to suppress a
wider reaction to labour coercion resulting from the land laws. The
deaths at Bulhoek, like those of the Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg ri­
ots that preceded Bulhoek, could have been avoided had the leader of
the Israelites, Enoch Ngijima, persuaded his followers to indenture
their labour to farmers of the surrounding districts. An equally effec­
tive measure would have been for the Israelites to donate their labour
to employers. The irony of Msimang's comments becomes apparent when he
says ft[I]t is not for me to pass judgement against Ngijima's teachings,
but I think it is within our right to condemn any system of Government
which encourages lawlessness and defiance to constituted authority. Man
is not bound to confess loyalty to a tyrant. ftl15 In later years
Mandela argues
that the only crime of the dead and the injured at Bul­
hoek was to live on a piece of land. 116

114 A Luthuli. Let My People Go .•.• p. 83.

115 ftAddress by Selby Msimang. President, Industrial and Commercial
Workers' Union of South Africa. July 23, 1921 (Published in The ft
;

Cape Times), quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest

to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 320.
116 N Mandela, "A Land Ruled By The Gun", in N Mandela, No Easy Walk
to Freedom ... , p. 122'.
 - 109 ­

Forty. two years separated the views expressed by Msimang and Mandela.
There is however a consistency in the conclusions implied,and stated in
their arguments. Both maintain that through dispossession of land and
the enforcement of legal measures to enable the alienation of land, vio­
lent resistance was inevitable, if nota necessity. In this case, then,
the perception of the past is not only to explain the present but to
justify action taken or planned. Such action might, in strictly legalis­
tic terms, be interpreted as illegal. But in this context the impres­
sion is created that not to take action could be construed to be a
gross dereliction of duty if not immoral.

With reference to the Bulhoek massacre Ncube takes up the idea of Roux
who states that the uprising was a manifestation of ft'the struggle ~or

racial freedom in South Africa which has often taken a religious

form.,·117 Aside from this perception of the nature of the revolt
Ncube also sees the police action as part of the ruthless eviction of
Blacks from the land ftto compel them to provide cheap labour for the
mines .• 118

Ncube's comment on the religious element, particularly the Christian

one, is significant. It is apparent throughout all the sources that all
the writers, commentators, speakers and.critics are in one way or
another concerned with Christianity. The concern is expressed in a vari­
ety of ways. Some writers see Christianity as the source of their
present condition, while others see Christianity as the solution. In
the case of the latter the writers did not merely content themselves

117 E Roux, Time Longer Than Rope. A History of the Black Man's Strug­
gle for Freedom in South Africa, p. 135, quoted in DMJ Ncube, The
Influence of Apartheid and Capitalism on the Development of Black
Trade Unions in South Africa, p. 32.
118 DMJ Ncube, The Influence of Apartheid and Capitalism on the Deve­
lopment of Black Trade Unions in South Africa, pp. 31-32.
 - 110 ­

with entrusting their lot to divine intervention. Instead they would

give Christianity a specific interpretation and establish·certain crite­
ria which would have to be met if Christianity was to b~ the means to
resolving the situation of Blacks. This latter development is signifi­
cant because Christianity was no longer seen as an absolute. but rather
as subject to external criteria that conformed to Black aspirations. In
many respects Christianity was meant to conform to the patterns that
the Dutch Reformed Church had been condemned for and so become a civil
religion.

The extent to which the ways of Black and White had separated became
clear with the Rand Revolt of 1922. Under ordinary circumstances it
would be expected that there would have been solidarity between work­
ers. irrespective of race. But Blacks saw that although they played a
pivotal role in the outbreak of the uprising they were unable to iden-·
tify with the White workers who took up arms against the state. It was
maintained that the strike was in reaction to the mine-owners' inten­
tion to allow Blacks advancement into more skilled levels of employ­
ment. On the one hand this would reduce labour costs but improve Black
wages. For Blacks to side with White workers in the confrontation would
have meant support to maintain the industrial colour bar. If. on the
other hand. Blacks had sided with the Government against White labour
it would have meant a tacit acceptance of Government policy. When view­
ed against their increasingly vociferous objections to the direction
that government policy was taking. this was an untenable position. At
best Blacks could adopt a policy of positive neutrality and maintain a
low profile when the verbal and military shrapnel started to fly.

