Secure Coding Practices
Secure Coding Practices
Input Validation
Identify all data sources and classify them into trusted and untrusted. Validate all data
from untrusted sources (e.g. file streams, web service calls etc.)
Specify proper character sets, such as UTF-8, for all sources of input
Determine if the system supports UTF-8 extended character sets and if so, validate after
UTF-8 decoding is completed
Validate all client provided data before processing, including all parameters, URLs and
HTTP header content (example: Cookie names and values). Be sure to include
automated post backs from JavaScript, Flash or other embedded code.
Verify that header values in both requests and responses contain only ASCII characters
Validate data from redirects (An attacker may submit malicious content directly to the
target of the redirect, thus circumventing application logic and any validation performed
before the redirect)
Validate for expected data types, data range and data length
Validate all input against “White List” Or “Black List”, whichever is appropriate. However
White list approach is recommended for input validation
If any potentially hazardous characters must be allowed as input, be sure that you
implement additional controls like output encoding, secure task specific APIs and
accounting for the utilization of that data throughout the application . Examples of
common hazardous characters include: < > " ' % ( ) & + \ \' \" (refer Security Invalid
Characters).
Contextually output encode all data returned to the client that originated outside the
application's trust boundary. HTML entity encoding is one example, but does not work
in all cases
Encode all characters unless they are known to be safe for the intended interpreter
Contextually sanitize all output of un-trusted data to queries for SQL, XML, and LDAP
Use a centralized implementation for all authentication controls, including libraries that
call external authentication services
Segregate authentication logic from the resource being requested and use redirection to
and from the centralized authentication control
Validate the authentication data only on completion of all data input, especially for
sequential authentication implementations
Authentication failure responses should not indicate which part of the authentication
data was incorrect. For example, instead of "Invalid username" or "Invalid password",
just use "Invalid username and/or password" for both. Error responses must be truly
identical in both display and source code
Use multi-factor authentication for highly sensitive or high value transactional accounts.
Require authentication for all pages and resources, except those specifically intended to
be public
All authentication controls must be enforced on a trusted system (e.g., The server)
All administrative and account management functions must be at least as secure as the
primary authentication mechanism
If using third party code for authentication, inspect the code carefully to ensure it is not
affected by any malicious code
Password Management
Temporary passwords and links should have a short expiration time and Enforce the
changing of temporary passwords on the next use
Password entry should be obscured on the user's screen. (e.g., on web forms use the
input type "password")
Enforce account disabling after an established number of invalid login attempts (e.g.,
five attempts is common). The account must be disabled for a period of time sufficient
to discourage brute force guessing of credentials, but not so long as to allow for a
denial-of-service attack to be performed
Password reset and changing operations require the same level of controls as account
creation and authentication.
Password reset questions should support sufficiently random answers. (e.g., "favorite
book" is a bad question because “The Bible” is a very common answer)
If using email based resets, only send email to a pre-registered address with a
temporary link/password
Passwords should be at least one day old before they can be changed, to prevent
attacks on password re-use
The last use (successful or unsuccessful) of a user account should be reported to the
user at their next successful login
Implement monitoring to identify attacks against multiple user accounts, utilizing the
same password. This attack pattern is used to bypass standard lockouts, when user IDs
can be harvested or guessed
Change all vendor-supplied default passwords and user IDs or disable the associated
accounts
Temporary passwords and links should have a short expiration time and Enforce the
changing of temporary passwords on the next use by redirecting to the required change
password page or relevant error pages
Enforce password complexity requirements established by policy or regulation. When
the requirements change, ensure that existing passwords meet the requirements.
Authentication credentials should be sufficient to withstand attacks that are typical of
the threats in the deployed environment. (e.g., requiring the use of alphabetic as well as
numeric and/or special characters)
Password entry should be obscured on the user's screen. (e.g., on web forms use the
input type "password")
Enforce account disabling after an established number of invalid login attempts (e.g.,
five attempts is common). The account must be disabled for a period of time sufficient
to discourage brute force guessing of credentials, but not so long as to allow for a
denial-of-service attack to be performed
Password reset and changing operations require the same level of controls as account
creation and authentication.
