Modern

European
Philosophy

Michel Foucault's
archaeology of scientific reason

Gary Gutting
 MICHEL FOUCAUL T'S
ARCHAEOLOGY
OF SCIENTIFIC REASON

GARY GUTTING
Unίveπity of Notτe Dame

The rιghι of ιhe

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was r,rantι!d fl.y
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The Unίversaγ has prιnιed
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 MODERN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY

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Lί/πασ of Congre.5.1' Catalogιng-ιn-Pιιblicatίon Data

Gutting, Gary.
Miclιel ~·oucault's archaeology of scientific rc<Ison I (~ar~· Gutting.
p. cm. - (Modern Euroρean ρhilosophy)
ISBN 0-521-3fifiι9-4· ISBN 0-52ι-36698-4 (pbk.)
ι. ~"<>uc<Iult, Michel- Contributions in archaeology οι· scientific
reason. 2. Science- Philosophy- History- 2oth century. 3· Social
sciences- Philosophy- History- 2oth ccntury. Ι. Title.
rι Series.
B24;10.F724C•87 ιg8g
ι94-dcιg 88-3ι88ι
CIP

Rrίtish Lίbτary C:ataloguίng in Puhlicatι:ωι Data

Gutting, Gary
Michel f"oucault's archaeology ο!' scientitic
reason. - (Modern European philosophy)
ι. French philosophy, Foucault, Michel, ιg26-ι984
ι Title Ι ι Series
ι94

ΙSΒΝ ο52 ι 366ιg 4 hard coνers

ISBN ο 521 36fig8 4 papcrback

Part of Chapter ι was published as "(;aston Bachel<Ird's philosophy οι· science"

ίη lnternalional .)tudieό ίn Plιilωoplιy of $cίen.ce 2 (ι g87) anιl is reprinted ν•ith
permission of Routlege and Kegan Paul. Part of Chapter 6 was included ίη
"Michel f'oucault and the Hisιory of Reason," published ίη Ernan Mι·Mullin,
ed., (:oιιstπιction anri constraίnt: the .l'hapίng of scίen.tίfic τationalίty, ιg88, and is
reprinted "'ith perιnission of the Uniνersity of Notl'e Dame Press.
 Το

ANASTASIA

τn καλλίστη
 CONTENTS

Preface page ίχ

Introduction
Bachelard and Canguilhem 9
Bachelard's philosophy of science 12
Reason and science
Bachelard's model οΓ scientific change
The epistemological and metaphysical ramifications
of Bachelard's model 22
Canguilhem's history οΓ science 32
Canguilhem's conception of' the history of science 32
Canguilhem's conception οΓ norms 45
Foucault and the Bachelard-Canguilhem network 52
2 Madness and mental illness 55
Early writings on mental illness 55
Madness in the Classical Age 6g
Mental illness and the asylum 87
The voice of madness 95
The hωory of madness: methods and results 100

3 Clinίcal medίcίne I I I

Classical ΠΊedicine 112

Α new medical consciousness 11 s
The clinic as aπ institution 1 ι8

νιι
Vlll

The linguistic structure of ιnedical signs ι~ο

The probabilistic structure uf medical cases ι22

Seeing and saying 124

Anatomo-clinical ιnedicine 127
The birtlι of tlι.e ι.Ζίnίc: nιethuds and results 1 33

4 The order of thίngs: Ι. From resemblance to

representation
The Renaissance episteιne
Classical urder
Classical signs ancl language
c:Ιassical knowledge
c;eneral grarnπιar
Natural history
Analysis of wealth
The cummun stι-uctuι-e of tlιe c:Ιassical dunιains
Cι-itical reactions

5 The order of thίngs: Π. The rise and fall of man ι 8ι

The modern episteme ι8 ι
Philosophy ι 84
Modern empirical sciences ι 86
ιanguage aπd ιnoderπ thought ι 95
Man and the analytic of finitιιde ι g8
~he human sciences 208
The ordeτ of things: methods and results 2 ι7

6 The archaeology of knowledge 227

The elements of archaeology 23 ι
Statements 239
Archaeology and the histury of ideas 244
Archaeology and the histury uf science 249
Discourse and the nondiscursive 256
Conclusion 260
7 Reason and philosophy 26 ι
Arch;ιeolugic·al ιnethod ancl Foucault's philusuρhical
project 262
Is Foucault's critique of reason self-refuting? 272
Conclusion 287
Biblίof:ζωplιy
lnιlex
 PREFACE

Any study of Michel Foucault should anticipate two sorts of read-

ers. On the one hand, there are those intrigued by what they have
heard of his ideas and methods but frustrated by texts they find
too difficult to penetrate. They turn to secondary literature to
dispel their bemusement and conf'usion. Ο η the other hand, there
are those who have worked through at least some of his books
with undeι-standing and appreciation and are looking for fuι-ther
interpretative and critical perspectives. In writing this book, Ι
have tried to keep both audiences in mind. Ι have put a very high
premium on lucid and thorough explanations ofFoucault's ideas,
and my analyses offer coherent interpretations of each work as a
whole, contrary to the tendency of many commentators to high-
light only selected aspects of a given text. Because of this, Ι hope
the book will be a useful resource for those making a first ap-
proach to Foucault's thought. Fοι- those already familiar with
Foucault, it offers a new perspective that places his thought in the
context of recent French history and philosophy of science, par-
ticularly the work of Gaston Bachelard and Geoι-ges Canguilhem.
(It also prcvides an intι-oduction to these two thinkers, who are
not very well known in English-speaking countries.) This opens
up a fι-esh and, Ι hope to show, Γruitful waγ of understanding
Foucault as a historian and philosopher of science, balancing a11d
ιχ
χ
PREFACE

complemeπtiπg the curreπt staπdard coπstrual of him as a social

critic aπd
theorist.
Το date, most studies of Foucault have rightly takeπ the form
of iπtroductory surveys of the eπtire body of his work, aimiπg at
a compreheπsive prelimiπary uπderstaπdiπg of his maiπ claims,
motiνatioπs, aπd methods. Here Alaπ Sheridaπ's Foucault: The
will to truth probably remaiπs the best siπgle overall guide, al-
though there is clearly a πeed for aπ updated aπd improved
geπeral iπtroductioπ. More receπtly, there have appeared a πum­
ber of studies with πarrower iπterpretative aπd critical foci, most
πotably Dreyfus aπd Rabiπow's Michel Foucault: beyond structural-
ism and hermeneutic.5 aπd Johπ Rajchmaπ's Michel Foucault and the
Ireedom of philosophy. These, like almost all more specialized work
οπ Foucault over the last few years, are primarily coπcerπed with
the theme of the iπtercoππectioπ of power aπd kπowledge that
was Foucault's οwπ primary emphasis duriπg the 1970s. There
are sigπs that the πext wave of Foucault aπalysis will focus οπ the
ethical directioπ his work took iπ the ιg8os. By coπtrast, this
book turπs back to the earlier, explicitly archaeological period of
Foucault's writiπgs. Ι have choseπ this emphasis ποt oπly because
these writiπgs have beeπ relatively πeglected iπ receπt discus-
sioπs but also because they are both difficult aπd importaπt
eπough to warraπt much closer scrutiπy thaπ they have yet re-
ceived. Moreover, beyoπd their great iπtriπsic importaπce, they
are crucial for aπ adequate uπderstaπdiπg of Foucault's later
developmeπt. As we shall see, some major elemeπts of the later
kπowledge-power theme are implicit from the begiππiπg of Fou-
cault's work; aπd the archaeological approach to the history of
thought remaiπs a key elemeπt iπ the later geπealogical method.
Without dowπgradiπg the value aπd distiπctiveπess of the work
after ΑΚ, 1 Ι waπt to call atteπtioπ to the importaπce of the pre-
cediπg archaeological period.
Ιπ additioπ to πumerous specific poiπts of iπterpretatioπ aπd
evaluatioπ, my aπalysis of Foucault's archaeology will support
three more geπeral coπclusioπs. First, archaeology is ποt aπ iso-
lated method reflectiπg Foucault's idiosyπcratic approach to the
history of thought. Rather, it is rooted ίπ the Freπch traditioπ of
history aπd philosophy of science aπd is specifically developed ίπ
the context of Gastoπ Bachelard's philosophy of science and

ι. See lisι of abbreviaιions, p. χίί.

 PREFACE ΧΙ

through an extension and transformation οΓ GeoΓges Canguil-

hem's history of science.
Second, Foucault's archaeology is essentially grounded in his-
torical practice rather than philosophical theory. It is a method of
historical analysis that was forged, pragmatically and piecemeal,
to deal with specific pΓOblems posed by the history of thought.
Foucault did not develop it as the corollary of fundamental philo-
sophical views about language, meaning, and truth. This is not to
deny that his historical work has a philosophical intent or that
philosophica\ issues are frequently in the background of his dis-
cussions. But his archaeological method oΓiginates primarily
from concrete struggles for historical understanding, not from
prior philosophical commitments. This understanding of archae-
ology is closely linked to Foucault's radical reconception of the
philosophi~al enterprise. He rejects the traditional goal of ulti-
mate, fundamental Truth and instead constrιιes philosophy as an
instrument for realizing concrete and local objectives in the strug-
gle for human liberation.
Third, J<'oucault's archaeology is not, as critics have often main-
tained, an engine of universal skepticism or relativism, under-
mining all pretensions to truth and objectivity. The project of
archaeological analysis does not, ίη itself, question the objectivity
or validity of a body of knowledge to which it is applied. There is
no reason, for example, to think that an archaeology of modern
physics or chemistry would have an epistemically subversive in-
tent or effect. MoreoνeΓ, as we shall see, even Foucault's analyses
of the much more dubious medical and social scientific disci-
plines typically allow them a substantial core of objective truth.
Properly understood, archaeology is a technique for revealing
how a discipline has developed noΓms of validity and objectivity,
not for questioning the very possibility of any such norms. Ar-
chaeology may, of course, find that some disciplines are far less
scientific than their own self-understanding sιιggests. Βιιt we
shall see that, even ίη such cases, it is designed as a careΓul
sσιιtίηy of the epistemic claims οΓ a discipline, not as an a priori
instrument for rejecting these claims.
The book begins with a brief introduction that formιιlates Fou-
caιιlt's Γundamental historicophilosophical pΓOject and quickly
surveys the whole of his work as carrying out this project. Chap-
ter ι provides some necessary backgroιιnd on Bachelard and
Canguilhem and on Foιιcault's connection to them. We then tιιrn
to a detailed exegesis οΓ the main books Foιιcaιιlt published
Xll PREFACE

through ιg6g aπd assessmeπts of their historical and philosophi-

cal significance. Chapter 2 deals with Foucault's study of the
historical roots of modern psychology aπd psychiatry in FD. It
begins with back- ground studies of his two earlier treatments of
these disciplines, Maladίe mentale et personnalite aπd the 'Ίntroduc­
tion" to Binswanger's Drearιι and existence. Ι am also concerned
\νith developiπg an interpretation and evaluation of FD as a
whole (not ofjust the greatly condensed English translation, Mad-
ness and civilization) and with showing how it sets the agenda for
all of Foucault's earlier work. Chapter 3 deals with BC, both to
offer a close aπalysis of its ofΊen dense text aπd to show its strong
methodological ties to Canguilhem's approach to the history of
science. Chapters 4 and 5 offer a detailed treatment of ΟΤ, pro-
viding both aπ overall interpretation and evaluation of its con-
tent and aπ explicatioπ of its full development of Foucault's ar-
chaeological method. In interpreting ΟΤ, my concern is not only
to elucidate each element of its wide-ranging discussion but to
show how all these elements fit together into a close though
complex unity. Ι also show how the matιιre archaeological
method of οτ both derives from and traπsforms the approaches
of Bachelard and Canguilhem, and Ι offer a critical assessmeπt
of its value as an approach to the history of thought. Chapter 6
turns to the explicit methodological account that Foucault puts
forward iπ ΑΚ, payiπg particular atteπtioπ to the relationship of
this methodology to other approaches to the history of thought
and to Foucault's own historical studies. Chapter 7 offers a con-
cluding philosophical evaluatioπ of Foucault's project of an ar-
chaeological history of reason.

Abbreviations

The fΌllowing abbreviations are used in citiπg Foucault's writ-

ings. (Full refereπces are giveπ ίπ the Bibliography.)

ΑΚ: The archaeology of knowledge

BC: Πιe birth of the clinic
DP: Discipline and punish
FD: F olie et deraison
HS: Hi.>tory of sexuality
MC: Μ adness and civίlization
ΜΜΡ: Μ aladie mentale et penonnalite
 PREFACE Xlll

MMPsy: Mental Illness and Psychology

ΟΤ: The orde1· of tlιings
RE: "Iηtrσductiση" to Biηswaηger's Reve et existence

Ιη geηeral, citatiσηs frσm

these wσrks are frσm the English
_translatiσns
listed ίπ the Bibliσgraphy. Translatiσns from RE,
from parts σf FD πσt included ίπ MC, and frσm parts σf ΜΜΡ
πσt included ίπ MMPsy are mine. Translatiσns frσm σther wσrks
by Fσucault are mine except wheη the ησtes cite a published
Eηglish versiση.

Acknowledgments
Ι am grateful first σf" all to Karl Aιneriks fσr σur many coηversa­
tiσηs σver· the last several years abσut Fσucault and much else.
He has been a coηtiηuiηg sσurce of stimulatiηg ideas aηd useful
iηfσrmatiση and σffered characteι-istically judicious reactiσηs to
the peηultimate dι-aft σf this bσσk. Thanks are alsσ due to Steve
Watsση fσr his helpful comments aηd suggestions; ω Maι-y Tiles
aηd C. Heι-togh, whσ read dι-afts σf my chapter ση Bachelard
aηd Caηguilhem and provided valuable expert suggestiσηs; aηd
to thσse whσ fσllσwed my seminaι-s ση Fσucault at Νσtι-e Dame
aηd at the Free University σf Amsterdam fσr theiι- many helpful
questiσηs aηd commeηts. Ι am especially appreciative σf the
cheerful aηd excelleηt service prσvided by Maι-gaι-et Jasciewicz
aηd heι- co-wσι-keι-s ίη the Nσtre Dame Arts and Letters Steησ
Ρσσl, particulaι-ly Nila Geι-hσld, Naηcy Kegler, aηd Cheι-yl Reed.
Οη a mσι-e σfficiallevel, Ι am happy to ackησwledge suppσrt
fσr wσι-k ση this bσσk by the Nσtre Dame Institute fσι- Scholar-
ship ίη the Libeι-al Arts aηd by the Natiσηal Scieηce Fσuηdatiση
(Histσι-y and Philσsσphy of Scieηce Divisiση).
Fiηally, Ι am especially gι-ateful to the members σf my uηfail­
iηgly iηteι-estiηg aηd challeηgiηg family fσι- a variety σf fσι-ms of
suppσrt, eηcσuι-agemeηt, aηd tolerance: to Tasha, fσr her fι-esh­
ness, chaι-m, aηd frequent reminders that theι-e is mσι-e to life
thaη bσσks aηd ideas; to Edwaι-d, fσr the iηtelligence, eι-uditiση,
and wit σf his cσηversatiσn; to Τσm fοι- always being so cheeι-ful,
kind, aηd helpful; and, mσst of all, to my wife, Anastasia, ινhose
beauty and lσve are Π1Υ coηstaηtjσy.
 INTRODUCTION

The work of Michel Foucault, now so abruptly and arbitrarily

completed, can be fruitfully analyzed and evaluated from a wide
range of contemporary intellectual standpoints. He can be re-
garded as a philosopher, a social historian, a literary analyst, a
social and political critic; each of these perspectives focuses on
something integral ω his achievement. But his intellectual me-
tier, through which he develops all his ideas about philosophy,
literature, society, and politics, is the history of thought. With
one exception, all his ιnajor books are histories of aspects of
Western thought, and the exception (ΑΚ) is a methodological
reflection ο η this historical work. Foucault's choice of title for his
chair at the College de FΓance was entirely appropriate: Profes-
sor of the History of Systems of Thought.
Foucault was not, however, interested in the history of thought
merely for its own sake. His historical work was guided by a "philo-
sophical ethos" 1 deriving from the Enlightenιnent values of hu-
man liberation and of autonomous human thought as an instru-
ment of that liberation. Foucault's work is a search for truths that
will make us free. But he develops this Enlightenment ideal in an

ι. Michel Foucault, "What Is Enlightenment)" in Paul Rabino\\', ed., 1Ίιe Foucaull

reader (New York: Pantheon, 1984), 45·
2 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

essentially self-critical mode, exhibiting an <iLCute aνΙ'areness of

how specific employments of Γeasons, even bodies of scientific
knowledge, can themselves constrain and oppress human beings.
The project of Foucault's l1istoηr of thought is, accoΓdingly, two-
fold: to show l1ow particιιlaΓ clomains of kno,νledge !1ave con-
strained hιιman freeclom and to pΓOvide tl1e intellectιιal Γe­
soιn·ces for oveΓcoming tl1ese constraints.
Foucault characterizes this pΓOject by coωparing and contrast-
ing it to Kant's eigl1teenth-century pΓOject fοΓ a critique of ι·ea­
son. According to Foucault, Kant's basic aiω is iωplicit in his
Γesponse to tl1e Berli1ιer Nfo?ιalsclLrift's question, "What is enlight-
enωent?" His famous answer was that enligl1tenωent is ωan's
Γelease fΓΟω his "inability to ωake use of his understanding
ν~τithout direction fΓOm another," 2 an inability that was to be
oveιτome by finding the couΓage to ιιse one's ο'γη Γeason ΓatheΓ
than subωit it to books, pastoΓs, physicians, and otheΓ exteΓnal
aιιthoΓities. Kant felt that l1is own age 'νas the beginning of
Γeason's eωergence as tl1e aιιtonomous force directing hιιrrian
life and so required a carefιιl assessment of its precise scope and
Iiωits. As Foιιcault puts it:

It is pι·ecisely at tl1is moment tl1at tl1e cι-itique is necessaιΎ, since its

role ίSΙ ·tlιat of defining tl1e conditions ιιnder wlιiclι the ιιse of
reason is legitimate in orcler to deternιine "'lιat can be knO'.I'll,
wlιat mιιst be done, ancl wlιat n1ay be hoped. Illegίtiιnate ιιses of
Γeason aι-e '~·lιat give τise to dogmatisnι and lιeteι-onomy, along
witl1 illιιsion; ... It is 'vhen tlιe legίtinιate ιιse of Γeason lιas been
cleaτly defined in its pτinciples tlιat ίts aιιtonoιny can be assιιrecl. 3

Kant, l1owever, thought that the Iimits ofΓeason Γevealecl by llis

σitique cleΓivecl froω necessaΓy a pΓiori stnιctιιΓes that defined
the very possibility of οιιr kno,νledge- tl1at is, fΓOn1 "foΓωal struc-
tιιres 'νitl1 ιιniνersal νalιιe." 4 (V/e νvill see belo,ν, in οιιr discιιssion
ofOT, how, according to Foιιcaιιlt, this connection ofthe liιnita­
tions ofknowledge to its possibility is chaΓacteΓistic ofthe ιnodeΓn
conception ofknowledge.) It is at tlιis point that Foιιcaιιlt's pΓOject
for a σitiqιιe of Γeason diffeΓs from Kant's. Unlike Kant, he is not

2. Ι. Kant, "\.Vl1at Is EnliglHenment?" tι-anslated by Le,vis \'\'hite Beck, in On

lιistory (Νe1ν York: Bobbs-Meπill, 1963), 3·
3· Foucault, "\-Vl1at Is Enlightenment?" 38.
4· Ibid., 46.
 INTRODUCτiON
3
concerned with deterωining the a priori, necessary conditions
governing the exercise of reason bιιt "\Nith reflection on what see1n
to be such conditions to reveal the extent to >vhich they in fact have
a contingent historical oΓigin. Through such reflection- canied
out by histoι·ies of thought- he aiωs at sl1o>Ι'ing how we can fΓee
ouΓselves fωω ("transgΓess") the constι·aints of these conditions.5
As a Γesult, Foucault gives a ne>v ωeaning to the pΓOject of a
cήtique of Γeason.

Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon liιnits.

But if the Kantian question >Ι'as that ofkno,ving wl1at limits knowl-
edge has to renounce transgΓessing, it seen1s to ιne that tl1e critical
question today l1as been tuΓned back into a ρositiνe one: in what is
giνen to us as uniνersal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occu-
pied by \VhateνeΓ is singular, contingent, and the pι·oduct of arbi-
traι-y constraints? The point, in bΓief, is to tΓansfoΓιn the σitique
conducted in the fοιΏl of necessaΓy liιnitation into a practical
critique that takes the foΓm of a possible transgression. 6

Foucault's project of 11istorical critiqιιe ΓepΓesents an iωpoΓ­

tant Γeconception of the cultural ωle of pl1ilosopl1y. He gives up
the traditional philosophical goal of glΌιιnding theoΓetical and
pΓactical knowledge in an understanding of the essential; univeΓ­
sal stωι':tuΓes of thought and reality and instead applies the phi-
losopher's analytic and synthetic skills to the task of ιιncovering
and, when possible, dissolving contingent, histoΓical constraints
ση thought. He thus abandons the veneΓable but eωpty pΓeten­
sion that philosophy pΓoνides a pΓivileged access to fundaωental
truths. 7 But, at the saωe tiωe, he offers a more concrete and
effective approach to the equally veneΓable goal of libeΓating the
huωan spirit.
Foucaιιlt's project also diffeΓs froιn Kant's in its point of appli-
cation. Kant was priιnarily concerned with the scientific kno>vl-
edge of natuΓe, ιnatheιnatics and physics, his idea being'ιhat an
ιιnderstanding of the conditions of possibility of tl1ese paΓa­
digιns of knovΛedge would Γeνeal the a pΓioΓi structuΓes of

5· This theme of transgression shows the influence of Georges Bataille ση Fou-

cault and is present as early as FD (Preface to the first edίtion, ίίί-ν).
6. Foucault, "What Is Enlίghtenment?" 45· .
7· In this sense, Foucault's view ίs skeptical. For a good dίscussion ofFoucault as
a skeptic, cf. John Rajchman, Michel Foucault: tlιe freedoιn of plιilosoplι;• (Ne1v
York: Columbia Universίty Press, ιg85), 2-7.
4 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

knowledge as such. Foucault, by contrast, is concerned witl1 the

much more dubious disciplines ("the human sciences") that try
to provide knov.τledge of l1uman beings. This is because he sees
these disciplines, rather than the natural sciences, as tl1e priωaι-y
source of conteωporaΓy constraints ο η hιιωaη fΓeedoω. W e can,
accordingly, chaΓacterize his fundaωental intellectual pΓOject as
a philosopl1ical critique of the huωan sciences, carried οιιt by a
histoΓy of thoιιght in the seΓνice of human liberation.
Foucault's σitiqιιe of the hιιωaη sciences is, in every case, a
matter of qιιestioning key aspects of theiι- contempoι-aι-y self-
undeι-standing. For exaωple, conteωpoι-ary psychology ancl psy-
chiatι-y regaι-d themselves as scientificallγ objective disciplines
that have discoveι-ed the trιιe nature of ωadness as "ωental ill-
ness." They fιιι-theΓ see theωselves as eωploying their knowl-
edge of ωental illnesses fοΓ the purely huωanitarian puι-pose of
cuι-ing those wl1o suffeΓ fΓOm theω. In his first ωajοι- book, FD,
Foucault tΓaces the histoι·ical oΓigins of psycl1ology ancl psychia-
trγ with a view to sho\ving, fiΓst, that there is no pήvileged status
to the ωoden1 conception of ωadness as mental illness. Second,
l1e tι-ies to show that the ωad aι-e ι-egaΓded as thι-eats to the
ωoral οι·deι- of modern society and tl1at tl1eiι- "medical" tι-eat­
ιnent l1.as been ωοΓe a ωatteΓ of social contΓOl than of coωpas­
sionate: relief.
In Foucaιιlt's seco11d book, BC, l1e ωoves fΓΟω "ωe11tal ill11ess"
to phγsical illness. Like psychiatι-y, ωoder11 ωedicine sees itself
as based 011 a body of objective, scie11tific kno\vledge (e.g., tl1at
of pathological anatoωy). Moι·eover, it tl1inks it l1as achieved
tl1is k11o,νledge siιnply by, for the fiΓst tiιηe, looking at the
lπιωaη body and its diseases \Vith a clear and ιιnbiased eωpiι-i­
cal eye. Foιιcaιιlt, however, sets οιιt to sl1o'γ that ωodern ιηecli­
cine is 110 ιnore a ιnatteΓ of pιιre obseι-vation tha11 was, foι­
example, tl1e medicine of tl1e seventee11th and tl1e eighteentl1
centuries. In botl1 cases, ιnec\ical kno,νledge v,ras based not on a
pιιre expeΓience, fΓee of inteΓpretation, bιιt on a veι-y specific
way of perceivi11g bodies ancl diseases, stΓιιctιιred by a gΓid of a
pΓiori conceptions.
FD a11d BC weι-e studies of paτticιιlar l1ιιman sciences. Moι-e­
over, theγ pι-imarily dealt v.τith kno>vledge of deviations (ωaclness,
illness) froιn "noΓn1al" l1ιιman states. In οτ (in ιnany ,γaγs his
majoΓ woΓk), Foιιcaιιlt pτovίcled a coιηprehensίve, tl1oιιgl1 often
verγ scheιnatic, accoιιnt of tl1e entire bocly of modern positive
 INTRODUCτiON
5
knoivledge ofhuωan beings. Here his central claiω is that all such
knoivledge is based on a particulaτ co11ception ofhuωa11 beings (a
conception he labels 1nαπ). The distίnctive featuτe of ωan, in tl1is
sense, ίs to be botlι an object ίη the >vorld a11d the k11oνvi11g subject
tlιroιιgh >vhίch theΓe exists a 'Norld of objects. Altlιough modern
tlιinkers tend to take tlιis conception of ouΓSelves as defi11itive of
hunιan realitγ o11ce and fοΓ all, Foucaιιlt maintai11s that it is just
one histoτical constτual of it- and one that is presently passing
away. Oveτall, ΟΤ can be τegardecl as a cήtique of tlιe co11cept of
man canied οιιt i11 tlπee stages. Fiτst, Foιιcault slιows tlιat the
concept had 110 role at all in the Classical Age tlιat pΓeceded οιιτ
modeΓ11 period. Second, he a11alyzes moder11 philosophical ef-
forts to .develop a coherent undeΓstanding of ιnan and exhibits
tlιeiΓ failure. Finally, lιe analyzes the ιnore successful efforts of
tlιe lιuman sciences to attain a knovΛedge of man and slιows that
tlιey themselves are basecl on disciplines that undermine the con-
cept of ωan. Foιιcaιιlt conclιιdes tlιat the age of thoιιght domi-
nated by this paΓticιιlaΓ conception ofhιιman reality is nearing its
end and that, accoΓdingly, ive aΓe in a position to break free of tlιe
constΓaints ση our fΓeedom tlιat it imposes.
111 the course of clevelopi11g lιis cτitique oftlιe lιιιma11 scie11ces,
Foucault became i11σeasingly sensitive to questions aboιιt the
methods ofhistorical analysis he was ιιsing. Specifically, he came
to see hinιself as e11ψloying a disti11ctive method of a11alysis that
he called aτchaeological. The use of aτclιaeolog)l as a methodological
metaphoΓ goes back at least to MeΓleaιι-Po11ty, a11d Foιιcault
i11itially ιιses it i11 a veΓy casual a11d vague way. 8 By the time lιe
wrote BC, he was sufficie11tly take11 with it (tlιough still not
entirely clear aboιιt its mea11i11g) to sιιbtitle the book "Απ archaeol-
ogy of medical peΓCeption [regaΓd]". Ι η the book following οτ­
ΑΚ- Foιιcaιιlt offered an exte11ded Γeflection 011 the archaeologi-
cal method he had developed i11 lιis preceding studies.
8. Cf., for example, Μ. Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis," in
Alden Fisher, ed., Esseιιtial τυιitings: Meι·leau-Ponl)• (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, & World, ιgβg), 86. Here Meι·Jeau-Ponty characterizes psychoanalysis
as an archaeology. Earlίer, Cavaίlles (referring to Fίnk's 1933 Kantstudieιι arti-
cle), refers to phenomenology as an archaeology. (I 01ve these references to
my colleague, Steve Watson.) Foucaιιlι's ΟΙVΠ first use of the term seems to be
in ΜΜΡ, 1vhere he says that Freudian "neuι-osis is a spontaneous archaeology
of tl1e lίbίdo" (26). Ηίs first use of ίt to refer to an appι-oach to the history of
thought is in the Pι·eface to the first edition of FD, 1vhere, speaking of the end
of reason's dialogue 1vith madness in the Classical Age, he says that he 1vants to
\Vrite "the archaeology of this silence" (FD, ίi).
6 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ΑΚ clearly ιnarks the end of one major stage of Foucault's

work. After its publication in ιg6g, he remained relatively silent
for six years. DP, publisl1ecl in 1975, resumes l1is critiqιιe of the
human sciences but ηο'ν in a ωode tl1at places faΓmoι·e empha-
sis tl1an his pι-eνious woι-k ση social and institutionalιnecl1anisms
of po,ver. Here Foucaιιlt's pΓiωary conceι-n is to sl10'~>~' 110'~>~' bod-
ies of knowledge - particularly t11e moden1 social sciences- aι-e
inextι·icably inter,voνen with techniques of. social control. They
aΓe not, he ωaintains, autonoιnoιιs intellectual achieveιnents ap-
plied, a la Bacon, as instι-uments of social po,ver. RatlleΓ, theiΓ
veΓy constitution as knowledge depends essentially on (although
it is not ι·educible to) ιnechanisιns of power. In DP, fοι- example,
Foucaιιlt details the essential dependence of cΓiιninologγ ση tl1e
developn1ent of prisons in tl1e nineteenth centuιΎ, and l1e sιιg­
gests siιnilar ties betΊ>Ι•een other social sciences ancl such contι-ol­
ling social stι-uctuΓes as schools, militaΓy caιnps, and factories.
Similarly, in the first νοlιιme of HS l1e argues tl1at tl1e "sciences
of sexιιality" developed in the nineteenth and tιventietl1 centu-
ries are integτal parts of another aspect of ιnoden1 society's con-
trol of its meιnbeι-s. Roιιgl1ly, the disciplinaι-y techniqιιes associ-
ated with "disciplines" sucl1 as criωinology and ρedagogy control
by making ωen objects, wlιereas tl1e sciences of sexuality make
tl1en1 self-monitoΓing sιιbjects.
TI1e theme of the essential connection of knowledge witl1
ρower develoρs fιιlly and explicitly 'vhat Ί>Ι•as sιιggested at ηιιιηeι-­
οus ρoints in Foucault's earlier 'voΓk. Wl1at is distinctiνe in DP
and HS is Foιιcaιιlt's new conceρtion of the natιιι-e of poνver. He
ι-ejects tl1e standaι-d νiew tl1at poy,reι· is a ριπely negative, ι-epres­
sive social foι-ce tl1at is cl1allenged and oveι-come by tl1e liberat-
ing light of trιιtl1. According to Foιιcault, pαΙ.veι-, altl1oιιgl1 fre-.
qιιently destructive and alwaγs dangeι-oιιs, is also a σeative
sοιιι-ce of ρositive valιιes (including those of trιιth ancl knowl-
edge). He fιιrtl1eι- ι-ejecιs tl1e comιnon ρicture of social and ρoliti­
cal ρower as flowing froιn a single dominant centeΓ (e.g., the
rιιling class, tlιe monarcl1). Instead, he sees a society as slιot
tlπoιιgh witl1 a mιιltiplicity of po,ver relations, inteι-acting but
ιnutιιally ineducible.
In oι-der to analyze the deνelopωent of bodies of kno,vledge
οιιt of systems of pο\Ι'eΓ, Foιιcaιιlt employs a ne'v l1istoι-ical
ωethod that l1e calls genealDf!J'· Genealogy does not reρlace ar-
cllaeology, νvllicl1 is still needed to ιιncover tlιe discursive ι-ules
 INTRODUCτJON 7
tl1at constitute boclies ofkno'Nledge. Βιιt genealogy goes beyond
archaeology by explaining (tlnoυgh tl1e connections ΊYitl1 poweΓ)
changes in the 11istory of discoιιΓse tl1at aΓe meΓely desCΓibed by
aΓcl1aeology.
As Foιιcaυlt Γesearched and ννΓΟte the later volιιωes of his
history of sexιιality, 11is conception of the pΓOject bΓOadened
consideι-ably. Instead of jιιst looking at the emeΓgence of the
modeι-n notion of ιhe self as sιιbject, l1e pΓoposed to tΓace the
WesteΓn concept of the self fΓοιn the ancient GΓeeks on. ΜοΓe­
ονeΓ, l1e began to coιnbine this l1istoι·ical pΓoject with the etl1ical
one of constnιcting alteΓ11atives to ιnodeΓ11 ωοΓal codes. Two
volιιιnes 011 GΓeek a11d Roιna11 viev.rs of sexιιal ethics (Ylze use of
pleasιιre and The care of tlιe self> appeaΓed in 1 g84 jιιst befoΓe 11is
deatl1. A11otheΓ volιιιne (Les aveux de la chaiτ), centeΓing· 011 the
Clυ·istian pΓactice of confession, ιnay appeaΓ postl1lιιnoιιsly.
The focιιs of ti1is stιιdy will be the eaΓlieΓ peΓiod of Foιιcaιιlt's
ΊνοΓk, begi11ni11g 1νith tl1e someννhat co11fιιsecl eιneΓgence of a11
aΓcl1aeological appΓoacl1 ίη FD, thΓoιιgl1 its eventιιal CΓystalli­
zatio11 i11 BC and especially ΟΤ, to tl1e explicit Γefiective forιnιιla­
tion of ΑΚ . .As· essential backgΓOιιnd to a11 υndeΓsta:ncling of
Foιιcaιιlt's arcl1aeology, we begin witl1 a discιιssion of tl1e woΓk of
Gaston Bachelard and Georges Ca11gιιill1eιn.
 1
~~-----­

BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

Foιιcaιιlt himself emphasized the impoι·tance of Bachelaι·d and

Cangιιillιem not only fοι· French thoιιght in general bιιt also for
his own intellectιιal oΓientation. In an essay ση Canguilhem, he
pιΌposes a fιιndamental division within post-World Waι· ΙΙ
French philosophy between a "philosophy of experience, of
meaning, ofthe subjectand a philosophyofknσ~vledge [savoir], of
rationality, and of the concept." 1 The former he associates with
the existential phenomenology ofSaΓtre and Merleaιι-Ponty, the
latter with the history and philosoplιy of science of Cavailles,
Koyn~, and especially Bachelard and Canguilhem. Foιιcault notes
that tlιis division can be traced back well into tlιe nineteenth cen-
tury, beginning with the opposition between Maine de Brian and
Comte and continuing in the differences separating Lachelier
and Couι·turat as well as Bergson and Poincare. In the tv.•entieth
century, the division is Γeflected in the two different ways French
thinkers appropriated the thought of Husserl after his Paris lec-
tures in 1929. On the one hand, there was Saι·tre's existential
reading (in τJιe transce?ιde?ιce of the ego); on the other, theι·e was
1. Michel Foucault, "La vie: l'experience et Ja science," Revue de metaplιysique et de
1no1·ale 70 (1985), 4· An earlier version of this paper 'νas published ίη English
as the introduction to the English translation of Georges Canguilhem, 01t tlιe
1ιοηιιαl and tlιe paιlιological, (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978).

9
10 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Cavailles's "forιnal" reading in Methode O-":iomatique and La forma-

tion de la theorie des ense1nbles. 'ιVhereas Sartre moves Husserl's
thought forward to the concerns of Heidegger's Being and time,
Cavailles brings it back to its origins in the philosophy of mathe-
matics. After World War ΙΙ, the philosophy of the subject was
inextricably tied to phenomenologγ in the work of Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty. However, the phifosophy of the concept was de-
veloped by Bachelard and Canguilhem in essential independence
of Husserl's work. According to Foucault, "these two forms of
thought have constituted in France two frameworks that have
remained, at least for a time, quite profoundly heteΓOgeneous."2
From 1945 to the late 1950s, existential philosophy, alongwith
Marxism as a social and political outlook, dominated French
thought. During this period, the central concern (which culmi-
nated in Saι-tre's Cτitique of dialectical reason) was to develop a
synthesis of existential phenomenology and Marxism. But, ac-
cording to Foucault, by the end of the 1950s, existential phe-
nomenology began to founder on the problems oflanguage and
the unconscious, and structuralism presented itself as a superior
alteι-native. 'Ίt was clear that phenomenology was no match for
stι-uctuι-al analysis in accounting for the effects of meaning that
could be produced by a structιιre of tl1e lingιιistic type, in whicl1
tl1e su:bjeι<:t (in tl1e phenomenological sense) clid not intervene to
confer ιneaning." Fιιrther, "the unconscioιιs coιιld not feature in
any discussion of a phenomenological kind .... tl1e phenomeno-
logical subject was disqιιalified by psycl1oanalysis, as it had been
by lingιιistic theory." 3 As a resιιlt, the efforts of tl1e 1940s and
1950s to unite Marxism and phenoωenology were replaced by
effoι-ts to connect Marxism with various forms of stι·ucturalisω
(particularly, Lacan's structuralist Fι-eudianism). "With phenoω­
enology disqιιalified ... , there was simply a sιιccession of fian-
cees, each fl.irting with Marxism in turn" in the effort to pΓOduce
a "Freudian-structuralist-Marxism."4 This ι·emained the domi-
nant theme of French thoιιght until the end of the 196os.
Ho>-vever, according to Foιιcault, this >vas the line of develop-
ιnent only for those ση the don1inant side of tl1e basic division in
French thoιιght- that is, for those "νΙ'l1ο v.•orked in teι-ms of the

2. lbid.
3· Gerard Raulet, "Structuralism and Post-Structuralisnι: an Interν:iew witlι Mi-
chel Foucault," Telos, 1983, 1g8. '
4· lbid.
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 11

categ01i.es of expeιi.ence, meaning, and subjectivity. "There were

also people Ινhο did not follow [this] movement. Ι am thinking of
those Ινhο Ινere interested in tl1e history of science .... Particu-
larly aΓOund Canguill1eω, an extΓemely influential figuΓe in the
French Univer~ity- the γoung French University. Many of his
students 'Nere neither Maπcists, nοι- Fι-eudians, nor structural-
ists. And here Ι aιn speaking of myself." 5
By Foucault's own account, then, his intellectual deνelopment
did not fit tl1e patteΓΠ folloived by many in France during the
ιg6os preciselγ becaιιse he 1νas connected to ν~rhat he calls the
"netννork" of thoιιght then Γepresented by Canguilheιn. 6 This is
not to say that Foucaιιlt did not try to come to grips with Marxist,
Freudian, and stnιcturalist thought; tl1ese were some of his ma-
joΓ concerns. Βιιt it is essential to realize that his reaction to these
dominant movements is based on a fundamental oΓientation to-
VΙ7ard the history of science that is strongly influenced by Can-
gιιilheω (and, through him, Bacl1elard).
The centrality of this influence is particularly apparent in light
of Foucault's specification of the Bachelard-Canguilheω "net-
ννoι-k" as the pήωaιΎ Frencl1 locus of the 11istorical critique of
reason that he sees as the ωain conceι-n ofhis own work. He notes
that in Gerωany this cι-itique has been caπied out in the context
of "a historical and political reflection ο η society" from "the post-
Hegelians to the Frankfιιrt School and Lukacs, by way of Feuer-
bach, Marx, Nietzsche, and Max Weber." But "in France, it is the
history of science which has above all been the basis for raising
the philosophical question of what enlightenωent is." Specifi-
cally, "the work of Koyre, Bachelard, Cavailles, and Cangιιil­
heιn" poses questions "to a rationality that claiιns to be universal
eνen while it deνelops in a contingent manner." 7 In this way it
exaιnines "a reason whose structural aιιtonoιny carried with it
the history of dogιnatisιns and despotisιns - a reason that, as a
result, produces eιnancipation only on the condition that it suc-
ceeds in freeing itself froιn itself." 8 As we saw in the Introduc-
tion, this is equallγ a characterization of Foucault's own ap-
proach to the history of reason.
It is appaι-ent, then, that Foucault hiιnself situates his work

5· Ibίd.
6. Foucault, "La vie." The French terrn Foucault uses isfiliatioιι.
7· Ibίd., 6.
8. Ibίd.
12 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

within the tradition of French history and philosophy of science

from Comte to Bachelard and Canguilhem. Canguilhem, espe-
cially through his "histoiΎ of concepts" and his concern with the
status of norms ίη science and its history, was the most immedi-
ate and the strongest influence on Foucault's historical work. But
Bacl1elard's philosophical view of science and, especially, of scien-
tific change was also a major presence in Foucault's intellectual
environment. Because of this - and also because their work is
not very well known outside o'r France9 - Ι offer here an outline
of the main themes of the history and philosophy of science of
Bachelard and Canguilheιn.

BACHELARD'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Gaston Bachelard developed his philosophy of science in a series

ofbooks publisl1ed from 1927 to 1953. 10 In addition to its impor-

9· Bachelard's works on literature and poetic imagination are fairly \Vell-kno\\•n

among English-speaking lite1·ary theorists. Mary Tiles, Bac/ιela1·d: science and
objectivity, (Cambridge: Cambήdge University Press, 1984) is a very interest-
ing and intelligent effo1·t to find inspiration in Baclιelard fo1· aπ app1·oach to
cun·ent p1·oblems of analytic philosoplιy of science. It is not intended, ho,v-
ever, as a general guide to Baclιelard's plιilosopl}y of science in its O\Vn terms.
Only όne of Canguilhem's books lιas been tι·anslated into English, and his
work has so fa1· received little attention f1·om Anglo-American histoι·ians and
plιilosophers of science. Dominique Lecourt, a stιιdent of Canguilhem, has
\Vritten a nuιnber of essays ση Bachelard, Cangιιill1em, and Foucault tl1at
lιave been translated and published together under the title, Marxίsιn aιzd
ejJisle1nology: Bac/ιelard, CanguiUιe1ιι, Foucault, translated by Ben Brewsteι· (Lon-
don: NLB, 1975). Lecourt places Foucault in the sanιe "tradition" as Baclιe­
lard and Canguillιem but does little to develop the point as a nιeans of
inteφreting lιis wo1·k. He does offeι· valuable expositions and interesting
cιiticisms (from a Marxist standpoίnt) ofBachelard and Canguίlhem.
10. References to Bachelard's texts \Vill be given internally in accord wίth tlιe
follo\ving sclιeme of abbreviations:
AR: L 'activite rationaliste de la physique co1Ιle7ιιporaine (PUF, 1951 ).
CA: Essai S1ι1·la con1zaissance apj11"oclιee (Vrin, 1927).
FES: La jorιnatio1z cle l'esprit scie?zlifiquc (Vιin, 1938).
MR: Le malbialisιne rationnel (PUF, 1953).
NES: Le nouvcl espιit scicntifique (PUF, 1934). References will be to the
English translation by Arthur Goldhaιnnιer, Tlιe New Scie1ztijic
Sj1irit (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984).
ΡΝ: La jJlιilosoplιie dιι non (PUF, 1940). References \νill be to the En-
glish translation by G. C. \.Yate1·ston, Tlιe Plιilosoplιy of Νο (Ne\1'
York: Orίon Press, 1969).
RA: Le rationalisιιιe appliqιιe (PUF, 1949).
VIR: La valcιι1· i1ιductive de /α ι·elativite (Vrin, 1929).
Except for NES and ΡΝ, translatίons of Baclιelard's texts are mine.
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

tance fοι-
understanding Foιιcaιιlt (as '"'ell as otheι- recent French
tlιinkers sιιchas Louis Altlιιιsser, Georges Cangιιilheω, and Mi-
chel Seιτes), Bachelard's '"'ΟΓk often sιιggests interesting ap-
pωaches to probleωs that aι-e central for Anglo-Aωeι-ican phi-
losophy of science. Ι η presenting tlιis sιπvey ofhis thought, Ι will
eωplιasize what is crιιcial as backgroιιnd to Foιιcaιιlt bιιt also
note connections with recent Anglo-Aιneι-ican issues.

Reason and science

According to Bachelaι-d, ι-eason is best known by ι-eflection on
science, and science is best known by ι-eflection on its histoιγ
The fiτst thesis deΓives froιn his conviction tlιat tlιe structures
of reason are apρarent not in abstι-act principles bιιt in the con-
σete eωployωents of ι·eason. Ν orωs of Γationality aΓe consti-
tuted in the veι-y pωcess of apρlying οιιι- tlιoughts to particular
pωbleωs, and science has been the pΓiωary locus of sιιccess in
sιιch applications. Tlιe proof of tl1e second thesis- that science
is best kno,vn thι-oιιgl1 its history - lies in the Γeρeated ι-efu­
tation of a pι-ioΓi ρlιilosopl1ical ideals of Γationality by lιistorical
scientific developinents. Descartes, fοτ exaωρle, l1eld tlιat sci-
ence ωιιst be gωunded in cleaΓ and clistinct intιιitions of the es-
sential ρωperties of ωatter. This view is ι-efιιted by the fact that
rilatteΓ, as described by twentieth-centιιry physics and cheωis­
try, is siωply not available to οuΓ intellectual intιιition. We know
it only through the indirections of hypothetico-dedιιctive infeΓ­
ence froω data that are theωselves ωediated by coωplex instrιι­
ωents (NES, 138-45 and ChapteΓ 6). Siιnilarly, Kant's foι-ωιιla­
tion of a transcendental, a prioΓi analytic of principles that
regιιlate all eωployωents of ι-eason collapsed with the triuωph
of theories (ι-elativity and quantuω ωechanics) based on the
denial of such Kantian princiρles as the perωanence of sub-
stance, which requiι-e a continιιity of eneι-gy inconsistent with
quantization (ΡΝ, Chapter 3). What initially seeιn to be a prioι-i
constι-aints on thoιιght as sιιch tun1 οιιt to be contingent condi-
tions deΓived fΓοω philosophers' inability to think beyond the
fraωewoι·k of pι-esent science.
Theι-e are, then, no viable accounts of rationality except those
derived fι-οω the historical developωents of scientific ι-eason. Το
ιιndeΓStand ι-eason, plιilosophy ωιιst "go to the school of sci-
ence." HeΓe, as elsewhere (e.g., the developωent ofωetaρhysical
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

theoι-ies), the achieveωents of science are tl1e dynaωics behind

all philosopl1ical understanding. "Science in effect σeates pl1i-
losophy" (NES, 3).
The ι-ationality that philosophy tήes to discoveΓ in the history
of science is no ωοι-e fixed and ωonoliιhic than tl1at history
itself. As v.τe sl1all see shoι-tly, Bachelard finds sl1arp bι-eaks in the
history of science and coπesponding changes in tl1e conception
of reason. Moreoveι-, Bachelard ι-eωinds us ιhat theι-e is, stι-ictly
speaking, no sιιch thing as the history of science, only_ vaτioιιs
histori.es of different regions of scientific work. Coιτespond­
ingly, philosophy cannot hope to uncover a single, ιιnified con-
ception of ι-ationality fΓΟω its ι-eflection ση the histoι-y of science;
it will find only vaι-ious "ι-egions of rationality" ('Ίes τegioτιs τa­
tionelles") (RA, Cl1apteτ 7). Bachelard, for exaιnple, analyzes (in
Le τationalis1ne αjJplique) tl1e rationalities inψlicit in i1ineteentl1-
centuΓy theories of electι-icity and of ωecl1anics. He agι-ees that
tl1e l1istory of science tends to tl1e integι-ation of diveΓse regions
of Γationality but sees η ο place fοι- a "science in geneι-al" to νvhicl1
woulcl coπespond a "general ι-aιionality." Bachelard was paι-ticu­
laι-ly conceι-ned 'vitl1 the ne'v ι-ationality tl1at he saw in tl1e
acl1ieveωents of twentietl1-centuι-y physical science, especially
ι-elativity tl1eoι-y and tl1e pl1ysics and chenύstry of qιιanta.

Bachelard's model of scientific change

Becaιιse ofl1is deιηancl that tl1e pllilosopheι- of science woι-k froιn
the histoι·ical developιnent of tl1e sciences, tl1e centeΓ of Baclle-
laι-cl's philosoplη of science is his ωoclel of scientific cl1ange.
Tl1is ωodel, wl1ich also pΓOvides l1is account of tl1e natuι-e of
scientific progι-ess, is built aΓΟιιηd fοιιι- key episteωological cate-
goι-ies: episteωological breaks, episιeωological obstacles, episte-
ωological pι-ofiles, and episteωological acts.
Bachelaι-d eωploys the concept of aπ eρisteωological bι-eak
in two contexts. First, he ιιses it to cl1aι-acteι-ize the νvay in νvl1icl1
scientific knowledge splits off froιn and even contι-adicts coω­
ωon-sense expeήences and beliefs. This sense of "break" is
fundaωental fοΓ Bacl1elard, since it constitutes science as a clis-
tinctive cognitive realω: "Scientific progι-ess al'~'aγs reveals a
bι-eak [τupl1ιτe], constant breaks, bet"reen ordinary [co?n?nune]
knowledge and scientific knoνvleclge" C:MR, 207). Bacl1elard illιιs­
trates this claiω "'ith seveι-al exanψles tl1at >Ve can ιιse to elιιci-
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

clate the key features of episteιnolog·ical bΓeaks. He finds one

simple exaιnple in a cheιnistη text's coιnιnent that glass is veΓy
siιnilaΓ to wιπtzite (zinc sιιlfide). Tl1e coιnpaΓison is one that
YΙ•onld neveΓ occur to comιnon sense, since it is not based on
any overt Γesemblance of the tΊΝΟ sιιbstances bnt on the fact that
they have analogoιιs crystalline strιιctιπes. Thns, science bΓeaks
with oΓdinary experience by placing tl1e objects of expeΓience
undeΓ new categories that ι-eveal pωperties and relations not
available to ordinaΓy sense peΓception.
But we should not think of scientific bΓeaks as merely a ιnatter
of discovering neΊ-v aspects of oι·dinaΓy objects, of taking up
wheΓe eveΓyday expeι-ience leaves off, as a telescope Γeveals stars
not visible to the naked eye. Ne,v, scientific concepts are re-
quiΓed to give an adequate account of even faωiliaΓ facts. Thίs is
very nicely illustrated by the case of LaωaΓck's fιιtile efforts to
use his exceptional obseΓvational abilities to develop an account
of coωbustion in opposition to LavoisieΓ's. His appωach was to
note caΓefully the seqιιence of color changes a piece of wl1ite
paper undeΓgoes when burned. On the basis of sιιch obseι-va­
tions, Laιnarck inteΓpΓeted coιnbustion as a process whereby tl1e
''violence" of tl1e fiι-e "ιιnωasks" tl1e fιιndaωental, ιιnderlying
color of the papeι- (black) by stι-ipping away sιιccessive chroωatic
layers. Bachelard argιιes that Laωarck's idea here is not ωerely
wrong in the ordinary way of an incorrect scientific hypothesis.
Rather, it is essentially anachronistic becaιιse it is based on iωωe­
diate phenoωenal experiences that Lavoisier had already shown
to be inadeqιιate for the task of ιιndeΓstanding coωbustion.
"The tiωe for diΓect, natιιral observation in the realω of cheωis­
try had passed" (MR, 219).
Α final exaωple shows how science ωay break with cοωωοη
sense even 'vhen eωploying ωodels based on its-language and
concepts. This is the case of Bohr's "water drop" ωodel of the
atoωic nιιcleus. Via this ωodel, Bohr pictιιΓed the protons and
neιιtrons of the nucleus as forωing a drop of water, the "teω­
peratιιre" ·(internal eneΓgy) of 'vhich increased when a neιιtron
ν~•as added and which partially "evaporated" wl1en a particle was
eωitted froω the nιιcleιιs. This ωodel was an excellent aid to
ιιnderstanding the process of fission, bιιt its ιιse of ordinary
concepts ιηιιst not ιnislead ιιs. As Bachelard pιιts it, sucl1 woΓds
as wateτ drop, te1nperature, and evaporation occιιr only in qιιotation
ωarks. In fact, the words are tacitly redefined so that they ex-
16 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

press conceρts that "are totally diffeΓent ... from tl1e concepts
of common kno>vledge" (MR, 216). (Imagine, Bachelard says,
the stupidity of asking a physicist to make a tl1ermoωeter to
measure the "temρerature" of tl1e nucleus.)
This last example also illustΓates BachelaΓd's second soΓt of
eρistemological breaks: those that occuΓ bet,~reen t~ro scie12tijic con-
ceptualizations. If nucleaΓ "temperature" is a very diffeΓent con-
cept froω ordinary pl1enomenal temperature, it is likewise very
different fΓOm the classical conceρtion of temρerature as the
mean kinetic eneΓgy of a collection of molecules. Tl1is illιιstrates
how science develops not only by breaks ννith ordinary experience
bιιt also by breaks with preνioιιs scientific theoΓies. FοΓ BachelaΓd,
the most stΓiking and imρortant sιιch bΓeaks came with relativity
and qιιantuω theoΓy, which he sa'v as initiating a "neνv scientific
spiΓit." This "new spiΓit" involved not only radically new concep-
tions of natιπe bιιt also new conceρtions of scientific method (e.g.,
new σiteΓia of explanatoΓy adequacy). Bacl1elaΓd's detailed treat-
ments of this topic (in, e.g., La valeuτ inductive cle la τelativite and Le
noιιvel esjπit scie12tijique) ρreceded by two or three decades similaΓ
discιιssions by Anglo-American historians and philosoρheΓs of
science sιιch as Κιιl1η and Feyerabend.
The langιιage of episteωolσgical "bΓeaks" sιιggests that there is
sometl1ing to be broken, a barrier tl1at ιnust be sl1atterecl. Bacl1e-
lard follows οιιt this sιιggestion with his notion of an episte?nological
obstacle. An episteωological obstacle is any concept or method that
pΓevents an episteιnological break. Obstacles aΓe residιιes frωn
previoιιs ways of thinking tl1at, 'vl1atever valιιe they had in tl1e
past, have begιιn to block tl1e path ofinqιιiry. Comωon sense is, of
coιιrse, a ωajοΓ souΓce of epistemological obstacles. Τhιιs, the
animism of primitive common sense, \vhicl1 inclined people to
explain the woΓld on analogy \Vith vital processes (sex, digestion,
etc.) was an obstacle to tl1e development of a mecl1anistic physics.
Likewise, the still strong commonsense idea that phenωnena
ιnιιst be the attribιιtes of an underlying sιιbstance blockecl tl1e
Γej ection of the ether as the locιιs of electromagΏetic waves. More
generally, Bachelard regards tl1e coωmonsense ιnind's reliance
on images as a breeding ground for epistemological obstacles.
Iιnages may have heuήstic use in science, but theγ l1ave no ex-
planatory force, ancl iftl1ey do tl1eiΓjob properly, tl1ey are eventu-
ally eliminated from scientific. thoιιgl1t. Th us, of BohΓ's planetaΓy
ωodel of the atoιn, Bacl1elaΓd says: ''τhe diagram of the atom
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

provided by Bohr ... has ... acted as a good image: there is

nothing left of it" (ΡΝ, 119). But epistemological obstacles may
also arise from successful scientific work that has outlived its
value. The most striking sιιch cases occur when the concepts and
principles of an established theory lead us to regard new propos-
als as obviously absurd- for example, tl1e counterintuitive feel of
quantum mechanics' rejection of classical determinism. But previ-
ously successfιιl scientific methods can also become epistemologi-
cal obstacles. For example, the emphasis on direct observation
that led in the seventeenth century to major bΓeaks with AΓistote­
lian science became an obstacle to eighteenth-century develop-
ments of atomic theoΓies. Finally, traditional philosophy, with its
tendency to canonize as necessary truths the contingent features
of one 11istorical peΓiod of tl1ought, is another major souΓce of
epistemological obstacles.
The attitudes that constitute given concepts and methods as
epistemological obstacles are not explicitly formulated by those
they constrain butτather operate at the level of implicit assump-
tions or cognitive and perceptual habits. Consequently, Bache-
lard proposed to develop a set of techniques designed to bΓing
them to our full ι-eflective awareness. He spoke of these tech-
niques as effecting a "psychoanalysis" of reason. Bachelard's use
of this term signals his aim of unearthing unconscious or semi-
conscious structures of thoιιght, but it does not express a commit-
ment to the details of Freudian theory.ιι
Closely related to the concepts of epistemological obstacles
and psychoanalysis of reason is the idea of an epistemological
profile. Tl1is is an analysis of a given individual's understanding
of a scientific concept, an analysis that reveals the degree to
which the understanding involves elements from various stages
in the concept's historical development. These stages correspond
primarily to various philosophical embodiments of past scientific
ideas (as well as to vaΓious commonsense notions). Thus, Bache-

11. For a discussίon of the relatίon ofBachelard's psychoanalysis of epistemologi-

cal obstacles to Freudian psychoanalysis, see George Canguilhem, "Gaston
Bachelard, Psychanalyste dans la cite scίentίfique?" Il Protagoι·a 24 (ιg84),
ιg-26. Bachelard's idea that 1vhat 1vas once an integral part of science can
later become an impediment to its developωent underωines the sharp dίs­
tinction, so proιninent in ωany Anglo-Aιnerican discussions, bet\veen inter-
nal and external history of science. For him, 1vhat at one point is internal to
the ratίonal developιnent of science ωay, at a later tiωe, be an external
obstacle to this developωent.
18 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

lard (ΡΝ, 36-38) proνides tlιe profile of his ονιη concept of

mass, which lιe finds to be dominated by the classical Γationalist
conception (mass as the pΓiωitive teΓm of eighteentlι-centιιΓy
mechanics). It also has a veΓy strong empiΓicist οΓ positivist com-
ponent (mass defined opeΓationally as what is measιπed on
scales). There aΓe smalleΓ, bιιt still significant, contΓibιιtions coΓ­
responding to tlιe child's naiνe ιιnclerstanding of mass as a desir-
able qιιantity of matter and of the i1ighly abstΓact and rational-
ized conceptions of relativity theoΓy and qιιaηtιιηι meclιanics. Α
parallel pωfile ofBachelaΓd's ιιndeΓstancling of energy (ΡΝ, 38-
43) slιows.a siιnilar domination by tlιe Γationalist conception of
the eighteentl1 centιιry bιιt less inflιιence of the empiΓicist con-
ception and ηιοΓe of the child's naiνe notion.
Obvioιιsly, an epistemclogical profile pι-ovides a Γecω·d of the
epistemological obstacles hindering the scientific thoιιght of a
giνen individιιal. Βιιt Bachelard does not make the scientistic
moνe of Γejecting all positiνe significance fοΓ those elements of
the profile that aΓe not fιιlly adeqιιate to tlιe achieνeωents of
conteωporaΓy science. Rather, particιιlarly in his lateΓ \Vork, he
cωnes to see tlιe fιιll range of the elements of episteωological
profiles - inclιιding tlιe philosopi1ical and coωωon-sense coω­
ponents- as νalid ο η νaΓious leνels of lιuman life and expeΓi­
ence. Scientific inadequacy does not entail complete invalidity.
Instead, Baclιelard concludes tlιat tlιe conψlexity of an episteωo­
logical pΓDfile shows that "a single plιilosoplιy cannot explain
eveηtlιing" and tlιat "it is necessaΓy to group all the philoso-
phies to obtain the complete notional spectΓtιl11 of a paΓticular
piece of knowledge" (ΡΝ, 42). Bachelard's fιιll appΓeciation of
tlιe nonscientific ("poetic") dimension of lιιιωaη exρeΓience is
deνeloped in a seΓies of books beginning with Tlιe ps)1C/ιoa?ιal)1sis
offiτe. Ο η one level, tl1is book siωply pΓDνicles a detailed analy-
sis of tlιe episteωological obstacles connected witlι οιιΓ iιnages
of fiΓe. (One exanψle is the "violence of fiΓe" tlιat we noted in
LamaΓck's thinking aboιιt combιιstion.) Βιιt Baclιelard's Γe.flec­
tions lead hinι to an appΓeciation of poetic images and exρeΓi­
ence for tlιeiΓ own sakes. He continιιes to Γesist "the ontological
temptation of beaιιty"; 12 that is, lιe is steadfast ίη Γejecting any
νiew ("naiνe Γealism") that woιιld make tlιe contents of ordi-
nary, sιιbjectiνe experience as real (οΓ moΓe real) than scientific
12. Cf. Roc\1 C. Smith, Gaston Baclιelaτd (Boston: T"•ayne Publishers, ιg82), 77·
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM ιg

objects. But he sees the subjective realm that feeds the poetic
spirit as intrinsically valuable and a necessary complement to
scientific knowledge. ·
The concept of an epist01nological act counterbalances that of an
epistemological obstacle. Whereas epistemological obstacles im-
pede scientific progι-ess thι-ough the ineι-tia of old ideas, "the
notion of epistemological acts coπesponds to the leaps [saccades]
of scientific genius that introduce unexpected impulses into the
course of scientific development" (AR, 25). An epistemological
act is not, hσ'i-vever, just a change; it has a positive value that
represents an improvement in our scientific accounts. There are,
accordingly, different values that must be accorded to different
episodes in the history of science. Consequently, Bachelard
holds that wι-iting history of science is different from writing
political or social history. In the latter case, "the ideal is, rightly,
an objective narration of the facts. This ideal requires that the
historian not judge; and, if the historian imparts the values of his
own time in order to assess the values of a past time, then we are
right to accuse him of accepting 'the myth of progι-ess' " (AR,
24). But in the case of the history of the natural sciences, prog-
ress is no ιnyth. Present science represents an unquestionable
advance over its past, and it is entirely appropriate for the histo~
rian of science to use the standards and values of the present to
judge the past. Application of these standards results in a sharp
division of the scientific past into 'Ί'histoiτe peτimέe" (the history of
'Όιιtdated" science) and 'Ί'histoiτe sanctionnee" (the history of sci-
ence jιιdged valid by cιιrrent standards). More broadly, follow-
ing F. Κ. Richtmyer, Bachelard distinguishes between the story of
science- an accoιιnt of past scientific achievements that have
contribιιted to οιιr present body of knowledge- and mere hist01y
of science, which inclιιdes efforts that have no positive place in
the genesis of cιιrrent science (AR, 27). Bachelard also speaks of
an accoιιnt of science that "starts from the certainties of the
present and discovers in the past progressive formations of the
trιιth" as "recιιπent history" (l'histoiτe τέcuπente).
Georges Cangιιilhem points οιιt 13 that this Bachelardian writ-
ing of the history of the past on the basis of the present is not
equivalent to the now generally disdained "Whiggish" approach
13. G. Canguilhem, Etudes d'histoire et de plιilosoplιie des sciences (Vrin, 1970, 197-
gS); Ideologie et ι·ationalite (Vrin, 1983), 21-23.
20 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

to the history of scieηce. For οηe thiηg, Bachelaι-diaη history

does ηοt try to uηderstancl past science iη terrns of pι-esent con-
cepts. It realizes the need to explicate the past in its own teι-ms.
Fσι- anσtheι-, theι-e is ησ assurnptiσn σf the irnrnutable adequacy
σf pι-esent science. Pι-ecisely because they are scientific, the pres-
ent achievernents by which we evaluate the past may theιnselves
be surpassed σr corrected by fιιtιιι-e scieηtific developrnent. Οιπ
evaluatiσn σf the past in teι-rns σf the pι-esent is, in Canguill1ern's
wσι-ds, nσt the application σf "a ιιηiveι-sal tσuchstone" but "a
selective pι-σjectiση σflight ση tl1e past." 14
But, fσι- Bachelard, eveη thoug·h all scieΊ1tific resιιlts aι-e σpeη
tσ revisiση aηd sσrne caη be defiηitively ι-ejected, σtheι-s rnust be
accepted as peι-ωaηently valid achieveωeηts. Thus, he says that
p111σgistoη tl1eσry is 'Όutdated [peri?nee] becaιιse it ι-ests ση a
fιιndaιnental erι-or." Histσriaηs whσ deal with it are wσrkiηg "iη
the paleσηtσlogy of a vanished scieηtific spiι-it" (AR, 25). By
cσηtrast, Black's wσrk ση caloric, eveη though ωost σfit has lσng
beeη jettisσned, did yield the perωaηeηt achieveη1eηt of the
coηcept of specific heat. 'The ησtίση of specific lιeat- we can
assert with equaηimity- is a ηοtίση that is forever a scientific
ησtίοη .... Οηe ωay sωile at tl1e clσgωatisω σf a ι-atiσηalist phi-
lσsσpher whσ wι-ites 'fσrever' ι-egardiηg a schσlastic trutl1. Βιιt
tl1ere aι-e cσncepts sσ iηdispeηsable iη a scientific cultιιι·e tl1at we
cannot coηceive beiηg led to abaηdoη tl1eιn" (AR, 26).
Ησw is this idea σfιιηalteι-able pι-ogress cσnsisteηt with Bache-
lard's iηsisteηce that all scieηtific resιιlts are σpeη tσ revisiσn?
Ησw can aη acl1ieveωeηt be "peΓιnaηeηt" aηd at the saιne tiιne
σpeη tσ coπectiσn in the wake σf aη episteωσlσgical bΓeak?
BachelaΓd's respσηse is that aη episteη1σlσgical bΓeak is ησt
ωeΓely the Γejectiση of past science bιιt alsσ a pΓeseΓvatiσn, via
ΓefοΓιnιιlatίση, σf σld ideas ίη a ηeνν aηd bΓσacler cσηtext σf
tl1σιιgl1t. Specifically, past ι-esults are Γeplaced by geηeΓalizatiσns
tl1at Γeject them as ιιηcσηclitionally cσπect but pι-eserve theιn as
cσιτect uηder certain restricted cσnditiσηs. Bachelard fiηds a
ιnσdel here ίη the developιnent σf ηση-Ειιclideaη geσmetη.
This developmeηt Γefιιtes the claiιn tl1at the Eιιclidean pσstu­
lates express tl1e sole tnιtl1 aboιιt geoωetιγ but at tl1e sarne tiη1e
presents tl1ese pσstιιlates as definiηg σηe exeωplificatiσn σf a
rnoΓe geηeral class of geoιηetries (i.e., Eιιclideaη geoιnetry is tl1e

14. Canguilhem, Idέologie et 1·atioιιalite, 22.

 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 21
paΓtiωlaι- geoιnetι-y possessed by a space of zeι-o cuι-vatuι-e). In
the same 1-νaγ, "Ne1-vton's astronomγ can ... be seen to be a spe-
cίal case of Einstein's 'pan-astι·onoιnγ' "{NES, 45). Thίs ίs so not
ιnerely because, to a ceι-taίn approximation, Newtonian calcula-
tions yield the saιne numbers as Einsteinian calcιιlations bιιt also
becaιιse keγ Ne>vtonian concepts such as mass and velocity can
be sho>vn to be special simple cases of the corresponding Ein-
steinian concepts. Bachelaι-d chaΓacterizes this process ofreplace-
ment by geneΓalization as "dialectical," not in the Hegelian sense
of a syntl1esis of opposites bιιt in tl1e sense of a pιΌcess of concep-
tιιal expansίon 1-vheΓeby what previously appeaι-ed to be contraι-­
ies {e.g., Euclidean and Lobachevskian geoωetries) are seen as
coωpleωentary possibilities. Eaι-lier concepts aι-e not ωysteri­
oιιsly "sιιblated" into a higl1eι- ιιnity but are rectified (corrected)
ση the basis of sιιpeι-iοι- sιιccessor concepts that allow ιιs to ex-
plain pι-ecisely the extent to which they are applίcable.Ι5
This account of scientific change allows Bachelard to reject the
continuity of science and still accept its p1·ogι·ess. Science develops
by a series of epistemological breaks that ωake it iωpossible to
ι-egaι-d its l1istoι-y as a linear accuωιιlation of trιιd1s within a
single conceptual fraωewoι-k. The conceptual framework of sci-
ence at one stage will be ι-ejected as erroneoιιs at later stages.
Nonetheless, soωe of its ι-esιιlts ωay be perωanent scientific
achieveωents in th_e sense that they 1-vill be preseι-ved as special
cases within all subseqιιent scientific fraωeworks. Each sιιcces­
sive fraωework will repι-esent progress over its predecessors in
that it attains a ωore general perspective froω which the range
of validity of previous perspectives can be assessed.
Bachelard's picture of science as discontinuoιιs bιιt pΓOgressive
involves an essential ι-ole for two coωpleωentaι-y factors that are
ιιsιιally excluded fι-οω the histoι-y of science; errors and norωs.
The forωer are geneι-ally thoιιght of as ιιnfoΓtunate, contingent
deviations fι-οω the path of science, dιιe to scient_ifically extrane-
oιιs factors such as pι-ejudice, inattention, and ignorance. Strictly
speaking, the scίentist as sιιch (like the ωatheωatician of Repub-
lic Ι) does not ωake ωistakes. The history of science is the history
15. BaclΊelard's references to geometry are notjust metaphorical. He sees the
dialectical rectification of scientific concepts as essentially connected to the
mathematical nature of scientific thought. Cf. Mary Tiles, op. cit., Chapter 3,
and C. Μ. Ρ. Μ. Hertogh, Bachelaι·d en Caιzguilhem: epistemologisclιe discontinuiteit
eπ hetιnedisch nonnbergι-ip (Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij, ιg86), Chapter 2.
22 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

of scientific trιιth, in which errors haνe no essential role. For

Bachelard, however, even a perωanent scientific achieveωent
sιιch as Newton's ωechanics ωay bejudged an enor (i.e., in need
of coιτection) fι-οω the ωοΓe general viewpoint of a later tl1eory.
Such errors aΓe essential stages in the development of science and
are, as we have seen, preserved in Γectified form by subsequent
theories. Siωilarly, scientific norωs are geneι-ally regaι-ded as oιιt­
side the historical process of scientific developιnent, since they are
thougl1t of as ateωporal, ιιniνeι-sally νalid pΓinciples of reason.
Bachelard however sees norn1s as foι·ωed i_n the very process of
the historical developωent of science. Νοι-ωs are prodιιcts of
science's rational activity and can be superseded at later tiιnes by
other ηοι-ωs tl1at prove themselves ιnore adeqιιate. In this Ίνay,
Bachelaι-d's ωodel of scientific change fulfills his pι-ogram of
treating reason as a genιιinely histoΓical phenoωenon.
Bachelard's approach to scientific change promises solutions
to soωe of the fιιndaωental pι-obleωs of post-Kuhnian philoso-
phy of science. FοΓ exaωple, by sιιggesting tl1at we can ωaintain
the progressiveness of science while denying the continιιity of its
developιnent, he offeΓS a 'vay of reconciling historical eνidence
of ι-adical shifts in paradigω 'vith the Γationality of science. Siωi­
larly, l1is tι-eatωent of norωs suggests tl1at this rationality can
itself be regarcled as fιιndaωentally 11istoι-ical. Howeνeι-, BaclΊe­
lard's accoιιnt of these ωatters needs fιιrtl1eΓ developωent, par-
ticιιlarly with ι-egaι-d to the "dialectical" p1Όcess wl1eι-eby past
scientific concepts eωeι-ge as special cases of present scientific
concepts. Ι η precisely what sense, fοι- exaωple, is Ν e'νtonian
ωass a "special case" of ι-elativistic ιηass? ΜοΓe generally, ΊNhat
are the geneι-al conditions ιιηdeι- >vl1ich one concept ιηay be said
to be a special case of anotl1er? Α plausible accoιιnt of tl1ese
ιηatteΓs ι-eqιιires a ωore caι-efιιl analysis of the natιιre of con-
cepts and of the ωeanings they exιπess than Bachelaι-d offeΓs. 16

The epistemological and metaphysical

ramifications of Bache]ard's model of scientific
change
Bachelaι-d's philosopl1y of scientific cl1ange inνolves, via its pι-e­
suppositions and conseqιιences, moΓe geneι-al episteωological
16. One promising direction for suclι an analysis is suggested by tlιe work of
Wilfrid Sellars. Cf. his Scieιzce atιd tιιctaplιysics, 128-34, and "Conceptιιal
Change" in his Essays ίn plιilosaplιy aιzd its Jιislol)' (Dordrecht: Reidel, 197 5).
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

and metaphysical positions. These positions derive from his re-

flections on the methodological and ontological results of actual
scientific practice. Bachelard dismisses as grouηdless specula-
tions any purely philosophical theories about how we know and
what there is. The nature of kno,vledge and of ι-eality caη be
kηοwη only by reflection ο η tl1e successfιιl applicatioηs of reason
to the understaηding of our woι-ld. (This view of epistemology
and metaphysics is, of course, just a generalization of the consid-
eι-atioηs noted above tha-t led Bachelard to insist ση approaching
the philosophy of science through tl1e histoι-y of science.) It is
impoι·tant to realize that Bachelard's suboι-diηation of philoso-
phy to science is not an instance of positivistic scieηtism. He does
not think- as does, fοι- exanψle, Quine with his ηotion of ηatu­
ralized epistemology- that philosophy itself is part of science.
Philosophy for Bachelaι-d is a reflection on sciences but its meth-
ods and results do ηοt share the empirical character of scientific
discipliηes.
What, iη aηy case, does Bachelard's τeflection ση scieηce yield
as to the general ηature of kηo,vledge? Wheι-e does he staηd as
an epistemologist? Since he explicitly proclaims his epistemology
to be "non-Cartesian" (NES, Chapter 6), we caη pι-ofitably pΓD­
ceed by contι-astiηg his position with that of Descartes.
Bachelard accepts Descartes's view that knowledge arises from
a critically methodical questioηiηg of accepted beliefs, but he
ι-ejects Descartes's claim that to attain kηowledge this question-
ing must terminate in indubitable intuitive certainties. 17 Carte-
sian foundationalism is ent~rely implausible relative to Bache-
lard's view of science's history as a series of epistemological
breaks. What reason do we have to think that the basis of ouι­
scieηce will prove aηy firmer than did that of our forebears? But,
beyoηd this, Bachelard argues that there are ηο grouηds for
accoι-diηg Cartesian intellectual intuitions (or aηy other sort of
claim to direct intuitive knowledge) the privileged certainty that
Descartes does. His critique of intuition ceηters ση the two poles
of an iηtuitive experieηce: its subject aηd its object.
With respect to the latter, the object of a fouηdatioηal iηtu­
itioη must be aηalyzable ίηtο a set of simple elements, each
knowη fully aηd uηambiguously. Το the extent that the objects
of our experieηce coηtain hiddeη complexities, our judgmeηts
about them aι-e subject to correction ίη the light of more peηe-

17. Cf. Tiles, 28-33.

 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tΓating analyses. This is \νhy DescaΓtes, in paΓticιιlaΓ, Γeqιιiτed

that cleaΓ and distinct peΓceptions effect a Γeclιιction of theiΓ
objects to "simple natιπes." (SimilaΓly, foιιndationalists in the
modeΓn enψiτicist tΓadition take ιιnanalyzable sense data as the
ιιltimate objects of expeΓience.) BachelaΓd's σiticisιn of tlιis as-
pect of foιιndationalism is that eνen the appaΓently nιost simple
objects of οιιΓ intιιition have lateΓ p1Όved to have conψlex lιid­
den stτιιctιιΓes. TheiΓ appaτently intΓinsic simplicity '~·as Γeally
only tlιe Γesιιlt of an ιιltinιately nιisleading simplification. Specifi-
cally, Baclιelaxd sees majoτ bι-eaks ίη the histoι-y of science as dιιe
to tlιe discovery of hidden complexities in objects that lιad been
ι-egaι-ded as simple intιιitive givens. One fanιoιιs exanιple is Ein-
stein's analysis of time and simιιltaneity. AnotheΓ less kηο'ίνη bιιt
veι-y stΓiking exanψle is the twentieth-centιιΓy stιιdy oflιydΓOgen
thΓOιιgh the analysis of its atomic spectωm (cf. NES, 148-150).
HeΓe physicists did at fiΓSt pΓOceed in accord with tlιe CaΓtesian
ideal. They began witlι the sinψle case of the hydΓOgen atom (a
single proton oι-bited by a single electΓOn) and tΓied to sho•~· lιow
the empirical fonnιιla that clesσibed its spectnιm (tlιe BalιneΓ
fοηιιιιla) coιιld be geneΓalized to aιτίνe at fonnιιlas descι-ibing
the spectΓa of moι-e conψlex atoιns. In this way, it seemecl that
knowledge of conψlex cases coιιld be cleveloped fι-om knowl-
edge of tlιe simple case. Βιιt in fact the developιnent was in
exactly the opposite dίΓection. 'Ίη oΓcleι- to give a cletailecl ac~
coιιnt of tlιe spectωscopic data, tlιe more conψlicated spectnιm
(heΓe that of the alkaline ωetals) lιad to be tΓeated fiι-st" (NES,
154-55). FοΓ exaιnple, the fine stnιctιπe of spectι-al lines (i.e.,
the doιιbling notecl in >νhat at fiΓst seeιn to be single lines) was
foιιnd fiΓst ίη the spectι-a of ιηοι-e complex atoms, and only
becaιιse it was noted tlιeι-e, clid scientists look fοι- it in the spec-
trιιιn of lιydrogen. Siιnilaι-ly, the ΓOle of the angιιlaΓ ηιοωeηtιιιη
of the nιιcleιιs (and of tlιe oι-biting electΓOns) ~ras discoveΓed only
by paying attention to the ωore coιnplex spectι-a.
In sιιιη, accoΓding to BaclιelaΓcl, the CaΓtesian appωaclι of
beginning with tlιe simplest case tιιrned οιιt to be a "positivism of
the fiΓSt glance" (NES, 154) that eιnphasized the ιnost appaΓent
featιπes of tlιe hyclιΌgen atonι ονeΓ tlιose that aΓe ίη fact centι-al
to an ιιndeΓstanding of it. As it tιιnιed οιιt, the sρectnιιn of
hydωgen coιιld be pωpeτly ιιndeΓstood only by noting its simi-
larity to conψlex cases \νlιeΓe its essential characteΓistics \VeΓe
ιηοΓe clearly present. Bachelanl sιιιηs ιφ the anti-Cartesian atti-
tιιde of nιodern science to~·aι-d the simple as follo>νs:
 BACHELARD Aί'I'D CANGUILHEM 25
Siιnple ideas are >Ι•orkinghypotheses or concepts, which must
ιιndergo ι-evision befoι·e they can assume theiι- propeι- epistemo-
logical role. Siιnple icleas are not tlιe ulιiωate basis of knowledge;
afteΓ a cωnplete theoι-y is aνailable, it Ίνill be appaι-ent tlιat sinψle
ideas aι-e in facι siιnplifications of ιnω·e conψlex tι-uths. (NES,
148)

But if the simple is no n1ore than a Γevisable starting point, then

'"e can no longer regaΓd οιπ intuitions of "sinψle" objects as the
ceΓtain foundation of scientific knowledge.
Regaι·ding tl1e subject that exρeriences a founclational intu-
ition, Bachelarcl notes that to be ceι-tain of οιιr intuitive judg-
ιnent, we must be fιιlly awaΓe of what the subject itself may be
contι-ibιιting to thejιιdgment. We need, for example, to be able
to filteΓ out subjective feelings and pΓejudices that migl1t distort
the intιιition's pΓesentation of its object's trιιe natιιΓe. Ν ΟΊΥ, for
sιιch filtering to οccιιΓ, the intuiting subject must be ι-eflectively
tΓanspaΓent to itself; it must be able to see and assess all that it
bΓings to the intιιition. Contrary to Descartes, Bacl1elard thinks
that sιιcl1 self-reflective transparency is simρly not available. The
existence of ιιndetected eρistemological obstacles at every stage
of scientific thougl1t sl1ows tl1at tl1ere are always unexamined
deρths of the self tl1at may be distoι-ting its intιιitions. Tl1ese
ιιnexamined deptl1s likewise undermine the hoρe of gι-ounding
knowledge in intιιitive certainty.ιs
BachelaΓd's critiqιιe of Descartes can be summed uρ as reject-
ing l1is ρroject of attaining clear and distinct ρerceρtions. Tl1e
requisite clarit;' v..σιιld Γequire a degree of self-awareness that is
not available, and the Γequisite clistinct1ιess a likewise ιιnavailable
sinψlicity of the intuited object.
Α fιιndamental pΓOblem for Bachelard's non-Caι-tesian eρiste­
mology is the question of how, lacking Descartes's founding
intιιitions (οΓ some equivalent epistemic absolute, such as a tΓan­
scendental deduction), he is able to guaΓantee the objectivity of
scientific knowledge. In paΓticulaΓ, how can he avoid the sugges-
tion that v.•hat we take fοΓ knowledge is just the deception of as
yet undetected eρistemological obstacles?
According· to Bachelard, tl1e gnaΓantee of objectivity is the
ωovement of the self from tl1e standρoint of its own intuitions
and intellectual inclinations to the standρoint of consideΓations
that aΓe cogent fοΓ all Γational minds. Thus: 'Ί think that you will
ι8. cr. ibid., 39-41.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tl1ink what Ι have just thought, if Ι infoΓm you of the rational

line of thought [l'evene?nent de raison] that has forced me to think
as Ι have" (RA, 58). In such a situation, "since Ι recognize tl1at
what Ι have thought is a noτm [nonnalite] fοτ noτmal thc:iught, Ι
have the means to force you to think what Ι think. In fact, you
νvill think as Ι have to the extent that Ι make you aννaΓe of the
problem to which Ι have found the solution." In tllis way, we
achieve the "sanctioning [consecration] of our method, the pωof
of the efficacy of our thought, tl1e socialization of tnιtl1" (RA,
s8).
In this connection, Bachelard speaks of a move froιn the soli-
tary cogito to the communal cogita1ιzus (RA, 57) and froιn individ-
ual existence to social su1·existence (RA, 6ο). (He also speaks of the
coιnmunity of tτuth as based on a coratioπalis?n.) His key point is
that this move from the personal to the interpersonal is a move
fΓOm the meΓely psychological to the genuinely epistemologi-
cal 'vhereby "a psychological value becoωes an epistemological
value" and "personal knowledge acquires a ceΓtain secιιήty by
becoming the knowledge of tl1e scientific community [ιιπe con-
naissance cle la cite scientifique]" (RA, 48). Indeed, he even exploits
the psycl1ological connection by developing a notion of an "intel-
lectnal sιιpeτego" (surmoi) (RA, 75) tl1at is the internal expression
of objective epistemological norms. Tllis notion is tl1e basis of
Bacl1elard's complex accoιιnt of the "intellectual surveillance of
tl1e self," whereby rational thinkeτs monitoΓ ancl evalιιate vaΓi­
oιιs levels of theiΓ cognitive activity (RA, Chapter 3).
Bachelaτd seeιns tl1en to hold a consensus account of scientific
justification and objectivity. The validity of knowledge claims is
assιιred by the agΓeeωent of tl1e comωunity of inqιιiΓers. Hov.r-
ever, he soωetiιnes seems to ωove in tl1e diΓection of a col1er-
ence accoιιnt. In RA, fοΓ exanψle, l1e Γaises the problem of tl1e
possibility of a false consensιιs. In response, he adωits that "nvo
ωinds can agΓee in the same eποτ" but points οιιt that truth and
eπor are not sίω ply inverses of one another in the pΓOcess of tl1e
development of inqιιiry.