Mine owners had welcomed the opportunity to increase the Black labour
complement at lower wages during World War I.119 With the return of
peace the mine owners were reluctant to increase White employment.
~fuite miners saw this as an infringement of the colour bar and thus

119 WM Tsotsi. From Chattel to Wage Slavery .. ;. p. 58.

 - 111 ­

came out on strike. 120 The White miners had come out to protect their
privile"ged wage position. Their advantageous position in the labour mar­
ket was seen to be due to the artificial scarcity of skilled labour cre­
ated by the industrial colour bar. The dilemma of Black labour was seen
in the position of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. By
showing solidarity with the White miners they would be tacitly support­
ing the colour bar. This was clearly " untenable. On the basis of the ar­
gument that "my enemy's enemy is my friend" the ICU supported Smuts.
This in turn created an odd alliance, as Smuts had been responsible for
the suppression of the Bulhoek and Bondelswarts rebellions. Smuts was
also seen to be acting in collusion with the Chamber of Mines. It was
therefore not surprising that the ICU should feel uneasy about an alli­
ance with the obverse side of the coin of labour relations. 121

The position of the individual Black was also invidious. Champion re­
marks that he was nearly shot by White strikers for aiding troops in
Fordsburg. This incident taught him the importance of worker solidari­
ty.122 But subsequent events were to show him that this was a
~~ilateral lesson, not to be reciprocated by most lihite workers. The
Transvaal Native Mine Clerks Association saw another lesson to be
learned from the Rand Revolt. The Association believed that Whites
should learn that without proper communication channels for Blacks with
their employers they would be open to virtually any form of
agitation. 123 Indirectly the 1922 strike was seen as a warning to
employers that they could expect similar action from Black workers

120 WM Tsotsi, From Chattel to Wage Slavery ... , p. 57.

121 DMJ Ncube, The Influence of Apartheid and Capitalism on the Deve­
lopment of Black Trade Unions in South Africa, p. 34.
122 UNISA, AWG Champion, typed reply by Champion to biographical ques­
tions, Ace. 1, Box 1 Autobiography/Biography, File AWG Champion ­
Section 2 Biography, set of papers numbered p. 2.2.2., np.
123 "Memorandum from the Native Mine Clerks Association to the Mining
Industry Board, 1922", quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds),
From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 321.
 - 112 ­

unless their demands were heeded .

.it.··
't
f Champion had viewed the strike as a lesson for the need !or solidarity.
Opposed to this is the perception of Magubane who believed that the
strike and its suppression were the beginning of the transformation of
the White labour movement "into an emasculated adjunct of Afrikaner na­
tionalism.· 124 Given the general tenor of Magubane's perceptions of
South African history as a gross manipulation by finance capital this
is a somewhat aberrant comment. In this instance he is giving recogni­
tion to a political movement rather than an economic force. To an ex­
tent Ncube also echoes Magubane's viewpoint when he argues that through
attacks by
Whites on Blacks "the white workers changed the ideological
focus from a white working class to that of white domination.· 125

The Rand Revolt was also seen to be a fillip for Afrikaner nationalism.
The reaction from the White electorate was such that the Pact govern­
ment with the aid of the Communist Party ousted Smuts. 126 The two ap­
parently disparate elements of nationalism and socialism that made up
the Pact government were cemented together in reaction to Smuts's han­
dling of the strike. 127 A general sentiment about the opportunism of
the Communist Party of South African is aired by Tsotsi who believed
that the CPSA would not support the lifting of the colour bar. This re­
fusal to support the abolition was based on the belief that only a few
Blacks would benefit from such an action. 128 Despite this contention
there does not appear to be any hint that the CPSA might hope to