Password reset questions should support sufficiently random answers. (e.g., "favorite
book" is a bad question because “The Bible” is a very common answer)
If using email based resets, only send email to a pre-registered address with a
temporary link/password
Passwords should be at least one day old before they can be changed, to prevent
attacks on password re-use
The last use (successful or unsuccessful) of a user account should be reported to the
user at their next successful login
Implement monitoring to identify attacks against multiple user accounts, utilizing the
same password. This attack pattern is used to bypass standard lockouts, when user IDs
can be harvested or guessed
Change all vendor-supplied default passwords and user IDs or disable the associated
accounts
Session Management
Use the server or framework’s session management controls. The application should
only recognize these session identifiers as valid
Session identifier creation must always be done on a trusted system (e.g., The server)
Session management controls should use well vetted algorithms that ensure sufficiently
random session identifiers
Set the domain and path for cookies containing authenticated session identifiers to an
appropriately restricted value for the site
Establish a session inactivity timeout that is as short as possible, based on balancing risk
and business functional requirements. In most cases it should be no more than several
hours
Disallow persistent logins and enforce periodic session terminations, even when the
session is active. Especially for applications supporting rich network connections or
connecting to critical systems. Termination times should support business requirements
and the user should receive sufficient notification to mitigate negative impacts
If a session was established before login, close that session and establish a new session
after a successful login
Do not expose session identifiers in URLs, error messages or logs. Session identifiers
should only be located in the HTTP cookie header. For example, do not pass session
identifiers as GET parameters
Protect server side session data from unauthorized access, by other users of the server,
by implementing appropriate access controls on the server
Generate a new session identifier and deactivate the old one periodically. (This can
mitigate certain session hijacking scenarios where the original identifier was
compromised)
Generate a new session identifier if the connection security changes from HTTP to
HTTPS, as can occur during authentication. Within an application, it is recommended to
consistently utilize HTTPS rather than switching between HTTP to HTTPS.
Set the "secure" attribute for cookies transmitted over an TLS connection
Set cookies with the HttpOnly attribute, unless you specifically require client-side scripts
within your application to read or set a cookie's value
Access Control
Use only trusted system objects, e.g. server side session objects, for making access
authorization decisions
Use a single site-wide component to check access authorization. This includes libraries
that call external authorization services
Deny all access if the application cannot access its security configuration information
Enforce authorization controls on every request, including those made by server side
scripts, "includes" and requests from rich client-side technologies like AJAX and Flash
Restrict access to files or other resources, including those outside the application's
direct control, to only authorized users
If state data must be stored on the client, use encryption and integrity checking on the
server side to catch state tampering.
Limit the number of transactions a single user or device can perform in a given period of
time. The transactions/time should be above the actual business requirement, but low
enough to deter automated attacks
Use the "referer" header as a supplemental check only, it should never be the sole
authorization check, as it is can be spoofed
Implement account auditing and enforce the disabling of unused accounts (e.g., After no
more than 30 days from the expiration of an account’s password.)
The application must support disabling of accounts and terminating sessions when
authorization ceases (example: Changes to role, employment status, business process,
etc.)
Create an Access Control Policy to document an application's business rules, data types
and access authorization criteria and/or processes so that access can be properly
provisioned and controlled. This includes identifying access requirements for both the
data and system resources
Cryptographic Practices
All cryptographic functions used to protect secrets from the application user must be
implemented on a trusted system (example: The server)
Establish and utilize a policy and process for how cryptographic keys will be managed
Error Handling and Logging
Use error handlers that do not display debugging or stack trace information
The application should handle application errors and not rely on the server
configuration
Error handling logic associated with security controls should deny access by default
All logging controls should be implemented on a trusted system (example: The server)
Logging controls should support both success and failure of specified security events
Ensure log entries that include un-trusted data will not execute as code in the intended
log viewing interface or software
Do not store sensitive information in logs, including unnecessary system details, session
identifiers or passwords
Log all apparent tampering events, including unexpected changes to state data
Log attempts to connect with invalid or expired session tokens
Log all administrative functions, including changes to the security configuration settings
Implement least privilege, restrict users to only the functionality, data and system
information that is required to perform their tasks
Protect all cached or temporary copies of sensitive data stored on the server from
unauthorized access and purge those temporary working files a soon as they are no
longer required.