Εττοτ and tτutΛ aι-e not syιnιnetιi.cal, as a pιιrely logical ancl foι-mal
philosophy mighι lead ιιs to believe. In tl1e sciences, trutl1s groιιp
into systems, whereas eπors are lost in a foι-n1less mixtιιre. In
otheι- words, tωtl1s are linked togetheι- apodictically 'νl1ile eιτors
accumulate assertoιi.cally. (RA, sB-sg)
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

But even here, Bacl1elard ιnay still be giving priority to consen-

sus, since l1e iιnιnediately goes on to contrast rational systems of
truths tl1at aι-e codified into books "provided νl'ith the guaι-antee
of the scientific coriιrnunity" Yvitl1 the erroι-s foιιnd in books that
are "most often characteΓized by a c\etestable originality" (RA,
59). It seems that, in the end, l1e c\oes not pι-ovide an entirely
cleaι- and cogent account of tl1e nor-ιnative groιιnds of scientific
objectiνity.
Coπelative to BachelaΓd's αitique of foιιndationalism is his
rejection of ι-ealism. The coιτelation is apparent from the clefini-
tion of ι-ealism l1e offeι-s in aπ early book: "Realism [is] ... any
doctΓίne that ιnaintains tl1e organization of impressions on the
level of the inψressions tl1eιnselves, tl1at places the geneι-al after
tl1e paι-ticιιlar, as a siιnplification of tl1e particulaΓ, that conse-
quently believes in the prolix richness of the inclividual sensation
and in the systeιnatic inψoverishment of abstΓactive thoιιght"
(VIR, 206). Τhιιs undeι-stood, realisιn asserts tl1e priωacy and
indispensability of tl1e objects of everyday sense expeΓience. It is
the vieνν, held by philosopl1eΓs ι-anging fΓOm pl1enomenologists
to Whiteheadians to oΓdinaι-y language analysts, that tl1e things
we see, l1ear, and toιιch are the conαete ("really ι-eal") realities
for which science supplies ωerely partial and abstract accounts.
When scientists say that a gas (e.g., tl1e air we bΓeathe) is a collec-
tion of molecιιles, this is only a ωanner of speaking. Talk of
ωolecιιles is one way of elιιcidating soιne iωpoΓtant aspects of
the behavior of air, bιιt theΓe is η ο qιιestion of claiιning tl1at aiΓ is
Γeally nothing bιιt a collection of ωolecιιles, that scientific talk of
molecιιles can take the ontological place of οιιr everyday talk
aboιιt air.
BachelaΓd sees realisιn in this sense as conflicting with l1is thesis
that the history of science advances by a seΓies of epistemological
breaks. For the realist, tl1ere are no episteωological breaks be-
caιιse every scientific discovery is jιιst the addition of another
tι-utl1 aboιιt the faιniliar objects given to ordinaη experience.
Science never takes us beyond the fundaιnen tal conceptual fraιne­
ΊYork tl1at we acquire ΊNhen we learn οιιΓ natuΓallanguage. Accord-
ingly, Bachela.rd's first way of criticizing realisιn is identical with
his case for the reality of episteιnological bΓeaks. Anotheι-, closely
related line of criticism is his argument froιn the guiding role of
theory over obseΓvation in the deνelopment of scientific knowl-
edge. Bachelard's point heΓe is strikingly illustΓated by his Γeflec-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tions ο η how a modern scientist would approach Descartes's proj-

ect (in the Second Mediation) of studying the nature of a piece of
wax. Descartes, of course, used the wax example against a form of
realism that rejects the need for intellectual understanding to
interpret the givens of the senses. But this is just an antiempiricist
account of the nature of our experience of material objects; it is
not a rejection of the realist tl1esis (which Descartes accepts) that
such objects are as they are given in tl1is experience properly
understood.
Bachelard argues tl1at Descartes's approach to the wax is fun-
damentally different from that of the modern scientist. Whereas
Descartes describes a piece ofwax as it is in its natural state, 'just
taken from the hive," a modern scientist would "start with ...
chemically pure wax produced by careful purification tech-
niques" (NES, 167). Then, instead of observing the wax under
various conditions in which we might find it in our daily experi-
ence (rolled between the fingers, softened by the sun), the scien-
tist would submit it to a series of carefully controlled manipula-
tions designed to put it in a state that will allow the observation of
its characteristic features. Thus, he would "melt this wax in a
crucible and resolidify it in a slow, methodical way. In this man-
ner he can obtain a wax 'droplet' whose shape and surface com-
position can be precisely controlled" (NES, 168). Next, he might
proceed to study the surface of this carefully prepared droplet
by exposing it to Χ rays: "Thanks to the slow cooking of the ball
of wax, the surface molecules will be oriented in a precise way
relative to the surface of the drop. Tl1is orientation will deter-
mine the diffraction pattern of tl1e X-rays and yield spectro-
grams similar to those obtained ... for crystals" (NES, 168). On
the basis of established results with crystals, the scientist will
expect these spectrograms to provide explanations of many of
the wax's surface properties, such as smoothness, adherence,
and oiliness. Bachelard goes on to suggest how further tech-
niques might be employed to determine the molecular structure
of the wax at deeper levels. But the essential point should be
already clear: Scientific observation consists in the systematic
manipulation of an object on tl1e basis of a theoretical preunder-
standing of it. The scientist treats'the object as he does because
an already accepted theory tells him that this is how to reveal the
object's secrets. Tl1e very process of scientific observation is
based on a theoretical redescription of the object ·that character-
 :BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 29
izes it in terιns ofvery diffeΓent categoΓies (e.g., "chemically pω·e
sample," 'Όrientation of sιπface molecιιles") from tl1ose of untιι­
tored experience. "Fοι- science, tl1en, tl1e qιιalίtίes of reality are
fιιnctions of οιιr ι-ational methods .... Όbjective meditation' [in
contrast to Descaι-tes's "subjective ιneditation" on tl1e wax] in the
laboratoιΎ coιnn1its us to a path of pωgressive objectification
tl1at giνes ι-eality to both a neΊY foι-m of expeΓience and a new
forω of tl1oug·l1t" (NES, 171). In tl1is process, tl1e faιniliar sen-
sory objects enshrined by realism aι-e left far bel1ind.
It seeωs cleaι- that 'Nhat Bacl1elaΓd heι-e calls ι-ealism is a variety
ofwl1at cιιιτeηt analytic philosopheι-s of science call antίι-ealism.
(Eitl1eΓ teι-ωinology is possible since the νiew is realistic aboιιt the
objects of oι-dinary experience and antirealistic about tl1e tl1eo-
retical postιιlations of science.) Siιnilarly, Bachelaι-d's own posi-
tion is very similaι- to Ίvl1at is ηοΊν called scientific realism. In
paι-ticιιlar, he vigorously defends tl1e reality of the entities postιι­
lated by explanatory scientific tl1eories and eνen maintains that it
is these entities Γatl1er than tl1e objects of ordinary sense expeΓi­
ence that aΓe the conσete ι-ealities of the pl1ysical world. 19 More-
over, Bachelard's approach offeι-s a way of defending scientific
ι-ealism tl1at has important aclνantages oνer some more recent
defenses. For one thing, it does not present ι-ealism as ωeι-ely
the result of a peremptoι-y deωand for fuΓtl1eΓ, tl1eoretical
causes of phenomena ~hat aι-e alΓeady acleqιιately accoιιnted for
by enψirical generalizations. Like Wilfrid. SellaΓs, Bachelard
bases his case for Γealism on the inadequacy of the "n1anifest
fι-amework" of eveι-yday observation langυage and the cor-
responding explanatory sιιperiority of tl1eω·etical frameworks.
Fιιrtl1eΓ, wheι-eas many recent νersions of realisιn find them-
selves in tension witl1 historical accounts (a la Κιιhη) of radical
changes in scientific concepts, BachelaΓd's realisιn is bιιilt on a
model of scientific deνelopωent that allows sιιch cl1anges. Specifi-
cally, his notion of l'lzistoi1·e sa?~ctionee pΓOνides a ΊYay of reconcil-
ing tl1e scientific progΓess Γequiι-ed by Γealist accounts νvith his-
toΓical discontinιιity.
HoweveΓ, νvl1ile BachelaΓd pΓoνides a valuable approach to the
defense of scientific Γealisιn- that is, of the ontological superioΓ-

ιg. Bachelard's rejection of ινl1at he calls 'Ί·ealism" also includes some features
thaι aΓe not part of the cιιπent notion of scientific realism - for example, his
opposition to the "clιosisιne" thaι gives ontological priol"ity to substances
ratheι· tlιan processes. Cf. NSS, 42.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ity of the framework of theoretical science -lιe is not 1νilling to

accept a full-blooded metaplιysical realism. τlιat is, lιe is not 1νill­
ing to assert the mind-independent existence of scientific entities.
Instead, he proposes what he calls "applied Γationalis111" (le τatio­
nalisme applique). Tlιe term "rationalism" eιnplιasizes, first, the
active role όf the mind in the construction of tlιe concepts neecled
to describe adeqιιately the objects of science. Seconclly, it enψlιa­
sizes BachelaΓd's claim that, contΓaΓy to a widespΓeacl enψiΓicist
misconception, it is (theω·etical) ideas ratheΓ tlιan sense expeι·i­
ences that give ιιs objects in their fιιll concreteness: 'Ίcleas reνeal
details and make specific features [specifications] appeaΓ. It is
through ideas that we see tlιe paΓticular in all its Γiclιness; tlιιιs,
they go beyond sensations, wlιich gΓasp only tlιe geneΓal."2° So,
for Bachelard, theoretical conceptions aΓe not abstΓactions from
the full reality of objects but the way of Γeaching tl1is Γeality be-
yond the vagιιeness and inconψleteness of our sense exρeι·ience.
We must not, lιowever, tl1ink of Bachelard as an iclealist 1νlιο
giνes absolιιte pΓiority to thoιιght. He rejects an idealist constitu-
tion of reality fΓom the pure thought of a cogito. Ο η the contΓaιΎ,
he holds that, if we began 1νith meΓe thought itself (afteΓ, fοΓ
example, a Cartesian "destrιιction of tlιe worlcl" tlποιιglι me-
thodic doubt), tlιen any world tlιat thouglιt positecl would be an
entirely arbitΓary construction. Iclealism must reduce eitlιeΓ to a
skepticism tlιat Γestricts Γeality to thouglιt or to a "cι-eationisιn"
that makes the world a mere capΓice of thought. BaclιelaΓd pΓe­
sents his version of rationalism as a midclle gΓOund between
tlιese two extremes. We arrive at tΓuth neitlιer by skeptically
destroying tlιe world nor by mentally σeating it. Rather, tΓUtlι
Γesults fΓDm reason's reνision (τectificatiO?~) of the vΙ'OΓld. "Be-
tween the two poles of a destroyed vl'orld and a constrιιcted
world, we pΓOpose simply to slip in [glisseτ] a rectified woΓld"
(RA, 51). Accoι·dingly, BaclιelaΓd's rationalisιn is appliecl in the
sense that for it any application of concepts by reason ηιιιst be to
an object tlιat has alΓeady been conceptualizecl: "Rationalism is a
plιilosophy that continues; it is neveΓ trιιly a plιilosophy tlιat
begins" (RA, 54). The objects of our knowledge are "already
there," not as autonomous givens but as the resιιlts of pΓevious
applications of reason.

20. Gaston Bachelard, L'histoire des scicι1ces dans l'enseignnιent, Publications de

l'enseignement scientifique, no. 2, 1933, 159·
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

Bachelaι-d's coηception of an apjJlied ι-atioηalism is alsσ de-

sigηed ισ highlight tlιe ΓOle σf scieηtific iηstnιmeηts ίη the cσηstί­
tιιtίση σf scientific .-eality. The miηd's Γectificatiση σf the wσι-ld is
mediated by tl1e techηiques σf experimeηtal maηipulatiση that
are aη integι-al part σf mσdeι-n scieηtific tl1eσries. Iηdeed, Bache-
la:rd speaks σf scieηtific iηstnιιneηts as "theσries materialized"
(NES, 13). It is thrσugl1 tlιis instrι.ιmental materializatiση that
theoretical coηcepts σve.-cσme tl1e abstractiση σf tlιe merely meη­
tal aηd provide trιιths mσΓe coηcrete tlιan those σf σΓdiηary
expeΓieηce. This is lισv.τ BaclιelaΓd dissσlves the paradσx we may
feel ίη his claiηι tlιat tlιe σbjects σf theσιγ are mσΓe cσηcrete ιhaη
thσse σf seηsatiση. (He alludes tσ this paradσx by speakiηg σf the
scieηtific σbject as aη "abstract-cσηcrete" object.) Scieηce Γe­
places σrdiηary expeΓieηces >Vith its σwn theσΓetically iηfσrmed
expeΓie:nce. It mσνes ιιs fΓOr:p. the "pheησηιeησlogy" that de-
scribes the σbjects σf σrdiηaΓy expeΓieηces tσ νvlιat BaclιelaΓd
calls a "pheησιneησ-technics," >vllich prσduces σbjects by the ap-
plicatiση σf scieηtific instrιιιneηts. "Scieηce realizes its σbjects; it
ηever fiηds theηι ι·eady-made. Pl1eησmeησ-techηics extends plιe­
ησmeησlσgy. Α coηcept has becσme scieηtific tσ tlιe exteηt tlιat it
lιas becσme techηical, tlιat it is accσmpaηied by a techηiqιιe σf
Γealizatiση" (FES, 61). Accσrdiηgly, BachelaΓcl rejects "the classic
diνisiσn that sepaΓated a tlιeσry frσηι its applicatiσn" aηd asseΓts
Γather "the ηecessity σf iηcσrpσratiηg cσηdίtίσηs σf applicatiση
iηtσ the very esseηce σf the theσry" (FES, 61). It is tlιrσιιgh the
techηical applicatiση σf a theoιΎ's abstract Γatiσηal strιιctuι·es
that there appears the coηcrete scientific σbject.
Baclιelard sees lιis applied ratiσnalisnι as a viable σηtσlσgical
middle grσuηd between idealism aηd realisηι aηd bet,νeeη em-
piΓicism and classical Γatiσηalism. It accepts idealism's emphasis
ση the miηd's active rσle, ΓegaΓdiηg aηy paΓticιιlar σbject as coη­
strιιcted by the applicatiση σf theoιγ Βιιt, at the same time, it
accepts the Γealist's emphasis ση the traηscendeηce σf the σbject,
agreeiηg that aηy particιιlaι· act σf theσretical cσηstructiση σpeΓ­
ates ση aη σbject alΓeady giveη tσ it. What fΓOm οηe (relatively
idealist) pσiηt of viev.τ is the mind's rectificatiση σf a concept is,
frσm aησther (relatively Γealist) pσiηt σf view, a better apprσxi­
matiση tσ reality (cf. CA, 279). Similarly, applied ratiσηalism
tries tσ dσ justice tσ bσth classical ratiσηalism's eηιphasis ση the
gιιidiηg Γσle of theσry and empiricism's emphasis ση the need to
put theωΎ tσ the test σf experience. "Scientific culture is aηi-
32 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

mated by a subtle [fine] dialectίc that constantly goes from theory

to experience ίη order to come back from experience to the
fundamental organίzatίon of [theoretical] principles" (AR, 16).
Bachelard's retreat from metaphysίcal realism ίs less impres-
sive than his defense of scίentίfic realism. His attempt to com-
bίne realίstίc and ίdealistic views of objects seems to be unstable.
In order to avoid idealism, Bachelard maintains that any opera-
tion of the mind ίs a transformatίon of an object pregiven to it.
But, unless he is willing to fall back into metaphysical realism, he
must agree that any pregiven object itself must be the result of a
previous "constitution" by mental actίvίty. lf so, his position re-
duces to a form of ίdealism. Consequently, ίt seems that Bache-
lard's posίtion collapses into eίther idealism or metaphysical real-
ίsm and does not in fact offer a viable third alternative.

CANGUILHEM'S HISTORY OF SCIENCE

Canguilhem was Bachelard's successor as director of the Insti-

tut d'Histoίre des Sciences et des Techniques at the Universίty
of Paris. Whereas Bachelaι-d ννas primarily a phίlosopher of
science who based his conclusions on historical studίes, Can-
guίlhem is primarily a historian of scίence, though one ex-
tremely sensitive to the philosophical presιιppositίons and impli-
cations of his work. Although Canguilhem definitely operates
fι-om the context of Bachelard's philosophy of science, there
are a number of key points at which he criticizes and modifies
Bachelard's views. Το some extent, their differences ι-eflect the
fact that, whereas Bachelard took physics and chemistry as his
models of scientific ratίonality, Canguilhem focuses pι-imarily
on biology and medίcίne.

Canguilhem's conception of the history of science

Canguilhem's project as a hίstorian of science is to wrίte the
l1istory of concepts, not- to cite some major alternatίves- the
history of terms, the history of phenomena, or even the history
of theories. Α history of terms ι-eflects the naive and all-too-
common idea that there is some hίstω·ical significance in find-
ing people who, for example, spoke of mass before Newton, of
atoms before Dalton, of evolιιtion before Darv.rin. Sιιch history
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 33
is nήsled by sιtpeΓficial sίmίlaΓities
in language and ίgnores the
Γeally ίmportant qιιestion of '-νhetl1eΓ
two scientists l1ad the
saωe ιιndeΓstanding of a gίνen aspect of natιιre. Α history cen-
tered ση phenoιηena is concerned \Ι'Ϊtl1 who fiΓst obseι-ved oι­
accurately descrίbed a given natural process or strιιctιιre, with-
oιιt takίng accoιιnt tl1at the crucial factor ίs not wl1at was ob-
seτνed bιιt the inteΓpretation inνolved in tl1e observation. Τl1ιιs,
Priestley may have dίscoνered oxygen in the sense of being the
fiΓst to produce it in a laboratoΓy and desσibe its phenomenal
featιιres accιιΓately. Βιιt sιιcl1 a "discovery" is of little signifi-
cance for Cangιιilheιη's history of concepts, since Priestley
faίled ίη tl1e decisίve ιηatter of piΌviding aπ adeqιιate scientific
ιιndeΓstanding of oxygen, >vl1ich he incorrectly interpΓeted as
dephlogisticated aiΓ. The decίsίve achieveωent ννas Lavoisier's
undeΓstanding of oxygen as a cl1eωical eleωent.
It might seem tl1at Canguill1eιn's Γejection ofhίstory of science
as tl1e history of tl1e discovery of pl1enomena coπesponds siιη ply
to a rejection of tl1e positivists' shaτp distinctίon of theoΓy and
obseΓvatίon. He is, we ωay tl1ink, drawing the obvious conse-
quence of Γecognizing tl1at tl1ere aΓe η ο scientifically interesting
obseΓνed facts apaΓt fΓom tl1eir tl1eoretical inteτpτetations. This
woιιld suggest tl1at Canguill1eω's is in fact a 11istory of tl1eories.
Wl1y tl1en does he insist tl1at 11is priωary concern is wίth concepts
rather than tl1eoΓies?
Το ιιnderstand Canguilhem's view l1eι-e, we need to distin-
gιιish - ίη a ν,ray that Anglo-American philosopl1eΓs of science
typically do not- bet,veen interpι-etation and theoΓy. Many re-
cent analytic philosophers of science have emphasized tl1at sci-
entific observation does not pι-esent ιιs with pure, uninteτ­
pΓeted data; all scientific data are given already inteι-preted.
Canguilhem woιιld agι-ee with t1ιis point, which was, afteι- all,
emphasized by Bachelard long befoι-e Hanson and Κιιl1η. Βιιt
the typical Anglo-Ameι-ican discussion of this topic also as-
sιιωes that the inteΓpΓetation of data is a matteι- of ι-e~ding
theω in teι-ms of a theory; that is, in terms of a set of scientific
geneΓalizations pιιt forward to explain the pl1enomena undeΓ
investigation. Interpretation is held to deι-ive from theoretical
commitments. Aristotelians saw the motion of a heavy body
sν.ringing fιΌm a chain as a constrained fall because of theiΓ
theoΓy that falling bodies seek theiι- natιιral place. Galileo sa'v it
as the nearly periodic ωovement of a pendιιlum because of his
34 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

theoretical principle of inertia. 21 On this νiew, the concepts

whereby data are interpreted deι·iνe from the theories 'vhereby
they are explained. It is not surprising that some philosophers
holding this νie\v (Feyerabend, for example) took the further
step of maintaining that the entire meaning of a concept or
teι-m is giνen by the role it plays in the statements of theory.
This led to tl1e puzzling conclusion that any reνisions ίη theory
entaίled changes. ίη the meaning of scientific concepts.
For Canguilhem, ho,veνer, it is essential to separate the con-
cepts that interpret data fωm the tl1eories that explain tl1em. Α
concept proνides us with the initial understanding of a phenome-
non that allows us to formulate in a scientifically useful way the
question of how to explain it. Theories proνide a variety of (of-
ten competing) ways of ans,vering the explanatory question.
Thus, Galileo introduced a new way of conceίving the motion of
falling bodies. But in order to explain the motion so conceived,
he, Descartes, and finally Newton intωduced a series of differ-
ent tl1eories. Accordingly, Canguilhem can ιηake sense of the
same concept playing a ωle in very different theories - of, as he
says, concepts tbat are "theoretically polyvalent" (FCR, 6). 22 This
in turn allows l1im to "'rite historical accounts of the forιηation
and transformation of concepts tl1at operate at a different- and
more fundamental- level than accounts of tl1e succession of ex-
planatory theories.
Canguilhem's conception of history of science as hίstοιΎ of
concepts is well illι.ιstrated by his 0\\'Π 'vork ση the forωation of
the concept of the refiex. As he sees it, the deνelopιηent of the
concept ofbodily refiex ιηovement 'vas a majoΓ innoνation, paral-

21. Cf. Thornas Κιιhη, τlιe stι1ιctιιι·e of scieιιtific revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: Uni-
νeΙ"sity of Chicago Press, 1970 ), 118-19.
22. References to Canguilhern's >Ι•orks will be given internally in accord with the
follo"'ing scherne of abbreviations:
CV: La Conιιaissaιιce ιle la vie, 2d ed. (Vήn, 1975).
Ε: Etudes d'lιistoirc et de p!ιilosoplιic dcs scieπces, 2d ed. (Vrin, 1970).
FCR: La fonιιation du conccpt de τeflex αιι:.; XVIJ• et X\ΙIJJ< siecles, 2d ed.
(V1·in, 1977).
IR; Ideologίe et ratioιιalite (Vήn, 1977).
ΝΡ: Le Νοηιιαl et le pathologίqιιe (Canguilhern's tlΙesis, Essai suι· qιιelques
pι·oblCιιιes concenιant le πornιalc et le patlιologίque, first published in
1943, along witl1 "Nouvelles reflections sur le nornΙal et le
pathologique") (PUF, 1966). Citations 1νill be frorn the English
translation Οπ tlιe Noπnal aιzd the Patlιologίcal (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1978).
Except for ΝΡ, all translations are mine.
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 35
lel to the CopeΓnican Γeνοlιιtίοη in astΓonomy. Earlίer physίol­
ogy, fωm Aristotle ancl Galen ο η, IΊacl postulated a "sίngle princί­
ple of command and control" (tl1e l1eart for Arίstotle, the brain
fοΓ Galen) fω- all bodily moνements. By contΓast, reflexes aΓe
movements that occur ίndependently of the oΓgan of central
control: "The CopeΓnican revolutίon ίη the physίology of move-
ωent is the dίssocίatίon of the notίons of the brain and of the
sensω-y-motor centeΓ, the dίscoveι-y of eccentΓic ce11ters, the foι-­
ωatio11 of tl1e concept ofthe reflex" (FCR, 127).
Sta11dard histoι-y attΓibutes ti1is revolutionary developn1ent to
DescaΓtes. Τhιιs, a recent stanclaΓcl refere11ce ;vork says:

The concept of tl1e refiex ... eιnbΓaces in a single theoΓy the

pl1ysiological desσίption of coιnplex bel1aviour and tlιe explana-
tion of hο>Ι' sinψle involιιntary activiιies, sιιch as tl1e kneejeΓk, aΓe
Γegulated. All tl1ese eleιnents of tl1e concept as a key to psychol-
ogy, aniιnal bel1avior and involuntaιΎ n1otions aΓe ίη Rene Des-
cartes' (ιsg6-ι6so) Tι·aite de l'Hoιnnιe. 23

Ca11guilhem agrees that DescaΓtes desaibed and tΓied to explai11

tl1e pl1e11omena (e.g., the witlιdrawal of a11 aΓm οΓ leg from a
fire) tlιat we call "reflex moveme11ts." But he insists that he clid
11ot forιηulate the co11cept of the reflex: "In DescaΓtes' woΓk ...
we fi11d 11either the term nor the co11cept of the reflex" (FCR,
52). 011e reason this is so is that a disti11guishing chaΓacteristic of
reflex moveme11t is tlιe fact tlιat "it does 11ot proceed directly
fΓom ... a ce11tral seat" sιιch as the heaΓt or the bΓai11 (FCR, 41).
But, accoΓdi11g to Descartes, a move111ent such as tlιe withdΓa;val
of a limb from fire does proceed directly from a central seat; it is
produced by the movement of the a11imal spirits from the brai11
(a11d ιιltimately from the heaΓt, wlιiclι is for Descartes the fiΓst
source of all bodily moveme11t). On Descartes's accoιι11t theΓe is
no place for moveme11ts originati11g from "ecce11tric" ce11ters.
FιιrtheΓ, the idea of reflex motion (as the termi11ological analogy
'vith the reflection of light sιιgg·ests) implies that the two move-
ωents, fΓοω the se11se oΓga11s to tlιe respo11se ce11ter a11d back
agaίn, are of the same kind. Βιιt this is by 110 mea11s so for
DescaΓtes, for >νhom "the excitatio11 of the se11ses and the co11trac-
tίon of the mιιscle are two ωovements with 110 a11alogical Γela-

23. Dictionaι)' of tlze lzistoη of science (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Uniνersity Press,
ιg81), 366.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tion" (FCR, 41). The first Descartes conceives as a pulling on the

chain of nerve fibers connecting the sω·face of the body to the
brain, analogous to pulling the cord that rings a bell. The second
he conceives as a pushing of the animal spirits through the tubes
containing the nerves, analogous to pumping air through an
organ pipe. In both cases, Descartes employs a mechanical ac-
count of the motion, but the two mechanisms are entirely differ-
ent. Canguilhem maintains that Descartes's views were in fact a
major obstacle to the formation of the concept of the reflex,
precisely because they did not allow for the sort of 'Ί·eflected"
motion, the same in both directions, that is ΓequiΓed by reflex
action (FCR, 51).
One source of the mistaken belief that Descartes introduced the
concept of the reflex is a confusion of the identification or descri p-
tion of a phenomenon with its proper conceptual interpretation.
But the misattribution also derives from a confusion of concept
and theory. In modern physiology, the concept of the reflex has
been a central element in mechanistic theories of the organism-
that is, theories that treat living things as merely complex versions
of inanimate physical systems. Descartes, of course, is famous as
an early proponent of mechanistic biology. Accordingly, it was
easy for historians who regarded tlιe course of science as a succes-
sion of tlιeories to assume that DescaΓtes's description of reflex
action in the context of lιis ωechanistic. tlιeory ν~τas equivalent to
the intΓOduction of the concept of reflex movement. This, how-
ever, ignores the essential independence of concepts fωm even
what come to be their canonical theoretical embodiments. In fact,
according to Canguilhem, the concept of the reflex was first intω­
duced in the distinctly nonmechanistic physiological theory of
Thomas Willis, a seventeenth-century English physician.
Willis explained bodily processes in terms of the chemistry of
combustion and a vitalistic notion of the animal soul. His ac-
counts were therefore faΓ Γemoved fωm the CaΓtesian mecha-
nism that seems the naturallocus ofreflex movement. Nonethe-
less, Willis was led, as Descartes was not, to the t'Yo central
elements of the concept of the reflex. First, he clearly distin-
guished the cerebellum, as tlιe center of involuntary movement,
from the cerebrιιm (οΓ bι-ain pωper), as the center of rational
thoιιght and voluntary action. This effected the crιιcial de-
centering of reflex movenιent. Second, he conceived of ι-eflex
movement as a genuinely syιηιnetrical pΓocess of back-and-
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 37
forth nιotion by tlιe animal sρiΓits, exρlicitly enψloying the
term mot~ιs τefleX'Lts in analogy to the Γeflection of liglιt. Conse-
quently, Cangιιillιenι concludes tlιat, "concerning the reflex, ·;ve
find in Willis the thing, the \Vord, and the notion" (FCR, 68).
Eighteenth-century uses aπd cleveloρωents of the conceρt of
the reflex (by, e.g., Astnιc, UπzeΓ, ancl PΓOchaska) likewise ρlaced
it ίπ tlιe context of noωnechaπistic aρpι-oaches to ρhysiology. It is
only in the late nineteeπth centιιry that "the majoΓity ofρhysiolo­
gists teπd to undeΓstand [tlιe Γeflex] as an eleωeπtary and rigid
meclιanisιn" (Ε, 302). LateΓ work (e.g., that of Slιeniπgtoπ), al-
tlιoιιglι thoΓOιιghly exclιιdiπg aπy asρect of final caιιsalίty from
the conceρt of tlιe reflex, has rejected extrenιe ιneclιaπistic inter-
ρretations of it (Ε, 304). In sιιm, the conceρt of the Γefiex lιas,
since its introclιιction by vVillis hνο lι ιιnclΓed yeaΓs ago, functioned
effectively iπ a wide variety of theoΓetical contexts.
Cangιιilhem places gΓeat emρhasis ο η the poiπt that his lιistory
of scientific conceρts does not itself ρretend to lιave scientific
statιιs. This is in contrast with a numbeΓ of otlιer inflιιential con-
ceρtions of the history of science. There is, fοΓ exaιnple, the essen-
tially ρositivist conception, articιιlated by Dψsterhuis (and earlier
by Coιnte's disciρle, Pierre Lafitte), of lιistory of science as the
"laboratoιΎ" of epistemology (cf. Ε, 13). Here the idea is tlιat the
events and resιιlts of scieπce's ρast aΓe simρly given to histoι·ians as
already constitιιtecl objects. Their fιιnction is to sσιιtiπize these
data- Lafitte spoke of the historian's 'Ίnental nιiσoscoρe" - and
ιιse tlιenι to evalιιate eρisteιnological accoιιnts of science.
Two other examρles of history of science modeled on science
itself are the "externalist" and "internalist" aρρiΌaches so mιιch
discιιssed by Anglo-American historians of science. Tlιe exter-
nalist ιιses the teclιniqιιes of ρsychology or the social sciences to
relate scientific develoρmeπts to economic, social, ρolitical, or
Γeligioιιs conditions. The internalist ignores sιιch conditions in
favoΓ of the. internallogic of a scieπce's development, bιιt he is
still inteΓested in eωρloying the facts aboιιt ti1is develoρωent to
evalιιate, in a broadly scientific way, generalizations about the
natιιΓe of science. This, we ωiglιt acld, is ρaι-ticιιlarly trιιe of
inteι-nalist history- fοι- exaωρle, tlιat of Κιιlιη, Lakatos, and
Laιιdan- designed to illιιιnine the ρlιilosophy of science. Here
histoι-ians view theωseives as exρeι-imenters in DUksterhιιis' labo-
ratory, ιιsίπg the data of histoι-y to test ιnethodological pι-inciρles
and models of scientific development.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

According to Canguilhenι, v.rhat is cοηιηιοη to all tlιese scien-

tific approaches to the history of science is tlιeir failure to see
history itself as passing noΓnιative judgnιents about the science iι
stιιdies. Consequently, to the nιodel of lιistory of science as a
laboratory, he opposes the nιodel of history of science as a la>ν
couτt in which ')udgnιents are nιade regarding the past ofkno>νl­
edge, or the kno>νledge of the past" (Ε, 13). On sιιch a nιodel,
history of science is not a scientific discipline precisely because its
explicitly nornιative intent excludes the value-free orientation
characteΓistic of a scientific analysis.
Βιιt in just \νhat sense does Canguilhenι see history of science
as evaluating Uudging) the past of science? Here he invokes
Bachelard's distinction of l'histoiτe pe1-i1nee and l'histoi1·e sanc-
tion?~ee, according to which past science is evaluated as outdated
or validated on the basis of its relation to the results of current
science. Thus, the historian's judgnιents are based on nornιs
derived fronι an epistenιological analysis infornιed (a la Bache-
lard) by current science. "It is epistenιology that is called ιιροη to
fuωish to histoι-y the principle fοι- judgnιent, and epistenιology
provides this judgnιent fΓΟηι its understanding of the latest lan-
guage spoken ... by science" (Ε, 13).
Canguilhenι also expι-esses the nonscientific natιπe of lιistory
of science in ternιs of the difference between its object and tlιe
object of science. "The object ίη tlιe histoι-y of science lιas noth-
ing in cοηιηιοη >νith the object of science" (Ε, 17). Essentially,
this is because the object of history of science has a lιistoΓical
character, >νhereas "science is science ofan object ... >vhich does
not have a history" (Ε, ι6). In tl1is context, an object's "having a
histoΓy" is not a nιatter of its nιeΓely having existed and changed
over tinιe. Ratlιer, an object is historical (has a history) >vlιen it is
regarded as essentially paΓt of a pΓOcess of histoΓical develop-
nιent tlιat is not finislιed. As historical, the object is essentially
inconιplete and hence not given ίη its full reality. The objects of
sciences (even of "historical" sciences such as geology ο Γ evolιι­
tionaΓy biology) are not lιistorical in this sense becaιιse science
treats thenι- along ;νith any histoτy tlιey nιay have- as givens
conιpletely available for analysis.24 The objects of tlιe lιistoιγ of
science are rather treated as only paτtially giνen, not fιιlly deteΓ-
24. Thus Canguillιem woulcl pΓesuιηably νiew "scientific" approaclιes to the his-
tory of science as not genιιinely historical, since, in treating eγents as data,
tlιey take tlιem out of tlιeir histoι·ical context.
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 39
mined. As a result, the νalue and even the meaning of science's
past may alter with its future progι-ess. In this regard, the work
of histoι·ians of science is νeι-y simίlar to that of critics of art and
literature.
Cangυilhem regards his conception of the history of science as
eliminating one majoι- concern of ιnany historians of science: the
search for precιιrsoι-s of major sόentific discoveries. Α precιιr­
sor, according to his wry definition, is "someone of whom we
know only after that he came before." 25 In speaking of precur-
sors, Canguilhem has particυlarly in mind the claim, frequently
made by historians, that maJor scientific innovations by, for ex-
ample, Copernicυs and Danιin were essentially anticipated by
mυch earlier thinkeι-s (e.g., Aristaι-chus, Diderot). Sometimes, ίη
fact, it seems that the historian's goal is to find ever earlier pre-
cursors for any important scientific work. As Cangυilhem points
ουt, if this seaι-ch fοι- precυrsoι-s is taken to the limit, then science
ceases to have a history; all scientific achievements occυrred in
some initial golden age (Ε, 21). In any case, he argυes that the
"discoveι-y" of a precursor is usυally based ση a failure to recog-
nize fundamental conceptιιal differences that underlie superfi-
cially similar formυlations. Those, for example, who think that
Reaumur or MaupeΓtuis were precursors of Mendel's work on
heredity do not understand the distinctive natυre of Mendel's
concept of an independent hereditary character (Ε, 22). Only
υnder the most stringent conditions does Cangυilhem allow any
talk of scientists from different historical periods having pυr­
sued the same line of research or having made the same discov-
ery. Unless, he says, we have

explicitly established that two researchers are asking the same

question and have the same research goal, that their guiding con-
cepts have the same signification and draw theίr meaning from
the same system of concepts, it is artificial, arbitrary, and inade-
quate ... to say that two scientific authors stand in a logical rela-
tion of beginning to completion or of anticipation to realization.
(Ε, 22)

But, although Canguilhem is firmly opposed to what, follow-

ing J. Τ. Clark (cf. Ε, 20), he calls "tlιe virυs of the precursor,"

25. Reported from a class lecture by J-J. Salomon, "Georges Canguilhem ou la

modernite," Rev1ιe de metaphysique et de 1noι·ale go (1985), 53·
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

this does not mean tl1at l1e denies the need to undeΓstanct tl1e
influence of earlier scientific vωrk on later. 26 Because science is a
part of human cultιιre, its discoveries aΓe conditioned by the
(explicit and implicit) education of those 1vho make them (Ε,
235). HeΓe Canguill1eιn speaks νeη 'positively of undeΓStanding
scientists' 1VOΓk ίη tenns of what they l1aνe leaΓned fωω tl1eir
"pΓedecessoΓS" and aΓgues tl1at failing to do tl1ίs leads to the soΓt
of empiricist ΟΓ positivist l1istoΓy of science that denies that genu-
ine histoτicity of science. Accoτdingly, we should not ιnisιιnder­
stand Cangιιilhem's rejection of the seaΓch fοι- scientists' precur-
sors in different histoΓical periods as a ι-efusal to consider tl1e
undeniably important influence of tl1eiι- predecessoτs ίη theiι­
own histoι·icocultuτal contexts. An adequate histoΓy of scientific
concepts will have to pay detailed attention to such inflιιences, as
Canguilhem himself does on many pages of his histoι-y of the
concept of tl1e Γeflex.
Cangιιill1em's conception of the l1istoΓy of science has obνious
strong affinities to Bacl1elaΓd's histoιΎ and philosopl1y of sci-
ence. Το cite two majoΓ exanψles, his focιιs on conceptιιal inno-
vation coπesponds to Bacl1elaΓd's pictιιτe of science as a seι-ies of
τevolιιtionaΓy bΓeaks, and he ιιndeι-stands tl1e evalιιative fιιnc­
tion of l1istoΓy of science in terms of Bacl1elard's contτast be-
tween l'histoire perimee and l'l~istoire sanctionnee. However, tl1eΓe
are also a nιιmber of impoι-tant ways in νvl1ich Cangιιilhem re-
fines, enricl1es, and even coπects ("rectifies") Bacl1elaΓd's ideas.
Even on the central point of epistemological bΓeaks, Cangιιilhem
offers a more nuanced vie1v than Bacl1elaιτl's, eιnphasizing the
need to ι-ecognize continιιities tlπoιιgh even majoι· bΓeaks in the
llistoΓy of science.

Often ... tl1e effect of a bι-eak is pι-esenιed as global, affecting tl1e

totality of a scientific '"οι-k. Βιιt '"e need to know l1oνv to ιιncoveΓ,
even in tl1e ν,•ork of a single historical figιιre, sιιccessive bΓeaks
and paι·tial bι-eaks. In a tl1eoΓeLical fabric, ceι·tain tlπeads can be
entiΓely ne>Ι•, 'vhile oίl1ers aΓe taken fΓon1 earlier Ι'/eaνings. Tl1e
Copeι-nican and Galilean revolιιtions also involved the preseΓva­
tion of a heΓitage. (Ε., 25)

26. But cf. ΝΡ, 8-ι. for wl1at seems ιο be an exanιple of Canguill1eιn IΊiιnself
falling Yicιiιn ιο tl1e virus.
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

Like,νise, with regard to l'histoiτe peτiιnee versιιs l'histoiτe sanc-

tionnee, Cangιιilhem's distinction of concepts fΓOm theoretical
context helps clarifγ the v.raγ in v.rhiclι a single piece of scientific
work (e.g., Black's discoveη' of specific heat) can be simιιlta­
neoιιsly sanctionnee (in tenns of tlιe concept intΓOdιιced) and
peτirιιee (in terιns of the tlιeoΓetical context of tlιe introdιιction).
Cangιιilhem also effects an implicit cωτection of Baclιelard's
concept of an epistemological obstacle. For Bachelard, the con-
cept lιas an entirely negatiνe connotation, Γefeπing ωeΓely to
what blocks tlιe path of iηqιιίητ and lιence needs to be removed.
Cangιιillιem, lιowever, allωΙ'S tlιat v.rhat are iωpediωents in one
respect ωay at the same tiωe be in otheΓ ways iιnpoΓtant soιιrces
of scientific pΓOgΓess. Sιιch, fοΓ exaωple, is the case in tlιe llistoΓy
ofbiology with tlιe ωιιclι abιιsed doctrine ofνitalisιn. 2 7 Altlιoιιgh
Cangι.ιilhem agΓees that ωaηγ decisive advances lιave reqιιired a
ωechanistic viewpoint, lιe nonetheless insists tlιat vitalisιn has
played the positive ΓOle of keeping biologists awaΓe of the distinc-
tive featιιres of the oΓganisms they aΓe trying to ιιnclerstand.
Cangιιillιem adιnits that "classical νitalisω" was entirely wrong in
its claim that OΓganisιns VΙ'eΓe exceptions to the laws of plιysics
and clιemistΓy. 'Όne cannot defend tlιe oΓiginality of biological
phenomena ... by setting ιιp, 'νitlιin tlιe doωain of physics and
cheιnistΓy, enclaνes of indeteπninisω, zones of dissidence, cen-
teΓs of heresy" (CV, 95). Ι η the sense that vitalism tried to reject
the application of physics and clιemistry to organisωs, it was an
obstacle to scientific progress. Βιιt, in anotheΓ sense, vitalisω
was- and Γemains- a salιιtary ΓeωίηdeΓ that, even if physico-
cheιnicallaws aΓe fully applicable to oΓganisιns, vital phenoιnena
still have distinctive featιιΓes that exclιιde any facile reduction of
theω to inanimate systems. DuΓing the eighteenth centιιry, fοΓ
exaωple, vitalists were, according to Cangιιilhem, "prιιdent posi-
tivists" or "Ν ewtonians" wlιo refused to engage in either material-
ist or animistic speculations about tlιe ιnetaphysical natιιΓe oflife
and instead called for ficlelity to the specific phenoιnena of the
biological realω.

27· Bachelard, ίη a discussion ofaniιnist obstacles to scientific pl"Dgress, explicitly

sets aside the questions of the role of vitalisn1 ίη the life sciences, saying he is
only concerned ιvith obstacles to progress ίη physics and chemistΙΎ (NES,
1 49).
42 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Vitalism was simply the recognition of life as an oι-iginal order of

phenomena and hence a recognition of the specificity ofbiological
knowledge .... [The vitalists') vital principle, their vi.r vitali.r, vi.r
iτιsita, vi.r neτvosa ιvere so many names that they gave to their inabil-
ity to accept either pure mechanism οι· the action of the soul [ani-
mism] as explanations of the phenomena of lίfe. (FCR, 164-65)

Α specific positive contribution of vitalism was to tl1e develop-

ment of the concept of the refl.ex: "Vitalism was ιnore suited
than mechanism to accustoιn the thought of biologists to the
decentι-alization of the functions of sensori-ιnotor cooι-dination"
(FCR, 171-72).
Canguilheιn's distinction of concept and theoι-y is l1elpful for
undeι-standing the dual status of vitalism. On the one hand,
vitalism is often an episteιnological obstacle to the development
of the best tl1eoretical system of explaining biological phenoιn­
ena. On tl1e other hand, it keeps biologists' concepts open to tl1e
uniqueness of the phenoιnena they aΓe designed to understand
and thus warns them against the reductionistic pretentions of
successful mechanistic theoι-ίes.
Given tl1e ambivalence he sees in soιne episteιnological obsta-
cles, it is not surpήsing that Canguill1em gives less weight than
BaclΊ.elard to the distinction between science and nonscience. For
Bacl1elard tl1is distinction is fundaιnental, since he sees the l1is-
tory of science as a constant struggle of scientific reason to break
away from nonscientific (especially iιnaginative and philosopl1i-
cal) constι-aints on thougl1t. Canguilheιn's uneasiness witl1 tl1e
idea of a sharp bι-eak between the scientific and the nonscientific
fiι-st appears in some comments about the application of BaclΊ.e­
laι-d's ideas to tl1e l1istory of the ι·eflex. At the end of his study of
this topic, he asks the Bachelardian question: "What sort of his-
toι-y, after all, have we been studying? Α histoι-y of scientific
thought or of pι·escientific tl1ought?" (FCR, 159). His answeι· is
that Bachelaι·d's dicl1otomy is not particularly applicable here,
since the concept of the reflex '\νas forωed during a peι-iod of
transition from prescientific to scientific thinking. Μοι·e to the
point, l1e suggests, is Bachelard's closely related distinction be-
tween everyday expeι-ience (l'expέrience con~m1.ιne) and scientific
experience (l'exjJέrίence scientifique). But even this distinction, Can-
guilheιn notes, is a relative one. In physiology, for exaιnple, tl1e
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 43
work of Legallois seems to involve scientific experience in com-
parison to the everyday experience employed by Whytt, but
>νhen compared to the >νork of Pflίiger or Sl1errington, that of
Legallois seems based on everyclay Γather than scientific experi-
ence (FCR, ι6ι). In the end, Canguilhem concludes that the
most we can say is that work on the reflex at lateΓ times (e.g.,
aroιιnd ι8sο) was 1nore scientific than at other times (e.g., around
ι8οο), >νl1ere the "mω·e" is due to the fact that the concept of tl1e
reflex is more fully integrated into experimental techniques and
employed in tl1e explanation of a '"'ider variety of phenomena.
Cangιιilhem's early hesitations about the significance of a
shaΓp distinction between the scientific and tl1e nonscientific
eventιιally led him to the important intermediate concept of a
scientific ideology. As l1e explicitly ackno,vledges (IR, g), his woΓk
on tl1is topic is inflιιenced by that of his pupils, Louis Althusser
and Micl1el Foucault.
Cangιιilhem notes that the. term icleology ω·iginally Γeferred to
"the science of the genesis of ideas" that, during the eighteenth
century, Cabanis and Destrutt de TΓacy pωposed as a basis for
'ίtΓeating ideas as natuΓal phenomena" understood in Γelation to
tl1eiΓ natural ei}νironment. Tl1e liberal political vίews of tl1ese
"ideologists" brougllt tl1em into conflict '"'ith Napoleon's impe-
Γial aιnbitions, and, in the ensuing controversy, Napoleon and
his sιιppoΓters portΓayed them as ιιnrealistic metapl1ysicians who
weΓe trying to cut Γeality to fit theiΓ theoι-ies. ΜaΓΧ picked up on
this abιιsive use of "ideologγ" and gave the term its canonical
meaning as "any systeιn of ideas pΓoduced as the effect of a
situation doomed fωm the staΓt to misιιnderstand its Γeal connec-
tion to Γeality [son rapjJort reel au reel]" (IR, 36).
ΜaΓΧ himself dΓaws a sharp contΓast between science (i.e., his
own scientific economics) and ideologγ, so that for hiιn the notion
of ascientific ideolog)' >νould seem to be a "logical monster" (IR, 36).
But Canguilhem notes that, in Tlιe Gennan ideology, ΜaΓΧ does not
include "boιιΓgeois sciences" such as Newtonian mechanics ΟΓ
classical electΓodynamics in the list of ideologies, although he does
enψhasize, against Feιιerbach, their essential debt- for both
goals and methods- to capitalist bιιsiness and industΓ)' (IR, 37).
This sιιggests that, even from a Marxist viewpoint, there is Γοοm
for activities that aΓe genuinely scientific- that is, yield objective
knowledge - even thoιιgh they are molded by the sort of forces
44 FOύCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

that pΓOduce ideologies. Το give Canguilhem's thougl1t here an

expι-ession he does not use, we might say that even Marx needs to
allow for the existence of "ideologίcal scίences. "28
But Canguίlhem tl1inks we must also introduce tl1e furtheι­
categoι-y of a scientific ideolog;', an ίdeology (l1ence not a body of
objective knowledge) tl1at has nonetl1eless an essential orίenta­
tίon to scίence. Such an ideology has two maίn characteΓistίcs.
First, it takes some exίsting science as its model of knowledge;
hence it has pretentions to a scίentific status defined by tl1e stan-
dards of science contemporary to ίt. Second, howeveι-, a scien-
tific ideology makes claίms about reality that go far beyond the
capacity of contemporaΓy science to establish; hence its pι-eten­
tions aΓe meι-ely pι-etentions and its claims scίentίfically pι-esιιmp­
tuoιιs. Scientific ίdeologies aι-e not ideologies of scientists - that
ίs, ideologies deriving fι-om scίentists' effoι-ts to deteι-mine the
place of theiι- science in relation to otheι- foι-ms of cιιltuι-e. They
aι-e ratl1er ideologies of pl1ilosopheι-s, deriving from "discnssions
'vith scientific pretentions carried out by men who aι-e still, ι-e­
garding tl1e subject under discussion, only pι-esunψtive or pre-
sumptuous scientists" (IR, 44) ..
As examples of scientific ideology, Canguill1em cites Maιιper­
tuis's woι-k οη genetics in his Vέ1~u.s p!ι)'siψιe and HeΓbert Spen-
ceι-'s evolutionary tl1eoι-y. Botl1 cases represent tl1e double rela-
tion that scientific ideology bears to genuine science. On tl1e one
hand, it points "lateι·ally" toward a science contenψoΓary to ίt
that seι-ves as its model; on the otheι- l1and, it points forwaι-d
toyνaι-d a future science tl1at will replace the ideology's preten-
tions with genuine ι-esults. Maupertuis's genetic specιιlations
were modeled on llis own sιιccessfιιl woΓk in mechanics and tl1e
calcιιlιιs of ρι-obabilities aηd weι-e sιιpeΓseded by Mendel's scien-
tific theory of heι-editaι-y chaΓacteristics. SpenceΓ pι-esented his
"law of eνolιιtion" as a geneι-alization of tl1e ρΓinciples of Von
Baeι-'s eωbryology, and l1is work was eventιιally clisρlaced by
Darwin's scientific theoι-y of evolιιtion thΓOιιgh natιn-al selection.
Althoι.ιgh the pι-etentions of scίentific ideologies ιnay 'vell
ρresent obstacles to tl1e pι-ogι-ess of scίence, Canguilhem also em-

28. Canguilhem notes (IR, g8) that Marx 11iιnself admits that Greek art, foι­
example, l1as a peι-ωanent Yalue despite its ι-elativity to paι-ticulaι- social
conditions. "Can Marxisω," l1e asks, "refuse to Greek geoωetry \Vhat Marx
accoι-ded to Greek aι-t?" As \Ve \Vill see in Cl1apteι- 6, Foucault also ι·ecognizes
sciences \Vith ideological content (ΑΚ, 184-86).
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 45
phasizes their positive role. This deΓives froω the fact that the
progτess of science "reqιιires ... a certain priority [anteτio1itέ] of
intellectιιal adventtπe over ι-ationalization, presuωptιιous sur-
passing, in view of the demands of life and action, of wlιat has
been pωperly veι-ified as knoνvledge" (IR, 38). Scientific ideolo-
gies pωvide this needed dimension ofintellectιιal adventuΓe that
is, strictly speaking, not entiΓely responsible. AccoΓdingly, Can-
guillιem concludes tlιat a scientific ideology can be "at the same
tiωe an obstacle and a condition ofpossibility ... fοΓ the constitιι­
tion of science" (IR, 38). So scientific ideologies appeaΓ as a majoΓ
example of the ambivalence of epistemological obstacles.
Canguillιem notes that scientific ideologies will be of no inteΓ­
est to tlιose who think tlιat tlιe histoι-y of science is sinψly the
continιιal accιιnιulation of tnιths. But for those, like Bachelaι-d
and himself, wlιo see the history of science as a never conψletecl
"pnrification" (IR, 44) of eπors, they are an essential concern.
Althoιιgh it is always necessary to distinguislι genιιine science
fωm scientific ideology, the two are in fact intertwined in tlιe
history of science, and an adequate understanding of the prog-
ress Όf science requires an understanding of botlι. Bachelard's
distinction of wlιat is outdated and ν.τlιat is validated in the scien-
tific past is still sound, but it cloes not justify tlιe historian in
mining only the scientific gold and ignoring the icleological dross
(IR, 45). This Γeinforces tlιe rejection of a sharp distinction be-
tween internal and external history of science, which, as we saνv
(note 11 above), was already implicit in BaclιelaΓd's account of
epistemological obstacles.

Canguilhem's conception of norms

ΟuΓ discιιssion of Canguillιem's conception of tlιe 11istory of
science shows that fοΓ him it is an essentially nor.mative disci-
pline. But so faΓ we have said almost notlιing abont his views on
the natιιre of nornιs and evaluation. That is a crucial issue, paι-­
ticιιlaι-ly given the difficulties that we have seen BaclιelaΓd has
undeΓstanding and gΓOunding normativejudgωents. MoreoveΓ,
Canguilhem has devoted a substantial poΓtion of his histoΓical
and philosophical effoΓt to an analysis of norιns and the normal,
and, as we shall see, the statιιs of nonns is an important issιιe fοΓ
Foucault. So it will be valuable fοΓ us to take a close look at this
key aspect of Cangnilheω's 'νοΓk.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Cangnilhem's thesis for his doctoral degree in medicine, pnb-

lislled in 1943, was an 'Έssay on Soωe Problems Concerning
the Normal and the Pathological." Here Cangnilhem ιιnder­
takes a snbstantial historical analysis and philosophical cτiticism
of a thesis pιιt forward by F.-J. V. Bι·oussais ίη the early nine-
teenth centuΓy and later taken up by Augnste Comte and
Clande Bernard. According to this tl1esis (B1·oιιssais's P1·i1ιciple),
patl1ological states (diseases) are merely quantitative modifica-
tions of normal (l1ealtl1y) states. Illness is nothing moΓe t~an an
exces~ or defect of some factor Γequisite for l1ealtl1. As Claude
Bernard put it:

Health and disease aΓe not t'vo essentially diffeΓent n10des ....
τl1ey should not be n1ade into distinct pΓinciples, entities \Vhich
fight over tl1e liνing oΓganisll1 and n1ake it the theatΓe of theiΓ
contest. These aΓe obsolete n1edical icleas. In Γeality, between
these two n1odes of being, theΓe are only diffeΓences of degτee:
exaggeΓation, dispΓOpoΓtion, discoι·dance of noΓll1al phenon1ena
constitιιte tl1e diseased state. TheΓe is no case wheΓe disease would
l1ave pΓoduced ne\ν conditions, a coιnplete change of scene, sοιηe
ne'v and special pΓOducts. (Cited, ΝΡ, 33)

Το cite some simple examples: Diabetes is due to an excess of

sιιgar in the ιπine, leιιkemia to an excess of \vhite blood cells,
anemia to a lack of red blood cells. Given Broιιssais's Principle,
there is no essential difference between pl1ysiology (the study of
normal bodily functions) and patl1ology (tl1e study of diseases as
deviations from tl1e norιn).
Cangnilhem criticizes Bronssais's Principle ση both conceptual
and empirical gronnds. Conceptually, he claims that its defense
freqnently involves a confnsion of contiπuily and lι01ιιogeneit)'­
that is, a failnre to realize that jnst becaιιse one state can be
derived fι-om anotl1eι· by a cοηtίηιιοιιs seι-ies of qnantitative
changes, it does not follow that the two states do not differ quali-
tatively. Empirically, he argnes that many diseases, particnlaΓly if
they are nnclerstood in their full coιnplexity, are in fact not
pι-odιιced by an excess or defect of some constituent of a healthy
body. In tllis regard, he offers a thoτoιιgh discιιssion of the
natuΓe and etiology of diabetes (ΝΡ, 37-40).
More impoΓtant for οιιr pnΓposes, Cangnill1em also outlines
his own view ofhealth and disease, the normal and the pathologi-
cal, as qιιalitatively diffeΓent states of tl1e organism. At the lιeart
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 47
of this vie'-\' is his claim that biological norms are posited by the
organism itself. Certain states and modes of functioning have a
special value fωm the organism's point of view, even though
otl1er states and modes of functioning aι-e equally possible and
perhaps even moι-e common. Here Cangιιilhem thinks there is
an inψortant contrast between modern physics and biology. Aris-
totelian mechanics distingnished between normal (natuΓal) and
pathological (violent) motions. Tl1is polaΓity of motions was re-
jected by Galileo and DescaΓtes in favoΓ of a pΓinciple of ineι-tia
that "made the distinction between natural and violent move-
ments absω·d, as ineΓtia is precisely an indifference '"'ith respect
to directions and vaΓiations in moveιnent" (ΝΡ, 71). By contrast,
life, the object of biology, "is far Γemoved frωn sucl1 an indiffer-
ence to the conditions whicl1 are made for it" (71). For exanψle,
when an oΓganism fails to exaete digestive wastes, whicl1 tl1en
congest or poison it, "this is all indeed accoΓding to law (pl1ysical,
chemical, etc.) but none of this follows the noΓm, which is the
activity of the organism itself" (ΝΡ, 71). It is biologically absurd
to make no distinction in principle between states that enhance
an oΓganism's fnnctioning in its environment and those tl1at im-
pede οΓ eliminate it.
AccoΓdingly, Cangιιilhem insists on a qualitative distinction
between health and disease, a distinction ιιndeΓstood in terms of
values establisl1ed by the veΓy nature of the organism. However,
he does not think of l1ealth (the normal state) as life in accord
with noΓms and of disease as merely life in violation of these
noι-ms. Το any state of an oΓganism there coπesponds a ceΓtain
mode of living, and this mode of living defines norms appΓOpri­
ate to it. Hence, any state of an oΓganism, even a pathological
one, is goveΓned by noΓms; that is, theΓe is a standaΓd patteΓn of
behavioΓ appropΓiate fοΓ an oΓganism in the state. In '"'hat then
consists the uniqueness and the superioΓity of states that aΓe
healthy? According to Canguilhem, it is the fact that in a healthy
state the oΓganism is capable of adjusting to new situations by
instituting new norms.

Being healthy means being not only noΓmal in a given situation

but also normative ίη this and otl1er eventual situations. Wl1at
characteΓizes health is the possibility of transcending tl1e norm,
which defines the momentary normal, the possibility of tolerating
infractions of tl1e habitιιal norm and instituting new norms ίη new
situations. (ΝΡ, 115)
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Thus, the lσss σf a kidney is pathσlσgical, even tl1σugh, in mσst

cases, the σrganism continues tσ functiσn just as it did 1vith twσ.
The pathσlσgy cσnsists in the fact that the range σf circum-
stances in which tl1e organism can ιnaintain nσrmal functions
has been significantly reduced. Thus, "disease is characterized
by the fact that it is a reductiσn in the margin σf tσlerance fσr the
envirσnment's incσnsistencies" (ΝΡ, 116). Tl1is pσint is particιι­
larly suppσrted by the fact that, typically,

we are more concerned about the disease. any given disease may
plunge us into tlιan about the disease itself.... Measles is notlι­
ing, but it's bronchial pneumonia tlιat we dι·ead. Syphilis is so
feaι·ed only after it strikes the nerνous systeω. Diabetes is not so
seι·ious if it is just glycoria [pι·esence of carbohydrates in tlιe
u1·ine]. But coma? gangrene? what 1vill happen if sul'gery is neces-
sary? (ΝΡ, 117)

In sum, an organism is healtl1y when it is nσt σnly capable σf

surviving in its current circumstances (by functiσning in accσrd
with nσrms apprσpriate to thσse ciΓcumstances) but alsσ capable
σf surviving in a significant range σf alternative circun1stances
(by fιιnctiσning accoι·diηg tσ new nσnns apprσpriate tσ the new
circumstances).
Α cruάal pσint fσllσws frσm this accσuηt σf biσlσgical ηοι·ms.
Tl1e cσηcept σf such ησrms "caηησt be reduced tσ an objectiνe
cσncept determiηable by scientific methσds" (ΝΡ, 138). Physiol-
σgy dσes, σf cσuΓse, describe aηd explain tl1e states that we call
nσrmal aηd l1ealthy. But tl1e appellatiσns "nσrmal" and "healtlιy"
are nσt applied ση the basis σf physiolσgical results. τl1ey are
applied iη virtue σf the meaηiηg σf the states iη questioη fσι- the
σrganism itself. Similarly fοι· patl1σlogy's coηceι-n witl1 disease.
When physiσlσgists study healtl1y states and pathσlσgists diseased
oηes, tl1.e states so cl1aracterized are given tσ tl1eιn ση tl1e basis σf
ηoηscientific judg1nents gΓΟιιηded iη the life experience of the
organism. As Caηguilhe1η says, it is tl1e patient who calls the doc-
tσr (ΝΡ, 134). 29 That is, all the apparatus σf scientific medicine is
oriented tσward nσrms (health, the avσidance σf disease) that are
defiηed indepeηdently σf and priσr tσ σbjective scientific analy-
sis. Of cσurse, a physiciaη may tell a patient that l1e is sick even

29. Except, he says, for the case of mental illness, a remark fοι· which Fotιcault's
FD can be regarded as providing an elaboι<ιte commentary.
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 49
when the patient feels l1.ealtlιy. But this is only because medical
science lιas discovered causal connections between the patient's
present "lιealthy" state and one that the patient wouldjudge un-
lιealthy. At root, the norιns that concern ιηedical science are not
objective facts that it discoνeΓs. 'Όne does not scientifically clictate
norms to life" (ΝΡ, 134). RatlιeΓ, norιns aΓe constituted by ω·gan­
isms themselves- by life itself.
In view of this, Caήguilhem says tlιat ιnedical noΓms lιave a
"subjective" origin and that in consequence "theΓe is no objec-
tive pathology" (ΝΡ, 134). Tl1is does not mean, of course, that
tlιe desσiptions and explanations offered by the pathologist (or
tlιe physiologist) aΓe not rigoωusly scientific ancl fully objective.
But the pΓecise chaΓacteΓization of the states described and ex-
plained as healthy οΓ diseased does not deΓiνe from objectiνe
scientific analysis bιιt frοιη the ω·ganism's expeΓience of the
state.
Althoιιgh Cangιιilhem insists on the "sιιbjective" nature of or-
ganic norms, it is important to realize that he regards them as
rooted not in the wlιims or idiosynσasies ofthe inclividιιal organ-
ism bιιt ίη its essential natιn-e as the soΓt of ω·ganism it is. As lιe
comιηents in his "New Reflections on the Norιηal and tlιe Patlιo­
logical," publislιed twenty years after lιis thesis, "tlιe vital needs
and norms of a lizaι-d or a stickleback in their natιιral habitat are
expressed in the very fact that these animals are veΓy natιπal
living beings in this habitat" (ΝΡ, 158). He even speaks in this
connection of an "innate model" fω· tlιe behaνioΓ of an organism
(ΝΡ, 155-56). Althoιιgh biological norms aΓe not objective in the
sense of conclusions from neutral scientific investigation, they
are nonetheless finnly rooted in the biological reality of the or-
ganisms they regιιlate. They are subjective only in the sense that
tlιey deΓive from the organism's lived experience of this reality.
Another point worth noting is that, for Cangιιilhem, altlιoιιgh
tlιe abnormal (or pathological) is grammatically and logically sιιb­
seqιιent to the norιnal, it is existentially pΓiω·. This is becaιιse
"rule begins to be rιιle only ίη making rιιles and this fιιnction of
coπection arises from infraction itself" (ΝΡ, 14 7). Merely lιealthy
ρersons do not think of themselves as suclι. Tlιe concept ofhealth
is formed only as a contrast to an expeι·ience of disease ΟΓ of the
tlπeat of disease. 'Ήealth," ίη tlιe ρhι-ase ofRene Leriche, "is life
lived in tlιe silence of the organs," a silence that has no need to
articulate a concept of itself (cited, ΝΡ, 149).
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

But can we move fΓOm this account of biological norms to an

understanding of the norms that apply to social gΓOups ancl to
the norms of that νery special social group, the cωnmιιnity of
scientific researchers? According to Canguil11em tl1e status of
social nol"ms is very different from that of biological norms. He
agrees tl1at societies mimic the noΓms of organisιns and that, i~
the case of archaic and so-called primitive societies, social norms
expressed in dominating traditions may have tl1e kind of inevita-
ble force that biological nonns do. But this is not so for the sort
of societies that we live in. In order to treat a society as an
organism ΊNith respect to norms, we Inιιst "be able to speak of a
society's needs and norms as one speaks of an ω-ganism's vital
needs and norms, that is, unambiguously" (ΝΡ, 158). In other
words, tl1ere has to be a fixed set of norms apρlicable to tl1e
society as a whole, defining its essential ρurpose as a society. But,
says Canguilhem, in societies like ours, 'Όne of the tasks of the
entire social organization consists in informing itself of its possi-
ble purposes," a fact that "seems to show clearly that, strictly
speaking, [sιιch a society] has no intrinsic finality" (ΝΡ, 155). τl1e
very fact tl1at individuals question the de facto needs and nonns
of their society sl1o>vs, in Canguilhem's view, "tl1at these neecls
and norms are not tl1ose of tl1e whole society" (ΝΡ, 158). Reflec-
tion on such cl1allenges sl1oιιld lead ιιs "to ιιnderstand to wl1at
extent social need is not imιnanent, to >vhat extent tl1e social
norm is not internal, and, finally, to wl1at extent tl1e society, seat
of restrained dissent or latent antagonisms, is far frωn setting
itself u p as a whole" that coulcl determine ιιneqιιivocally autl1ori-
tative norms (ΝΡ, 158).
In fact it seems tl1at, for Canguilheω, it is not only the fact of
dissent by individuals that undermines tl1e aιιtl1ority of social
norms. Even a universal consensus regaΓding standards woιιld
not in itself give theιn genuinely noΓmative statιιs. This, at least,
is Canguilhem's position VΙ•ith Γegard to the case most important
for us, tl1e noΓms of tl1e scientific conυnιιnity. This position be-
comes cleal" in his σitical evalιιation of Thomas Kιιhn's notions
of paΓadigm and of noΓmal science. The teΓms jJaτadigιn and
nonnal science suggest, as they sl1ould, tl1e idea of noπns regulat-
ing scientific activity. But, accoΓding to Canguill1eιn, Kul1n un-
derstands tl1em in a way that deprives them of any genιιinely
regulatory function. This is because he accoΓds 11is paΓadigωs
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM

aηd ησrmal scieηces 'Όηly aη empirical mσde σf existeηce as

cultural facts." Mσre fully, fσr Kuhn,

the paradigm is the result of a choice by those who use it. The
normal is what is common, over a given peι-iod, to a collectivity of
specialists in a university or other academic institution. We think
we are dealing with concepts of a philosophical critique, only to
find ourselves on the level of social psycl1ology. (IR, 23)

Sσ the coηseηsus abσut

a paradigm that prσvides the basis fσr
Kuhηiaη ησrmal scieηce is σηly a de factσ psychσlσgical agree-
meηt with ησ ησrmative fσrce. Here Caηguilhem's critique σf
Kuhη is very similar tσ that σf Pσpper, Lakatos, aηd their fσl­
lσwers.
Caηguilhem coηtrasts what he sees as Kuhη's merely psychσ­
lσgical ησtiση σf ησrmal scieηce with the ησrms σf Bachelard's
history aηd philσsσphy σf scieηce. 30 The latter, he says, have
mσre thaη a psychσlσgical status siηce they are staηdards fσι- the
cσrrectiση (rectification, norιnalisation) σf the errσrs σf tl1e past
(IR, 23). But iη aησtheι- discussiση Caηguilhem raises aη σbjec­
tiση tσ Bachelard that is veι-y similar to his criticism σf Kuhη. He
begiηs by recalliηg Bachelard's emphasis ση the psychσlσgical
σι-igiηs σf epistemσlσgical σbstacles to scieηtific prσgress aηd ση
the ηeed fσr a "psychσaηalysis σf kησwledge" to σvercσme them.
He theη asks:

But does not an enterprise that consists, by its author's own admis-
sion, in searching, through the psychoanalysis of epistemological
obstacles, for the psychological conditions of the progress of sci-
ence run the risk of disqualifying science's claim to objectivity?
Psychologism does not have a good press. (Ε, 204-205)

Bachelaι-d's respσi_lse, σf cσurse, is that the pι-σcess σf ι-ectificatiση

σfpast eπσrs elimiηates the merely cσηtiηgeηt psychσlσgical ele-
meηts iη favσr σf geηuiηe ησrms. By pωgressively elimiηatiηg
errσι-s ση particulaι- issues, "the task σf depsychσlσgizatiση is car-
ι-ied σut" (RA, 48; cited, Ε, 2σ5). But Caηguilhem is ησt at all suι-e

30. In my νiew this psychological interpretation of normal science is not an

accurate reading of Kuhn. For an alternatiνe reading, see my Introduction to
G. Gutting, ed., Paι-adigms and 1·evolutioιιs (Notre Dame, Indiana: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1g8o).
52 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

this is aπ adequate respoπse. How precisely do πorms derive from

the process of rectificatioπ? As we have seeπ, Bachelard iπvokes
his coπcept of "coratioπalism," whereby a scieπtific claim is sup-
ported πotjust by aπ iπdividual iπcliπatioπ to accept it but by the
logical force that its proof will exercise on any ratioπal miπd. He
also speaks of the "iπtellectual surveillaπce of the self," whereby
the self, divided ίπtο the "existiπg Ι" of the cogito aπd the
"surexistiπg Ι" of the cogitamus iπterπalizes epistemic values.
Caπguilhem fiπds all this iπgeπious but ποt fiπally coπviπciπg. He
πotes that throughout "Bachelard coπtiπues to employ the vo-
cabulary of individual aπd iπterpersoπal psychology" (Ε, 205). He
speaks of "πormative psychism" aπd "πormative psychology."
But, Caπguilhem asks, if we describe scieπtific πorms ίπ this way,
haveπ't we ίπ fact proposed a "psychologism of πormalizatioπ"­
that is, reduced πorms to coπtiπgeπt psychological factors? The
most Caπguilhem is williπg to graπt is that "Bachelard is totally
clear about the difficulty of thoroughly coπstitutiπg the vocabu-
lary of a ratioπalist epistemology without referriπg to aπ oπtologi­
cal theory of reasoπ or to a traπsceπdeπtal theory of categories"
(Ε. 206).
So it seems that, ίπ the eπd, Caπguilhem fiπds ίπ Bachelard πο
more than ίπ Kuhπ aπ adequate accouπt of the basis for social
norms. Ενeπ for the privileged special case of the πorms of
scieπtific commuπities, πeither adequately grouπds the authority
of πorms. Nor does Caπguilhem himself aπywhere provide the
πeeded middle grouπd betweeπ psychologism aπd traπsceπdeπ­
talism. Although biological norms are for him firmly rooted ίπ
the life of the orgaπism, social πorms, eveπ those of Caπguil­
hem's πormative history of scieπce, remaiπ without aπ adequate
fouπdatioπ.

Foucault and the Bachelard-Canguilhem network

Ιπ maπy importaπt respects, Foucault's view of scieπce is Bache-
lardiaπ. He accepts, for example, the esseπtial historicity of scieπ­
tific coπceptioπs as well as the uπderstaπdiπg of this historicity ίπ
terms of a discoπtiπuous series of breaks. lπdeed, all the talk of
"rupture," "coupure," "mutation," aπd so οπ, that Foucault aπd
others (e.g., Althusser) made so fashioπable ίπ the 1g6os derives
directly from Bachelard. Foucault further implicitly accepts the
basic πegative epistemological aπd metaphysical theses- for ex-
 BACHELARD AND CANGUILHEM 53
ample, the rejections of a sharp theory/observation distinction
and of naive realism- associated with Bachelard's account of
science. He also shares Bachelard's emphasis on the need to treat
questions of scientific rationality in "regional" terms, eschewing
grandly global theories for specific studies of particular disciplin-
ary and chronological domains. Similarly, Foucault's historical
studies share \νhat he himself appreciatively noted 31 as Bache-
lard's penchant for focusing on obscure and neglected works
and figures as a way of challenging orthodox views ίη the history
of science.
But there are even deeper affinities between Foucault and
Bachelard. Foucault's fundamental critical project of showing
the contingent nature of what present themselves as necessary, a
priori limits on knowledge corresponds to Bachelard's insistence
that philosΌphical a prioris derive f'rom our inability or unwilling-
ness to think beyond the categories of current (οΓ recently past)
science. Similarly, Foucault's basic idea of an archaeological un-
covering of the "deep structures" of knowledge is closely related
to Bachelard's idea of a "psychoanalysis" of' knowledge. Indeed,
Foucault himself characterized his work as primarily aimed at
the elucidation of' the unconscious of our knowledge. 32
Furthermore, on a number of points where Foucault would
disagree with Bachelard, his disagreement mirrors that of Can-
guilhem. Ι η ΑΚ, f'or example, he follows Canguilhem ίη emphasiz-
ing the various ways that continuities can persist across epistemo-
logical breaks. He likewise rejects Bachelard's entirely negative
construal of "unconscious" factors in scientific thought as episte-
mological obstacles. Also, Foucault sympathizes with Canguil-
hem's move away from Bachelard's insistence ση a sharp distinc-
tion between science and nonscience.
Positively, Foucault's work in the history of' science is strongly
influenced by Canguilhem's history of' concepts. This is not sur-
prising, since Canguilhem was not only one of his teachers at the
Ecole Normale Superieure but also the director of his doctoral

3 ι."Gasωn Bachelard, le philosophie et son ombre: 'pieger sa propι-e culture',"

Figaro littPι-αίre, Sept. 30, 1972, p. ιfi.
32. Cf. for example, an intervie\v \vith J-P. ΕΙ Kabbach. "Foucault repond ;'ι
Sartre," Qιιinzaine lιtteι-αιre, Mar. ι-15, ιg68, in \vhich Foικaulι says: 'Ί have
tried to disengage aπ auιonomoιιs domain that \Voιιld be that of the uncon-
scious ο Γ science, the unconscioιιs of kno\v[e(\ge [c<avoir], \vhich would have its
own rules, _just as the unconscious σι· ιhe lωman indi\·idual also has its rules
and determinations" (2 ι).
54 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

thesis, FD. (Althσugh mσst σf the thesis seems to have beeη

writteη while Fσucault was teachiηg σutside Fraηce, the preface
to FD explicitly ησtes the clσse readiηg aπd commeπtary Caπ­
guilhem gave the maηuscτipt.) Ιπ aπy case, as we shall see, Fσu­
cault's historical aηalyses coπsisteπtly reAect Caπguilhem's em-
phasis ση coπcepts σver theσries aπd οη the vanity σf superficial
pursuits σf "precursσrs." It wσuld be clearly wrσπg to ideπtify
Fσucault's archaeσlσgical methσd with Caπguilhem's history σf
coπcepts. But it is equally clear that this sσrt σf history is σπe
impσrtant aspect σf archaeσlσgical aπalysis aπd sσmetimes (as ίη
BC) the dσminaπt σne.
Nσne σf the abσve is meant to suggest that Fσucault was a
mere disciple σf Bachelard aπd Caπguilhem. His wσrk devel-
σped frσm his σwπ distinctive agenda and embraced maηy topics
and coηcerns far remσved frσm their dσmaiπ σf the history and
philσsσphy σf science. Mσreσver, even where the iπAueπce σf
Bachelard and Canguilhem is particularly strσng, Fσucault ex-
teπds, adapts, aπd transfσrms their idea aπd methσds. But it
remains true that uπderstaπding his relatiσπ to these two think-
ers is a sigπificant aid in uπderstaridiπg the methσdσlσgy he
develσped fσr writing the history σf reasσπ. Accordiπgly, in the
fσllσwiπg chapters, my comments ση the methσdσlσgical aspects
σf FD, BC, aπd ΟΤ will σften take the fσrm σf reAectiσπs ση
Fσucault's cσnπectiσπs with Bachelard aηd Caπguilhem. Απd
my discussiσn σf ΑΚ in Chapter 6 will prσvide the σccasiσn fσr
some final conclusiσηs abσut Fσucault's place in the Bachelard-
Canguilhem netwσrk. Here - as well as in Chapter 7 - Ι will alsσ
raise the issue σf Fσucault's pσsitiση on the cτucial issue σf
nσrmativity.
 2
----------------------~ ~----------------------
MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS

Early writings on mental illness

Foucault's first publications appeared in 1954: a monograph enti-
tled Maladie mentale et personnalite (ΜΜΡ) and a long ( 120 pages)
introduction to the French translation of Ludwig Binswanger's
Traum und Existenz (RE). These two works were the culmination
ofhis studies in philosophy and psychology at the Ecole Normale
Superieure and provide essential background for understanding
his major work on madness, Folie et deraison, published seven
years later. They also reflect the strong influence of existential
phenomenology and of Marxism on his early work.
ΜΜΡ appeared again in 1962 ίη a second edition, retitled
Maladie mentale et la psychologie (MMPsy). The first part is es-
sentially the same ίη the two editions, but the second part has
been radically rewritten in the second edition, ίη accord with
the views Foucault put forward in Folie et deraison (FD). Thus,
comparing the two editions provides a sense of the develop-
ment of Foucault's thought from 1954 to 1961 and is very
important for understanding his viewpoint in FD. Unfortu-
nately, matters have been very confused by the presentation of
the English translation, which is ίη fact of the 1962 second
edition but which gives the copyright date of the original being

55
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

translated as 1954· This has misled some commentators into

thinking that Foucault held already in 1954 views that he in fact
developed later. The confusion about translation- along with
the replacement in France of the first edition by the second-
has also led to a lack of awareness of Foucault's important and
interesting early views on the nature and explanation of mental
illness. Ι will begin with an analysis of the _1954 texts (ΜΜΡ and
RE) and then move to a discussion of the 1962 text (MMPsy) as
a transition to FD.
Foucault's goal in ΜΜΡ is to see what sense there is in our talk
of mental "illnesses" and just how such disorders are related to
organic illness. His initial proposal is that it is a mistake to "give
the same meaning to the notions of illness, symptoms, and etiol-
ogy in mental pathology and in organic pathology" (1-2, 2) and
that to understand mental illness we must abandon the "abstract
metapsychology" that assumes that 'Όrganic disturbances and
personality changes ... possess the same type of structure" (2,
2). 1 Consequently, he proposes to analyze the phenomenon of
mental illness ίη its own terms, with no reliance on organic analo-
gies, and determine its specific character and origin.