124 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica. p. 282.
125 DMJ Ncube. The Influence of Apartheid and Capitalism on the Deve­
lopment of Black Trade Unions in South Africa. p. 33.
126 JK Ngubane. "African Political Movements". in Africa South. Vol
1. #1. October - December. 1956, p. 74.
127 WM Tsotsi. From Chattel to Wage Slavery ... , p. 58.
128 WM Tsotsi, From Chattel to Wage Slavery ...• p. 57.
 - 113 ­

achieve. more by solidArity with the White worker. None of the sources
appear ·to suggest that . the CPSA might have followed this, with a far
longer term obje'ctive, step to ensure solidarity in the Black prole­
tariat.

Generally it appears that Blacks viewed the 1922 strike on the Rand as
an internecine affair amongst Whites that served to confirm the percep­
tion that Whites would see to their own concerns first. If any atten­
tion was given to Blacks it was in terms of a nprob1em" that had to be
removed by legislative measures, rather than resolved' by a mutually
agreed solution.

The next instalment in the formal exclusion of Blacks from a say in gov­
ernment was seen to be the Native Administration Act. No. 38 of 1927.
On the one hand it was accepted that the Act agreed with the principle
that no legislation affecting Blacks should be implemented without pri­
or consultation with them. This may have been implied in the legisla­
tion but the Native Affairs Commission, established in terms of the Na­
tive Affairs Act of 1920, had. not met for five years. Therefore there
could be no talk of consultation based on the precedent of the Native
Affairs Commission. 129 Instead the Act was seen as "tyranny invoked
in the name of customary 1aw. n130 The 1927 Act was the final step in
the conquest of the Blacks and completed the political evisceration of
the African people by making a White the "Supreme Chief ft of the
African. 131 In keeping with the evolving perception that the thrust

129 "Urban Native Legislation." Memorandum to the Minister of Native

Affairs from the Location Advisory Boards' Congress of South Afri­
ca, September 8, 1930. (Published in the Report of the Location
Advisory Boards Congress of South Africa), quoted in T Karis and
GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 342.
130 "Presidential Address", by Dr. A.B. Xuma, ANC Annual Conference
of December 14-16, 1941. quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds),
From Protest to Challenge. Vol- 2, p. 181.
131 nCongress Youth League Manifesto," issued by the Provisional Com­
mittee of the Congress Youth League, March 1944, quoted in T Kar­
is and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 2, p. 303.
 - 114 ­

of colonization in
South Africa was towards labour coercion Modisane
contends·· that the law was designed to redistribute IIsurplus labour 132 ll
•

The legislative measures previously discussed were not believed to have

originated in a vacuum but were part of a deliberate programme. This
programme sought to rehabilitate the poor-Whites. The "Afrikaner work­
ers and poor whites saw in the petty-bourgeois program their only
salvation from poverty and Simultaneously the solu~ion
despair. 11133
to thepoor~White problem fuelled national chauvinism. 134 Because the
advancement of the poor-White was seen to encourage the interests of
Afrikaner nationalism, it appeared that the programme to rehabilitate
the poor-White was a unilateral solution to a universal problem.

The causes of poverty recognized no racial distinctions. The Xhosa, for

example, had social structures to absorb the IIrefugees" from poverty,
while the poor-Whites resorted to the IIrobbing of black Peter to pay
white Paul. n135 The frontier struggle of the preceding centuries had
become struggle between a Black and White proletariat which was lIeu_
a
phemistically called the 'Poor White Problem,.n 1 36 To ensure
electoral support lithe Afrikaner political class!! had to wean the
Afrikaner proletariat from a radical class consciousness. This weaning
process was achieved by introducing legislation that ended the
Afrikaner workers' "poverty and despairn, At the same time a more