Encrypt highly sensitive stored information, like authentication verification data, even
on the server side. Always use well vetted algorithms, see "Cryptographic Practices" for
additional guidance
Do not store passwords, connection strings or other sensitive information in clear text
or in any non-cryptographically secure manner on the client side. This includes
embedding in insecure formats like: MS viewstate, Adobe flash or compiled code
Remove comments in user accessible production code that may reveal back-end system
or other sensitive information
Remove unnecessary application and system documentation as this can reveal useful
information to attackers
Disable client side caching on pages containing sensitive information. Cache-Control: no-
store, may be used in conjunction with the HTTP header control "Pragma: no-cache",
which is less effective, but is HTTP/1.0 backward compatible
The application should support the removal of sensitive data when that data is no longer
required. (example: personal information or certain financial data)
Implement appropriate access controls for sensitive data stored on the server. This
includes cached data, temporary files and data that should be accessible only by specific
system users
Communication Security
Implement encryption for the transmission of all sensitive information. This should
include TLS for protecting the connection and may be supplemented by discrete
encryption of sensitive files or non-HTTP based connections
TLS certificates should be valid and have the correct domain name, not be expired, and
be installed with intermediate certificates when required
Utilize TLS connections for all content requiring authenticated access and for all other
sensitive information
Utilize TLS for connections to external systems that involve sensitive information or
functions
Filter parameters containing sensitive information from the HTTP referer, when linking
to external sites
System Configuration
Ensure servers, frameworks and system components are running the latest approved
version
Ensure servers, frameworks and system components have all patches issued for the
version in use
Restrict the web server, process and service accounts to the least privileges possible
Remove test code or any functionality not intended for production, prior to deployment
Prevent disclosure of your directory structure in the robots.txt file by placing directories
not intended for public indexing into an isolated parent directory. Then "Disallow" that
entire parent directory in the robots.txt file rather than Disallowing each individual
directory
Define which HTTP methods, Get or Post, the application will support and whether it will
be handled differently in different pages in the application
If the web server handles both HTTP 1.0 and 1.1, ensure that both are configured in a
similar manor or insure that you understand any difference that may exist (e.g. handling
of extended HTTP methods)
Remove unnecessary information from HTTP response headers related to the OS, web-
server version and application frameworks
The security configuration store for the application should be able to be output in
human readable form to support auditing
Implement an asset management system and register system components and software
in it
Isolate development environments from the production network and provide access
only to authorized development and test groups. Development environments are often
configured less securely than production environments and attackers may use this
difference to discover shared weaknesses or as an avenue for exploitation
Implement a software change control system to manage and record changes to the code
both in development and production
Database Security
•Use strongly typed parameterized queries
•Utilize input validation and output encoding and be sure to address meta characters. If these
fail, do not run the database command
•Ensure that variables are strongly typed
•The application should use the lowest possible level of privilege when accessing the database
•Use secure credentials for database access
•Connection strings should not be hard coded within the application. Connection strings should
be stored in a separate configuration file on a trusted system and they should be encrypted.
•Use stored procedures to abstract data access and allow for the removal of permissions to the
base tables in the database
•Close the connection as soon as possible
•Remove or change all default database administrative passwords. Utilize strong
passwords/phrases or implement multi-factor authentication
•Turn off all unnecessary database functionality (e.g., unnecessary stored procedures or
services, utility packages, install only the minimum set of features and options required (surface
area reduction))
•Remove unnecessary default vendor content (e.g., sample schemas)
•Disable any default accounts that are not required to support business requirements
•The application should connect to the database with different credentials for every trust
distinction (e.g., user, read-only user, guest, administrators)
File Management
•Do not pass user supplied data directly to any dynamic include function
•Require authentication before allowing a file to be uploaded
•Limit the type of files that can be uploaded to only those types that are needed for business
purposes
•Validate uploaded files are the expected type by checking file headers. Checking for file type
by extension alone is not sufficient
•Do not save files in the same web context as the application. Files should either go to the
content server or in the database.
•Prevent or restrict the uploading of any file that may be interpreted by the web server.
•Turn off execution privileges on file upload directories
•Implement safe uploading in UNIX by mounting the targeted file directory as a logical drive
using the associated path or the chrooted environment
•When referencing existing files, use a white list of allowed file names and types. Validate the
value of the parameter being passed and if it does not match one of the expected values, either
reject it or use a hard coded default file value for the content instead
•Do not pass user supplied data into a dynamic redirect. If this must be allowed, then the
redirect should accept only validated, relative path URLs
•Do not pass directory or file paths, use index values mapped to pre-defined list of paths
•Never send the absolute file path to the client
•Ensure application files and resources are read-only
•Scan user uploaded files for viruses and malware
Memory Management
•Utilize input and output control for un-trusted data
•Double check that the buffer is as large as specified
•When using functions that accept a number of bytes to copy, such as strncpy(), be aware that
if the destination buffer size is equal to the source buffer size, it may not NULL-terminate the
string
•Check buffer boundaries if calling the function in a loop and make sure there is no danger of
writing past the allocated space
•Truncate all input strings to a reasonable length before passing them to the copy and
concatenation functions
•Specifically close resources, don’t rely on garbage collection. (e.g., connection objects, file
handles, etc.)
•Use non-executable stacks when available
•Avoid the use of known vulnerable functions (e.g., printf, strcat, strcpy etc.)
•Properly free allocated memory upon the completion of functions and at all exit points
Altering paths
Tagging of security relevant events, if they are mixed with other log entries
Cited Reference
Sans and TippingPoint "The Top Cyber Security Risks"
http://www.sans.org/top-cyber-security-risks/