Placing our credit in man himself and not in the abstractions of

illness, we must analyze the specificity of mental illness, seek the
concrete forms it can take in the psychological life of aπ individ-
ual, and then determine the conditions that have made these di-
verse aspects possible and restore the whole of the causal system
that has grounded them. ( ι6-ι7)2

According to Foucault, mental pathology needs to be under-

stood on successively more concrete and significant levels. On a
first level, mental illness appears as a regression in the process of
human evolution:

The illness ... , going back to the earlier phases of evolution ...
eliminates recent acquisitions and rediscovers forms of behavior

ι. The first page reference is to ΜΜΡ; the second is to the corresponding pas-
sage in the English translation of MMPsy. Translations of passages that ap-
pear only in ΜΜΡ are mine.
2. In the second edition, this passage rather concludes: "Seek the concrete forms
that psychology has managed ιο aιtribute to it, then determine ιhe conditions
thaι have made possible this strange status of madness, a mcntal illness that
cannot be reduced to any illness" (MMPsy, 13).
 ΜΕΝΤ AL
MADNESS AND ILLNESS 57
that have normally been surpassed. The illness is the process
throughout which the web of evolution is unraveled. (22, ι8)

This aspect of mental illness is most familiar through Freud's

account of neuroses as involving fixations at various stages (e.g.,
oral, anal) of infantile sexuality. But Foucault maintains that all
forms of mental illness exhibit a regressive replacement of late,
more complex behavior patterns by early, simpler ones. He ac-
cepts the idea of evolutionary regression as the basis for a struc-
tural description of mental illness but denies it an explanatory
role. He does this first because, in his view, there is never ίη fact
a literal return to aπ "archaic personality": "We ιnust accept the
specificity of the morbid phenomenon: the pathological struc-
ture of the psyche is not a return to origins: it is strictly original"
(31, 25-6). The disturbed personality contains regressive ele-
ments, but it has its own unique overall structure. Further, Fou-
cault notes that regressive analysis is not explanatory because it
cannot tell us why a particular person becomes mentally ill at a
particular time. "From the point of view of evolution, [mental]
illness has no other status than that of a general potentiality"
(34-35, 28). He concludes that our effort to understand mental
illness must move from the level of general categories of evolu-
tionary development to the level of personal life histories of
mentally ill people.
Foucault thinks that moving to this level of personal history
reveals the function of regressions to archaic modes of behavior.
They serve to defend the personality against anxiety generated by
present conflicts (e.g., between desire for something and guilt
over the desire). The patient reverts to an earlier (e.g., infantile)
mode ofbehavior as a way of escaping from ("derealizing") pres-
ent conflicts. Unfortunately, however, the behavior resorted to
for escape is the very behavior that is historically tied to the anxi-
ety being Aed. Consequently, the patient finds himself trapped in
a "circularity that makes him defend himself against anxiety with
mechanisms that ... serve merely to augment that anxiety ... "
(50, 41 ). Α η understanding of mental illness requires a knowledge
(sought, e.g., by Freudian psychoanalysis) of the factors in indi-
viduals' psychological histories that have led them to such ill-fated
regressive defenses against anxiety.
But Foucault maintains that individual history itself cannot be
understood without reference to yet another level of understand-
 FOUCAUL τ's ARCHAEOLOGY

ing: that σf the patient's lived experience. The σbjective facts σf

persσnal histσry (σf, e.g., the Oedipal situatiσn) may be the same
fσr variσus individuals. This raises the questiσn:

Why, in a given situation, does one individual encounter a sur-

mountable conflict and another a contradiction within which he is
enclosed in a pathological way? Why is the same Oedipal ambigu-
ity overcome by one individual while, in another, it sets off a long
sequence of pathological mechanisms? (5 ι, 42)

Accoι-ding tσ Fσucault, the aηsweι- lies in the special meaηiηg

giveη to the facts σf aπ individual's histoι-y by his σrganization of
them iηto a world σf cσncrete, lived experieηce. Accordiηgly, we
need aη understaηdiηg σf the experience of mental illηess frσm
the iηside, a "phenomeηolσgy of meηtal illηess" (56, 46).
In ΜΜΡ, Fσucault sketches this pheηomeησlogy in terms of
the staηdard dίνίsίση σf ηoetic analysis (σf the "sick cσηsciσus­
ness") aηd ησematic aηalysis (σf the "patholσgical wσrld"). The
fσrmer fσcuses ση the various ways in which the meηtally ill are
aware of themselves as differeηt frσm σther, "nσrmal" peσple.
Thus, a patieηt may perceive his σr her illηess as merely aη
orgaηic matter, as in hypσchσηdria, or as "the explosiσn σf a new
existeηce that prσfσuηdly alters the meaηiηg of his life" (58, 48),
as iη σbsessions σr maηias, σr as aηother world inhabited iη
additiση to the ordiηary σηe, as iη halluciηatory psychσses. Fi-
ηally, iη the mσst extreme fσrms of mental illηess (the worst
forms σf schizσphreηia aηd demeηtia), "the patieηt is eηgulfed
ίη the wσrld of his illηess" aηd experieηces the σrdinary world as
merely a "distaηt, veiled reality" (59, 49). Fσucault's ηoematic
aηalysis of meηtal illηess is based primarily ση the wσrk σf Eu-
gene Miηkowski aηd distiηguishes disturbaηces ίη patieηts' expe-
riences σf time, space, the cultural and sσcial wσrlds, aηd even σf
their σwn bσdies.
Ιη terms of this pheησmeηolσgical approach, Fσucault, citing
Biηswaηger, says that mental illηess iηvolves twσ key elements.
First, the world σf the mentally ill is a private σne, σpaque to the
perspectives aηd attitudes σf σther peσple. But this privacy,
thσugh it represents the ill persση's attempt to ftee the real,
σbjective world, dσes not ίη fact bring freedσm from it. On the
cσntrary, precisely because the meηtally ill fail to engage with the
shared, iηtersubjective meaηiηgs σf the real wσrld, they experi-
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS 59
ence this world ιnerely as a series of causally deterrnining exter-
nal events. Hence, the second element of mental illness is that a
person suffering from it "abandons himself to events .... One
sees the mark of disintegration that abandons the subject to the
world as to aπ exterπal fate." So, paradoxically, meπtal illπess "is
both a retreat into the worst of subjectivities aπd a fall ίπtο the
worst of objectivities" (6g, 56).
Foucault provides a much fuller development of the basis of his
understaπdiπg of meπtal illπess ο π the level oflived experieπce ίπ
his 'Ίπtroductioπ" to the French traπslation of Biπswanger's
Traurιι und Existenz. This essay (twice as loπg as Biπswanger's
piece) is far more thaπ an iπtroductioπ to someoπe else's work. It
is, ίπ fact, Foucault's critical synthesis of ideas from a variety of
major thinkers (iπcludiπg Freud, Husserl, Heidegger, Biπswan­
ger, Bach"elard, aπd Sartre) iπto a geπeral existeπtial view of hu-
man reality. Foucault characterizes his view as aπ "aπthropology
of the imagination," siπce he sees the essential features of humaπ
reality expressed ίπ our imagiπative life, particularly dreams.
He begins with a criticism ofFreud's method of dream iπterpre­
tation, which he faults for treatiπg dreams merely as poiπters to
external factors (e.g., traumatic past eveπts, uπcoπscious desires)
and ignoring the iπtriπsic meaπing they have ίη their own right.
"The laπguage of the dream is aπalyzed oπly ίπ its semaπtic fuπc­
tioπ; Freudiaπ analysis leaves ίπ the dark its morphological aπd
syπtactic structures" (RE, ιg). This is a mistake since "the imagi-
πary world has its own laws, its specific structures; the image is
something more than the immediate fulfillmeπt of meaniπg; it
has its thickness" (RE, 20). Foucault suggests that the root of
Freud's error here is his failure to distinguish betweeπ a symbol as
a mere indication of something else and a symbol as aπ expΓession
of meaπing- the distiπction Husserl draws (in hisLogical investiga-
tions) betweeπ index and sigπification. The former- for example,
the tracks by which a huπter recogπizes the presence of a Γabbit­
fuπctions oπly in virtue of "an actual situatioπ that does, has, or
will exist." The latter- for example, the word rabbit- "need ποt,
ίπ order to be significaπt, be based ο π any objective situation" (RE,
31-32). Freud in effect treats dreams as meΓely indices aπd not as
sigπificatioπs. As a result, he thinks their meaπing is exhausted ίπ
their references to uncoπscious memoΓies aπd desires and fails to
see them as expressioπs of human existence as such. Thus,
Freud's aπalysis of a crucial dream of his patieπt "Dora" revealed
6ο FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

oπly symbols of repressed heterosexual aπd homosexuallove aπd

failed to recogπize the dream's esseπtial meaπiπg as aπ expressioπ
of Dora's resolve to break off psychoaπalytic treatmeπt aπd to
assume a πew, iπdepeπdeπt mode of existeπce. Such aπalysis
failed to discover what Freud himself sometimes suspected: that
"the dream was ποt coπteπt to symbolize aπd express ίπ images
the history of past experieπces [but rather] eπcompassed the eπ­
tire existeπce of the subject ... " (RE, 76). Biπswaπger, however,
explicitly recogπizes the dreamiπg subject itself "as the founda-
tion of all the possible meaπings of the dream: aπd, to this extent,
[the dream] is not the reappearaπce of aπ earlier form or aπ
archaic style of the persoπality; it reveals itself as the process and
the totality of existence itself" (RE, 79-80). As such, dreams do
not merely poiπt to the past; they also evoke the future the subject
is creating for itself: "The dream cannot have as its subject the
quasi-objecιive subject of past history; its constituting moment
can be oπly this existeπce that makes itself in the course of time,
this existence iπ its movement toward the future" (RE, 83).
Although dreams thus represent aπ individual's world, "the
world that belongs to me by aπnouncing my own solitude,"
their esseπtial structures reveal the fundamental dimensioπs­
freedom, values, destiny, death- of human existence as such.
'Ίf in sleep consciousness slumbers, in the dream existence
awakens" (RE, 70). Following Binswaπger, Foucault sketches
the dream's essential existeπtial meanings in terms of the "spati-
ality" of the dream world, which he regards as defining "the
trajectory of existence itself" (RE, 86). Specifically, he distin-
guishes three dimensioπs of 'Όneiric space," each defined by a
pair of polar categories and eacl1 correlated witl1 the mode of
human experience expressed by a particular literary genre.
Thus, he correlates the dimension of the πear and the far with
epic experiences of travel aπd return, that of the obscure aπd
the clear with lyrical experieπces of confusioπ and enlighten-
ment, that of the vertical, up/down axis with experiences of
tragic exaltation aπd fall. Foucault regards this last dimension
as tl1e fundameπtal one. It is only ίπ this dimensioπ, which
fouπds human temporality, authenticity, aπd historicity, that
"we abandon the anthropological level of reflectioπ that aπa­
lyzes man as man, within his l1uman world, for aπ oπtological
reAectioπ that coπcerπs [his] mode of being aπd existeπce as
preseπce to the world" (RE, 105).
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 6ι

Foucault next turns to the relation between dreaming and

imagining. His account of the imagination is developed through
critiques of Sartre and Bachelard. On a classical view (e.g.,
Hume's), aπ image is merely a diminished perception, present-
ing an object ίπ a positive but less "lively" way. Sartre, by con-
trast, views the image as "negating" its object by positίng it as
unreal. Foucault, however, rejects the assumption, common to
both the classical and the Sartrean accounts, that the image is
defined through its relation - positive or negative- to its object.
He agrees with Sartre that, when Ι imagine an object, "its ab-
sence surrounds and circumscribes the movement of my imagina-
tion" (RE, 108). But he argues that this absence is "already there"
before the act of imagination (through e.g., feelings of regret or
nostalgia) .and is not the essence of this act. The essence of imagi-
nation is rather a derealizing of the imaginary subject: "Το imag-
ine Pierre after he has been absent for a year is not a matter of
my introducing him ίπ the mode of unreality ... it is first a
matter of my derealizing myself, absenting myself fron1 this
world in which it is not possible for me to n1eet Pierre" (RE, 108).
Not only does the imagining subject absent itself from the
world that lacks the imagined object; it also enters- Foucault
even says it becomes - a world in \νhich the object exists. Imagi-
nation is a free projection of myself into a world that Ι constitute
and pervade and that, consequently, expresses my existence. So
understood, imagining has precisely the same essential structure
as dreaming; both are projections of the self into a world express-
ing its existence. Indeed, Foucault maintains, contrary to the
usual view of dreaming as a special form of imaginίng, that
imagination is just a waking dream.
Nor, according to Foucault, should we think of the world of
imagination as something separated off from the real world of
perception, an isolated and insulated domain of existential soli-
tude. On the contrary, imagination is essentially involved in even
our perceptual experiences. Even when Pierre is present, "Ι am
required to imagine him" (RE, 1 14)- that is, Ι experience him
not as merely present here and now but as moving along a trajec-
tory through which Ι am projecting my existence into its future.
Accordίngly, for Foucault, "the imaginary is not a mode of unre-
ality but a mode of actuality, a manner of taking presence Όη the
diagonal' in order to call primitive dimensions [of exίstence]
forth from it" (RE, 116).
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

We see, then, how Foucault develops his account of dream-

ing- and of imagining as a form of dreaming- into a general
existential account of human reality. He goes on to maintain
that a proper understanding of imagination leads to an existen-
tial grasp of the significance of mental illness. Here his key
move is the displacement of the image from the central role it is
usually given. Bachelard, for example, whom Foucault has fol-
lowed in emphasizing the dynamic, vectorial role of imagina-
tion in perception, regards the movement of the imagination as
culminating in the image. Foucault, however, says that the im-
age is the death of imagination and that imagining requires the
destruction of images:

The image constitutes a ruse ο η the part of consciousness whereby

it tries to avoid further imagining .... And, ifit is true that [im.agina-
tion] moves through a universe ofimages, [this is only] to the extent
that it breaks them, destroys them, consumes them: it is by essence
iconoclastic. (RE, llg, 120)

What Foucault has in mind here is this: Imagining is a dynamic

and creative process whereby Ι freely project a world of my own
beyond what is present to me. An image, however, is a static
representation that destι-oys the movement of the imagination,
disrιιpts the dream world Ι have σeated, and returns me to the
merely present world. (True, the object of which Ι form an
image may not be part of the present νvorld, but, as Sartre's
analysis has shown, what Ι experience through the image is pre-
cisely the present woΓld as lacking this object.) Accordingly, "to
have an image is to give up imagining" (RE, 117).
Foucault uses this opposition of the image to imagining to
characterize the essential nature of mental illness. The world of
the mentally ill is a morbid one that paralyzes and stifles those
who inhabit it precisely because it is a world of dominating im-
ages that allow no space fοΓ the free flight of imagination. The
goal of psychotherapy is to break through the patient's images in
order to liberate his imagination.
Foucault also sees this opposition as relevant to the (Heideg-
gerian) distinction of anthropological from ontological refl.ec-
tion. The former treats human Γeality solely ίη terms of images,
wheΓeas the latter opeΓates on the level of free imagination. In
this connection, Foucault speaks of the move from images to
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

imagi11atio11 as a "tra11sce11de11tal reduction of the imagi11atio11"

a11d claiωs that such a reductio11 is concretely carried out i11
Binsv.ra11ger's T1·a1ι1n und E>..-istenz (R.E, 124).
Fi11ally, Foucault 11otes that there is yet another aspect of the
life of the imagi11atio11, beyo11d its liberati11g move from the
νvorld of images to the νvorld of dreams. For, although imagil1a-
tiol1 as dι-eam constitutes the 'vorld of my personal existe11ce, it
does 11ot bring me i11to the ι-eal, objective world of hιιma11 his-
.tory. For this to happe11, l1e says, imagi11atio11 ιnιιst go beyo11d
dι-eaming to expressi01~- tl1at is, a realization of itself in the objec-
tive woι-ld via, fοι- exam ple, aι-tistic CΓeatiol1 οι- ethical actio11. Ο11
tl1e level of expressio11, theι-e is a ι-etuι-11 to the image. But it is an
image tι-ansfoι-111ed, one that is 110 lo11geι- a11 "image of some-
thi11g" but a11 "image addι-essed to soωeo11e" (RE, 125-26). Heι-e
the iωage functions 11ot as a ι-eplaceωe11t of an abse11t object bιιt
as the ωea11s of expι-ession fοι- the iωagi11ation, the νehicle of its
CΓeative "style." For exaιηple, i11 the ι-ealω of liteι-aι-y creatio11,
wl1ich seems to be both the model a11d the pι-imary example of
Foιιcaιιlt's existential accou11t, metapl1oι- (the pΓiωaι-y vehicle of
iωagi11atio11) is fiι-st of all a way of destωyi11g images. It bι-eaks
away fι-οιn la11guage tl1at ωerely represe11ts (1niπoι-s) reality. Βιιt
011ce la11guage is freed froω the image i11 tl1is sense, it goes 011 to
create 11ew images tl1at are not tied to a repι-esentative fu11ction
bιιt have their own i11tri11sic fullness a11d weight as the author's
free expressio11. Foucault co11cludes that eνen moι-e fundamen-
tal tl1an the a11thropology of iωagi11atio11 he has oιιtlined i11 this
essay is a11 a11thropology of expression, 'vhich remai11s to be
developed.
The iωportance of the phe11ome11ological/existe11tiallevel of
analysis fοι- Foucault is obvious fiΌm the co11ψlexity and detail in
which he develops it. There is no doubt that the young Foucault
was strongly i11fluenced by Husserl, Sartι-e, Merleau-Po11ty, a11d
especially Heidegger. 3 (A11d, as 've shall see, this influence is still
a significant presence in FD.) Howeveι-, froω the fiι-st, Foucault's
interest was ωixed with caution. Even i11 the l1ighly existe11tial
introductio11 to Binswanger, Foucault is careful at the outset to
qualify his allegia11ce to Heidegger and Bins,vanger. He meι-ely

3· For a good discussion of Heidegger's influence ση Foucault's early \Vritings,

cf. Η. Dreyfus's Fore,vord to the University of California Press edition of
Mental illness and psyclιology.
 FOUCAULT's ARCHAEOLOGY

says tl1at "it seeωs to us worth the trouble to follσ\v, for tl~e mo-
rnent, the path of this Γeflection" (RE, 12, ωy eωphasis). Siωi­
larly, he explicitly waΓΠs that the "concrete encounter with exis-
tence ... [and] the statιιs that ωust in the end be accω·ded the
ontological condition of existence pose probleωs, ['vhich] 've
postpone approaching until another occasion" (RE, 13-14).
The reservations aboιιt the existential approach sιιggestecl by
these passages aΓe ωade explicit in the last paΓt of ΜΜΡ. Here
Foιιcault notes that thoιιgh ωental illness 1nanifests itself on the
thΓee, successively deepeΓ, levels of 'Όrganic evolιιtion, psycho-
logical history, [and] the sitιιation of ωan in the woΓld," none of
these levels of analysis Γeνeals the conditions tl1at explain the
occιιrrence of ωental illness: "the roots of the pathological devia-
tion, as sucl1, aΓe to be foιιnd else,vhere" (ΜΜΡ, 6ο). Specifically,
"it is not possible to account fοΓ pathological expeΓiences without
Γefeπing to social strιιctιιΓes; ηω· to explain the psycl1ological
diωensions of ωental illness ... without seeing tl1e huωan envi-
ΓOnωent of the ωentally ill as tl1eiι· Γeal condition" (ΜΜΡ, 83).
HeΓe Foιιcaιιlt's analysis takes a distinctly Maαist diΓection. The
conflicts psychiatΓists discoνeΓ in individιιals' life histol'ies deΓive,
l1e says, froω "contΓadictions" in existing social Γelations that aΓe
theωselves deteΓωined by "present econωnic conditions in the
form of oon.flict, exploitation, irnperialist ~rars, and class strug-
gles"· (ΜΜΡ, 86). Foιιcaιιlt rejects tl1e three levels of analysis that
l1e l1as discιιssed, including "existential anthropology," as "ωythi­
cal explanations" of ωental illness and concludes that "ίη Γeality,
it is only in l1istory that one is able to discover the conditions for
the possibility of psychological strιιctιπes" (ΜΜΡ, go).
Given this view, Foιιcault next asks what accoιιnt we can give
of tl1e ιnechanisωs wheΓeby "real" social contradictions aΓe trans-
forωed into the psychological con.flicts at the root of ωental
illness. He sιιggests that the key is Pavlov's physiology of tl1e
Γeflexes, wl1ich tells us how stiωιιli froιn tl1e external environ-
ment trigger vaΓious responses in tl1e nerνous systeιn. In particu-
lar, he aΓgιιes that ιnental illness clerives from a "generalized
defense reaction" of a neΓνous systeιn oνen,,helιned by its enνi­
ΓOnιnent. Norιnally, inclividιιals are able to Γeact to conflicts in
theiΓ social enνiΓOnιnent (e.g., between faιnily and woΓk obliga-
tions) by differentiated ι·eactions- that is, "individualized reac-
tion[s] to each terιn οΓ to each phase of a conflictιιal sitιιation."
Howeνer, "when ... the conflict presents itself ;vith a contradic-
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

tory characteι· that is so absolute, οΓ 1-11hen the individιιal's possi-

bilities aι·e so restricted that diffeΓentiation cannot οccιιΓ, then
tl1e individιιal can defend l1imself only by pιιtting himself οιιt of
play, only by responding with a geneΓalized inl1ibition" (ΜΜΡ,
101-102)0 Sιιch generalizec\ inl1ibition gives Γise- in accoΓd witl1
Pavlov's pι·inciples- to all the phenoιnena of mental illnesso
Foιιcaιιlt insists that this appeal to Pavlovian Γeflex theoη is
not a materialist reduction of psychology to pl1ysiologyo Even
thoιιgl1 mental illness is tΓiggered by disorders in pl1ysiological
fιιnctions, nonphysiological social conflicts Γeωain as necessaΓy
conditionso Mental illness is still a distω·bance of the personality
that deΓives fωm conflicts in the social worldo Βιιt social and
psycl1ological conflicts do not of tl1eιnselves prodιιce ωental ill-
nesso This οccιιΓS only when social and psychological conflicts
becoιne physiological conflictso Τhιιs, Foιιcaιιlt sees lιis accoιιnt
of tl1e etiology of mental illness as not redιιcing tl1e psychologic~~
to the organic but ιιnifying the two in the account of ωental
illness: 'Ίt is necessary to abandon the antitl1esis between psy-
chogenesis and organogenesis"; as a Γesult, "ωental patl1ology
finds itselfιιnited with organic patl1ology" (ΜΜΡ, 106)0
Tl1e irreducibly social natιιι·e of Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt of ιnental
illness is appaΓent in l1is insistence tl1at tl1e reality of ιnental
illness is pωof of the inadeqιιacy of boιιrgeois societyo

The mentally ill deιnonstrate that boιιΓgeois society, because of

the very conflicts that 111ake their illness possible, is not the nιea­
suι·e of the real man, ο ο ο tlιat it constantly puιs into conflict the
unitary idea that it lιas created of ιnan and the contΓadictory
status that it gives to himo The mentally ill aΓe the apotlιeosis of
this conflicto And if, by tlιe myth of mental alienation, they are
pushed back to the outer lίmits of the city, this is so as not to see in
them the scandalous expτession of the contradictions tlιat lιave
made tlιeir illness possibleo ο (ΜΜΡ, 104)
..

Tl1e last point in the above qιιotation is one that Foιιcaιιlt makes
earlier in a passage that stΓikingly anticipates FD: 'Όur society
does not \νish to Γecognize itself in the ill individιιal 'νlιοm it
rejects ΟΓ locks ιιp: as it diagnoses the illness, it excludes the
patient" (75, 63)0
Finally, Foιιcault dra,νs froω his analysis some conclιιsions
aboιιt psychotheΓapyo One key point concerns the inadeqιιacy of
psychoanalysis, wlιich regards tlιe patient's conflicts as entiΓely
66 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

due to events in his personal psychological history and ignores

their roots in the objective contradictions of his social world.
"Psychoanalysis psychologizes the real in order to derealize it: it
forces the subject to regard his conflict as the disordered law of
his own heart, in order to avoid seeing there the contradictions
of the order of the world" (ΜΜΡ, ωg). In contrast, Foucault
proposes the use of therapies "that offer the patient concrete
means of going beyond the conflict-situation, of modifying his
environment or of responding in a differentiated (i.e., adapted)
way to the contradictions of his conditions of existence" (ΜΜΡ,
ωg).
The second edition of Maladie mentale et personnalitέ, retitled
Maladie mentale et psyclιologie, appeared just after the publication
of Folie et dέraison. This edition is significantly different from the
first in three ways, each representing a distinctive new feature of
the approach to the historical understanding ofmental disorders
that Foucault develops in FD. 4 The most obvious difference is a
shift away from Marxist principles and categories. Thus, Fou-
cault simply omits the entire attempt (Chapter VI of the first
edltion) to employ Pavlov's physiology of the reflex as a material-
ist vehicle for transforming social contradictions into psychologi-
cal conflicts. Furtlιer, in his description of the social conditions
of mental illness, he often backs away frοιη Marxist terminology.
Fοι- example, where he had previously referred (ΜΜΡ, 87), in a
comment on Freud's view on the origin ofwar, to "capitalism" as
having aπ experience that derives from "contradictions in social
relations," he now (MMPsy, 83) speaks merely of the experience
of 'Όur culture" and omits any mention of contradictions in
social relations. Similarly a mention of "imperialist wars" (ΜΜΡ,
86) is omitted in a list of causes of social relations that determine
a "culture" (replacing the first edition's "economy") (MMPsy,
82). This is not to say that Foucault abandons all Marxist con-
cepts and terminology (even in the passage last cited he contin-
ues to speak of exploitation and class struggle). But there is a
definite move away from the routine employment of Marxist
categories that suggests an increasingly critical attitude on Fou-
cault's part. Overall- and this is borne out by FD - Foucault
seems to retain much of the Marxist dissatisfaction with bour-
4· For a detailed catalogue and analysis of the differences between the t\VO
editions, see Pierre Macherey, 'Άuχ sources de 'L'histoire de la folie': une
rectification et ses limites," Cιitique, 43 (1g86), 752-74.
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS

geois society but has becoιηe much less confident of orthodox

Marxist analyses of and remedies for its defects.
Anotheι- majoΓ Ί-Ι'ay in 'vhich the second edition differs from the
first is in its switch from a focus on mental illness, an object of
psycl1ology, to psychology itself. This switch is reflected first of all
in the new title but even more importantly in tl1e new account of
hoν,r ωental illness develops froω a social milieιι. In the first edi-
tion, Foucault is content to accept fΓDm psychology the basic cate-
gory of mental illness. He wants to understand the meaning of
this category and is convinced that the nature and oι1.gins of men-
tal illness in a given society will be a fιιnction of the characteι- of
that society. But he does notquestion modern psychology's funda-
mental claim that mental illness represents an intΓinsic defect in
those who sιιffeΓ froω it. His approach is similaΓ to Cangιιill1em's
to>vaι-d organic pathology: Just as the natuι-e of an oι-ganism de-
fines noι-ms in teι-ms of wllich certain physical conditions aι-e
pathological, so does the natιπe of a given society define nonηs in
terms of which ceι-tain personality traits are pathological. Βιιt in
tl1e radically reιvritten Part ΙΙ of the second eclition, Foιιcault
moves to the idea that the category of mental illness is a conscruc-
tion of a psycl1ology and psycl1iatry in tl1e service of our society's
attempt to contΓOl (by excluding and silencing) those who clo not
conform to its basic values. On this ne>v view, mental illness is not,
as Foucault assumes in the first edition, something that will be
found, in different forms, ίη any society. TheΓe are, no doubt, in
all societies, i11dividuals whose deviant behavioΓ waπants the ap-
pellation "mad." But the chaι-acteΓizatio11 ofsuch people as "me11-
tally ill" - that is, sufferi11g fΓOm some psycl1ic a11alogue of
disease- is the pecιιliaΓ invention of a peΓiod of WesteΓn cιιlture
begi11ni11g at the end of the eightee11th ce11tu1Ύ a11d co11ti11ui11g to
the pι-ese11t. Admittedly, mad11ess will always ί11volve seΓious de-
νiations fΓOm the ΓU!i11g 11orms of society. But otheΓ societies- for
example, those of medieνal and Re11aissa11ce EuΓOpe- toleΓated
a11d eve11 accepted the i11ψoι-tance of the mad's deνiatio11s. Our
society, howeνer, refuses the mad even a margi11al place a11d i11-
stead claims- 011 the allegedly scie11tific authoΓity of psychology
a11d psychiatry - that mad11ess has 110 status beyo11d that of an
objectiνe me11tal deficie11cy. l11 his second editio11, Foucault ques-
tio11s this claim as well as the authority i11 whose name it is made.
What is prese11t i11 the deνelopme11t of our psychology a11d psy-
chiatry "is 110t the gradual discoνery of the true 11ature of mad-
68 FOUCAULT'S ARCBAEOLOGY

πess, but simply the sedimeπtatioπ ofwhat the history ofthe West
has made of it for the last three huπdred years" (MMPsy, 6g).
This shift leads to aπ importaπt chaπge iπ the πature of the
social criticism iπvolved iπ Foucault's discussioπ of meπtal illπess.
Ιπ the first editioπ, the criticism is aimed at certaiπ esseπtial
defects iπ the structure of a giveπ society- "social coπtradic­
tioπs," as he is apt to call theιn. Οπ this view, the preseπce of
meπtal illπess is the result of a historical πecessity rooted iπ the
evolutioπ of social iπstitutioπs. Ιπ the secoπd editioπ, as ίπ FD,
Foucault is critical of coπtiπgeπt historical developmeπts- for
exaπψle, that of "scieπtific" psychology- withiπ our society that
are ποt iπevitable coπsequeπces of the social iπfrastructure. Coπ­
sequeπtly, his criticism suggests the possibility of reform iπ treat-
meπt of the mad withiπ the existiπg strιιctures of society. By
coπtrast, the first editioπ seems to see πο possibilities except
revolutioπary traπsformatioπ of society or else the madmaπ's
acceptaπce of (adaptioπ to) the πorms of his society.
The third majoι- differeπce betweeπ the first aπd the secoπd
editioπs is less obvious but moι-e surprisiπg. It is implicit iπ aπ
extremely iπterestiπg modificatioπ Foucault iπtroduces iπ a text,
cited above, characteriziπg various levels of uπderstaπdiπg meπ­
tal illπess as "mythical explaπatioπs." Ιπ the first editioπ, Fou-
cault iπcludes, as we πoted, tl1e levels of evolutioπary develop-
ιneπt, iπdividual histoιΎ, a12d existeπtial aπtl1ropology iπ this
characterizatioπ (ΜΜΡ, 8g). But iπ the secoπd editioπ (MMPsy,
84), he poiπtedly omits existeπtial aπthι-opology from the list of
"mythical explaπatioπs." FurtheΓ, whereas the first editioπ goes
οπ to say meΓely that the Γeal explaπatioπ of meπtal illπess is to
be fouπd iπ histoΓy, the secoπd edition says that the key to avoid-
ing the ιnythical explaπatioπs is to treat "these vaΓious aspects of
mental illness as ontological forms" (MMPsy, 84). Siπce the sec-
oπd editioπ Γetains the idea that the ι-eal explanatioπ of meπtal
illπess ιnust be histoΓical, the implicatioπ seems to be that Fou-
cault is eπvisagiπg some soΓt of historical applicatioπ of existeπ­
tial aπalysis. This idea is further supported by Foιιcault's subse-
queπt talk (iπ the title of the secoπd editioπ's ChapteΓ V) of "the
historical coπstitutioπ of meπtal illπess." Απd, iπ fact, FD places
gΓeat emphasis on the effort to uπdeι-stand the "expeΓieπce" of
madness duriπg various historical peΓiods. So it seems tl1at in
moviπg away fι-om Maαist histoΓical analysis, Foucault ΊYas also
tryiπg to develop a way of exteπdiπg the tecl1πiques of existeπtial
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS 6g
aπalysis to uπderstaπd hoνv people of past histoήcal periods coπ­
stitιιted the woι-ld of their experieπce. This impressioπ is coπ­
finned by Foucault's commeπt iπ a 1983 iπtervieν.r: 'Άt the time
Ι was workiπg οπ my book about tlιe-11istory of madπess .... Ι
"''as clivided betweeπ existeπtial psyclιology aπcl pheπomeπol­
ogy, aπd my reseaπh νvas aπ attempt to discover tlιe exteπt these
could be defiπed iπ lιistorical terπιs." 5
We see, theπ, that iπ writiπg FD Foucault abaπdoπed tlιe piΌj­
ect of providiπg a Marxist explaπatioπ of meπtal illπess fοΓ a
much more ambitious aπd origiπal piΌject: that of explaiπiπg
tlιe coπtiπgeπt lιistorical origiπ of moderπ psychology aπd psy-
chiatry (aloπg witlι their coπcept of meπtal illπess) through a
histoήcal ιιπdeι-staπdiπg of past ages' expeΓieπces of madπess.
We πονv tuι-π to Foucaιιlt's carryiπg οιιt of this pωject, his his-
toΓy of madπess.

Madness in the Classical Age

Foιιcault's view of tlιe history of maclness is in one key respect
similar to BaclιelaΓd's view of the history of science. He sees it as
split at different points by slιaψ clιanges or breaks in the way
people experienced ancl treated tlιe nιad. One suclι break oc-
cuπecl iπ the middle of tlιe seveπteeπtlι ceπtury when laΓge num-
bers of citizens (madmen and otheι-s) νvere confined in detention
centeΓS such as the Hδpital General in Paris. This break begins
wlιat Foucault calls the "Classical experience" of madness, aπ ex-
perience that defines the European attitude toward maclπess uπ­
til the eπd of the eighteenth centuι-y. (The term Classical derives
from the fact that iπ Fι-ance this peΓiod is geπerally called 'Ί'Age
Classique. ") He locates another break in the histoΓy of madness at
tlιe end of the eiglιteeπth centιιη, ι-ight around the time of the
FΓench Revolutioπ; this break initiates a πeV\7 way of experienciπg
madπess that corresponds to οιιr moderπ psychological vieιv of
maclπess as "mental illπess." Foιιcault's overall strategy iπ FD is to
present the Classical experience of madness in some detail as a
basis for understanding the πew, modern expeΓience ofmadness
tlιat dominates tlιe nineteeπth and twentieth centιιries.

5· "An IntervieΙ\' Ινiιlι .Michel Foucault" (by Charles Ruas), prinιed as a "Post-
scripι" ιο Ruas's translaιion of Foιιcaιιlt's Rα)•ιιιοιιd Rozιsscl: ι/cαιlι and tlιc laby-
ιintlι: t!ιe woι·ld of Rayιnond Row;sel (Gaι-den City, Ν.Υ.: Doubleday and Com-
pany, 1986), 174.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

It is important to understand what Foucault means in speak-

ing of an age's "experience" of madness. For one thing, he does
not mean that people of the age were aware of certain intrinsic
characteristics of the mad that other ages did not notice. Rather,
an age's experience of madness is its distinctive way of viewing
madness, its manner of "constituting" madness as an object.
Moreover, this constitution is not merely a mental interpreta-
tion. It is essentially connected to the institutions and practices
an age uses to deal with the mad. For example, Foucault main-
tains, as we shall see, that the Classical practice of confining the
mad "did not play merely a negative role of exclιιsion bιιt also a
positive organizational role. Its practices and rιιles constituted a
domain of expeΓience that had its own ιιnity, coherence, and
fιιnction" (FD, 102). FD's project of an existential analysis of the
historical experience of madness thιιs continιιes (thoιιgh ίη a
very different key) Foιιcaιιlt's earlier theme of mad·ness as the
prodιιct of "real" social factors.
Το provide some backgroιιnd for his treatment of the experi-
ence of madness in the Classical Age, Foιιcaιιlt starts with a brief
discιιssion of madness in the Renaissance. Adopting a strikingly
existential tone, he says that the Renaissance experience of mad-
ness was an "experience of nothingness" (FD, 16). 6 The Middle
Ages' experience of nothingness had focιιsed on physical death,
especially represented by the leprosy that consιιmed so many
bodies. Βιιt for the Renaissance, "death's annihilation is no
longer anything becaιιse it was already eveηthing, becaιιse life
itself was only fιιtility, vain words, a sqιιabble of cap and bells.
The head that will become a skull is already empty" (FD, 19; MC,
16). This move fΓom death to madness as the quintessence of
hιιman loss also meant that thenothingness of existence was "no
longer considered an external final term, both thΓeat and conclιι-

6. References are to the first edition (1961), Folie et deτaison: l'histoire de lafolie α
l'age cla.rsique. The second edition (1972) (with a ne1ν preface and two further
artίcles appended) is tίtled L'Jιistoiι·e de /α folie α l'age cla.rsique. Ι ι was reprinted
ίη 1976 without the appendices. The English translatίon, titled iVladness and
Civilization (MC), is primarily of Foucault's 1964 abridgment ofFD, 1νith some
material added (by Foucault) from the complete versίon. Madness and civiliza-
tioι~ translates less than half of FD. (Translations of passages of FD not avail-
able in MC are my own.) Foucault himself offers a lucίd summary of the maίn
themes of FD in Chapter 5 of MMPsy. Cf. also the very helpful exposίtion,
from a socίological vίewpoίnt, ίη Chapter 9 of Ρ. Hirst and Ρ. Woolley, Social
relations and human activities (London: Tavistock, 1982), and J. Russ's "profile"
of FD, Histoire de /α fo/ie: Miche/ Foucault (Parίs: Hatίer, 1979).
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

sion; it is experienced from within as the continυoυs and con-

stant form of existence" (FD, 20; MC, 16).
The distinctive Renaissance experience of madness took, on
Foυcaυlt's accoυnt, two importantly different forms. In one
(wl1ich he finds dominant in Renaissance painters sυch as Brυe­
ghel and DίireΓ), madness appears as something that "commυni­
cated ννith the great tragic powers of the world." Here madness
is man's animality breaking loose froιn conventional bonds and
leading him to a secret knowledge, a l1idden '''isdom that means
his destrυction: "The animal that l1aιιnts his nightmares ... is
his own natυre, which willlay bare hell's pitiless tωtl1s" (FD, 27;
MC, 23). By contrast, the second Renaissance forιn of madness
(which Foυcaυlt finds particυlarly in hυmanist wΓiteΓs, sυch as
Erasmυs and Bι-ant) "is not linked to tl1e world and its sυbterra­
nean forιns, bυt rather to man, to l1is weakness, dΓeams, and
illυsions" (FD, 29; MC, 26). Madness in this sense is expΓessed
not in dramatic images of power and horror bυt in the ironic
thrυsts of moral satire. In sυm, Foυcaυlt sees in the Renaissance
"an opposition between a cosmic experience of madness in the
nearness of [its] fascinating forιns and a critical experience of
this same madness in tl1e impassable distance of irony" (FD, 3 2).
Althoυgl1 this twofold experience of madness is clearly pres-
ent at the beginning of the sixteenth centυry, within a hυndred
years the cosmic experience almost entirely disappeaΓs and only
the critical experience remains. Foυcaυlt sees this as a particυ­
larly important development since it represents a sυppression of
madness as an aυtonomoυs and positive form of hυman experi-
ence. This sυppression has persisted, he says, witl1 a few striking
exceptions, from the later Renaissance throυgh the Classical Age
down to the present. The resυlt has been that, apart from sυch
isolated "lightning flashes" sυch as Nietzsche's last messages and
Van Gogh's final paintings, madness has been encoυntered only
as one or another sort of negation of reason. It is no longer a
tΓagic confrontation with a preternatυral world bυt only a devia-
tion from the life of reason.
However, this tamed madness has, accoΓding to Foυcaυlt,
been itself regarded in very different ways. Dυring the later
Renaissance, it is domesticated and takes its place as an integΓal if
clearly sυboΓdinated part of the hυman world, like the jester at a
royal court. Here reason and madness speak to one another, like
Lear and his fool. They are in "a perpetυally reversible relation
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

in virtue of which every folly rJolie] has its reason that judges and
masters it, and every reason has its folly in which it finds its
derisory truth" (FD, 36).7 Foucault sees this relation expressed,
for example, ίη the ironic literary themes (influenced by Chris-
~ianity) of the folly of wisdom and the wisdom of folly. Later
Renaissance madness is part of one world with reason, in dia-
logue with it; it is reason's essential mocking counterpart, with a
place and perspective of its own that is acknowledged by reason
itself.
Foucault finds particular evidence of this special relationship
of madness and reason in the Renaissance phenomenon of the
"ship of fools," which sent the mad traveling fΓOm city to city on
the canals and rivers of Northern Europe. Their voyages sepa-
rated them from the "normal" life of Γeasonable men (and con-
signment to the wateΓs was a symbolic gesture of puΓification).
But the fact that the mad weΓe periodically dropped off at new
towns showed that, though at the margins of Renaissance life,
they were not sharply excluded from it.
With the advent of the Classical Age, the relationship of rea-
son and madness is, accoΓding to Foιιcault, fundamentally tΓans­
formed. The focal point of this transformation is tl1e "Great
Confinement," wheΓeby, for example, '-vitllin the space of just a
few months duΓing 1656, over 1 percent of the population of
PaΓis was compelled to live undeΓ state sιιpervision in one or
anotl1e:r: division of the Hόpital GeneΓal. Foucault maintains
that, in the middle of the seventeenth century, similaΓ develop-
ments occuπed all over Europe. EνeΓywhere significant parts
of the population were isolated in state-controlled houses of
confinement.
Those confined weΓe, to οιιr eyes, a heteΓogeneoιιs gΓoup,
including not only the mad but also the sick, the poor, the pΓO­
miscuous, blasphemeΓs, Γebellious children, iπesponsible paΓ­
ents, etc. TheiΓ most obvious common characteristic, Fouc;::ιult
notes, was merely that they were idle; thωugh unwillingness or
through lack of ability οΓ opportunity, they did no work in soci-
ety. Coπesponding to this, the immediate and explicit motive
for their confinement was economic and political. In the mid-
seventeenth century, a σisis in the Spanish economy had pro-
7. Ο η the ambigι~ity in French bet\νeen folie ιneaning "madness" and folie mean-
ing "folly," see A\an Sheridan, Miclιel Foιιcault: τlιe will to trutlι (London:
Tavistock, ιg8ο), ι6-17.
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 73
duced, throughout Western Europe, "reduction ofwages, unem-
ployment, scaΓcity of coin" (FD, 8ο; MC, 49). Confinement v,τas,
accoΓding to Foucault, first of all, a ;νay, in difficult economic
times, of contΓOlling the thΓeat of violence fΓOm the unem-
ployed. Furtheι·, even when prospeΓity retιιrned, confinement
seeιned to proωise the econoωic benefit of providing an inex-
pensive, closely controllecl source of labor. Τhιιs, confineωent
provided "cheap ωanpower in periods of full eωployment and
high salaι-ies; and, in periods of unemployment, ι-eabsorption of
tlιe iclle and social protection against agitation and uprisings"
(FD, 82; MC, 51).
But Foucault maintains that confinement was much moΓe than
just an (ultimately unsuccessful) economic and political expedi-
ent. Besides being an act of physical exclusion carried out for the
sake of specific goals of public policy, it also pΓOduced (and
expressed) a radically new experience of those who were con-
fined and, in paΓticular, a new expeΓience of madness.
He says that a fiΓst key feature of this new experience of mad-
ness lies precisely in the fact that the mad are included as one
particulaΓ group in tlιe moι-e general category of those confined.
We have already noted tlιat all tlιose confined slιared tlιe eco-
nomic failing of idleness. But tlιere is anotlιer general.categoriza-
tion of those confined that is, in Foucault's view, muclι ηιοΓe
important for an understanding of the Classical Age's expeΓience
of ωadness. This is the category of ιι121·eason (deτaison). Every
group confined deνiated in some way fι-om the Classical Age's
noΓms of rational behavior. Each coιτesponded to a mode of
existence that rejected the defining standards of "the age of rea-
son." Thus, madness was ι·egaι-ded as one vaι-iety of unι-eason.
In this respect, the Classical expeι-ience of madness is not
deeply different fι-οιη that of the later Renaissance (except that
madness is no longer the only inverse of reason). Βιιt Foucault
cites a second key featιιre of the Classical experience of ωadness
that shaΓply distinguishes it froιn that of the Renaissance. J ust as
the Gι-eat Confinement physically excluded tlιe ωad from the
shared life of tlιe coιnmunity, so did the Classical expeι-ience of
madness regard it as conceptιιally excluded from the life of ι-ea­
son. Foucault sees this stΓiking·ly illustrated in Descartes's attitude
towaι-d madness in the First Meditation, when he is consideι-ing
νarious possible gΓOunds fοΓ doubting his beliefs. The possibilities
that his senses deceive him and that he is dreaωing both allow, in
74 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Descartes's view, for some residual truths. The former possibility

does not call into question overwhelmingly obvious sense percep-
tions (that he is now in front of a fire, holding a piece of paper,
etc.); the latter depends on "simple natures" from which images
are formed and which, even in a dream, may be objects of mathe-
matical knowledge. So in both cases, Descartes argues that, even if
his senses are in some respects unreliable or if he is dreaming,
some truths remain certain. But, in the case of madness, he does
not similarly argue that, even if he is mad, some truths remain.
Rather, he says, in effect, that 'Ί who am thinking am not able to
be mad" (FD, 55). By this Descartes means, according to Foucault,
that his veΓy project of pursuing the rational path of methodic
doubt excludes the possibility that he is mad. The fact that he is
engaged in attentive, reflective thought shows that he has chosen
reason over unreason. "Dreams or illusions are overcome in the
very structure of truth; but madness is excluded by the doubting
subject [itself]" (FD, 55). 8
According to Foucault, Descartes's attitude here is typical ofthe
Classical Age. Madness is no longer, as in the Renaissance, the
ever-present foil of reason, continually engaging it in challenging
dialogue. Rather, it has been excluded ab initio from the life of
reason. Hhysical confinement mirrors conceptιιal exclιιsion.
Fouca;w:lt identifies a thiΓd key aspect of the Classical experi-
ence of n1adness as that of moral condemnation. As a species of
idleness - like all foΓms of ιιnreason - madness is a violation of
the fιιndamental ethical conscioιιsness of boιιrgeois society. For
this society, work is the instrιιment of redemption and hence
"idleness is the faιιlt par excellence" (FD, 88; MC, 56). The mad-
man is not an outsider becaιιse he "comes from the world of the
irrational and bears its stigmata; rather, he is an outsider becaιιse
he crosses the frontiers ofboιιrgeois order ofhis own accord and
alienates himself oιιtside the sacred limits of its ethics" (FD, go;
MC, 58). As an object of moral censure, madness is no longer
regarded as a tragic fate (as in the early Renaissance) nor as a

8. For a criticisrn of Foucault's interpretation of Descartes, see Jacques Derrida,

"Cogito et l'histoire de la folie," Revue de mέtap!ι)•sique et de morale 3-4 ( 1964),
460-94· This is reprinted in Derrida's Ecrituι·e et la diffέreιιce (Editions du
Seuil, 1967), which has been translated by Alan Bass as V\1τitiιιg and diffeι·ence
(University of Chicago Press, 1978). Foucault responds to Derrida in "Mon
corps, ce papier, ce feu," Paideia, Septernber, 1971. The essay is also included
in the 1972 edition of FD and is translated by G. Ρ. Bennington in Oxford
Liteτaτy Review 4 (1979), 5-28.
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 75
psychologίcal infirmity requiι-ing medical treatment (as in mod-
ern psychiatΓy). It is, ι-atheι-, an oΓiginaι-y choice of unΓeason
ονeΓ reason.
Closely tied to the moΓal condeωnation of ωadness is Fou-
cault's fouι-th key feature of the Classical experience: a peι-cep­
tion of madness as an object t·equiΓing administΓative contΓOl.
Eaι-lieι- socίeties had, of couΓse, punished moΓal faιιlts undeι- the
civillaw. But, accoΓding to Foucault, it 'vas only v-•ith the Classical
Age that a system fοΓ total pιιblic contΓol of "the disoΓdeΓs of
heaΓts" was developed. FοΓ tl1e fiΓst time, "men weΓe confined ίη
cities of pιιΓe moΓality, 'vheΓe the la'v tl1at should Γeign in all
heaι-ts was to be applied withoιιt coωpiΌmise, withoιιt conces-
sion, in tl1e rigoroιιs form of pl1ysical constraint." In tl1is boιιr­
geois society, "moΓality presented itself to be administeΓed like
tΓade or economy" (FD, g2; MC, 6ο-61).
The featuι-es of the Classical experίence of madness discιιssed
so faι- aι-e also featιιι-es of the Classical experience of unreason in
geneι-al. Eveι-ything we have said aboιιt the pl1ysical confine-
ment, conceptual exclιιsion, moι-al condemnation, and adωinis­
trative contι-ol of the ωad coιιld also be said aboιιt the poor, the
promiscuoιιs, and otheι- confined groιιps. Tl1e next step is to
locate the specific diffeι-ence tl1at sets madness off fiΌm tl1e
other varieties of ιιnι-eason. According to Foιιcaιιlt, tl1is diffeι-­
ence ι-esides in the aniωality that was attι·ibιιted to the ωad. Put
siωply, the Classical Age regarded the mad as people in νvhoιn
the aniωal aspect of hιιman natuι-e was doωinant. Βιιt we mιιst
be caι-efιιl to ιιndeι-stand the pι-ecise conception of animality that
is involved heι-e. It is not, Foucaιιlt says, aniωality as a daι-k
inνerse of reason bιιt Γather as SOtnething wholly Olltsίde the
rational ordeι-. At the saωe time, howeveι-, he noιes that it is not
an aniωality tl1at expresses soωe pov-rer beyond man (like the
cosωic foΓce of the early Renaissance view). Rather, the aniωal­
ity of ωadness is siωply the hιιman being at his zero degΓee,
bereft of reason. As such it represents huωanity in its most
impoveι-ished, ωost abject state.
Foucaιιlt points οιιt that, in contrast to lateΓ vie,vs, the aniωal­
ity ascribed to the mad by the Classical Age is not ι-egarded as a
sign that they aι-e sick. On the contΓary, it was "comωon knowl-
edge" that the animality of the mad ωade them healthieι- than
others, impeΓvioιιs, fοι- example, to the rigoι-s of heat and cold.
Again in contΓast to lateι- vie,vs, this aniωality is not associated
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

with a mechanistic detenninism that destroys freedom. It is re-

garded not only as the result of a free choice but as itself "an area
of unforseeable freedom where frenzy is unchained" (FD, 187;
MC, 76, emphasis omitted). In this connection, Foucault also
points out tl1at the animality of the mad is not regarded as part
of the plentitude of natuΓe but as an antinature, tl1e locus of a
frenzy tl1at tlπeatens to undermine the natural order. This atti-
tude, he says, led to a lack of empl1asis on medical treatment of
madness, since such tΓeatment was a matteΓ of operating on its
object thωιιgh natuΓal causal mechanisms. He agΓees tl1at tl1ere
was soωe ιηedical attention given tl1e mad dιιring tl1e Classical
Age bιιt holds that it ~·as ωostly a matter of ι-esίdιιal ωedieval
practices. SiωilaΓly, he says that, altl1ough madness νvas Γe­
garded as a l110Γal defect, the ordinary techniques of moΓal cor-
rection (exhortation, confession and repentence) were not ap-
plied to it. This νvas because the mad were thought to be so
imωeι-sed in their aniωality that there was no qιιestion of tl1eir
responding to sιιch technίqιιes. They could only be disciplined-
that is, bι-utally coerced to obey.
The essential animality of the ωadωan explains, accoι-ding to
Foιιcaιιlt, a striking diffeΓence in tl1e tΓeatn1ent of madness in
contrast to otheΓ forms of ιιnreason. Ordinarily, ιιnι-eason ~·as
treated as a scandal to be hidden from public aννareness in
hoιιses of confinement. Tl1ere 1νere, l1owever, regιιlar public
exhibitions of the mad, fixed times when tl1e general popιιlation
was allowed and encouι-aged to visit the hoιιses of confineιηent
and observe tl1e bizarre antics of madmen. Foιιcaιιlt explains tllis
in terms of tl1e religίoιιs sίgnificance tl1at the Classical Age saνv in
tl1e anίmalίty of the mad. Tllis animality ΓepΓesented tl1e lo1vest
depths to wllich man's sinfιιl nature coιιld bΓing hiιn. The exl1ibi-
tion of tl1e ωad showed men "hο1ν close to animalίty tl1eiΓ Fall
could bι-ing tl1em; and at tl1e same tiιne l1ο1ν far divine meΓcy
could extend wl1en ίt consented to save men" (FD, 193; MC, 81).
The above description of the Classical experience of ωadness is
not complete. It covers only what Foιιcaιιlt calls the "critίcal" and
the "practίcal" conscioιιsness of madness (FD, 201-204). The
former is reason's refiectίve and morally disapproving awareness
of madness as ίts opposίte, the latter Γeason's choice, in tl1e light
of groιιp ηοΓωs, to exclιιde madness. Togetl1eΓ these tν~•ο com-
pΓise wl1at we might call (tl1ough Foιιcaιιlt does not use the
term) an eval1ιative awaΓeness of madness, an aνvareness that
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 77
embodies ι-easo11's co11αete rejectio11 of mad11ess as a form of
u11reaso11. We have 110t yet discιιssed what we might call the
Classical Age's cognitive aware11ess of mad11ess, its aware11ess of
mad11ess as a11 object of k11owledge ratlιer tha11 as a11 object of
rejectio11. Here Foi.ιcaιιlt also disti11gιιishes two forms of aware-
11ess: an iιnmediate recog11ition (1·econnaissance) a11cl a body-of
objectiνe-k11owledge (co1212aissance). He calls tlιe former an "e11H11-
ciative" co11scioιιsness and the latter a11 "a11alytic" co11scioιιs11~ss
(FI;:>, 205-206). He emphasizes, a11ticipating his later i11siste11ce
on the intimate ties betν~ree11 k11owledge a11d power, that the
disti11ction betwee11 (wlιat Ι am calli11g) tlιe evalιιative and the
cog11itive aware11ess of ωad11ess is 11ot a disti11ctio11 betwee11 the
pΓactical a11d the theoΓetical. The two forms of evalιιative co11-
scious11ess are gι-oιιnded i11 theoretical conceptio11s of mad11ess
and the two forms of cognitive conscioιιs11ess are i11formed by
society's practices for deali11g '"itlι the ωad. Βιιt the theory that is
i11choately present in evalιιative co11scioιιs11ess is explicitly formu-
lated a11d developed as a body of positive k11owledge ίη cog11itive
co11scioιιsness.
Accordi11g to Foιιcaιιlt, the Classical Age recog11izes (reconnait)
ιηadness through its twofold relatio11 to reason- that is, first, as
a deviatio11 fro111 tlιe 11onηs of reaso11 and, seco11d, as an object
available for reason's scie11tific knovνledge (i11, e.g., medici11e).
Sιιch a dιιal appι-ehe11sio11 of mad11ess is fou11d i11 pΓevious ep-
ochs, but Foιιcaιιlt thi11ks the Classical Age is distinctive in weav-
i11g the two modes of ι-ecog11itio11 together so closely that they
can11ot be disti11guished. There is 110 effective disti11ctio11 be-
twee11 "the moι-al 11egativity of the ωadman" a11d "the positivity
of what ca11 be k11own about him" (FD, 225). The result is that
there ίs 110 lo11ger (as there clearly was i11 the early Renaissance) a
disti11ctio11 betvνee11 the "po,νeι-s of reaso11" a11d the "powers of
the i11sa11e." The reaso11 for this seems to be that the moral
jιιdgme11t that madness is a11 ιι11acceptable deviatio11 from rea-
S011 provicles all the objective co11tent of a11y scientific k11owledge
of mad11ess. Conseqιιently, Classical mad11ess is, i11 Foucault's
view, si1nply u11reason. More fιιlly, reaso11 provides the o11ly posi-
tίve eleme11t i11 the recog11ition of mad11ess; what disti11guislιes
mad11ess as such is sίωply the fact that it misιιses (a11d i11 that
se11se negates) ι·eason. Τhιιs the strιιcture ofthe Classical recog11i-
tion of ωad11ess refl.ects the pιιrely 11egative view that vνe saw i11
the Classical evaluative conscioιιs11ess of it.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

With regard to Classical knowledge ("analytic consciousness")

of madness, Foucault finds the situation more complex. He
notes that accounts of madness were developed as part of the
theory of illness ίη geneΓal. The typical approach (characteristic
of Classical thought) was to offer complex classifications of the
varieties of madness. (Chapter 3 discusses in some detail the
application of this approach to bodily illness.) Since Classical
thinkers viewed illness as an essentially positive phenomenon
(here Foucault cites the view of Boissier de Sauvages as typical),
there was a tension between the Classical Age's effoΓts to develop
a body of knowledge about madness and the aiteΓia 'vhereby it
recognized it. However, he maintains that this tension neνeΓ
became critical, primarily beGause none of the numerous efforts
to pΓovide classificatory schemes fοι- madness had any lasting
effect on Classical thought. Each scheme (from PlateΓ's in ι6οg
through W eickhard's in 1790, including that of Linnaeus, the
greatest classifier of all) disappeared alφost as soon as it v.τas put
forward and had no lasting effect.
Foucault cites a numbeΓ ofreasons for this failure: tl1e concep-
tual inadequacy of all the schemes offered, the peΓsistence of a
pre-Classical classification (based more on experience than on
conceptual analysis), ancl tl1e development of tl1e ωedicine of
vapors, wl1icl1 classified diseases on tl1e basis of medical tlleι-apy
ratl1:eΓ tl1an nosological tl1eoιγ But l1e thinks the deepest Γeason
for tl1e failure was sinψly the fact that the tΓeatωent of madness
as a positive phenomenon was inconsistent with the Classical
Age's fundamental view of it as negative. The classification
schemes failed because tl1ey conflic~ed witl1 the basic stnιctures
defining the possibility of the Classical experience of ιnadness.
In turning to the Classical Age's cognitive conscioιιsness of
madness, Foucault has ιnoved from Γeading its expeΓience of
madness in practices and institutions for controlling tl1e mad to
reading this experience in the wΓitings of "sages and plιiloso­
phers" and of "physicians and scientists." He notes tl1at the
Classical Age was Γeιnarkable (in contΓast, for exaιnple, with
οιιΓ own) in the extent to wllich it accepted a wide gap between
its evaluative and its cognitive consciousness of madness. In
particular, the econoιnic, social, and political policies that cen-
tered on confineιnent made no appeal to medical or otheΓ "sci-
entific" accounts of madness. Nonetheless, Foucault ωaintains
that the Classical Age's evalιιative and cognitive consciousness
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 79
of madness share a fundaιnental stnιcture. "These two do-
mains, so Γigoroιιsly separated, do not fail to exlιibit, on close
examination, the ωost pΓecise stnιctω·al analogies .... As sepa-
rated as they are, there is nothίng of iωpoι-tance ίη the first
tlιat is not ωatclιed [equilibπi] ίη the second" (FD, 211-12).
HoweveΓ, Foucault thinks tlιat tlΊίs cοηιωοη stι-ucture is ωοι-e
ι-eadily cliscernible thι-ough analysis of the cognitίve conscious-
ness. What is seen only in pa1·tial glimpses ίη a study of the
evaluative doωain appeaι-s full bloνvn in a study ofthe cognitive.
Accω·dingly, Foucault expects that in disengaging the Classical
Age's positive knowledge of ωadness lιe 'vill also reveal explicitly
the "coωmon experience" of ωadness that underlies both do-
ωains. "Tlιis uniqιιe expel"ience, wlιich ι-esides both heι-e and
theι-e, νvlιich sιιpports and jιιstifies the pι-actice of confinement
and the cycle of knowledge- it is this that constitutes the classical
expeι-ience of ωadness" (FD, 212).
This effoι-t to find a comωon stι-uctuΓe.that undeι-lies both the
scientific knowledge and the institutional pι-actices of an age is in
effect Foucaιιlt's fiι-st use of lιis archaeological ωethod. (How-
ever, except for one sentence in the Preface (FD, ii) he does not
use the term aτclιaeology.) Later woι-ks, culminating ίη the explic-
itly methodological ι-eflections of Ylιe arclιaeology of lιnowledge, will
modify and ι-efine the method. Eventιιally, for example, Foιι­
cault will abandon the idea that archaeology illuωinates some
soι-t of fιιndamental expeι-ience and >vill instead constι-ue it as
dealing witlι objective conditions fοΓ the possibility of lingιιistic
acts. Also, he will think mιιch ωore carefully about the relation
of aι-chaeological stι-uctures to institutions and practices. But the
fact remains that his stιιdy, in Part ΙΙ of FD, of the strιιcture of
the Classical experience of madness Γepresents Foucault's first
development of wlιat he later calls the archaeological approach
to the history of thought.
In taking this aι-chaeological approaclι, Foucault abandons the
effort, pursued so far in his treatment of the Classical knowledge
of madness, to describe "the evolution of theoretical concepts ο η
the surface of a [body of] knowledge." Now, rather, "by cutting
into tlιe histoΓical thickness of an experience, we 'vill try to recap-
ture the movement by which a kno,νledge of madness finally
became possible" (FD, 252). As our discussion so far has sug-
gested and as we shall see more fully, this possibility could not be
fully realized within the context of the Classical experience of
8ο FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

madness. Its realization ΓequiΓed, fiτst, a bΓeak with tlιe Classical

view of madness as essentially negative and, second, the develop-
ment of tlιe modern conception of madness as mental illness.
Foucault's archaeology of Classical ιnadness pωvides the basis
for his development of tlιese ideas.
Foucault pΓesents this new level of his inquiry as one tlιat re-
quires close attention to detail. "We must now proceed slowly and
detail by detail. .. , witlι tlιe respect of a 11istoΓian" (FD, 252). His
goal, lιe says, is to discoveΓ in this detail tlιe "constituting fonns of
madness," an expΓession tlιat shows tlιat, even in embaΓking on
this new aΓclιaeological patlι, lιe still lιas in mind lιis pΓOject of
developing a lιistoΓical version of existential analysis.
Foucault's aΓclιaeology of Classical madness begins by noting
that the Classical Age ΓegaΓded madness as an affliction not of
tlιe mind ΟΓ soul alone bιιt of tlιe Ίνhole peΓson: "Wlιen someone
in tlιe 17tlι or ι8tlι centuΓy speaks of madness, he is not, stΓictly,
speaking of 'illness of tlιe mind' but ratheΓ of sometlιing wheΓe
the body and the soul are togeίlιeτ in question" (FD, 25g-6o). It is,
lιe says, only in the nineteenth centuη tlιat medicine takes up a
dualistic vieΊν of mind and body and begins to Γaise questions
about tlιe Γelation of matteΓ and the inυnateΓial, tlιe natuΓe of
tlιe soul, and so on. Even tlιouglι DescaΓtes's tννo-substances view
of man was put foΓwaΓd at tlιe beginning of tlιe Classical Age, it
did not become a major inflιιence on meclical tlιoιιglιt and pΓac­
tice ιιntil mιιclι lateΓ.
Foιιcaιιlt ωaintains tlιat, in tlιe context of tl1is holistic νieνν of
madness, Classical meclicine gave a centΓal Γole to passio12 (lιeΓe
following DescaΓtes's opinion that passion is tlιe point of ιιηiοη
of mind and body). He notes tlιat passion and madness had been
closely associated long befoΓe the Classical Age. Τhιιs, tlιe GΓeek
and Latin ιnoΓalists saw passions as tenψoΓary and attenιιated
foΓms of madness. Βιιt, fοΓ tlιe Classical Age, Foιιcaιιlt ωaintains
tlιat the Γelation was Γeversed; instead of ιιndeΓstanding ρassion
in teΓιns of madness, it saw passion as tlιe Γοοt caιιse of maclness.
ΜοΓeονeΓ, the passion belιind ιnadness is self-destnιctive in a
fιιndanιental sense. FοΓ tlιe ωadness to wlιich it giνes Γise tlιι-eat­
ens the ιnind-body ιιnity in Ίνlιiclι passion itself is gωιιnded.
HeΓe Foιιcaιιlt finds two ιnain lines of developιnent. On the
one lιancl, nιadness may lead to "a ιnovenιent of the nerνes and
ιnιιscles so violent tlιat notlιing in the seqιιence of iωages, ideas,
or volitions seeωs to coιτespond to it" (FD, 28ο; MC, gι, tΓansla-
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS

tion modified). On the other hand, "madness can, in tlιe body's

repose ο Γ inertia, generate and tlιeιι maintain an agitation of tlιe
soul ... , as is the case in melancholia, wheΓe exteι-nal objects do
not prodιιce the same impι-ession on tlιe suffereι-'s mind as on
that of a lιealthy nιan" (FD, 28ο; MC, 92). In either case, there is
a dissociation between nιental activity and bodily nιovenιents
that tlιι-eatens even tlιoιιgh it does not abolish tlιe ιιnity of soul
and body. Most inιportantly, tlιere is a dissociation between the
nιadnιan's expeι-iences and the bodily organs tlιat put hinι into
contact with the exteι-nal world. Tlιis gives ι-ise to clelιιsions and
hallιιcinations.
Tlιus at tlιe core of classicalnιadness is the experience of the
unreal, of "chinιeι-as, of hallucinations, and of erroι-- the cycle
of nonbeing" (FD, 282; MC, 93). The next step in Foucault's
archaeology is an exanιination of this experience.
An initial impω-tant point is that tlιe ιιnreality of madness is
not tlιat of nιere imagination, even the nιost fantastic. Rather,
"nιadness will begin only in the act which gives the valιιe of truth
to the inιage" (MC, 94; FD, 282)- that is, witlι tlιe acceptance of
what is inιagined as real. On tlιe basis of such an acceptance, the
nιad construct entire systems of reasoning. Tlιis clarifies Fou-
caιιlt's point, encoιιntered earlier, tlιat Classical madness is essen-
tially ιιιπeasοη. It is the employment of reason to deι-ive (what
may well be rigoroιιsly valid) conclιιsions fronι delιιsory prem-
ises. (Here we might recall G. Κ. Chesterton's clιaracterization of
the nιadman as one who has lost everything excepl his reason.)
This is tlιe precise sense in which Foιιcault maintains that mad-
ness is nothing ιnore than a negation of reason. Its positive con-
tent is entirely that of the methods of reason, but its employιnent
of these ιnethods is an essentialιnisιιse of them in tlιe service of a
delιιsion. "The ιιltiιnate language of madness is that of reason,
but the language of reason enveloped in the prestige of the
image" (FD, 284; MC, 95). The language ofreason so misιιsed is
what Foucault calls the "language of deliriιιm."
The above analysis not only confirms and furtlιer explicates
the idea that Classical madness is ιιnι-eason. lt also leads Foucaιιlt
to the cωcial point that Classicalιnadness is essentially linguistic.
"Madness, in tlιe classical sense, does not designate so mιιch a
specific change in tlιe mind ΟΓ in the body, as the existence,
under the body's alteration, undeι- the oddity of conduct and
conveι-sation, of α deliτious discouτse" (FD, 287-88; MC, 99). Fou-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

cault finds this point strikingly illustrated by the fact that Classi-
cal authors frequently classify vertigo as a type of madness but
seldom so classify hysterical convulsions. The reason, he main-
tains, is that vertigo "inνolves the delirious affirmation that the
world is really 'turning around'," whereas "it is often impossible
to find in hysterical convulsions the unity of a language" (FD,
288; MC, 100). Thus, for the Classical Age, madness is not ίη its
deepest reality the garbled and incoherent experience that its
often foolish and frenzied manifestations suggest. It is, on the
contrary, a highly structured experience, and "language is [its]
first and last structure, its constituted form; on language are
based all the cycles in which madness articulates its nature" (FD,
288; MC, ιοο). Further, the linguistic character of madness fits
ίη well with its association with the union of mind and body,
since the delirious discourse of the mad is "both the silent lan-
guage bywhich the mind speaks to itself ίη the truth proper to it,
and the visible articulation in the movements of the body" (FD,
288; MC, ιοο).
But no matter how "rational," ίη the sense of logically struc-
tured, Classical madness may be, Foucault holds that it remains a
manifestation of unreason because all its rationality is based on
the fundamental erι-or of taking dι-eams and delusions fοι- reali-
ties. Furtheι-, as we l1ave seen earlier, the Classical Age does not
regard this error as an involuntary ωistake but as something
cΛose11 by the mad. "Tl1e madωan,, ίη the 17th and ι 8th centu-
ries, is not so much the victiω of an illusion, of a halluci:nation, of
his senses, οι- of a ωovement of his ωind. He is not abused, he
deceives Λimself' (FD, 292; MC, 104).
Next Foucault inquiι-es as to the precise nature of the decep-
tion the madωan has broιιght on himself. He notes that the
characterization (often found in Classical writers) of the mad as
blind as paι-ticulaι-ly apt. This is becaιιse blindness is able to
express both "that night of qιιasi-sleep which sιιrι-οιιηds the iω­
ages of ωadness" and the "ill-foιιnded beliefs, ωistaken judg-
ωents, ... that whole backgroιιnd of eιτors [that is] insepaΓable
froω ωadness" (FD, 294; MC, ιο6). Saying that the mad are
blind catches both the dreaωlike obscuΓity and the falsity of their
deliriuω.
Finally, Foιιcaιιlt points οιιt that fοι- the Classical Age the ι-ea­
son of the ωad is blind not becaιιse it is cιιt off frοιη light bιιt
becaιιse it is dazzled by an excess oflight. "Tl1e madωan sees the
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS

daylight, the same dayligl1t as the ma11 of reaso11 ... ; but seei11g
the same daylight and 11otl1i11g i11 it, l1e sees it as void, as 11ight, as
11othing.... \.Yhicl1 ιηea11s that he does not see at all. And believ-
i11g he sees, he admits- as Γealities the halluci11atio11s of his imagi-
natio11 a11d all the n1ultitudi11oιιs populatio11 of 11ight" (FD, 2g6;
MC, 108).9 He points out tl1at tllis undeι·sta11di11g of the bli11d-
11ess of the mad fits ί11 well with the famous Classical co11ceptio11
of Γeason as a "11atιιτallight." In keeping VΙ7 ith his fundamental
idea that reaso11 is the e11tire positive conte11t of Classical mad-
11ess, mad11ess is 110t a ωatter of being cut off from the light of
reaso11 but of bei11g dazzled by focusi11g 011 the light alone a11d
not 011 the reality it reveals.
Foucault eωphasizes that this talk of light a11d dazzleωe11t is
110 ωere passi11g ωetaphor. Rather, it derives froω "the great
cosωology which a11i111ates all classical cultuι-e" (FD, 2g6; MC,
ιοg). The fu11dame11tal law of this cosmology is "the circle of
11ight and day" in which there is an alteι-11atio11 of light and
daι-k11ess that "exclιιdes all dialectic a11d all ι-eco11ciliatio11 ... ;
everythi11g ωust be either waking or dream, truth or daΓk11ess."
This "law prescribes a11 i11eνitable order, a sere11e divisio11 whicl1
ωakes tι-uth possible and co11fi11es it forever" (FD, 297; MC,
110). Thus, accordi11g to Foιιcanlt, at the root of all Classical
thougl1t lies a sharp divisio11 betwee11 the lucid order of reaso11
a11d truth a11d the dark co11fusio11 of u11reaso11 a11d falsity. Mad-
11ess, however, transgresses this divisio11 by creating a ratio11al
order of falsehoods. As sucl1, it is an esse11tial negatio11 of Classi-
cal reaso11 a11d a threat to its defi11i11g structure. This is why
Classical reaso11 ca11, 011 Foncaιιlt's accou11t, accord ωad11ess 110
rights, ca11 e11ter 110 dialogue with it. The o11ly possible relatio11
of Classical reaso11 to ωad11ess is o11e of rigorous exclusio11.
Foncanlt sees the above a11alysis as deepe11i11g onr understa11d-
i11g of tl1e starti11g poi11t i11 his study of Classical ωad11ess, the
historical fact of the Great Co11fi11eme11t. Whatever the immedi-
ate political a11d eco11omic 111otives of this physical exclusion of
the ωad, he mai11tai11s tl1at we must ultimately u11dersta11d it as
a11 expressio11 ofωad11ess's i11compatibility with the basic cosmol-
ogy gover11i11g Classical thought. The Great Co11fi11eme11t was

g. Compare Edmund Burke: 'Έxtreme light ... obliterates all objects, so as in its
effects exactly to resemble darkness," Α plιilosoplιical enquiry into tlιe o1igin of our
ideas of tlιe sublime and tlιe beautiful, 1757; cited by La\\•rence Allo\vay, "The
American Sublime," Living Aτts, June, 1963, ι8.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

notjust another event in tl1e flo\v of histoη but an expression of

the fundamental structιιΓes of Classical Γeason.
We aΓe nov,r in a position to pΓesent an oνeΓVie\V of Foucault's
complex analysis of the Classical Age's expeΓience of madness.
He distinguishes fouΓ diffeι-ent types of consciousness of n1ad-
ness. Two aι-e evaluative: the critical, inνolving a moral jιιdg­
ment of madness; and the pΓactical, involving society's choice of
how to treat the mad. Two aΓe cognitive: the recognition of
madness in terms of criteria expressing its relation to reason and
the knowledge of madness thΓOugh objective, systematic inqιιiry.
The Classical Age's evalιιative consciousness of madness was ex-
pressed in the physical exclιιsion of the macl throιιgl1 social and
economic policies sucl1 as tl1e GΓeat Confinement. Foucault's re-
flection on this physical exclusion yields four key characteristics
ofthe Classical evalιιative consciousness ofmadness: (ι) the plac-
ing ofmadness in the geneΓal category ofunΓeason, along with a
number of otl1er gτoups ofidle citizens; (2) the conceptιιal exclu-
sion of madness frωn the life of reason; (3) the moΓal condemna-
tion of madήess; and (4) the administrative contΓOl of the mad.
These aΓe also featιιres of the Classical consciousness of ιιnΓea­
son in geneΓal. For tl1e Classical evalιiative conscioιιsness, the
distingιιishing featιιΓe of madness was a specific soΓt of aniωal­
ity. With regard to the Classical cognίtive conscioιιsness of ωad­
ness, Foιιcault finds tl1at maclness is recognizecl ωeΓely as a clevia-
tion fιΌω reason and hence has no positive content of its oνvn.
This ωade it strictly impossible for tl1e Classical Age to develop a
body of kno,vledge aboιιt ωadness, althougl1 there were ηιιωer­
οιιs attempts to do so.
Foucault maintains that all fοιιΓ of tl1e aboνe foΓms of the
Classical conscioιιsness of madness share a comωon underlying
strιιctιπe, a stnιctιιre that he delineates in \Vhat \Ve can noνv
Γecognize as l1is fiΓst atteωpt at an aΓchaeological analysis of
thoιιght. TI1e ωain stages in this analγsis aΓe: (ι) a cl1aΓacteΓiza­
tion of madness as a phenomenon of 1πiπd-bocly unity,· (2) a coΓ­
relative grouncling of ωadness in passioπ; (3) a Γecognition of
ωadness as deli1ium- tl1at is, the taking of the ιιnΓeal for the
real; (4) an ιιnderstanding of deliriιιω (and hence ωadness) as a
Γationally strιιctιιΓec\ lατιgι.ιαge; (5) a conseqιιent Γealization tl1at
ωadness is a state of reason, but of reason in a condition of
blindness; (6) an analysis ofthis blindness as dιιe not to a lack bιιt
an excess of ligl1t- tl1at is, dazzle1πeπt; (7) a Γelation of this ιιnder-
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

standing of n1adness to tl1e f1.ι1ιda?ne11tal Classical cos1nolog;ι of day

and nigl1t. On the basis of this aι-chaeological analysis, Foucaιιlt
concludes that the Classical Age exρeι-ienced ιnadness as tl1e
fιιndamental negation of the reason tl1at definecl its '"'orld of
tι-utl1; because of tl1is, it rigoroιιsly excluclecl madness fΓOm ev-
eι-y level of its existence.
Given the foι-egoing undeΓstancling of the Classical conscious-
ness of n1adness, Foucaιιlt proceecls to discussions of the paι-ticu­
laι- forιns of madness tl1at 'vere geneΓally Γecognizecl by Classical
medicine and of tl1e ωajor therapeutic pΓactices eιnployed to
tΓeat the ιnad. Witl1 .-egaι-d to the foι-ms of ωaclness, he finds
one vaι-iety- deωentia- that coωes close to a pιιre ι-ealization of
tl1e general Classical conception of ιnadness as the negation of
ι-eason. Tl1e otheι- ωain Classical species of ωadness - tl1e pairs
ιnania/melancholy and hysteΓialhypocl1ondria- l1ave, l1e notes,
mιιcl1 n1oι-e positive content of tl1eiι- o'-vn. Medical accoιιnts of
tl1e111 \VeΓe, as we sa'"' above, in tension ·'"'ith the Classical Age's
fιιndamental expeι-ience of ωadness and, as a ι-esιιlt, neveι- sιιc­
ceeded in taking on a coherent, geneι-ally accepted form. Tl1is
seeωs to be a pΓimary ι-eason wl1y Foucaιιlt tl1inks l1e cannot
discover tl1e Classical conscioιιsness of madness in tl1e "sιιι-face"
concepts and theories Classical meclicine developed about it bιιt
ωιιst ι-ather work at the deeper, aΓcl1aeologicallevel.
Classical therapies for ωadness weι-e not, accoΓding to Foιι­
caιιlt, closely tied to Classical medical theory; indeed, they vνere
not fοι- the most paι-t sιιpenised by doctors. But l1e thinks they too
diι-ectly reveal little about the Classical experience of madness,
since they are almost all holdovers fι-om medieval and Renais-
sance therapeιιtic pι-actices. This, of coιιrse, is what we 'voιιld
expect, given the Classical Age's exclιιsion of madness. Medical
treatιnent is a positive interaction inconsistent 'vith the attitιιde of
exclιιsion.
Althoιιgh Foιιcaιιlt holds that tl1e histoι-y of Classical medical
theoΓies and therapeιιtic practices l1as little to add to οιιr ιιndeι-­
standing of the Classical experience of madness, he does think it
inψortant for ιιnderstanding the tι-ansition to tl1e new concep-
tion of madness as ιnental illness tl1at arose at the end of the
eighteenth centιιry. He regaι-ds the development of theories of
hysteι-ia and hypocl1ondι-ia as particιιlarly significant in this ι-e­
gaι-d. These- as theiΓ names indicate- v.rere long tl1oιιght to be
seated in specific organic locations. Indeed, in the eaι-ly Classical
86 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

periσd, they were, accσΓdiηg tσ Fσucault, thσught tσ be eηtirelγ

phγsical aηd ησt eveη Γegarcled as varieties σf madηess. GΓadιι­
allγ, hσweveι-, their pιιΓely σrgaηic chaΓacteristics νvere ι-eiηteι-­
preted iη psγchσlσgical terms. Wσmeη, fσΓ example, weι-e σΓigi­
ηally tl1σιιght tσ be mσΓe sιιsceptible to hγsteΓia because theiι­
iηterηal oι·gaηs were less deηse. But eveηtιιally this lesseι- deηsity
was Γeiηterpreted as a sσftηess aηd delicacy that is iηclιιced by
"sσft" (luxιn-iσus) liviηg. Fσιιcault thiηks tl1at thrσugh this aηd
similar ι-eiηteι-pretatiσηs (e.g., σf the cσηcepts σf sγmpatl1y aηd
σf ηeι-ves) the σrigiηal uηclerstaηdiηg σf l1γsteι-ia as eηtiι-elγ
phγsical was tι-aηsfσrmed iηtσ aη uηderstaηdiηg σf it as psycl1σ­
lσgical. This, he saγs, laid the grσιιηdwσrk fσr the mσcleι-η
cσηstrual σf hγsteria as a "meηtal illηess."
Similarly, Fσucault sees Classical therapeιιtic pι-actices gradu-
allγ mσviηg iη the directiση σf mσdeι-n psychiatΓy. He pιιts
particιιlaι- emphasis ση Classical mediciηe's develσpωeηt σf the
cσηcept σf a cure: a specific reωedy fσr a particulaι· disease, iη
cσηtrast tσ the idea, wl1ich dσmiηatecl eaι-lier ωediciηe, σf a
jJanacea tl1at wσuld be sσveι-eigη fσΓ all cases. Obtaiηiηg a cιιre
reqιιired a precise adjustωeηt σf the patieηt's sιιfferiηg and the
dσctoι·'s kησwledge tσ σηe aησther. (Tl1is ι-ecalls Caηgιιill1eιn's
iηsisteηce σf tl1e rσle σf the σι-gaηisω itself iη the defiηitiση σf
the pathσlσgical.) Sucl1 aη adjustmeηt ι-equired "a cσmιnση laη­
guage, a cσmωuηicatiση- at least iωagiηary- betνveeη dσctoι­
aηd patieηt" (FD, 371). Tl1is ησtiση σf a cιιι-e, whicl1 νvas espe-
ciallγ prσniiηeηt iη tl1e tι-eatmeηt σf "ηeι-νσιιs diseases," mσved
away frσm tl1e Classical attitude σf rigσι-σus exclιιsiσn and tσ­
waι-d ωσderη psychiatric practice.
Witl1 ι-egard tσ specific tι-eatωeηts σf maclηess, Fσιιcaιιlt pιιts
special eηψl1asis ση tl1e fact tl1at Classical theι-apies ιnake ησ
distiηctiση betweeη the tι-eatιneηt σf ιηaclηess as a pl1ysical disσι-­
der aηd as a ωeηtal disσrdeι-. Ιη keepiηg witl1 tl1e fuηdaιηeηtal
peι-ceptiση σf ωadηess, all tι-eatωeηts deal with madηess as a
pheησmeηση σf miηd-bσdy ιιηity. Yl1ere is a distiηctiση be-
tweeη tι-eatη1eηts that fσcus ση the passiση at the rσσt σf mad-
ηess aηd thσse that fσcιιs ση the delirium in 'vhich it is ιιltiιnately
expressed; aηd, tσ σιιι- eyes, the fσΓmeι· σfteη seem eηtirelγ phγsi­
cal aηd tl1e latteι- eηtiι-elγ meηtal. AccσΓdiηg tσ Fσιιcaιιlt, l1σνv­
eveι-, clσser examiηatiση always reveals bσth physical aηd meηtal
aspects iηteΓtwiηed. Tlnιs, tl1e freqιιeηt recσιιrse "tσ exhoι·ta­
tiση, tσ persιιasiση, tσ reasσηing," vΛ1icl1 strikes ιιs as entirely
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS

psγchological, in fact coπesρonds to the Classical νiew that "lan-

guage, tlιe forωulations of tΓutlιs or moΓality, aΓe ίη diΓect con-
tact with tlιe body.... The adaptation or Γejection of an ethical
pΓinciple can directly ωodify tlιe couΓse of oΓganic pΓDcesses"
(FD, 397; MC, 183). Ho,vever, he maintains tlιat ίη tlιe coιπse of
tlιe eighteentlι centιtΓy, ιlιeΓe was a gΓadualω~νe towaΓd a psy-
chological construal of all ιlιeΓapies. For exaωple, eνen ρΓOce­
dιιres suclι as cold sho>ve~·s and "centrifugation" (wi1irling pa-
tients aroιιnd on seats attaclιed to Γeνolνing mechanisms), whiclι
pΓOduce obvious bodilγ effects, weΓe aρρlied to tlιe mad meΓely
as ρunislιments designed to alteΓ tlιeir ωental attitιιdes.