132 B Modisane, Blame Me On History, pp. 305-306.

133 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, p. 168.
134 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, p. 246.
135 N Jabavu, The Ochre People, p. 115.
136 DMJ Ncube, The Influence of Apartheid and Capitalism on the Deve­
lopment of Black Trade Unions in South Africa, p. 37.
 - 115 ­

. positive identification with the symbols of Afrikaner nationalism such

as Afrikaner churches. conunerce, cultural movements.' literature and
politics had to ·be striven after .137

The idea had to become entrenched that White security lay in ~ihite sup­
remacy.138 The answer to the poor-White problem was achieved at the
expense of the poor-Blacks. The poor-White was encouraged to urbanize
by industrialization. while the poor-Black was repatriated to the re­
serves from the industrial centres. This repatriation intensified the
pressures on the already overcrowded reserves. 139 Industry could not.
however. survive entirely on White labour and thus from the 1930s one
saw the establishment of a "permanently urbanized semiskilled black
proletariat". Thus. Tabata alleges. the solution of the poor-White
problem held a certain irony in that the answer resulted from "racial­
economic integration. not racial separation."140 This interpretation
is significant because in many respects Tsotsi has highlighted what. to
many Blacks, is the inherent contradiction in the evolution of South Af­
rican history. The contradiction lies in the increasing economic inter­
dependence that is matched by an equal determination to counteract this
integration by measures to segregate all others spheres of being.

Much of the conunent and criticism of the preceding legislation was made
against the background of an even more ominous legislative package that
first appeared in the 1920s but would only be promulgated in the 1930s­
the Hertzog "Native Bills".

The passage of the Hertzog Bills, the Natives Trust and Land Act and

137 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica. p. 167.
138 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, p. 170.
139 G Mbeki. South Africa The Peasants' Revolt. p. 71.
140 WM Tsotsi. From Chattel to Wage Slavery ..•• p. 60.
 - 116 ­

the Representation of Natives Act o~ 1936, confirmed a trend that many

Blacks 'had discerned developing since 1652. The Acts "'established once
and for all that the conquered land could not be acquired by Africans
either by commercial purchase or political means.~141 The token
consultation that the government had undertaken with Blacks should not
let it be thought that Blacks had acquiesced to the proposed
legislation. The government had failed to realize that the "Black race
has passed that stage where it can be made to swallow anything given by
the legislators and enjoy it with gusto: n142 It was also unacceptable
for the government to take 8-9 years to frame the legislation and then
only allow Blacks three months to consult on the Bills. In addition,
this consultation via a was select committee, the Young Commission,
that had no Black members. 143

Jabavu's comments at the end of the last paragraph are an indication of

the hardening of Black attitudes. Until the tabling of the Hertzog
Bills, Blacks had tenuously clung to the belief that there was some
prospect of hope; that an equitable resolution of conflict was pos­
sible. This belief was held despite the increasing perception that the
development of South Africa's past clearly showed that Whites had not
come to the subcontinent with any altruistic motives. Jabavu's views
are also a reflection of a new generation of Black writers, who did not
feel themselves as constrained by their background. They increasingly
expressed their views in terms that denied a debt to Whites.

The tone of the writers who came to the fore in the 1930s (and later)
showed that age of the supplicant was gradually dying out. While Blacks
still believed that they depended on the goodwill of Whites they could

141 BM Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Af­
rica, p. 85.
142 DDT Jabavu, The Findings of the All African Convention, p. 25.
143 DDT Jabavu, The Findings of the All African Convention, pp.
26-28.
 - 117 ­

not readily afford to. portray the r.ole of "Whites in South African his­
tory as" antagonistic to that of Blacks. But the circumstances surround­
ing the passage of the Hertzog Bills were such that this, inhibiting fac­
tor was jettisoned. It appears in the criticism of the Hertzog Bills
that, relatively speaking, Blacks had thrown political caution to the
wind. In many respects the Hertzog Bills were envisaged as a crisis
moment. Unless everything was thrown into the opposition against the
Bills then all would be. lost. Similarly if the struggle failed then
nothing was to be lost anyway. and thus there was no point in explain­
ing their opposition to the proposed legislation in polite terms.

