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Republic vs. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996)

The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for change of name cannot be granted through an adoption proceeding and must be filed separately. While an adoption decree allows the adoptee to take the surname of the adopter, it cannot be used to change the adoptee's given or first name registered with the civil registry. A change of name requires its own independent special proceeding under the Rules of Court in order to vest the court with proper jurisdiction over the petition.

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127 views2 pages

Republic vs. Hernandez, 323 Phil. 606, 637-638 (1996)

The Supreme Court ruled that a petition for change of name cannot be granted through an adoption proceeding and must be filed separately. While an adoption decree allows the adoptee to take the surname of the adopter, it cannot be used to change the adoptee's given or first name registered with the civil registry. A change of name requires its own independent special proceeding under the Rules of Court in order to vest the court with proper jurisdiction over the petition.

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Edgar Joshua Timbang
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Republic vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209.

February 9, 1996

REGALADO, J.:
While the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter is the natural and
necessary consequence of a grant of adoption, the given or proper name, also known as the
first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil
register. A petition for change of name is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in
and by itself, governed by its own set of rules—a fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any
other proceeding.

LEGAL DOCTRINE: Change of name in a decree of adoption in respect to substantive and


procedural requirements therefor under Articles 183 to 193 of the Family Code in relation to
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court for adoption, and Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code in relation
to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name (A decree of adoption and a petition for
change of name must be instituted separately).
FACTS:
 On March 10, 1994, herein private respondent spouses, Van Munson y Navarro and
Regina Munson y Andrade, filed a petition to adopt the minor Kevin Earl Bartolome
Moran, duly alleging therein the jurisdictional facts required by Rule 99 of the Rules of
Court for adoption, their qualifications as and fitness to be adoptive parents, as well as
the circumstances under and by reason of which the adoption of the aforenamed minor
was sought.

 In the very same petition, private respondents prayed for the change of the first name of
said minor adoptee to Aaron Joseph, the same being the name with which he was
baptized in keeping with religious tradition, and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since May 6, 1993 when he arrived at private
respondents’ residence.

 On April 18, 1994, petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in
the same petition for adoption. In its formal opposition dated May 3, 1995, petitioner
reiterated its objection to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for
change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petitions should be conducted
and pursued as two separate proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in granting the prayer for the change of registered proper
or given name of the minor adoptee embodied in the petition fort adoption. (YES)
HELD/RULING:
 Yes. Clearly, the law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the
adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary
consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the
court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

 However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the
adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an
adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s
registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon
the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption.
 Changing the given or proper name of a person as recorded in the civil register is a
substantial change in one’s official or legal name and cannot be authorized without a
judicial order. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of name is
simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object
of the statute, a court to which the application is made should normally make its decree
recording such change.

 A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the
requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its
adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself,
governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other
proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding
would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under
our remedial law system.

 While the rule allows a plaintiff to join as many separate claims as he may have, there
should nevertheless be some unity in the problem presented and a common question of
law and fact involved, subject always to the restriction thereon regarding jurisdiction,
venue and joinder of parties. Petitions for adoption and change of name have no relation
to each other, nor are they of the same nature or character, much less do they present any
common question of fact or law—in short, they do not rightly meet the underlying test of
conceptual unity demanded to sanction their joinder under the Rules.

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