Mental illness and the asylum

vVe now turn to PaΓt ΠΙ of FD, Foucault's analysis of the new,
modern view of madness as mental illness. Ti1is analysis is diffeΓ­
ent in one cnιcial resρect froιn 11is eaΓlieΓ treatment of the Classi-
cal experience of ωadness. Tlιe latter was a 11istory of a ρast tlιat
is, for tlιe most ρart, no longer νvitlι ιιs, wlιeΓeas tlιe fon11er is a
study of what lιas becoωe our own view of ωadness. Tl1is is
particιιlarly significant becaυse Foυcaυlt belieνes tlιat our com-
mon modern self-υnderstanding of οιιr conception of madness
is Γadically mistaken. AccoΓding to this self-undeΓstanding, tlιe
idea tlιat madness is an illness affecting tlιe mind is ωerely a
recognition of tlιe objectiνe reality that it has al,vays had. EaΓ!ier
ideas that the ωad were filled witlι a god, diabolically possessed,
had chosen to embΓace unreason, and so forth, were merely
ωistakes that haνe been replaced by οιιr scientific discoνery that
ωadness is actually ωental illness. FuΓtlιer, tl1is objectiνe, scien-
tific understanding of madness provides, for tlιe first tiιne, the
tools fοΓ effectiνely alleνiating the suffeΓings of the mad. Preνi­
ous ages' treatιnents of madness were often really forωs of crιι­
elty, representing either innocent ignorance or deliberate mal-
treatment. Βιιt, on tlιe basis of a coπect understanding of the
nature of madness, ωodern ρsychology and psyclιiatry offer tlιe
mad libeΓation froω the crιιelties of the past and tlιe prospect of
a scientifically based cιιre of tlιeiι· illness. Foιιcaυlt's study of the
orig·ins of the modern νie'"' of ωadness aims to υnderωine this
self-υnderstanding. 'ιVitlιout denying all objectiνity to the mod-
ern vieVΙ', he emρlιasizes its essential connections to contingent
featυres of ωodern society. He also claims that tlιe ρictυre of
88 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

modern psychology and psychiatry as disinterested searches for

a truth that frees the mad from abuse and manipulation is a
myth. Ι η fact, our modern knovΛedge and treatment of the mad
are devoted to a particularly thorough and insidious manipula-
tion of them.
In the light of this "subversive" intent of Foucault's study of
the modern experience of madness, his idea of an archaeological
approach becomes particularly important. For, if he is correct
about the faulty self-understanding of our psychology and psy-
chiatry, a correct grasp of the significance of these disciplines
will-not be forthcoming from a straightforward study of the
concepts and theories they put forward. Such a study would
remain at the surface and fail to uncover an underlying struc-
ture that reveals, beneath their scientific pretensions, the true
nature of modern psychology and psychiatry. Foucault'!i project
therefore requires an archaeological approach.
He develops this approach to the modern experience of mad-
ness in terms of the two general types of consciousness - eval-
uative and cognitive - he used in treating the Classical experi-
ence. According to the modern self-understanding, the cognitive
consciousness of madness in modern psychology and psychiatry is
valιιe-fl·ee, treating n1adness siιnply as an object of disinterested
scienci:fic inquiry. As for the coπesponding evalιιative attitude, it
is said to be that of a compassionate,-scientist, eageι· to use his
knowledge to improve the lot ofhis less fortunate fellows. Accord-
ing to Foucault, however, the modern evaluative consciousness of
madness is much less striaghtforward and innocent and, more-
over, is inextricably tied to the cognitive methods and content of
scientific psychology and psychiatry.
Let us begin with the first dimension of evaluative conscious-
ness, the critical consciousness that expι-esses a moral judgment
of madness. Foucault sees the first majoι- sign of something new
here in the "Great Feaι-" of contagion from the houses of confine-
ment that swept over Europe in tl1e ιnideighteenth centuι-y. "Peo-
ple were in dread of a mysterious disease that spι-ead, it v.•as said,
from the hoιιses of confinement and 'Nould soon threaten the
cities. They spoke of prison fevers; ... it was said that the air,
tainted by disease, would coπupt the ι-esidential quarteι-s" (FD,
429; MC, 202). Although this feaι- was "formulated in medical
terms," it was, Foucault maintains, "aniιnated, basically, by a
moι-al myth." This moral myth involved a new understanding of
 MADNESS AND J\•IENT AL ILLNESS 8g
madness as a ιnω-al faιιlt. In the Classical Age, madness was, on
Foucaιιlt's accoιιnt, condemned froιn a moral viewpoint because
it v.τas a clιoice of ιιnreason - that is, a tur11i11g away fωιη the
νvorld of lιιιman realities to a world of delιιsio11s. Tlιe madman
νvas, by his Ο'Ν11 choice, outside the hιιma11 world, an a11imal. Ι11
this view, madness νras i11 esse11ce exter11al to the lιιιman history
a11d society that it rejected; it v.τas 110t a human fault, but a fault
that gave ιιp huωa11ity. Foucault regards the Great Fear as iω­
poι-ιant because it reι)ΓeSe11ted a break ΙVΪth this mora} attitude
toνvard ωad11ess. As a11 object of fear, the mad were 011ce again
im plicitly regarded as paι-t of the lιιιma11 v.τorld, not as tlιose νvlιο
had stripped off tlιeir hιιιnanity by a choice of ιιιυ-easοη.
Foιιcault holds tlιat this humanization ofmad11ess lιad two σu­
cial cliωe11sions. FiΓst ιηadness was 110 lo11ger located in a fantas-
tic, "secret" 1νorld beyond human experience. It v.τas, rather, a
foΓm of lιuωan experie11ce, "lodgecl in tlιe hearts, in tlιe desires,
the iωagi11ation of ιηe11" (FD, 436; MC, 2og). It was a moral
faili11g that, unlike the aniωality of Classical ωacl11ess, was subject
to con-ection. The ωad tlιus needed to be refω-mecl, and since tlιe
begi11ning of reform is agreement tlιat one is i11 tlιe wro11g, tlιe
maclωan ωust be ωade to feel gιιilt over his co11dition. Second,
since it 1vas now part of tlιe human world, the exteΓnal factors tlιat
tι-igger madness were 11ot souglιt in gτancl, e11duΓing cosmic
forces (e.g., lu11ar influences). Ratlιer, they weΓe soug·ht in spe-
cific contingent features of local environments. As an example,
Foιιcaιιlt cites melancholia, 1vhich 1vas ι-egarded as a distinctively
E11glish coωplaint, due to the fι-eecloω and wealth of English
society. He also notes an emphasis ση religious excesses and the
artificialities of ωodern society (fωω stylized ωanners to novel
reading) as sources of ιηad11ess.
Foucault closely links this ne1v aitical consciousness of mad-
ness to a 11ew practical conscioιιsness, a nev.' way of dealing Ιvitlι
the ωad. This had, in his vieVΙ', a tΙvofold oι-igin. First, from
νvitlιin the Classical systeιη of confineιnent, there arose pωtests
that it was wrong to foι-ce the sane to live witlι tlιe ωad. Inaeas-
ingly thι-ough the eighteenth centιιι-y, the feeling grew that
no11ιnad social offenclers (e.g., cι-iιninals) should not have to e11-
dω-e tlιe νiole11ce a11d otlιer excesses of the ιnad. Co11sequently,
lιe says, tlιere develoρed a conse11sus that, witlιin the system of
confi11enιent, the ωad should be isolated fωιη the rest of the
confined ρopulation. Thus,just 1vhe11 the perception of madness
go FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

as a form of unreason was abandoned, so '1-Vas the method of

confining madness with other forms of unreason.
Second, external social and economic changes were leading to
the breakup of the old system of confinement. Here Foucault
tl1inks the fundamental development was a new conception of
the social and economic role of-the poor. Pι-eviously, poverty had
been regarded as a moral fault, the prodιιct of slothfιιl idleness,
and as we have seen, sιιch idleness was the social mark of unrea-
son. Now, however, poverty came to be viewed as freqιιently the
result of economic forces beyond a person's control and, more
inψortantly, as a necessary condition of the overall wealth of a
society. "Becaιιse they labor and consιιme little, those who are in
need permit a nation to enrich itself ... ; in shoι-t, a people would
be poor which had no paιιpers" (FD, 492-93; MC, 229-30).
This new appreciation of the pοοι- was closely tied to tl1e ι·ealiza­
tion that population was a powerful positive economic resource.
Foιιcault points out tl1at, given the new view of the poor, confine-
ment appeared to be a major economic mistake. It withdrew a
significant body of cheap labor from tl1e maι-ket and, even
woΓse, required its support by public charity. (PΓesιιmably, the
idea of using tl1ose confined as a controlled souΓce of cheap
labor had not worked out in practice.) Accordingly, theι·e devel-
oped strong pressures for an end to confiήement.
However, Foucault notes that a crιιcial distinction had to be
made between the confined poor wl1o were capable of woΓk and
tl1ose '~ho were not. It was obvious that the formel" sl1oιιld sim-
ply be released from confinement- constrained by notl1ing but
the iι·on laws of economics. The latter had no econon1ic value
and required (for ethical, not economic, reasons) care and sιιp­
port from society. τl1is group, which inclιιded the physically ill
and the mad (along with CI"ίminals, who posed a dangeι- to soci-
ety) constituted a subclass that still requiι·ed confinement. Since
it was agreed that the mad coιιld not be confined "'ith eitl1er the
pl1ysically ill or criminals, it followed that a sepaι·ate system of
confinement would have to be developed for them. Furtheι-,
although the general view at tl1e end of the eighteenth centιιry
was tl1at care fοι- the needy should be handled by the private
chaι-ity of neighbors and especially the family, the dangers tl1e
mad (like criminals) posed to public ordeι- required that their
care be handled by tl1e '~ider community.
But the great and difficult question '1-Vas, on Foucault's ac-
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

coυnt, pΓecisely VΙ'hat ιnetlιocl of confineιnent shoιιld be eιn­

ployed fοΓ tlιe ιnad. Tlιe ηeΊΙΙ' evaluative conscioιιsness of ιnad­
ness as a lιιιιnaη nιoral failing reqυiring coπection ιnade the old
Classical nιethod of ιneι-e exclιιsion inappropriate. Tlιe two ιnod­
els available :.__ froιn tlιe other ι-eιnaining subgroups ι-equil"ing
confinenιent- were tlιe lιospital and the (newly developing)
prison. Eνentιιally, the hospital ιnodel won out, pι-iιnarily be-
caιιse of tlιe case nιade by ''.rriteι-s suclι· as Tenon and Cabanis
that the very fact of confinenιent woulcl constrain the iιnagina­
tion and so have a positive theι-apeutic effect on the ιnad (FD,
526). Given this, tlιe project of confineιnent itself led to a theι-a­
peιιtic approaclι to ιnadness ancllιence to a forιn of confineιnent
ιnodeled on the lιospital. Foυcault eιnplιasizes that this develop-
ιnent follo,ved fronι clιanges in the institution of confineιnent
and not fronι any interνention (e.g., on coιnpassionate grounds)
by the ιnedical profession. Indeed, as we shall see, he ιnaintains
tlιat doctoι-s precisely as experts on ιnedical nιatters played little
ΓOle in early treatnιent of the ιnad.
Accoι-ding to Foucault, then, tlιe ιnodeι-n evaluative (critical
and practical) consciousness of tlιe nιaclled to tlιe priιnary institu-
tional locus of nιodern nιadness, the asyluιn. His next step is to
analyze tlιis institution witlι a view to discoveι-ing tlιe tnιe nature
of the nιodern cognitive consciousness of ιnadness. For lιis cl.aiιn
is that it is the structιιre of asyluιn life nιore tlιan a disinterested
scientific pursuit of trιιtlι that ιιnderlies ιnodeι-n psychology and
psychiatry.
On the surface, of coυrse, it appeaι-s that the asylιιnι is pι-e­
cisely tlιe locυs of the objective scientific study and treatιnent of
ιnadness. It pι-ovides a space in VΙ7 hich ιnedical expeι-ts can care-
fυlly observe the ιnad, assess the nature of tlιeiι- condition, and
presaibe aπ effective regiιnen of tι-eatιnent. Foucault agrees
tlιat, in the asylιιιn, the ιnad becoιne objects of the "nιedical
gaze" and of nιedical treatnιent, but lιe finds that the fornιeι- is
ι-ooted in a nιoι-al judgnιent of the nιad as violatoι-s of bourgeois
society's valυes and tlιat the latter consists of techiniques for
coιnpelling the nιad back beneath the yoke of these values.
Foυcaιιlt nιakes lιis case thΓOugh a sautiny of the work of the
two great foundeι-s of the asylυnι nιovenιent, Sanιιιel Tυke in
England and Philippe Pinel in France, prinιary figυι-es in the
nιythical origins of scientific, lιuωanitarian psyclιology and psy-
chiatry. Tυke freed the nιad fι-om the dank cells of Classical
92 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

captivity and took tl1eιn to live at the idyllic country "Retreat" he

founded ίη York. Tl1e principle bel1ind Tιιke's Retreat was the
idea, noted above, that ωadness deι-ived fωιn the aι-tificialities
of ωodeι-n sociallife. At the Retreat, Tuke's ωadωen ν,rere to be
ι-estored by living in a siιnple, natuι·al setting that ννould puι-ge
theω of theiι- diseases of ciνilization. Accoι-ding to Foιιcaιιlt, ho,v-
eveι-, tl1e Retι-eat was not stι·ictly a ι-etιιrn to a Roιιsseauian state
of natuι-e but to a pι-iωitive social gι-oup, sn·uctuι-ed along the
sociallines of the Biblical faιnily: "a gι-eat fι-ateι-nal coωnΊtιnity
ofpatients and guaι-dians, under the authoΓity ofthe adωinistι-a­
tiνe diι-ectoι-s" (FD, 570). Within this coιnιnunity, he says, the
ιnad weι-e ι-equiι-ed to subωit theωselves to the two constι-aints
of woτk and obseτvation. Thωugl1 work they ι-etuι-ned to tl1e οι-­
deι- of the divine cωnωandωents and subιnitted theωselves to
the laws of ωoι·ality and of ι-eality. Tl1eiι- sιιccess in doing so was
ωonitω·ed by the close obseι·vation of theiι- caι-etakers, a sσutiny
tl1at "puι-sued in the ωadωan the least perceptible signs of his
ιnadness" (FD, 584; MC, 249). Α priωaι-y locus of tl1is observa-
tion weι-e the Retι-eat's faωοιιs "tea-parties," wheι-e patients ωet
socially νvith diι-ectoι-s and staff and tl1e ωad guests '"'οιιld "dι-ess
in tl1eiι- best clothes, and vie witl1 eacl1 otl1eι- in politeness and
pωpriety" (cited, FD, 584; MC, 249).
Wl1ateνeι- Tuke's intentions, the effect ofthis soι-t oflife was, ο η
Foιιcault's νiew, not a ι-etuι-n of the ωad to a life of natιn-al calω.
Ratl1eι-, it placed "tl1e insane indiviclual within a ιnoι-al eleιnent
wheι-e l1e [was] in debate witl1 hiωself and l1is suπoιιndings ... a
ωilieιι wl1eι-e, faι- fωω being pΓOtectecl, l1e [νvas] kept in a peψet­
ual anxiety, ceaselessly threatened by Laνv and Tι-ansgι-ession"
(FD, 58ο; MC, 245). As Foιιcaιιlt sees it, tl1e ιnad weι-e tι-eated
objectively- that is, as objects of sσutiny- in Tuke's Retι-eat, bιιt
the pι·iιnary effect of this objectification was not scientific knσ<,vl­
edge ίη those obserνing but feaι- and gιιilt in tl1ose obseι-ved. Of
cοιιι-se tl1e pι·evioιιs Classical systeω of confineωent l1ad had its
terroι-s and l1ad judged tl1e ιnad gιιilty of ωoral faιιlt. But in
Tuke's ι-egiιne feaι· and gιιilt v.•eι-e internalized: 'Ήe sιιbstituted
fοι- the fι-ee teιτοι- of ωadness the stifling angιιisl1 of responsibil-
ity; feaι- no longeι- ι-eigned on tl1e otheι- sicle ofthe prison gates, it
now raged undeι- the seals of conscience ...." Siιnilaι-ly, "the asy-
lιιω η ο longeι- punished the ιηadιnan's gιιilt .... ; bιιt it clid n1oι-e, it
oι-ganized that guilt ... [so that] the ωadιηan becaωe an object of
punishιnent alv.•ays vulneι-able to lιiιnself and to the Otheι- .... "
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 93
(FD 582-83; MC, 247). So, altl1ougl1 Tuke's asylum was in some
>νays ιnοΓe lnιmane tl1an tl1e bΓutal pl1ysical constΓaints ofhouses
of confinement, it V.'as Ϊη otheΓ 1-νays even lllOΓe manipulatiνe and
dominating. Never before hacl tl1e mac\man been controlled by
tl1e ιnanipulation of his 01-νη feelings ο( ι-esponsibility and guilt.
Ν eνer before l1ad l1e been recnιited as 11is own keepeΓ.
Foucaιιlt offeι·s a similaι- analysis of Pinel's celebrated 'Ίibera­
tion" of the mad at Bicetre. At first sight, it migl1t seem tl1at
Pinel's asylιιm ννas based ση essentiallγ diffeΓent pι-inciples from
Tuke's, since tl1e latteΓ was modeled ση tl1e religious community
of Qιιakeι-s (to ννl1ich Τιιke belonged ancl fοι- whoιn the Retreat
was mainly intencled), wl1eΓeas Pinel opposed ι-eligion and paι-­
ticulaι-ly eιnphasized its ΓOle in tl1e proclιιction of ιnadness. How-
eνeι-, Foιιcaιιlt thinks this cliffeι-ence is sιφeι-ficial since Pinel is
oρposed to onlγ "the iconogι-aphic [i1naginaiτe] forιns, not the
ιηοι·a! content of Γeligion" (FD, 591; MC, 256). Fοι- him, "the
asyluιn is a ι-eligioιιs domain v.•itl1oιιt ι-eligion, a doιnain of ρure
ιnoι-alitγ, of .et11ical ιιnifoΓmity .... τl1e valιιes of family ancl
νvork, all the acknowledgecl νirtues, ... reign ίη [l1is] asylιιm"
(FD, 592; MC, 257). τ}1e specifics of Pinel's tι-eatment of tl1e
n1ad did diffeι- fron1 Tιιk,e's. Instead of l1aνing the mad retreat
fΓοιi.1 tl1e 1-νorld into an idealized "natιιι-al" cοιηιηιιηίtγ, Pinel
tried to bΓing theιn back fΓom tl1e "loweι- deρths" of societγ
(•vheΓe, in 11is vieΙv, their ιnadness originated) and integΓate
theιn into the systeω of boιιrgeois societγ. FοΓ example, one· of
his patients- an English captain who was the fiΓst ιnadman he
freed- becaιne Pinel's personal seι-νant. Βιιt Foιιcault holds that
Pinel shared Tιιke's ultimate goal of sιιbjecting the mad to bour-
geois ιnoΓalitγ and, even ιηοι-e iιnpoι-tant, eιnploγed the saιne
sort of inteι·nalizing tecl1niques to attain it. One sιιch technique
was that of silence, the Γigoroιιs prohibition fΓΟω ιιttering a
single v.rord to certain ωadωen ιιntil, huιniliated bγ continual
snιιbs, tl1eγ abandoned the self-intoxication of their ωadness
and accepted the norωs of society. Another, "ι-ecognition bγ
ωίιτοr," aiωed at getting the ωadman to see (e.g., in other mad-
men) the absurdity of his pretensions. Finally, and perhaps ωost
iιnρortant, Pinel, like Tuke, sιιbjected his chaΓges to "peψetιιal
jιιdgωent." 'Ένeηrthing >Vas organized so that tl1e madman
Ιvοιιld ι-ecognize himself in a world of judgment that enveloped
hiιn ση all sides; l1e n1ust knoνv that he is ννatched, jιιdged, and
condeιnned" (FD, 6ο1; MC, 267).
94 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

We have finally to discuss wlιat Foucault ΓegaΓds as the most

impoι-tant featιπe of all in the strιιctuΓe of the asyluω life tlιat
developed at the end of the eiglιteenth centuΓy. This is "tlιe
apotheosis of tlιe medical peΓsonage" (FD, 6ο4; MC, 26g), the
dominating role played by doctoι-s in botlι the admission of pa-
tients to the asylum and tlιeiι- tι-eatωent once there. Το us this no
doιιbt seeωs entirely natιιral; since the mad aι-e mentally ill, they
reqιιire medical treatment. HO\Neνer, according to Foιιcaιιlt, the
doctor did not ι-ule tlιe asylum ίη νirtue of 11is scientific medical
knowledge bιιt in viΓtue of his moΓal aιιthω·ity. 'Ά man of gΓeat
probity, of utteΓ virtue and scruple, who had long expeΓience in
the asyluω would do as well" (FD, 6ο4; MC, 270). The first
doctoΓ put in clιarge at Tuke's RetΓeat soon realized tlιat lιis
medical knowledge was of little use in improving the condition
of tlιe patients. Tlιere VΙ7 eΓe cuΓes, bιιt "tlιe medical means νveΓe
so iιnperfectly connected witlι the pΓDgress of recovery, that he
coιιld not avoid suspecting theιn, to be ι-atheι- concomitants tlιan
causes" (cited, FD, 6ο6; MC, 271). Tuke insists that tlιe doctoΓ
did have great infiιιence on his patients. But Foucault ιnaintains
tlιat this was clearly ίη viΓtue of his moral and social aιιthority
witl1in the institιιtion, not l1is scientific knowledge of madness.
Similarly, "tlιe ωedical personage, accoΓding to Pinel, lιad to act
not as tlιe Γesult of an objective diagnosis, but by relying upon
tlιat pΓestige wlιich envelops tlιe seCΓets of the Family, of AutlιoΓ­
ity, of Punislιωent, and of Love; it is by bΓinging such poVΙreι-s
into play, by weaΓing the mask of FatheΓ ancl of Jιιdge, that tlιe
plιysician ... became tlιe almost magic peι-petΓatoΓ of the cuΓe."
(FD, 6ο7-6ο8; MC, 273).
Foucault points out that, fοΓ Τιιke and Pinel, theΓe νvas notlιing
puzzling about this influence of the ρlιysician, since tlιey ac-
cepted the efficacy of moΓal ρower. But 1'Ιith the develoριnent of
medical pΓactice in tlιe nineteenth centιιι-y in accoΓd witlι a ρosi­
tivist ideal of purely objective, valιιe-free kno\vledge, plιysicians
were no longeι- able to invoke moral consideι-ations to explain
their power over the ιnad. Tlιey (and society in geneι-al) thoιιglιt
of tlιemselves as woι-king solely ση tlιe basis of medical kno,vl-
edge. At tlιe saωe tiωe, tlιe vieVΙ' of nιadness as a pιn-ely psycho-
logical disordeι- (tlιe eighteentlι-century begίnnings of \vlιiclι we
noted above) was coming to dominate. The natuι-al result \Vas
tlιe belief tlιat cloctors in asylιιms VΙ•eι-e cuΓing tlιe ωacl in νiΓtue
of theiι- scίentific kno'rvledge ofnιental illness. vVίtlι this was bοω
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 95
the ιηodern concept of scientific psychology and psyclιiatry. But
in fact this concept '"as just a disgιιise for tlιe doctors' moral
domination of the ωad in the name of bourgeois society and its
νalιιes. Foucaιιlt sιιιns tlιe ωatter up this way: "[The] objectiv-
ity ... of nineteenth-century psychiatι-y fι-οω Pinel to Fι·eιιd ...
'"as fι-οηι the start a ι-eification of a ιnagical nature ... , begin-
ning froω a clear and tΓansparent ωoral practice, gradually fω·­
gotten as positiνisω imposed its ωytlι of scientific objectivity ....
Wlιat we call psychiatι-ic practice is a certain moral tactic conteιn­
porary witlι tlιe end of the eighteentlι century, preserved in tlιe
rites of asylιιm life, ancl oνerlaicl by tlιe ωyths of positiνisω" (FD,
610; MC, 276).
\1\fe see tlιen tlιat, accω·ding to Foucault, tlιe modern cognitiνe
consciousness of ιnadness (οιιr recognition of it as mental illness
and our psyclιological and psyclιiat.-ic knowledge aboιιt it) are in
fact groιιnded in and sιιbω·dinated to the modern evalιιatiνe
consciousness of madness. At the arclιaeological level beneatlι
tlιe concepts and tlιeories of psychological science, we find a
st.-ιιcture defined by the pι-oject of moral doωination. Tlιis, lιe
says, is t.-ιιe even (and especially) of Freud's psyclιoanalysis. Ad-
mittedly, psyclιoanalysis does treat patients outside tlιe setting of
tlιe asyluιn and even enters a dialogιιe in wlιiclι tlιe ωad are, for
tlιe first time in centuries, allowed to speak in tlιeir own name.
Βιιt on Foucault's account, Freιιd preseι-ves and even augnιents
the asylιιnι's pι-imaι-y instrιιment of moral domination, the aιι­
tlιority of the doctoι·. (Tlιe famous "transference" that is the key
to psychoanalytic cures would seeω to be the ωain locιιs of tlιis
aιιtho.-ity and its doωinating ωorality.) As a resιιlt, psychoanaly-
sis allov.rs the mad to speak, bιιt it does not really hear what they
say. Like the rest of ωodern psychological knowledge and psyclιi­
at.-ic pι-actice, it inιplements "tlιat gigantic moι·al iωpι-isonment
vνlιiclι we aι-e in the habit of calling, doubtless by antiplιι-asis, the
libeι-ation of the insane" (FD, 612; MC, 278).

The voice of madness

Throιιghout FD, Foucault's pι-imary eήιphasis is ση the ways that
a society constitιιtes its experience of madness and theι-eby deνel­
ops a language to speak to ancl about ωadness. But an iωpoι-tant
counterthenιe of the book, wlιich coιnes to centeι- stage in the
conclιιding chapter, concenιs the possibility of nιadness itself
g6 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

speaking to a society. Here Foucault turns froω ωadness as an

object about v,•hich truths are foΓΩιulated to ωadness as a subject
expressing trutlιs of its ov,•n. As we haνe seen, during the eaΓly
Renaissance, the tΓagic expeΓience of ιnadness ;vas Γegarded as a
source of terrifying trιιths about tlιe world. And eνen the critical
experience of ιnadness that eventually donιinated involvecl ιnad­
ness confΓOnting reason ;vith basic tΓutlιs aboιιt its liωitations
and tenιptations. But, ;vith the Clas~ical Age, the rigoΓOus exclu-
sion of the ιnad left no rοομι for coωιnunication betv,•een reason
and ιnadness. The latter 'vas ιnerely unΓeason - that is, Γeason ίη
deliΓiuω - and theΓe was no langιιage 'vorth listening to other
than that of reason. But Foιιcaιιlt sιιggests that, toν.•aΓd tlιe end
of tlιe eighteenth century, this began to change. He cites Dider-
ot's reιnaΓkable dialogιιe, Ra1neaιι's 12eplιew, as a first indication of
a renewed possibility of Γeal inteι-change between Γeason and
ιnadness. The 'Ήe" of the dialogue (tlιe nephev.• of the gΓeat
ιnusician, J ean Philippe Ranιeau) presents hiωself as "ignω·ant,
ιnad, iιnpertinent, and lazy," whereas the 'Ί" (ostensibly Diclerot
hiιnself) is the eιnbodiωent of all the solid coιnnιon sense ancl
Γeasonableness of tlιe Enliglιtennιent. Βιιt in the couΓse of the
discιιssion, the nephe\v is disconcertingly peΓceptiνe and clιal­
lenges his interlocutω· (ancl the Γeader) to ι·eassess lιis ιιndeι·­
standing of and cωnωitωent to tlιe fundanιental nιoral values of
"nornιal" sociallife. On Foιιcault's inteΓpΓetation, Dic!erot's bΓil­
liant dialogιιe ωarks "the reappearance of nιadness iiι tlιe do-
nιain of language, a language in \vhich it can speak in tlιe first
person and· state, in the nιidst of all its enιρty talk and in the
insane gι·anιωar of its paradoxes, sonιetlιing tlιat lιas an essential
connection to tlιe tΓUtlι" (FD, 618).
τlιe concluding chapteΓ of FD, "The antlιropological ciΓcle,"
consideι·s, ση tlιe basis ofFoucaιιlt's analysis of tlιe nιodern expeΓi­
ence of nιadness, just >vhat this "sonιething" ιniglιt be. As the
anticipatoΓy role of Rameau's 12eplιew suggests, one place that nιacl­
ness finds a voice in the nineteenth centιιry is in literaΓy texts.
Enιploying the sanιe cliνision ofliteΓary types tlιat he υsecl in tlιe
IntΓOduction to Trau?n ιι1ιd Existe12z, Foιιcaιιlt says tlιat this voice
arises neitlιer in the epic (\Ι•hich is ρresιιnιably alv.•ays an expΓes­
sion of a society's accepted values ancl truths, not a clιallenge to
thenι) ηοι·, as fοΓ the early Renaissance, in tragedy, but in the
alteΓΩating obscurity and illιιnιination of the lyιic. In poets sιιch
as Hδlderlin and NeΓval "nιadness finds once again its language"
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS 97
(FD, 61g), a langιιage that does not (like the Renaissance's tΓagic
expeιi.ence) Γeveal "tl1e invisible figιιΓes of the νvoΓld" bιιt Γatheι­
"the seσet tΓLΙtlιs of ιnan" (FD, 620). Tlιese tωtlιs aι-e a clιallenge
to tlιe shaι-p categoΓical cliνisions on '\'lιich ι-ational tl1oιιglιt de-
pends, telling ns tlιat "in ιnan, the inteΓίoΓ is also the exteΓiOΓ, that
tlιe extι-eιne of sιιbjectivity is identical to the iιnιnediate fascina-
tion of tlιe object, tlιat eveΓy encl is a sωbboι-n Γetιιι-η [to a begin-
ning]" (FD, 62ο).
Βιιt Foncaι.ιlt tlιinks tlιat tl1ese saωe soΓts of tι-ιιths aι-e con-
veyed in the nonlyτical context of discnτsive thongl1t, paΓticn­
laΓly psychological tlιeοιγ Here, hoνveveι-, we do not find the
Γoιnantic poets' ννelcoιning of tlιe Ίνisdoιn of ιnadness. Ratheι-,
Γeason "pωtects itself by insisting ... tlιat tl1e ιnadωan is only a
tlιing, [sρecifically] a ωedical tlιing" (FD, 621). Βιιt, on Foιι­
canlt's view, the resnlts of scientific ρsychology tlιeωselves belie
tlιis clain1. The conseqnence is that ιnodeΓn knowledge of ωad­
ness is peΓνaded by a set of antinoωies. Τlιιιs, on the one hand,
ωadness apρeaΓs as a Γetι.ιΓη to a siωρleΓ, pΓimitive stage of
hnman existence. Bnt, on the otheΓ lιand, it is the ιιltiιnate oιιt­
coιne of oveΓcivilization. Also, "in [ωadness] tlιe oι-ganic tι-i­
ιιωρhs, [it is] tlιe sole tωth of ωan that can be objectified ancl
peΓceived scientifically." Bnt, at tlιe same tiωe, ιnadness is distin-
gιιished fωιn bodily illnesses by the fact tlιat "it ιnakes sιιΓge np
an inteΓiOΓ ΊΥΟΓld of evil instincts, of peΓveι-sity, of sιιffeΓing, and
ofviolence .... " (FD, 622). AnotheΓ confiict aι-ises fωω tlιe ap-
peaι-ance ofωad acts as siιnιιltaneoιιsly the pωdιιct of deteΓωin­
ing Γeasons (desiΓes, passions) and as done fοι- no Γeason at all. Α
final (and peΓhaps fιιndaωental) antinoωy: Modeι-n psychology
thinks of itself as discoνeΓing, thΓOιιgh its stι.ιdy of ωadness,
fnndaιnental tΓιιths aboιιt hιιιηaη natι.ιΓe, trιιths that aι-e the
basis of its cnΓes. "Βιιt tlιe lιι.ιιηaη tΓιιth tlιat ιnadness Γeveals is
the diΓect contΓadiction of the ωοΓal and social tΓιιtlι of ιnan [in
boω·geois society]." In fact, psychiatΓic tΓeatment begins by ''ι·e­
pressing this inadιnissible tnιth" of ιnadness and goes on to snb-
ject tlιe ιnadωan to tlιe tnιths of society (FD, 623).
Foιιcanlt sιιggest tlιat it is becaιιse of these antinoιnies that
ιnodeΓn psychology and psychiatι-y aΓe clιaι-acteΓized by a con-
tinnal confiict of coιn peting theoΓetical interpΓetations. Even
tlιe ιnοdeπι p~ι-iod, theΓefoΓe, has been ιιnable to develop a
colιeι-ent theoΓetical acconnt of ιnadness. Βιιt noνv the obstacle
to colιeΓence is not, as in the Classical Age, tlιe contradiction of
g8 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

offering a positive science of an essentiallγ negatiνe realitγ. It is

rather tl1e contradiction between tl1at VΙ7 hich ωadness itself re-
νeals about l1uman realitγ and tl1e conception of hιιιnan nature
required bγ the social values tl1at psγchology and psychiatrγ
serve.
The antinomies are expressed in continual conflicts bet,veen
rival psγchological inteι-pretations and psγcl1iatι-ic app1Όaches.
Foucault remarks that, as νvith Classical medical views of ωad­
ness, there maγ lie beneatl1 these contending views of madness a
coherent stnιcture. Specificallγ, he suggests that in place of the
"binarγ stι-ucture of Classical ιιnι-eason (tnιth and en-ω-, νvω-ld
and phantasm, being and nonbeing, Daγ and Night)" theι-e maγ
be a modeι-n "anthropological thι-ee-term stι-ucture [of] man, his
ιnadness, and his tnιth" (FD, 624). Pι-esιιmablγ, a detailed ar-
chaeological analγsis, paι-allel to tl1at sketcl1ed for tl1e Classical
experience of madness, would ι-eveal this stι-ιιcture; Foucaιιlt
sιιggests that he plans to provide sιιcl1 an analγsis in a "lateΓ
stιιdy" tpat woιιld draw up a "meticιιloιιs inνentoι-y" of the nine-
teenth centιιι-y's "expeι-ience of madness in its totalitγ; that is in
tl1e wl1ole [com posed] of its scientificallγ explicit foπns and of its
silent aspects" (FD, 624). (Νο sιιcl1 studγ eveι- appeaι-ed, al-
thoιιgl1 Les 1not.s et les cΛoses pι-ovided an aι-chaeologγ of soιne
ι-elated aι-eas of nineteentl1-centuι-y tl1oιιgl1t.) Fοι- tl1e moιnent,
Foucault contents l1imself witl1 a bι-ief cliscιιssion of soιne distinc-
tive featιιres of tl1e nineteenth centιιι-y's "sιιι-face" accoιιnt of the
types of maclness. Heι-e he focιιses on abeιτations- geneι-al pa-
ralysis, "ιηοι-al insanitγ," and ιnonoιnanίa- tl1at l1ad no Classical
counteι-parts and that illιιstι-ate tl1e conflicts of modeι-n psychol-
ogy and psγchiatι-y.
But wl1at, finallγ, ίs tΊ1e place and iιnpω·tance for us of ιnad­
ness's fiι-st-peι-son ιιtteι-ances? Το ans>veι- tl1is question, Foιιcault
retuι-ns to tl1e ι-elation bet,veen madness and aι-t. It soon be-
coιnes cleaι- tl1at fω- ,Foucaιιlt at this peι-iod, aι-t offeι-s οιιι- ιnain
l1ope of bι-eaking οιιt of the lies and self-deceptions of boιιrgeois
values. His analyses of 'voιιld-be sciences of man aι-e consistently
deflations of wl1at theγ claim, but his analyses of aι-tistic vvω-ks
aι-e always appι·eciations of what tl1eγ offeι-. Heι-e, at the νeι-y
end of his studγ of ιnadness, Foιιcaιιlt fiι-s t sl10'NS, tlπoιιgh discιιs­
sions of Goya's paintings of the macl and of De Sade's noνels,
how aι-t can in different 'vays tι-ansmit tl1e cries of madness.
Moreoveι-, he claims that, in the '''ake of Goya and De Sade,
 MADNESS AND ΜΕΝΤ AL ILLNESS 99
"unΓeason has belongecl to >vhateνeΓ is decisive, for the modern
>VOΓld, in any '"'ork of art: tlιat is, '"'lιateνer any work of art
contains that is botlι ιnurderous ancl constraining" (FD, 64ο;
MC, 285). Thus, there is a sγιnbiotic relation between art and
nιadness- tlιe fornιeΓ expressing tlιe latter, tlιe latter giving the
fornιeι- its po>veΓ. Βιιt this does not mean that tlιe a1·tist througlι
>Ι'hose work tlιe νoice of ιnaclness speaks is hinιself 1nad. Indeed,
"Madness is pι-ecisely the absence of tlιe "ΊVΟΓk of art" and "wheι-e
tlιeΓe is a "ΊVΟΓk of aΓt tlιere is no nιadness" (FD, 641-42, 643;
MC, 287, 288-Sg). Nietzsclιe's last denιentecl postcaΓds, for ex-
ample, aΓe "tlιe νery annilιilation of the ΙvοΓk of art" (FD, 642;
MC, 287). Βιιt the aΓtist's experience of the absence of his wω·k
in lιis nιadness can be the soιπce of new aΓtistic creation. In
Artaιιd, for example, tlιe 1vork of art is nothing otlιer than "all
those >Ι'ords hιιΓled against a fιιnclanιental absence of langιιage"
(FD, 642; MC, 287). Eνen when nιadness teΓnιinates ratlιer tlιan
ιnerely internιpts tlιe aΓtist's >vork, this dissolution of the work
1naγ, as in the case of Nietzsche, "be tlιat by wlιiclι [it] opens οιιt
onto the nιodern '"'orld," ιnaking tlιe work imιnediate to ιιs by
tlιe very slιock of nιadness.
So for Foιιcaιιlt nιadness speaks tlιrough art, bιιt only in tlιe
sense tlιat art is a reaction to the nιadness tlιat destωys it. We see
1nadness in art only throιιgh tlιe violence it does to aΓt. Tlιe
effect of this spectacle is that we recognize οιιr cιιlpability for the
aΓtist's laceration by nιadness. ''τhe world is nιade aware of its
gιιilt .... Henceforth, and thΓοιιglι tlιe ιnediation of ιnadness, it
is the world that beconιes cιιlpable (for the first tiιne in tlιe
Western woΓld) in relation to tlιe woΓk of art ... " (FD, 643; MC,
288). Cιιlpable fοΓ wlιat? FοΓ Γefιιsing to Γecognize ιnadness in
its own ternιs, refusing to accept its voice as a legitinιate one. It is
tlιis refιιsal that nιakes it inιpossible fοΓ theΓe to be a ιnad woΓk
of aτt and so forces the aτtist into a destΓιιctive Γelation 'vith tlιe
nιadness that is the Γοοt of his creativity. Το be fΓee of οιιr gιιilt,
to nιake τepaτation, we need to caπy οιιt "the task of restoΓing
ΓeasonfrO?n that ιιnΓeason and to that unτeason" (FD, 643; MC,
288)- that is, of nιaking a >vorld in >vlιiclι τeason (e.g., the coher-
ent cliscourse of a1·t) is not in violent confrontation witlι nιadness
bιιt exists >Ι'ith ίt ίη a harnιonious conιplenιentaΓity. So, contΓary
to the project of nιodeτn psychology, thωugh wlιich the nιodern
world ainιs at nιeasιΙΓing andjιιdging ιnadness, "tlιe world ηιιιst
jιιstify itself before nιadness" (FD, 643; MC, 28g).
100 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

The history of madness: methods and results

In tlιe publications of 1954, seven years before FD appeaΓed,
Foucault had soιιglιt an ιιndeΓstanding of the nature of the ωen­
tal illness studied by psychology and tΓeated by psyclιiatry. The
two priωaΓy tools he eωployed 'νeΓe Heideggerian existential
analysis of the lived woι-ld of the ωad and a Maαist accoιιnt of
the ι-eal social factors (contradictions) that caιιsed tlιe forωation
ofthis 'νorld. Roιιghly, the existential analysis pΓOvided tlιe deep-
est and richest level of the description of ωental illness and the
Maαist account pΓOvided tlιe explanation of its occιιnence. By
the time he wrote FD, Foucaιιlt had becoωe disenchanted 'νith
the Marxist explanation, though he still thought tlιe ultimate
accoιιnt of mental illness must be foιιnd in its real histoΓical
(social and cιιltιπal) context. Νονν, however, he hoped to reach
this accoιιnt by some form of histω·ical existential analysis tlιat
would explicate tlιe natuΓe of the "expeΓience" of madness. This
sv-•itch to "madness" fΓom 'Ίnental illness" Γeflects anotlιer major
change in Foιιcaιιlt's thoιιglιt fΓΟιη 1954 to 1961. He lιas becωne
distrιιstfιιl of modern "scientific" psychology and its concept of
mental illness. 10 As a Γesιιlt, lιe is no longeΓ νvilling to take "ιnen­
tal illness" as a given, objective fact tlιat needs explanation.
Ratlιer, lιe sees diffeΓent lιistorical periods as lιaving distinctive
expeΓiences of ιnadness, eaclι of wlιiclι- inclιιcling tlιat of mod-
ern psyclιology and psychiatΓy- needs to be ιιncleΓstood in
terms of its own lιistorical context. The pl'imary goals of FD aΓe
to analyze tlιe experiences of nιadness of tlιe Classical Age and
of tlιe modeΓn peΓiod tlιat follo,νed it and thereby ιιndeΓstand
tlιe trιιe significance of tlιe psychology and psyclιiatι-y of nιental
illness.
Το caπy οιιt this task, Foιιcault eιnploys a some,νlιat confιιs­
ing variety of historicalωethods. Occasionally, lιe takes the stan-
dard lιistorical appΓOaclι of explaining eνents via political, social,
and economic caιιses. He says, for exaωple, tlιat the Great Con-
finement v-•as tlιe FΓenclι governιnent's Γesponse to the crisis

10. Foucault's antipatlιy to contemporaιΎ psyclιology and psychiatη• is νeιΎ ap-

paι-ent in his 1957 essay, "La Γeclιerclιe scienιifique et la ρsyc!Jo!ogie" in Des
clιιn·c}ιeιιι·sji·anι;ais s'inten·ogent, ecliιed by J-E. Morere (PUF, 1957), 171-201.
Foucault's critical attitιιc\e has soιne affinities 1vitlι Cangιιillιem's νiews in lιis
1958 essay, "Qιι'est-ce que la psychologie?" reρrinted in Ε, 365-81. Cf. par-
ticularly pp. 376-Sι.
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 101

produced bγ the Spanish econoιnic collapse and cites social and

economic caιιses of the end of tl1e Classical sγstem of confine-
ment. But this approach is not adeqιιate fοΓ his pΓimarγ purpose
in FD. It accounts fοΓ events on the basis of the actions of groιιps
and individuals, Ι\rhich actions aΓe themselves explained by the
agents' beliefs and intentions. Foιιcaιιlt, however, is interested in
the "consciousness" (evaluatiνe and cognitive) that ιιnderlies
such beliefs and intentions. Conseqιιently, the standard causal
approach ofhistorians, νvhile ιιseful as a starting point, cannot of
itself answer the qιιestions he is posing.
Foucault also sometimes refers to the effect of external events,
sιιch as the Great Confinement, on tl1e way -people think and
perceive. He eνen saγs, as we sa>\ that the institιιtions and prac-
7,

tices of confinement "constitιιted" the Classical experience of

madness (FD, 102). Βιιt it is cleaΓ that he is not content with a
reduction of thought to external material causes and that any
relati<;>ns of caιιsality beι1-veen pr~ctices of confinement and the
Classical experience of madness are reciprocal.
Giνen Foucaιιlt's refusal of a mateΓialist reduction of thought,
we might expect tl1at he Ιvοιιld puΓsιιe the usual appΓOacl1 of the
history of ideas, offering an internal account of tl1e νiews deνel­
oped by individιιal thinkers and showing how their work inflιι­
enced and was modified by those following them. But, althoιιgh
Foucaιιlt does mention the ideas of a large and diνerse set of
thinkers, his discιιssion is by no means built around summaries
and analyses of indiνidual νiews. Indeed, FD does not provide a
thorough exposition of what any single thinker, no matter hoνv
important, thought about madness.
It might seem that this lack of emphasis on particular accounts
of madness reflects Foucault's interest ίη writing (a la Canguil-
hem) a history of the concept of madness rather than a history of
theories of madness. Certainly, there is a sense in which Foucault
is trying to disengage, for exam ple, the concept of madness that
somehow underlies the theoretical disagreements of Classical
thinkers as well as the Classical tΓeatment of the mad. However,
in this case (in contrast to e.g., Canguilhem's history of the re-
flex) theΓe is η ο commonly accepted concept of madness present
in the medical and scientific literature of the Classical Age. At
the leνel of scientific concepts and theories formιιlated in their
terms, there is simply an irredιιcible plιιralism. Accordingly, the
sense in νvhich Foucaιιlt is seeking a "concept" of Classical mad-
102 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ness is different from the sense in which Canguilhem found the

concept of the reflex ίη Willis and subsequent thinkers.
Το some extent, a similar point can be made about the nine-
teenth century. As we have seen, the "antinomies" of modeΓn
psychology prevented consensus on a comprehensive theoretical
viewpoint. However, it could nonetheless be argued that modeΓn
psychology has at least formulated a widely accepted concept of
madness as mental illness that expresses a common conscioιιs­
ness of madness and is discoverable by the methods of Canguil-
hem's history of science. But even if this is so, an· ιιnderstanding
of the modern consciousness of madness in these terms would be
misleading, since it would ignore what Foucault regards as the
essential dimensions of evaluative consciousness (madness as
transgression of social valιιes, and so on) that ιιndeι-lie a theory
and practice that presents itself as merely objectively scientific.
In sιιm, althoιιgh Cangιιilhem's histoι-y of concepts comes
closer to Foucault's intention ίη FD than other available histori-
cal methods, any straightfonvard application of it is inadeqιιate
to his deepeι- purposes. This is because, first, opeι-ating only on
the level of the cog·nitive content of scientific concepts and theo-
ries, it cannot discoveι- a common cognitive consciousness lo-
cated beneath iπedιιcible conceptual and tl1eoι-etical disagι-ee­
ment. Ν or can it reveal any evaluative consciousness tl1at may be
the real soιιrce of what aι-e purported to be merely objective
concepts and theories. However, as we shall see, the new meth-
ods that Foucault eventually deνelops in his histoι-ical woι-k can
be plaιιsibly viewed as extensions and tι-ansfoι-mations of Can-
guilhem's history of concepts.
Foιιcaιιlt's treatment of madness requiι-es, then, anotheι- ap-
proach to the histoι-y of thought, an approach that may be called
"archaeological" in viι-tιιe of its need to discoyer stι-uctures be-
neath the surfaces open to oι-dinary histoι-ical scι-ιιtiny. How-
ever, it never becoωes entiι-ely clear in FD precisely 'vhat this
new archaeological method might be. lt evidently must involve
techniques for dealing with both texts and pι-actices, since these
aι-e the data frωn which Foιιcault begins. Fιιrther, these tech-
niques must be capable of operating on a level that is otheι- and
more fιιndamental than those of ordinaι-y heι-meneutics, 'vhich
seeks the meanings of individιιal utterances and actions. Some-
how, archaeology must be able to see stι-ιιctures that aι-e common
to all the texts and pι-actices (in a given domain) of an age and
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 103
that lie deeper thaη the level of "111eaηiηg" iη aηy staηdard
seηse. Here, howe·•ιeι-, it is difficult for Foucault to give a clear
sense to his ηe'v approach because of l1is iηsisteηce ση preseηt­
iηg it as explicatiηg a coηsciousηess or experieηce. If this is takeη
seι-ioιιsly, νve ιnust ask who ΟΓ what is tl1e expeΓieηciηg coηscious­
ηess iη qιιestioη. Βιιt Foucault does ηοt see111 sy111patl1etic to aηy
of tl1e ι-aηge (fΓοη1 Hegel to Jιιηg) of available aηswers. 11 Coηse­
quently, the arcl1aeology of FD re111aiηs a tecl1ηique of Γeadiηg
histoΓical texts aηd practices for wl1icl1 Foucault is able to offer
ηο satisfactoιΎ Γeflective accoιιηt. Ιη sιιbsequeηt l1istorical works
he 111oves away froιn the existeηtial viewpoiηt ση wl1ich his talk
of "coηsciousηess" and "expeΓieηce" is based. Ad111ittedly, BC
111akes frequeηt Γefereηces to 111edical "expeΓieηces" aηd eveη
οτ occasioηally speaks of vaΓious aspects of Classical aηd 1110cl-
erη "experience." But ίη these books experieηce is ηο loηger, as
iη existeηtial pheηoωenology, an ultiωate category. It is subordi-
ηated to the liηgιιistic structιιΓes ιιηderlyiηg expeΓieηce that aι·e
the tnιe coηcerη of Foucault's aηalysis. Moreover, iη ΑΚ he
presents archaeological aηalysis as dealiηg witl1 a level of discur-
sive structιιre iη wl1ich tl1e expeήeηcing subject plays ηο role.
Ιη additioη to the 111ethodological uηclarities of FD, there are
serioιιs proble111s Γegardiηg its l1istorical accuΓacy. There is ηο
cloιιbt that it reιnaiηs aη iωp.oΓtaηt pioηeeι-iηg woΓk, οηe of the
very fiπt to questioη the staηdaΓd Whiggish vieνv of 111oderη
psychiatι-y as ηothiηg 111ore thaη a ωονe to ωοι-e l1ιιωaηe tΓeat-
111eηt of tl1e ωad based ο η a coιτect ιιηderstaηdiηg of the natιιι-e
of their afflictioη. Over the tweηty-five years siηce FD was pub-
lished, there has appeared aη iιnpressive series ο[ stιιdies of tl1e
uηderstaηdiηg and treat111eηt of ωadηess fΓΟ111 tl1e Reηaissaηce
ση. On the οηe haηd, this work has sιιbstaηtially coηfiΓ111ed Fou-
cault's geηeral clai111s that fuηdaιneηtally diffeΓent coηceptioηs
of 111adηess have characterized diffeι-eηt histoΓical peΓiods aηd
that the historical 111ove towaι·d 111οdeΓΠ psychiatry l1as by ηο
ωeaηs beeη οηe of ιιηequivocal progress. Οη tl1e other haηd,
111aηy of his ωore specific clai111s have beeη serioιιsly qιιestioned.
So111e i111poΓtant CΓiticis111s deΓive fΓοω the fact that, althoιιgl1

11. In ΑΚ, Foucault says tl1at FD "accorded far too gι·eat a place, and a very
enigmatic one too, to '"hat Ι called an 'experience,' thus sho,ving to 'vhat
exιenι one '"as still close to admίtting an anonymous and general subject of
histoιΎ" (ΑΚ, ιβ). (SI1eridan's trans!ation l1as "experiment" for the French
e;.:peιience, but the context requires "expeι·ience.")
104 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Foucault claiωs to pΓOνide a general account of WesteΓn atti-

tudes toward ωadness since the Renaissance, the gΓeatest bulk of
his eνidence is restricted to French tl1ought and practice. Thus,
Klaus Doerner and, ωore Γecently, Roy Porter haνe aΓgued that
the Great Confineωent that occuιτed in France had no signifi-
cant parallel in Gerωany οΓ England. 12 SiωilaΓly, Daνid Rotl1-
ωan's history of nineteentl1-centuη AωeΓican psychiatιγ sl1oν.rs
it to haνe been far less concerned than Tuke and Pinel with the
ωedical treatωent of ωadness.I3
Hoνveνer, eνen in its own restrictecl doωain of eνidence, Fou-
cault's accoιιnt has been attacked as incoωplete and inaccιιrate.
Η. C. Eric Midelfon, fοι· exaωple, ωaintains that "ωany of his
argιιωents fly in the face of eωpiΓical eνidence." 14 He σiticizes, in
paΓticulaΓ, Foιιcaιιlt's neg·lect or ωisreading of the ωedieνal roots
ofωodern appΓOaches to ωadness. Specifically, he says, Foucault
fails to see the extent to whicl1 confineωent is not a radical innoνa­
tion of the Classical Age bιιt continιιes ωedieνal ωonastic prac-
tices; ωοreονeι·, he ignores ωajοΓ disanalogίes beti'leen ωedieνal
attitudes toward leprosy and lateΓ attitudes tov.τard the ωad.
Midelfort fιιrther objects to Foιιcaιιlt's sharp contΓast between tl1e
Renaissance acceptance and the Classical exclusion of ωadness.
This, l1e says, ignores the Renaissance's stΓOngassociation ofωad­
ness witl1 sin and its fn:qιιent harsl1 tΓeatωent (eνen confineωent)
ofωadωen. He also points οιιt that the faωous Renaissance ships
of fools, wl1icl1 Foucaιιlt takes as a ωajοΓ indication of the
"liωinal" place of the 111ad in Renaissance society, al111ost surely
neνeΓ existed. He ωaintains, mοΓeονeΓ, that Foιιcault oνeΓempha­
sizes the Classical exclusion of the ωad bγ doνvnplaγing i'll1at was
in fact a significant role of medical tΓeat111ent.
In soωe cases, these soΓts of σiticis111s can be ωet by pointing

12. Klaus Doe1·neι·, Μαd1ιιen ωιd tlιe bσιιrgeσisie: α sociαl/ιistory• σf nιαd1ιess απd insαn·
ity, tι·anslated by J. Neιιgroschel and Jean Steinberg (Oxford: Black\νell,
1981, German original, 1969). Roy Porter, Mindfστg'd ?ιιαnαcles: α lιislo1)' of
1ιιαdness in Englαndfrσnι tlιe τeslσι-αtiσn lσ tlιe ,·egeΙ!C)' (London: Athlone, 1987).
13. David Rotlιman, τ!ιe discσvery σf tlιe a.sylu1n (Boston: Little, Bro,νn, 1971 ).
14. Η. C. Eric Midelfort, "Madness and civilization in early modern Europe: a
reappraisal o[Miclιel Foucault", in Β. C. Malament, ed., Aftιrι· tlιe Refonιιαliσn:
essαys i1ι lισnσι· σf]. Η. Hextιrι· (Pl1iladelpl1ia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
198ο), 259. Cf. also Lawι·ence Sιone's comments in "Madness," New Υσι·!ι
Review σf Βσσ!ιs, Dec. 16, 1982, 36ff, an<l his ensuing exchange \Vith Foucault,
New Υσι·k Revietυ σf Books, fγfaΓ. 31, 1983, 42-44. HistoΓical criticisιns ο[ FD
a1·e also developed in Εvοlιιliοιι psyclιiαtτique 36 (1971), aπ issue entirely de-
voted to the book. Cf. ρarticularly tlιe essays by Η. Ey and G. Daumezon.
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS

out that Foι.ιcault is not concerned νvith foι-mulating excep-

tionless empiι-ical generalizations fωm the historical data but
with giving an overall characteι-ization of a society's fundamental
attitudes towaι-d madness. Such attitιιdes may well not be mani-
fest in all texts and practices, and their existence can even be
compatible 1vith a variety of contrary tendencies. Thus, when
Foucault presents the seventeenth and eighteenth centuΓies as
"the age of con:finement," he should not be taken as maintaining
that there weΓe no instances of confinement prioΓ to that peι·iod.
His point is Γather that in the Classical Age confinement takes on
a new and paΓticularly central role in the tΓeatment of the mad.
Such a thesis is not an empiΓical geneΓalization that can be re-
futed by a few contrary instances. It is a geneΓal pι-inciple for
inteψΓeting a large body of diverse and often conflicting data
and can be decisively refuted only by showing that there is a
moΓe satisfactOlΎ overall interpretation of the data.
This is an important- and Ι think decisive- Γesponse to the
claim of soήle σitics that Foucault's account is a blatant misrepΓe­
sentation, easily dismissed by a few quick factual references. Nev-
ertheless, it seeωs clear that, even as an oveΓall inteΓpretation,
Foucaυlt's account is often seriously defective. Its fundamental
failure lies in the assumption that theΓe is soωe siωple unifying
conception of madness in each ωajοΓ histoΓical peΓiod. Con-
struals of Renaissance madness as the mocking inverse of reason,
of Classical madness as a free embΓace of unreason, and of mod-
ern madness as a threat to bourgeois valιιes masked as illness aΓe
far too nanow to do justice to the complexity and diversity of
attitudes toνvard madness ονeΓ the last thΓee centuries. As usιιal,
simple unifying schemata do not sustain detailed scrutiny of the
historical record.
Foucault's history of madness was not written simply to pι-o­
vide an accurate oveΓall pictuΓe of how people's views of and
treatment of the mad have changed through the years. It also
had the critical intent of discrediting the idea that our conteωpo­
rary conception of ωental illness is nothing moι-e than the objec-
tive scientific truth about what madness Γeally is. AccoΓdingly,
beyond the question of the accuracy of Foucault's histoΓical re-
constructions, we need to Γaise the issue of the success of his
cήtique of contempoι-ary psychiatry and psychology.
In this regard, a major difficulty concerns the relevance of
Foucault's historical analyses to his critique of contemporary dis-
106 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ciplines. For example, the puΓpose of l1is tΓeatments of Renais-

sance and Classical madness is apparently to sl1oνv that theΓe
l1ave been alternatiνes to our modern conception of madness as
mental illness. But νvl1at, ;ve may ;vell ask, is the point of doing
this? Surely we can adωit that past ages have tl1ought diffeΓently
about madness without haνing to ΓegaΓd this as a challenge to
our conception of it. We do not, for exaωple, find tl1e historical
fact that οιιr ancestors thought very differently about the natuι-e
of ωatter or of the solar system a cl1allenge to our cuιτent νieνvs
of these topics. Beyond demonstι-ating the existence of alterna-
tiνe conceptions of madness, it νvοιιld be necessary to sho\v- as
Foucault does not- tl1at tl1ese conceptions aι-e, at least in soωe
respects, as well-gι-ounded as οιιΓ own.
Moreover, it is higl1ly releνant that Foιιcault's discussion
scarcely goes beyond the fiΓst beginnings of ωodern psychiatry
witl1 Pinel and Tuke. He simply does not offer tl1e sort of detailed
analysis of current psycl1ological theory and psychiatric practice
that ν\'Οιιld be necessary for a serious critical evaluation of them.
Even if he l1as shown tl1at some of tl1e initial developωents of the
idea of madness as n1ental illness weι·e not sιιpeΓior to the concep-
tions that tl1ey replaced, drawing conclusions fωm tl1is aboιιt the
status of conteωporary work woulcl be an egregious exaωple of
tl1e genetic fallacy. Siωilarly, even if tl1e νiews and practices of
Pinel and Τιιke inνolνed an inappωpriate cliιnension of n1oral
judgωent, it does not follow tl1at tl1is defect has carried oνer into
contenψorary psychology and psychiatry.
It seeωs clear, tl1en, tl1at, eνen if there were notl1ing to faιιlt in
Foucault's l1istorical accoιιnts of Classical and early ωodeι-n
views of ωadness, tl1ese accoιιnts \vould not of theωselves sus-
tain a critique of contemporaι-y psychology and psycl1iatry. The
claiιn, often ωade by Foucault's followers, tl1at FD ιιndermines
the autl1ority of tl1ese disciplines is siωply not sιιstainable.
This is not to say, ho-.,vever, that Foιιcault's history l1as nothing
to contribute toward a critical assessιnent of psychology and psy-
chiatry. One reason that established systeωs of thougl1t and pΓac­
tice often maintain their autl1ority in spite of basic fl.a\\'S is that,
precisely because they aι-e so entι-enched, it is difficιιlt to tl1ink of
any serioιιs alternatives to their conceptions and pωcedures.
Another reason is that tl1ey l1ave, overyears of doωinance, deνel­
oped subtle ways of maskίng tl1eir ftaν\•s. Histoι-ical analyses sιιch
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS. 107

as Foucaιιlt's can be used to overcoιne both these sorts of defense

ιnechanisιns. By ιιnearthing alten1ative ways of thinking and
acting, they end the de facto ιnonopoly of the doιninant systeιns.
This is particιιlarly so since tl1e alteΓnatives sucl1 histoΓical analy-
sis uncoveΓs are not ιneΓe logical possibilities but have theιnselves
been entrenched in the reality of οιιΓ past. Tl1us, tl1e fact tl1at
ιnadness l1as been regarded as reason's ιnocking partneΓ ΟΓ as a
fιιndaιnental rejection of l1uιnanity shows that tl1ere aΓe serious
alteΓnatives to ΓegaΓding n1adness as siιnply ιnental illness. Even
if, precisely becaιιse theγ are in οιιΓ past, tl1ere is no possibility of
siιnply retιιrning to these conceptions as sιιch, they ωay still
suggest nuωeωus ways of ωodifying specific aspects of the en-
trenclled viewpoint. Α siιnilar point l1olds ΓegaΓcling tl1e tecl1-
niqιιes establisl1ed systeωs have of ιnasking theiΓ flaνγs. Histori-
cal analysis can sιιggest tl1e sorts of flaws tl1at ιnight well be
pΓesent (since tl1ey were tl1ere at the beginning) ancl even tl1e
kinds of techniqιιes that l1ave been develoρed to hide theιn.
Simρly knowing, for exaιnρle, that early ωodern views of mad-
ness contained eleιnents of ωoraljudgment covered by a veneer
of scientific authority makes it ρlaιιsible to look for sometlύ.ng
siιnilar in cιιπent elaborations of these views.
My sιιggestion, tl1en, is tl1at, on the one hand, Foιιcault's llis-
tory in FD is siωρly not adequate to caιτy οιιt its ρroject of
ιιnderωining the aιιthoΓity of conteιnρorary ρsychology and ρsy­
clliatry. On the otl1er hand, it can be ρlaιιsibly regarded as an
iωportant heιπistic preliωinaΓy to sιιch a critiqιιe. It is not, as
Foιιcaιιlt and his sιιρρorters seeω to think, decisive; bιιt it is
highly sιιggestive.
This view of FD as heιιristic also redιιces its bιιΓden of histori-
cal accιιracy. If all we expect froω it is tl1e sιιggestion of possible
directions for a critiqιιe of conteωporaΓy disciρlines, then its
failιιre to ρrovide an adeqιιate general accoιιnt ofWestern views
of ιnadness over the last tlπee l1undred years is not fatal. Even if
ceΓtain conceptions and attitιιdes weΓe ωucl1 less ρΓevalent or
iιnρortant than Foucault suggests, they still coπesρond to real
ρossibilities that proνide ρlausible direction to οuΓ sιιsρicions
about the claiωs of current views aboιιt "mental illness." The
relation of Foιιcault's histoιγ to the critique of ρsychology and
ρsycl1iatry is like that of the ιnedical llistory a ρatient gives llis
ρhysician (in contrast to a highly Γeliable blood test) to the ρhysi-
108 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

cian's diagnosis of his cιιιτeηt illness. Botl1 serve to geneι-ate

plaιιsible sιιspicions even tl1oιιgh tl1ey may l1ave serioιιs limita-
tions as accιιι-ate histoΓical accoιιnts.
My constnιal of FD as of primaι-ily heuΓistic value is a signifi-
cant backing away froω tl1e goals Foιιcaιιlt sιιrely had in mind
\Vl1en l1e WΓOte it. On the otheι- hand, it fits \vell with Foιιcaιιlt's
lateΓ idea- fοι- example, in "What Is Enlightenment?"- tl1at his-
torical critiqιιes of reason have essentially local or regional im-
poι-t. Τhιιs, the history of ιnadness may well point tοννaι-d spe-
cific criticisms of particιιlar aspects of psychological tl1eory and
psychiatric practice; bιιt there is no reason to think its CΓitical
sιιggestions will lead to their total ιιndermining. Fόιιcaιιlt him-
selfmade a very similar point in one ofhis last interνieνvs. Speak-
ing of the intiωate tie between psychiatry and tl1e mecl1anisms of
modern poweι-, he said: ''Yhis fact in no 'νay impairs the scien-
tific validity οι- tl1e therapeιιtic efficacy ofpsychiatry." 15
Indeed, Ι tl1ink ν.•e can go eνen fιιrtheΓ and maintain that
there is nothing in FD's l1istorical analysis inconsistent with the
claim that the modern view of madness as mental illness is, in
some majoι- ways, botl1 a cognitive and ωoral advance on earlier
views. Even if, for example, modern psycl1ological tl1eoΓies are
by no means essentially coπect and will reqιιire majoι- ι-ectifica­
tions in tl1e fιιtιιre, it may still be tωe tl1at tl1ey embocly iωpor­
tant objective trιιths aboιιt tl1e natιιre of ιnaclness that ν,•ere not
available to tl1e tl1oιιgl1t ofpι-evioιιs epochs. They ιnay, fοι· exam-
ple, coπectly tie certain forms of ιnadness to cl1emical imbal-
ances or to ιιnconscioιιs Oedipal conflicts. Siιηilarly, for all the
ways modern psychiatric pι-actice ωay be tiecl to fonns of clomi-
nation, it ωay still be tΓHe tl1at ωany of its specific featuι-es are
ωorally prefeι-able to earlieΓ proceclιιres or even that it repre-
sents an oνeι-all ωοι-al advance ονeι- tl1eω. Fοιιcaιιlι's histoι-y
sιιggests ωany ways of deflating tl1e pretensions of cuπent νieν.•s
of ωadness to a pΓiνilegecl statιιs. Βιιt it provides no basis fοΓ
denying all credibility to moden1 νieν~rs or for conclιιcling tl1at
eaι-lier views are sιιperioι- to theω.
Tl1is point requires particulaι- enψhasis because the rl1etoι-ical
force of Foιιcaιιlt's prose often goes faι- beyond tl1e eνidentiaιγ

15. 'Tlιe ethic of care for tlιe self as a ρπιctice of freeclom (an intervie\1' with
Miclιel Foucatιlt on Januaι-y 20, 1984)" (interviewers R. Fornet-Betancourt,
Η. Becker, ancl Α. Gomez-Mίίller), translatecl by J. D. Gauthier, S.J., Plιiloso­
p!ι)' and Social C1iticis1ιι 12 (ιg87), 127.
 MADNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS 109

foι-ce of his arguments in condeιnning moden1 psychiatι-y. Το

speak of it as a "gigantic moral inψrisonιnent" and to say that it
can be called a libeι-ation only "by way of antiphrasis" go far
beyond anything established οι· even plausibly suggested by Fou-
caιιlt's historical analyses. Here his vie1v is particularly distorted
by his pι-ejιιdice against bourgeois morality and by his romantic
desiι-e to see ιnadness as an infι-arational souι-ce of fιιndamental
trιιth. Foucault siιnply assumes that a moral system bιιilt aroιιncl
respect for property a_nd family relations stι·ikes at the ιΌοt of
tl1e individιιal's autonoιny and happiness. His overwhelming
emotional aversion to sucl1 a moι-ality leads l1in1 to reject it in
toto, witl1 no analysis of its precise valιιes and de.ficiencies. This is
one ι·espect in wl1icl1 Foιιcaιιlt (like Sartre and ιnany other con-
temporary French literaι-y intellectuals) ι-emains ιιnnecessarily
constι-ained by tl1e liιnits of l1is cultural milieu. Similaι-ly, l1is
ωmanticization of ωadness as a ·source of deep trutl1 blinds
Foucault to the fact tl1at, qιιite apaι·t from any exclιιsion or ex-
ploitation by society, the n1ad aι·e often cι-ipplingly afflicted by
the distortions and terroι·s of madness itself. Here l1e has forgot-
ten tl1e perceptive analyses of his earlier book, Maladie 1nentale et
pen;onnalite, wl1ere l1e presented madness as "both a retreat into
tl1e νvorst of subjectivities and a fall into tl1e worst of objectivities"
(ΜΜΡ, 56) and as a ιnorbid stifling of the imagination.
Ι η sιιm, FD has son1e major limitations, including an ill-de.fined
ιnetl1odology, significant histoήcal inaccιιracies, and uncritical
evaluative presuppositions. Howeveι·, it ι-emains an impressive
achievement that introdιιced a neνv and extι-eιnely fι·ιιitful ap-
proach to the histoι-y of ιnadness and provides a poweι-ful basis
for tl1e critique of contemporary psychology and psychiatry.
With regard to Foιιcaιιlt's own sιιbseqιιent work, FD has a
crucial gerιninal role. lts methodological and critical theιnes are
carried forward by everything else that Foιιcaιιlt wrote. The
archaeological ιnethod becomes more explicit and coheι-ent in
BC and ΟΤ, althoιιgh theι-e is an increasing eιnphasis on ιιsing
it for the analysis of discιιrsive ι-atl1eι· tl1an of nondiscιιrsive
practices. It is not ιιntil DP that Foιιcaιιlt ι-eturns to a centι-al
concern witl1 the latter. Τlποιιgh all these developments, hoνv­
eveι-, Foucault remains faithful to the fιιndamental goal of tl1e
archaeological ωethod as it .first appears in FD: to analyze strιιc­
tιιres lying beneath those elucidated by standard techniques in
the history of thought. Similarly, the precise cήtical thι-ust of
110 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Fσιιcault's subsequent νvσrk varies frσm bσσk tσ bσσk, depend-

ing ση the tσpics treated and tlιe directiσn σf apprσaclι. BC and
οτ are, fσr example, much less challenging to tlιe σbjective
tnιth-content σf tlιe disciplines they examine. But, tlπσuglισιιt,
tlιe basic prσject Γemains that σf FD: tσ use histσry to questiσn
tlιe self-undeΓstanding σf cuπent knσwledge σf human beings.
Beyσnd this, the specific cσntent σf Fσucaιιlt's lateΓ ν~rσrks is
σften clσsely tied to that σf-FD. Fσr example, the central ques-
tiσns σf BC and DP are pσsed by a σucial episσde in Fσucault's
lιistσry σf madness. This was tlιe pσint at wlιiclι tlιe system σf
Classical cσnfinement was rejected as ecσnσmically unsσund and
mσst σf thσse cσnfinecl weΓe Γeleased tσ the jσb maΓket. As ν~•e
saν~•, special aπangements had tσ be made fσΓ tlιι·ee gΓOups tlιat
were nσt able to be paΓt σf the wσrk fσι-ce: the mad, the sick, and
σiminals. Becaιιse σf pΓOtests against inflicting the mad ση the
sane, a separate system σf cσnfinement was devised fσr tlιem.
Part ΠΙ σf FD studies this, the asylunι system. BC analyzes the
lισspital system develσped tσ care fσr the sick, while DP tΓeats
tlιe prisσn tlιat dealt witlι criωinals. Bσth wσΓks thus begin frσm
a lιistoΓical cnιx defined by FD. SimilaΓly, οτ can be Γegardecl as
a lιistorical generalizatiσn σf tlιe lιistσΓical pΓOject σf FD. Instead
σf fσcusing ση the specific tσpics σf madness and psyclισlσgy, it
attempts a general aΓclιaeσlσgy σf all tlιe mσcleΓn lιuman sci-
ences tlπσuglι aπ analysis σftlιe transitiσn frσm Classical to mσd­
eΓn views σf life, labσΓ, and language.
OveΓall, then, FD must be recσgnized as tlιe fσundatiσn σf the
entire bσdy σf Fσucaιιlt's wσrk. Althσuglι there aΓe many signifi-
cant revisiσns and innσvatiσns, it lays dσwn the basic nιethσcls,
prσblems, and valιιes tlιat infσrm everything else he wΓσte.
 3
---------------------- ~ ~ ----------------------
CLINICAL MEDICINE

Tl1ere is no siιnple or direct connection between τlte birt!t of t!te

clinic (BC) and FD. We migl1t be tempted to reacl BC as a history
of tl1e concept of boclily illness, paralleling FD's 11istory of mental
illness. Βιιt tllis woιιld ignore tl1e faΓ ωore restricted Γange of
analysis in BC, ~~l1icl1 says nothing aboιιt Renaissance medicine
and offeι-s only a relatively brief tΓeatωent of the Classical νieΊν
of clisease as a contrast to ~~l1at eωerged in tl1e nineteenth cen-
tιιry. Nor is BC a ωeΓe appendix to FD. Its histoΓicallocιιs is, as
Ίve l1ave seen, defined by the cnιcial point in the histoηι of ωad­
ness at νv11ich tl1e geneΓal systeω of confineωent bΓOke doΊvn
ancl separate aιτangements had to be made fοΓ the mad, σimi­
nals, ancl the sick. Βιιt, despite this connection, BC appΓOaclΊes
its topic withoιιt reliance on the Γesιιlts of FD, νΙ7 11ich is neνeΓ
eνen cited. This no cloιιbt reflects Foncaιιlt's Bacl1elaΓdian ten-
dency ιο esclΊeΊv facile syntheses and tΓeat eacl1 ~·region of ratio-
nality" in its own teπns.
BC is generally Γegarcled as Foιιcaιιlt's fιιrtl1est moνe in the
diΓection of stnιctιιral analysis. Tl1e first printing· of tl1e book
freqιιently refeπed to its appΓOach as "stnιctιιral," altl1oιιgh Fou-
caιιlt deleted sncl1 references in later pΓintings to avoid Ίvhat he
came to regard as a highly ωisleacling clΊaracteΓization of his
νvοΓk. Tl1eι-e is sιιι-ely soωething broaclly stnιctιιralist aboιιt cer-

111
112 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tain asρects of BC's analysis, paΓticulaι-ly the focus in tlιe latteι­

part of tlιe book ση language as a phenomenon, independent of
speakeΓs' intentions, to be analyzed as an autonoιnoιιs systeιn of
ωle-goνeΓned eleιnents. (Muclι of οτ and eνen paΓtS of FD-
e.g., tlιe accoιιnι of Classical ωadness as essentially lingιιistic-
aι-e siωilaι-ly stnιctιπalist.) Βιιt, as νve ν~rill see in Chapteι· 6, the
fιιndaιnentally lιistoι-ical nature of l1is stιιclies sepaι-ates tlιeιn
froιn a pure stnιctuΓalisω. Moι·eover, Ι will aι-gιιe that the ιneth­
odology of BC is muclι closeι- to tlιat of Cangιιillιeιn's l1istoι-y of
conceρts. Wι-iting a book fοι- a seι-ies editecl by Canguillιeιn,
Foucault's pι-iιnary accoιnρlishιnent is to νvι-ite a history of the
foι·ιnation of tlιe ωodeι-n concept of disease.

Classical medicine
Foucaιιlt presents the ιnodeι-n undeι-standing· of disease as tlιe
ι-esult of a shaι-p break νvith tlιe Classical conception. Tlιe latter is
clιaι-acteι-ized in teι-ιns of ,.vhat he calls thι-ee ιnodes of "sρa­
tialization": a "pι-inιaι-y spatialization" tlιat sitιιates disease in a
conceptιιal configιιι-ation defining its fιιndaιnental natιπe, a "sec-
ondary sρatialization" tlιat relates clisease to tlιe indiviclιιal bod-
ies in '"'lιiclι it is ι-ealized, and a "teι-tiaι-y sρatialization" tlιat
ρlaces disease in a social context. Froιn οιιι- nιodern standpoint,
tlιe ιnost striking featιιre of tlιe Classical νieΥΙ' is tlιat it nιakes a
slιarp clistinction betν~reen the ρι-iιnary and tlιe secondaι-y spa-
tializations of disease. We think it entiι-ely obvious that disease is
to be conceivecl as soιnetlιing localizecl in an individιιal bocly; a
disease sinψly is sonιetlιing that is wι-ong νvitlι a sick organisnι.
Βιιt Foucaιιlt claiιns that "the exact sιιρeι-position of tlιe 'body' of
tlιe clisease and tlιe body of tlιe sick nιan is no ηιοι-e tlιan a
lιistoι-ical, teιnpoι·ary datuιn" (3). Classical nιedicine, in particιι­
laι-, conceived of diseases as abstι-act essences (clefined by sets of
general qιιalities) tlιat did not depencl ση the paΓticιιlaι- bodies in
wlιich they nιight be exenιplifie(l. Incleed, to ιιndeι·stand a dis-
ease, doctors had to "abstι-act the patient" sιιffeι-ing from it to
avoid being confιιsed bγ idiosyncι-asies tlιat ιnight obscω·e its
tnιe natιιre. 'Ίη ι-elation to that wl1iclι lιe is sιιffering fωιη, the
ρatient is only an exιenιal fact; the ιnedical ι-eading nιust take
lιinι into accoιιnt only to place lιίιη in parentheses" (8).
The nonbodily space in tenns of >Ι'hich Classical diseases are
ιιndeι-stood has t'vo diιnensions ('Nhich Foιιcaιιlt labels, respec-
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 113

tively, νertical and l1orizontal). First, a disease is undeΓstood in

terωs of an ideal teωpoι-al seqιιence- not al>vays ι-ealizecl in spe-
cific cases - in ""hich tl1e qιιalities of tl1e disease ιιnfold. Second, a
disease is understood throιιgl1 analogies (siωilaι-ities and dissiιηi­
laι-ities in qιιalities) betννeen it ancl other cliseases. In both diωen­
sions, disease is regarclecl noncausally. Any caιιsal relationsl1ips
tl1at ιηay obtain an1ong the tempoι-al sιιccession of a disease's
qιιalities aι-e not essential to a gι-asp of its natιιι-e. Siωilaι-ly, dis-
eases aι-e regaι-ded as ωω·e οι- less closely Γelated to one anotl1eι·
solely in νiΓtιιe of theiι- degι-ee of qualitatiνe reseωblance; consid-
eΓations of genesis ancl caιιsal ι-elationships aι-e not ι-elevant.
As we sl1all see in Cl1apter 4, tl1is vie>ν of clisease is jιιst one
instance of a geneι-al Classical conception of knov.τledge in terms
of tabιιlaι· classification. All objects of knσ;νleclge are classified
into species on the basis of tl1eir qιιalities, 'νitl1 meωbeι-s of the
saωe species exl1ibiting an identical set of key overt qιιalities.
Fιιrtl1er, tl1e system of identities ancl diffeι·ences that defines tl1e
classificatoι-y systeω is not seen as ωerely a convenient system of
ωapping; the systeω proνides the "intelligible oι·dering" tl1at
repΓesents tl1eir objectiνely true natιιι·es (7).
Witl1 regard to secondary spatialization (tl1e ingression of tl1e
disease into tl1e local space of the sick body), 'ννe l1ave alι-eady
seen tl1at, on Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt of Classical medicine, this has η ο
essential connection with the natιιι·e of the disease. When soωe­
one is sick, the disease ωay, at a giνen ωοιηeηt, be localized in a
particιιlar organ. Βιιt this localization tells ιιs nothing about tl1e
disease's natιιre, and in fact diseases ciΓcιιlate freely froω one
organic site to another with no essential alteration. Siιηilarly,
Foιιcaιιlt notes, the ιπesence of a Classical disease is ωanifested
by a teωporal series of symptoωs, bιιt this developωental pω­
cess need beaι- no relation to the pathological essence. Ratheι-,
the presence of a disease in a paι-ticιιlar body is merely a ωatter
of the appeaι-ance of the qualities tl1at define the disease in tl1e
space of the body. Diagnosis reqιιires only that the doctor caΓe­
fullγ determine which qιιalities are present; \Vhere οι- "''l1en tl1ey
occιιr is of η ο central iωpoΓtance. Ho>νever, since the indiνidιιal
qιιalities of paι-ticιιlar patients (e.g., theiι- tenψeΓaωent, age, \·νay
of life) can obscιιre tl1e "essential nιιcleus" of tl1e disease, tl1e
doctor must take caΓefιιl accoιιnt of theιη, not as aspects of the
disease bιιt as factoΓs tl1at need to be abstΓacted to effect an
accurate diagnosis.
114 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Tertiary spatialization inclιιdes all the social teclιniqιιes and

strιιctιιι-es V\7hereby a society deals 'νith disease. The terιn tω·tiωy
shoιιld not mislead ιιs into tlιinking it is not of crιιcial signifi-
cance in Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt. In fact it coπesponds to something
of the lιighest iιnportance: "a system of options that ι-eveals the
Ί-Ι'ay ίη wlιich a gι-oup, in oι-der to protect itself, practises exclu-
sions, establishes the fonns of assistance, and reacts to poverty
and the feaι- of death" (16). Moι-eoveι-, as V\'e slιall see, Foιιcaιιlt
ι-egards teι-tiaι-y spatialization as the point of oι-igin fοι- the oveι-­
tlπow of the Classical system of medicine.
Accoι-cling to Foιιcault, Classical teι-tiaι-y spatialization lιas tV\70
fιιndaιnental chaι-acteι-istics. Fiι-st is tlιe idea tlιat the tnιe, siιnple
essence of a disease is most fιιlly ι-ealizecl ίη ιηοι-e pΓίmitive social
strιιctιιres. The sicknesses of moι-e lιiglιly "civilized" societies
take complex and diveι-sified foι-ms that obscιn-e the ι-eal natιιι-e
of diseases. Second is the paι-allel idea that "like civilization, the
hospital is an aι-tificial locιιs in whiclι tlιe transplanted clisease
nιns the ι-isk of losing its essential identity" (20). As a resιιlt,
Classical nιedicine felt that disease shoιιld be caι-ed fοι- in the
"natιιι-al" locale of the hoωe, a view that fit well with tlιe libeι-al
economics of tlιe eiglιteentlι centιιι-y. However, Foucaιιlt notes
tlιat tlιis did not ωean tlιat tlιe practice of ιnedicine ννas to be
free of state sιιpeι-vision. On tlιe contι-aι-y, coιnpetent ιnedical
practice was regarded as so impoι-tant fοι- society as a "''hole that
tlιere lιad to be carefιιl centι-al contι-ol oveι: the licensing· of
doctoι-s. Accoι-clingly, fοι- tlιe Classical Age, "the ιnedicine of
individιιal peι-ception, of family assistance, of hoωe caι-e can be
based only ση a collectively controlled strιιctιιre" (120).
Foιιcaιιlt points οιιt that tlιe ηeνν clinicalιnedicine tlιat aι-ose at
the end of tlιe eiglιteentlι ancl the beginning of tlιe nineteentlι
centuι-ies was not withoιιt Classical antececlents. Theι-e was, along-
side tlιe donιinant medicine of species, a Classical ιnedicine of
epidemics. Tlιis had a clistinctly ιnaι-ginal statιιs becaιιse it was
'Όpposed at every point to a ωedicine of classes [species]" (26).
τlιis opposition derived fι-οιη the fact tlιat the analysis of epidenι­
ics was not a ιnatteι- of recognizing tlιe qιιalities that defined the
place of a clisease in an abstract pathological classificatory sclιeωe.
It ι-eqιιired ι-atlιer the ιιncovering of particιιlaι- processes, vaι-i­
able fι-οιη instance to instance, >νheι-eby diseases spι-ead aιnong
the ιneιnbeι-s of an aniωal οι- Ιηιωaη group. Τ!ιιιs, Foιιcaιιlt con-
clιιdes tlιat tlιe ιnedicine of epidemics requiι-ed the analysis of
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 115

temporal seΓies 'rVith a vie'v to detenηinations of causality, in

slΊaΓp contrast to tl1e ιηeclicine of species' concern νvitl1 tl1e place-
ιηent of diseases in an abstract scheωa of classifications defined
by atemρoral qualities.
τl1e practice of tl1e medicine o'f epidemics ΓeqιιiΓed a distinc-
tίνe foΓm of tertiarγ spatialization. ·As ιnιιch as tl1e ωedicine of
species, it needed its OΊ-vn "definition of a political statιιs fοΓ
ιηeclicine and tl1e constitιιιion, at state level, of a ιηedical con~
scioιιsness whose constant task VΙ'Oulcl be to provide infonηation,
supeΓvision, and constι-aint" (26). In FΓance, ίη particulaΓ, a
gro>ving concern •vitll Ll1e contι-ol of epideιηics led to a social
Γestnιctιιring of ιηedicine tl1at began tl1e ιιncleΓωining· of the
Classical ωedicine of classes and started tl1e pι-ocess of transfoΓ­
ιηation tl1at led to ωodeΓn clinical ωedicine.
Foucault describes tl1e ιηaίη stages of this pΓOcess. The initial
restnιctιιι·ing of ωedicine to deal '-vitl1 epideωics led to a new
fοΓω of "ωedical conscioιιsness" tl1at VΙ'aS jιιst eιηeι-ging at tl1e
beginning of tl1e Fι-ench ReYolιιtion. Tllis ωedical conscioιιsness
convergecl in certain key respects witl1 tl1e political conscioιιsness
of tl1e Revolution, a conYeΓgence tl1at resιιlted, in tl1e eaΓly Revo-
lιιtionaι-y peήod (befoι-e 1793), in a vaΓiety of proposals fοι- radi-
cal refoΓω of n1edical institιιtions and practices. However, Fou-
caιιlt argues tl1at no Γadical refoΓω coιιld be effectiYe until tl1eι-e
was a conespondingly radical transfonηation of ωedical experi-
ence ancl discoιιι-se. This, he says, occuιτed only in tl1e fiΓst paι-t
of the nineteenth centιιry, in connection νvith the Consιιlaι- gov-
eΓnωent's reorganization of ωedical pΓactice in ι8ο3, VΙ'hich
ιηaΓked tl1e biΓth of clinical ωedicine. Following this, there was
tl1e integι·ation (by Bichat) of pathological anatoιny into clinical
n1edicine, whicl1 lecl to the displaceωent of clinical ωedicine by
anatoωo-clinicalιnedicine. On Foucault's account, it is this disci-
pline, finally constitιιted by BΓOussais's \VOΓk on feνeΓs, tl1at has
been tl1e doωinant forω fοΓ the practice of ωedicine even into
the tιventieth centuιγ We tιlΓn ηοΊ-Ι' to the details of Foucaιιlt's
analysis of these deνelopιηents.

Α new medical consciousness

The pΓe-Revolιιtionary concern with epideιηics led to the estab-
lishωent of the Societe Royale de Medicine as tl1e centralιηedical
aιιtl1ority in France. This society •vas oι·ganized qιιite diffeι·ently
116 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

froω the older Facιιlte of doctoΓs associated Ί-Ι'ith tlιe University,

ινhose authoι·ity it eventιιally replaced. Corresponding to this
ne'~' organization (designed to ωonitor and contiΌl epidenιics)
was a new ωedical consciousness that ννas, first of all, clιaracter­
ized by its collective nature: ''τhe Societe ... had becoωe the
official organ of a collective conscioιιsness of pathological phenoω­
ena tlιat opeι-ated at both the leνel of expeι-ience and the level of
knowledge" (28). According to Foucault, tlιis collective conscious-
ness ωoved away froιn tlιe Classical vieιν of ωedical knowledge as
an encyclopediac systeιn that included all particulars in a pre-
established structure. Instead, it presented ωedical knoννledge as
a body of "constantly revised inforωation" in '~hich the intersec-
tion of different inforωationallines ωarks causal (οΓ otlιer) con-
nections bet'\'een diseases that ιnay have nothing in cοωωοη
froω the stand point of classical classificatoι-y structures. Ι η sum:
"The locus in ~7 hich knowledge is forωed is no longer the patho-
logical garden Ί-νhere God distributed the species, but a general-
ized ωedical conscioιιsness, diffused in space and tiωe, open and
ιnobile, linked to each individual existence, as 'vell as to the collec-
tive life of the nation, ever alert to the endless domain in which
illness betrays, in its various aspects, its great, solid fοΓω" (31 ).
Foucault connects to tlιe new ωedical consciousness and its
conception of ιnedical knoΊ-νledge two coιnpleιnentaιΎ "ιnyths"
tlιat lιe believes exeιτised a strong inflιιence on ReνolιιtionaΓy
tlιinking. Tlιe first 'vas tlιat of "a nationalized ωedical pΓOfes­
sion," Γeplacing the cleΓgy, 'vitlι po,vers over bodies coιnpaι·able
to tlιe latter's over souls. The second ωytlι envisaged "a total
clisappeaΓance of disease in an ιιntΓOιιbled, dispassionate society
retιιrned to its oτiginal state of healtlι," ,~)ιeΓe tlιere ννοιιld be η ο
need at all for doctoΓs (32-33). Foιιcaιιlt thinks these myths 'νere
paΓticularly important because they pΓesented ιnedicine as '~oΓk­
ing fοΓ positive ideals ancl notjιιst fοΓ the negative goal of cuι-ing
illnesses. Coιτesponcling to this ~'as a sνl'itclι fΓOm a ιnedicine of
lιealιlι to a ωedicine of norωality. That is, ιlιe doctoΓ 'vas no
longer seen ωerely as soωeone ~'lιο restoΓes the body to a
healtlη (noncliseased) state bιιt as the aΓbiter of stanclarcls tlιat
define positive nonns of ιnan's ideal physical state. 'Ίnstead of
reωaining ... tlιe dιιbious negation of the negative, [ωedicine]
'~as given the splendid task of establishing in men's lives the
positive role of lιealtlι, viΓtιιe, and lιappiness" (34). Accoι-clingly,
~ιhereas Classical meclicine 'vas pΓίωarily concernecl "'ίtlι restoΓ-
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 117

ing "qualities of νigor, sιφpleness, and fl.uidity, ,.y}ιich ν1rere lost

in illness," the new meclical consciousness looked fω·,νaΓd to
nineteentlι-centιΙΓy meclίcine, ννl1ich "fonned its concepts and
pΓesCΓibed its intenentions in relation to a standaΓd of function-
ing and ω·ganίc stΓuctιiΓe" (35). It ννas tlιis tΓansfonnation tlιat
lecl to the nineteentlι-centuιΎ conception of life as not pΓimaΓily
"the intenιal stnιctuΓe of the organized bei1~g, but [as] the 11ιedical
bijJolω'il)' of tlιe ?2Ο?'Ύ!ιαl and t!Le pathological" (35). (Here Foιιcault's
discιιssion makes contact ,-vith Canguillιem's νvοΓk, sιιggesting
tlιat tlιe clistinction of tlιe nonnal and tlιe patlιological, '-vhiclι
Canguillιem takes as a giνen for philosoplιical analysis, is a
contingent- and faiΓly Γecent- pιΌdιιct of specific lιistoΓical
tΓansfonnations.) Foιιcault also notes tlιat this ιnedical distinc-
tion of tlιe norιnal and the patlιological νvas fιιnclanιental for tlιe
"sciences of man" that developed in the nineteentlι centιnγ
DιΙΓing tlιe fiΓst yeaΓs ( 1789-1792) of the Reνolιιtion, theΓe
was. a stωng impetιιs tOVΙ7 aΓd ιnedical ΓefοΓιn, deΓiving fιΌιη a
convergence of tlιe denιands of the new ιnedical conscioιιsness
ancl of RevolutionaΓy political ideology. Tlιe fοΓωeΓ required a
"free fielcl" ofinquiry in νvlιiclι, ιιnconstrained by ideal classifica-
toη categoΓies, doctors miglιt pιιΓsue '-vitlιoιιt Γestriction any
infonnation Γeleνant to "tlιe forιnation of an accιιrate, exlιaιιs­
tiνe, pennanent cοι-ριιs of knω1rledge about the healtlι of tlιe
population" (38). τlιis stΓiving fοΓ freedonι of inquiΓy fit in 'νell
witlι the Reνolιιtion's ideology of a fΓee social space, "a space of
fΓee comιnιιnication" (39) unfetteΓed by the arbitΓaι-y pΓiνileges
of tlιe a?ιcien τegi1ne. Specifically, medical and political consideΓ­
ations alike ι-eqιιiΓed the abolition of institutions such as the
lιospitals, doctoΓs' guilds, and the U niνersity ιnedical faculty,
ν~rhich weΓe obstacles botlι to the pιιrsιιit όf medical knoν~rledge
and the establishιnent of a free society.
But in spite ofthese ιnιιtually suppoι-tive deιnands for medical
ι-efoι-ms and the nιany proρosals they engendeΓed, the Revolιι­
tion failed to implement any ne'v medical systeιn. Accoι·ding to
Foucault, this was becaιιse "the sιιbject of medicine remained the
sanιe, and concepts '-vere forιned accoι·ding to tlιe saιne Γules"
(51). The neν~r medical consciousness (and theΓefoΓe tlιe Revolιι­
tionaΓ)' discussions based on it) lιad opeΓated only at the leνel of
theoretical foι·ιnulations that coιιld do no ιnore than reoι·ganize
"alΓeady constituted elements ofknoν~rledge" ancl so did not effect
any fundaιnental mιιtation. What was needed for radical change
118 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

in medical thought and practice was "a ne~', coheι-ent, unitary

model for the foι-mation of medical objects, perceptions, ancl con-
cepts" (51). In effect, Foucault is claiming that there had as yet
been no change in medicine at the aιτhaeologicallevel. The fouι­
elements of medical knowledge that he mentions- objects, peΓ­
ceptions, concepts, and theories- are pι-ecisely Ίνhat he identifies
in ΑΚ as the elements constituting the "discuι-siνes foι-mations"
that are the conceι·n of archaeological analγsis. Changes at the
theoι-eticalleνel that do not also involve fundamental ontological,
epistemological, and conceptual transformations do not repre-
sent a change in discuι-sive formation- that is, in the fundamen-
tal structures of thought and discourse for a domain.
But Foucault holds that the fundamental structures of the
medical domain did change at the beginning of the nineteenth
century with the development of what he calls "the clinic." The
clinic is for hiιn simultaneously a new institution, the clinical
hospital, and a new form or style of medical thought and pι-ac­
tice associated ~rith it. On the latter leνel, the clinic, Ί\7 ith its
empl1asis on careful and exact observation of patients as the
foundation ofmedicine, was one ofmany instances in the history
of medicine of a call for a ι-eturn to diι-ect experience. But,
Foucault notes, sucl1 "retuι-ns" to experience aι-e neveι· as siιnple
as they seem. Tl1ey are not- contraι-y to tl1eir own standard self-
interpretation - meι-ely Γenewals of contact with an age-old accu-
mιιlation of observational tι·uths that peι-si:Sts through tl1eoΓetical
disagι-eements and tι-ansforιnations. Far fι-om being ιneι-e re-
tuΓns to a constant basic expeι-ience, they have typically inνolved
cl1anges "in the νeΓy gΓid accoι-ding to Ίνhich this experience was
given, was articιιlated into analysable elements, and found a clis-
cιιι-sive formulation .... The fundaιnental peΓceptual codes that
weι-e applied to patients' bodies, the field of objects to ~rhich
observation addressed itself, tl1e surfaces and depths traveι-sed
by the doctor's gaze, the νιhole system of oι-ientation vaι-ied"
(54). Α priιnaι-y task of BC is to chaΓt the cl1ange of this soι-t that
accoιnpanied the "return to experίence" heralcled by clinical
ωedicine.