There appears to have been a sense of relief at the publication of the

Bills. By announcing his intentions Hertzog had at last brought the
question of race-relations into the open. 144 Further gratitude to
Hertzog is expressed by the feeling that .the very nature of the Bills
held the key to Black liberation. 145 Hertzog had broken pledges that
dated back to unification and had committed -a breach of faith which
can only result in the most serious menace to peace and security of
this land. H146 Thus Blacks saw themselves as relieved of any explicit
or implicit obligations to Whites.

The opprobrium attached to the Bills was not only directed at Hertzog
but at Whites in general. A modern writer contended that the Bills al­
lowed for Blacks to be excluded from the electoral process, while

144 "Report on Proceedings and Resolutions of the Annual Conference

of the African National Congress, January 4-5. 1926 [Extracts]
(Published in The Friend), quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds).
From Protest to Challenge. Vol I, p. 299.
145 "The Challenge- and "The Alternative". Extracts from pamphlet The
Crisis by Selby Msimang, quoted in T Karis and GM Carter (eds),
From Protest to Challenge. Vol 2, p. 61.
146 "Resolutions of Demonstration Against the Prime Minister's Native
Bills, 1926", quoted in T Katis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest
to Challenge. Vol 1, p. 326.
 - 118 ­

Whites could ftfeel moral about doing so at the time".147 The

unanimous support given by Whites to the ftpolitical emasculation" of
Blacks in 1936 "showed how little they respected the solemn
undertakings' to which they had been party. "148 Governm~nt policy was
stripped of the "sweet promises for the future" as Blacks at last
realized that they
had been dispossessed of their country. Blacks now
realized that they could rely on no one but themselves. 149

This declaration of political independence had important repercussions

for Black historical perceptions. As has been stated previously there
is a close linkage between the ideology of Black politics and historic­
al perception. If independence of political thought and action had been
declared then it was to be expected that the historical perceptions un­
derlying these new directions in political thought had also changed.
Blacks increasingly portrayed South African history in accordance with
their political programme. In this sense the perception of the South
African past as being one of unmitigated disaster for Blacks gains the
ascendancy. The image of the past no longer had to pay obeisance to
White sensitivities. There was no longer be the tendency to view the
past as part of a shared experience. Increasingly Blacks argued that
their past was unique, because only they had borne the brunt of White
political machinations. Opposed to this Whites might have lived through
this past, but could not claim to have experienced it as Blacks had
done. 1SO

Even those writers who, for a variety of reasons, declined to follow

147 G Mbeki, South Africa The Peasants' Revolt. p. 28.

148 G Mbeki. South Africa The Peasants' Revolt. p. 29.
149 "Address by LB. Tabata, AAC Conference. December 16, 1941", in T
Karis and GM Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. Vol 2, p.
341.
150
Preface to 1920 edition contained in 1921 edition, in DDT Jabavu,
The Black Problem... , p. x.
 - 119 ­

the preceding argument to its logical conclusion and dismiss White in­
volvement in Black politics as irreleva.nt or as being a form of inverse
racialism, expressed a more vehemently independent ,perception of the
past. That they adopted this stance can probably be attributed to the
need for Blacks to make it clear that their claims were not based on a
fallacious interpretation of the past, but rather on a harsh appraisal
of what had gone before.

The writers of this era and later generations, had the advantage of
more concrete examples of the thesis that colonization,exploitation and
disposs~ssion were synonymous. Therefore it follows that they would
seek to establish a far closer relationship between the final legislat­
ive measures of the era 1870 to 1936 and initial colonization.

It is against this background that the perceptions of the next period,

1936 to 1960, should be viewed.