The clinic as an institution

Foucaιιlt fiι-st, howeveι-, sketches his account of the institutional
reforms associated with the epistemic cl1ange. Tl1e Ίvar condi-
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 119

tions that existed from ι 792 dre'νν so n1any qualified doctω·s into
militaηι service tl1at ciνilian medical practice becan1e dωninated
bγ qιιacks anc!' other inconψetents. Tl1is led, especially afteι­
Robesρieιτe's fall in 1794, to a stΓOng moyement fοΓ fιιndamen­
tal refonns in ωeclical institιιtions. These weι-e caιτied out be-
tνveen 1795 and 1803 ancl inYolved ω<Uor changes in tl1e organi-
zation of botl1 the medical profession ancl tl1e l1ospital systeω.
vVitl1 ι-egaΓd to tl1e ιnedical profession, Foιιcaιιlt ωaintains tl1at
the ι-efoι-ms ιιltiωately adopιed follov.red tl1e essentiallines of a
Γeport tl1at Cabanis l1ad sιιbmitted in 1798. This Γeport '~as pι-i­
maι-ily concerned 'ννith tl1e pΓOblem of ι-estι-icting tl1e pΓactice of
ωedicine to qιιalified pl1ysicians νvithout ι-everting to detailed
goνen1n1ental ι-egulation (>~'l1icl1 'vas Γepugnant to libeΓal pΓinci­
ples) οι- to the ιπe-Revolutionaι-y model of ιnedicine as an aιι­
tοηοιηοιιs coι-poι-ation ruled by the self-inteι·est of tl1e doctoΓs.
Cabanis's solution νvas to giYe a centι-al place to tl1e concept of
1ιιedical co1ιιpetence. Tl1e Γigl1t to pι-actice ιnedicine '~oιιlcl be a
function ιneΓely of a ρeι-son's kno,~ledge, expeι-ience, and ιnoral
pΓObity, not of his confoι-ιning to buΓeauσatic ηοι-ωs οι- gaining
entrance to a socially pΓivileged circle. Funher, tl1e sοιιιτe of
ιnedical competence 'νvas to be the sort of direct perceptual ac-
qιιaintance νvitl1 cliseases tl1at was pΓOvicled by tl1e clinicall1ospi-
tal. Foιιcault illιιstι-ates this by tl1e ne'~ distinction between doctors
and ωere officers of lιealtΛ. This replaced the old clistinction of
physician and sιπgeon, in v,rl1ich tl1e foΓιner νvas accoι·cled a
more eιninent status in virtue of l1is tl1eoretical knowleclge as
opposed to the latteι-'s meΓe practical expeι-ience. The doctoΓ
also hacl a higheι- status becaιιse of his knowledge. But tl1is was
not speculatiνe tl1eoι-etical knowledge but conσete kno,~ledge
derivecl froω close obserνation of patients in clinical l1ospitals.
These hospitals aι-e, on Foιιcault's accoιιnt, tl1e second aspect
of the ι·efοι-ιη of ιnedical pι·actice. Tl1ere '~as still a strong at-
tacl1ιnent to the eaΓly ReνolιιtionaΓy idea that a v.rell-regulated
society sl1oιιld not need l1ospitals. Even if disease could not be
eliιninated, it shoιιld, accω·ding to libeΓal ρrinciρles, be caΓed
for in the l1oιne, not in state-controlled institutions. But it be-
came apparent tl1at the goal of eliminating hospitals ν~ras en-
tiι-ely ιιnrealistic. Theι·e 'veΓe too ιnany ροω· and too ιηιιch
conceι-n about the ρolitical conseqιιences of distι-ibuting laι-ge
aιnounts of ιnoney to ροοr faιnilies fοΓ the caι-e of tl1eiΓ sick. 'Ά
stι-uctuι-e had to be foιιnd, for tl1e preseΓνation of botl1 the
120 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

hospitals and the privileges of medicine, that was conψatible

'vith the principles of liberalism and the need for social protec-
tion" (82). Α solιιtion νvas foιιnd ίη teΓms of the valιιe of chaΓity
hospίtals fοΓ medical ΓeseaΓch. On stΓictly libeΓal princίples, it
made good sense for the Γich to sιιppoΓt hospitals fοΓ the tΓeat­
ment of the pοοΓ provided that sιιch lιospitals νvere also ιιsed as
a locιιs fοΓ stιιdy and tΓaining tlιat 'voιιld lead to advances in
medίcal knowledge and inψΓove the competence of doctoΓS.
"By paying fοΓ [the pοοΓ] to be tΓeated, [the Γich ωan] is ...
ωaking possible a greateΓ knoν.•ledge of the illnesses r~•ith r~•hich
he himself may be affected" (84). Coπespondingly, the pοοΓ
"pay" fοΓ the tΓeatment they receive by allo,ving themselves to
be objects of medical stιιdy. "The clinic ... is the inteτest paid by
the poor on the capital tlιat the Γich lιave consented to ίnvest in
the lιospital" (85). Τhιιs, the clinic in the sense of a charity
hospital that was a soιπce of ne'v medical knowledge and the
traίning· of ne'v doctoΓs became the focal point of the clinίc in
the sense of a system of medical pΓactice foιιnded on the diΓect
obseΓνation of patients.
Βιιt what 'veΓe the fιιndamental cognitiνe tΓansfoΓmations
that coπespondecl to tl1is "biΓtlι of the clinic"? As vve haνe
alΓeady noted, Foιιcaιιlt ιnaintains tlιat tlιe clinic's 'Ί·etιιrn" to
what is "diι-ectly obseΓνable" in fact involves seeing meclical ob-
jects tlιroιιglι a new inteΓpΓetatίve grid. 1-Iis next task is the
analysis of tlιe strιιctιπe of this gι-icl, of the neVΙ• "codes of
kno,vledge" tlιat ιιndeΓlie tlιe clinical gaze. Tlιere aΓe, lιe ωain­
tains, tν.•ο sιιch codes: one expΓessing a ne'~', lingιιistic strιιctιιΓe
of tlιe signs of diseases, anotheΓ expΓessing a ne'v aleatoΓy
(pΓObabilistic) stnιctιιre of tlιe doωain of ωeclical cases.

The linguistic structure of medical signs

Foιιcault sees tlιe Classical accoιιnt of disease as ιnaking a cnιcial
distinctίon between signs and synψtωns. Tlιe syιnptonι lιas a
privίleged position becaιιse it "is tlιe forιn in which the clisease is
pΓesented: of all that is νisible, it is tlιe closest to the essential. ...
Tlιe syιnptoιns alloν.• tlιe inνaΓiable fοΓιη of tlιe disease ... to
slzoω tlιτouglι" (go ). Signs, by contΓast, ιneΓely annoιιnce ν.•hat is
happening, has lιappenecl, or ν.•ill happen. They pΓOνide no
kno,vledge of the clisease bιιt ιneΓely indicate ho'v it is likely to
deνelop ονeΓ tiιne. FοΓ nineteenth-centιιry ιnedicine, by con-
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 121

trast, there is no longeΓ an absolute distinction between signs and

syιηptωns; everything available to tlιe observing gaze (both Clas-
sical sign and Classical syιnptom) is sinψly a signifier tlιΓοιιglι
νvhiclι tlιe signified (tlιe disease) appeaι-s. Cωτespondi11g to tlιis
meι-gi11g of sig11 and sy11ψtom is a reductio11 of disease fιΌm a11
ideal essence to a meΓe aggregate of phe11ome11a. ''τlιeι-e is 110
lo11geι- a pathological esse11ce beyond tlιe symρtonιs: eνeι-ytlιing
in the disease is itself a ρlιenωnenon" (91). TlιeΓe is no Γοωη fοΓ
a pΓivileged class of synψtonιs becaιιse there is no disease be-
yond tlιe obserνable signs.
Ηο'\'eνeι-, the signs of a disease do not simply pΓesent tlιeιn­
selνes as sιιch to tlιe doctoΓ's ριn-ely passiνe conscioιιsness. In
oΓder fοΓ consciousness ιο ι-ecognize a plιenωnenon as a sign of
a ρanicιιlar disease, it ιηιιst conιpaΓe it ~ritlι ρlιenome11a associ-
ated νvitlι otheΓ oΓganisιns and 'vith tlιe nonnal fιιnctioning of
tlιe organisnι, notice tlιe fι-eqιιe11cy νvitlι 'vlιiclι it occιιrs i11 C011-
jιιnction νvith otheΓ phenonιena, and so foι-tlι. Calling a11y patlιo­
logical phenonιe11o11 obseΓνed in an organisιn a "syιnpto111," Foιι­
caιιlt says tlιat conscioιιs11ess is tlιe age11cy νvlιeΓeby a syιηρtοηι is
tιιrned i11to a sig11 - that is, is recognized as an indicator of a
disease (νvlιiclι is itself only tlιe aggΓegate of all sιιclι indicatω·s).
!11 tlιe iclealliιnit of conιplete kno~rledge, eνeΓy syιnρtom 'voιιld
be Γecog11ized as a sig11 of a clisease so that "all ρatlιological
nιanifestations '\'οιιld sρeak a cleaΓ, OΓdered la11gΉage" (95).
Corresρo11ding to tlιe vie'\' tlιat tlιe disease is siιηρly tlιe total-
ity of its syιηρtonιs is the vieνv tlιat the natιιre of the disease ca11
be exhaιιstively exρressed in desσiρtive langιιage. "!11 a cli11ical
nιedici11e to be seen a11d to be spokeπ inιιnediately comωιιnicate i11
tlιe ma11ifest tnιth of the disease ofwhich it is pΓecisely the νvhole
beiπg. TlιeΓe is disease 011ly i11 the eleιηe11t of the νisible and
therefoΓe statable" (95). This co11tΓasts '''itlι the Classicalιnedi­
ci11e of species, fοΓ 'vhiclι theΓe is 110 diι-ect cωτesρo11clence be-
tνveen the natιιre of a disease and what νve obseΓνe and fοΓ νvhich
conseqιιently οιιr eωpiι-ical obseΓνation langιιage is neνeΓ fιιlly
acleqιιate to expι-ess the essence of a disease.
Foιιcaιιlt notes that tlιis πeν~τ conceptio11 of signs and tlιeiι­
role in ωedical kno,vledge is isoιnoι-plιic to tlιe ρlιilosoρhical
accoιιnt of signs develoρed at tlιe same tinιe by Condillac and
others. FοΓ exanιple, tlιe piΌcess ν~rhereby conscioιιsness tιιι·ηs
plιenonιenal synψtωns into signs of a disease is jιιst an instance
of νvhat Condillac calls "analysis"- that is, "coιnposing and de-
122 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

composing our ideas in order to make different comparisons

Ί\7 ith them, and in order to discoveι- by this means the relations
that they have among themselves, and the neνv ideas that they
may produce" (cited, 94). Also, the ability of descriptive lan-
guage to capture totally the nature of disease fits perfectly with
Condillac's view of the exact coπespondence betΊνeen empirical
language and reality. "The doctor's reflective perception and
the philosopher's discursive reflexion on perception come to-
gether in a figιιre of exact sιι perposition, since the woτld is fοτ
the1n the a12alogue oflanguage" (96).

The probabilistic structure of medical cases

According to Foιιcaιιlt, clinical medicine also deployed a fιιnda­
mentally new ιιnderstanding of the place of change and ιιncer­
tainty in οιιr knowledge of diseases. Of course, it has alνvays been
a trιιism that medical knowledge is uncertain, that the conψlex­
ity and variety of the cases with Ί\7 hich it deals makes its jιιdg­
ments particιιlarly pωne to error. Βιιt Foucaιιlt maintains that,
with the advent of clinical ιηedicine, the role of chance and
ιιncertainty no longer merely expΓessed a defect in medical
knowledge and began to take on a positive cl1aracter. Tl1is was
because the ιιnpredictable variations among medical cases (the
soιιrce of ιιncertainty) Ί~'ere gι-adιιally recog·nized as alloΊving for
application of the ιηatl1ematical apparatus of tl1e probability
tl1eory developed by Laplace and others. "Medicine discovered
that ιιncertainty may be treated, analytically, as the sιιιη of a
certain nιιmber of isolatable degι-ees of ceΓtainty that Ί~'eΓe capa-
ble of rigoι-oιιs calcιιlation. Τhιιs, this confιιsed, neg·ative con-
cept, whose meaning deΓiνed fι-om a tι-aditional opposition to
mathematical knoΊνledge, Ί\'as to be capable of tι-ansforming it-
self into a positive concept ancl offeι-ed to the penetration of a
tecl1niqιιe proper to calcιιlation" (97).
This new pι-obabilistic ιιndeΓstanding developed slowly fι-on1
initial vagιιeness and incoheι-ence. Foιιcaιιlt tΓaces the develop-
ment throιιgh fοιιr principal stages. Tl1e first involved a neνv
perception of the "complexity of combination." On the Classical
view, simplicity inσeased νvith geneΓality. By contΓast, there de-
veloped at the end of tl1e eighteentl1 century the vieνv that "siιn­
plicity is not to be foιιnd in tl1e essential geneι-ality bιιt at the
primary level of the given, ίη the small nιιmber of encllessly
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 123
repeated elements" (gg). (τl1ink, for exaωple, of the status of
Ηιιιηe's "iιnpressions.") As a Γesult, tl1e coιnplexity of individιιal
cases '"'as no longeι- viev.•ecl as ωeΓely due to uncontiΌllable varia-
tions that οccιιιτed >νhen one descended fron1 tl1e leνel of gen-
eral trutl1s about essences. Ratheι-, tl1e complexity was seen as
soιnething that coιιld be analyzed into its constitutive elements
and thereby exhaιιstively kno\Ι'n.
The second stage involνed a cl1ange in the use of analogy. Foι­
the medicine of species, analogy v.•as ιneι-ely a matteι- of siιnilar­
ity to an ideal pathological essence. Classical cloctors invoked
analogies bet,veen a ρatient's conclition and sιιch an essence to
jιιstify tl1eir cliagnoses. But, since there was ι-aι-ely a coιnplete
instantiation of the ideal essence, they v.•eι-e also led to explain
a'νay ωanifest syωρtoωs tl1at clid not col1eι-e with tl1eiι- diagnosis
as accidental "coιnplications" obscιιι-ing tl1e essential tωth of the
clisease. Fοι· clinical ωedicine, analogy was a ωatteι- of "an
isoιnorpl1isω of ι-elations bet,veen elements" (100). Tl1is made
diagnosis a ωatteΓ of identifying tl1e disease pΓesent in a given
case witl1 wl1at l1acl been obseι-ved in otl1eι-s. Tl1eι-e was no longer
any need to treat a disease as a "mixed reality" in wl1ich some
eleωents weΓe ιneΓe accidental accretions. It could ratl1er be
seen as "a conιplex jig-ιι1·e in tl1e col1eι·ence of a ιιnity" (ι 01).
This ne,v, nonessentialist vie>Ι' of disease led, Foucaιιlt says, to
tl1e third stage: a new way of obseι-ving tl1e ι-ange of different
instances of a given disease. Sucl1 a Γange alv.•ays Γeveals a nuω­
beΓ of vaΓiations and diveι-gences aωong different cases of tl1e
same disease. Classicalιnedicine ιneΓely ignoι-ed sιιch deviations
as of η ο significance. On tl1e clinical view it 'vas also tnιe that in
ωany instances the cliveΓgences aωong a laΓge set of cases woιιld
prove to be of no ιιltiιnate inψoι-tance. Βιιt if certain variant
phenoωena (e.g., conjunctions of appaι-ently ιιnrelated synψ­
toωs) continued tlπoιιgh a large seΓies of cases, tl1en clinical
ιnedicine Ί-vas prepaΓed to ι-ecognize theιn as essential featuι-es of
tl1e disease. Tl1is ne'~' sensitivity to the "peι-ception of fι-eqιιen­
cies" reflects tl1e fact that ιneclicine had taken "as its peι-ceptιιal
field not a gaι-den of species bιιt a doωain of events" (102).
Knowleclge of this doωain was not a matteι- of aρproxiωation of
tl1e eidetic insigl1t of an ideal observeΓ. Rather, it v.•as soιnething
acl1ieved only by "the totality of obseι-veι-s," fοι- 'vhich the errors
of individual observations aΓe eliωinated by statistical analysis.
Finally, as the fouι-tl1 stage, clinical medicine fonnulated an
124 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ideal of developing a method for the calculation of probabilities,

a method that would maximize tl1e certitude of medical conclu-
sions. Foucault points out, hov.rever, an unresolved ambiguity
concerningjust what sucl1 a metl1od would achieve. Sometimes it
seemed that medicine should be content ννίth a "patlιology of
phenomeπa"- that is, with a knowledge of tl1e la,vs of the appear-
ance of phenomenal facts. But sometimes it seemed that more
was required, that the manifold of phenomenal facts had to find
its coherence in a "natural structure," knov.rledge ofwhicl1 would
constitute a patlιology of cases (103). So even though clinical medi-
cine rejected the Platonism that took diseases as separately exist-
ing essences, it was not sure that it could go beyond an Aristote-
lian construal of diseases as natural kinds to a wholeheartedly
positivist phenomenalism. However, this "fundamental contra-
diction" (105) remained unnoticed by clinical medicine.
As Foucault sees it, the above two codes of kno,vledge (the
linguistic and the probabilistic) define clinical medicine as a sci-
ence in the sense of a cognitive enterprise gωunded in careful
observation of specific cases and requiring the cooperation and
consensus of an organized community of inquirers. He notes,
however, that clinical medicine is not an experimental science.
The latteΓ involves pιιtting qιιestions to natιιre νvhereas the
former is meΓely a matter of listening to wl1at natιn-e has to say.
This, he says, does not n1ean tl1at cliήical medicine is antiex-
perimental. Its observations 'vill natιιΓally lead to expeΓiment,
but the questions posed νvill be expι-essed in the language of
observation- that is, in the languag·e spoken by natιπe to the
clinical gaze.

Seeing and saying

The mixed visual and aιιral metaphoΓs enψloyed above are no
merely rhetoΓical device or accident. RatheΓ, they coπespond to
what we have already seen as a central featuΓe of Foucault's ac-
count of clinical medicine: the essential connection bet,veen per-
ception and langιιage. "Tl1e purity of the gaze is boιιnd up witl1 a
certain silence that enables [the doctor] to listen.... The clinical
gaze has the paradoxical ability to lιeαι- α la1ψ;r.ιage as soon as it
perceives aspectacle" (107, ιο8). Tl1is connection, already appaΓent
in the notion of aπ 'Όbserνation languag·e" ιhat emerged from
Foucault's analysis of the linguistic nature of clinical signs, takes
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 125

the centΓal ΓOle in the next stage of lιis aΓchaeology of clinical

peΓception.
This stage centeΓs ο η ιlιe nature of and ρωblems aΓising from
the clinical connection of peπeptίon and langιιage. Foucault foΓ­
mιιlates a fiΓSt key issιιe tlιis νιay: ''If tlιe clinical domain is open
only to tlιe tasks oflanguage οΓ to tlιe demands of tlιe gaze, it will
lιave no liωits and, therefoΓe, no organization" (111). His point
seeιns to be tlιat tlιe separate pωjects of obseΓving facts aboιιt
tlιe body and of foπηulating statements in a clinical langιιage
>l'ill neitlιer by tlιemselves establislι a coheΓent doωain of ωedi­
cal knowledge. Left to tlιeωselνes, looking and talking 'vill just
\l'andeΓ witlιoιιt encl οΓ strιιctιιre fΓol11 fact to fact, fωω state-
ωent to statenιent. An organized bocly of kno,vledge aΓises only
νvhen expeΓience and langιιage aι-e connected v.ritlι one anotlιeι-,
'vlιen 'vlιat 've say is consLΓained by νvlιat '~'e see and 'vlιat we see
is infonηed and gιιided by the categorical fΓaωe,voΓk of οιιΓ
langιιage.
Clinical ωedicine's ρωject of connecting its expeΓience and
langυage began, Foucaιιlt says, witlι the sinψle deιηancl that
peΓception and speech a:lteΓnate in nιedical investigations. Tlιus,
Pinel ρroposed an ideal ωetlιod of inquiΓy in wlιiclι tlιere is a
"regulaΓ alteΓation of sρeeclι ancl gaze" 'vheΓeby "tlιe clisease
gι-adually cleclaΓes its tnιtlι, a tnιth tlιat it offers to the eye and
the ear" (112). But a ωeΓe deωand that sρeeclι and peΓception
be alteΓnately eωployed is not sufficient to specify a precise coι-­
ι-elation 'l-l'hereby eaclι liωits and forωs tlιe otlιeι-. Accoι-ding to
Foucaιιlt, the needed coπelation was successfully effected by tlιe
pωject of an ideally exlιaustive desaiption. Α Γigoι-oιιsly coιη­
plete desaiption ι-equiι-es both perception tlιat oωits nothing
and language that pΓecisely expι-esses all that is perceived. Lin-
guistic pι-ecision reqιιires tlιat language be constι-ained by exρeι-i­
ence ίη the sense tlιat it ωust "establish ... a coπelation between
each sector of the νisible and an expι-essible element that coπe­
sponds to it as accurately as possible" (113). Coι-respondingly,
peι-ceρtual completeness can be ωeaningfιιlly defined only on
tlιe basis of the categoΓies inψlicit in "a constant, fixed νocabu­
laΓy" (113). In tlιis way, the dΓive fοΓ an exhaιιstiνe desaiρtion
of nιeclical Γeality effects the needecl ωιιtιιally liωiting Γelation
between expeι-ience and langιιage.
Foucaιιlt notes, lιo>veνeι-, that this crιιcial ideal of exhaustive
clesaiption itself Γested ο η a fonηidable postιιlate: "that all tlιat is
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

visible is expressible and that it is wlωll)• visible becaιιse it is ωlιoll)•

exp1·essible" (115). The assιιnψtion, in other vl'ords, is that the visi-
ble and the expressible are entiΓely convertible. In fact, hοΊΥeνeΓ,
the framewoΓk of clinical medicine was not able to support this
complete convertibility. TΓue, clinicians thoιιght that there was an
"unprobleωatic eqιιilibΓiιιω ... between the cωnposition of the
visible and tl1e syntactic ωles of the expressible" ( 117). It was
assumed that what was perceived itself had a linguistic stnιctιπe
that coιιld be ιιnproblematically expΓessed. Βιιt the idea that the
elements of perception have a linguistic stι-uctιιre makes sense
only on cenain conceptions of the natιιre of langιιage. Foucaιιlt
suggests that clinical ωedicine had no accoιιnt of langιιage capa-
ble of sιιstaining sιιch a vievl'. The assιιmption of the conveι-tibility
or ωutιιal tι-ansparency of perception and language left 'Όpaqιιe
the status of the language that must be its foιιndation, itsjιιstifica­
tion, and its delicate instωωent" ( 117). (He notes that a paΓallel
difficιιlty aι-ises fοι- Condillac's philosophy.)
Foucault ωaintains that, in place of an appΓOpriate account of
the natuι-e of language, clinical ωedicine offered a number of
"ωyths" that served to cover ι.ιp the lack. Theι-e was, fοΓ exam-
ple, the myth of the "alphabetical stωctuι-e of disease." This
Γegarded "the singιιlaι- impression ... of a syωptoω" as an iιτe­
dιιcible unit out of wllicl1 a disease was formed, just as letters
fοΓω words. Related to tl1is was the acceptance of a noωinalist
view of disease, not only in tl1e sense (ν,rhich ΊΥe have already
encoιιnteι-ed) that the disease has no sιιbstantial ι-eality sepaι-ate
fΓOm its phenomenal signs bιιt also in tl1e sense (ι-equi1·ed fοι- the
clinic's basic postιιlate) that "the foι-m of tl1e coωposition of tl1e
being of tl1e disease is of a lingιιistic tγpe" ( 119).
He ι-egaΓds two other myths as ωιιcl1 ιnore impoΓtant be-
caιιse they laid the foιιndation for the tΓansition frωη clinical to
anatoωo-clinical ωedicine. First, tlleΓe 1νas the ωove to a cheιηi­
cal ωodel of οιιr knoΊνledge of disease (in contΓast to the Classi-
cal botanical model). Tl1e clinical analysis of cliseases into tl1eir
basic eleωents was regaΓded as siωilar to the cheωist's "iso}a-
tion of puι·e bodies and . . . depiction of their coιηbinations"
(120). Corresponding·ly, "tl1e clinician's gaze becoωes the func-
tional eqιιivalent ο( fire in cl1eωical coωbιιstion; it is thΓoιιgh it
that tl1e essential pι.πity of pl1enomena can emeΓge: it is the
sepaΓating agent oftnιths" (120). This is an important transfor-
ωation of the role of tl1e gaze, v.rhicl1 ηο1ν "no longer ωerely
 CLINfCAL MEDICINE

ι-eads tl1e νisible" bιιt also frees its "iιnplicit stι-uctιπe." Fι-οιη
ηοΙ~' on, the gaze is not meΓely a Γeading of Γeality; "it has to
discoνeΓ its seαets" (120). Α similaΓ tΓansfonnation is effected
by a final myth, tl1at of clinical obseΓvation as not ιneι-e sense
perception bιιι as a "fine sensibility," a facility of judgment
cleνeloped from tl1e doctor's enιdition, training, and experi-
ence. Such obseπation is no longer so mιιch a gaze as a glance.
Tl1at is, it is not a matιer of meticιιloιιsly scanning eνery percep-
tual element in tl1e field of a disease bιιt of instantly penetrat-
ing, in νiΓtιιe of a trained sensibility, to tl1e essential meaning of
νιl1at is obseΓved. "The glance chooses a line that instantly dis-
tingιιislΊes tl1e essential; it ιl1erefore goes _beyond wl1at it sees; it
is not mislecl by tl1e iιnmediate fonns of the sensible ... ; it is
essentially demystifying" (12 1).
Tl1ese two mytl1s ννeΓe not, according to Foιιcaιιlt, just begιιil­
ing metapl1ors tl1at covered oνer tl1e problem of tl1e convertibil-
ity of perceρtion and language. Tl1ey also suggested a vieΙ-v of
ιneclical knoνvledge that asσibed it a depth and ρenetration into
its object tl1at was not ρresent in tl1e oΓiginal clinical view. Tl1ey
provided a basis fοΓ mσving beyoncl tl1e model of an "ear strain-
ing to catcl1 a langιιage" to the model of an "index fingeΓ ρalpat­
ing tl1e deptl1s" (122). This made tΌon1 fοΓ clinical methods tl1at
did not ωeΓely look at the sιιι-face of the body bιιt ρenetrated it
to Γeνeal the hidden seats of cliseases. Tl1ese methocls, in tιιΓη,
openecl the νvay fοΓ the acceptance of pathological anatoιny and
its pι-imary instι-ιιωent, tl1e aιιtopsy, as soιπces of ιneclical knoΙ-vl­
edge. The Γesιιlt, as we sl1all noν,r see, νvas a fιιndaιnentalιηodifi­
cation in the stι-uctιιι-e of clinicalωedicine.

Anatomo-clinical medicine
StandaΓd ωedicall1istoι-y l1as alΙ-vays connected tl1e cleveloρωent
of clinical ιnedicine to tl1e cliscovery of patl1ological anatoιηy. Βιιt
it is also geneι-ally adιnitted tl1at this anatoιηy developed only at
the end of tl1e histoι·ical pι-ocess leading to the clinical stand point.
vVl1y 1-vas s{ιch an essential factoι· so late in aι-ising? Tl1e standaΓd
answeΓ has been tl1at tl1e doιηinance of pathological anatoωy was
delayed becaιιse of the opposition of"ι-eligion, moι·ality, and stub-
boι-n pι-ejιιdice" (124) to tl1e dissection of coι-pses. Accoι-ding to
Foιιcaιιlt, l1oνveνer, this vie1-v is simply contι-ary to tl1e l1istoι·ical
facts. Doctors geneι-ally had no difficulties obtaining coι-pses and
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

carrying out dissections during the eig·hteenth century. The stan-

dard νie'\\• confuses ,.vhat lιappened during tlιe Renaissance, '1\•hen
there was deep Γeligious and ιnoΓal opposition to dissection, ,γίth
the sitιιation duι-ing the Enlightenment. In fact, the tnιe reason
'γhy pathological anatomy '"'as so late in deνeloping '"'as ωoted ίη
the natuι-e of clinical ιnedicine itself. Its concern νvith directly
obse:rvable phenoιnena, carefully scΓutinized fοΓ tenψoral pat-
terns and probabilistic fι-equencies, '\vas, by its stΓuctures, foreign
to the investigation of mute, intemporal bodies" that νvas carried
out by dissection ( 126). Accordingly, befciΓe patlιological anatonιy
could be a significant factoι-, tlιere had to be a basic modification
in tlιe clinical viewpoint. This ωodification ν~•as, Foucaιιlt aι-gues,
effected by MaΓie-FΓanς:ois-XavieΓ Bichat and his successoΓs.
Biclιat slιares the vie'\\ψoint of clincialωedicine in that his "eye
is a clinician's eye, because he gives an absolute privilege to the
su?face gaze" (129). Ηο,γeνeΓ, Foucaιιlt thinks his ν~•ork sig'l1ifi-
cantly tΓansfoΓωs tlιe ωeaning of "sιιΓface gaze" by pιιtting it into
an anatoωical context. The sιn-faces scι-ιιtinized by the doctoι· aι·e
tlιose opened ιιp by anatoωical dissection, not ωerely tlιose fonn-
ing tlιe exteι·nal body. This chang·e led to a basic shift toν~•aι-d a
ι·ealistic vieν~• of tlιe resιιlts of ωedical analysis. Τlυ-οιιglι Bichat's
ν~•οΓk, patlιological anatoωy appeaι-s as "an objective, real, and at
last unquestionable foιιndation fοΓ tlιe _description of diseases"
(12 g). Meclical analysis is η ο longeι- ωerely of 'voι·ds ο Γ of peΓcep­
tual ιιnits convenible '1\•itlι νvoΓcls bιιt oftlιe ι-eal caιιses of disease.
As a ι-esult, tlιe contι·acliction, noted above, bet,Ι•een tlιe "patlιol­
ogy of phenomena" ancl the "ρathology of cases" 'vas eliωinated
ίη favor of tlιe latter. Τhιιs, tlιeΓe 'vas a ιnove a'"'ay fωηι the
eaι-Iieι- clinical nominalism ancl toνvaι-d soωething ιnore like the
ι-ealisιη of tlιe oldeι- classificatoι-y ωedicine. Theι-e ν~ras no qιιes­
tion of a ι-etιπη to tlιe sepaι·ated essences, bυt the anatoωical
appωach gave "tlιe old nosological project ... neν~• νίgοιιr, inso-
faι- as it see1ned to pωvide it 'γitlι a solicl basis: real analγsis accoι-cl­
ingto peι-ceptible suΓfaces" (131-32).
Hoνveveι-, tlιe pωject of a medicine tlιat 'voιιld ιιncleι-stancl
and classifγ diseases ση tlιe basis of anatoωical tnιtlι facecl, on
Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt, t'γο nιajoι· difficιιlties. FiΓst, tlιere ν~•as the
pωblenι of connecting the "sinιιιltaneoιιs set of spatial phenom-
ena" ι-evealed by anatomy to tlιe "tenιpoι·al seΓies" of tlιe extel·-
nal synιptoιns (134). ΗοΊ-Ι', for exaιnple, can one tell '"'lιiclι ana-
tomicallesions aΓe essential caυses of the disease and '1\•hiclι only
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 129
its effects? Siιnilarly, tlΊeΓe was no sinψle conelation betv.•een tl1e
intensity of anatoιnical caιιses and the streng·tlΊ of tl1eir effects;
for example, a veΓy small tιnnor might caιιse deatl1, νιl1ile major
organic changes mig·l1t l1ave little effect on healtl1. Tl1e second
ιnajor difficιιlty centered on deatl1. The deatl1 of an oΓganism is
a majoι- distιιrbance that ωay νvell obscιιι-e tl1e tnιe natιιι-e of tl1e
killing disease. Ho'v do 'νe kno'ν that what οuΓ postnΊoΓteιη dis-
section reνeals is a caιιse of the disease and not jιιst an effect of
the pι-ocess of dying? Bichat's anatomy pΓOvided ansν.•eι-s to
tl1ese qιιestions bιιt, ίη tl1e pι-ocess, effectecl ιnajor cl1anges ίη tl1e
ιneaning of clinical ιnedicine.
Foιιcaιιlt says that, in ι-esponse to tl1e fi.ι-st difficιιlty, Bicl1at
and l1is sιιccessors eωployecl a siιnple ωetl1od of tl1e coιηparison
of facts. Tl1ey coωpared, for exaιnple, healtlη bodies 'νitl1 clis-
eased ones, different patients 'νhο hacl died fι-οω the saιne clis-
ease, and tl1e natιn-e of oΓgans obseι-ved in aιιtopsies v.•itl1 ν.•l1at
'νas knoνvn aboιιt tl1eiι- nonnal fιιnctioning. In tl1is way, it ιvas
possible to discern the tnιe place of anatoωical lesions in tl1e
developωent of diseases. But this sinψle conψaΓative ιnetl1od
resιιlted in an iιnportant cl1ange in tl1e conception of disease.
"Disease is no longeΓ a bιιndle of chaΓacteΓs disseωinated l1eΓe
and tl1eι-e ονeι- tl1e sιn-face of the body .... It is no longeΓ a
patl1ological species inseι-ting itself into tl1e body 'νl1ereνer possi-
ble; it is the body itself tl1at has becoιne ill" (136).
It ωight be objected tl1at Foιιcault is ν,τι-οηg to pΓesent this as a
major change, since it 'νas jιιst tl1e oιιtcωne of a continuous
series of sιιccessivelγ closeι- and ωore fine-gΓained obserνations
of tl1e body. But he Γejects the idea that "tl1e access of tl1e ωedi­
cal gaze into tl1e sick body v.•as ... tl1e continuation of a ιnove­
ωent of appΓoach that had been deνeloping in a more οι- less
Γegular fasl1ion since the daγ wl1en the fiΓst doctoΓ cast his soωe­
ι~•hat unskilled g·aze fιΌω afaι- on the bodγ of the fiι-st patient"
(139). This νίeν,τ ωisreads l1istoι-y by pΓOjecting onto it "an old
theory of knoνvledg·e ν,τhose effects and ωisdeeds l1aνe long been
known" (139). Using a distinction that will becoωe fundaωental
fοΓ hiιn in ΑΚ, Foιιcaιιlt ωaintains that the ωονe to pathological
anatoωy "VΙ•as the Γesult of a Γecasting at the level of episteωic
knowledge [savoir] itself, and not at the level of accuωιιlated,
ι-efined, deepened, adjιιsted knoVΙ•ledg·e [co1212aissances] . ... It is
not a ωatteΓ of the saωe gaωe, soωeνvl1at impΓoνed, bιιt of a
qιιite diffeΓent g·aιne" (137).
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

In support of his position, Foucault points to the ωajor differ-

ence i11volved i11 the ωove fωω a mere observatio11 of sympto-
matic correlations to a specification of the a11atoωical site of a
disease. The move meant that the esse11tial co11ditio11 of a disease
was 110 longer a11y particulaΓ set or ordeΓ of symptoms ('vhich
ωay i11 fact vary widely) bιιt a specific anatomical lesio11. Thus,
"the chronological seτies of symptoωs" was subω·di11ated to "the
ra?nifications oftlιe lesional space" ( 139). Foucault does not gΌ so faΓ
as to say that the earlier cli11ical vie'v of disease νvas simply aba11-
doned. But he does claim that it has bee11 fu11dame11tally modi-
fied by bei11g introduced "into the specified voluωe of the body,"
'vith the Γesult that "the notio11 of seat has finally replaced that of
class" (140). That is to say, altlιough medical diag11osis is still a
ωatteΓ of classifying the body's disease, this classification is 110
lo11geΓ a pΓiωitive fact but rather deΓiνes froω facts about the
location of anatoωicallesio11s.
With regard to the problem of death, Foucaιιlt 11otes that a
fiΓst step toward a solιιtion was bιιilt i11to the strιιctuΓe of the
cli11ical hospital, which allowed aιιtopsies to be peΓforωed iωme­
diately after death, so that theΓe 'vas minimal tiωe fοΓ distoι·ting
effects to opeΓate. But beyond this Bichat eωployed a11 impoΓ­
tant disti11ctio11 betνvee11 phenoωe11a connected νvitlι a disease
itself a11d phe11oωe11a tlιat νvere paΓt of ;;ι relatively autonomoιιs
pωcess leadi11g to death. On the basis of this distinction, death is
no longeΓ "tlιat absolute, ψivileged point at νvlιich tiωe stops
a11d moves back"; it is Γather a pι-ocess, "ιnιιltiple, dispersed in
tiιne" (142). As suclι, death can be understood i11 its οvω terms
a11d "ca11 110 lo11geΓ be co11fιιsed νvith the disease οι- 'vith its
traces" ( 143). With its distorting effects t!ιιιs co11tι-olled, death, in
virtue of the dissectio11s it allows, becoωes the key to the k11oνvl­
edge of disease. τΙιe a11alytic knoν~rledge that the nιyths of the
cli11ic had vainly soιιght in matheωatical, cheωical, and li11gιιistic
ωodels, it now foιιnd i11 death.
This new view of death Γeprese11tecl a majoΓ change frωn the
view, doωinant si11ce the Re11aissance, that "tlιe kno,vledge oflife
was based ση the essence ofthe living" (145). After Bichat, "k11owl-
edge of life finds its oι-igi11 in the destructio11 of life." (145). This
Γeqιιiι-ed rhat medicine fι-ee itself fωω its lo11g-standing fear of
death as tlιe abolition of medical skill and knoν~rledge. But, more
tlιa11 this, Bichat's woι-k "integrated ... cleath into a teclιnical and
conceptual totality" of a 11e'v medical vie"ψoi11t. Becaιιse of the
 CLINICAL MEDICINE

fundaιnental cl1anges effected IJy the integι-ation of anatoιnical

pathology, Foucault is even 'νilling to claiιn that "the gι-eat bι-eak
in the l1istory of \ι\Testeι-n ιnedicίne clates pι-ecisely flΌιn the 1110-
ιnent clinical expeτience became tl1e anatoιno-clinical gaze" (146).
This break involνes, fiτst of all, a ne'ν conception of disease,
whicl1 is no longeι- "an eνent or natuΓe inψorted froω tl1e out-
side" IJιιt τather a sρecific form of life itself. "The idea of a
clisease attacking life ιnust be ι-eρlacecl by the ωιιcl1 clenser no-
tion of patlιological life" (153). Foιιcaιιlt tl1inks tl1is new concep-
tion deriνes fΓOm the localization of clisease as a clisω·der at a
sρecific site ννitl1in tl1e body. Disease is a fοι-111 of life in tl1e
pι-ecise sense tl1at it is a particulaι- diΓection tl1e body's life takes.
Tl1is direction is one of degeneration, leading ιιltimately ιο
cleath. Hence, disease is a fonη of life to tl1e extent tl1at life itself
l1as an intι-insic connection to cleatl1. Deatl1 is tl1e ιιltimate encl
towaι-d ννhich life moνes, and disease lies on the tι-ajectory of tl1at
motion. "Now deatl1 is the νery sοιιι-ce of disease, a possibility
intrinsic to life tl1at makes disease ρossible" (156). Accordingly,
deatl1 becomes tl1e crucial third terω tl1at clefines tl1e relation-
sl1ip between life ancl disease. "In anatoιnical perception, deatl1
was tl1e ρoint of νiew from tl1e l1eigl1t of wl1icl1 disease opened
ιψ onto tωth; tl1e life/disease/deatl1 tΓinity was aΓticιιlated in a
tΓiangle vΙ'l1ose sιιmmit culωinated in deatl1" (158).
Foιιcaιιlt argιιes that, coπesponding to this new conception of
clisease, theτe is a ιnajor tι-ansfonnation of ωedical ρerception,
signaled by a neν~r construal of the notion of sigιι. Tl1e phenoωe­
nal signs doctoι-s obseι-ve on tl1e sιιrface of the bocly lose tl1eir
pΓivileged statιιs as diι-ect indicators of disease. They aΓe signifi-
cant only to the extent that they Γefeι- to lesions 'vitl1in the body,
ν1'l1icl1 aι-e ηο'ν tl1e only sιn-e signs of disease. Given this new
ιιndeι-standing of signs, ωedical peι-ceρtion takes 011 a veΓy dif-
ferent chaΓacteι-. It is 110 longeΓ a tν~ro-diιnensio11al Γeading of a
series of synψtoιns bιιt ratl1er a three-diωe11sionalιnaρρing of a
νoluωe, tl1e thiι-d diωension repι-esenting tl1e co11nection of sιιr­
face synψtoιns to eve11ts a11d strιιctιιres ννitl1in the body. Foιι­
caιιlt sωns ιιp tl1is ne'ν fonn of ιnedical pe1-ception as a "strιιc­
tιιι-e ... of i1ιvisible visibility" ( 165). Pι·eviously, the priωary object
of meclical perceρtion 'νas tl1e sensoη' data visible ο η the suι-face
of the body. Νονl' it sees tlπough this "supeι-ficial" visibjlity to the
"fundaωental visibility" witl1in tl1e body tl1at is unveiled by ρatlΊo­
logical anatoιnγ.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Fσucault alsσ maintaiπs that tl1e new mσde σf perceptiσπ

iπvσlves a recσπstrual σfthe πσtiσπ σf π1edical caseo Ιπ clinical
experieπce, the case ;γas viev.red as part σf a series that revealed
the esseπtial πature σf the disease, a series iπ '"hich iπdividual
idiσsyπcrasies σf particular cases γγσuld be elimiπated as πσt sta-
tistically sigπificaπto But fσr aπatomσ-clinical experieπce, each
case can be appreciated iπ its full individualityo 'Όπly iπdividual
illπesses exist" (ι68)ο This is because the space σf illπess has
πσw been eπtirely identified with the bσdily space σf the iπdivid­
ual sufferiπg frσm it. The entire reality aπd meaniπg σf disease
resides iπ its specific bσdily siteso Ιπ this way, Fσucaιιlt πσtes,
cσπtrary tσ the lσπg-staπdiπg Aristσteliaπ dσctriπe, a scieπce σf
the individual is πσt σnly pσssible but πecessaryo Irσπically, it
was death, the destructiσn σf the iπdividual, that was the key
uπlσcking this "fσrbiddeπ, immiπent secret: the kπσ,Yledge σf
the individual" (ι7σ)ο
Carried to its lσgical coπclusiσπ, the aπatσmσ-clinical view
required the ideπtificatiσπ σf the disease itself '"ith the cσrre­
spσnding iπternal lesiσno The lesiσπ cσuld πσt be just aπ effect
(sσmetimes, perhaps, nσt even present) σf tl1e diseaseo This fιιll
ideπtificatiσn, hσ,ΥeνeΓ, was nσt made by the eaΓly develσpers
σf pathσlσgical aπatoιηyo Bichat himself, fσΓ exaιnple, allσ,γed
fσΓ sσιne cases σf diseases fσΓ '"l1ich there '\'as πσ coιτespσπd­
iπg σι-gaπic lesiσπ at all. Fσucault hσlds that the full flσ,.γeriπg
σf the aπatσωσ-cliπical view can1e σnly "''ith Brσussais's '"'σrk ση
feverso Brσιιssais σppσsed the claim, defended, fσι- example, by
Pinel, that theι-e '"ere "esseπtial fevers," '"11ich did nσt σriginate
in σrganic lesiσnso Attackiπg Pinel's accσιιπt, Brσussais .estab-
lished the view that all feveι-s aπd indeed all diseases are lσcallγ
situatedo "Frσm πσw ση, tl1e σι-ganic space σf the lσcalizatiσn is
ι-eally independeπt σf tl1e space σf tl1e nσsσlσgical cσnfigιιΓa­
tiσπ" (ι86)ο
On Fσucault's accσunt, Bωussais's fulfillιηent and coιηpletiσn
σf Bichat's '"σrk effects tl1e final transfσι-ωatiσns σf ιηedical peι-­
ceptiσno He sees, iπ particular, tν\'σ ιηain final chaπgeso First, the
σrder σf pι-iσritγ between vίsibilitγ and lσcalizatiσn is reversedo
Fσr Bichat, diseases are lσcalized because they aι-e νisible tσ aπa­
tσmical scι-utiπyo Afteι- Brσιιssais, lσcalizatiσn in aπ σrgaπic site is
the fundameπtal featuΓe, flΌιη '"hich visibility fσllσ,vs as a cσnse­
quenceo Secσnd, Brσussais ιηakes "the lσcal space σf the dis-
ease ο ο ο alsσ, imιηediately, a causal space" ( ι8g)ο Fσι- Bicl1at, tl1e
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 1 33
local site of a disease is tnerely its point of spatial and tempoΓal
oτΊgin. For Broιιssais, whaι happens at tl1is site (specifically, tl1e
iπitation of tissιιes) is the caιιse of the clisease, ιvhicl1 indeed has
no longeΓ any Γeality otl1eι- tl1an tl1at of tl1e effect, peΓhaps even-
tually spΓead thωιιgl1out the body, of a disoΓcleι- (lesion) of an
ω·gan. "Disease is ηο;ν no more than a ceι-tain complex move-
ment of tissιιes in reaction to an iπitating caιιse: it is in this tl1at
the ινhole essence of the ρathologicallies" ( ι8g).
vVith tl1ese "final tΓansfoπnations, the Classical view of disease
as sωnething indeρendent of tl1e sick bocly is entiΓely elωinated.
''τl1e sρace of tl1e clisease is, ινitl1οιιt ΓeωaincleΓ ΟΓ shift, tl1e νeι-y
space of tl1e oι-ganism" (191). Foucault agι-ees tl1at BΓOιιssais's
\ΥΟΓk has been rightly σiticized fοΓ some Γespects in wl1icl1 it \Yas
a Γetιπη to antiqιιatecl ωedical concepts sιιch as synψathy and
pΓactices sιιch as bleeding. Βιιt he tl1inks that ωeclical histoι-ians
haνe oveΓeωpl1asized tl1ese Γeνeι-sions and failed to notice that
eνen they aι-e paΓt of a stnιctιιΓe tl1at, as a whole, ι-epΓesents the
essence of ωodeι-n ωeclicine. In sρite of all the liωitations and
ι-egΓessions of his \VOΓk, Bι-oιιssais "had fixed fοΓ his peι-iod tl1e
final eleωent of tlιe way to see. ... Tl1e historical and concι-ete a
pΓίω·i of tl1e ωocleΓn ωeclical gaze \Vas finally constitιιted" (192).

The birth of the clinic: methods and results

In his conclιιding ι-eωaΓks, Foιιcault presents BC as an exeι-cise
in a ωetl1od of \Vriting intellectιιal histω-y: "τl1is book is, aωong
otl1ers, an atteωρt to apρly a ωethod to the confιιsed, ιιn­
derstrιιctιιι-ed, and ill-stnιctured doωain of the l1istoΓy of ideas"
(195). His ιιndeΓstanding of tl1e puι-ρose and natuΓe of this
ωethod was eaΓlieΓ expΓessed in the book's p1·eface. TheΓe he
begins >νith the skeptical thoιιght that οιπ age is, no doιιbt, one
of σiticism, bιιt not, as fοΓ Kant, σiticisω (σitiqιιe) that can staι-t
fΓOm the fact of knov.rledge. Rather, οιιΓ σitiqιιe can staι-t only
fι-om the "fact tl1at langιιage exists," \·νitl1 no assιnnptions aboιιt
its tι-ιιth ο Γ νaliclity. W e cannot expect to find laι-ge tωths aboιιt
οιιι- natιιι-e and destiny in the \visdoω of>vhat l1as been said οι- to
eνalιιate this v.risdoω on the basis of οιπ οινη ιιncoνeι·ing of sιιch
tnιths. We can only tΓy to ιιndeΓstand "tl1e innιιωeι-able woΓds
spoken by ιnen" tlυ·oιιgl1 v.rhicl1 "a meaning has taken shape tl1at
l1angs oveι- ιιs." TheΓe is no hope of bι-eaking thΓOιιgh tl1is web
of langιιage to a >νοι-ld of fιιndaιnental tωths. "We aΓe doomed
134 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

histωically to history, to the patient construction of discourses

about discouι·ses, and to the task of heaι-ing wlιat has already
been said" (xvi).
Βιιt Foucault also ιnaintains that οιιr discoιιrse aboιιt discourses
need not take tlιe foι-m it alιnost al"Ι>Ι'ays lιas in the modern world:
that of cO?n?nentary'. Coιnmentaι-y is an effort to "ιιηcονeι- the
deepeι- ωeaning of speech." It is based on tlιe assuιnption tlιat
tlιeι-e is, ίη what lιas been said, something not explicitly expι-essed
that is nonetlιeless implicitly pι-esent as the fιιndaιnental meaning
intended by those "Ι>I'ho lιave spoken. In slιoι-t, "comωentaι-y" is
the techniqιιe enψloyed by ωodern efforts at the lιenneneutic
undeι-stancling of texts.
As νve lιave seen, even in FD, Foucaιιlt sa~r tlιe need to nιove
beyond tl1is soι·t of henneneιιtic analysis of ιneaning. But, al-
thouglι FD eωployed a nonhenneneιιtic (archaeological) ωetlιod
of analysis, it clid not aι-ticιιlate a ι·eflective ιιndeι-standing of that
ιnethod. Tlιe preface to BC shows tlιat Foιιcaιιlt lιas at least begun
to develop sιιclι an ιιnderstanding. He sιιggests tlιat, as an alterna-
tive to coωωentary, it ωay be "possible to ωake a stnιctuι-al 1
analysis of discoιιι-ses tlιat νvοιιld evade the fate of coωωentaι-y by
sιιpposing η ο ι-eωaindeι-, notl1ing in excess ofwlιat has been said,
bιιt only tlιe fact of its lιistoι·ical appearance" (xvii). Sιιc!ι an ap-
pι-oaclι, he says, woιιld not constnιe tlιe ωeaning of a stateωent in
terωs of a speaker's intention; ratlιer, ωeaning 'voιιld be a fιιnc­
tion of tlιe stateιnent's ι-ole in a systeω of stateωents, cletennined
by "tlιe cliffeι-ence that articιιlates [tlιe stateωent] upon tlιe other
real οι- possible stateιnents." Heι-e Foιιcaιιlt adιιωbrates tlιe vie'v
of tlιe aι-chaeologicallevel of analysis tlιat ΑΚ ~roι-ks οιιt in detail.
He proposes tlιis sort of analysis as an altenιative to tlιe ωetlι­
ods of standaι-cl lιistoι-y of tlιoιιglιt: These metlιods lιe chaι-acteι-­
izes as eitlιeι- "aestlιetic" or "psyclιological." Tlιe formeι- 'vorks
fι-οω analogies between the vie,vs of different tlιinkeι-s, 'vlιiclι
are clιaι-ted eitlιeι- diaclυ-onically as "geneses, filiations, kinships,
inflιιences" οι- synclπonically as "ιlιe spiι-it of a peι-iod, its Weltan-
sclιauung, its fιιndaιnental categories, tlιe OI-ganization ofits socio-
cιιltural world" (xvii). In eitlιeι- case, tlιe histoι-y operates entirely
ο η tlιe level of tlιe intentional content of,vlιat lιas been said. Tlιe
psyclιological apρroach operates at the saιne level bιιt tries to
reverse tlιe apparent nιeanings of texts thι-oιιgh, fοι- examρle, a
ι. Later printings of BC omit tJ1e adject.i\'e "strιιctuι<ιl" in ιbis passage.
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 1 35
"psyclιoanalysis" of tlιought tlιat >vould sho>v lιo>v a certain
ιlιinker or age >~'as not as rational or irrational as a surface read-
ίng inclicates.2 Neither of tlιese nιetlιods allows ιιs to overconιe
the Iimitations of tlιinking of nιeaning ίη terιns of the speaker's
conscious or unconscious intentions.
In BC, tlιen, Foιιcaιιlt explicitly sets out to enιploy the soΓt of
aιτhaeological approaclι lιe lιacl, because of the exigencies of lιis
cliscιιssion, iιnplicitly developed in FD. His appΓOaclι initially par-
allels FD in its focιιs ο η botlι discuΓSiνe and nondiscιιΓsive factoΓs.
The developnιent of nιodern nιedicine is poΓtrayed as a conιplex
of ne'i\' ννays of tlιinking ancl perceiving and neV\ institιιtional7

foΓnιs. As in FD, no cleaΓ prioΓity is given to eitheΓ; the ΓefoΓιns of

tlιe eaΓly RevolιιtionaΓy periocl and tlιe first nιoves toward a new
conception of illness seeιn ιο be nιιιtιιally constitιιtive. Ho,veveΓ,
as Foιιcault's analysis progresses, it coιnes to cleal alιnost exclιι­
sively ννith the concepts (botlι substantive and nιetlιodological) of
nιedical discouΓse. TlιeΓe is a tlιoωuglι analysίs of tlιe clinical and
the anatoιno-clinical concepιs of illness and of tlιe ne>v concep-
tions of ιnedical obseΓνation associatecl with them, but veΓy little
discιιssion ofhow tlιese are related to tlιe institιιtίonal structιιΓe of
tlιe clinical hospital.
In tlιis analysis ofillness Foucaιιlt's ιnetlιod is essentially tlιat of
Cangιιillιeιn's histoι-y of concepts. As V\ e saw, Foιιcaιιlt •vas not
7

able to use this method in FD fοΓ two Γeasons. First, Classical and
(to some extent) modern vieV\7S of madness lackecl the canonical
set of concepts ancl tlιeoΓies needed to gιιicle a noΓnιative lιistoι·y
of science. But this was not so fοΓ the ωodeΓn view of disease tlιat
is the pΓimaι-y concenι of BC. HeΓe theι·e is a single, geneΓally
accepted concept of disease as an inteΓnal disoι·deΓ of the patient's
body tlιat does in fact guicle Foucault's lιistoΓical accoιιnt. Τlιιιs,
just as Canguilheω identifies Willis as the oΓiginatoΓ of the con-
cept of tlιe Γefiex, Foιιcault identifies Bichat as tlιe OΓiginatoΓ of
the nιodeΓn concept of disease. And,jιιst as Cangιιilheιn follo\Ys
later iωpoΓtant nιodifications of the concept of the Γefiex by
Asn·uc, UnzeΓ, ancl otheΓs, Foιιcaιιlt tΓaces lateι- developωents of
tlιe concept of disease by Bωιιssais. .
The second factoι· that ωoved the lιistoΓy of nιadness beyond
2. Foucault may n1ean ιο include Bacl1elard among those employing the "psycho-
Iogical" approaclι, alιhough Bacl1elard does not tγpically use his psychoanaly-
sis of knoΙvledge as a 1vaγ of ιιndennining tl1e apparent significance of scien-
tific texts.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

the Γesources of the lΊistoΓy of scientific concepts VΙ'as the neec\ to

take accoιιnt of aπ evalιιative consciousness of ωadness that l\11-
derlay the allegedlyνalιιe-neιιtι-al conceptions of ωodern psyclιol­
ogΎ a11d psyclιiatry. Το the exte11t tlιat Foucault connects ωedical
discourse to institutional pι-acιices (and hence to the valιιes iω­
plicit in thenι), lιis discιιssion does, like that ofFD, go beyond any
straightforν~raι-d applications ofCanguilheω's ωetlιod. But, as '~'e
lιave seen, this aspect receiνes progι-essively less eωphasis i11 BC,
and the final detailed analyses of both the clinical and the
anatoωo-clinical concepts ofillness are alωosι entiΓely a ιηatteΓ of
tlιe histoι-y of co11cepts.
Besides its ωethodological connections to Ca11guilheιη's his-
torical woι-k, BC also has iιηpoΓtant affinities VΙ7 ith his philosophi-
cal a11alysis of the noΓωal and the pathological (i11 ΝΡ). In fact,
BC ca11 be plausibly νiewed as pωνidi11g a historical backgωu11d
to Cangιιillιeω's philosophical discussion. Hoν~reνer, Foιιcault
does not discιιss Cangυilheω's ωai11 tlιeses (e.g., co11cerning tlιe
qualitative differences bet,veen the norωal and the patlιologi­
cal); and, oνeι·all, his historical account is consistent ν~ritlι but
strictly neutral ν~rith respect to Canguilheω's philosophical νiews
of norωs ancl tlιe norωal.
Despite the decreasing enιplιasis in BC on tlιe tie of clinical
ωedicine to tlιe new bourgeois institιιtions and νalues of tlιe
French Revolιιtion, Foucaιιlt's discιιssion does proνide sonιe basis
for a critiqιιe of tlιe ωοι-al νalιιes lιidden beneatlι tlιe alleged puΓe
objectivity and νalιιe-neιιtι-ality of ωοdeπι ωedicine. ΜοΓeονeΓ,
we get a sense of lιον~τ lιe lιiιηself 'vould caπy οιιt sιιch a aitique
fι-οιη his acid coωωents in the Preface (χiν-χν) οη the pιιrported
hιιωanity ancl coιnpassion of ιnodern ωedical tΓeatιnent and
froω tlιe ίΓΟηy oflιis discussion ofthe "contract" betνveen riclι a11d
poor that set ιιp tlιe clinical hospital. ΗονΙτeνeι-, the thrιιst of BC is
ιnuclι ιηοι-e to>vard a pιιΓely episteιnological σitique of clinical
ωedicine. Specifically, it ιιndenηines ωedicine's positiνist concep-
tion of its ιnethod as ωeΓely tlιe direct obseπation of >vlιat is
inιωediately apparent. Foucaιιlt slιoYΙ'S tlιat ν~rhat presents itself as
notlιing ηιοΓe ιlιan fidelity to 'Nhat is sinψly given to any naive
gaze is actιιally a ωode ofperception based 011 a coιnplexly stι-uc­
tured inteηπetaιive gΓid. His analysis is a splendid instance of
laying bare tlιe a pιi.ori presuppositions involνed in Γepoι-ts of
allegeclly ιιninteΓpι·eted data. As suclι, it lιas tlιe saιne geneι-al
significance as tlιe critiques of tlιe theory/obserνation distinction
 CLINICAL MEDICINE 137
develoρed at about tlιe same tίme by Englίsh-speaking plιiloso­
ρheΓS of science sυclι as Hanson, Κιιlιη, and FeγeΓabend. (How-
eνeι-, lίke Canguillιeω, Foucaιιlt sees conceρts ratheΓ tlιan theo-
ι-ies as tlιe pΓίωaΓγ ίnterρretatiνe eleιnents.)
It is iωportant to note tlιat neither aspect of his CΓitique of
ωoclenι nιedicine leacls Foιιcaυlt to deny that it is based on an
objectiνe bodγ of scίenιific knoΊvledge. Like BachelaΓcl, Ί-νlιο enι­
plιasized tlιe controlling role of Γeason in tlιe experinιents of
phγsics and cheιnistry νΙritlιοιιt denγing tlιe objectίvίty of these
discίplines, Foιιcault does not pι-esent the interpΓetative grid of
nιodern meclicine as ιιndeι-cιιtting its scientific statns. Ν οι- does he
think tlιat the νalιιe-laclenness ancl ideological content of nιedi­
cine exclυde its objectiνity .3 Ι η ΑΚ ( ι8ι), as ΊΥe slιall see, he explic-
itly notes tlιat it ΊΥουld be a nιistake to clenγ that pathological
anatomy is a science becaιιse of the connectίons of clinical medi-
cine to institutional noι-ms. Ancl he goes on to maintain tlιat, in
general, ideological significance is conιpatible with scientific ob-
jectivity. Consequently, as was the case νvith psychology and psy-
chiatry, the CΓitiqιιe of nιedicine sιιpported by BC cloes not lead to
a global Γejection of it. 4 Rather, it suggests specific Ί.vaγs of calling
into question impoΓtant aspects of its self-unclerstanding. Once
again, Foυcaι.ιlt's cήtique of reason is linιited and local, not an all-
dissolving skepticisnι.
Among historians, BC has been tlιe best ι-eceived of all Fou-
caιιlt's books. 5 There have been (entirely justified) conιplaints
aboι.ιt the often opaque style, bιιt feνΙ' serioιιs objections to his
main theses. This is no doιιbt dιιe, fiι-st, to the fact that Foucault
heι-e operates on a nιuch snιaller scale than in FD (or ΟΤ) and so
avoids the sorts of sν~reeping generalizations we find in lιis otlιer
books. Fιιrtheι·, his critiqι.ιe of nιedicine, as we have seen, prinιar­
ilγ takes the fοι-ηι of an epistemological analysis of its conceptιιal
fι-anιeνvork and does not serioιιsly challeng·e its statιιs as scientific

3· FΓanς:oisDagognet (Jike Foucaιιlt, a stιιdent of Canguillιem) crίticized BC fοΓ

taking too positive a vie'v of clinical meclicine and not developing tlιe sort of
critiqιιe that FD pι·ovided for psychiatry. Cf. 'ΆΓcheologie οιι histoire de Ja
ιnedicine," Cιitiqιιe 21 (1965), 436-47.
4· Similarly, the sanιe points 1nade in Chapter 2 about tlιe difficulties of movίng
fΓom the histOJΎ of Classical and early modern madness to a σiticίsm of
conte1nporary psychiatJΎ apply to tlιe ιιse of Foιιcat11t's history of the clinίc for
tlιe critiqιιe of cιιrrent 1nedicίne.
5· Cf., for example, revίe,vs by Karl Figlio, Britislι Journal fοτ t!ιe Hisl01)' of Science
10 (1977), 164-67, F. Ν. L. Poynte1·, Histo1J' of Scieιιce 3 (1964), 140-43, and
Stanley J. Reίseι·, Social Science andMediciιιe 10 (1976), 124.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

kησwledge. Thus, there is much less tσ ιnake cσnveηtiσηal histo-

Γiaηs uηeasy.
Fωm the pσint of Yiew σf Fσucaιιlt's σ'vη prσject, σηe majσr
flaw iη BC is its failιιre tσ fσllσw thrσιιgh ση the cσηnectiσηs,
discιιssed iη the earlieΓ paΓt σf the bσσk, bet,veeη cliηical kησνvl­
edge aηd the ησηdίscιιπiνe strιιctιιΓes (e.g., iηstitutiσηs) assσci­
ated with it. Fιιrther, eveη tσ tl1e exteηt that these cσηηectiσηs
are discιιssed, Fσιιcaιιlt fails tσ give _a clear accσιιηt σf jιιst hσw
discιιrsiye aηd ησηdiscιιrsiye factσrs are Γelated. He ησtes, fσΓ
example, that the FΓeηch Revσlutiση's effσΓts at medical Γefσrm
effected ησ fundameηtal change becaιιse they were ησt cσπe­
lated with aηy fιιndameηtal (ί.e., archaeσlσgίcal) chaηges iη
thσιιght. Real refσrm, he seems tσ say, was cσηtiηgeηt ση the
pΓiσΓ deyeJσpωeηt σf a ηew fσrm σf kησwledge (cliηical medi-
cine). Βιιt then he seems tσ pΓeseηt cliηίcal medίciηe as itself aη
σιιtcσme σf the ίnstitιιtiσnal refσrms (based ση Cabaηis's prσpos­
als) that pωdιιced the cliηical hσspital. This leaYes ιιs wσηdeΓiηg
l1σw these ΓefσΓms, aηy mσre thaη thσse ιιηdertakeη earlieΓ,
cσιι!d have effected a fιιηdameηtal tΓaηsfσrmatiση withσιιt a
pΓiω· chaηge iη the system σf medical knσwledge. UnfσΓtιι­
ηately, it is at jιιst this pσiηt that Fσιιcaιιlt tιιrηs tσ a pιιΓely
iηternal aηalysis σf cliηical discoιιrse aηd abaηdσns the qιιestoη
σf its ησηdίscιιΓsiΥe coηηectiσηs.
Fσιιcaιιlt's ηext bσσk, ΟΤ, explicitly limits itself tσ the iηteΓΠal
aηalysis σf discσιιΓse, aηd apart frσm sσme teηtatiYe methσd­
σlσgical sιιggestiσηs iη ΑΚ, Foucaιιlt dσes nσt Γetιιrn to the inteΓ­
Γelatiσηs σf tl1e discιιΓsive aηd the ησηdiscιιΓsive ιιηtil DP. All
this Γeflects the great difficιιlty he had, while develσpiηg his
archaeσlσgical methσd, iη coη1iηg tσ gι-ips with the central issιιe
σf the place σf kησwledge iη the realm σf histσrical caιιses and
effects.
ΑησtlΊeΓ limitatiση σf BC fωm Fσιιcaιιlt's oνvn pσiηt σf Yiew is
pΓecisely its ΓestΓictiση tσ a histσry σf cσncepts. This ησ doιιbt
put him ση fiΓmer grσιιηd histσrically, but it kept him fωm
develσping the cσηnectiσns σf medical discσιιΓse with σtheΓ sys-
tems σf discσιιΓSe - the sσrt σf cσηηectioηs that are esseηtial tσ
aη archaeσlσgical aηalysis. This may be 'vhat Fσιιcaιιlt has iη
miηd wheη, iη ΑΚ, he criticizes BC fσΓ tendiηg tσ "bypass ...
the leYel pωpeΓ to archaeσlσgy" (ΑΚ, 16). Ιη ΟΤ, l1σ\Ι'ever, ~s
we sl1all nσw see, the archaeσlσgical-methσd retιιrηs ίη full fσΓce.
 4
----------------------- ~ ~ ----------------------
ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS:
Ι. FRONl RESEMBLANCE
ΤΟ REPRESENT Α ΤΙΟΝ

The ultimate concern of Tl~e orde1· of tΛiτιgs (ΟΤ) is tl1e cognitive

status of the modeι·n "human sciences" or "sciences of man." Fou-
cault ωaintains that, to undeΓstand this status, •νe need to ιιnder­
stand the place of these sciences in the overall episteωological
field ofmodern knowledge. This in turn requires a grasp ofwhat
knowledge means in modern cιιlture, what forωs it takes, and
where, among these forωs, the hιιman sciences are situated. OTs
effort to achieve this understandingis based ο η several fundamen-
tal propositions. The first is that what knowledge means has var-
ied fωm one historical period to anotheΓ; specifically, in recent
Western culture, the Renaissance (roιιghly, the sixteenth cen-
tιιry), the Classical Age (froω the mid-seventeenth century to the
end of the eighteenth century), and the ModeΓn Age (froω the
beginning of the nineteenth centιιry to at least the ωiddle of the
tινentieth) have all had very different conceptions of knowledge.
Second, a given epoch's conception of knowledge is ultimately
groιιnded in its "experience of order"- that is, the fιιndamental
"''ay in which it sees things connected to one another. Fω· exaω­
ple, in the Renaissance, things ινere ordeΓed through resem-
blance, 1νhereas in the Classical Age ordeΓ 1νas a matter of rela-
tions of strict identity and diffeΓence. Third, since knowledge is

1 39
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

al,vays a ωatter of soωel1ow forωulating trιιtl1s about things, its

nature in a given periσd νvill depend on the peΓiσd's constΓual of
the natuι·e of the signs used tσ foΓn1ulate tΓuths. Fourth, since tlιe
signs ωσst inιpσΓtant for fσrιnulating knoνvledge claiωs aΓe lin-
gιιistic σnes, the natuΓe σf knoν~rledge depends ση an epσch's
cσnceptiσn σf langιιage.
AccσΓdingly, in σrdeΓ tσ ιιndeτstand the cσgnitiνe status σf tlιe
huωan sciences, '"'e need to ιιndeτstand the ωσdern cσnceptiσns
σf σΓder, signs, and langιιage. Ριιt IΌιιghly, sιιch a set σf cσncep­
tiσns, alσng with the cσnceptiσn σf knσν~rledge they entail, cσnsti­
tutes what Fσιιcaιιlt calls tlιe ej;iste?ne σf a peΓiσd. Μστeσνeτ, since
an episteωe is nσt an inνariant cιιltιιτal absσlιιte, we need to
ιιnderstand it against the backgωιιnd σf pτeviσιιs episteωes, spe-
cifically, in the case σf σιιΓ mσdeτn peτiσd, thσse σf the Renais-
sance and the Classical Age. Fωm this, '"'e can appτeciate the
σveτall stnιctιπe σf οτ. It begins 'vith a τelatively bΓief desaip-
tiσn σf the Renaissance epistenιe and the knσ,·Ι'ledge based ση it,
mσves tσ a mιιclι ωστe detailed analysis σf tl1e Classical episteιne
and knσwledge, elιιcidates the nature σf the ηισdeτη episteιne
and its knσwledge thωugh a cσmpaτisσn ν.vith that σf tlιe Classi-
cal Age, and, finally, uses tlιis ιιndeτstanding σf mσdeτn knσ,vl­
edge tσ cleteτn1ine the status of tlιe human sciences.

The Renaissance episteme

As alτeady nσted, the Renaissance, ση Fσucaιιlt's accσunt, sa'v
tlιings as σrdeι-ed thrσιιglι tlιeiτ
resemblances tσ σne anσtlιeι-.
The natιπe σf Γeseωblance (σΓ siιnilaΓity) can be appΓeciatecl by
Γeflecting ση νvl1at Fσucaιιlt pΓesents as its fσιπ pιi.ncipal fσnns:
cσnvenience, eωulatiσn, analσgy, and synψatlιy. Tlιe fiΓst cσnnσ­
tatiσn σf cσnνenience (convenientia) is spatial ρτσximity Γatlιeτ
tlιan siωilaτity. But tl1e Renaissance iclea is tlιat at "tlιe lιinge
bet,veen t'·νσ tlιings a τeseω blance aρpeaτs" ( ι8). Ι η fact, sρatial
ρτσχiωity inνσlves Γesenιblance in t'vσ 1vays. Tlιings aΓe tσgetlιeΓ
because σf an antecedent similaι-ity betνveen theιn, and they be-
cσnιe ηισι-e siιnilaτ as a τesιιlt σf theiΓ pι-σxinιity. The sσul ancl
the body pωvide a gσod exaιnρle. "τΙιe sσιιl lιad tσ be nιade
clense, heavy, and teπestΓial fσΓ Gσd to place it in ιlιe νeΓy lιeaι-t
σf ωatter. Βιιt thτouglι tlιis pωρinqιιity, the sσιιl receives the
ωσveωents σf tlιe bσdy ancl assiωilates itself to tlιat bodγ" ( ι8).
Τhrσιιg\1 τelations σf cσnvenience, eνeryt11ing in tl1e '\'σΓlcl is
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 141

li!1kecl together ίη a clΊain, eacl1 link bound to tl1ose adjacent by

Γeseωblances associatecl 111ith convenience.
The second pι-incipal fonη of Γeseιυblance is eωulation (aerι~u­
latio). Unlike convenience, it is not tiecl to sρatial proxiωity.
RatheΓ, thι-oιιgl1 it t11ings Γesemble one another eνen fι-om gΓeat
clistances, like reflections in ωiπΌΓS. Tl1eΓe aΓe, fοΓ example,
--τelations of emulation beι,veen tl1e hιιιηaη face and the sky,
bet\\ een ωan's intellect ancl God's, betν11een Ll1e featuΓes of tl1e
7

huιηan face (eyes, nose, ωοιιtl1) and vaι-ioιιs l1eaνenlγ boclies.

Like conνenience, eιηιιlation unites tl1e '"oΓld into a ''~l1ole. Βιιt
here it is ηοι a matteι- of adjacent links in a cl1ain "bιιt rat!ΊeΓ a
series of concentric circles Γefiecting and Γivaling one anotheι-"
(2 1).
WheΓeas convenience and eιnιιlation inνolνe Γeseωblances be-
tl\leen pι-opeι-ties, F oιιcault ιπesents analogy as a ιnatteΓ of ι-eseιn­
blance betν11een ι·elations. Becaιιse of tl1is, it effects ωιιcl1 ωοΓe
sιιbtle and less obvioιιs connections betν~reen tl1ing·s. Like conνe­
nience and eωιιlation, analogy unites tl1e entiι-e VΙ'OΓld, bιιt it is
clistinctiνe in tl1at it ωakes man the centeΓ of tl1is ιιnity. Tl1is is
becaιιse, fοΓ Renaissance thought, "all analogies can find one of
tl1eiΓ necessaι-γ teΓms in l1iιn .... He is tl1e great fulcrum of
pΓopoι-tions- tl1e center ιιpοη v.rhicl1 .-eflections aΓe concen-
tΓatecl ancl fι-οιη wl1icl1 they aΓe on'ce again reflected" (22, 23).
Finallγ, tlΊeΓe is synψatlη, Γeseωblance operating as a princi-
ple of spatialιηoνeωent and qualitatiνe cl1ange. It is, for exaιη­
ple, by syωpathy that heavy objects aΓe attΓacted to the eartl1 and
light tl1ings to tl1e weightless etheΓ. Moreove.-, things that ωove
thι-ough space in virtue of sγnψathγ also change tl1eiΓ qιιalities,
becoωing ωοΓe like tl1e realm into wl1ich they ωονe. FοΓ exaω­
ple, wl1en fiι-e Γises into the aiΓ, it ιιndeι-goes a seι-ies of changes
that eνentually change it into aiΓ. This illιιstΓates tl1e dangeι-oιιs
tendency of syωpathy to assiωilate ti1ings to one anotheΓ. "Left
to itself, syιnpathy ν11οιιld eventually ι-edιιce the entiι-e νvoι-ld to a
l1oωogeneoιιs ωass, to the featιιι-eless foΓm of the Same" (24).
This is pι-evented, hoννeνer, by the coιηpensating foι-ce ofantipa-
thy (illιιstΓated by natural enωities betνveen aniωals and by
heΓbal medicines that prodιιce offsetting effects), wl1ich isolates
things and ''~OΓks against their assiωilation. Tl1roιιgh the coιιn­
terbalancing play of syιηpatlηr and antipathy, things "can reseω­
ble otl1eι-s and be dΓaν11n to then1 ... v.rithoιιt being s'~rallo,ved ιιp
or losing theiι- sίngιιlaι-ity" (24-25). Foucaιιlt notes tl1at tl1e Re-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

naissance saw "the ωoveωent and dispersion created by ... the

syωpathy-antipathy pair" as giνing ι-ise to and explaining the
otheι- thι-ee fοι-ωs of reseωblance (25).
The above discussion sl1ould give us a sense of hoνv, on Fou-
cault's account, Renaissance thought ω·deι-ed tl1e v,rorld in teι-ms
of ι-elations of ι-eseωblance. The next question conceι-ns tl1e na-
tuι-e of the signs tlπough wl1ich kno,νledge of tl1e νvoΓld's ι-esem­
blances can be foι-mιιlated. Foucault aι-gues that a key featιιΓe of
tl1e Renaissance episteωe is that tl1e signs whereby tl1e resem-
blances of the world aι-e known are tl1emselves ι-eseωblances. Α
ι-esemblance fι.ιnctioning as a sign of anotheι- ι-esemblance is
called a sigιιature. As an example, Foιιcault mentions the case of
aconite, a plant that was used to treat diseases of the eye because
of a "sympathy" betν~reen it and the eye. The sign (signatιιι-e) by
νvhich we aι-e able to Γecognize this ι-elation of sympathy is the
analogy between the eyes and the seeds of tl1e plant: ''τhey aι-e
tiny daι-k globes seated in νvhite skinlike coveΓings νvhose appear-
ance is ωuch like that of eyelids coveι-ing an eye" (27). Thus, the
sign of one kind of ι-eseωblance (a sympathy) is another kind of
ι-esemblance (an analogy). This is typical of Renaissance knoν~•l­
edge. Tl1e sign of a syωpathy may be an analogy, the sign of an
analogy an eωulation, of an emulation, a convenience, of a con-
venience a sympathy once again. In tl1is (and siωilaι-) 'νays, Re-
naissance thought pursued knowledge of its world thι-ough an
unending spiral of linked resemblances, each a sign of anotheΓ.
The systeω of tl1e ν~•οι-ld and the systeω of knoνvledge of the
'νorld had, accordingly, tl1e saωe essential stι-ucture, tl1at of a
coωplex of interconnected Γeseωblances. Kno,νledge of signs in
their own right (wl1ich Foucaι.ιlt calls seωiology) and kno,νledge
of what signs tell ι.ιs about tl1e νvoΓld (l1erιneneι.ιtics) VΙ'ere col-
lapsed onto one another. The collapse, hο,νeνeι-, did not, in his
view, mean that kno,νledge and natι.ιre entirely coincided. This
would have ι·equired that each Γeseωblance in the ν~•οι-ld be its
own sign (signatιιι-e) and tl1at, in conseqι.ιence, all tnιth be iιηme­
diately appaι-ent. Instead, tnιtl1 l1ad to be soιιght thι-oι.ιgh the
endless pursι.ιit of the chain of signs.
At this point, Foιιcaιιlt is able to dra'ν sωne important conse-
quences regarding the natιn-e of kno,νledge fοΓ the Renaissance.
(Otheι-s will follow fι-ωη the specific nature of lingι.ιistic signs.)
Fiι-st, Renaissance kno,νledge is "plethoι-ic yet absolιιtely poverty-
stΓicken" (3ο). Itis pletl1oric in the sense that tl1e systeω ofreseω-
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 43
blances is endless, any one leading to an infinite chain of others.
But fοι- tl1is very ι-eason it is also poveι-ty-stricken: "The wlιole
νvoι-ld nιust be exploι-ed if even tlιe sliglιtest of analogies [foι­
exanψle] is to be jιιstified and finallγ take ο η the appeaΓance of
ceι-tainty" (30). Suι-e knoνvledge Γequiι-es an infinite accuιnulation
of successively dependent confiΓmations. Το be ceι-tain, for in-
stance, that a given relationship of sγmpathy exists, Ίνe ωaγ have
to know that a given analogy holcls; to be sιπe of tlιe analogy, we
ωay have to be sHre of an emulation, and so on. Το some extent,
tlιis difficιιlty is ovσcome by the faωous Renaissance doctrine of
tlιe ιnirroring of tlιe nιacrocosm by the miσocosm. Tl1is gιιaran­
tees that knoΊvledge of a subsγstem of tlιe Ίνorlcl can be an ade-
qιιate gυide to knoν.rledge of the ν~τhole ancl so liωits the extent of
οιιr puι-sιιit of siωilaΓities. Foιιcaιιlt notes that for lιis analγsis, in
contΓast to tlιe oι-dinaι-y vieνv, the ωicrocosm-ωacι-ocosω ι·ela­
tion is not part of the fundamental strιιctιιι-e of Renaissance
knoιvleclge but meι-elγ a "sιιΓface effect" functioning to solve a
pωblem.
Another iωpoΓtant conseqιιence concerns a feature of Renais-
sance knowledge tlιat is paι-ticularly puzzling fοι- us: its accep-
tance of magic and of erιιdition (citations of ancient aιιthorities)
on a par witlι wlιat we can Γecognize as scientific ι-ationalitγ. Even
in as late a figιιΓe as Newton, we find endιιΓing aclιieveωents in
ωeclιanics and optics disconcertingly side by side with the serious
pιιrsιιit of alchemy and bizaπe Scι-iptιιι-al exegesis. Το us, sιιch
coωbinations seeιn unstable, reflecting an ιιnfortιιnate confιιsion
that was eventιιallγ overcome by ι-ecognizing the pήority of ι-a­
tional, scientific metlιods. Βιιt, on Foucaιιlt's accoιιnt, the accep-
tance of science, ιnagic, and erιιdition on equal episteωic ternιs
folloΊvs fωηι the basic stΓuctιιre of the Renaissance episteωe. As
an example, he cites the ωagical practice of divination (foretelling
tlιe fιιtιιre from present signs), wlιich is nιerely an instance of the
interpretation of signatιιres (i.e., infeι-ence fωω a sign to a resenι­
blance it signifies) that is knoΊvledge for tlιe Renaissance. ΜοΓe­
ονeι·, since the signs inteΓpreted aι-e tlιeωselνes reseωblances
and, as sιιch, part of the world, it is Sl1Γelγ to be expected that
opeΓations caπied οιιt on or Ίνith them Ίνilllιave effects in that
νvorld. So theΓe is nothing bizaπe in, say, Paracelsιιs's claim that
snakes aι-e ι-epelled by ceΓtain GΓeek words. According to Foιι­
caιιlt, then, tlιe "Natural Magics" that historians of tlιoιιght have
encountered at the end of the si.xteenth cenωry aι-e not "a νesti-
1 44 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

gial phenomenon in the European consciousness"; they arise "be-

cause the fundamental configuration of knowledg·e consisted of
the reciprocal cross-ι·eference of signs and similitudes. The foΓm
of magic was inheΓent in this way of knoν~rledge" (33).
Similarly, it made perfect sense for Foιιcault's Renaissance to
seek knowledge of the '-vorld through the inteψretation of the
texts of ancient authors. FοΓ these texts (of ScriptuΓe and of
Greek and Roman antiqιιity) were just fuΓtheΓ sets of signs put
into the woΓld by God as indicators of tΓuth about Γesemblances.
"There is no difference between the visible maΓks that God has
stamped upon the suΓface of the earth, so that we may know its
inner secrets, and the legible woΓds that the Sσiptιπes, or the
sages of Antiquity, have set down in the books preseΓved fοΓ us
by tradition" (33). Thus, both magic and eΓUdition have a natu-
Γal place in the Renaissance conception of knowledge.
Το complete his account of Renaissance knowledge, Foιιcaιιlt
tuΓns to the status of language. As a paΓticulaΓ system of signs,
language in the Renaissance was, of couΓse, a part of the world
itself, one segment of the complexly intertwined system of resem-
blances. As a resιιlt, language '-vas studied (e.g., by Ramus) in the
same way as any other natuΓal object. Further, since language
was assiinilated to the enduΓing maΓks (signatuΓes) found on
physical objects, pΓiority was given to its wΓitten form. Foιιcault
suggests that this privileged position of VΙ7 Γitten over spoken lan-
guage is closely related to such well-knoννn Renaissance develop-
ments as the invention of movable type, the interest in ancient
manιιscripts, and the pΓiority assigned the text of ScriptιιΓe ονeΓ
Chιιrch tradition. (He says, howeνeΓ, that it is not possible to
determine which are caιιses and '~rhicl1 effects of the pΓioΓity of
WΓiting.)
The pΓimacy of writing in the Renaissance vie'-v of language
accoιιnts fοΓ t'-vo other distinctive featuΓes of kno,-vledge in this
peΓiod. The fiΓSt- again, νeΓ)' difficιιlt fοΓ ιιs to ιιndeΓstand - is
the failuΓeto distingιιisl1 between "'-vl1at is seen and what is
Γead," between directly observed facts and claίms made by possi-
bly ιιnΓeliable sources. For exanψle, in tl1e 'Nork of Ulisse Al-
dΓOνandi on "seΓpents and dragons," theΓe is "an inextricable
mixture of exact desσiption, repoΓted quotations, fables without
commentaΓy" (39). FοΓ Buffon, writing fΓom the standpoint of
the later Classical epίsteme, this made Aldro,randi's νvω·ks a
"hotch-potch" containing only a sn1all poΓtion of Γeal natural
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 45
11istory. But fοΓ Aldrovandi the distinction betνv-een the observed
and the ωerelγ Γeported, 'Nhich ωeant so ωuch to Buffon, νvas
of little significance. For hiω, natυΓal signs, directly observed,
aΓe just as ωuch >vriting (legenda) as are '''ords theωselves. Ac-
cordingly, theΓe is no particulaΓ Γeason to eιnphasize the differ-
ences bet1veen, say, the fact that an aniωal has a certain color
skin and the fact tlιat it figures in ceΓtain ωytlιs. Foucault's point
is not, it seeωs to ωe, that Renaissance natuΓalists belieyed the
myths they Γecoιιnted; there is no reason to think they weΓe
ιnοΓe credιιloιιs than people a centιιΓy and a half later οΓ that
they weΓe doing anything moΓe tlιan recoΓding the fact that
certain stories had been told. The difference bet1veen the Renais-
sance and the Classical Age- benveen Aldωvandi and Buffon-
is not about νv-hether the ωyths are true bιιt about whetheΓ in-
foΓωation about ωyths has an essentially different statιιs fωω
infoΓωation aboιιt direct obseΓvations of an aniωal. Renaissance
natιιralists >-~'ere ceΓtainly capable of understanding the distinc-
tion in question; but, becaιιse of theiΓ subsιιmption ofboth obser-
vations and'ωyths to the category of 1vΓitten signs, they had no
Γeason to give it any special Ιveight.
The second conseqιιence Foιιcaιιlt dΓaws froω the privileged
place ofwΓiting in the Renaissance is the central episteωic ωle of
c01nmentary. Given the assiωilation, via the pΓiωacy of writing, of
langιιage to natιιral "signatιιΓes," knowledge becoωes nothing
otheΓ than "Γelating one fοΓω of language to anotheΓ forω of
langιιage" (4ο). Accordingly, knowledge is inevitably expΓessed
in the "secondaΓy discoιιΓse of coωωentaη," languages inteΓ­
pΓeting langιιage. Since coωωentaΓy is itself langιιage, it too can
be coωωented on; hence theΓe is no liωit to it, no end, as Mon-
taigne said, to books aboιιt books. However, the Renaissance's
projects of coωωentaΓy aΓe ιιltiωately contωlled by the "soveΓ­
eignty of an oΓiginal Text" that 'ΌffeΓs its ιιltiωate Γevelation as
the pωωised reν~raΓd of coωωentary" (41 ). This, of cοιιΓse, is the
fιιndaωental tΓLιth of the woΓld as expΓessed by God in His
creation. Ι t is the ιιltiωate Γeality that pΓOvides the standaΓd fοΓ
the trιιth of Renaissance linguistic expressions.
Ι η sιιωmaΓy, then, Foιιcault pτesents the Renaissance episteωe
as OΓdeΓing the ννοr ld in terωs of relations of reseωblances and as
likewise construing signs as constitιιted by theiΓ reseωblance to
νvhat they signify. Langιιage (1vith νvriting giyen priωacy) then
becoωes itself a paΓt of the Ιvorld, a sιιbsysteω of Γeseωblances.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

The resιιlting conception of kno,vledge is one that places ιnagic,

erudition, and science ο η a paΓ, that ιnakes 110 esse11tial distinctio11
between direct observations a11d Γeported stories, that takes the
forιn of coωιnentary, a11d tlιat is the essentially incoωplete pur-
suit of a11 unendi11g chain of siωilarities.

Classical order
Around tlιe ωiddle of tlιe seventeenth centuι-y, there occurι·ed
what Foucaιιlt ι-egaΓds as a Γadical break witlι the Renaissance
episteωe, and Western tlιoιιglιt took 011 a fιιndaωentally differ-
ent character dιιri11g tlιe Classical Age. Tl1is ne,·Ι' structιιre of
thought (11e'v episteωe) 'νas based on a nevΙ' co11ception of lιow
thi11gs i11 the woι-ld are ω·deι-ed. The pΓinciple of orcleΓing
ceases to be reseωblance a11d becoωes relations of identity and
difference. Foιιcault finds the Classical viewpoint first fιιlly ap-
parent i11 Descaι-tes's Rules for tlιe directioπ of tlιe 1ιιi1ιd, 'νlιiclι expli-
citly presents resembla11ces as occasio11s of enω· ratlιeι- tlιa11
objects of knσ1-vledge. Α siωilaι· critiqιιe can be found in Bacon's
discussio11 of the idols of tlιe ωind, bιιt Foιιcault thinks that
Bacon, u11like Descartes, cloes not offer a metlιod for avoiding
tlιe deceptio11s of reseιnbla11ce and for bιιilding a positive body
of knowledge. He expresses the ιιneasiness of the Renaissance
with itself ratlιer tlιan tlιe new Classical vieΊ-Ι'pOil1t.
Foιιcaιιlt allows that for Descartes- and tlιe Classical Age in
geneι·al- reseωbla11ces bet,νeel1 things ιnιιst still be the starting
point of inqιιiries leading to knovΙ'ledge. But resemblances are
110 longer regaΓded as expressing the true orcler of reality, an
order tlιat is ratlιer to be fοιι11d i11 the strιιctω·e of the eleιnents
i11to whiclι tlιings and their rese111bla11ces can be analyzed. Tlιese
eleωents are related not by vague and aιnbiguoιιs reseιnblances
bιιt by strict identities and differences (prese11ce or absence of
particular propeι-ties). On the basis ofthese identities ancl diffeι-­
e11ces, eleιne11ts can be aπangecl in series (e.g., fωω tlιe siιnplest
to the ιnost coιnplex) in terιns of pΓecise criteria.
The pι-operties tlιat clιaracterize tlιi11gs a11cl e11able theιn to be
related to one a11othervia a precise systeω ofidentities and cliffeι-­
ences ιnay be qιιantitative a11d lιence expressible in teι-ιns of a
cοωωο11 u11it of ιneasureιnent. Το tlιe extent that this is so, tlιe
woι·ld (natιιι-e) 1vill fοιΉι a matheαιatical sysιeιn and οιιΓ kl1o,vl-
edge of it will be a kind of algebra. Hσ1-vever, Foιιcaιιlt ιnaintains
 Π-ΙΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 147
that the Classica1 oι-cler of tlιi11gs νιas not an essentially ωatheωati­
cal one. Ενe11 nonωathenιatical, pιιΓely qιιa1itatiνe pΓOperties
coιιld be the basis of relatio11s of strict iclentity and difference. (Α
good exanψle, ,ν)ιίclι ννe 'νl'ill cliscιιss ll10Γe fιιlly, is tlιe ordeΓing of
living things in tlιe classifications of natιιΓal history.) Conse-
qιιently, Foιιcault opposes tlιe sta11claΓd νieνΙ' tlιat finds the es-
se11ce of Classical tlιought in redιιctionist projects of nιeclιanisιn
and ωatlιematization (56). Tlιe Classical episteωe does see tlιe
'νorld as a set of elenιents oΓdered by ρrecise iclentities and cliffer-
e11ces ratlιeι- tlιan νagιιe Γeseιηblances. Βιιt tlιese identities a11d
diffeι-ences need not be- a11cl i11 nιa11y important cases 'νere not-
qua11titatiνe. Tlιe ge11eral scie11ce of oΓder (1natlιesis) to v.•lιich
Classica1 thoιιght aspired '~·as not identical 'ννith a matheιnatical
ιιndeΓsta11ding of natιπe; tlιe analysis by wlιiclι it ωονed fΓOlll
reseωblances to pΓOperly ordered elements '~ras not ι-educible to
algebι-a.
The Classical conceptio11 of tlιe ordeτ of things, eνen apaτt
froω its 11ew co11ceptio11s of signs a11d la11gιιage, 'vhiclι we '"ill
discuss belo,v, has ω<Uοτ effects on tlιe conceptio11 ofknowledge.
Foucaιιlt's fu11danιental poi11t, of coιιrse, is that k11owledge is no
longeι- a ωatter of recognizi11g reseωblances bιιt of extracting
froω reseωbla11ces precise com paΓiso11s of tlιe identities ancl dif-
ferences of tlιings' pΓOpeΓties. Fτοω tlιis he tlιinks theΓe follo'v
two ωajοΓ sets of ωodifications in what is ωeant by kno'Nledge.
FiΓst, there aΓe cha11ges in tlιe pτocess whereby knoνvledge is
attained. The pΓiωary i11strιιnιe11t of knoνΙrledge becωηes the
a11alysis of reseωbla11ces, not tlιeiτ nιeτe Γecognitio11. Ν ο Γesenι­
blance will be accepted as of a11y cognitiνe significance u11til it is
"subjected to proof by cωnparison [of identities a11d diffeι-­
ences]" (55). Conseque11tly, the ωincl's essential actiνity in knoνv­
ing is no longer tlιe connecting of things but theiΓ discι-inιina­
tio11. Its pΓimary ΓOle is 110 lo11ger to draw things together on the
basis of theiι- reseωbla11ces bιιt to separate theω 011 the basis of
theiι· diffeτences. Seco11d, tlιeι-e are changes in tlιe characteτ of
the k11owledge tlιe ωi11d attains. Becaιιse it dealt with an ιιnend­
ing chain of resenιbla11ces, Renaissance k11owledge 'vas necessar-
ily inconιplete and ωeι-ely probable. By co11trast, the eleωe11ts
Γeνealecl by Classical analysis could be completely enuωeι-ated
and exlιaustiνely ιιnderstood. Accordingly, Classical knowledge
coιιld, at least in ρrinciple, attai11 conψlete certitιιde. Fιιτther
modifications in tlιe co11ceρtion of knovΙ7 ledge aι-e tied to ne1ν
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Classical conceptions of signs and language, to which v-.re nov-.r

turn.

Classical signs and language

Foucault finds three fundamental contrasts between the Classi-
cal conception of signs and that of the Renaissance. The first
concerns the relation of signs to the human minds that deal with
them. For the Renaissance, a sign was a part of the world given
to man, like any other resemblance. It was there for us to dis-
cover, but there whether or not we did in fact discover it. For the
Classical Age, by contrast, a sign as such exists only for a know-
ing mind: "There can no longer be an unkno,vn sign, a mute
mark" (59). This means, then, that signs are no longer anteced-
ently present objects given to our knowledge but rather intrinsic
parts of knowledge itself. The locus of signs has moved from the
world to the mind. As a result, degrees of certainty (from mini-
mal probability to absolute certainty) are now intrinsic character-
istics of signs, not merely states of the minds that employ them.
Α second contrast with the Renaissance is that signs (no longer
constrιιed as resemblances) do not serve to dΓaw things together
but to separate and dispeΓse them. Tl1is is becaιιse the sign is
now essentially connected witl1 analysis. This connection is, in
fact, twofold. The sign is botl1 the result of analysis (since for an
e}ement of ΟΗΓ expeι-ience tO become a sίgn it lllUSt be diffeΓenti­
ated from the impression in 'vhich it is confιιsedly giνen) and the
instrument of analysis (which is carried out by applying signs to
fιιΓther impressions).
Thirdly, wheι-eas the Renaissance gave priority to natιπal
signs, for Classical thoιιght conνentional signs have pΓide of
place. This follo,vs fι-om the placing of signs in the mind. Ν atu-
ral signs are awk,vard and inconvenient becaιιse they typically do
not fit easily and effectiνely into the ιnind's workings. Conven-
tional signs- aΓbitι-ary in that ,-;re constnιct them but not aι-bi­
trary in that οιιι- constι-ιιction is constrained by the functions -vve
need them to peι-forω- are mιιch easieΓ to deal 'vith. The ideal
system of arbitrary signs 'Νοιιld achieve tvΙ'O compleιnentary
goals. On the one hand, it would piΌvide a fι-aιneνvoι-k fοΓ identi-
fying the simplest eleιnents οιιt of 'vhich any systeω being ana-
lyzed is composed; on tl1e other l1and, it νιοηld pΓOνide a means
of combining these elements to prodnce every possible configura-
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 49
tίon of tl1e systeιn. Fοι· us, tiΊeΓe seems to be a tension between
tl1ese t\VO fιιnctions of a sign systeιn. \•Vl1y, '"'e ιηaγ ask, shoιιld we
exρecι tl1e signs that accu.-ately pick out the actual elements
fΓOm νvl1icl1 a real sγsteιn is built to be also effectiνe logίcal instru-
ιηents for constnιcting all possible coιnbinations of these ele-
ιnents? Doesn'ι it often l1appen tl1at calculational efficiency ι-e­
quiΓes a fictional constrιιal of the system being dealt ιvitl1 (as
\vhen we find geocent.-ic astΓononτy a ιnore efficient instnιιnent
fοι- calculating ιnotions on tl1e sιιrface of the eartl1)? Βιιt, as
Foιιcaιιlt presents it, tl1e Classical eρisteme leaνes no ρlace for
sιιcl1 qιιestions, since it sees Γeality itself as ordeι-ed in tenns of
the veι-y same systeω of ι-elations (iclentities and differences) that
orcleΓ signs. Becaιιse of tlΊis, a sign system bιιilt fιΌω priιnitives
that adeqιιately conesρond to tl1e basic eleιnents of tl1e \voι·ld
νvoιιlcll1ave exactly the saιne logical st.-uctω·e as tl1e 'voι-ld.
Tl1is last point bι-ings ιιs to the fιιndaωental qιιestίon of tl1e
.-elation of Classical signs to \VI1at tl1eγ signifγ. Accoι·ding to Foιι­
caιιlt, for the Renaissance tl1is Γelation \vas, as νve l1ave seen,
reseωblance. Jιιst as things in tl1e world resembled one anotl1eΓ,
so signs resen1bled what tl1ey signified. Indeed, as ι-eseωblances,
signs ιve.-e siιnρly ρart of tl1e world tl1ey signified. For Classical
tl1oιιgl1t, bγ contrast, l1e l1olds tl1at signs are ontologicallγ sepa-
rated fΓΟιη the \VOι-ld ancl instead exist in an iclealιnental ordeι-.
Βιιt Foιιcault also aι-gιιes tl1at, preciselγ becaιιse they aΓe onto-
logically seρaι-ated, Classical signs as sιιch are diΓectly Γelated to
\Yhat tl1ey signify, v.ritl1oιιt any inteι-ωediary sιιch as a Γeseιn­
blance to the signified. Wl1etl1eΓ or not a sign haρρens to ι-eseιn­
ble what it signifies, it directly τep1·ese1ιts it in tl1e νvay that an idea
represents its object. In fact, Classical signs aι-e ideas (οι- siιnilaΓ
ιnental reρresentations sιιcl1 as ρeι-ceρtions, iιηages, ΟΓ sensa-
tions). (Foιιcault, folloνving Classical ν,rι-iters, 'ιl'ill also sρeak of
ιηaterial things sιιcl1 as ιnaρs and ρictιπes as signs, bιιt pΓesιιιη­
ably tl1is is only in νiΓtιιe of tl1eiι- ι-elations to tl1e conψlexes of
ideas tl1at tl1ey instantiate.) Ho,veνeΓ, a sign is not ιηeι-ely an idea
ΟΓ otl1eΓ ιηental ι-eρι-esentation. An idea is a srgn only on tl1e
condition tl1at "it ιnanifests ... the ι-elation tl1at links it to νvl1at it
signifies" (64). In otheΓ 'ι\7 oι-cls, the sign "ιηιιst Γeρi·esent; bιιt tl1at
ι-eρresentation, in tιιrn, n1ιιst also be Γeρ.-esented 'ιl7 ithin it" (64).
Foιιcaιιlt recognizes, accoΓdingly, t\νο essential featuι-es of a
Classical sign in Γelation to \Yhat it signifies. Fiι-st, it signifies its
object by ι-epΓesenting it ancl, indeecl, "l1as no content, no fιιnc-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tion, and no determination other than VΙ'hat it Γepresents" (64).

In contrast to a Renaissance sign, νvhich signified in νirtιιe of the
similarity of its intrinsic content to the content of what it signi-
fied, the Classical sign directly ("transparently") represents the
content of the object it signifies. Second, "tlιis content is indi-
cated only in a representation that posits itself as such ... " (64).
This is νvhat Foucault means by speaking of the Classical sign as a
"duplicated representation" (65). It is "doubled oνer on itself' in
the sense that it refers to its O"\\'ll repι-esentatiνe function. Fou-
cault suggests that both these featιιres are particularly apparent
in maps or pictures (or the ideas they express), which the Port
Royal Grammar gives as primary examples of signs. Α map or a
picture is exhausted in its representation ofits object; eνery prop-
erty that it has (pι-ecisely as a map or a picture) coι-responds to ·
some aspect of what it represents. And maps and pictures, by
their veι-y natures, present themselves as signs of something else;
a map is necessaι-ily a map of some region, a picture a poι-tι-ayal
of some peι-son or thing.
According to Foucault, the distinctive nature of Classical signs
entirely excludes certain questions about signification that otheι­
periods find natιιral and eνen necessaι-y. He says, for example,
that "in the sixteenth century, one asked oneself how it was
possible to knoνv that a sign did in fact designate what it signi-
fied" (42). The Classical Age abandons this question and instead
begins "to ask how a sign could be linked to νvhat it signified"
(43), a question that still occupies modern thought. On the otheι­
hand, Classical thought excludes fundamental modern questions
about what signification is, since it "precludes even the possibility
of a theory of signification" (65).
These claims are initially pιιzzling, bιιt ιιnderstanding them
clarifies important featιιres of Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt of the Classical
conception of signs. Ι pωpose the follOVΙ'ing interpretation of his
cryptic comments. The reason the Classical Age no longer asks
how we can knoΙ'I that a sign designates >vhat its sίgnifies is that
this qιιestίon presιιpposes that theΓe is soιnethίng in addition to
the sign and the signified in νirtue of \vhich the former signifies
the latter. For the Renaissance, a sign signified ίη virtιιe of its
resemblance to \vhat it signified. Since we might have doιιbts
aboιιt the existence of tlιis reseωblance (e.g., aboιιt 'vhether
there really is an analogy betVΙ•een aconite seeds and hιιman
eyes), it is appωpriate to ask hOVΙ' ΙΙ'e kno1v tlιat a sίgn does in fact
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF τHINGS Ι

signify Ί<νhatit seems to. Βιιt fοι· the Classical Age, there is no
inteΓmediaι-y suclι as resemblance betΊ<Ι'een sign and signified.
The sign diι-ectly repι-esents Ί<νhat it signifies and, moreover,
presents itself pι-ecisely as so representing. For tlιis ι-eason, tlιeι-e
is no basis for doυbting Ίνhetl1er it in fact signifies what it seems
to; the "tι-anspaι-ency" of tlιe sigiL guarantees it. On tl1e other
hand, pι-eci.sely because tl1ere is no tenn interιnediate betΊveen
sign ancl signified, it is appropΓiate to ask hoΊv tl1e t>νο can be
linked. Tl1e answer reqιιiΓes an analysis of representation, show-
ing lιοΊ<ν its natιιre peΓmits the diΓect connection of tννο teι-ms
Ίvitl1 η ο role fοΓ ~!_eτtiu7ι~_ qιιi~- sucl1 as ι-eseinblance.
Βιιt if Classical thoιιgl1t appeals to tl1e natιιι-e of repι-esenta­
tion to ιιndeι-stand tlιe link betΊveen sign and signified, how can
it exclιιde the possibility of a tlιeoι-y of signification? In Classical
terms, after all, signification- tl1e fιιnction peι-fonned by a
sign- is pι-ecisely representation. How can tl1eι-e be an analysis
of the natuι-e of ι·epι-esentation but no theory of repι-esentation
(signification)? Tl1e ansΊver tuι·ns on tlιe meaning Foιιcaιιlt gives
here to tlιe01y. Ι sυggest tl1at l1e ιιndeι-stancls it to involve not an
analysis of the natιιre of repι-esentation bιιt rather an account of
how representation originates- tl1at is, of l1ow consciousness
comes to l1ave a capacity to form repι-esentations. Tl1is latter
question is pointless fωm a Classical vieννpoint, fοι- ννl1icl1 all
conscioιιsness (thoιιght) is necessarily representative. The qιιes­
tion pι-esιιpposes that "signification [ι-epresentation] ... is a de-
terminate form in our consciousness" (65) tl1at needs to be
accounted for by some specifying caιιse (e.g., soιne "specific activ-
ity of consciousness," 66). Classical thoιιght denies this, since it
holds the conscioιιsness' as s1ιclt provides ι-epι-esentations of
things. It is only at the end of the eigl1teenth century, ννith Kant
and tlιe beginning of the modern episteme, tl1at consciousness is
no longeι- regarded as intι-insically repΓesentational and qιιes­
tions aι-e raised as to how the mind is able to foι-m thougl1ts that
ΓepΓesent objects.
It needs to be emphasized that such qιιestions aι-e not tl1e same
as those that conceι-n tl1e actιιal existence of the objects con-
ceived by thought. The latter ννeι-e obviously ι-aised - and in very
ι-adical forms- by Classical philosopheι-s froιn Descartes on. But
eνen in asking these questions, Classical thinkers took for gι-anted
that the mind's tlιoughts had a coheι-ent representational content,
even if the objects of ι-epι·esentation ν~•ere tl1emselves merely
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

other tlιougl1ts. Τ!ιιιs, when Descartes asked if tlιere really is an

external ιvoι-ld con-esponding to our thoιιglιts of one, lιe presup-
posed that those thoughts at least Γepresented tlιe sense impres-
sions that '"'e ordinarily regard as of material things. Witlι Kant,
lιo,νever, tlιe representational clιaracter of thoιιglιt is no longer
taken for granted. Α repι-esentation of sense inψressions by
tlιouglιt requiι-es a syntlιesis of them by tlιe mind, and tlιe possibil-
ity of such a syntlιesis does not follo'ν merely froω the nature of
consciousness as such. Only a conscioιιsness that is appropriately
stnιctιn-ed (by, for exanψle, tlιe forms of sensibility and tlιe cate-
gories of tlιe ιιnderstanding) ι~rill be able to achieve the syntlιesis
and tlιιιs ι-epι-esent objects. Even a successful Cartesian aι-gωnent
for the existence of the exteι-nal objects tlιat ιve find ourselves
tl1inking of ι~rill not explain ι~r!ιat it is that enables ιιs to think of
sιιch tl1ings at all. And if Foιιcaιιlt is Γiglιt, Classical thoιιght is not
even able to seek sιιch an explanation becaιιse it cannot conceive
of thoιιght as other tlιan representative.
Το sιιm ιιp my interpretation of Foιιcaιιlt's often obscιιre ac-
coιιnt of Classical ι-epresentation: For the Classical Age, repre-
sentation is tlιe necessary fonn of all thoιιglιt, so that thoιιglιt
can never "step back" fΓOm it ancl ιιnderstancl it in ternιs of
anything else. Tlιere is, in otlιer '-voι-ds, no possibility of treating
representation itself as one of tlιe elements of an orderecl system
and tlιereby ιιnderstancling it in tenns of its relationslιips of
identity ancl clifference to the otlιer elements. Βιιt this is sinψly
to say tlιat repι-esentation itself cannot be represented. It is tlιe
point fΓΟηι ιvhich any Classical thoιιght originates and ι~r!ιiclι,
acconlingly, cannot bejιιst anotlιer object of that tlιoιιglιt. Tlιis,
of coιιrse, is not to say that Classical tlιoιιght νvas ιιna,νare of its
own representational clιaracter οι- even that it coιιlcl not develop
analyses ("tlιeoι-ies") of representation in the sense of clescι-iρ­
tions of the eleιnents ancl types of ι-epresentation. Βιιt ιvlιat ιvas
not possible was for Classical thoιιglιt to represent tlιe νery act of
representation- tlιat is, to regaι-d tlιis act, 'vhiclι constitιιtes all
tlιouglιt, as jιιst one ele1nent among otheι-s in an ordered series
(e.g., a table of the facιιlties of the nιind).
Foιιcaιιlt illustrates this Classical nonreρresentability of ι-epre­
sentation tlιroιιgh lιis ingenioιιs and tοrtιιοιιs analysis of Velaz-
qιιez's Las i\tleninas in Clιapter ι of ΟΤ. He begins ιvitlι a cletailecl
discussion of the painting's spatial stnιctιιι-e, shoιving ho'~' at
eνeι-y level tlιis strιιctιιre is bιιilt aΓOιιncl a single point outside
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 53
tl1e painting. Tl1is is tl1e point that is, ιnost obνiously, occιιpied
by ιιs >Ι'l1ο aι-e looking at tl1e painting. Βιιt it is also the point at
wl1icl1 tl1e anist ιηιιst haνe stood in painting it, and tl1e point
νvheι-e, by the spatial logic of the painting, 'Ne ιηιιst place tl1e
ωodels (the King and Qιιeen of Spain) tl1at tl1e painteΓ poι-­
tι-ayed on the canνas is painting. Eacl1 of tl1e thΓee figιπes ''lo-
cated" at this focal point of tl1e painting coιτesρonds to one
eleωent in tl1e pωcess of ΓepΓesentation: the King and Qιιeen to
tl1e object ΓepΓesented, tl1e painteΓ to tl1e subject ΓepΓesenting,
tl1e spectatoι- to the sιιbject νie>ving tl1e ΓepΓesentation. FιιΓtheΓ,
all thΓee of tl1ese eleιnents aΓe tl1eωselνes ΓepΓesentecl in tl1e
painting as, Γespectively, tl1e iιηag·e Γeflected in the ιηiηΌΓ on tl1e
back 'vall, tl1e self-poΓtΓait of tl1e aι-tist, and tl1e ιnan standing at
tl1e back dooι-,νay. Ηο,νeνeι- none of tl1e tlυ-ee aΓe poι-tι-ayed as
peΓfonηing tl1eiΓ Γole i11 ι-epΓesentatiol1. Tl1e painteΓ and tl1e
spectatoΓ appeaΓ, bιιt not in fι-ont of tl1e pictιιΓe, wheΓe tl1ey
ιnιιst be >vhen actιιally painting οΓ viewing. Tl1e ωodels aρpeaΓ
only in ιηiποΓ iιηage and not as objects of tl1e painteΓ's gaze. Tl1e
painteΓ's and tl1e spectatoΓ's ΓOles could be poΓtΓayed only by
pιιtti11g tl1e111 as Γeflections in tl1e ωiποι-, bιιt tl1en ·tl1ey woιιld
not be diι-ectly repΓesentecl in the pictιπe. Tl1e ιnodels aι-e repι-e­
sented as tl1ey look to tl1e painteΓ, bιιt tl1ey aΓe pΓesent only as
Γeflections ancl not in the positio11 they ιnιιst occιφy to be objects
of tl1e painteΓ's gaze. Accoι·dingly, Velazqιιez's ρainti11g ca11 be
ι-egaΓdecl as a Classical effoι-t to ι-epΓesent ι·epΓese11tatio11. As
sιιch, it does sιιccessfιιlly portΓay all tl1e sepaΓate eleωe11ts tl1at
aΓe involνed i11 Γepι-ese11tatio11. Βιιt it fails- 11ot tl1ΓOιιgl1 a11y
inadeqιιacy of Velazqιιez's aΓt bιιt becaιιse of the logic of the
sitιιation- to ΓepΓesel1t a11y of tl1ese eleιηe11ts i11 its pΓecise Γole
i11 tl1e pΓOcess of ι-eρι-ese11tation. Foιιcault's sιιggestio11 is that ti1is
coιτesρonds to a11 essential featιπe of the Classical Age: TheΓe
was i11 pΓil1ciple 110 'νay of"tl1eωatizi11g" (explicitly ι-epι-ese11ti11g)
the act of ι-epι-esentatio11 itself.
Coπespondi11g to the 11e'ν Classical νie'ν of sig11s in geneι-al,
theι-e is, Foucaιιlt ωai11tai11s, a new νiew of tl1ose paΓticulaΓ signs
tl1at ωake ιιp la11gιιages. As signs, vωΓds 110'" belo11g to a sepa-
ι-ate ontological Γealω. La11guage is 110 lo11ger i11teΓtν~ri11ecl with
tl1e ΥΙ'ΟΓld, a ι-eality of the saιne natιπe as tl1e tl1ings it sig11ifies. It
ceases to ι-eseωble and instead ι-epΓesents, 'νl1icl1 ιnea11s tl1at
"discoιιι-se 'νas still to l1ave the task of speaki11g that ν~rhicl1 is, bιιt
it was 110 longeΓ to be anytl1ing ιηοΓe tl1an 'νl1at it said" (43). τlΗ~
1 54 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

representatiσns σf language express a cσntent that they them-

selves dσ nσt pσssess. An inψσrtant epistemolσgical conseqιιence
is that erudition ceases tσ be a form σf knowledge. This is be-
cause words can ησ lσnger be regarded as natural signs forming
a part σf the wσι-ld, included in it as marks σf the truth. 'Ίt is the
task of 'vσrds to translate the truth if they can; bιιt they no
longer have the right tσ be considered a mark σf it. Language
has withdrawn frσm the midst of beings themselves and has
entered a periσd of transparency and neιιtrality" (56). This new
status σflanguages alsσ explains why, in the Classical Age, natιι­
ral histσry, for example, ceases tσ include what has been said
abσut an animal (myths, and so ση) as knowledge abσιιt it.
Foιιcaιιlt sees the transition fι·on1 the Renaissance to the Classi-
cal view σf language expressed in Ceι-vantes's Don Qui.xote. Part 1
σf the novel exhibits the folly of seeking resemblances in a "''orld
where they have no place. Don Qιιixote, in gσσd Renaissance
fashiσn, believes the books he has read '\-vill blend ίη with reality,
that "\-\•riting is still "the prσse σf the wσrld." Βιιt this is ησ longer
sσ: "Resemblances and signs have dissσlved their former alli-
ance; similitιιdes have become deceptive and verge upon the
visionary or madness ... ; words wander σff ση their own with-
oιιt content ... " (47-48). Βιιt while Part 1 ex11ibits the failιιre of
the Renaissance cσnceptiσn of languag·e, Part 2 reveals a new
pσweι- σf langιιage. For, as Don Qιιixσte meets peσple who have
read Part 1 and recognize him as the hero of the book, he comes
tσ achieve his own pι·σper reality as a literaιΎ character. "Dσn
Quixσte has achieved his reality- a reality he owes to langιιage
alone, and which resides entirely inside the 'vσrds" (48). This
corresponds tσ tl1e s"\-\•itch from language as part of the world,
wσven into the systeω σfresemblances, tσ language as an aιιtono­
mσus system σf repι-esentation.
Foucault presents this new statιιs of language as entailing an
impoι-tant change in the statιιs oflanguage about language. Dιιι-­
ing the Renaissance, as 've l1ave seen, this took tl1e form of com-
?nenta?y, a cσntinιιal pι-obing of the depths of language's intrinsic
meaning content. But for the Classical Age, the ιneaning of lan-
guage is entiι-ely exhausted in its repι-esentative fιιnction, with
the ι-esιιlt that the only qιιestiσns about it concern hσw it per-
fσrms this fιιnction. Such qιιestions belong tσ what Foιιcault calls
the domain of critiώm rather than coιnmentaιγ Criticism co,•ers
such issιιes as the critique of available vσcabιιlaries as bases of
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 55
science and philosophy, the analysis of the relative values of
varioιιs lingιιistic
devices (e.g., syntactical forms, rhetoι-ical fig-
ιιres) for canying οιιt the function of repΓesentation, and the
relation of special languages (e.g., that of SσiptιιΓe) ·ιο their
representational content. Wheι·eas commentary "sacralizes" lan-
gιιage by treating it as a foιιnt of "\Yisdom, σiticism 'judges ...
and profanes" it by tι-eating language as a mere means of express-
ing truths independent of it (81).

Classical knowledge
Now that we have sιιrveyed Foucault's account of the Classical
conceptions of order, signs, and language, we are in a position to
sketch his view of the geneΓal stι-uctιιre of knowledge during the
Classical Age. The overall project of knowledge is that of achiev-
ing a "general science of order"- that is, a lingιιistic representa-
tion of things that places them in series according to the identities
and differences existing among their propeι·ties. The appωpri­
ate expression of such a representation is a table (like the tables of
genera and species developed by natιιral history) that lays οιιt all
the categories ofbeing and places each thing in its proper place.
Foucault distinguishes two important divisions οΓ poles of the
general science of oΓder. The first is nιathesis, the part of the
science of order that deals with "the ordeΓing of simple natιιres"
and employs an algebraic method of analysis. Mathesis handles
those aspects of reality that are susceptible to a qιιantitative,
mathematical treatment. (Here Foucault is using?natlιesis in a nar-
rower sense than he does when he employs it as the name of the
g·eneral science of ordeι-.) The second divίsion is taxinonιia, νvhich
deals with "the oι-dering of complex natιιres"- tlιat is, of things as
they occur in the natural ordeι- of our experίence (72). Taxinomia
provides a qualitative o.-deι-ing of things and is the method used
by the "enψirical" (i.e., nonmathematical) sciences oftlιe Classical
Age that we will discuss in some detail belo~\'.
But the mathesis and taxinomia that comp.-ise the general
science of order do not, ση Foιιcault's view, exhaust the domain
of Classical knoνvledge. For the methods they employ presup-
pose that there has alΓeady been a preliminaητ ordeι-ing of the
impΓessions from wl1ich οιιι· efforts to attain kno'l'ledge ιnust
always begin. HeΓe νve need to ι-ecall that, even thongh the Classi-
cal episteme deprives resemblance of a central role in knowledge
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

and signification, it does not entirelγ elminate it. Resemblance

still remains as "an indispensable bω·deι- of knovvledge" (67).
Specificallγ, the flux of impressions fι-om which we inevitablγ
begin coιιld not be oι-derecl at all if some inψι-essions dicl not
resemble otlιers. Kno>~•ledge begins >~•itlι our recognition of re-
semblances among impressions and the consequent connection
(ordering) of them in the iωagination. Ylιus, at the verγ root of
our knowledge aι-e the coπesponding factoι-s of ι-eseωblance
and iωagination (i.e., the ωind's povveι- to ι-ecognize ι-eseιn­
blances and connect impΓessions in tenns of them).
Knowledge of the process >~•heι-eby iωagination transfoΓωs
the flιιχ of inψΓessions into a p:ι;-eliωinaΓilγ ordeΓed seΓies is the
doωain of what Foιιcaιιlt calls ge1ιetic a11al)'Sis (or ge11esis). He
presents this aΓea of inqιιiry as a ωajor concern of philosoplιers
froω Locke to the Ideologues. It united t'vo coωpleωentary
areas of analysis. One, the a1ιal)'Sis of ηαtιιτe, "gives an accoιιnt of
the reseωblances benveen tlιings ... befoΓe their redιιction to
ordeΓ" (6g). The otheι·, the a11al)'tic of i1ιιagination, shOVΙ'S lιo'v the
imagination is able to oΓder the flιιχ of siιnilaι- iωpΓessions and
thιιs provide a basis fοι- the fuΓther ordeΓings of taxinomia and
mathesis. Genetic analysis tlιιιs provides tlιe philosopl1ical foun-
clation and jιιstification for tlιese two enterprises and witlι tlιeιn
compΓises tlιe entire body of Classical knowledge.
Witlι tlιis account of tlιe geneΓal strιιctιιΓe of kno,vledge, Foιι­
cault completes his delineation of the Classical episteme. His
next step is to ιιndertake detailed stιιdies of three paι·ticιιlaΓ
domains of Classical kno,vledge: geneι-al gΓamωaΓ, natιιι-allιis­
toΓy, and tlιe analγsis of vvealth. All three of these aΓe, lιe re-
ωinds ιιs, subdomains of taxinoωia; that is, theγ undeι-take qιιali­
tative oΓdeΓings of the conψlex Γeιπesentations belonging to
specific Γegions of οιιr expeΓience of the woΓlcl. Ι η this sense tlιey
are empiι-ical Γatheι- than ιηathematical disciplines. One of Foιι­
cault's Γeasons fοι- focιιsing on them as examples is no doιιbt tlιat
they exhibit the strιιctιιΓe of the Classical episteωe in a paι-ticιι­
laΓly cleaΓ Yνay. Βιιt even moΓe impoΓtant is tlιe fact tlιat tlιese
thΓee aΓeas of kno,vleclge aΓe extΓenιely valuable fοΓ the com-
paι-ative undeΓstanding of the philology, biology, and economics
that emeι·ge in tlιe context of the ωocleι-n episteιne and tlιat, as
've slιall see, exercise an essential ΓOle in tlιe foΓmation of tlιe
hιιιnan sciences. We ιuηι, ιhen, to Foιιcaιιlt's analysis of tlιe
Classical dίsciplίnes tΓeating langιιage, liνing things, and >νealth.
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 57
General grammar
FοΓ the Classical Age, langιιage is identified v.•itlι discoιιΓse­
tlιat is, "reρresentation [thouglιt] itself ΓeρΓesented by veΓbal
signs" (81). But v.•hat is tlιe sρecial featιιΓe of lingιιistic ΓeρΓesen­
tation that "distingιιislιes langιιage fΓΟιn all otheΓ signs and en-
ables it to ρlay a decisiνe ΓOle in ΓeρΓesentation?" Accoι-ding to
Foιιcaιιlt, it is the fact that langιιage "analyses repΓesentations
accoΓcling to a necessarily sιιccessive order" (82). This οι-deι- is
foι-eign to that of tlιoιιglιt in itself, for thoιιglι "tlιoιιglιts sιιcceed
one anotlιer in tinιe, ... each one foΓιns a ιιnity" in wlιiclι tlιere
are no discernible tenιpω-al cliνisions. Βιιt in langιιage tlιe cliffeι-­
ent eleιnents of a tlιoιιglιt ιnust be expressed sιιccessively. "Το
ιny gaze, 'tlιe bι-iglιtness is νvitlιin the ΓOse'; in ωy discoιιrse, Ι
cannot avoid its coιning eitheι- before or afteι- it" (82). It is pre-
cisely this featιn-e of langιιage tlιat is tlιe focus of "tlιat ne'~'
episteιnological domain tlιat the Classical Age called 'geneι-al
gι-aιηιηaι-,' "'vlιiclι Foucaιιlt defines as "tlιe stιιdy ofverbal orcleι­
in its relation to tlιe simultaneity tlιat it is its task to reρresent"
(83, eιnplιasis oιnittecl). General gι-ammar 'vas of ρarticιιlar im-
ρoι-tance for Classical plιilosoplιy because tlιe discoιιι-se it stud-
ied ("natιιι-al language") is οιιι- fiι-st ("spontaneous and un-
tlιoιιglιt-out") analysis of tlιouglιt. "It constitιιted, as it were, a
plιilosophy inlιeι-ent in the ιnind ... and one tlιat any plιiloso­
plιy had to woι-k thι-oιιgh if it νvas to ι-ediscoνeι- ... tlιe necessaιγ
and eνident ordeι- of ι-epι-esentation" (83-84).
Foιιcaιιlt enιphasizes that geneι-al graιnmaι- is not an effoι-t to
discoveι- gι-anιmatical structuΓes conηnon to alllanguages. Tlιeι-e
is, in fact, a cliffeι-ent general gι-aιnmaι- fοι- each lιuωan lan-
guage. Tlιe "geneι-ality" of these graωιnars consists in tlιe fact
tlιat tlιey explicate tlιe fundaιnental systenι of repι-esentation
that ιιndeι-lies all tlιe gι-anυnatical ι-ules of a given langιιage. Α
geneι-al gι-aωωar aiωs at establishing "the ta:.:ono1ny of eaclι lan-
gιιage," the "systeιn of identities and diffeι-ences" tlιat defines its
particular mode of ι-epι-esentation and provides "tlιe basis, in
eaclι of tlιeω, for tlιe possibility of discourse" (gι ). Sρecifically,
any geneΓal gι-aιnιnar can be ιιnderstood in teΓms of tlιe fouι- key
features of a language's reρι-esentative fιιnction: attι-ibution, aι-­
ticulation, designation, ancl derivation. These featuι-es aι-e ηοι
al,vays the exρlicit focιιs of the tlιeories of ρarticιιlar geneΓal
gι-aωmarians. Foιιcault's discussion of geneι-al gΓaωnιar consists
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

not in a survey of sιιch theω·ies bιιt in an analysis of the structure

of any general grammaι- as it is determined by the above four
featureso
According to Foucault, a necessary cσndition for any 1inguistic
representation of thought is the connection of two ιnental rep-
resentations- that is, tl1e att1-ib1ιtion of one to the othero Tl1is is
achieved in a proposition by tl1e veι-b's affirιnation of the coexis-
tence (in thought) of tl1e two representationso This affirιnation is
the essential function of the verb, and accoι-dingly the basic foι-ce
of every verb is that of to be (though of couι-se a given verb ιnay
also exercise fιn-ther functions of adjectival attι-ibution, expι-es­
sion of tenses, and so on)o The being asserted by verbs in tl1is
function is not that of extΓamental ι-eality but meΓely that of
connection οΓ coexistence in thought. This is the fιιndamental.
ιneaning of attΓibutiono
Foucault points out that, of itself, tl1e veι-b's connection of tvvo
ι-epΓesentations says nothing about the specific content of those
representationso This content is provicled by '"'oΓds (in the fiι-st
instance, nouns) that naιne vvhat is contained ih a given Γepι-esen­
tationo The process wl1ereby diffeι-ent worcls expι-ess clifferent
repι-esentational contents is art:ιtulatio11o In tl1eory, of course, ev-
ery noun could be a pΓOper ηοιιη, giving a unique naιne to,the
coιnplex unitγ of content pι-esent ίη eacl1 clifferent repι-esenta­
tiono But langιιage tl1at is of any l1uιnan valιιe needs nouns tl1at
clesignate ι-epΓesentations in a more geneι-al v.raγo This leads to
two soι-ts of articιιlationo The fiι-st is "hoΓizontal aι-ticιιlation,"
>vhicl1 gΓOups "togetl1er indivicluals that have ceι-tain identities ίη
comωon and separates those tl1at are diffeι-ent," thιιs yielding
vaι-ious comιnon noιιnso The seconcl is ''vertical articιιlation,"
whereby we distingιιish "entities that sιιbsist bγ tl1eιnselves froιn
those ο ο ο [eogo, qιιalities] that one can never ιneet in aπ indepen-
dent state," tl1us .obtaining adjectives, adveι-bs, and so ση, ίη
addition to noιιns (97) 0

ΤhΓΟιιgh theoι-ies of attribιιtion and articulation, a general

gι-amιnaι- provides an account of the stι-ucture of a language con-
sidered as an aιιtonoιnous systeιn. Βιιt of course the point of a
systeιn of representation is to repι-esent sometl1ing oιιtside itself.
Specificallγ, tl1e names of a language do no1jιιst delineate a coιn­
plex system of contents; they clenote objects existing outside lan-
gιιageo Α geneι·al gι·ammaι-'s tι-eatment of designation and deι-iva­
tion covers this essential aspect of langιιage as denotation.
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 59
According to Foucault's analysis of general grammar, the lin-
guistic function of desig12ation originates in the initial association
of the cries and otl1er sounds that people naturally emit in ceι-­
tain situations to objects involved in those sίtuatίons. Thus, a
peΓson will naιιn-ally give a cι-y of pain when hit by a falling tΓee
bΓanch. Such cries are "tl1e effect and consequence of ΟUΓ animal-
ity" and are not ίη theιnselves tl1e signs of anytl1ing. But tl1ey aΓe
bίological universals in tl1at they "clepend solely ση the con-
formation of our oΓgans" and so will be the same in all hιιmans.
As a result, soωeone can associate anotl1er's cι-y "with the saωe
repΓesentations tl1at have ... accompanied 11is own cries" (105).
When this occurs, the cι-y begins to functίon as a linguistίc sign
(and similar processes occur in more complex 'vays). In this way,
langιιage originates fωm a "langιιage of action," developing out
of natιιι-al huωan responses to events in tl1e world. Βιιt it be-
coωes langιιage pωpeι-ly speaking only to the extent that it de-
tacl1es itself fωω the woΓld, thι-ough tl1e universalizing process
that ωakes a cι-y not meΓely a cι-y (i.e., meι-ely a biologίcal re-
sponse). The origin of langιιage froιn the langιιage of actίon
explains botl1 its essential arbitrariness and tl1e nonetl1eless close
connection of words to wl1at tl1ey naωe. Language is arbitrary
because "cries ancl otl1er ηaιιιι·al reactions νΙrill, in general, have
no identity of content ... with what tl1ey designate" bιιt merely
''ι·elations of siωultaneity and succession" ( 106). Ο η the other
hand, the basic linguistic signs are linked to 'vhat they designate
in virtιιe of facts aboιιt our biological condition (e.g., our propen-
sity to cry out when in pain). Theι·efore, there is a stωng caιιsal
tie (at tl1e fundamental level) betνveen woι-ds and tl1eίι- objects.
On the basis of the above analysis of the language of action,
general grammaι- develops a theoι-y of roots. Roots are 'Ί-udimen­
tary wω::αι," found in many if not alllanguages, that have been
"imposed upon langιιage by nature in the form of ίnvoluntary
cries spontaneously employed by the language of action" (107).
Βιιt, beyond thίs orig·in, roots have been specifically selected by
people as part of tl1eir langιιages becaιιse of petceived resem-
blances to what they designate. For example, a particular root
may be chosen because of an onomatopoetic resemblance to a
sound it designates, or a root involving an r may be regaι·ded as
ι-esembling the "harshness" of the color red. By means of thίs
process of selection on tl1e basis of resemblance, each langιιage
comes to have a set of basic ι-oots from whίch the rest of its vωι-ds
 160 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

aΓe deΓived. These ι-oots aΓe the basis of tlιe langιιage's tie to a
Γeality outside itself and hence to its poweΓ of designation.
Οιιι· langιιages lιave, of cοιιΓse, gΓeatly cleveloped fΓΟηι theiΓ
pΓimitive ωots. Ν ot only have tlιe foΓms of ννοΓds changed, bιιt
so lιave theiΓ mea11ings. Tlιis pι·ocess wheΓeby the nιeanings of a
language lιave developed,, "''ith increasing· subtlety ancl C011ψl~x­
ity, fΓΟηι tlιe meanings of its initial rootS, is -ivlιat Foιιcaιιlt calls
deτivation. Το eaclι stage of deΓiνatio11, theΓe coπespo11ds a ne'v
level of tlιe langυage's articιιlation. General granιnιaΓs enιpha­
size the ΓOle όf wΓiting in tlιe pΓOcess of cleΓivation. They pιιt
paΓticιιlaΓ stΓess 011 tlιe fact that alphabetical fοπιιs of "1-νriti11g (as
opposed to "figιιΓative" foΓnιs sιιclι as hieroglyplιics) e11coιιrage
the developnιent ancl tΓa11snιissio11 of 11evΙ' nιeanings and tlιιιs
sιιpport lingιιistic (a11d, coπespondi11gly, inιellectιιal, social, and
political) innovations. FigιιΓative systenιs aΓe so clifficιιlt to learn
that the e11ergy of a society is spent in sinιply JΠeseΓving· 'vhat it
lιas Γeceived. MoΓeover, theiΓ ηιοΓe concΓete, pictoΓial chaΓacteΓ
encoιιrages imaginative credιιlity (ΓatheΓ than tlιe scientific analy-
sis suppoΓted by alphabetical systeιηs) and tlιιιs iιηpedes lιunιa11
pΓogΓess.

Βιιt tlιough tlιe fonη of 'vΓiting is cnιcial in tlιe de,relopnιent

of a la11guage fωηι its roots, it is not, according to Foucaιιlt, tlιe
ultinιate foΓce belιind tlιis developnιent. Tlιis force is Γatlιer tlιe
"Γlιetorical diιηension" of langυage, "''heι·eby a woΓd takes ση a
new meaning becaιιse of sonιe sinιilaΓity (οΓ otheΓ Γelation) ίη
fonη ΟΓ content to another woΓcl. ;Rlιetoric is tiecl to νvlιat Foιι­
caιιlt calls the "spatiality" as opposed to tlιe tenιpoΓality of lan-
-gιιage. By this he nιea11s tlιat Γhetorical tΓansfoΓnιatio11s of ή1eaiι~
· ing are inιplicit in a langιιage as a static systenι. Even thouglι tlιey
nιay in fact occuΓ over a peιiocl of tinιe, their basis lies not in any
teιηpoΓallaws of causal clevelopnιent bιιt in tlιe ateιηpoι·al stΓuc­
ture of tlιe language. FοΓ example, tlιe ·move, via ιnetonymy,
wlιeΓeby "roof" coιnes to mea11 "lιouse" is based 011 tlιe Γelation
between tlιe meanings of tlιese 'voΓds and is not an insta11ce of
some law goveΓning tlιe clevelopme11t of language ονeΓ time.
Conseqιιe11tly, altlιoιιglι cleΓiνation obviously does take place
over time, it is 110t at root a teιnporal phenomeno11. Tlιe la'I-I'S it
follows aΓe deternιinecl by the ateιnρoΓal stΓιιctιιΓe of tlιe "tropo-
lo.gical spa.ce." of language.
Foιιcault notes tlιat the fοιιr basic fιιnctions of langιιage ννe
lιave been discussing can be aπanged as tlιe vertices of a quadΓi-
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 161

lateι-al (beginning "''ith attι-ibution and ρι-oceeding clockwise

tl1ι-ough aι·tiωlation, designation, and cleι-ivation). He uses this
"quadι-ilateι-al oflanguage" (115) to sιnnmaι-ize tl1e ι-elationsl1ips
in geneι-al gι-aωωaι- aιnong tl1e foιn· functions. Tl1e geneΓal pι-in­
ciple is that functions located at adjacent points botl1 'Ί-einfoι-ce"
and "confΓont" one anotl1eι-. Tl1us, aι-ticulation ι-einfoι-ces tl1e
_pΓOposi.tion's attΓibutive functi01..1 by pΓOνicling it 'vitl1 specific
content, but, ση tl1e otl1eΓ hand, aι-ticulation diffeι-entiates tl1ings
νvlΊeι-eas attΓibution connects tl1eιn. Designation ι-einfoΓces aΓticu­
lation by ι-evealing the ρoint at vΛ1iclι nouns develoρed by tl1e
latteι- attach to the νvoΓld; bιιt its ρointing to tl1e paι-ticιιlaι- con-
tΓasts with the geneι-ality ac11ieved by aΓticulation. Deι-ivation
sl1o,vs l1o'~' "'oι-ds deνeloρ continuoιιslγ fι-οω theiΓ oι-igin in des-
ignation, but it destΓOys tl1e one-to-one ΓeρΓesentation clΊaΓacteι-­
istic of designation. Finally, conψleting the ciι-cιιit, derivation
provides tl1e generality tl1at is ι-equiι-ed for tl1e attribιιtion ef-
fected by a ρΓOρosition; but it has a "spatial" stΓuctuΓe in contrast
to the tenψoι-al seqιιence of tenns in the uttering ΟΓ 'νΓiting of a
pΓOposition. TheΓe aι-e also iιnρoι-tant Γelations between func-
tions at opposite ends of the diagonals of tl1e quadrilateΓal. Aι·­
ticulation ancl derivation aι-e Γelated by tlιe fact tlιat a language's
"aι-ticμlative capacities aι-e cleterωined by the distance it has
ωoved along tlιe line of deΓiνation"; ancl attι-ibution and designa-
tion by tbe fact that "woι·ds al,vays naιne soωething ι-epι-esented"
(ιι6). '
At the center of the qιιadι-ilateι-al, wheι-e tl1e two cliag·onals in-
teι-sect, is the eleιnent aι-ound νvlιiclι "tl1e entire Classical tl1eoη
of language is oΓganized": the naωe ( 116). Ενeη one of the foιιι­
function~ is essentially tied to naωing. Α pι·oposition can connect
(via attι-ibution) ι-eρι-esentations only if tlιey have been naιned;
articιιlation is a ρι-ocess of geneι-alizing pι-opeι- naωes; designa-
tion Γelates a naωe to an object, and deι-ivation changes the
ωeaning of naωes. Ι t is even the case tl1at the use of language to
exρι-ess tι-utl1s is, fοι- tl1e Classical Age, intiωately tied to nanιing.
Of couι-se, only pΓOpositional jιιdgωents, not naωes, aι-e stι-ictly
tι-ue οι- false. Βιιt naωing things proρeι-ly is tlιe key to forωιιlat­
ing tι-ue ρΓOpositions. 'Ίf all naωes 'veι-e exact, if the analysis
ιψοη which they aι-e based had been peι-fectly thought οιιt ... ,
theι-e woιιld be no difficιιlty in ρΓOnouncing tι-uejudgωents ... "
(ιι6). This is because it is tl1rougl1 the pι-opeι- naωing of tlιings
that langιιage enables us to ωονe froιn the vague confιιsion of
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

resemblances to the identities and differences that define their

true reality.

Natural history
Unlike general grammar, seventeenth and eighteenth century
1vork in naturall-ιistory has received considerable attention frωn
historians of science. Foucault is therefore, fι-om the outset, con-
cerned to distinguish his (archaeolog·ical) approacl1 to this work
from the standaι·d ones. He begins with a sketch of νiews that, he
says, corresponcl to those of "an aνeι-age σoss section" of histori-
ans of the life sciences in the Classical Age. Such histoι-ians begin
with the idea tl1at, dιιΓing the seνenteenth centuι-y, there arose a
ηeιΙ' "cιιι-iosity" that led to ιιnpΓecedented deνelopments in tl1e
scope and accιιracy of the life sciences. Giνen this, their concern
is, first, to ascertain the caιιses of this ne1v cιιι-iosity and, second,
to tι-ace the cοιιι·se of its manifestations. The caιιses are said to
inclιιde both factoι-s within science- sιιch as the new emphasis
placed on observation and tl1e recent prestige of the physical
sciences, \Vl1icl1 made tl1em a model of ι-ationality- and ex-
tι-ascientific inflιιences, sιιcl1 as inteι-ests in agι-icιιltuι-e, exotic
plants and animals, and in "the et!Ίical νaloι-ization of natuι-e"
( 126). τl1e manifestations of tl1e new cuι-iosity aι-e desσibed
primarily ίη teι-ms of a set of conflicts bet\veen scientific concepts
and theoι-ies. Theι-e aι-e, fοι· exaιηρle, conflicts between mecha-
nism and νitalisιn, between expeι-imentalists ancl systematists,
and bet,veen fixisω and tΓansforιnisω. Fιιrther, ιιnderlying all
tl1ese conflicts, tl1eι-e is tl1oιιgl1t to be a basic tension bet\veen
factoι-s (meclΊanisω and tl1eology) tl1at \Voι-k to keep Classical
natιιral history as close as possible to its Caι-tesian oι-igins and
factoι-s (vitalisιn ancl iπeligion) tha:t 1vere pusl1ing it tO\\'ard its
nineteenth-century futuι-e.
Foucault is highly critical of this picture. For one thing, he
thinks it is incapable of explaining why soιne of the conflicts it so
emphasizes arose. It ιnust, for exanψle, accept the disagree-
ments between fixists and tι-ansforωists and bet1·veen experiιnen­
talists and systeιnatists as brute facts. Siιnilaι-ly, it is unable to see
the connections between such diνeι-se phenoωena as taxonoιny
and the use of the ιnicroscope. Secondly, the standard account
fails to do justice to the shaι-ρ gaps that exist between different
ωodes of thought about liνing tl1ings; it treats as paι-ts of a single
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι

llistστical fabτic such mutually alien frameνvσrks as Aτistσte­

lianism, Ν ewtσnianism, Cartesianism, and Darwinism. Mσst im-
pσrtantly, it applies to the Classical Age anachrσnistic categσries
sιιch as that σf life, which, as Fσucault νvill tι-y tσ shσ,v, had ησ
fundamental place befσre the nineteenth century.
Fσucault's archaeσlσgical apprσach is very diffeΓent fι-ση1 the
standaΓd σne. Fσr σne thing, it puts in brackets all questiσns
abσιιt the causes σf neνv fσΓms σf scientific thσugl1t. This is nσt
becaιιse Fσucaιιlt thinks such questiσns aΓe pσintless οι- unansνver­
able but because l1e thinks we need clescΓiptiσns σf the phenσm­
ena in questiσn at a much deepeΓ level befσΓe we can prσfitably
seek theiι- causes. (Cf., ΟΤ, "FσΓewσι-d tσ tl1e English Editiσn,"
xii-xiii.) Fuι-theτ, archaeσlσgy puι-pστts tσ supply tl1is deepeτ
clescriptiσn ancl theτeby repaiΓ the defects nσted abσve in the
standaτd accσunt σf tl1e "manifestatiση.s" σf Classical ηaturall1is­
tσΓy. Ιη particulaΓ, Fσucault tl1iηks tl1at l1is arcl1aeσlσgical ap-
pΓOacl1 will τeveal the stΓucture σf Classical ηatuτal llistory that
sl1aΓply distiηguishes it fι-σm bσth pΓeviσus kησwledge σf living
things aηcl fΓOm ηiηeteeηth-ceηtιιη biσlσgy, aηd tl1at it will sl1σw
l1σw, iη relatiση to tl1is strιιctιιre, tl1e cσnflicts sσ central tσ tl1e
stanclaι-cl accσuηt aρpeaι- as mere suι-face disagreements.
Οη Fσucault's accσιιηt, natιιι-alllistση aΓσse fΓOm tl1e Classical
episteme's sepaτatiση σf signs fΓση1 tl1e wστld aηcl the ι-esιιlting
emphasis ση the distiηctiση bet,veeη what was knσwη σf a thing
bγ diΓect observation and what l1ad ωeι-ely been said abσut it. As
've l1ave already nσted, fσr the Reηaissaηce, sigηs (iηcluding
legends aηd fables) ιveτe paΓt σf tl1e νvσrld ση a paι- νvith, fσΓ
exaηψle, the σΓgaηic strιιctuΓes σf plants aηd aniωals. As a re-
sult, Reηaissaηce desσiρtiσηs σf living things iηcluded accσιιηts
σf bσth ση equal teΓms. But witl1 tl1e Classical sepaΓatiση of sigηs
fΓOm the wσΓld, 'Ίl1e wσΓds that hacl beeη iηteΓvωven iηtσ the
νeι-y beiηg of the beast have beeη uηravelled and τeωσved"
(129). The idea σf a natural "histσry" takes ση a meaηing clσser
tσ the σrigiηal GΓeek seηse of a "seeing." WheΓeas fσΓ the Reηais­
saηce, the histσriaη (σf natιιτe σι· σf aηythiήg else) "was defiηed
ησt sσ much by what he saw as by νvhat he ι·etσld," fσr the
Classical Age, histστy (paΓticularly natural histση) meaηs "a me-
ticulσus examinatiση of thiηgs themselves fοΓ the fiτst tiωe, aηd
theη σf transcribiηg what has beeη gatheΓed iη smσσili, neutral-
ized, aηd faithfιιl wστds" (13σ-31).
AccσΓding tσ Fσucault, theη, Classical ηatιιτal histσry is tl1e
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

enterpι-ise of representing things in language as exactly as possi-

ble. Its task is to reduce the distance between woι-ds and things
"so as to bι-ing language as close as possible to the obseι-νing gaze,
and tl1e things observed as close as possible to \\7 oι-ds" (132).
TheΓefore, "natuι-al l1istorγ is nothing more than the nomina-
tion of the visible" ( 131 ). This is the souι-ce of the sense tl1at
Classical natural l1istoι-ians haνe of merelγ pointing out w lιat l1as
been there to see from the beginning bιιt escaped peoρle be-
caιιse of inattention. But in fact tl1eir descriptions νvere possible
not because tl1eγ had oveι-come distractions fωm tl1e obvious but
because "a ne'v field of visibtlitγ" lιad been "constituted" (132).
This field, ιnoreoveι-, omitted a gΓeat nuιnber of the 'Όbνious"
facts about plants ancl aniιnals, even in the alreadγ restricted
don1ain of the diΓectly obserνable. For, Foucault points out, not
only hearsaγ but also taste, smell, ancl 1nost of touch (except for
soωe fairly obvious distinctions) were excluded from tl1e desσip­
tions of naturall1istoιγ Sight becomes tl1e alιnost exclιιsiνe or-
g·an of obseΓvation, and eνen heι-e not eνerγthing (e.g., coloι-s) i~
admitted. Theι-efoι-e, lιe concludes, instead of being a siιnple
ι-etuι-n to 'vl1at is obνiously tlιere, Classical natιιΓal l1istoι-y is a
stι-ongly constι-ained and limited systeω of descι-iption. FοΓ it,
"to observe ... is to be content with seeing ... a few tl1ings sys-
tematically. Witl1 seeing wl1at, in tl1e ratl1eι- confused wealtl1 of
reρresentation, can be analyzed, Γecognized bγ all, and tl1us
given a naιne that eveι-yone will be able to undeι-stancl" (134).
Tl1e object of tl1is special soΓt of clescι-iption is what natuι-al
histoι-y calls tl1e stnιcture of a plant or aniωal. Accoι-ding ιο Fou-
caιιlt, strιιcture encωnpasses jιιst fοιιr asρects of tl1e eleωents
tl1at ιnake ιιρ a natιιι-al tl1ing: tl1eiι- foπn, tl1eiΓ nuωber, tl1eiι­
mιιtual spatial aιτangeιnent, ancl their relatiνe ιnagnitιιdes. It
thus pωvides a gι-id tl1at, "by limiting and filtering the visible ...
enables it to be transσibed into language" (135). Viewed as stωc­
tιιres in tl1is sense, natuΓal objects aρρear as visible ρatteΓns of
"sιιrfaces and lines" and not as organic ιιnities of "functions ΟΙ'
invisible tissues." "Ν alUΓal histoΓy tΓaνeΓses an aΓea of visible,
siωultaneous, concωηitant vaΓiables, 'vitl1oιιt any inteΓnal Γela­
tionsl1iρ of suboι-dination ΟΓ organization" (137). Tl1is, l1e says,
exρlains wl1y botany ι·atl1eΓ tl1an anatωηy l1ad eρisteιnological
pήoι·ity aωong disciplines dealing witl1liνing things. Ι η tl1e nine-
teenth centuιγ, anatωηy would Γetιιrn to tl1e kind of ρι-οιηί­
ηeηce it l1ad lιad in tl1e Renaissance. But fω· the Classical Age,
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι

"tlιe fundamental aπangement of the visible and the exρΓessible

η ο longeΓ passed thΓoιιgh the thickness of tl1e body" ( 13 7). It νvas
not, as histoΓians often claim, that a shift in inteΓest to botany
duΓing the Classical Age led to an emphasis on techniques fοΓ
desσibing visible suΓface stΓuctω·es. Ratl1eΓ, it was a shift to the
epistemological pΓimacy of such stΓuctιιΓes that made plants
Γatl1e1· than animals the living things more accessible to our
knowledge.
StructuΓe alone, howeveΓ, is not adequate as a basis fοι· Classi-
cal knowledge of a living thing. This is because structιπal desσip­
tion presents each plant and animal as meΓely an individual Γeal­
ity and does nothing to place it in relation to otheΓ plants and
animals. TheΓefoΓe, out of the desσiptions of individual stΓuc­
tιιΓes, natuΓal histoΓians had to extΓact the essential natιιΓe of
each thing desσibed :_ that is, the featιιΓes that ν~rould enable ιιs
to assign the thing its exact place in an oΓdeΓed table of natιιral
beings. These featuΓes constitute what was called the c!zaτacter of
a plant οΓ animal.
HistoΓians of science Γecognize, in the Classical Age, tν,ro com-
peting ways of deteΓmining chaΓacteΓs. One, called tl1e system,
began with tl1e arbitΓary specification of a small set of descriptive
eleιη.~nts (an initial characteι·). FοΓ example, Li~~naeιιs selected
those parts (elements) of tl1e plant tl1at νveΓe Γelevant to fΓUcti­
fication.~Each individual plant was analyzed in teΓms of these
elements and chaΓacteΓized 'as the saιne as ΟΓ diffeΓent fωm
otheΓs ο η the basis of the saιneness ο Γ diffeΓence of tl1e elements.
Tl1e second way of specifying character was known as the 1netlιod.
Tl1is (as pΓacticed, e.g., by Adanos) did not begin 'vitl1 aΓbitrarily
selected eleιnents but with an arbitrarily chosen species of plant
οΓ aniιnal. The chosen species was desσibed in exhaustive detail,
taking account of all its eleιnents. The next species encoιιnteι·ed
ν1ras likewise exhaιιstively desσibed, except that any featuΓes al-
τeady included in the desσiption of the fiΓst were not men.-
tioned. SimilaΓly, each subseqιιent species was described with the
όmission of featuΓes already encoιιntered in pΓeceding species.
On the basis of this seΓies of description, theΓe would eventιιally
eιnerge a "geneΓal table of Γelations" (142), as varioιιs species
were seen to share the saιne chaΓacteΓs.
Foucault acknoνvledges that there aΓe soιne obvioιιs and iιnpor­
tant diffeΓences between these two ways of deteΓιnining the chaΓ­
acters of natural objects. FοΓ exaιnple, νvheΓeas the methocl is
166 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

unique, there are as many systems as there are ways of se1ecting

the set of elements that specify the initial character. On the other
hand, once the arbitι-aι-y initial character is chosen, the system's
chaτacterizations are fixed, whereas knowledge of ηeνγ species
may reqιιire modifications in the method's division of tl1e oatural
woΓld. But Foιιcault emphasizes that "despite these diffeτences,
both system and method rest upon the same epistemological
base." They aΓe merely alternative means to the same u1timate
goal: "a knowledge of empirical individuals ... [in terms of] the
continuous, ordered, and universal tabulation of all possible dif-
feι-ences" (144). Method and system, for all theiΓ superficialdiffeΓ­
ences, "are sinψly two ways of defining identities by ιneans of the
general gτid of diffeΓences" (145).
Foucaιιlt notes that a fundamental problem for the p1Όject of
natuΓal history V\ras ι-aised by tl1e possibility that theι-e might not
be sufficient continuity from one individual to anotheι- to \allow
us to gωup them accoι-ding to shaι-ed cl1aracteΓs. He says that, to
eliιninate this possibility, natuΓal history had to lay doν\'n a postu-
late of tl1e conlinιιil)' of ηαtιιτe. lt is obvious that this continuity is
not iιnmediately Γevealed in οιιr expeΓience of natuΓe, Ι\'l1icl1 is
full of gaps ancl confιιsions in comparison witl1 tl1e ideal tables of
natαι·a111istoΓy. HoweνeΓ, according to Fοιις:aιιlt, these gaps ancl
coηftιsions l1ave, in the Classica1 view, nothing to do with the
natιιΓe of animal geneΓa and species themselves. They aΓe dιιe to
extrinsic conditions of tl1e eaΓtll, sιιch as climate and geological
cl1ange, tl1at l1ave, for exaιnρle, destιΌyed soιne species and
foΓced otl1ers witl1 notlling essential in cωnιnon to live in the
san1e area. As a Γesιιlt, natuι-all1istoι-y l1ad to clistinguish betΙ\'een
tν\'ο diffeΓent gιΌιιpings of living tl1ings. Ο η tl1e one hand, tl1eΓe
ΙYas the ideal "spatial" gιΌιιping, exρressed in the gΓeat tables of
taxonomic ordeΓs, tl1at ΓepΓesentecl the tnιe continιιity of na-
ture. On the other hancl, tl1eΓe Ι\'as the experienced grouping of
living things tl1at l1ad resulted frωn tl1e teιnporal series of events
in the l1istory of the Eaι-tl1. The task of natural llistory "''as to
reconstΓιιct tl1e ideal ordeι· of tl1e fonner fΓom the fι-agments
pι-esented by tl1e latteΓ.
According to Foucaιιlt, tllis shows "hοΙ\7 sιιpeΓficial it is to Ο})·
pose ... [in Classical natuΓal history] a 'fixism' that is content to
classify the beings of nature in a permanent tabιιlation, and a sort
of 'evolutionism' that is sιιpposed to believe in an immemorial
l1istory ofnature ... " (150). Natιπal history does involve both the
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι

idea of a fixed and continιιous network of species and the idea of a

tenψoral dispersion that has blιιrred that network. Βιιt these aι-e
not alteι·native conceptions of natιιre. Tl1e first alone expι-esses
tl1e fundamental Classical understand!ng of living things; the lat-
ter is merely the explanation of why οιιr expeι-ience cloes not
immediately ι-eveal the tι-ιιe fixed divisions of natιn·al species.
Βιιt what, then, are we to make of the discιιssions of the trans-
foπnations of living tl1ings offeι-ecl by thinkers sucl1 as Bonnet,
Maιιpertιιis, and Diderot? Are tl1ese not, as is comιnonly held,
the precursors of tl1e evolutionaι·y ideas of Laωaι-ck and Daι-­
win? In this regaι-d, Foucaιιlt pιιts forward the follo'\\•ing very
stι-ong thesis: "Theι-e is not and cannot be even the sιιspicion of
an evolutionism or a tι-ansfonnism in Classical tl1oιιght" (ιsο).
The fιιndamental reason is that a genιιinely evolιιtionaι-y view of
natιιι-e conceives "time ... as a ιπinciple of clevelopment foι­
living beings in their internal oι-ganization," wheι-eas fω- Classi-
cal thought tiωe is always exn-insic to tl1e essential ι-eality of a
living thing and l1as no role in deteι-ωining its natιιι-e. Becaιιse of
this, the ideas of the so-called pι-ecuι-soι-s of evolιιtion aι-e in fact
"incoωpatible witl1 what we uncleι-stand today by evolutionaι-y
tl1ougl1t" (151).
Το establish tl1is point, Foucault discusses the tιvo diffeι-ent
Classical appι-oaches to the development of species over tiωe.
One (proposed by Bonnet) regaΓds the entiι-e fixed taxonomy of
living things as "affected by a tempoι-al index" .1vheι-eby the
1vhole system moves foι-waι-d in a 1vay that pι-eseΓνes the fixed
ι-elations between species. Each species simply moνes ιιp to oc-
cιιpy the place on the scale of perfection pι-eviously occιιpied by
its pι-edecessoι- in the table ofnatιιι-al beings. (Fοι- exanψle, man
moves to a new οι-deι- of peι-fection, and his old place is taken by
the loweι- pι-imates, so that "theι-e will be Newtons among the
ωonkeys.") This is obvioιιsly a peΓfoι-mationist view tl1at in no
Ι\•ay ι-egards species as emeι-ging· from one anotheι- in time. The
taxonoωical table of species is given froω the beginning, and
tiιne seι-ves meι-ely as an arena fοι- "1the infinite chain of being
[expι-essed in the table] to continιιe its pι-ogι-ess in the direction
ofinfinite amelioι-ation" (152).
The second appι-oach (developed, fοι- example, by Maupeι-tιιis)
does not involve the teωpoι-al displacement of the entiι-e system
of species bιιt rather has particιιlaι- species appeaι-ing one afteΓ
anotheι-. Here Foucault agrees that there seems to be a simi!?ι-ity
168 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

to evolιιtionaι-y thoιιght becaιιse the appeaΓance of ηeΊ<Ι' species is

causally tied to "changes in the condition of life" sιιclι as aiΓ,
clinιate, and wateΓ. Βιιt lιe insists tlιat this similaήty is ιneι-ely
appaΓent. The changes in conditions oflife may cause the eιneΓ­
gence of a particιιlaΓ species at a giνen time, bιιt they haνe η ο Γole
in deteΓιnining tlιe natuΓe of tlιe species. This natιιre is given
alιead oftiιne by tlιe ideal taxononιic table. Accoι·dingly, the condi-
tions of life do not play the ι-ole of enviτon?ιιent in an eνolιιtionaι-y
theoη; tlιey do not tΓansfonn a species by changing the fιιnctions
of its oΓgans. Ι η sιιηι, "fοι- this fonn of tlιouglιt ... the seqιιence
of tiωe can neνeι- be anything but the line along "'lιich all tlιe
possible νalues of the pΓeestablislιecl vaι-iables sιιcceed one an-
otlιeι-" (153). So neitheΓ Classical appωach to the deνelopιnent of
species is genuinely evolιιtionaιΎ, fοι· in neitheΓ does tinιe pι-ecede
and pωdιιce the continuum of sρecies. 'Ίt is ... inιpossible fοι·
?ιatu?·allιisto?)' to conceiνe of tlιe lιist01y ofnatuτe." (15'7.).
Foucault nιaintains that it is not jιιst in the absence of evolu-
tionaι-y ideas tlιat Classical natuι-al histoι-y diffeΓs fωm the biol-
ogy tlιat eωeΓges at tlιe beginning of tlιe nineteenth centιιι-y.
Ylιe tΊ<vo enteι-ρrises aΓe radically cliffeτent and slιoulcl not be
regaΓded as ρaΓts of tlιe same intellectιιal pωject. Tlιis, lιe says,
is due to tlιe essentially difΊerent status of tlιe conceρt of life fοι·
natural lιistory and biology. Altlτouglι naturallιistory dealt pri-
ωarily witlι living tlιings, it \\•as not in princiρle limited to tlιem.
Its geneΓal ρι-oject was to cleveloρ a langιιage tlιat coιιld classify
taxonoιnically all natιιι-al beings, notjιιst tlιose tlιat lιapρenecl to
ρossess tlιe attΓibιιte of being alive. Accordingly, wlιen natιπal
lιistoιΎ sρeaks of "life," it ωeans only 'Όne clιaΓacteΓ- ίη the
taxononιic sense of tlιat woΓd- in tlιe ιιniversal distribιιtion ο[
beings" (160). ΜοΓeονeΓ, the Γange of tlιe objects of naturallιis­
tory tlιat ρossess tlιis chaΓacter will vary depending on lιo'v life is
defined. On Maιιpeι·tιιis's loose definition in terιns of nιotility
and relations of affinity, eveιΎtlιing clealt 'vitlι by natuι·allιistory
is alive; on Linneaus's stΓicteι· definition, the range of life is
ωιιch ωore restΓicted. But no ωatter lιονv wide or naιτow its
Γange, life ι·eιnains just one possible clιaΓacteΓ of tlιe objects
known by natuΓal history. "Life does not constitute an obvious
threslιold beγoncl wlιich entirely neνv foΓms of kno,vledge aΓe
reqιιiΓed" (161). By contrast, Foιιcault says, biology is a science of
life, a: ωode of knowleclge ρeculiaι-ly aρρΓopΓiate to tlιe category
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 169
ofliving things. There could be no biological knowleclge of non-
living tlιings. But life is only a contingent clιaracter of some
objects of natιπal history; it is not a fundamental categoΓy that
specifies the objects of natuΓal history (or any other Classical
science) as such. This is wlιat Foucault means by his perlιaps
overdι-amatic claim that, befoι-e the nineteentlι centuτy, "biology
did ηοι exist" and that this was because "life itself did not exist.
All that existed νvere liνing beings" (127-28; cf. also 160).

Analysis of wealth
We come finally to Foucault's treatment of a third empiι-ical
clomain of Classical knowledge: the analysis of wealtlι. Once
again, lιe caιιtions against constΓuing this dωnain anachronisti-
cally, as either a continuation of Renaissance thouglιt on wealth
or as an anticipation of nineteenth-century economics. And, as
before, lιe sets οιιt to slιow tlιat the domain constitutes a distinct
body of knowledge.
Foιιcaιιlt recognizes one important similarity between the Clas-
sical approach to wealtlι and tlιat of tlιe Renaissance: both begin
witlι the pι-όbleω of lιow to understand money (tlιe medium of
economic exchange) ancl its ι-elation to the prices of tlιe goocls
exchanged. Fοι- tlιe Renaissance, he holds, tlιe fundamental fact
aboιιt 1noney was that it had value in its own ι-ight. In virtιιe of
ι:l.1e pι-ecious ιnetal froιn ;vhiclι it 'vas ιnade, it lιad an intι-insic
woι-th. Because of this, ιnoney "'aS able to function in exchanges
ειs a sign (mark) of the value of other things. Although the Classi-
cal analysis of 'vealth begins from the same pΓOblem, it ΓeνeΓses
tlιe solιιtion. Instead of basing money's function as a sign of
wealth on its intrinsic value, it bases the value of money on its
fιιnction as a sign. As a medium of exchange, money has valιιe
only because it reρresents the value of otlιeι- tl1ings. Heτe theΓe is
an exact ρarallel ;vith Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt of tlιe geneΓal νiews of
tlιe Renaissance and tlιe Classical Age Γegarding signs, '"itlι tlιe
fonneΓ tΓeating a sign (ωoney) as signifying in virtue of its reseιn­
IDlance to what it signifies and tlιe latter making the sign a ρuΓe
reρresentation with no content (value) of its own. Foucault says
tlιaι this Classical constΓual ofωoney was develoρed by ιhe "com-
plex of reflections ancl ρΓactices" called "nιeι-cantilism" (175).
Altlιoιιgh the mercantilist vie"' of 'vealtlι ρarallels Classical deνel-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

opments in the treatment of language (and of natuι-e), it took

l1old mιιch more slowly becaιιse of its much closer tie to institu-
tions and practices.
The practical significance of money as a ι·epΓesentation of
wealtl1 is tl1at it is able to seι-ve as a pledge offered in excl1ange for
cOinιnodities: 'Ίt l1as exactly the same value as that for which it
has been given, since it can in tιιrn be exchangecl for that same
quantity of mechandise or the eqιιivalent" (ι Β ι). The value of a
given aιnount of ιnoney as a pledge is, of couι·se, the price of the
ιnerchandise exchanged for it. Money's role as a pledge, express-
ing ilie price of commodities, raises ilie qιιestion of ho\v it is able
to fulfill tl1is ι·ole. What is the economic basis fοι· the pledge tl1at
is implicitly made when money is exchanged fοΓ goods? What
sιιpports tl1e valιιe of ιnoney as a pledge? Heι-e standaι·d histoι-y
finds anotl1eι- of the fιιndamental contΓoversies of 'vhicl1 it is so
fond. One gι-oup (Law and otl1eι·s), it is said, l1eld to the view
(which Foιιcaιιlt l1as pι-esented as tlιe Classical view) that money is
a pure repΓesentation. Consequently, tl1is groιιp claimed that its
value as a medium of exchange must be guaι-anteed by some
intrinsically valuable goods otl1er than money itself. Βιιt anotl1er
groιιp (Condillac, Destι·utt, and others) held that the value of
money was guaranteed by its intrinsic value as a marketable com-
modity. On that standaι-d account, then, this issιιe led to a funda-
mental split between those 'vho maintained tl1e Γepι-esentative
view of money and those 'vho did not.
Foιιcault, however, argιιes that iliis is a misunderstanding. In
fact, both sides of ilie controversy accepted tl1e basic Classical
doctrine that money's representative fιιnction is not based ση its
intrinsic value as a coιnmodity. The cι-ucial conceptual point,
however, is that to accept this is not to deny that money may,
quite apart from its representative function, ίη fact have .a valιιe
as a comιnodity. All that tl1e vie'v of money as a pure repι-esenta­
tion requires is that it not Γepresent wealth in vi1·tue of any intrin-
sic valιιe it has as a commodity. Indeed, both sides to tl1e contι-o­
versy ίη qιιestion agreed that money was an intι-insically valιιable
commodity. They differed merely over the qιιestion of \Vhetheι·
this value of money or the valιιe of some oilier commodity \Vas
the gιιaι-antee for money as a pledge 'vhen it was excl1anged for
merchandise. So, as ίη other cases, controversies iliat standard
history presents as repι-esenting fundaιnental divisions ίη the
thought of an ag·e turn οιιt, fι-om Foucaιιlt's perspective, to be
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS 1

:-;uperficial disagreements among thinkers working witlιin the

:-;ame fundamental fraιne,voτk.
Tlιe same, he argues, is tτue of another "gΓeat contωversy"
ί\Ιηοηg Classical analysts of wealtlι, that between the Physiocrats
;ιncl tlιe "utilitarians" (Condillac, Galiani, Gτaslin). This disagΓee­
ιηent arose fΓΟιn reflections on tlιe things that are bought and
sold in the process of econoιnic exchange. Obviously, they are
bouglιt and sold because they have value for people. But how is it
ιlιat things come to lιave value and '"'lιat determines the precise
values they have? We can summaι-ize Foucaιιlt's account of the
l>Jιysiocrats' vie'\\7 as follows: They helcl that all valιιes oι-iginate
Γι-οιη an excess of comιnodities. Α commoclity has economic
valιιe pΓecisely to the extent that Ι have moΓe of it tlιan Ι neecl
;ιnd so am able to sell it to soιneone wlιo has less of it tlιan he
needs. ΜοΓeονeΓ, the Physiocrats located the soιυ-ce of tlιe sιιΓ­
ρlιιs of commodities in tlιe fecιιnclity of the land. It is only in
agricιιltιιΓal procluction that theΓe is a net gain once all prodιιc­
tion costs lιave been deducted. Only '"'lιen God (or Natιιre) is
acting as οιιr uncoιnpensatecl copΓOdιιcer do we ι-eap more than
we so'"'· (In manιιfacturing, any apparent increase in value is
balancecl by expenses of pΓOduction and entrepreneιιrial pΓOfi.t.)
AccoΓdingly, the Physioσats see all valιιe as ιιltiιnately dιιe to the
fecιιndity of tlιe land, whiclι geneΓates a suΓplιιs of coιnιnodities
tlιat have value as possible objects of exchange. Fιn-thennore,
tl1e process of excl1ange itself does not inσease the value of
coιnmodities. TΓue, a higher price may be obtained by, fοΓ exam-
ple, selling· the con11nodity in anotheι- ·ιnarket, but any such
profit will be offset by added expenses suclι as tΓanspoΓtation.
On tlιe Plηsiocrats' view, then, all value ιιltimately ω·iginates in
land, which pΓOduces a suι-plus of coιnmodities. This sιπplus
takes on value by enteι-ing into the pΓOcess of exchange, vvhich
ιπocess cannot itself aeate ιnοΓe valιιe but can only enψloy 'vhat
l1as come to it from the land.
By contΓast, Foucault says, the "ιιtilitaΓians" held a psyclιologi­
cal tlιeoΓy of tlιe origin of value tlιat exactly reνeΓSes the Plιys­
ioσats' account. They begin fΓOm hu1nan needs, '"'hich are, of
coιπse, clιιe to a lack, not a sιιΓplιιs, of comωodities. Coωιnodi­
.ties lιave an initial valιιe pΓecisely because tlιey '"'οιιld be ιιsefιιl
for satisfying οuΓ needs. ΜοΓeονeΓ, contΓary to the Physiocrats,
tlιe process of exchange seι-ves to augnιent tlιis value, wlιen it
tu1·ns out that others are willing to give me coιnωodities tlιat Ι
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

value more than what Ι give them in exchange. Thus, the dia-
monds that may be of rather small value to me in themselves
become of great value to me because of the price others will pay
for them.
It is, then, quite true that the Physiocrats and the utilitarians
propose sharply opposed theories σf the origin σf value. The
fσrmer lσcate the sσurce σf value in the surpluses prσduced by
the land and see exchange as merely a means of distributing this
value, nσt σf increasing it. The latter lσcate the sσurce σf value in
human need (hence in the insufficiency σf the land's prσductiσn)
and see exchange as a means for increasing this initial value. But,
according to Fσucault, the disagreement is merely a matter σf
reading the same "theσretical elements" ( ιgg) in oppσsite ways.
Both sides think about the σrigins σf econσmic value in terms of
the same fundamental ideas. Bσth see land as the sσle sσurce σf
wealth, but the Physiσcrats assert its superabundance and the
utilitarians its insufficiency. Both admit an essential connectiσn
between value and exchange. But, although the Physiocrats as-
sert that cσmmσdities have value σnly as pσssible σbjects σf ex-
change, they deny that exchange can increase this value. The
utilitarians, ση the other hand, see cσmmodities as valuable (be-
cause σf their usefulness) apart frσm any pσssibility of exchange,
but they think exchange increases their value. Thus, "what plays
a positive rσle in σne theσry becσmes negative in the σther"
(ιgg). The twσ views arejust inverse cσnstruals of the same basic
elements. The disagreements between them are real and impor-
tant. But they σccur within the same basic cσntext σf thσught
abσut wealth.
Fσucault concludes by cσmmenting ση the pσssibility, pursued
by many histσrians, of explaining the disagreements between the
Physiσcrats and utilitarians in terms σf the σppσsing sσcial and
econσmic interests of the twσ grσups. "Perhaps it wσuld have
been simpler tσ say that the Physiσcrats represented the landσwn­
ers and the 'utilitarians' the merchants and entrepreneurs"
(2σσ). Fσucault dσes nσt dispute the pσssibility σr even the value
σf this sσrt σf explanation. But he nσtes that "though member-
ship of a social grσup can always explain why such and such a
persσn chose one system of thought rather than another, the
condition enabling that system to be thσught never resides in the
existence σf the grσup" (2σο). Archaeσlogical analysis of Classi-
cal thσught about wealth is concerned precisely with this condi-
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι

tion of possibility. It is not inteι-ested in the soιιι-ces of inclividιι­

ιιls'
opinions, vvhich Foιιcaιιlt says is the conceΓn of "cloxology."

The common structure of the Classical domains

ΤllΓοιιghοιιt his discιιssion of tl1e tlπee Classical enψirical do-
mains, Foιιcaιιlt eιnphasizes not only tl1eir ι·adical clistinction
froιn corresponcling sixteentl1- and nineteenth-centιιry systeιns
of tl1oιιgl1t bιιt also tl1e de~p strιιctιιral siιnilarities tl1ey exhibit
an1ong tl1eιnselves. Becaιιse of these siωilarities, he argιιes, eacl1
is, in its ovvn doιnain, an expΓession of essentially tl1e san1e con-
ceρtions of oιτler, signs, langιιage, ancl knowledge- tl1at is, an
exρression of the Classical eρisteιne. Given the central role of the
conceρtion of langιιage in any eρisteιne, we sl1oιιlcl exρect that
geneΓal graιnιnar woιιld, as it does, exhibit tl1e stΓιιctιιre of the
Classical episteιne in a ρarticιιlaιΎ cleaΓ ιnanner. Attι·ibιιtion ancl
anicιιlation define a langιιage as a systeιn of Classical Γepresenta­
tion. The forιneΓ connects reρresentations tl1roιιgl1 tl1e affirιna­
tion of the veΓb; the latteΓ defines a systeιn of identities and
c:lifferences wl1icl1 express tl1e sρecific content of tl1e representa-
tions connected. Then designation and derivation relate tl1e sys-
teιn of Γeρresentation to tl1e objects it reρΓesents, tl1e forωer
effecting fιιndaιnental connections between tl1ings ancl ρriιnitive
roots, tl1e latteι- tΓansforωing the ιneaning of t1;ιe roots in the
diΓection of incι-easing coιnplexity and sιιbtlety.
Foιιcaιιlt argιιes that natιιι·al l1istory and analysis of wealtl1
exl1ibit the saωe essential stι-nctιπe as does geneΓal graιnιnar.
NatιιΓal history's descι-iρtions of strιιctιιres connect tl1e elen1ents
conψosing a ρlant οΓ aniιnaljιιst as attΓibιιtion does the tenns of
ρι-opositions. Μοι-eονeΓ, strιιctιιral descriρtion not only ρι-ovides
(as attribιιtion does) the geneΓal fοΓιη of repΓesentation; it also,
like aΓticιιlation, sρecifies tl1e ρaΓticιιlaΓ content of tl1e repι·esen­
ιation. Fιιι·theτ, the sρecification of chaτacteι· coιnplen1ents the
clesσiρtion of stΓιιctιιΓe jιιst as desigηation and deι-ivation coω­
ρleιnent attribιιtion and aτticιιlation. The chaΓacteτ designates
tl1e ρaΓticιιlar sρecies to vvhich a descι-ibed stΓuctιιre belongs. But
tl1is clesignation is not like the siιnρle "pointing" of a ρriιnitive
root; it also functions like deτivation, placing the sρecies in a
cleνeloρed systeιn, vvl1icl1 coιnρlexly relates it to other sρecies.
Siιnilarly, in the analysis of wealth, valιιe fιιnctions in a way that
ρaΓa!lels both attribιιtion and articιιlation. It both connects iteωs
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

of equivalent value and defines a systeω that specifies eaclι

thing's particulaΓ νalue. And, finally, the function of ιηoney paΓ­
allels tlιat of designation and deΓivation. It initially ι-epresents
(designates) coωωodities as haνing ceΓtain values and also Γepre­
sents tlιe deνelopιnent (clιanges) of this νalue through Γepeated
exchanges.
Foucault points out that tlιe pairs, attΓibιιtion/articulation and
designation/deΓivation, are paΓalleled by just a single function in
natιιι-al histoΓy and analγsis ofv.realtlι. The Γeason, he says, is that
the languages treated by geneι-al graωωaΓ have developed spon-
taneously wheι-eas those tι-eated by tlιe otheΓ tΙ'IO doωains lιave
been deliberately constι-ucted by nιen. In natιπallanguages, tlιe
initial acts of designation by pι-iωitive ι-oots have been deνeloped
Ιvithoιιt unified puι-pose and in diffeΓent νvays by groups speak-
ing diffeΓent languages. As a ι·esult, there aι-e diffeΓent systeιns
of articulation through νvhiclι propositional attΓibutions can be
given content. Coιτesponding to this νaι-iοιιs ancl unguided de-
νelopιnent are tlιe vagueness and inaccιιΓacies of natιιΓal lan-
guages. By contrast, the language of natιιι-al histoΓy and that of
tlιe analysis of v.realth lιave been consciously deνised to exιπess
lιighly developed scientific ancl social conceptions. τlιerefoι-e,
initial designations of objects are ωade in terιns of an alι-eady
derived systenι of ωeanings, so tlιat any p1Όpositional attι·ibu­
tion connects terωs alreadγ belonging to an aι-ticulatGd gτaω­
ιnatical systenι. Tlιis, Foucaιιlt conclιιdes, is ν~τhγ fιιnctions sepa-
ι·ated by general gΓaιnιηaι- aΓe coιnbined by natιιι-al history and
tlιe analysis of wealtlι.
The Classical episteιne that pervacles the three eιnpiι-ical clo-
ιnains Ι'le havejιιst exaωined is doιninated by repι-esentation,jιιst
as the pι-eceding Renaissance episteιne v.ras doιninated by reseιn­
blance. Like Γesenιblance, representation is not only the way in
Ιvlιiclι signs (inclιιcling langιιage) Γelate to 1vlιat tlιey signify; it also
constitιιtes tlιe waγ in Ιvlιich tlιings in the Ιvoι-ld ι-elate to one
anotlιeι-. Fοι- it is ρι-ecisely in viΓtue of relations of identity and
difference (by Ινlιiclι tlιe Classical νΙ'ΟΓld is oΓdered) that tlιings
ι-eρι-esent one another. This is 1νlιy not only the four basic func-
tions tΓeated by general gΓaιnιnar bιιt also tlιeiΓ ρarallels in natιι­
ral history and analysis of1νealth are all ιneans ofι·epι-esentation.
"ReρΓesentation goνerns the nιode ofbeing oflanguage, individ u-
als, nature, and need itself. Tlιe analysis ofι-epΓesentation ... lιas
a detennining valιιe fοι· all tlιe eιnρiι-ical doιnains" (~ωg).
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 75
Accω·dingly, ,...,)ιen ι-epι-esentationlost its central place, theι-e
was a funclaιnental break \νitlι
the Classical episteme. In Foιι­
caιιlt's vie>Ι', this οccιιιτed ι-atlιeι- abω ptly in aboιιt a fifty-year
peι-iod spanning the end of the eighteentlι centιιι-y and tlιe begin-
ning of tlιe nineteenth. J ιιst as Don Qιιixote ι-eflected tlιe transi-
ιion fωιn the Renaissance to the Classical Age, the Marqιιis cle
Sacle's paiΓ of novels, jusline and ]ιιlielle, ι-eflect the ιnove froιn
tlιe Classical to ιlιe ιnoclern eι-a (cf. 208-11). ChaρteΓ 5 \vill
discιιss Foιιcaιιlt's accoιιnt of the ιnodern episteιne ancl, paΓticιι­
laΓI}', of the 'Ίιuman sciences" tlιat it sιιstains.

Critical reactions
Of all Foιιcault's books, οτ has been tlιe most seveΓely cι-iticized
by lιistorians. Sonιe see it as a fι-ee-floating pι-ose fantasγ Γatlιer
tlιan a seι-ioιιs \VOrk of lιistoι-ical sclιolaι-ship. G. S. Roιιsseaιι, fω­
exanψle, begins 11is revie>ν by contrasting ΟΤ \'litlι FD, in vvhiclι,
lιe says Foιιcaιιlt "was tiecl to solid facts and still concerned vvitlι
lιistorical accιιracy" and ends by coιnmenting tlιat lιe is "soι-elγ
disaρpointed at tlιis necι-omantic peι-fω·mance." 1 Sιιclι negative
assessments vveι·e paι-tly the predictable Γeaction of soberacadeιn­
ics to the book's portentoιιs, self-iιnportant tone and to its daz-
zlecl ι-eception by an intellectιιal pιιblic faι- moι-e impressed tlιan
its coιnprehension of Foucault's fιιliginous pronoιιnceιnents
coιιld possibly \Varrant. Βιιt there \vere also often solid lιistorical
Γeasons fοι- the reaction.
In order to assess the iιnpact of these cι-iticisιns, it is iιnportant
to distinguish several different lιistorical levels on which οτ
opeι-ates. Tbe first ιniglιt be called the level of sjJecific lιistory: the
interpretation of particιιlaι- texts (e.g., Descartes's Regulae, the
IJoι-t Royal Graιnmar) in their o\vn teι-ιns. Second, there is tlιe
level of coτιstructive lιisloτy, which bιιilds general interpretative
fl·aιne\vorks connecting a ι-ange of texts. Foιιcaιιlt pιιrsιιes con-
strιιctive history at different leνels of generality, ranging fι-om
tlιe characterization of a set of texts as forιning a unified empiι-i­
cal domain (natuι·al history, analysis ofwealth), throιιgh analysis
of the cοιηιηοη stι-ιιcture of seveι·al eιnpiι-ical domains, to claims
aboιιt the overall chaι·acter of the thought of an entire epoclι

1. G. S. Rousseau, "'1-Vhose Enlightenment? Not 111an's: the case of Michel Fou-

cault," Eighteenιlι-Ceιιtιιι)• Studies 6 (1972-73), 239, η. g; 256.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

(Renaissance ι-eseιnblance, Classical repΓesentation). Ti1iΓcl is the

leνel of cιitical!Listoιy: tlιe use of the Γesιιlts of specific and con-
stι-uctiνe histoι-y to qιιestion the self-undeι-standing of νaι-ίοιιs
conteιnpoΓaι-y disciplines (ρlιilosophy, the lιuωan sciences). (V\'e
ωiglιt also inclιιde a fοιπtlι leνel of sjJΙJculative lzistoι;•, "Ινhίclι pωj­
ects futιιι-e diι-ections of \ιVesteω thought.) Foιιcaιιlt's cι-itical
(and specιιlatiνe) l1istoΓy deι-ive ωainly fωωllis discιιssion of the
ωοdeω episteωe, "Ιvhiclι ννe will take ιιp in the next clιapteΓ. Βιιt
CΓίticisιns of his specific and constΓuctive histωγ have pι-iιnaι-ily
focιιsed on his tΓeatιnents of the Renaissance ancl Classical Age
and so aι-e ιnost appι-opι-iately consicleΓed at this point.
Foιιcaιιlt's specific lιistoι-ical analyses haνe attι-actecl tlιe least
aωount of σitical fiι-e. George Hιιppeι-t has taken stωng excep-
tion to l1is presentation of Raιnus ancl Belon as instances of the
Renaissance systeιn of ωagical siιnilitιιcles and sigηatιιι-es. 2 He
argιιes tlιat Foucaιιlt siιηply ιnisreads ννlιat are in fact bodies of
essentially scientific Γeseaι-ch. Siιnilaι-ly, J ohn Gι-eene lιas ex-
pΓessecl stωng reseι-vations aboιιt Foιιcaιιlt's inteηπetations of
Bιιffon and Lanιaι-ck. 3 Βιιt it seeωs that νvhat ιnost clistι-esses
histoΓians aι-e not Foucaιιlt's specific inteι-pι-etations of texts ancl
autlιoι-s bιιt tlιe ιιse lιe ωakes of tlιeω in llis constnιctive lιistoι-y.
Tlιe paι-ticulaι- cases lιe discusses aι-e not ωaι-slιaled, ίη tlιe caι-e­
fιιl way of tlιe seι-ious lιistoι-ian, to establislι tlιe tΓιιtlι of his
sweeping claiωs. Tlιey fιιnction not as evide12ce bιιt as illιιstι·atio12s.
Foιιcaιιlt seldoω ιnakes any effort to slιow that lιis claiιns aΓe
sιιpported by all tlιe ι-elevant texts of a giνen peι·iod, η οι- does he
pay ωιιclι attention to apparent coιιnterexaωples to lιis vie"Ιvs.
As a resιιlt, historians lιaνe rightly felt tlιat tlιey are being
presented witlι οι-acιιlaι- pωnoιιnceιnents ratlιeι· than >νell-sιιp­
portecl conclιιsions.
Beyond this, ιnost lιistoι·ians "'hO lιave discιιssecl οτ lιaye
founcl tlιe ωore aιnbitioιιs cω~ectuι-es of its constrιιctίye histoι-y
not only unsιιppoι-tecl bιιt also lιiglιly qιιestionable. T1vo soΓts of
difficιιlties are particularly prωninent. First, specialisιs in paι-­
ticιιlar periods ωaintain tlιat Foιιcaιιlt's clιaι-acteι-izations of eρis­
teωes aι-e gι-oss oversiιnplifications tlιat not only ignore iωpoι-­
tant cliffeι-ences bet"Ι~'een indiνidιιal figlll·es bι.ιt also contradict
ιnajor aspects of tlιe ρeΓiods' thoιιglιt. Τlιιιs, HιιppeΓt aι-gιιes

2. G. Huppeι-t, "Divinalio el enιdίtio: tl1oughts on Foucaιιlt," Histary αιιd τ!ιeary• 13

(1974), 200-203-
3· J. GJ"eene, "Les ωots et les cJ1oses," Sacial Scieιzcc ΙnfαηιΙLΙΙίαn 6 (ι g67), 131-3 8.
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι 1 77
ιlιat Foucault's account of the Renaissance gives ιιnto;vaι-d promi-
nence to a marginal group of hermetic and magical wrίters,
wlιose v.•ork 'vas disdained by the period's eιnpiι-ical scientists
(e.g., Copernicus, Vesalius), whom Foιιcault almost entiι-ely ig-
nores.4 Foιιcault's ιιnified episteme, in which science and magic
coexist as two 'νΙ'ays of follo,ving the infinite chain of resem-
l>lances, ignores the sharp Renaissance diνision between magi-
ι:ians and natural scientists. (Similarly, Ι woιιld add, it is dif.ficιιlt
to see hov.• ratίonalistic Scholastic philosopheτs such as Sιιarez fit
into Foιιcault's scheme.)
Α second ιηajor area of difficulty concerns Foιιcaιιlt's claim that
cach episteme expι·esses an entirely distinctive way of thoιιght,
ι·epι-esenting a sharp bι·eak with eνerything that comes before
:ιnd afteι·. This, of coιιrse, contradicts the search for "precursors"
ιlιat constίtιιtes so mιιch of standaι·d research in tlιe histoι-y of
ideas, so it is not surprising that there has been a critical deluge of
cxamples of thinkers who pre- or postdate what Foιιcaιιlt presents
::ιs tlιe distinctive features ofa given episteme. G. S. Rousseau, fοι·
cxaιnple, maintains that the νiew of langιιage developed in the
I>ort Royal Grammar, which for Foucaιιlt is uniquely associated
with the Classical episteme, is already present in a wowk by the
Spanish gι·ammarian, Sanctius, published in 1585. (Similarly, he
nrgues.that the notion of organic strιιcture, which, as we will see,
Foιιcault thinks is distinctive of the modern episteme, is in fact
ρresent in nιιmeroιιs thinkers from Plato and Aristotle, throιιgh
Albert the' Great, Leonardo da Vinci, and Leibniz.5)
Tlιere are several ways of .defending Foucault against the
above criticisms ofhis constrιιctive history. We might, of course,
clispute the critics on the level of the specific examples and inter-
pretations that they adνance. We may, perhaps, be able to offer a
Foιιcaultian reading of Copernicus or Suarez that is more persιιa­
sive than his critics' or show that Sanctius's grammar bears only
sιφerficial similarities to that of Port Royal. ΟΤ has the merit of
sιιggesting numerous areas where we might fruitfully reexamine
sιandard historical interpretations. However, its failure to sup-
ρort its claims with anything even approximating a compι-ehen­
sive sιιrvey of the relevant evidence has left its defenders 'νΙ•ith an
imnιense body of appaι·ent counterexamples to explain away.

'I· Huppert, ιg6.

li· Rousseau, 246-47.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Foucault himself suggests anotheι- line of response in ΑΚ and

his Foι-eνvord to tl1e English tΓanslation of ΟΤ. ln ΑΚ l1e ι·efers,
for example, tO his COmpaΓΪSOl1 in QT ofthe Classical domains of
geneι-al graωmaι-, analysis of '~realtl1, and natuι-al lΊistoι-y. The
comparison, he says, Γeνealed some striking similarities in tl1ese
doωains but νvas not paι·t of an effort to describe "a mentality
that was general in the 17tl1 and 18th centιn·ies" or to 'Ί·econsti­
tute ... the fοι-ωs of ι-ationality that opeι-ated ίη the whole of
Classical science" (ΑΚ, 158). He agι-ees, ωοreονeι-, that the unity
he found in these particulaΓ domains coιιld not be extended to
include other aspects of the histoι-y of Classical thougl1t. Taking
accoιιnt of, for example, cosωology, physiologΎ, and Biblical exe-
gesis would have ι-esιιlted in a very different analysis. This, he
says, in fact illustι-ates an essential featιn-e of his archaeological
ωethod, which is an instrument of local studies and "is not in-
tended to reduce the diversity of discouΓse" (ΑΚ, 150).
As Foιιcault is aware, readers of ΟΤ ιηay ~rell be surprised at
this characterization of its Γesιιlts. He says: 'Ίη Tlιe oτder of tlιi1ιgs,
tl1e absence of methodolog·ical sign-posting ωay have given the
impι-ession tl1at my analyses were being condιιcted in tern1s of
cultuΓal totality" (ΑΚ, 161). (τΙ1e saιηe point is n1ade more fιιlly
in tl1e Fore,voι·d to tl1e Englisl1 editίon of ΟΤ, wl1ere Foucaιιlt
insists tl1at l1e offeι-ed a "strίctly Ί·egional' study" [χ].) In fact, tl1e
problem is sιιrely not jιιst that l1e failed to ωake explicit the
implicit ι-estι-ictions ση l1is discιιssion. His oν,rn cliι-ect stateωents
clearly claiιη generality for his analysis. He consistently uses
tenns sιιcl1 as Classicalllιoιιglιt, 1noclenι thought and 1Υesteτn tlιoιιght
in a global sense. Fοι- example, after explaining Descaι-tes's ι-ejec­
tion of ι-esemblance in favoι- of identity and diffeι-ence, he says:
"All tlΊis ,yas of the gι-eatest iωportance to Westeι-n tl1oιιght. ...
As a ι-esult, tl1e entire ejJisteme ofvVesteι-n cιιltuι-e found its funda-
ιnental anangements ιnodified" (ΟΤ, 54). Tl1ere is, ωoι-eover,
Foucaιιlt's freqιιently cited explicit stateωent: 'Ίη any given cιιl­
ture and at any giνen moιnent, theι-e is alν,ιays only one episte1ιιe
that defines the conditions of possibility of all knoνvledge ... "
(ΟΤ, 168). In fact, this saωe soι-t ofνie>Ι' is pι-esent in the defini-
tion of an episteωe that Foιιcault offers in ΑΚ itself. It is, he says,
"the totality of ι-elations tl1at can be discoνeι·ed, for a given pe-
ι-iod, bet,Yeen the sciences" (ΑΚ, 191). Tl1eι-e is suι-ely ιηιιch
moι-e than an "absence of ωethodological sign-posting" that
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Ι

leads Foιιcault's readeΓs to think that he is making global claiιηs

aboιιt the tlιoιιght of an entiΓe peΓiod.
Α ωοΓe lιonest ι-esρonse v.roιιld be to adιηit fΓankly that, on
one leνel, QT does offeΓ
a highly inteι-esting and stiιnulating
conψι-ehensiνe constnιctive histoι·y of vVestern thoιιght since
tlιe Renaissance. Ν ο doιιbt this ilistOI)' is 11igilly conjectιπal and
based ιnore on Foιιcault's intιιitions than on solid evidence, and
no cloιιbt ιηuclι of it '"'ill not 1νitlιstand close scnιtiny. Ηο1-Ι'eνeΓ,
tlιis cloes not ιnean that it is 1νorthless. The valιιe of s1νeeρing
lιistoι·ical constrιιctions sιιch as Foιιcaιιlt's is precisely as soιιrces
ο[ frιιitfιιl sιιggestions rather than as ιιltiιnately accuΓate geneΓal­
izations. As J. Η. Hexter lιas ρointecl out, the stΓiking and spec-
LaculaΓ claiιns of constrιιctiνe history aΓe alnιost alv,rays refuted
by cletailed studies of sρecific issιιes. 6 But such refιιtation is fΓe­
quently follσ1-vecl by 1νlιat HexteΓ calls a "reconstΓuction" in
1νhiclι the constrιιctive clainιs retunι in a ιnοι-e ciιτuωsσibed
and qιιalified fonη. Tlιe νa!ιιe of Foιιcault's constΓuctiνe lιistoΓy
lies, then, not in its initial accuΓacy bιιt ίη its ability to stiιηιιlate a
fωitfιιl process of σiticisιη and Γeconstrιιction. It must be adωit­
tecl, lιωvever, that, in contrast to Foιιcault's woι-k on ιnadness
(and also his lateΓ VI'OΓk Oll tlιe prίson ancl sexιιality), 0Τ has not
yet ρrovicled a ιηajor stiιηιιlιιs to fιιι-theΓ historical work.7 It
tlιerefore ι-eιηains to be seen wlιetlιeι- it v,rill be jιιstified by its
refutations.
We now tιιι-η to OTs tι-eatιηent of the ιnodern eρisteιηe and
tlιe place in it of the hιιιηaη sciences. This 1-vill be followed by a
cliscιιssion of the book's ιηethodologγ and an assessιnent of its
criticallιistory of the huωan sciences.

G. J.Η. Hexter, Οιι Histoτiaτιs (CambΓidge, l\-Iass.: Harνard Uniνersity Press,

1979), 5-6. .
7· One important exception is Ian Hacking, Tlιc Eιιιeη;cncc of Pτobabilil)• (CaΠ1-
bΙ·iclge: Cambridge Uniνersity Press, 1975).
 5

ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS:

11. ΤΗΕ R1SE AND FALL OF ΜΑΝ

The modern episteme

As is tl1e case witl1 any episteme, tl1at of tl1e modern age involνes
a fundamental reorςlering of ι-eality, a new 'vay of regarding
tl1ings and their interrelations. The basic realities are no longer
eleιnents related to one another by identities and differences in
tl1eir pι-operties. Foucault presents them as ι-ather "ω·ganic stι-uc­
tιιι-es," connected to one anotheι- by analogies bet,νeen tl1eiι­
stnιctuι-es and hence between tl1eiι- functions. As a ι-esult, he
says, the essential Γeality of tl1ings is not located in tl1e continu-
oιιs seΓies that they foι-m in an ideal conceptual space. It is found
ι·atl1eι- in their existence as disσete structuΓes. FuΓtl1eΓ, theiΓ
similarities of structω·e aΓe not due to "their adjacency in a classi-
ficatoη' table [but to] tl1e fact that they aι-e close to one anotheι­
in a tenψoral succession" (218). Α thing is vΙ'hat it is not because
of its place in tl1e ideal classification system but becaιιse of its
ρlace ίη real histOlΎ· The οΓdeΓ of conσetely existing things is
fΓom no'v ση deteΓmined not by ideal essences outside tl1em but
bγ tl1e l1istorical foΓces buΓied νvitl1in tl1em.
Coπesponding to tl1is ne'v conception of orc1er, tl1ere is, Fou-
caιιlt ιnaintains, a neνv conception of the sign, one that displaces
tl1e centΓal lΌle tl1e Classical Age gave to representation. He

181
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

therefore speaks of modernity as closely tied to a "decline" or

"failure" of representation. In this regard, hoννever, it is crucial
to keep ίη mind that Foucault does not mean that the modern
episteme eliminates representation as a function of thought. Rep-
resentation still has a crucial place in the modern conception of
signs (as well as of language and of knoΊNledge). His point is just
that it is no more an unquestioned, self-justifying starting point;
it is no longer simply accepted as a function identical to thought
itself.
Rather, representation must be understood and grounded in
terms of something other than itself. This is because "representa-
tion has lost the poweι- to provide a foundation ... for the links
that can join its various elements together. Ν ο composition, no
decomposition, no analysis into identities and differences can
now justify the connections of representations one to another"
(238-39). The power of representation to connect must instead
be sought 'Όutside representation, beyond its immediate visibil-
ity, in a sort of behind-the-scenes world even deeper and more
dense than representation itself" (239).
Foucault sees Kant's project of critique as a primary focus of
this new view of representation. Kant allows that soιne forms of
knowledge- that is, empirical ones- are essentially representa-
tional. But he does not accept the Classical assunψtion that all
thought (and hence all knowledge) is by its very nature represen-
tational. His critique "questions representation ... ση the basis
of its rightfullimits" and thereby "sanctions for the first time ...
the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside tli.e space of
representation" (243). Thus, the entire system ofrepresentation,
which, for the Classical Age, is the necessaι-y form of thought
and reality as such, appears, to Kant's critical eye, as just a par-
ticular form of thought and reality that needs to be grounded ίη
something more fundamental. Philosophies based ση the uncriti-
cal acceptance of representation are simply systems of dogmatic
metaphysics. However, Foucault notes that, ννhether or not it
was his intention, Kant's Ί'Vork also 'Όpens up ... the possibility
of another metaphysics; one ΊNhose purpose Ίνill be to question,
apart from representation, all that is the soυrce and origin of
representation." Tl1is, as we shall see, is the root of the varioυs
nineteenth-century "philosophies of Life, of the 'ι\lill, and of the
Word" that develop in the wake of Kant's cι-itical phi1osophy
(243)·
 τΙ-ΙΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π

Tlιe ne1ν viev.•s of oΓder and of sigηs had, in Foucault's view,

ωajοι· consequences for the modeι-n conception of knov.•ledge.
He thinks that the single ιnost iιηpoι-tant developωent was a
fragιnentation of the field of knoΙνing. Fοι- tlιe Classical Age,
knov.•ledge foπned a lιoωogeneous Ινhole, Ιvith eaclι doωain
(froιn ιnatlιematics to plιilosoplιy ιο empi1·ical sciences) jιιst a
paΓticιιlaΓ foπn of the geneΓal science of οΓdeι-. Το know, in any
doιnain, \Ι•as ιο constrιιct oΓdered tables of identities and diffeΓ­
ences. "Βιιt, fΓωn the nineteenth centιn-y, the episteιnological
field ... exploded i11 diffeι-ent diι-ections" (346) a11d coιιlcl 110
longeΓ be ιιncleΓstood as a lineaΓ series of inqιιiries employing
ιlιe saιne basic nιetlιod in diffeι-ent dωnains. Rather, tlιere ;νeΓe
tlυ-ee clistinct cliιnensions to tlιe space of k11ov.•ledge. One was
ιlιat of matheωatical sciences (including puΓe matheιnatics ancl
ιnatlιeιnatical plιysics), Ινlιich co11stnιct dedιιctive systeιns "link-
ing togetheι- ... evident οι- verified pΓDpositio11s" (347). Anotlιer
'Nas tlιat of 1νlιat Foιιcaιιlt calls tlιe "eιnpiΓical sciences," sιιclι as
biology, econoωics, ancl plιilology, Ινlιich ι-elate the "clisco11tin-
ιιoιιs but a11alogoιιs" eleωents of tlιe expeΓienced Ινοι-ld so as to
ι-eveal "caιιsal ι-elations a11d stnιctιιral co11stants betwee11 tlιeιn"
(347). Tlιe tlιird cliωe11sio11 was tlιat of plιilosoplιical reflection,
Ινhίclι seeks a ιιnified ιιnclerstanding of the gΓOιι11cls of knowl-
edge ancl of tlιe onleι- of Γeality.
Foιιcaιιlt sees these diνisio11s in the field of knowledge as dιιe to
tlιe clecline of ι-eρresentation. τιιe splitti11g off of plιilosoplιy as a
ωethodologically clistinct mode of ί11qιιίη is tlιe diΓect ι-esιιlt of
tlιe fact that representation is 110 longeι- tlιe ιιnqιιestionable fοΓω
of tlιoιιght and knoΙvledge. Soωe aι-eas of knoΙνledge (specifi-
cally, those dealing Ινith eιnpiΓical ι-ealities) can, he agι-ees, C011-
ιinιιe to opeΓate v.•itlιoιιt tlιemselves deali11g with tlιe qιιestion of
ιlιe groιιnds of repι-esentation. (Τhοιιglι, even these he sees as
clevelopi11g fιιndamental co11cepts that cannot be ι-edιιced to ι-ep­
resentatio11). Βιιt there is a need for a 11ew sort of ι-eflectiνe in-
qιιiι-y tlιat pΓObes tlιe oι-igi11s and basis of the ιnind's pov.•eΓS of
ι-eρι-esenting objects. Foιιcaιιlt pΓesents the split betv.•een the
nιathematical a11d tlιe eιnpiΓical sciences as a conseqιιence of a
neν1• distinction between analytic and synthetic knoΙνledge, which
itself follo>vs from tlιe qιιestioning ofι-epresentation. Fοι- the Clas-
sical Age, theΓe was 110 impoι-tant distinction between analytic (a
priω·i) and syntlιetic (a posteriori) kno>νledge. An analysis of Γep­
resentations in terms of identities and differences ;vas at the same
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

time a connection (synthesis) of them in tl1e oΓdered tables tlιat

express their essential reality. But with the moden1 refιιsal to
accept representation as the inevitable form of thoιιght and Γeal­
ity, tl1is unity of analysis and syntlιesis disappears. TheΓe is no
longeι· any basis fοι· assuDΊing that the repι-esentatiνe systeιn of
identities and diffeι-ences yielded by, say, a logical ΟΓ a nιatlιeιηati­
cal analysis v-rill expΓess the soΓts of connections that in fact consti-
tute the conαete ι-eality of tlιings. For these connections \\'Ϊll not
ίη general be those of identities and diffeι-ences but, as '\'e lιave
seen, tlιose of stι-uctuΓal and functional sinιilarities. Accoι·dingly,
the analytic knowledge of the DΊathematical and logical sciences
beconιes shaι-ply sepaι-ated fΓOm tlιe syntlιetic kno\vledge of enι­
piι-ical sciences.
Altlιough tlιe thι-ee dimensions correspond to iπeducibly dif-
ferent kinds of kno\vledge, Foιιcault notes that it is possible to
apply tlιe DΊethods of one diDΊension to the problenιs of another.
Thus, we have DΊathenιatical foι·nιulations of eιnpiι·ical sciences
such as biology and econoιnics and pΓOjects fοι- foι-nιalizing
thoιιglιt that conιbine mathenιadcs and pl1ilosophy. He also ι-e­
fers to effoΓts to clevelop philosophies tlιat eDΊploy enψiΓical
concepts suclι as life and production (laboι·) and to plιilosoplιical
analyses of tlιe foιιnclations of enιpiι-ical sciences.

Philosophy
Foιιcaιιlt notes that nιodeι-n philosophical Γeflection takes tlπee
diffeι-ent forιns, corresponcling to tlπee diffeι-ent approaches to
tlιe qιιestion of ι-epΓesentation. Repι-esentation is essentially a ι·ela­
tion between a subject and tlιe objects it tlιinks ancl expeι-iences.
One approaclι to a plιilosoplιical account ofι-epresentation begins
fι-οηι the side of the expeι-iencing sιιbject and seeks in it the condi-
tions for the possibility of objects of repΓesentation. Heι-e the idea
is tlιat the nιind is a tπinscendental ι-eality tl1at constitutes tlιe
objects of ι-epι-esentative kno'Nledge. This, of course, is tlιe ap-
pι-oaclι taken by Kant in lιis transcendental philosophy of the
subject. But Foucaιιlt notes that it is also possible to approaclι tlιe
question fronι the side of tlιe object. Here tlιe idea is to find in the
object tlιe conditions oftlιe possibility ofthe sιιbject's ι-epΓesenta­
tίonal experience, tlιeΓeby developing a tΓanscendental plιiloso­
phy of the object. Such philosopl1ies particιιlω-ly focus ση Hfe,
laboι-, and language, whiclι, as -ι;ve 'vill see, aΓe ίntΓOdιιcecl in tlιe
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π

empirical sciences as nonrepι·esentational sources of repι-esenta­

tional systerns. Τhιιs, life, laboι-, ancl langιιage define fields of
'vhat \Ve might terιη "tι-anscendental objectivity ," opposite poles
to Kant's field oftι-anscenclental subjectivity. The ι-esιιlt is a seι-ies
ofphilosophical systeιns (fοι· example, Schopenhaueι-'s) tl1at ωay
sιιperficially appear to be reversions to precritical ωetaρhysics.
Βιιt Foucault aι-gιιes that ίη fact tl1ey aι·e siωρly anotl1eι· way of
taking the transcendental ω.-η introclιιced by Kant.
Both of the above ρhilosophical aρp.-oaches assιnne ιhat there
is a need to connect tl1e ι-eρresentations ίη terωs of wl1ich our
exρe.-ience occurs to either a sιιbject or an object ιhat lies oιιtside
tl1at experience but gι-ou"nds its possibility. Howeveι-, Foιιcault
ι)oints οιιt anotheι- oρtion: sinψly to restι-ict ourselves to οuι·
exρeι-ience, YΙ'ith no effo.-t to pΓOvide it ννitl1 any transcendental
g1·oιιnding. Tl1is aωounts to acceρting what Kant woιιld call tl1e
"ρhenoωenal" 1νorld as tl1e only doωain of ν,rllich we l1ave any
kno\vledge. This, Foucaιιlt says, is ρositivisω, tl1e tl1ird forω of
modern ρl1ilosopl1ical ι-eflection. Like transcendental philoso-
pl1ies of tl1e object, positivisn1 ιnight seeω to be a reversion to
Classical ωodes of thougl1t. Is it not, after all, tl1e identification
of .-ealiιy witl1 tl1e 1voι-ld of reρι-esentations? Should we not,
tl1erefore, rega.-d it as a ωeι-e revival of the eιnpiricist philoso-
ρl1ies of the Classical Age? Althoιιgh Foιιcaιιlt does not .-aise tl1is
question, he ωight resρond by ωaintaining that it is not ρossible
to sepaι-ate positiνisω fιΌω tl1e critical tιιrn tl1at it .-ejects. The
point would be that, once this tιπη has been ωade, theι-e aι-e, in
contrast to the Classical Age, alteι-natives to regarding thougl1t as
ωe.-ely a systeω of repι-esentations. Positiνisωωay ωaintain that
in fact this is all our thought is, tl1at theι-e is nothing beyond the
pl1enoιnenal realn1. But it does so in a context tl1at, in contι-ast to
tl1e Classical Age, at least allo\vs the possibility of otl1eι· con-
stι-uals of thougl1t. Of coιιrse, the positivist can tι-y to exclιιde
tl1ese otl1er constι-ιιals (as, fοι· exanψle, ιneaningless). But hovv
can he do tl1is except by ωethods (for exaωple, the aρpeal to a
pΓinciple of veι-ification) that theωselves go beyond the re-
sou.-ces of thougl1t liωited to the phenoιnenal Γealω? Τhιιs, ρosi­
tivisω seeωs to face the alteι-native of eitheι- ωaking the ωeι-ely
dogωatic asseι-tion that tl1oιιght is to be identified with represen-
tation οι- else falling into incoheι-ence by attenψting to establisl1
tl1e assertion. In either case, it is sustained (although as an essen-
tially ιιnstable ρhilosophy) by the ωoclern, not the Classical,
186 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

episteme. In this way, Foucault mightjιιstify joining positivism to

"cήticism" (transcendental plιilosophy of the subject) and "meta-
physics" (transcendental plιilosophy of the object) to foΓm the
"triangle" of modern philosophical thoιιght (245).

Modern empirical sciences

Foucault says very little about the mathematical dimension of
modern kno1vledge but has a substantial discussion of the empiri-
cal sciences of biology, economics, and philology, paralleling his
earlier tι-eatments ofnatιιι-al history, analysis of>vealth, and g·en-
eι-al gι-aιnmar. (This is pι-esumably because the empiι-ical do-
mains aι-e faΓ ηιοι-e relevant to an understanding of the niodern
huιnan sciences and perhaps because the natuι-e of the modeι-n
episteme is more shaι-ply ι-evealed in them.) Like his treatment
of the Classical empirical clomains, Foucault's discussions lιere
are concenιed, first, to slιo1v that modenι biology, economics,
and philology coπespond to sharp bι-eaks in tlιe lΊistoιΎ of
thouglιt and aι-e not meι-ely (ωοι-e successfιιl) extensions ofpι-evi­
ous ways of thinking. He also attempts to sho>v, as before, tlιat
certain controversies Γegarded as funclamental by historians aι-e
just alteι-native manifestations of tlιe same arclιaeological struc-
ture of tlιouglH.

Ε cononι ic.s

In Foucaιιlt's accoιιnt of tlιe Classical analysis of Ιvealth, valιιe is

understood in tenns of representation. TlΊis is becaιιse tlιe eco-
nonιic valιιe of a commoclity is essentially related to tlιe systenι of
exchange. According to tlιe Plιysiocrats, comnιodities lιaνe value
only as possible objects of exchange; accoι·ding to the ιιtilitarians,
tlιeir initial valιιe is inσeased tlπoιιgh exclιange. But exclιange
is a systenι of ι-epresentation; tlιings enter into it only by being
represented by money, >~•lιiclι itself has νalιιe only insofar as it
represents. Tlιe decisiνe bΓeak of ιnodern econoιnics ΙYith the
Classical approach is due to its ι-econception of econonιic valιιe
as due to tlιe prodιιctiνe po1veι- of laboι- ratlιeι· than to any con-
nection with ι-epι-esentation. Foιιcaιιlt tl1inks that tlιe initial step
in the diι-ection of the ιnodern view >vas taken by Aclaιn Sιnith,
wlιen he employed laboι- as an absolute ιneasιJΓe ofthe valιιe that
a commodity has in tlιe sγsteιn of exchang·e. Fω· Snιith, this νalιιe
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π

was not ωeasιιι-ed by tl1e ιnoney οι- tlιe eqιιiνalent aωount of

goocls tlιat >vould repΓesent the coιnωodity in an excl1ange bιιt
by the aιnount of labor needed to produce it. 11-fοΓeονeΓ, Sιnith
clid not (as hacl earlieι- tllinkers •νlιο eωployed the concept) cle-
fine laboι- in teΓnιs of the neecls and desiι-es that aΓe repΓesented
by coωωoclities ίη ιlιe systeιn of exchange. He used it as an
iιτedιιcible ιneasιιre of valιιe. Το tlιis extent, Foucaιιlt sees hiιn
nιoνing beyond a pιιι-ely ΓepΓesentational vieΊN of>vealth. On the
otheΓ hancl, Foucaιιlt lιolcls tlιat Snιith neveΓ decisiνely bΓOke
>vitlι tlιe Classical appωach. Even thoιιglι he νie>vecllaboΓ as the
ιιιeαs'Ι.ι?·e of a conιιnodity's valιιe, he still held tlιat tlιe conυnoclity
lιad νalιιe only becaιιse of its connection "'iNith the ΓepΓesenta­
ιional systenι of exclιange.
On Foιιcault's vie>v, tlιe decisive bΓeak occιιπed only >νitlι Ri-
caΓdo, >vlιo presented laboι- not only as tlιe nιeasιιι-e of valιιe bιιt
a!so as the sole sοιιι-ce ofvalue. Fωnι this point on, tlιings ceasecl
to lιave econonιic valιιe becaιιse tlιey coιιld be traded for nιoney
ΟΓ otlιeι- coωnιodities tlιat repΓesent tlιenι in the systeιn of ex-
clιange. Tlιey had νalιιe because (and to tlιe extent that) people
>vorked to pι-oduce thenι. "Value lιas ceased to be a sign, it lιas
becoωe a pωject" (254).
Foιιcault sees this new view of value basecl on laboι- as lιaving
tlιree fundaωental conseqιιences fοι- the new science of econωn­
ics. First, it leads to a ne>v conception of econoωic histoι-y as a
linear caιιsal seι-ies. Fοι- Classical analysis of >vealth, econonιic
"lιistoι-y" is ωeΓely a cyclical repetition of seqυences of events -
for exanιple, inσeased cleιnand caιιsing lιiglιer pΓices, caιιsing
less deωand, caιιsing lo>ver prices, caυsing, once again, inσeased
cleωand. This is because valυe is al>vays Γelated to the systenι of
exchange, in wlιich any clιanges in νalυe (for exanι_ι1le, ofωoney
or of cωnωodities) aι-e alιvays coπelated •~·itlι inverse changes in
otheι- values. Since the systeω always inνolνes only a finite nιιω­
ber of coπelated values, changes can be only cyclical. FοΓ Ri-
caι-clo, by contΓast, tl1e value of a conιnιodity is detennined by
sωnething outside the cyclical systenι of exclιange: tlιe qιιantity
oflabor needed to pι-odιιce tlιe conυnodity. Moι-eoνer, this qυan­
ιity of laboι- itself depends on the available "fonns of pι-odυc­
ιion" suclι as tlιe tools υsed, tlιe systeω of the division of laboι-,
and the aιnount of capital invested ίη the pι-odιιction pι-ocess.
FιΙΓtlιeι-, tlιe fοι-ωs of pΓOduction lιave theιnselνes been pΓO­
clιιced by previous laboι-, >vlιich itself depended on pΓeνίοιιs
188 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

forωs of production, and so on. Therefore, current values are

the result of a linear series of causes that extends back ίη tίωe
ίndefinitely. This ωeans that econoωίc deYelopωents, which de-
pend essentially ση changes ίη the values of coωωodities, are
now viewed as occurring in the linear succession of histoήcal
tiωe. ''All value is deterωined, not according to the instruωents
that perωit its analysis, but according to the conditions of pro-
duction that have brought it into beίng.... The mode of being
of economics is no longer linked to a siωultaneous space of
differences and identities, but to the tίωe of successive produc-
tions" (255-56). Not that the systeω of exchange, defiήed in
terωs of 1·epresentation, ceases to exist. But it now depends on
labor to produce the valuable coωmodities that it circulates. ''Af-
ter Ricardo, the possibility of exchange is based upon labour;
and henceforth the theory of production ωust always precede
that of circulation" (254).
Α second fundaωental consequence of. the role of labor in
ωodern economics is a new conception of man as an econoωic
agent. Since economic values are created by the historical forces
of production, ωan as seeking and depending ο η these values is
now regarded as dependent on these forces. The role of huωan
beings in the analysis of wealth was exhaιιsted by their capacity
to form representations of tl1ings that they needed or desired.
Modern economics deals with the factors that have caιιsed ωen
to forω sιιch representations- for exaωple, with the baιτenness
of nature that forces ιιs to work, with the bodily deficiencies and
the external threats that liωit our ·ability to prodιιce. Conse-
qιιently, it presents a view of ωan not available for a Classical
analysis that reqιιired him only as a beareι· of representations.
This is ωan as a finite being strιιggling in an indifferent or even
hostile world. ''H01no oeconorι~icus is not the hιιωaη being 'vho
represents his own needs to hiωself, and the objects capable of
satisfying them; he is tl1e hιιman being 'vho spends, weaι-s οιιt,
and wastes his life ίη evading the imminence of death" (257).
Modern economics is ultimately based not on an analysis of rep-
resentations but on an "anthropology" of human finίtιιde.
The thίrd conseqιιence involves the relation of the ne'v lineaι­
tiωe of economics to the finitude of men. Tl1e history of laboι­
is a history of inaeasing l1ιιman want as population increases
and resources diminisl1. Consequently, as time goes by, human
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF ΊΉΙΝGS Π 189
beings become increasingly confronted with their limitations.
"The moι·e man nιakes hiinself at lιome in the heart of the
woι·ld, ιhe further he advances in his possession of nature, the
moι·e strongly also does he feel tlιe pι-essιιre of his finitude, and
tlιe closer lιe comes to lιis 01-νη deatlι" (259). Accordingly, eco-
noωic histoι-y is nο1ν seen as clirected toward soιne sort of con-
clιιsion, in \\'hich ιnen 1vill encoιιnter the ιιltimate consequences
of their ωateriallinιitations. Here, ho1νever, tlιeι·e are two diι·ec­
tions taken by modern economic tlιt?!!gh.t.,_!{1cardo himself takes
the-pessimίsElc view that the end result of economic h~ will
·qe the stabilization of mankind in a permanent state of scarcιty.
\Yfarx, 'pn the otheι- lιand. :offers an optimistic vision according
~ο wlikl1,1i"Γffie-very poίnt of utmost scarcίty, when human
finitιιde lιas rea.ch.e.cLthe.-extr-emiψ.Qf-its-distFe-ss;-t:lιere· ·w-ill..acis..e..
a new consciousness among men. "this will be q-n awareness that
thΠoject conaίίion to which they lιave come is not tlιe inevita-
ple fate of their finitude but just an "alienated" form of it tlιat
can be overcome by. a r~<:lical transforro.aιίOILO.Le.c.onomic aD d..
social arrangements.
Accoι·ding to I•'oϊicaulι, tlιen, both Marx and Ricardo see eco-
nomic life as the linear lιistory of finite man's struggle to survive
tlιΙΌugh lιis labor. Moreover, botlι see tlιis lιistory as moving
toward a cιιlminating point at wlιich man will face the ultimaιe
conseqιιences of lιis finitude. Howeveι-, Ricaι-do sees this culmi-
nating point as a meι·e dead end that makes permanent tlιe
scaι·city against which ιnan has so long struggled. Marx, on tlιe
other lιand, sees it as the end of scaι-city and the beginning of a
ne1v form of huιnan existence. These nvo lines of tlιought aι·e
just t"~νο different ways of developing the same basic picture of
economic reality; both aι·e founded ση the identical aι·chaeologi­
cal structure of ωodern economics. Therefoι·e, no matter how
ι·evolutίonary Marx's ideas nιay be as clιallenges to the poweι· of
tlιe ruling class and to the economic tlιeories that sιιpport this
power, tlιey do not represent a ι·adically new foι·m of thought.
''At the deepest level of Westeι·n knoΙvledge, Marxisιn intΙΌ­
duced no real discontinιιity" (261). It is, of course, opposed to
bourgeois economic views. Βιιt this opposition is nιerely a sur-
face effect. The opposition and the contι·oversies following from
it "ιnay lιave stiιτed ιιp a few waves and caused a few suι-face
ripples; but they are no moι-e tlιan stoι-nιs in a childι-en's pad-
190 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

dling pool" (262). At the level of archaeological analysis, Marx-

ism is not a revolutionary event but one that fits exactly into the
structure defined by the modern episteιne. 1

Biolog)ι

Like the analysis of,vealth, Classical natural histω-y was based on

a system ofrepresentation: the taxonomic tables in which species
were classified in terms of their identities and differeΏces. The
move to modern biology begins, according to Foucault, with the
introdιιction (by e.g., Lamarck) of the notion of organic structu1·e.
However, Lamarck (as well as Jussieu and Vicq d'Azyr) em-
ployed organic structure merely as a means of establishing char-
.:ιcter, which was itself still understood as the ι-epresentation of a
species' place in the taxonomic tables. Foucault therefore main-
tains that Lamarck and the others were still (like Adam Smith in
his analysis of wealth) essentially tied to the Classical episteme.
He holds that the decisive break, constituting modern biology,
was rather effected by Cuvier, who was the fiι-st to give oι-ganic
stι-ucture a role prior to and independent of taxonomic classifica-
tion. Fω· Cuvier, the structure of an organ is to be undeι-stood in
terωs of the function that the ω·gan perforιns. In dι-awing up a
list of species, what is of iωportance is no longer identities and
differences in plants' and animals' pΓOperties but only functional
similarities in their organs. Thus, organs (e.g., gills and lungs)
that have no eleωents at all in coωn1on may nonetheless be
grouped together on the basis of theiι- similar functions. Like-
wise, organisωs themselves will be classified on the basis of their
siωilarities as functional systeωs.
In this way, Foucault says, VΙ'e arrive at the ωodeι-n definition
of a living thing as a functional systeω. Given this definition, the
propeι-ty of life is η ο longer just one categω-y of natιιι-al classifica-
tion. Rather, all classifications express subdivisions of life (de-

1. In aπ intervie\Ι' given afteι- the publication ofOT, Foucaιιltnotes that his claims
about Marx's lack of origίnality may apply only to the domaίn of economics. 'Ί
do not believe that [IΙ'farx's] economίc analyses go beyond the epistemologica!
space set up by Ricardo. On the other hand, one might suppose that Marx
introduced into the historical and political conscίousness of men a radical break.
and that the Marxist theoι-y of soόety indeed inaugιιrated an entirely ne"'
epistemological field." Raymond Bellour, "Deuxieme entretien a\'ec Miche!
Foucault," in R. Bellouι·, Le livτe de.s a1ιlτes (L'Herne, 1971), 192. The inteι-\'ΪeΙI'
originally appeared in Lettι·esfranςaises, June 15, 1967.
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS ΙΙ

fined in terιηs offunctional system); to clefine a thing's species is

to specify the precise sω·t of functional system that it is. As a
result, life becomes tlιe category that defines the objects of bio-
logi.cal inquiry as such, and ωodeι-n biology beconιes, in contrast
to Classical natιιrallιistory, the scie1~ce of life.
Foucaιιlt characterizes the life 'γίtlι Ινlιίch biology after Cιιvieι­
is concerned in tenns of three key featnres. Tlιe first is tlιe
cliscontinιιity of its fοι-ωs. There is no possibility of oι-cleι-ing tlιe
vaι-iety of fιιnctional systeωs (living things) in a continιιoιιs se-
ries. Every living thing is a coωplex system of oι-gans, each of
,;vhich perforιns a function related to the suι-viYal of the organ-
isnι as a νvlιole. Some oι·ganisωs aι-e ωore coιnplex tlιan otheι-s in
the sense tlιat tlιey lιaYe ηιοι·e oι-gans exeι-cising ωore fιιnctions.
Βιιt ιηοι-e coωplexity in this sense is a basis for no ωore tlιan
loose groιιpings of oι-ganisωs into broad categories. It is not, foι­
exaωple, possible to ωake an ιιnaωbigιιous deteι-nιination of the
nιιinbeι- of ω·gans and. of tlιe ηιιωbeι- of fιιnctions each peι-­
forωs. Theι-e ιnay be more precise Ί-Ι'ays of oι·deι·ing oι-gans
tlιeωselYes (e.g., accoι·ding to hov,r νvell they perform tlιeir fιιnc­
tions). Βιιt these will not provide aπ oι-deι-ing of speόes, since
one sort of organ will be sιιpeι-ior in one species, anotlιer in
anotlιeι-. As a ι-esult, tlιe continιιum of Classical order is ι-eplacecl
by a cliscontinυoιιs pι-olifeι-ation of species of life.
The second key featιιι-e of life is its connection witlι environ-
ιnent. For 11atιιral histoι-y, disti11ctio11s of species ννeι-e explained
by preestablished diffeι-ences expι-essed i11 tlιe taxonoωic tables.
Tlιe differentiation of species was not prodιιced by any exteι-nal
caιιsal factors opeι-ati11g on real plants a11d aniωals. Βιιt foι­
CιιYier and tlιose who came after hiιn, the separation of living
tlιings into different classes is dυe to the different v,•ays that
living things are linked to tlιe sιιn-oυ11di11gs 011 whiclι tlιey de-
ρend for their sιnΎiYal. Exteι-nal factoι·s aι-e 110 longeι-, as for
11atιιral history, mere occasio11s for the aρpeara11ce of species
wlιose 11atιιι-es and inteπelations are already detennined by
tlιeiι- place in the system of repι-ese11tation. For ωoder11 biology,
tlιe natιιre of a species is causally dependent on the e11Yironιnent
in wlιiclι its ωembeι-s exist.
Tlιe thiι-d fιιndamental chaι-acteι-istic of life is its teωpoι·ality.
Pι-ecisely becaιιse living things are scatteι-ed into discontinιιoιιs
gωιιps that haYe been formed by the pressιιre of enviιΌ11mental
forces, they are essentially tied to the time in which these forces
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

and their effects exist. For the Classical Age, livίng things weι·e,
so to speak, in but not ·essentially of tiιne. Individuals existed
teιnporally, of course, but their natures, the geneΓa and species
to which they belonged, Ί-vere not deterιnined by the coιιrse of
teιnporal events. In this sense, natural "history" was profoιιndly
nonhistorical. With Cuvier, however, life is essentially tied to
time; it is a tl1oroιιghly histoΓical reality.
Foucault argues that it is this temporality and histoΓicity oflife
that provides tl1e basis for tl1e introduction (by Darv-rin ancl Wal-
lace) of the idea of evolιιtion, whicl1, as we have seen, he regaΓds
as totally foreigr;ι to Classical thought. It may seeιn that Foucaιιlt
is obviously wrong to point to tl1e work of CιινίeΓ as the basis of
evolutionaι-y theory. He was, as is well known, a "fixist" who
opposed Laιnarck's ideas about tl1e developιnent of species.
Doesn't this show tl1at we shoιιld follow the standard histω~ies of
biology ίη ι·egarding Cuvier's thoιιght as a throwback to earlier
tiιnes and Lamarck as the trιιe precursor of Darwiι1? Foιιcault,
however, argues tl1at the standard view heι-e is very ιnistaken.
Tl1ere are, he admits, some superficial reseιnblances bet,νeen La-
ιnarck's ideas and tl1ose ofDar,νin. But tl1ey differ fundamentally
and injιιst tl1e way that, according to Foιιcaιιlt, Classical ideas of
development (advanced by Diderot and otl1ers) differed froιn
genιιinely evolιιtionaΓy tl1ougl1t. Specifically, Lamarck conceives
tl1e development ofliving tl1ings as "an ιιnbroken pωcess of im-
provement" tlπoιιgh wl1ich the stages of a preestablisl1ed 'Όnto­
logical continιιity" were gΓadually unfolded (275). His vieΊ-vs, ac-
cordingly, are, as we saνν Foucault argιιe above ίη a different
context, sqιιarely within the Classical episteme of natιπal histωγ
CιιvieΓ rejected LamaΓck's clevelopιnentalism,. bιιt tl1is for Foιι­
caιιlt was meΓely a consequence of his bΓeak ννitl1 Classical
thought about living beings. It is also tnιe that he tι·eated species
as fixed and did not pιιt fonvaΓd any evolιιtionaΓy νiew of theιn.
Βιιt Foucaιιlt holds that his fixism is jιιst one >νay of constnιing,
froιn tl1e modern viewpoint, the l1istoΓicity oflife. Just as Ricardo
l1eralcled a fιιture peΓmanent state of economic stability, so
Cιινίer saw hiιnself as describing a present peΓmanent state of
biological stability. But in each case, the stability ;vas cleteι-minecl
by the very foι-ces tl1at make labor ΟΓ life radically 11istorical. Dar-
win, like Marx, introduced a different constnιal of this historicίty.
Βιιt his approach is made possible by tl1e saιne general conception
oflife (as essentially tempoΓal and llistoι·ical) that 'νas the basis of
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π 1 93
Cuvier's νvork. In suω, Cuvier and Danνin both belong to the
modern episteωe, Lanιaι-ck to ιlιat of the Classical Age. Once
again, Foιιcault concludes, standard lιistoιi.cal accounts of"funda-
nιental" disagreements (and aι-gιιωents) aι-e ιιndeι-mίned by ar-
clιaeological analysis.

Ρ Jιilolof5)1

Foucault says that tlιe development of modern philology was simi-

laι- to tlιat ofbiologγ, altlιough it ρroceedecl moι-e slowly because
of the ρaι-ticιιlarly central place of language in tlιe Classical
epίsteme. An initial ωove a>vay fωm representation- but still
(like tlιe parallel work of Sιnitlι and Lamaι-ck) 'vithin tlιe Classical
episteme- was inνolνed in the woι·k ofWilliaιnJones and otheι·s
on inflections. But for Foucaιιlt tlιe decisiνe bι-eak that sepaι-ates
philology from general gramιnar coωes only 'vith Bopp. For
Βοpρ woι-ds do, of coιιrse, lιaνe representatiνe.fιιnctions; we can
and do ιιse them to expι-ess 'vlιat >νe ιnean. Βιιt these fΊιnci:ions no
longer define tlιeir basic reality as words. Ratheι-, words are ιιn­
derstood as first of all elements of a graιnmaιical system defined
'by the ry.les governing tlιeir use. Tlιeίr ρower to represent derives
entiι-ely fωm tlιeiι- roles in tlιis system.
Foιιcaιιlt specifies modeΓn philology's ne'v conception of words
in fοιιι· of its main featuτes. The fiι-st is its nιethods of distingιιish­
ing one langιιage froιn another. Fοι· tlιe Classical.Ag~, this was
done by ι-efeι-ence to tlιe different ways that langιιages analyzed
.the_thoug.b._tUb.~y_:ι;:.~_ρr~ented. For ιnodern..e_hilology, howeνer:
@_!!gV~g~s are distingιιished on the basis of differences in _the .
.foι:!P.-al feaφres of their granιmars. Foιιcault points οιιt, fοΓ exam-
ple, that ιnιιch attention is ρaid to the diffeΓences between lan-
gιιages (e.g., Chinese) that forω coωplex expΓessions solely by
jιιxtaposing aιιtonomous gΓammatical elements and those (like
Sanskrit) that form complex expressions by inflectional modifica-
tion ofroots.}l):<πe.oY.cr, plιilology does not merely ιιse these for-
mal characteristics to distingιιish langιιages from one anotlιeι·. It
also - and this is its second main featιιre- tak~.§ !hese characterjs-
tics as a primaι-y object of its detailed stιιdy of a langιιage. Theι-e
>vere, fοι· example, thoroιιgh stιιdies of tlιe piioiιetic ήatιιι-e of
langιιages that tι·eated tlιenι as moι-e like systems of mιιsical notes
than systenιs of νisible signs.
The tlιiι~d _distinctive featιιre of philology is its nev,( tlιeoι-y of
1 94 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLO(;y

the root. 1:-'or general grammar, primitive roots were rιouns,

names representing objects ίη man's environment. On Bopp's
analysis, the roots of· a given language can be determined en-
tirely by a study of its properties as a formal system, wίth no need
to work back to a primitive language and its initial connections
with objects. On thι~ othcr hand, phίlology does recognίze that
languagc has ίts orίgins in human existenι:e and specifically in
lωrnan cΓΓorts to con1c to tcrms with the world. This recognition
is apparcnt irι Bopp's accoιιnt οΓ thc roots οΓ verbs. 1:-Όr general
grammar, the root of all verbs was to be, \νhic-h asserted a connec-
tion between representations. All other verbs were regarded as
combinations of this assertion (attribution) and various a~jectival
n10difications (c.g., "he runs" = "hc i.~ [in a state οί] running").
Λα:ording to Bopp, however, verbs have their own roots, indc-
pendent of the copula and the reρresentative functions of adjcc-
tivcs. Moreovcr, nouns are, for Bopp, derived from verbs, so
that thc f'undaιnental conrιcction of langιιagc as a wlωle to real-
ity is effι~ι:ted l>y thc roots oiΎerl>s.
l'oucaιιlt maintains that this is of great sigrιificance becaιιse
verbal roots do not represent o~jects; they rather express the
actions and volitions of a subject. "Language is 'rooted' not ίη the
things perceived but in the active subject." This suggests that we
rcgard it as "a product of will and energy, rather than of the
Ineinory tl1at duplicates representation" (2go). In this way, lan-
guage becomes that which "manifests and translates the funda-
mental will of those who speak it" - that is, "the fundamental will
that keeps a whole people alive" (2go). Thίs leads to a view that
tics the development of languages and hence of civilizations not
to what elites have learned but to what peoples as a whole
desire- not, in sum, to knowledge but to freedom. Thus, philol-
ogy, wiΊich seerns so <listant Γrom praι:tical aΓΓairs, links 'Ίan­
guage and the free destiny of men ίη a profound kinship" anιl
hence comes "to have profound political reverberations" (291 ).
The fourth fco.tιιre of plΙilology is its ncw π1cthod f'or dcfining
"systems of kinship betwccn languagcs" (291). Based on the
thcory οΓ roots, whi<:h allowed their determination ίη purely f'or-
mal terms, this method is similarly able to chart the relationships
bet ween langιιo.gcs without rcΓercnce to their rcprescntative chaι·­
acter. 1:-'urtherrnore, study οΓ thcsc rclationships rcveals laws of
linguistic change tho.ι enable philologists ιο draw conclusions
about tcrnporal relations between languages. 1:-Όr general gram-
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π 1 95

mar the sιιccessίon oflanguages ίη time- like the tempoι-al series

of species- is merely a matter of the seqιιential appearance of
fonns already deterωined apart fτοω time and its laws. But now
the mιιtatίons oflangιιage folloν,r la>Ι'S ofteιnporal sιιccession that
are part of pllilology's accoιιnt of their inner stnιcture. Tl1us, like
livίng beings, languages become essentially historical realities. In-
deed, Foucaιιlt ιnaintains that, since tl1e 11istoΓicity of languages
deι-ives froιn laws of development that are essential to it, its his-
tory necessaήly iπvolνes eνolutionary change. By contrast, as we
have seen, living tl1ings do not evolve because of principles built
into their veη' nature as living but because of contingent relations
bet>Ι'een them ancl their environments. This is why theι-e is no
pllilological parallel to Cuvier's fixisιn.

Language and modern thought

\ιVith tl1e decline of representatίon ancl the conseqιιent fragmen-
tation of kno,vledge, langιιage, Foιιcaιιlt says, lost the central
place it had held in the Classical episteme. τl1e structure of
langιιage is no longer tl1at of knowledge as sιιcl1 (i.e., an order-
ing of representations); nor is all scientific knowίngjιιst a refine-
ment of tl1e knO>Ι7 ledge inψlicit in ordinary langιιage. Language
is now itself just 'Όne object of kno;vledge among others" (2g6).
(τhis is w.hy, in contrast to our discussion of the Classical epis-
teme, 've coιιld sketch the main features of modern knωΙ'ledge
without reference to lang·ίιage.) Ho,~τever, Foucault notes that
this "demotion" of langιιage does not mean that it has η ο special
significance for modern thought. Even thoιιgh its structure is no
more the strιιcture of kno>~•ledge, it still remains the medium
through which any knowledge mιιst be expressecl. (τhis implies,
Foιιcaιιlt says, that langιιage cannot be entirely redιιced to an
object, since it always reappeaι-s in the subject's effort to express
what he kno,vs.) However, pι-ecisely becaιιse of its histoΓical na-
ture, our ιιse of language buι-dens ιιs with meanings and presιιp­
positions that confuse and distort what we are tτying to say. We
expι-ess οιιr "tl1oιιghts in words of >Ι7 hich ['ve] are not the mas-
ters" (297).
Foιιcault discιιsses two complementary projects modern
thoιιght undertook to gain some control over language. The
first was an effort of purification νia formalization, designed to
pιιrge alien, distorting linguistic eleιnents. This included both
ιg6 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

the positivists' constructions of ideal formalized languages and

what Foucault sees as an even more radical effort (by Boole and
others) to develop a symbolic logic that would express thought
independently of any language. The second project was that of
the critical interpretation of Ianguage. Here the idea was not to
purify or replace historical Ianguage but rather to understand
the meanings that were implicit in it. The aim of such interpre-
tation (as practiced, e.g., by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud) is not,
as in the Renaissance, to discover the fundamental truth buried
in Ianguage. It is rather to reveal the myths through which we
are "governed and paralyzed" by our language.
On Foucault's view, then; fot-Ϊnalization and fu_teφretatίon­
the two great and apparently opposed modern approaches to
Ianguage - are both rooted in the new status of language as a
,bistorical reality and object of our knowledge. Moreover, the
practice of either is implicitly connected to the other. Interpreta-
.!!~n seeks to understand language as .a historical reality; but, as
we learn from philology, this reality is, in its essence, a formal
structure. Correspondingly, the project of formalization must
begin with some implicit understanding of the meaning of the
linguistic forms with which it deals. Accordingly, Foucault main-
tains that the movement of modern formalization (which culmi-
nates ίη Russell) and the movement of modern interpretation
(whίch culminates in Freud) are not radically opposed but rather
have a common origin and purpose. This explains (and presum-
ably justifies) attempts to connect them- for example, phenome-
nology's effort to express the meanίng contents of experience in
precίse discourse, structuralism's efforts to discover the pure
forms of the unconscious. Foucault notes that these complemen-
tary enterprises reveal the "common ground" (299) of phenome-
nology and structuralism in the modern episteme.
The final- and, Foucault says, most ίmportant and most sur-
prising- way in which modern thought has a special concern
with language derives from the appearance of literature. Here
''Iiterature" does not mean just any sort of artίstic writίng but
the peculίarly modern phenomenon of writing that presents
the realm of language as an entirely autonomous domain. Lit-
erature in this sense (whίch has existed "from Hδlderlin to
Mallarme and on to Antonίn Artaud," 44) is "a manifestation of
a language which has no other law than that of affirming- ίη
opposίtion to all other forms of dίscourse - its own precipίtous
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π 1 97
existence" (300). As sιιclι, literatuι-e is conceτned solely with
"tl:ι.!:: simple. act of >πiting" ii:Self. Here language is nothing but
tlιe "silent, cautious deposition of the 'voι-cl upon the 'vhiteness
of a piece of papeι- ... , wlιeΓe i1 has notlιing to say bιιt itself,
notlιing to do but shine in the bΓightness of its being" (300). In
sunι, nιodeΓn literature is language existing solely fοι· its own
sake, speaking in its o'vn Γight and about notlιing otlιeι- than
itself. fiίetzsche said that, when confl'Onted 'vith a text, we
should al,vays ask: Wb.9.. is speaking? Foucaιιlt notes tlιat nιod­
ern literature's (inιplicit) response to tlιis qυestion is given by
Mallarωe: It is the 'vords tlιenιselves.
In nιodeΓn liteΓatuΓe, accoΓding to Foucault, langιιage retuΓns
tosometlιing.like its status duΓing tlιe Renaissance. It has its own
density, its Ο>Ι'η being, as opρosed to tlιe tΓanspaΓency of Classi-
cal Γepresentational Jangιιage. Βιιt, 'vhereas Renaissance lan-
guage was ultiωately controlled and liωited by tlιe pι-inιal Text
of the world, given as God's creative word, the langιιage of nιod­
ern literatιιre is totally ιιηgι-οιιηded and wanders with "no point
of departuΓe, no end, and no pι-omise" (44).
Foιιcaιιlt points οιιt that, in spite of tlιese important areas of
modeι-n interest in langιιage, it lιas not ιιntil recently lιad the
kind of importance that v.ras earlier accoΓdecl life and laboΓ, both
of wlιich were taken as tlιe foιιndations of nineteenth-centιιι-y
efforts to pΓobe the fιιndamental meaning of hιιman existence.
This, he sιιggests, 'vas pι-obably becaιιse, wheΓeas life and labor
Ί-VeΓe tlιe objects of single scientific disciplines tlιat gave tlιeω a
ιιnified and coherent intelligibility, the stιιdy of langιιage was
from the beginning of the modeΓn eΓa dispeΓSed among a Ί-vide
range of disciplines. WheΓe life and labor weΓe studied by biol-
ogy and economics alone, the stιιdy oflangιιage was the conceι-n
of a wide range of intellectual enteΓprises, froω philology and
formallogic to hermeneιιtics and liteΓature. Βιιt now, as Ί-ve shall
see, that the ιnodeι-n episteme itself seenιs ·to be failing, v.re have
retιιrned to langιιage, tlιinking perhaps that, since ιnodern
thoιιght arose witlι the dispersion of langιιage, whatever is to
replace it will reqιιire a ι·ebirth of its-ιιnity (cf. 386). In any case,
Foιιcaιιlt maintains that qιιestions aboιιt langιιage aι-e once again
central. We ask about the natιιre of s-igns, the scope and ωeaning
of. signification, the status of literature. All these qιιestions can,
perlιaps, be sιιmmed ιιp ίη the qιιery (in 'vhich he says "the
"'lιole cιιriosity of οιιr thoιιght no'v ι-esides"): "VIllιat is langιιage
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

[and] how can we find a 'vay round it in ordeΓ to ωake it appea1·

in itself, in all its plentitude?" (3ο6). Βιιt, he says, we are unable
to ans,veΓ these questions and, νvhat is ωore, cannot even assess
the ultiωate ωeaning of the fact that 've aι-e condeωned to ask
theω. Our queries ωay be eitheι- the dawn of a ne'v era (a ne'"'
episteωe) or just the coιnpletion of the ωodern bι-eakιιp of Clas-
sical order. But, Foucault claiωs, his archaeological analysis of
ιnodern thought at least shows why 've botl1 can and ιηιιst ask
our qιιestions about language.

Man and the analytic of finitude

Althoιιgh we have suι-veyed tl1e thι·ee axes of ιnodern kno\vl-
edge- the ωatheιnatical, the pl1ilosophical, and the eιnpirical-,­
'"'e have not yet encountered the l1un1an sciences tl1at aι-e Foιι­
cault's ultiιnate conceι·n. This is because, as he puts it, these
sciences aι-e not located on any of the tl1ree axes of ιnodeι-n
knoνvledge bιιt 'vithin tl1e space of tl1e tl1ree planes tl1ey define.
Less ωetaphoι-ically, tl1e point is that the huωan sciences ιnust
be ιιndeι-stood in tenns of tl1e special relations tl1at tl1ey have to
.all tl1e diιnensions of ωodern knowledge. Tl1ey have a constant
aiιn of developing ιnatheιnatical foι·malizations; tl1ey eιnploy
models taken fωm tl1e empirical sciences; and tl1eir object is
the "being of man" tl1at is also, in a cliffeι-ent >Ι•ay, tl1e object of
philosopl1y. We will ι-etιlΓn to the connection of the huιηan
sciences '"'ith ιnathematics and the empirical sciences ofbiology,
econoωics, ancl pl1ilology. But οιη· first step ιηιιst be an undeι-­
standing of l1ow, on Foιιcault's view, ωodern pllilosophy (i.e.,
philosophy froιn Kant on) has dealt 'vitl1 tl1e "man" tl1at is also
tl1e object of the huιnan sciences.
Foucaιιlt insists that "ωan" is a pecιιliarity of ιnodeι-n thougJ.:ιt.
He says tl1at "before tl1e end of the eigf1teenth centιll'y, man did
not exist" (308) and tl1at he >vill disappear 'vitl1 th·e (appaι·ently
iωn1inent) collapse of tl1e mocleι·n episteωe. Η ον~• are 've to ιιn­
derstand these odd pωnounceωents? Tl1ere aι·e two crιιcial
points First, >ve ωust ι-ealize that Foιιcault is l1ere using mωι to
refer to huωan beings pι·ecisely as those for VΙ'I1om representa-
tions exist. The tenn does not ΓefeΓ to l1tιωan beings as a biologi-
cc;ιl species nor even to theiΓ psychological ancl social Γeality ex-
cept insofar as it invo1ves representation. Second, 'vl1en Foιιcault
speaks of ωan "existing" or "not existing" in various eras, he
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π 1 99

means tl1at the huιnan po>ver of representation is or is not an

object of knowledge for that eι-a. Tl1e claiω tl1at ωan did not
exist in tl1e Classical Age is merely a dran1atic >vay of making the
point, 'Nhich >Ι'e discιιssed above, that tl1ere >νas no way of repre-
senting representa~on itself ancl therefore no YΙ'ay of knowing
ι-epresentation <ιs one object aωong otl1eΓs. As v,re saνν, given tl1e
Classical conception. of knowledge, Γeιπesentation coιιld have
been an object of kno>vledge only by treating it as one species of
tl10Hgl1t, related by a table of identitίes and differences tO otlleΓ
such species. Βιιt this contι-aclicts the Classical identification of all
thought ΥΙ'Ϊth repΓesentation. Ho>veveι-, at._the end of the eigl1-
_teenth centuΓy, Γepresentation is no longer siωply identified
_with .~11Q];ιght, and questions can be ι-aised about its origin as a
specific fοι-ω of tl1inking. Once this happens, representation be-
coωes an object ofknowledge- tl1at is, "ωan exists." If, in soωe
successoι- to the ωodern episteωe, huωan beings are no longer
conceived as those for ΥΙ'hοω representations exist, then ωan will
have "ceased to exist," and >ve can speak of tl1e "deatl1 of ωan."
The appearance of ωan witllin the ωodeι-n episteme ωeans
tl1at the subject,ρf_repι-esentational knowledge becoωes, as sucl1,
an object of knowledge. Foucaιιlt Γecognizes fl1e eωpirical sci-
ences as one locus of sιιch knowledge. Tl1ey sl1ow l1ow the repι·e­
sentational capacities ofhuωans as living organisωs (e.g., percep-
tion), as econoωic agents (e.g., valuing), and as users oflanguage
(e.g., describing) are theωselves the causal pωducts of the forces
of life, labor, and langιιage that pι-ecede and ιnold ωan. But
ιnan cannot be ωerely an object produced by the world. He is
also soωehow the sιιbject that constitutes that world and all tl1at
is in it as objects. Foucault ωaintains that the stucly of ωan,
pΓecisely as a constituting subject, is the central concern of ωod­
eι-n philosophical refl.ection and, in another way, of the ωodern
l1uωan· sciences. He first exaωines the philosophical appωach
(in Chapter 9 of ΟΤ, "Man and his doubles") and then finally
takes ιιp the approach of the huωan sciences.
Man as an object- that is, of tl1e enψirical sciences - appeaι-s
as a finite being, liωited by the environment, forces of produc-
tion, and linguistic heritage that have forωed hίω. As Foucault
sees it, the question fοΓ ωodeΓn philosophy is how such a being
can also constίtute the woι-ld of objects ίη wl1ich it is included.
He says that the geneΓal anSYΙ'er, first proposed by Kant, is that
this is done precisely ίη virtue of the veηr finitude that charac-
200 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

terizes man as an objec:t. Kant argued that the νeιΎ factω·s

limiting our knowledge- its restriction to the forms of space
and time and to the framework of the categories - are also the
conditions for the possibility of knowledge. The constraints of
having to experience objects as spatial and temporal, as inψli­
cated in a system of causality, and so on, are also the condωons
that allow the appearance of objects in the first place. The idea
of applying this sort of approach to the specific domains of life,
labor, and language is to display particulaι- characteristics of
man's finitude as the bases of the objective reality of tl1ese do-
mains. The forces of life that form me as an ω·ganisιn aι-e giYen
to me as objects by my body; the forces of production that form
me as an economic being aι-e given by my desiι-e; the forces of
language that form my speaking and wι-iting are given by my
expression (cf. 314-15).
The philosopl1ical effort to show how this is possible is carried
out in what Foucault calls an :'analytic of finitude"- that is, a
reflection on the conditions of possibility of human finitude. The
goal of this analytic is to present man's finitude as pι-oviding its
own foundation. In Foucault's teι-minology, finitude asjoιιndi1~gis
"the fιιndamental"; finitude asjou1~ded is "the positive" (315). The
project of modern philosophy has been to discoveι- a ι-elation
between the fundamental and tl1e positive tl1at will suppω·t a
coheι-ent account ofhuman finitude's self-foundation. The diffi-
culty of the project lies in the fact that the relation mιιst somehoνν
be both one of identity (since man is one being) and diffe1·ences
(since nothing can literally pι-eα;de and pι-odιιce itself). Foucault
thinks that the efforts of modern philosophy to develop an ana-
lytic of finitude have taken thι-ee main foι-ms, coπesponding to
tln-ee different ways of taking tl1e fundamental-positive pair. One
relates man as a tι-anscendental sιιbject to man as an einpiι-ical
object; anotheι- relates man as the thinking cogito to ωan as the
unthought the cogito tΓies to gΓasp; a thiι-d ι-elates ωan as a ι-etιιrn
ofhis origin to tl1e present to ωan as a ι-etι-eat ofilis oι-igin into tl1e
past. We ννill discuss eacl1 of tl1ese efforts in turn.

The erιψirico-transcendental doτιblet

Kant gave ιιs the distinction betνveen ωan as a tι-anscendental

sιιbject,
constituting the objects of his experience, and man as
hiωself an empirical object of that expeΓience. But, on Foucault's
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS ΙΙ 201

vie1v, he was not able to gjve an adequate account of the relation-

ship bet>veen ιnan as tι-anscendental ancl ιnan as eιnpirical. One
approacl1 ιο this probleω taken by philosophers after Kant was to
reduce the transcendental to the eιnpirical. Foιιcault suggests tl1at
this approach ;vas deyelopecl in two different ways. One took our
(e1npirica1) biological knoivledge ofthe l1uιnan body as tl1e basis
of a positivistic renclition of a transcendental aestl1etic. The result
was tl1e discoνeι-y that "kno;vledge has anatoιno-physiological
conditions, that it is foι-ωed gι-adually YΙ7 ithin the stωctures of the
body" (3 19). Tl1is 1vas taken to sho;v that huωan knowleclge had
an (eιnpirical) nature that determined its cl1aΓacter and, at the
same tiιne, ιnade it an object of our eιnpiΓical knowledge. Anotl1eΓ
deνeloριnent oftl1e approach 1vas based ση histoΓical ratl1er than
biological knowledge about the huιnan condition. This led, for
exaιnple, to a Maι-xist version ofa transcendental dialectic, sl1ow-
ing "tl1at knowleclge had l1istorical, social, ΟΓ econoιnic condi-
tions; ... in sl1ort that tl1ere was a /ιist01y of huωan knowledge
whicl1 could both be given to eιnpirical knoΙvledge and prescribe
its forιns" (319).
Foucault notes tl1at, although this redιιctionist approach, in
both ofits forιns, purports to work entiι-ely at tl1e level of empiΓi­
cal objects, it pΓesupposes episteωic distinctions that seem to
ι-equire a Γeference to ωan as an iι-ι-edιιcibly tnnscendental sιιb­
ject. PaΓticularly iιnportant, he says, is the distinction between
the eιnpiΓical tωth involved in our biological and histoΓical
knowledge of emplΓical objects and tl1e truth of our pl1ilosophi-
cal discouΓse about this knowledge. Το accept these as two ine-
ducibly diffeΓent kinds of truth would of couΓse imιnediately
reinstate a shaΓp distinction between the enψiΓical and tl1e tran-
scendental. The reductionist apρΓOach mιιst, tl1erefore, find
some way of giving a single accoιιnt of both eιnpirical and philo-
sophical tΓιιth; basing the latteΓ on the forωeΓ ΟΓ vice versa.
Tl1e alternative of basing philosophical trιιth ση eιnpirical
trιιth Foucaιιlt calls "positivist," and that of basing eιnpirical
tωt.h on philosophical trιιth he calls "eschatological" (320). The
positiYist alternative says that οιιr philosophical discoιιΓse aboιιt
knowledge is itself tωe in viΓtue of trιιths aboιιt eιnpiήcal objects
(pΓesιιιnably biological or historical truths aboιιt l1ιιman beings).
The eschatological alternative says tl1at οιιΓ scientific and histoΓi­
cal accoιιnts of eιnpiΓical objects aΓe tΓue in νiΓtιιe of the truth
(once it is achieved) of οuΓ pl1ilosophical discouΓse about knowl-
202 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

edge. (Presumably, Foucault calls this alternative "eschatologi-

cal" because for it the philosophical truths that are fundamental
are nonetheless established only as the culmination of the less
fundamental process of empirical understanding.) But Foucault
regards both alternatives as se\f-defeating. On the positivist ap-
proach we set out to give a philosophical account of the possibi\-
ity of empirical truths but wind up grounding this very account
on the empirical truths that are in question. On the eschatologi-
ca\ approach we base empirical truth on philosophical truth and
thereby abandon our initial project of working solely on the leve\
of empirical objects. Foucault notes that ef'forts (by, e.g., Comte
and Marx) to carry out the reductionist project typically Auctu-
ate between positivism and eschatology. But no matter how it is
developed, he concludes, the project is one in which "pre-critical
naϊvete ho\ds undivided rule" (320).
More recently, phenomenological philosophers (Husserl and,
especially, Merleau-Ponty) have tried to treat man as an "em-
pirico-transccndcntal doublet" (322) without reducing either
term to the other. The idea is to develop "a discourse whose
tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcenden-
tal, while being directed at both" (320). Such discourse has ap-
propriately undertaken the analysis of our concrete actual expe-
rience, which seems to be a \ocus of man both as transcendenta\
subject and as empirica\ object. ''Actual experience is ... both
the space in which al\ empirica\ contents are given to experi-
ence and the original form that makes them possible in gen-
era\" (321 ). Foucault notes that the phenomenologica\ descrip-
tion of actual experience has two abso\ute starting points that
provide the basis of' its account of man: the body as experi-
enced ίη its "irreducible spatiality"and cu\ture as experienced
"ίη all the immediacy of' its sedimented significations" (321).
However, according to Foucault, the body and culture are sim-
ply man's empirical reality as part of nature and of history,
respectively; this, he says, means that phenomenology ίη fact
understands man in terms that are ultimately empirica\. For al\
the care and subtlety of its descriptions, "it is doing no more ...
than fulfilling with greater care the hasty demands laid down
when the attempt was made to make the empirica\, ίη man,
stand for the transcendental" (321). Phenomenology is, there-
fore, at root the same sort of reductive project as, for example,
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS ΙΙ 203
Marxism. Because of this, Foucault says, we should not be sur-
prised at their recent rapprochement.

The cogito and the unthought

Viewing man as irreducibly both empirical and transcendental
also requires resisting reduction of the empirical to the transcen-
dental. Foucault argues that this means, in particular, renounc-
ing the Cartesian notion of the cogito, which identifies man with
the "sovereign transparency" of a pure consciousness (322). Any
genuinely modern cogito must be one that sees human conscious-
ness as inextricably tied to an unthought that cannot be entirely
incorporated into the clarity of the cogito's thought. For Kant, the
unthought lay ίη a transcendence on the 'Όther side" of nature.
But for modern thought after him, the unthought is a dimension
of our own reality, an otherness ίη which we must find ourselves.
The cogito/unthought duality expresses the fundamental reality
of ιnan as both an experiencing subject and the never fully un-
derstood (indeed, always somehow misunderstood) object of that
experιence.

Foucault acknowledges that, ίη one sense, even Descartes pre-

sented his cogito as confronted by an unthought- that is, by
dimensions of thought (e.g., illusions, dreams, madness) that
escaped the control of reflective consciousness. But for Des-
cartes, the uncontrolled status of certain thoughts was merely
temporary. Ultimately, he claimed, they were controlled by be-
ing reduced to the clarity of reflective consciousness. The cogito
of· modern philosophy, however, must be understood in a way
that respects and preserves the irreducible distance between it
and the unthought ίη man. Α modern philosophy of the cogito
cannot, like Descartes, present "the sudden and illuminating
discovery that all thought is thought"-that is, that all deviant
thoughts (illusions, and so on) can be reduced to reflective con-
trol. It can merely continue to pose, without answering it, the
question of "how thought can reside elsewhere ... ; how it can
be ίη the form of non-thinking" (324). For this modern cogito,
therefΌre, there is no indubitab\e inference from "Ι think" to "Ι
am"- that is, no unproblematic connection between man's rea\-
ity as a reflective consciousness to his reality as an object in the
world. For there is no unambiguous sense ίη which Ι can say,
204 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

for example, that Ι (as a reflective consciousness) am "this lan-

guage Ι speak, ... this labour Ι perform, ... this life Ι sense
deep in me .... Ι can say, equally well, that Ι am and that Ι am
not all this" (324, 325). Accordingly, "the [modern] cogito does
not lead to an affirniation of being, but it does lead to a whule
series of questions concerned with being ... [e.g.] What must Ι
be, Ι who think and who am my thought, in order to be what Ι
do not think, in order for my thought to be what Ι am not?"
(325). (Note the strongly Sartrean tone of these formιιlations.)
Foucault maintains that appreciating the distinction between
the modern and the Cartesian cogito is important for assessing
the significance of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. It
might seem, for example, that the phenomenological reduction
shows how the empirical ego- like the entire empirical realm-
is constituted (as meaningful) by the transcendental ego, even
though the two are not ontologically distinct entities. If so, hasn't
Husserl linked man as a transcendental subject and man as an
empirical object in a coherent account of human finitude as its
own ground? Foucault agrees that this indeed might be Husserl's
achievement if the transcendental ego revealed by the epoche
were a pure Cartesian consciousness. But, in fact, in the modern
era, there is no basis for positing any such pure consciousness.
Even transcendental consciousness must be understood in the
manner of the modern cogito- that is, as intimately tied to an
opaque unthought that is its own reverse side. This means that
even the red uction cannot have effected a sharp distinction be-
tween man as a transcendental subject and man as an empirical
object, so that even the Η usserlian transcendental ego is aπ in-
stance of, rather than a solution to, the problem of man's double
status. Like every other instance of the modern cogito-unthoιιght
distinction, Husserl's merely poses and does not answer the ques-
tion of man's being. Foucault concludes by noting that this ex-
plains the tendency of phenomenology to collapse into either the
empirical analyses of psychologism (as we noted ίη Merleau-
Ponty's existential analysis) or into a transcendental ontology.
In sum, then, Foucault allows that philosophical reflection on
man in terms of the cogito and the unthought avoids the incoher-
ence of attempts to reduce the transcendental to the empirical
(and vice versa) and preserves the tension between man as consti-
tuting subject and man as constituted object. But he argues that
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS ΙΙ

it does not provide an understanding of the basic relationship

underlying this tension. It effectively poses but is not able to
answer the fundamental question of the analytic of finitude.

The retreat and return oj the origin

Modern thought's final way of approaching the problem of
man's double nature is in terms of the notion of his origin (i.e.,
by reftecting on man as a historical reality). Foucault suggests
that from this point of view, the "positive" aspect of human
finitude is found in the fact that man is, from the very first
instant ofhis existence, burdened (even constituted) by a history
that is not of his own making. Ι η one sense, of course, this is true
of anything, since there is nothing in the world that begins to
exist without arising from something other than itself. But pre-
sumably Foucault's point is that the ordinary things of the world
originate as members of a series of homogeneous elements. The
'Όther" from which they arise is another of the same sort. Man,
however, as the unique reality capable of knowing the world of
which he is nonetheless a part, originates from what is essentially
other than him. It is as though his origin is the limit of a series of
terms (man's history) to which it does not belong. If, then, man
tries to discover his essential nature and identity by tracing back
his history to its origin, he will be continually frustrated. Any
point of apparent origin that lies on the line of human history will
be found not to be the true origin. On the other hand, the true
origin (the point of application of the conditions that ίπ facι
produced man) will be a point at which man as such is not pres-
ent; it will not, strictly speaking, be his origin. This is the sense in
which man's origin constantly retreats from him. It is a limit that
he can πever reach by goiπg back through the series of eveπts
that make up his history.
However, Foucault notes that reftection on the origin of man
also reveals the "fundamental" dimension of his finitude. The
world is, after all, constituted as a historical reality only through
human consciousness. Apart from man, there is merely a succes-
sion of events that may possess the unity and intelligibility of a
"natural history" but that are not part of the temporal series of
meaningful actions that make up history properly speakiπg. His-
torψbeginif oπly with the projects of human consciousπess; the
206 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

world of events becomes historical only when consciousness inter-

prets it in terms of these projects. Man, by constituting himself as
a historical reality, a\so constitutes the world as historical.
From this second point of view, then, man's origin does con-
tain his essential identity. It is prccisely the point at which he
constitutes himself and his wor\d. The path of our history has no
doubt \ed us far away from this origin in which resides the funda-
menta\ meaning of our humanity. It is a\so true, as we have seen,
that if we pursue it in terms of our positive finitude, the origin
will always recede from us. But from the standpoint of funda-
mental finitude, even this retreat of the origin is part of the
historica\ reality constituted by man. Consequently, it would
seem that we can overcome the retreat of our origin by reap-
prehending the original project whereby man constituted his-
tory. Such a reapprehension would be a return of the origin
through which man would recover his original, essential reality
as man. Foucault interprets a number of modern thinkers from
Hegel to Heideggcr as having taken this return as their primary
task, a fact which explains the modern age's "preoccupation with
recurrence ... its concern with recommencement" (334). There
are, he thinks, two dif'ferent ways in which modern thought has
regarded the return of the origin. Some (e.g., Hegel, Marx,
Spengler) see it as a restoration of a plentitude, a completion of
what has been \acking in us as we wandered from the origin.
Others (e.g., Holder\in, Nietzsche, Heidegger) see it as the open-
ing of a void, a collapse of al\ the meanings of our history back
into the nothingness from which they sprang. These two con-
strua\s of the origin correspond to two construals of man's essen-
tia\ identity, either as a fullness or a negation of being. But in
both cases, the return of the origin is a return to the authentic
and original meaning of human existence.
Foucault thinks that the approach to the analytic of finitude
through reflection on the origin of man and his history does
operate at a deeper level than do the other two approaches.
Specifical\y, it \eads us to the important realization that human
finitude is rooted in "the insurmountable relationship of' man's
being with time" (335). However, he does not think that any of
the modern projects for return are successfu\. The origin re-
mains "ever-elusive" (336). This means that even the effort to
think finitude in terms of history and time, for all its profundity,
fai\s to understand the being of man, the mysterious relation
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS ΙΙ

between man as a transcendental subject and man as an empiri-

cal object.

The death of man

Foucault does not propose some further, more subtle or more
profound, approach to the understanding of man. He claims,
rather, that modern philosophy's quest for man, which has led it
to take the form of"anthropology," has come to a dead end. The
unquestioned acceptance of man as the ineluctable focus of phi-
losophy is a new form of dogmatic slumber ("the anthropological
sleep," 340). Our awakening from it requires the uprooting of
anthropology through the elimination of man as a ruling category
of our thought. Foucault sees this "death of man"- heralded by
Nietzsche as the inevitable consequence of the death of God- as
both imminent ("the ... ground ... is once more stirring beneath
our feet," xxiv) and promising. The "void left by man's disappear-
ance" is "the unfolding of a space in which it is once more possible
to think" (342 ).
As to the new possibilities of thought opened up by the death
of man, Foucault's main suggestion is that they are connected
with the nature of language. As we noted above, he sees lan-
guage as the major concern of current thought and as a concern
that is particularly appropriate for those witnessing the end of
the modern episteme. Since this episteme scattered our thinking
about language through several disciplines, its demise seems con-
nected to the return of a unified and coherent reftection on the
nature oflanguage. Here there are two possibilities (cf. 338-3g).
One is that our new unified account of language will be some-
how integrated with an account of man. By this, Foucault pre-
sumably means that conditions of possibility for the existence of
man would be derived from a new unified account of language,
with the result that in a postmodern episteme man (like represen-
tation in the modern episteme) would have a derived rather than
a fundamental status. Ι η this case, the death of man would mean
the loss of his central role, but not his total elimination. On the
other hand, Foucault notes that up until nowίhe incompatibility
of unified conceptions of both man and language "has been one
of the fundamental features of our thought" (339). Perhaps,
then- though Foucault insists we have no way of knowing- a
new episteme will involve a conception of language that has no
208 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

place at all for man. In any case, l'oucault is quitc ccrtain that the
dominance of our philosophy by man and "all these warped and
twisted forms of reAection" on him is at an end. "Το all those
who still wish to talk about man ... we can answer only with a
philosophical laugh" (342-43). But, presumably since the new
philosophy that will replace reAection on man does not yet exist,
this laugh must be "to a certain extent, a silent one" (343). Fou-
cault's final suggestion is that whatever new philosophy develops
will find its origin in the legacy of Nietzsche: "Nietz!>che marks
the threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin
thinking again; and he will no doubt continue for a long while to
dominate its advance" (342).

The human sciences

However, Foucault does not think that the fortunes of man and
the modern episteme that he dominates are identical with those
of plιilosophy. Man is also the central concern of the human
sciences (the sciences of man), to which we at last turn. These
sciences deal with man as living, producing, and speaking but
not in the manner of the empirical sciences of biology, econom-
ics, and philology. The latter treat man as part of nature, as an
empirical object, presenting his powers of representation as
products ofthe external world. The human sciences, like philoso-
phy, are concerned with man as a subject, as a knower whose
representations constitute his world and are notjust products of
it. "The human sciences are not ... aπ analysis of what man is by
nature." They are rather an analysis that moves from man's
nature as a living, producing, speaking being "to what enables
this same being to know (or seek to know) what life is, in what the
essence of labour and its law consist, and in what way he is able to
speak" (353). In contrast to biology, for example, a human sci-
ence concerned with human life (e.g., psychology) is not inter-
ested in man as a ''living being with a very particular form (a
somewhat special physiology and an almost unique autonomy)."
It is interested in him as a ''living bcing ... who constitutes repre-
sentations by means of which he lives, and on the basis of" which
he possesses the strange capacity of being able to represent to
himself precisely that life" (352). ~-,.
But how then do the human scicnces differ from philosophy,
which is alsen~~ntered on the active role of man's representations
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS 11

in the constitution of his world? l<'oucault thinks that the essential

difference is that, whereas philosophy treats man's representa-
tions as they appear in his ίnterior consciousness, the human
sciences treat them as part of unconscious structures and pro-
cesses (or at best as on the outer boundaries of consciousness).
We will return to his account of how the human sciences deal
with representations after a brief sketch of what he regards as
theίr general methodological features.

Psychology, sociology, and literary analysis

Foucault thinks that we can, without too much imprecίsίon, di-
vide the domain of the human sciences into three "epistemologi-
cal regions" (335), each corresponding to onc of the empίrical
sciences of biology, economics, and philology. Linked wίth biol-
ogy ίs a '"psychological region" concerned with man as a living
being that 'Όpens itself to the possibility of representation"
(355). Linked with economics is a sociological region" con-
cerned with the way "the labouring, producing individual offers
hίmself a representation of the socieιy ίπ which this actίvity oc-
cuτs ... " (355). Finally, lίnked to philology is a region of "the
study of lίterature and myths" conc;erned with "the analysis of
the verbal traces that a culture or individual may leave behind
ιhem" (355-56).
Foucault develops his account of the methodology of the hu-
man sciences (i.e., of the "sort of concepιs and the kind of ratio-
nality" they involve) in terms of this threefold division (356). An
overarching point is that the difficulties and controversies sur-
rounding the methodology of the human sciences do ηοι derive,
as ίs often claimed, from the peculiar complexity of their object.
Rather, meιhodological difficulties- for example, do the human
sciences employ genetic or structural analysis? do they aim at
explanaιion or understanding?- arise primarily because of the
peculίar position of the human sciences ίπ the modern episteme.
Specifically, most of ιhe sιandard methodological difficulties de-
rive from the human sciences' employment of models from the
empirical sciences to which they are lίnked. The models Foucault
has in mind are "constituent models," which he distinguishes
from "models of formalization" and merely metaphorical mod-
els (e.g., organic models in nineteenth-century sociology). Con-
stituent models constitute the objects of the human sciences.
210 FOUCAULτ's ARCHAEOLOGY

"They make ίt possίblc ιο crcate groups of phenunιena as so

many objects for a possίble branch of knowledge .... They play
the role of 'categorίes' in thc area of knowledge particular ιο the
human sciences" (357). 2
Foucault holds that 'each of the three divίsions of the human
sciences employs a model taken from the empirical science to
whίch it is particularly lίnked. Mureover, each model involves a
key pair of concepts .irι terms of which the human science's ob-
jects are understood.· Psychology, for example, takes from bίol­
ogy the model of functions "regulated by norms. Through thίs
model, man is viewed as reacting to stimuli (both physiological
and socίal) ίη ways geared ω maintaίn an adequaιe level of adjust-
menι to his environmenι Sociology borrows the economic model
of conflict governed by a body of rules, thus presenιiιιg individu-
als in opposition to one another ίη the pursuit of their necds and
trying to regulate ιhe opposition socially. The study oΠiterature
and myths employs a philologίcal model through which every
form όΓhuman expressίon is understood as having meaning
wίthίn the context of a system of sίgns.
Although Foucault believes that each of these modcls has a
prίmary role and sίgnίficance in one particular human science,
he recognizes that .all the models (and their associated pairs of
concepts) operate in all the human sciences. 3 Because of this, "all
the human sciences interlock and can always be used to interpret
one another," and as a result, their boundaries blur and "compos-
ite discίplίnes multiply endlessly" (358). Foucault uses this inter-
locking to explain ιhe methodological controversies endemic to
the human scίences. They arise, he says, from disagreements
about which constituent model is most appropriate for a given
area of inquiry. For example, the opposition of genetic to struc-
tural explanation is an opposition between the diachronic biologί­
cal model of function and norm and the synchronic models of
2, Comparc Canguilhem's discussion of models in 'The rolc of analogics and
models in biological discovery" in Α. C. Crombie, ed., Scientific change (l.on-
don: Heineman, 1963). ('l'hc French original was publishcd later in Ε.)
3· ln BC (35-36) Foucault notes the importance of the conncction ο(' biology
with medicine in thc former's role as a model for the human sciences, Hc
particularly emphasizes the role of the norms ιhaι characιerize ιhc modern
medical understanding of' man. "When [in the human scicnces] one spoke οΙ'
ιhe life of groups and societies ... or even of the 'psychologicallife,' one did
not think first of thc internal structures of the organized bein{ζ. but of the medical
bipolarity of the nomιal and the pathologicaΓ' (35). Here, of course, Canguilhem's
inAuence is particularly apparent.
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF ΊΉΙΝGS 11 21 1

cunflict and rule and of meaning and systcm. Similarly, method-

ological disputes betwcen proponcnts ot· understanding and pro-
J><>nents of explanation are about whether priority should be
given to the philological model over those borrowed from biol-
ogy and economics. 4
l<'oucault maintains that we could write the entire history of" the
lωman scicnces ίη terms of" their rclation to their three models.
One key feature of" such a history would be the primacy assumed
IJy each of the models in turn. The dominance of the biological
ιηodcl in the Romantic period was fΌllowed by the reign of the
economic model (Comte and Marx) and then by the rule (from
Freud to the present) of the philological model. Another key
Γeature of this history has been a gradual shift in priority from the
concepts of basic elements (functions, conΠicts, and meanings) ω
thc concepts of organizing principles (norms, rules, and systems).
(Foucault specifically locates this shift in Goldstein's work in psy-
chology, Mauss's in sociology, and Dumczil's in interpretation of
myths.) This is a particularly important development because it
alters the role of norms in the human sciences. As long as the
concepts ofbasic elements dominated, each domain of the human
sciences accepted a fundamental division of the normal from the
abnormal - that is, between the normal and the pathological in
psychology, between the rational and the irrational in sociology,
and between the meaningful and the meaningless in language
analysίs. But with the dominance of the concepts of organizing
principles, each of which defines a normative domaίn, this divi-
sion is eliminated. Because everything treated by the huιnan sci-
ences has a place in a domain of norms, rules, or principles of
systematίc ordering, the human sciences are no longer based on a
Γundamental "dichotomy of values" (361 ).
Gίven thίs brief survey of the methodology of the human sci-
ences and its historical development, Foucault turns to the cen-
tral questίon of" exactly how the mcthods of the human sciences
are deployed to provίde knowledge of' man as a representing
subject. Modern philosophy has sought such knowledge through
analyses of human consciousness (ranging from positivίst reduc-
tions of it to an empirίcal object to thc Heideggerίan dίscovery of

4· Tlιc F.nglish ιranslaιion speaks οι· "'explanaιion and comprehension .. (e.g., ρ.

356). Βuι ιhe sιandard contrast in Anglo-Λmcrican discussions of mcιhodol­
ogy is hcιween explanaιion and undcrstanding, so ιhc laιιcr sccms a bcιιcr
translaιion Γοr comprehen.5ion.
212 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

its profouπd relatioπ with time). But, accordiπg to Foucault,

ποπe of these efforts has beeπ able to provide a cohereπt uπder­
staπdiπg of how maπ caπ be both aπ o~ject ίπ the world aπd a
subject coπstitutiπg that world. As we have seeπ, he thiπks that a
stumbliπg block for some approaches (those based οπ the cogito)
has beeπ the uπthought eπcouπtered by moderπ thought as the
esseπtial obverse of humaπ coπsciousπess. He locates the origi-
πality of the humaπ scieπces ίπ the fact that they seek the basis of
maπ's active role as a subject (i.e., his power of represeπtiπ!ζ
objects) ίπ this very uπthought- ίπ what has come to be called
the uπcoπscious.
We may ask why philosophy itself πever took this directioπ.
Foucault πever raises this questioπ. But he might respoπd that
philosophy regarded coπsciousπess as the oπly possible locus for
maπ's represeπtatioπs of the world. It had, ίπ moviπg out of the
Classical episteme, rejected the idea that there was πο coπscious­
πess without represeπtatioπ, but it had ποt beeπ able to give up
the coπverse claim, that there were πο represeπtatioπs without
coπsciousπess. Ιπ aπy case, Foucault thiπks the humaπ scieπces
are able to do this through the three key pairs of coπcepts, bor-
rowed from the empirical scieπces, οπ which they are based.
Meaπiπgs (sigπs), fuπctioπs, aπd coπflicts caπ all be represeπted
without appeariπg to coπsciousπess, merely through their orgaπi­
zatioπ by πorms, rules, or systematic priπciples. Ιπ this way, the
humaπ scieπces have beeπ able, for example, to speak iπtelligibly
of the fuπctioπ of a social practice, of· a coπflict withiπ aπ iπdivid­
ual psyche, or of the meaπiπg of a myth, eveπ though the society,
iπdividual, or culture ίπ questioπ has πο awareπess of it.
Through uπcoπscious fuπctioπs, coπflicts, aπd meaπiπgs, the
humaπ scieπces are, accordiπg to Foucault, able to develop aπ
accouπt of how maπ represeπts (though ποt coπsciously) the
fuπdameπtal realities of life, labor, aπd laπguage, which appear
ίπ the empirical scieπces as determiπaπts of· maπ as aπ object.
They ποw appear, οπ the level of the uπcoπscious, as objects
coπstituted by maπ as a subject. Moreover, this coπstitutioπ itself
is represeπted ίπ the uπcoπscious through the structuriπg of
fuπctioπs, coπflicts, aπd meaπiπgs by πorms, rules, aπd systems.
Thus, the humaπ scieπces are able to show how maπ represeπts
the very forces that determiπe him as aπ empirical object, aπd, ίπ
this way, they provide a cohereπt represeπtatioπ of maπ as a
represeπtiπg subject. He therefore coπcludes that they succeed
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS 11

where philosophy f·ailed ίπ constituting man as a coherent object

of his own thought.
According to Foucault, this achievement of the human sci-
ences belongs to the domain of knowledge but not of science.
The l1uman science are forn1s of knowledge because, _just as
much as physics or biology, they have a legitimate position de-
fined ίπ the modern episteme. "They are ... not merely illu-
sions, pseudo-scientific Γantasies" existing merely "at the level of
opiπions, interests, or beliefs" (365). Rather, they surcessfΊII!y
employ epistemically sound methodologies to yield bodies of ob-
jective knowledge. On the other hand, they "do not possess the
formal criteria οΓ a scientifi.c form of knowledge" (365). Foucault
does not elaborate on this theme, but presumably he has in mind
the standard points concerning the differences οΓ the human
sciences from the natural sciences in standards of testing and
formalization. He does, however, emphasize that the difierences
between the human sciences and "the sciences ίπ the strict sense"
is due to neitheΓ "the presence οΓ some obstacle [no doubι in
Bachelard's sense] nor some internal deficiency" but simply to
the distinctive place οΓ the human sciences ίπ the modern epis-
teme (366). Ι π virtue οΓ this place, they define a body of· knowl-
edge about man that lies between mere opinion and rigorous
science. But their assumption οΓ the title .5ciences comes only Γrom
the fact that they employ models taken Γrom the sciences οΓ
biology, economics, and philology.

Hi~tory

Psychology, sociology, and the analysis οΓ literature and myth

are, in an important sense, the central human sciences fΌr Fou-
cault; but they do not exhaust the domain. There are also hisιor-y
and a triad οΓ disciplines that f'oucault calls the human "counter--
sciences" (psychoanalysis, ethnology, and linguistics) that play aπ
essential role. Foucault holds that history has a special position
because the object of the human sciences- man - is a historiral
being οΓ which they treat only a single set οΓ "synchronous pat-
ternings" (370). In other words, the "man" treated by any hu-
man science will ίπ Γact be man only through a particular range
of his history. Because οΓ this, Foucault thinks that history is
needed to describe the historical range ίπ which any given psy-
chological, sociological, or literary analysis is valid. For- each hu-
214 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

man science, history "determines the cultural area- the chrono-

logical and geographical boundaries- in which that branch of
knowledge can be recognized as having validity" (371). But pre-
cisely because of this- and because each human science is itself a
historical entity- hisιory also liιnits the scope of tl1e human sci-
ences and destroys any claim they might make to universality.
Thus, the perspective of history results in fundamental limita-
tions on the knowledge of the human sciences. (l'oucault adds,
that, as a hιιman science itself, history too is subject to these
limitations.)

The counterscience.>
Whereas history sets the central human sciences \Vithin temporal
boundaries, Foucault sees psychoanalysis and ethnology as re-
lating them to a deeper level of analysis. For example, while
these sciences go no further than the unconscious representa-
tiorιs tlΙrouglΙ whiciΙ rnaπ constitutes hiιnself and his world, psy-
choanalysis uncovers, through a direct analysis of the nature of
the unconscious, the conditions for the possibility of these repre-
sentations. (Here Foucault has primarily in mind Lacan's struc-
turalist versioπ of psychoanalysis.) Earlier, C:Iassical systems of
representation (described by natural history, analysis of wealth,
and general grammar) were found by the modern empirical
sciences to depend on the forces of life, labor, and language.
Similarly, the unconscious representations of these forces are
now found to depend ση the deeper "metapsychological" princi-
ples of Death, Desire, and Law (l"acan's formulations of Freud's
death instinct, libido, and incest taboos). These are, for the mod-
ern episteme, the profoundest roots ofhuman finitude, the con-
ditiorιs of possibility for tl1e reality of man and for our knowl-
edge of him. However, Foucault insists that we must not think of
psychoanalysis as some sort of empirically grounded "general
theory of man" (376). Precisely because it reveals conditions of
possibility for all knowledge of marι, it cannot have even the
degree of systematicity and objectivity proper to the central hu-
man sciences. Its only access to its fundamental knowledge is
through a therapeutic praxis that excludes the theoretical dis-
tance of these sciences. We should not, therefore, expect from
psychoanalysis "anything resembling a general theory of marι or
aπ anthropology" (376).
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS 11

Psychoanalysis reveals the general conditions for unconscious

representations of life, labor, and language. Ethnology (cultural
anthropology) deals with the conditions οΓ possibility of such
representations for individual cultures. (Here Foucault has in
mind Lcvi-Strauss's structuralist anthropology.) It shows, in par-
ticular, the precise form that a given culture gives to the norms,
rules, and systems, which, by organizing functions, rules, and
meanings, effect unconscious representations. In so doing, it
describes a culture's distinctive form of historicity. This is not to
say that ethnology treats cultures historically. Foucault accepts
the common view that it is a study οΓ stable structures, not of
temporal series of events. But he maintains that its structural
analyses yield an understanding of the form (cumulative, circu-
lar, ftuctuating, and so ση) taken by history in a given culture. In
this way, ethnology provides the foundation for history's simulta-
neous validation and limitation of the human sciences. Finally,
Foucault notes that, like psychoanalysis, ethnology arises out of
concrete relations between human beings. Where psychoanalytic
knowledge ftows from the doctor-patient relation, ethnological
knowledge arises from the special relationships that exist be-
tween the dominant Western culture and all other cultures. Con-
sequently, we should not expect ethnology, any more than psy-
choanalysis, to yield a general scientific account of the nature of
man.
In fact, Foucault argues that, instead of developing a general
concept of man and putting the human sciences ση a firm foun-
dation, psychoanalysis and ethnology call the very concept of
man into question. His point seems to be that, precisely because
they probe the conditions outside man that make his reality as a
representing subject possible, they offer ways οΓ thinking that do
not take man as a fundamental category and even offer alterna-
tive ways of conceiving ourselves. J ust as Kant's raising of the
question of the conditions for the possibility of representation
led to the decline of representation, so the raising of· a similar
question about man by psychoanalysis and ethnology is a sign of
the collapse of his hegemony in our thought. For this reason, we
may say of both these disciplines "what l.evi-Strauss said of eth-
nology: that they dissolve man" (379). Psychoanalysis and ethnol-
ogy are foundational in relation to the human sciences in the
sense that they excavate the ground ση which they are built. But
Foucault thinks the result is not ultimately to strengthen their
216 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOC;Y

posιtιon but to undermine them by depriving the concept of

man of its fundamental role. ln relation to the human sciences,
psychoanalysis and ethnology are not supporting but "coun-
tersciences" (379). Accordingly, both the failure of philosophy
and the success of' the human sciences ίη trying to develop an
understanding of man lead equally to the breakup of the mod-
ern episteme, to the "death of man."
Foucault finally suggests the possibility, not yet realized, of a
third counterscience: linguistics. It can be located epistemically
by imagining future developments of psychoanalysis and ethnol-
ogy whereby ethnology would, like psychoanalysis, pay explicit
attention to the unconscious and psychoanalysis \Vould employ
ethnological methods of formal structural analysis. lf this hap-
pened, l'oucault suggests, it would be possible to establish a f'un-
damental relation between these two countersciences by connect-
ing the experience of the individual (the focus of psychoanalysis)
to the structure of his culture (the focus of ethnology). Specifi-
cally, he seems to be thinking of a situation ίη which an individ-
ual's experiences are understood as a f'ormal system of significa-
tion deployed ίη the same conceptual space as that of' a culture's
structure; and, conversely, in which this structure is, like that of
the individual's experiences, construed as that of an uncon-
scious. Then, the choices available (and those not available) to
the individual at each point ίη his life history could be read as
due to the structure of the culture ίη which he lives. Conversely,
the development of social structures ίη one direction rather than
another could be read as corresponding to a specification of the
sorts of individuals that can (and those that cannot) exist in the
culture.
Α necessary condition of the interaction Foucault envisages is
that both psychoanalysis and ethnology be developed as formal
sign systems. The understanding of their nature and relations as
such systems would have to be achieved through a new coun-
terscience ofΊinguistics. This linguistics could not be developed ίη
the context οΓ modern philology, which presupposes the fun-
damental role of' man that is being questioned by the counter-
sciences. It would rather be a study ofΊanguage ίη a pure state, not
as the product and the vehicle of· man's power of· representation.
Such a linguistics (of' which Foucault η ο doubt thought recent
work ίη structuralist linguistics was an adumbration) would, he
thinks, greatly strengthen the connection of the human sciences
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS 11

to formal methods aπd make the issue of formalίzatioπ much

more ceπtral thaπ it has beeπ so far. But eveπ more importaπt is
the fact that the πew liπguistics would play aπ esseπtial role ίπ the
reflectioπ οπ laπguage that, as we have seeπ, Foucault regards as a
crucial part of the developιηeπt of a πew, postmodern episterne.
Ιπ this reflectioπ, the Γormalism oΠinguistics would, he suggests,
be the couπterpart οΓ the "formalism" οΓ moderπ literature,
which also uπdermiπes the place οΓmaπ by treatiπg laπguage as a
se!Γ-coπtaiπed, se!Γ-referriπg system that is ποt essentially tied to
the humaπ project οΓ represeπtiπg the world. What literature
develops as aπ experieπce οΓ "the eπd of maπ" liπguistics would
develop as a structural aπalysis that uπdermiπes maπ's ceπtral
place ίπ laπguage.
Foucault coπcludes that all the developmeπts of moderπ
thought, its successes, its failures, aπd its immediate prospects
poiπt to the immiπeπt collapse οΓ the moderπ episteme. He ad-
mits that he may be wroπg ίπ his suggestioπs as to how the fiπal
collapse will occur aπd what may be the πatuι-e of a postωodeιη
episteme. Specifically, his idea that the eπd οΓ maπ will be esseπ­
tially tied to a πew visioπ οΓ laπguage caπ, he says, be expressed
oπly as a questioπ, ποt aπ aΓfirmatioπ. Similarly, implicit sugges-
tioπs about the fuπdameπtal role οΓ "structuralism" (1-acan's psy-
choaπalysis, Levi-Strauss's cultural aπthropology, receπt develop-
meπts ίπ liπguistics) ίπ a πew episteme are oπly coπjectures (aπd
oπes Foucault later backed away f'rom). Ιπ the fiπal paragraph οΓ
ΟΤ, Foucault eveπ hedges a bit from his earlier declaratioπs that
the eπd of maπ is immiπeπt, sayiπg oπly that "ίΓ some eveπt of·
which we caπ at the momeπt do πο more thaπ seπse the possibil-
ity" were to alter the fuπdameπtal structures ofkπo,νledge, "theπ
οπe caπ certaiπly wager that maπ would be erased, like a Γace
drawπ ίπ saπd at the edge οΓ the sea" (387). But what remaiπs
eπtirely certaiπ fΌr him is the crucial Γact that the moderπ
episteme, domiπated by its peculiar coπceptioπ of· huωaπ reality
as "maπ," is merely οπe, relatively receπt, way of thiπkiπg our-
selves. Its coπstraiπts are ποt absolute aπd may οπe day be brokeπ.

The order of things: methods and results

ΟΤ is much more explicit thaπ Foucault's two pre•ious historical
studies ίπ its fΌrmulatioπ aπd deploymeπt οΓ the archaeological
method. lt claims Γrom the outset to oΠer a πew approach ("[my]
218 FOUCAULτ's ARCHAEOLOGY

analysis does not belong to the history of ideas or of' science,"

xxi) and, as we have seen, f'requently pauses to explain just how,
on a particular issue, it breaks with standard pracιices and re-
sults. However, to a very significant extent, t~oucault's methods
in οτ are applications and extensions of c:anguilheιn's i1isιory
of concepts. C:ertainly, his accounts of' particular empirical disci-
plines of' the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are straightfor-
ward histories of" concepts. In every case, tΌucault's effort is to
search beneath the play of theoretical fΊπmulations for more
basic conceptual similarities and diΠerences. For example, his
treatment of' natural history presents .>tructure and clιaracter as the
two organizing concepts of the αassical study of living things,
spanning even the most important theoretical divisions (e.g., be-
tween the system and the method). Similarly, his discussion of'
economics is concerned to shωv the f'orωation (f"rom Smith to
Ricardo) of' labor as an original concept that distinguishes eco-
nomics from the αassical analysis of wealth and as the common
background of all nineteenth-century accounts of economic his-
tory. Further, in the typical fashion of' a history of concepts,
Foucault's work undermines the standard identification of' pre-
cursors, based on superficial resemblances of terminology or
theoretical form. Thus, he rejects eighteenth-century "develop-
mentalists" and even Lamarck as precursors of Darwin on the
grounds that they did not in fact have the concept of evolution. ln
sum, in OTs application of "archaeological" analysis to individ-
ual empirical disciplines, there is nothing that goes beyond the
methodology of c:anguilhem's history of concepts.
Foucault also extends the history of' concepts to interdisciplin-
ary contexts. There is, for example, his linking of apparently
diverse disciplines by exhibiting similarities in their basic con-
cepts. Thus, the three Classical empirical disciplines are all seen
to have the "quadrilateral" structure of attribution, articulation,
designation, and derivation tΌund in the αassical analysis of'
language. Further, and ωore importantly, Foucault is able to
show how philosophical concepts such as re.Ι·emblance, repre.>enta-
tion, and man pervade the thought of an entire period. This
enables him to introduce the notion of' an episteme as the system
of concepts that specifies the nature and structure of' knowlege
f'or an intellectual era.
These extensions of' Canguilhem's approach also transforω it.
The key point is that, in analyzing concepts that span diverse
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINC;s 11

modes οΓ inquiry, J<'uuι:ault πωves to a level where iπdividual

discipliπes are πο loπger allowed to defiπe the terms in whiι:h the
historiaπ must understaπd them. As a historian οΓ biology,
Caπguilhem Γocuses οπ the ι:onι:epts that are ίπ Γact deployed by
the biologists whose work he is aπalyzing. He writes the history οΓ
the reflex because this is a ceπtral ι:oπcept in current descriptioπ
aπd explaπatioπ οΓ biologiι:al phenomeπa. Foucault, however,
deals ποt oπly with first-order biological ι:oπcepts but also with
coπcepts that defiπe the conditioπs οΓ possibility Γοr fΌrmulating
suι:h ι:oπcepts. He shows, Γοr exam ple, how coπcepts suι:h as struc-
ture aπd character, organic Junction aπd evolution are themselves
grouπded ίη more geπeral conceptions οΓ represeπtatioπ and οΓ
historici ty.
This is aπ impurtant developmeπt, first, because it allows Fou-
cault to write the history οΓ discipliπes such as the humaπ sci-
eπces that are defined through essential relatioπs to other disci-
plines. Α history οΓ, say, psychology that dealt only with the
descriptive aπd explaπatory concepts employed by contempo-
rary psychologists would preseπt a coπtradiι:tory taπgle οΓ com-
petiπg approaches and would ποt be able to exhibit psychology
as aπ essentially uπified applicatioπ οΓ the biological model οΓ
Γuπction aπd πorm.
But Γar more importaπt is the Γact that Fouι:ault's extension οΓ
the history οΓ coπcepts uπdermiπes the privileged role οΓ disι:i­
pliπes in the history οΓ thought aπd kπowledge. For Baι:helard
and Caπguilhem, eaι:h particular domaiπ οΓ knowledge (e.g.,
chemistry, biology) emerged at some point f·rom prescicπtific
coπf.usioπ aπd has, siπce that poiπt, developed progressively as
a uπified body οΓ scieπtific kπowledge. There may be sharp
coπceptual breaks, but subsequeπt coπcepts are rectifications οΓ
earlier oπes aπd <:ontain them as special cases of· a broader aπd
more adequate explaπatioπ οΓ the world. Acι:ordingly, the his-
tory οΓ scieπce is writteπ Γrom the πormative standpoint οΓ
curreπt scieπce, which provides the historiaπ with standards fΌr
judging past scieπtific work by the exteπt to which it is pre-
served ίπ today's science. For Foucault, however, the possibility
οΓ the eπtire ι:oπceptual developmeπt of· aπy given discipline is
based οπ deeper ι:oπcepts, shared by other disciplines, aπd
themselves subject to traπsfΌrmations over time that are ποt
ι:ontrolled by aπy discipliπe. The Classical empirical domaiπs,
fΌr example, were grouπded (along with Classical philosophy) ίπ
220 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tl1e concept of representation. When this concept was funda-

mentally transΓormed at the beginning οΓ the modern era, the
basis οΓ all the Classical disciplines was eliminated and a whole
new system οΓ knowledge instituted. Such changes have consti-
tιιted the grounds for the possibility οΓ current disciplines; there-
Γore, the history of such changes cannot be written ίη terms of
the concepts of these disciplines and the norms of knowledge
their concepts define. By extending Canguilhem's methods, Fou-
cault discovered a level οΓ conceptual history more Γundamental
than that of the first-order concepts of scientific (and other)
disci plines.
The significance of the move ω this level can be more Γully
appreciated by noting how it modifies some ο Γ the basic concep-
tions οΓ Bachelard's philosophy of science. Consider, Γοr exam-
ple, the central notion of epistemological break. Bachelard used
this ίη two different contexts: first, to characterize the move
from nonscientific ω scientific modes οΓ thought and, second, to
characterize major shifts within the progressive development οΓ
aπ established discipline. For Foucault, however, the notion Γur­
ther applies to transitions whereby one discipline is disestab-
lished and replaced by another as the locus οΓ knowledge of a
given domain of reality. Απ epistemological break in this sense
implies a radical change ίη how knowledge ίη the given domain
is conceived; concepts previously regarded as embodying impor-
tant truths are disregarded as inadequate, irrelevant, or, at best,
peripheral.
Foucault's new level οΓ analysis also involves a transfΌrmation
of Bachelard's notions οΓ epistemological obstacle and of the
psychoanalysis of knowledge. Bachelard, after all, did recognize
epistemological Γactors that work below the level οΓ the first-
order concepts οΓ scientific disciplines and, unknown to those
working ίη a given discipline, inftuence the Γormation οΓ these
concepts. However, Γοr Bachelard such Γacωrs are entirely nega-
tive, the residues οΓ outdated modes of thought that obstruct the
path of scientific development by hindering the development of
new concepts. By contrast, Foucault's deeper epistemological
level is one that has positive significance, embodying the condi-
tions that make possible the formation of new concepts. For him,
therefore, the level beneath first-order scientific concepts is itself
one of knowledge, not of obstacles to it. Foucault places less
emphasis than Bachelard on the diachronic progress οΓ knowl-
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS ΙΙ 221

edge but much more on its synchronic depth. The latter is the
object of archaeological analysis, which, unlike Bachelard's psy-
choanalysis of knowledge, is concerned not with the elimination
of negative epistemic factors but with the description of positive
ones.
In summary, the archaeology that Foucault deploys in ΟΤ
operates at two levels. The first, corresponding to his analyses of
particular Classical and modern empirical sciences, is essentially
that of Canguilhem's history of concepts. The second, corre-
sponding to his analyses of the epistemes that ground the possi-
bility of a variety of empirical disciplines, fundamentally trans-
forms the conception of knowledge employed by Bachelard and
Canguilhem.
We have already discussed, at the end of Chapter 4, criticisms
of OTs specific and constructive histories of the Renaissance
and Classical Age. The general points made there also apply to
l<'oucault's treatment of the modern episteme. His interpreta-
tions of particular autlωrs (paΓticularly Cuvier and Marx) have
drawn some criticism, but the primary objection is to the lack of
detailed evidence for the sweeping claims of his constructive
history. This must be admitted but, as befΌre, it can be pointed
out that the primary value of' constructive history lies in fruitf'ul-
ness rather than accuracy.
In any case, Foucault's account of the modern episteme is
primarily important as the basis of his critical history of' the
human sciences. ΟΤ diΠers from FD ίη that it does not merely
provide a heuristic basis for such a critique but actually endeav-
ors to carry it out through an analysis of the nature and limita-
tions of both recent philosophy and the central contemporary
disciplines of psychology, sociology, and literary studies. Ι η the
case of botl1 pliilosophy and the human sciences, the basis of· his
critique is the centrality of the concept of man in these disci-
plines. Given this, he goes on to argue that philosophy has been
unable to provide an adequate account of how man can be both
constitιιting suh_jec:t and constituted object and so has never
really made man an object of knowledge. The human sciences
have been more successful. Approaching man not through a
self-reflective analysis of consciousness but through an analysis
of his unconscious, they have managed to make him an object of'
knowledge, even though this knowledge lacks the rigor of· a sci-
ence. However, Foucault further claims that this focus on the
222 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

unconscious has led to the structuralist countersciences (psycho-

analysis, ethnology, and- on the horizon -linguistics) that un-
dermine the concept of man on which the human sciences are
based.
Foucault's critique seems open to at least tlπee lines of funda-
mental criticism. First, there are difficulties associated with his
claim that philosophy and the human sciences are based on the
concept of man (as he understands it). With regard to philoso-
phy, for example, the claim may well be acceptable for the sort of
philosophy Foucault discusses under the rubric of the "analytic
of finitude"- for example, phenomenology and its existential
progeny. But what of the rich variety of Anglo-American philo-
sophical projects that we assign the vague label "analytic philoso-
phy"? The only ways in which they can be plausibly thougl1t of as
covered by Foucault's discussion of the modern episteme are in
his comments on formalization (a la Russell) for tl1e sake of
linguistic clarity and on positivism as a naive rejection of the
modern problematic of man. But it is highly implausible to think
that anything close to the whole of current analytic pl1ilosophy
could be reduced to either Russellian formali:sm οτ positivism. At
a minimum, then, there is a major g'<lp in Foucault's case for
regarding philosophy as dominated by the modern concept of
man. 5 Moreover, even if Foucault can show that analytic philoso-
phy too is directed toward the understanding of man, he must
also show that it has not been able to achieve this understanding.
Perhaps, for example, the turn of many analytic philosophers
from consciousness to language. as their fundamental category
makes the problem of man's status more tractable. The linguistic
turn may have the same sort of virtues that Foucault sees in the
human sciences' move to the unconscious.
Second, Foucault is far from successful in showing tl1at even
the sorts of philosophy he does discuss in the analytic of finitude
cannot reach an adequate understanding of man. Consider, for
example, his treatment (in his discussion of the empirico-tran-
scendental doublet) of Merleau-Ponty's attempt to understand
man through an existential phenomenology of "actual experi-
ence." He notes that this experience is doubly focused: ο η the
body that defines the perspective of our perceptions and on the
5· On the other hand, Thomas Nagel's discussion of the root ο[ major problems
ίη analytic philosophy might support Foucault's conclusion. Cf. Nagel's Ylιe
view from nowlιere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π 223
culture that defines the perspective of our sΌcial practices. From
this, he abruptly concludes that Merleau-Ponty's project of un-
derstanding man by describing his fundamental bodily and cul-
tural experiences is an empirical one. But this conclusion follows
only on the assumption that Mer-leau-Ponty is wrong in his cen-
tral claim that our actual experience ofbodily and cultural mean-
ings occurs at a level prior to the distinction of transcendental
subject and empirical object. Foucault gives no reason at all for
questioning this claim, which Merleau-Ponty would hold is justi-
fied by a rich variety of pl1eήomenological analyses; he simply
denies it. At the best, Foucault offers an indication of the direc-
tion in which he would carry out a critique of Merleau-Ponty's
approach (presumably by actually exhibiting the empirical char-
acter ofhis phenomenological descriptions). But there is no such
critique presented in οτ.
Foucault's critiques of Husserl's transcendental phenomenol-
ogy and of Heidegger's ontology of time are similarly unsatisfac-
tory. The former is based on the unsupported assertion that the
Cartesian ideal of total refiection is impossible and the latter on
the likewise unsupported assertion that a genuine return to the
origin of man is impossible. In both cases, Foucault's "critique" is
once again merely a matter of gratuitiously denying the possibil-
ity of what the philosophers he is criticizing present as the ulti-
mate acl1ievement of tl1eir mode of analysis. Since Foucault's
discussions of the three "doubles" include some of the most con-
voluted and obscure passages in ΟΤ, readers can be easily fooled
into thinking that there is a level of profound criticism they have
failed to penetrate. In fact, however, whatever profundity there
is in these analyses concerns only Foucault's way of understand-
ing the major projects of recent Continental philosophy and
relating them to one another. On this interpretative level he may
be making an important contribution. But the contortions of his
interpretative analysis serve only to hide the weakness of his
criticism.
The third difficulty concerns the significance of Foucault's
conclusion tl1at the structuralist "countersciences" undermine
the concept of man and hence tl1e human sciences based on it.
Lacan's psychoanalysis and Levi-Strauss's ethnology provide, he
maintains, an analysis of the unconscious conditions that enable
us to understand how man can be both constituting subject and
constituted object. (Just how they do this is not made clear in
224 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ΟΤ, but let us grant the point for the sake of tl1e aι-gιιment.) In
this sense, they groιιnd the concept of man. But, precisely be-
cause they explain man in terms of something more basic (his
unconscious), they deprive the concept of man of its place as a
fιιndamental epistemic category. In this sense, they ιιndermine
it. The idea here seems to be that the coιιntersciences show how
sιιch a thing as man is possible, but only by moving to a level of
analysis at which he appears as jιιst one possibility. They there-
fore also show that there are alternatives to thinking of ourselves
ιιnder the category of man, thereby freeing us from tl1e tyranny
of this concept.
Βιιt the qιιestion naturally arises, What tyranny? Granted that
the hιιman sciences are based on the concept of man and tl1at
tl1is concept has been somehow ιιndermined, what differences
does this make for hιιman liberation? The problem is tl1at the
concept of man, as articιιlated in οτ, is an epistemological con-
cept. It encapsιιlates a view of man as both a knoweι- and an
object of knowledge. The elimination (or decentering) of this
concept will η ο doubt significantly alter οιιr conception of knowl-
edge. Βιιt why shoιιld sιιch a cl1ange bring with it the sort of
social and moral transformations relevant to human liberation?
The evidentjoy with which Foucaιιlt heralds the "death ofman"
strongly suggests that he thinks something more than a change
in the epistemic wind is at stake. Βιιt there is little in ΟΤ to
explain why this should be so.
At the root of'this crιιcial gap in Foucault's critique is tl1e fact
that οτ almost entirely ignores.nondiscιιrsive practices, which, in
his work both before and after ΟΤ, are the essential means of
controlling human freedom. There is nothing corresponding to
the asylum in FD, the clinical hospital in BC, or tl1e prison in DP.
The entire analysis is ofbodies of discoιιrse. The reason, as Foιι­
cault explains in an interview shortly after the pιιblication of οτ,
was his realization that ''discιιrsive domains did not always obey
the strιιctures that they share with their associated practical and
institutional domains, bιιt rather [sometimes] obey tl1e structιιres
shared with other epistemological domains." 6 Accordingly, con-
trary to his appι-oach in FD and the beginning of BC, ΟΤ treats
discourses as relatively independent of nondiscursive structures.
Foιιcault was not, admittedly, abandoning his earlier concern

6. Bellour, 195-g6.
 ΤΗΕ ORDER OF THINGS Π 225
with the relations of discursive and nondiscursive structures but
merely bracketing it until he had a better understanding of the
former in their own terms. Thus, in the interview cited above, he
says that archaeology must pursue "two perpendicular axes of
description: that of the theoretical models common to several
discourses, [and] that of the connections between the discursive
domain and the nondiscursive domain." 7 This view is also re-
fl.ected in his remark, noted above, that questions about the
causes of changes in episteme require reference to nondiscursive
factors that we will be able to discuss only after we have more
fully developed archaeology as discursive analysis.
It is, however, notjust that the lack ofnondiscursive analysis in
ΟΤ makes it impossible for Foucault to explain tlιere how the
concept of man is tied to restrictions on human freedom or why
its elimination would be a blow for human freedom. Even when,
in DP and HS, he integrates nondiscursive structures into his
analysis of tl1e l1uman sciences, it remains unclear wl1at OTs
epistemic concept of man has to do with domination. There is a
bήef reference in DP to the notion of mα1ι invoked by Enlighten-
ment legal reformers (74). But here "man" refers to a no.tion of
'Ί:iumanity," common to all human beings and the locus of their
inviolable moral worth. Foucault offers no account of how, if at
all, this moral concept of humanity is to be connected to man as
an epistemological concept.
It is, of course, true tl1at DP and HS connect knowledge with
the social and political power tl1at restricts freedom. Moreover,
DP shows how people are dominated by being made objects of
knowledge, while HS sl1ows how they are dominated (thωugl1
systems of self-surveillance) by becoming subjects possessing and
employing knowledge. In this sense, Foucault does eventually
connect domination witl1 the epistemic categories of subject and
object. However, the conception ofknowledge at work in DP and
HS requires merely that human beings l1ave knowledge about
tl1emselves- a situation that would obtain at any period in hu-
man history. Even the Classical Age, for example, had no diffi-
culty with the idea of human beings as objects of their own
knoννledge. The modern concept of man fιιrther reqιιires the
notion of human beings as somehow constituting themselves as
objects of tl1eir knowledge and knowing themselves precisely as
7· lbid., 196.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

knowers. Foucault offers no account of how this distinctively

modern concept of man is connected with modern systems of
power.
In view of the above difficulties, we must conclude that Fou-
cault's critique of the human sciences in ΟΤ is unsuccessful. Not
that the objections Ι have raised show the key claims of his criti-
cal history to be false. But tl1ere are major gaps at crucial points
in the argument that must be filled if tl1ese claims are to be
adequately supported.
 6
------------------------- ~ ~ ------------------------
ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE

It would be too much to claim that the histories of thought

Foucault wrote before the methodological reflections of ΑΚ
were, from the beginning, part of a single coherent project. He
himself remarks 1 that it was only after finishing οτ that he saw
the possibility of construing the earlier works as part of a unified
enterprise. But, as our discussions of tl1e methods at work in the
three books has confirmed, there is an important sense in which
this series of studies gradually develops a distinctive approach to
the history of thought. ΑΚ was Foucault's effort to articulate this
approach in an explicit methodology.2
The leitmotiv of ΑΚ is its connection of the archaeological
method developed in Foucault's three historical studies to the
pήmary substantive thesis of ΟΤ: the death of man. The book's

1. "La naissance d'un monde" (intervie'v with J-M. Palmier ση ΑΚ), Le Monde, 3
mai, 1969.
2. Foucault gives an interesting preliminary sketch of some of the main ideas of
ΑΚ in l1is reply to questions posed by students at the Ecole Normale Su-
perieure, "Sur l'arcl1eologie des sciences: response au cercle d'epistemologie,"
Calιiers pour l'analyse 9 (1968), 5-44. τl1is has been translated (in a slightly
condensed form) as 'Όη tl1e archaeology of tl1e sciences," τ!Moretical Practice 3/
4 (1971), 108-27. Cf. also Foucault's "Response a une question," Esprit 36
(1968), 850-74, translated by R. Boyers and C. Gordon as "Politics and tl1e
study of discourse," Ideology and Consciousness 3 (1978), 7-26.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

main effort is to define archaeology as an approach to the his-

tory of thougl1t that eliminates the fundamental role of tl1e l1u-
man subject. Archaeology would thus operate as the historical
counterpart of the structuralist countersciences (psychoanalysis,
ethnology, and linguistics) in the postmodern move away from a
conception of man as the object tl1at constitutes the world of
objects.
This explains both the close link of Foucault's work with struc-
turalism and his insistence that he is not a structuralist. The link
derives from the fact that, like structuralist work on language,
culture, and the uncqnscious, archaeology displaces man frωn
his privileged position. As Foucault said in a ιg6g interview,
botl1 archaeology and structuralism operate "witl1in a great trans-
formation of the knowledge of tl1e human sciences" that has
"put into question ... the status of tl1e subject, the privileged
place of man." 3 But, as he goes on to say, altl1ougl1 archaeology
works "alongside" structuralism in this transformation, it is not
part of it. This is simply because arcl1aeology is a l1istorical
method of inquiry, concerned not with structural possibilities
but with actual occuπences and their effects. As Foucault re-
marked to Raymond Bellour regarding his relation to structural-
ism: 'Ί am not so much interested in the formal possibilities
offered by a system like a language. Personally, Ι am, rather,
obsessed by the existence of discourses, by the fact that words
have happened, that these events have ... left traces behind
them." 4
As a historical method that decenters the human subject, ar-
chaeology is, according to Foucault, similar to that practiced by
the historians of the Annales school (and by the Cambήdge and
the Soviet schools).s He notes that history has been the last bas-
tion of tl1ose who insist ο η tl1e primacy of man. Even if structural-
ism has eliminated the originative role of the subject in the study
of language and the unconscious, still, they maintain, man rules
over his own history. "For them, there is an absolute subject of
history, who makes history, who assures its continuity, who is the

3· "Michel Foucault explique son dernier livre" (interview witl1j.-j. Brocllier ση

ΑΚ), Magazine litteτaire 28 (1969), 25.
4· Raymond Bellour, "Deuxieme entretien avec Michel Foucault," in Bellour's Le
livre des autτes (Paris: L'Herne, 1971), 201. (The interview first appeared in
Lettres franr;aises, 15 juin, 1967 .)
5· Cf. Bellour, 189-91, and Brocllier, 23-24.
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 229

author and the guarantee of its continuity. As to structural analy-

ses, they are merely part of a synchronic slice of this continuity of
history, which is thus submitted to the sovereignty of man."6
(Foucault says that tl1ose l1olding this view include not only Sar-
tre but also Goldman, Lukacs, Dilthey, and the nineteenth-
century Hegelians.) But Foucault argues that contemporary his-
toriography, as practiced by tl1e Annales group and others, belies
this claim. It has, for example, focused on periods of such great
length (la longue duree) that they cannot be the loci of the activi-
ties of any individιιal or social subject; the relevant factors be-
come instead slowly altering material conditions such as geogra-
phy and climate.
In tl1e history of tl1ought (e.g., history of science, of philoso-
phy, of literature), the move away from the constituting subject
has, by contrast, been associated with an emphasis not on long-
term continuities and gradual change but on sharp discontinu-
ities, on radical breaks and dislocations. This is because in the
history of thougl1t, unlike other histω-y, the subject has pήmarily
been a principle of continuity, transmitting (tlπough mecha-
nisms such as influence and tradition) ideas from one mind to
another. Foucault mentions the work of both Bachelard and
Canguilhem on the history of science as examples of the new
approach. He also refers to Martial Gueroult's work in the his-
tory of philosoplη and that of Michel Serres in the l1istory of
mathematics. But his own studies in FD, BC, and ΟΤ are clearly
the main examples he l1as in mind in undertaking to formulate a
methodology for a non-subject-centered history of thougl1t.
The very idea of such a history may seem incol1erent. How can
there be a history of thought that is not essentially a history
of tl1inkers? Το begin ιιndermining this notion, so deeply en-
trenched in stanclard history of ideas, Foucault undertakes a
critique of the "subjective unities" (i.e., tl1e various products of
the intellectual activities of human subjects) that are tl1e objects
of the standard history. Sucl1 ιιnities fall into a hierarchy depend-
ing on their closeness to the immediate activity of the individual
subject. Tl1us, at tl1e most fundamentallevel, tl1ere is tl1e particu-
lar bool< (or poem, essay, or what l1ave you) by a given writer;
next there is the oeuvre, the asse1nblage of all the works of a
wήter. At a higher level, there are such things as periods and

6. Brocl1ier, 24.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

traditi01-ιs(works of autl1ors related by way of interests and infl.u-

ences). Finally, there are disciplines (each itself part of a disciplin-
ary hierarchy, ranging, for example, from science in general to
subspecialties of microbiology) that include different traditions
through different periods. Within the framework of traditional
history of ide~s, these various subjective unities are related by a
number of subjective means of transmission. Thus, there is the
development of an author from work to work, the influence of one
author on another, and that generalized infl.uence of all on all
that is called the spirit of an age.
Foucault marshals a variety of considerations to question the
coherence and intelligibility of these subjective unities and subjec-
tive means of transmission. The former- particularly the funda-
mental unities of book and oeuvre - are often taken as self-
evident, unproblematic starting points for the history of thougl1t.
Α little refl.ection reveals, however, that we are hard put to define
the extension of either book (does it include an "anthology of
poems, a collection of posthumous fragments, ... a volume of
Michelet's Histoire de France ... , a Catholic missal".?) or oeuvre
(does it include "pseudonymous texts, unfinished drafts, letters,
reported conversations"? [ΑΚ, 23]). 7 As to the subjective means of
transmission, it is apparent that intellectual histories tracing the
"infl.uence" of writers on one another often yield uninformative
juxtapositions of parallel texts and that explanations in terms of
the "spiήt of the age" are often virtually tautologous. Foucault
reacts with understandable impatience to much garden-variety
"research" in the history of ideas:

Το seek in the great accumulation of the already-said tl1e text that

resembles "in advance" a later text, to ransack l1istory in order to
rediscover tl1e play of anticipations or echoes, ... to say that the
Port-Royal grammarians invented nothing, or to discover that
Cuvier had more predecessors than one tl1ougl1t, these are l1arm-
less enough amusements for historians who refuse to grow up.
(ΑΚ, 144)

Here, of course, he is echoing Canguilhem's critique of "precur-

sors."
7· On -the same subject, cf. Foucault's essay, "What is an Autl1or?" in Colin
Gordon, ed., Language, Counter-memory, and Practice (Ithaca, Ν.Υ.: Cornell
University Press, 1977).
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 23l

Such difficulties do not, of coιιrse, show that tl1e subjective

ιιnities and sιιbjective means of transmission are incoherent or
ιιnusable, bιιt tl1ey do suggest that they are not unpΓOblematic,
entirely self-evident starting points and may be challenged and
replaced as basic categories of tl1e history of thoιιght by alterna-
tive, non-sιιbject-centered categories. Foιιcault sees his archaeol-
ogy of thought as doing precisely this.

The elements of archaeology

Like any historical inquiry, · Foιιcault's archaeology begins with
documents, collections of statements that we have received from
our ancestors. Ordinary history- and especially the history of
ideas - sees docιιments as clues to tl1e intentional acts (beliefs,
thoughts, d~sires, feelings) of those who prodιιced them. It uses
the objective linguistic data of statements to reconstruct the in-
ner life of sιιbjects. Foucaιιlt, by contrast, proposes to take state-
ments as objects of stιιdy in their own right, making no effort to
use tl1em as means to revive the thoιιghts of the dead. He treats
them as monuments rather than documents (ΑΚ, 7). 8 We are, of
course, already familiar with two (nonhisto;rical) areas of inquiry
that treat statements in their own right: grammar, which defines
the conditions ιιnder which a statement is meaningfιιl, and logic,
which specifies what can and cannot be consistently added to a
given set of statements. Βιιt it is obvious that the set of statements
actually made in a given domain and epoch is a very small subset
ofthose permitted by grammar and logic. Ordinarily, we explain
the vast number of grammatically and logically possible state-
ments that are not made on the basis of the experiences, beliefs,
and intentions of subjects. We do not speak of Jupiter hurling
thunderbolts because we do not believe in him; the ancient
Greeks did not speak of space travel because they had no experi-
ence of it; the Victorians suppressed certain aspects of sexuality
out of shame. Foιιcaιιlt suggests that in many fιιndamental cases
the explanation for sιιch linguistic gaps is rather that statements
are sιιbject to a fιιrther set of rιιles (neither grammatical nor
logical) to which speakers unwittingly conform. Sιιch a set of
statements belongs to what he calls a discursive formation.
8. Foucault credits Canguilhem. with suggesting to him this use of the term
mσnument. Cf. "Sur l'archeologie des sciences," 127.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

More fully, Foucault regards a discursive formation as involv-

ing fοιιr basic elements: the ob}ects its statements are about, the
kinds of cognitive statιιs and authority they have (wl1at Foucault
calls their enunciative modality), the concepts in terms ofwhich they
are formιιlated, and the tlιemes (theoretical viewpoints) they de-
velop. However, he does not think of a given discursive forma-
tion as defined by a uniqιιe system of objects, a single enunciative
modality, a distinctive conceptιιal framework, or a consistent set
of themes or theories. The same discursive formation will be a
vehicle for discoιιrse aboιιt different systems of objects, catego-
rized in terms of different conceptιιal frameworks, and its state-
ments will have a variety of enιιnciative modalities and may de-
velop very diverse theoretical viewpoints.
Accordingly, Foιιcault does not regard a discursive formation
as distingιιisl1ed by any ιιnity (of, e.g., objects, concepts, metl1od)
provided by its elements. Ratl1er, a discιιrsive formation is a "sys-
tem of dispeτsion" fοΓ its elements: It defines a field within whicl1
a vaτiety of different, even confiicting, sets of elements can be
deployed. Thus, the unity of a discιιrsive formation is due entirely
to the rules that govern the formulation of statements about differ-
ent systems of objects, exhibiting diffeτent enιιnciative modali-
ties, employing different conceptual frameworks, and expτessing
diffeτent theoretical viewpoints. ·
Examples of discιιrsive formations that Foιιcault treated in his
historical studies are the three Classical empirical sciences, gen-
eral grammar, natιιral history, and analysis of wealth as well as
the modeτn sciences of philology, biology, and econόmics. Fur-
ther, the shaτp bτeak between Classical and modern thoιιght is
refiected in the fact that the nineteenth-centιιry empirical sci-
ences are each sepaτate discursive formations, not part of the
discιιτsive formations of the corτesponding Classical disciplines.
But these examples should not mislead us into thinking that
discuτsive foτmations aτe always coterminoιιs with scientific (or
qιιasi-scientific) disciplines. Α scientific discipline may, for exam-
ple, be just one part of a discursive formation that also includes
vaτious soτts of nonscientific (e.g., legal, liteτaτy, philosophical,
and commonsense) statements. As we will see below, this is Foιι­
cault's view of nineteenth-centιιτy psychiatτy. His archaeological
analyses befoτe ΑΚ did almost always start fτom scientific (ΟΓ
would-be scienti:fic) disciplines and often enough (especially in
BC and οη did not go much beyond them. But in his geneτal
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 233
characterization of discursive formations, l1e wants to emphasize
that the scope of archaeological analysis is mιιch broader than
some of his practice might sιιggest. Moreover, it is clear that this
broader .construal is operative in his earlier work, especially FD
and the beginning of BC.
There are two other important ways in which Foucaιιlt's pre-
ceding historical practice does not correspond exactly to ilie gen-
eral conception of discιιrsive formations pιιt forward in ΑΚ. For
one thing, none of his analyses deal with all fοιιr of the elements
of a. discιιrsive formation ο η anything like an equallevel. Ι η all
three of the earlier books, there is a very strong emphasis on the
history of concepts, either in Canguilhem's sense of the concepts
of a particular scientific discipline or in the deeper archaeologi-
cal sense of the concepts underlying various disciplines and/or
nondiscιιrsive practices. The question of the objects of discιιrsive
formations is extensively considered only in FD, in, for example,
its discιιssion of criteria for the recognition of th.e mad. The
topic of the cognitive status (enιιnciative modality) of statements
is importaήt primarily in BC, because of its concern with the
emergence of a medicine that claims to be based on empirical
scientific knowledge. Alternative tl1eoretical viewpoints are em-
phasized primarily in ΟΤ, where Foucaιιlt is concerned to show
the relative superficiality of what other historians take to be fun-
damental disagreements. Foucault's own suggestion (ΑΚ, 65)-
that FD operates primarily on the level of objects, BC on tl1at of
enunciative modalities, and ΟΤ on that of concepts- seems
qιιite an oversimplification. It may be that in retrospect these
seemed to him the areas in which the three studies made their
most important or most original contribιιtion. Βιιt, particιιlaι-ly
in its downplaying of concern with concepts in FD and BC, the
suggestion is very misleading.
Secondly, Foιιcault's earlier treatments of discιπsive forma-
tions do not highlight their role as "systems of dispersion" nearly
so much as ΑΚ does. The idea is occasionally present but dis-
tinctly mιιted, since the primary emphasis is on tl1e common
groιιnd rather than the diversity it supports. οτ does, of course,
emphasize the role of the various empirical disciplines as com-
mon groιιnds uniting those engaged in theoretical disagree-
ments, and these disagreements sιιrely also involve differences
in views aboιιt the locus of scientific authority (e.g., reason versιιs
experience) and about the conceptualization and objectification
234 FOUCAULT'S ARCI-IAEOLOGY

of empirical domains. But there is no suggestion tl1at under-

girding such diversity is the primary function of discursive for-
mations such as general grammar and nineteenth-century eco-
nomics. The reason for this is perhaps that most of the discursive
formations of ο τ are scientific disciplines, which are much more
homogeneous than formations that also embrace a variety of
nonscientific discursive practices.
None of the above points show that the notion of discursive
formation developed in ΑΚ is not present in Foucault's historical
studies. But they do suggest that his explicit methodology empha-
sizes aspects of the earlier works that are often only implicit and/
or subordinated to other concerns. Rereading them from the
perspective of ΑΚ involves a construal of their intention and
results that in some ways deepens our understanding of them
and in others distorts it. ΑΚ not only elucidates Foucault's past
achievements but also appropriates them for his present and
future purposes.
Foucault's general analysis of discursive formations consists of
his detailed classification of the rules governing them. These fall
into four types, each corresponding to one of the elements of a
discursive formation. First, there are rules for the formatioπ of ob-
jects, which are themselves of three sorts. The first sort includes
rules associated with the social loci ("surfaces of emergence")
from which the objects of a discursive formation emerge. Such
rules derive from the social norms whereby objects characterized
in a certain way are separated off from a social context and trans-
ferred to the domain of the discursive formation. For example, in
modern society, children whose behavior is sufficiently deviant
from social (e.g., familial) norms arejudged mentally disturbed
and hence become an object of concern for psychopathology.
Thus, the family is a surface of emergence for objects of the
discursive formation of contemporary psychopathology. Α sec-
ond sort of rules for the formation of objects is associated with
those to whom a society gives the authority of deciding what ob-
jects belong to a given discursive formation. (Here Foucault
speaks of "authorities of delimitatior:ι.'.~) Thus, even if a person's
behavior has not been sufficiently deviant from social norms, doc-
tors may decide, after careful tests and examinations, that he or
she is mentally disturbed and requires their care. Finally, entirely
apart from social norms and authoritative judgment, people may
merit classification as mentally disturbed simply in virtue of hav-
ing certain symptomatic properties. Here they will be objects of
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF ΚNOWLEDGE 235
psychopathology because of where they are located on what Fou-
cault calls "grids of specification," the systems whereby discursive
formations classify and relate different kinds of objects. In nine-
teenth-century psychopathology, for example, the "soul," con-
ceived as a specific system of interrelated faculties, and the
"body," conceived as a specific system ofinterrelated organs, were
grids of specification. Thus, someone with a certain sort of chemi-
cal imbalance or inherited disposition might, by that very fact, be
an object of psychopathology. Foιιcaιιlt emphasizes that these
three sorts of rules for the formation of objects are not indepen-
dent of one another. For example, in some typical cases, a social
ιιnit's (say, a family's) decision that certain deviant behavior shows
that a child is mentally distιιrbed can be overruled by a psychia-
trist's jιιdgment, and the latter judgment is itself subject to the
rιιles of psychopathological classification. Βιιt it woιιld be ~ over-
simplification to say that the only relation between the three types
of rules is this one of hierarchical subordination. There will, for
example, be cases in wl1ich the rules ofpsychopathological classifi-
cation yield to the rules associated with social deviancy. Thus, a
president's assassin migl1t bejιιdged sane even ifthisjιιdgment is
not supported by the rules of classification. More generally, the
formation of objects depends ο η a complex vaΓiety of interactions
among the three sorts of rιιles.
Α second general type of rule governing the statements of a
discursive formation concerns the formation of enιιnciative mo-
dalities. Α statement's modality is a function of the context from
which it originates. One key determinant of modality is the right
of certain people to ιιse a given mode of speech. Τhιιs, only
those properly trained and certified may make authoritative
medical statements. Another factor is the "institιιtional site"
from which a statement originates- whether, for example, it is
the report of a hospital laboratory test, an article in Πιe New
England J oumal of Medicine, or the advice to a patient of a physi-
cian in private practice. Α third consideration is the position of
the subject making the statement vis-a-vis the objects of dis-
course- for example, whether the statement is a direct percep-
tιιal report, a conclusion drawn from evidence by theoretical
calcιιlation, or a restatement of such a conclιιsion, on a theoreti-
cian's authority, by a classroom teacher. Το each of these three
sorts of factors there correspond different sorts of rules for the
formation of enιιnciative modalities.
The third type of rιιles of a discursive formation comprises
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

those that govern the formation of concepts. On Foucault's

account, concepts are specified by a complex set of rules regard-
ing our treatment of statements. Once again, he distinguishes
three sorts of such rules. First, there are those that establish
relations (e.g., logical or methodological) of ordering and suc-
cession among statements. In Classical natural history, for ex-
ample, there are rules that govern l1ow we move from direct
observational descriptions of a plant to a characterization of its
essential properties and then to a classification of it in a taxo-
nomic table. Similarly, certain statements of natural history will
be related to others as premises to conclusions, hypotl1eses to
verifications, or laws to applications. ·
Second, there are rules for the formation of concepts that
establish various attitudes of acceptance or rejection toward
classes of statements. Such rules define, first, α field of presence-
that is, a range of statements in the discursive formation in
question that are accepted, a range that are rejected, and a
rang.e that are regarded as needing critical evaluation. They
also "define a field of concO?nitαnce, a range of statements from
otlιer discursive formations that are, in various ways, "active"
(e.g., as models or analogical confirmations) in the given discur-
sive formation. Finally, these rules define α field of memory, a
range of statements that are no longer accepted or even dis-
cussed in their own right but that have various historical connec-
tions with accepted statements. Foucault illustΓates these sorts
of rules by referring once again to Classical natιιral history
(ΑΚ, 58). But his account of the modeΓn sciences of man is also
a good example. TheiΓ field of pΓesence corresponds to the
distinctive set of statements about man that are accorded se-
Γious disciplinary consideration by psychology, sociology, and
liteΓary analysis. Their field of concomitance includes, most
prominently, the empiΓical sciences (biology, economics, and
philology) that pΓOνide theiΓ models. And their field of mem-
ory includes the Renaissance and Classical disciplines for which,
as ΟΤ shows, they aΓe the modern Γeplacements.
ThiΓd, the formation of concepts is goveΓΠed by ΓUles specify-
ing vaΓious procedures of intervention that may be applied to a
discursive foΓmation's statements to produce new statements.
Thus, theΓe aΓe techniques fοΓ ΓewΓiting statements (from, e.g.,
linear to tabular form), of transσibing them (e.g., into a foΓmal­
ized language), or of translating them (e.g., into quantitative or
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 237
qualitative form). Also included here are methods ofapproxima-
tion, techniques for limiting the domain of a statement's validity,
procedures for applying a statement to a new domain, and meth-
ods of systematizing statements.
The fourth and last type of rule governing the statements of a
discursive formation concerns the formation of strategies. By a
strateg;y Foucault means a specific theory (or theme) that develops
within a discursive formation (e.g., a theory of evolution in biol-
ogy, the idea of aπ originallanguage from which all others derive
in philology). Foucault notes that, for standard history of ideas,
theories develop from "chance encounters between ideas ... ,
influ'ences, discoveries, [and so on] ... that the genius ofindividu-
als ar'ranges into more or less well constituted wholes" (ΑΚ, 64).
His own view, by contrast, is that the range of possible theoήes in a
discursive formation is specified by rules that underlie and impli-
citly control the efforts of individual thinkers.
The range of theoretical alternatives is defined, first of all, by
the various points of diffraction found in a given discursive forma-
tion. Such points exist where there are two or more statements,
existing on the same level and equally permitted by the discursive
formation's rules, that are incompatible with one another. They
thus represent forks within the discursive formation from which
different theoretical turns can be taken, leading to very different
theoretical developments. Alternative theories are equivalent in
the sense tl1at the rules of the discursive formation do not prefer
one over the other, but they are incompatible in the sense that both
cannot be accepted at once. In ΟΤ, for example, the split in biol-
ogy between Cuvier's fixism and Darwin's evolutionism occurs at
a point of diffraction, as does the separation of Marx's from Ri-
cardo's economics.
Foucault notes, however, that we do not in fact find points of
diffraction everywhere that the rules of the discursive formation
allow them. This is because there are further factors (he calls
them "authorities") that limit the number of alternatives. One is
the economy of tlιe discursive constellation to v.rhich the discursive
formation in question belongs. By this Foucault means the rela-
tion of the discursive formation to other contemporary discur-
sive formations. The various discursive formations within a con-
stellation will be analogous or complementary to one another
and will serve one another as models for application; and sucl1
relations may lead to the elimination of points of diffraction that
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

would otherwise exist within a discursive formation. Another

limiting factor is the fact that a discursive formation exists in a
field of nondiscursive practices. Thus, an economic discursive
formation will be employed in government decision making, a
grammatical discursive formation in pedagogy, or- to cite an-
other order of example- the discursive formation of a certain
kind of pornography may be an object of forbidden desire. In all
such cases, a nondiscursive authority _may affect the theoretical
options allowed within the discursive formation. Further, Fou-
cault insists that such authorities should not be regarded as "dis-
turbing elements," altering the structure of an intrinsically com-
plete discursive formation; rather, they are "formative elements"
(ΑΚ, 68) of the discursive formation.
Foucault lays special emphasis on the importance of tl1e inter-
connections among the various systems of rules that govern a
discursive formation. He says, for example: 'Όne might say,
then, that a discursive formation is defined (as far as its objects
are concerned, at least) if one can establish ... a groιιp of rela-
tions ... between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and
specification" (ΑΚ, 44). Similarly, speaking of the "elements"
(i.e., the various systems of rules of ordering, coexistence, and
intervention) that govern the formation of a discursive forma-
tion's concepts, Foucault says: "What properly belongs to a dis-
cursive formation and what makes it possible to delimit the
group of concepts, disparate as they may be, that are specific to
it, is the way in which these different elements are related to
one another" (ΑΚ, 6ο). Similar points hold for the rules for the
formation of enunciative modalities and of theoretical strate-
gies. Foucault also emphasizes the interrelations among the
four kinds of rules of formation themselves. Thus, tl1e possibil-
ity of strategic choices "is determined by points of divergence in
the groups of concepts" (ΑΚ, 72) and, conversely, "theoretical
choices exclude or imply ... the function of certain concepts"
(ΑΚ, 73). Similarly reciprocal relations hold among other pairs
of systems of rules of formation. Because of this emphasis on
interconnections of systems of rules, Foucault often speaks of a
discursive formation being specified by discursive relations (i.e.,
relations among its rules of formation). Different discursive for-
mations may have many of (even, in theory, all) the same rules,
but different discursive relations among their rιιles will differen-
tiate them.
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF ΚNOWLEDGE 239
Statements
Foucault presents discursive formations as gΓOups of statements.
But just what does l1e mean by statement? Since archaeological
analysis is distinct from both grammar and logic, Foucault refuses
to identify statem~nts with either sentences - that is, the units of
grammatical analysis- or propositions- that is, tl1e units oflogi-
cal analysis: Indeed, he finally concludes that a statement is not
really any kind oflinguistic unit at all but is rather afunction. Το
understand what Foucault has in mind here, we need to get some
perspective on his way of thinking about language. Α language,
he says, echoing .Saussure, is "a collection of signs defined by their
contrasting characteristics and their rules ofuse" (ΑΚ, 85). From
such a collection we can, of course, form numerous particular
series of signs. Α given series will be a sentence or a proposition
depending on whether it conforms to the grammatical and logical
rules that govern tl1ese linguistic units. Further, whether a series
of signs is a sentence or a proposition is entirely determined by
reference to the relevant set ofrules; it does not require tl1at the
series have any relation to other series of signs (on the same lin-
guistic level). There could in principle be a language with only one
sentence or one proposition. By contrast, a series of signs is a
statement only if it is related to other series of signs, wl1ich series
constitute the statement's associated field (cf. ΑΚ, g6). Indeed, the
fact that it is a statement and the precise statement that it is are
entirely determined by the complex set of rules whereby it is
related to other series of signs (which, by virtue of this same set of
relations are themselves statements). Thus, a statement is not a
linguistic unit, as are sentences and propositions, since it has no
reality as a statement prior to its inclusion within a rule-governed
system. Thus, like a mathematical function, a statement is entirely
defined by the relations between a set of elements. The other
meaning offunction is also relevant: a series of signs is a statement
precisely because it has a place- a role or a function- within a
system.
Linguistic units such as sentences and propositions (and other
entities such as graphs, diagrams, and formulas) will also typi-
cally be statements- not, of course, simply because they are sen-
tences, propositions, and so on, but because they are parts of
sign systems. As such, they will be open to analysis not only at the
standard levels of logic and grammar but also at the enunciative
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

level- in terms of their enunciative function (enunciative since

statement translates the French enoncey. The enιιnciative level is
not unconnected to other semanticallevels. Indeed, in important
respects it is presupposed by tl1em. Consider, for example, the
case in which we say that a proposition- for example, "The
present king of France is bald"- is false or meaningless because
it has no referent. Tllis will be so only if "The pι-esent king of
France is bald" is a statement that belongs to a factual, histoι-ical
discιιrsive formation. If it instead belongs to a fictional discιπsive
foι-mation (say of a novel written about the days of Charles the
Bald), then the coπesponding pι-oposition will l1ave a refeι-ent
(in the fictional domain) and indeed be trιιe. Similarly, when we
say that a ceι-tain string of words (say, "a way a lone a last a loved
a long the") is meaningless, this is so only if we aι-e assuming that
the stι-ing occιιrs in some oι-dinaι-y context and is not paι-t of an
expeι-imental liteι-aι-y woι-k. Τhιιs, a gι-οιιp of signs' status as a
statement is ι-elevant to whetheι- οι- not it is (as a sentence οι- a
proposition) trιιe or even meaningfιιl. Specifically, questions of
trιιth and meaning depend on the natuι-e of the ι-elevant discιπ­
sive formation's domain of objects and ι-elations (which Foιιcault
calls its referential): "The referential of the statement ... defines
the possibilities of appeaι-ance and delimitation of tl1at whicl1
[objects, states, ι-elations] gives meaning to the sentence, a valιιe
as truth to the pι-oposition" (ΑΚ, 91).
The natιιre ofFoucault's statements can be clarified by compar-
ing them to the speech-acts that aι-e the conceι-n of language
analysts sιιch as Aιιstin and Searle. Although Foιιcault initially
maintained (in ΑΚ) that statements cannot be identified with
speech-acts, he lateι- admitted, in coπespondence with Searle,
that 'Ί was wrong in saying that statements were not speech-
acts."9 Βιιt exactly what aι-e we to make of this admission? One
point Foucault may have had in mind is that statements aι-e
"things done with woι-ds" (moves in a language game). From tl1is
point of view, the analytic categoι-y of speech-act is extensionally
equivalent to that of the statement. Both are generallinguistic
categories that include not only expι-ession of sentences and
propositions but also of other lingιιistic units such as gι-aphs, ta-
bles, and gestιπes. But, as Foιιcaιιlt also sιιggests in his coπespon-

9· Cf. Η. Dreyfus and Ρ. Rabinow, Miclιel Foucault: beyond structuralism and lιerme­
neutics, 2d ed. (Clιicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 46, note.
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 241

dence with Searle, his concern with statements is very different

from the concern a language analyst has with speech-acts. In my
view this difference can be best put tl1is way. 10 The analyst works
at the level of meaning- that is, the level of the implicit under-
standing of a language possessed by tl1ose who use it. (Hence tl1e
standard method of asking "What do we say when ... ?" or "What
would we say if. ·.. ?") Such analysis is concerned with distinguish-
ing and describing the functions that speech-acts have within a
language. But Foucault, as an "archaeologist," is rather con-
cern.ed with a structure of relations between statements that is not
available to speaker&' refl.ections ση the meaning ofwhat they say.
He wants to look at statements from the outside and describe the
relations that define the field in which various sorts of statements
are able to perform tl1eir linguistic functions and l1ence l1ave
various meanings.
The rules and relations that constitute a statement have, as we
would expect, nothing to do with the beliefs and projects of
human subjects:

The analysis of statements operates ... without reference to a

cogito. It does not pose the question of the speaking subject ...
it is situated at tl1e level of the "it is said"- and we must not
undeΓStand by this a sort of communal opinion, a collective Γep­
resentation that is imposed on every individual ... but we must
understand by it the totality of things said, the Γelations, the
regularities, and the transformations that may be observed in
tl1em. (ΑΚ, 122)

Of course, all statements are made by individual speakers, but in

making a statement a speaker takes up a position that has al-
ready been defined- quite apart from his mental activity- by
the rules of the relevant discursive formation. Foucault does
hold that every statement has a subject (not in the grammatical
sense but in the sense of a discursive source). But this subject is
not any "speaking consciousness" (which will at most be tl1e au-
10. Dreyfus and Rabinow, 47-48, suggest that, unlike SeaΓ!e et al., Foucault is
interested in "seήous speecl1-acts" (those that have a special institutional
status and autonomy) rather than "everyday speech-acts." This is not entirely
coπect, since Foucault explicitly says that archaeology is concerned with the
savoir underlying 'Ίes opinions de tous les jours" (eνeΓyday opinions). (Cf.
Raymond BellouΓ, 138.) His arcl1aeological analyses do in fact deal almost
exclusively with serious speech-acts. But Ι do not tl1ink tl1at this is the funda-
mental difference between Foucault's work and that of speech-act theoήsts.
242 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

thor of a particular formulation of the statement) but ratl1er "a

position that may be filled in certain conditions by various indi-
viduals" (ΑΚ, 115)0 This position is, of course, established by the
rules of the discursive formationo
It is important to be clear about Foucault's view ofthe relation
of tl1e statements of a discursive formation to the rules that
govern themo The rules do not have a transcendental status; that
is, they are not "principles of construction" or "conditions of
possibility" that exist somehow prior to statements and constitute
themo If this were so, we could distinguish between a discursive
formation as an "ideal form" and its exemplification in a particu-
lar set of historically existing statementso But for Foucault there
is nothing more than the historically existing statements and the
relations that obtain among themo The rules of the discursive
formation are simply the description of the existing relationso
Thus, he says: ''τhe regularity of statements is defined by the
discursive formation itself. The fact of [a statement's] belonging
to a discursive formation and the laws [rules] that govern it are
one and the same thing" (ΑΚ, 116)0 Hence, "discourse in this
sense is not an ideal, timeless form that also possess_es a his-
tory ο ο ο it is, from beginning to end, historical" (ΑΚ, 117)0
;

Το emphasize that archaeological analysis treats statements

merely as given historical facts, without concern about any tran-
scendental origin, Foucault calls the groups of statements he is
concerned with (the statements of discursive formations) positiv-
itieso And he says tha( if rejection of a transcendental approach
means that 'Όne is a positivist, then Ι am quite happy to be one"
(ΑΚ, 125)0 Similarly, to express the role of discursive formations
as conditions on the thought that goes on within them, he intro-
duces the admittedly "rather barbarous" term historical α priori
(ΑΚ, 127)0 This is to make clear that a condition "imposed" by a
discursive formation is "not a condition of validity for judg-
ments, but a ocondition of reality for statementso" Α discursive
formation provides "an a priori not of truths that might never be
said, or really given to experience, but an a priori of a history
that is given, since it is ofthings actually said" (ΑΚ, 127)0 At a yet
higher level, Foucault speaks of the archive as the complex of all
the discursive formations that exist in a given "society, culture,
or civilization" (ΑΚ, 130)0 The archive is, for a given society or
culture, "the law ofwhat can be said, the system that governs the
appearance of statements as unique events" (ΑΚ, 129)0 But, like
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 243
discuΓsive fσΓmatiσηs and theiΓ histσΓical a pΓiσΓis, the aΓchive is
ησt a tΓaηshist"σΓical cσηditiση ση histσΓy; it is meΓely the cσm­
peηdium σf existiηg discσuΓSe.
Foucault alsσ takes paiηs tσ make cleaΓ the pΓecise level ση
which aηalyses σf statemeηts aηd discuΓSive fσΓmatiσηs (aΓchaeσ­
lσgical aηalyses) take place. Οη the σηe haηd, aΓchaeσlσgy is ησt
cσηceΓηed with textual aηalysis, with specific questiσηs abσut
what paΓticulaΓ wσΓds meaη σΓ hσw paΓticulaΓ statemeηts aΓe
lσgically σΓ ΓhetσΓically cσηηected. It "Γemaiηs aηteΓiσΓ tσ this
maηifest level" σf specific liηguistic usage aηd dσes ησt accσuηt
fσΓ the specific details σf a paΓticulaΓ text. 'Ίt leaves the fiηal
placiηg σf the text iη dσtted σutliηe" (ΑΚ, 75). Fσucault alsσ
makes this pσiηt by distiηguishiηg the discursive relations with
which aΓchaeσlσgy is coηceΓηed fΓOm the secondary relations (gΓam­
matical, lσgical, ΓhetσΓical) that gσνeΓη the cσησete uses σf laη­
guage. But he is eveη mσΓe iηsisteηt that aΓchaeσlσgical aηalysis is
ησt aη access tσ a ησηdiscuΓSive Γeality that lies σutside aηd
gΓOuηds the discuΓSive fσΓmatiση. It dσes ησt σpeΓate at the level
σf the primary relations that, "iηdepeηdeηtly σf all discσuΓse σΓ all
σbjects σf discσuΓse, may be desσibed betweeη iηstitutiσηs, tech-
ηiques, sσcial fσΓms, etc." (ΑΚ, 46). Put aησtheΓ way, if aΓchaeσl­
σgy dσes ησt deal with cσησete words, ηeitheΓ dσes it deal with
things themselves (ΑΚ, 48). 11 It Γemaiηs withiη discσuΓse, but at its
bσΓdeΓs (which it is cσηceΓηed tσ defiηe as cleaΓly aηd pΓecisely as
pσssible) ΓatheΓ thaη at its iηteΓiσΓ. Fσucault alsσ makes it cleaΓ
that his cσmmitmeηt tσ aη aΓchaeσlσgical appΓOach dσes ησt
meaη that he Γejects the alteΓηative appΓOaches (which we might
label "liηguistic" aηd 'Όηtσlσgical"). He allσws that tl1eΓe is place
fσΓ the liηguistic aηalysis σf a teΓm (σf, e.g., what melancholia
meaηt iη the seveηteeηth ceηtuΓy) aηd eveη that σηe might wΓite a
"histσΓy σf the ΓefeΓeηt" that wσuld aim tσ "uηcσνeΓ aηd fΓee ...
pΓediscuΓSive expeΓieηces fΓOm the tyΓaηηy σfthe text" (ΑΚ, 47).
But whateveΓ the value σf these sσΓts σf eηteΓpΓises, Fσucault's
aΓchaeσlσgy deals ηeitheΓ with pΓediscuΓSive expeΓieηce σf thiηgs
ησΓ with the veΓbal fσΓms pΓOduced by discσuΓSe. It fσcuses ση "a
gΓOup σfΓUles ... [that] defiηe ησt the dumb existeηce σfa Γeality
ησΓ the caησηical use σfa vσcabulaΓy, but the σΓdeΓiηg σf σbjects"
(ΑΚ, 49). Withσut deηyiηg that discσuΓSe is cσmpσsed σf sigηs σΓ

11. In view of this, the title Les mots et les clιoses is, as Foucault notes, ironic, since
archaeology operates at the level of neither words nor things. Cf. "Michel
Foucault explique son dernier livre," 24.
244 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

that signs can be used to <fesignate things, he insists that there is

more to discourse than this. 'Ίt is this 'more' that we must reveal
and describe" (ΑΚ, 49).

Archaeology and the history of ideas

As we have seen, Foucault's archaeology is meant as an alternative
to the traditional approach, which sees the history of thought as
constituted by the human subject. By focusing ο η systems of state-
ments in their own right, archaeology turns away from the subject
and toward the conditions that define the discursive space in
which speaking subjects exist. This fundamental difference from
standard history of ideas has a number of consequences that fur-
ther clarify the distinctiveness of archaeological analysis. These
consequences concern attitudes toward tradition and innovation,
the handling of apparent contradictions, and the problem of
change and discontinuity.Ι2

Tradition ω~d innovation

History of ideas is dominated by the two poles of the old and the
new: 'Ίη every oeuvre, in every book, in the smallest text, the
problem is to rediscover the point of rupture, to establish, with
the greatest possible precision, the division between the implicit
density of the already-said, a perhaps involuntary fidelity to ac-
quired opinion, the law of discursive fatalities, and the vivacity of
creation, the leap into irreducible difference" (ΑΚ, 142). As a
result, such history is concerned with ordering the thoughts of
individuals in a single great chronological series, with each mem-
ber of the series characterized by its degree of resemblance to
previous members. Thus, a primary concern is finding out who
was the true originator of a given thought and who merely re-
peated or creatively modified it; or, as Foucault wryly puts it,
"determining those degrees of nobility that are measured here
by the absence of ancestors" (ΑΚ, 143). However, he insists, for
the archaeology of knowledge "the originality/banality opposi-
tion ... is not relevant" (ΑΚ, 144). The archaeologist is con-

12. Foucault also presents arc!Ίaeology as having a distinctive approach to tl1e

comparison of different systems of thought, particularly in its concern with
regional rather than global analyses. We have already discussed his views ση
this topic at the end of Chapter 4·
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 245
cerned only with wl1at Foucault calls the "regularities" of discur-
sive practices (enunciative regularities). Tl1ese are tl1e patterns
defined by tl1e relation of any given statement to other state-
ments. These patterns (expressed in the rules of the discursive
formation discussed above) define the field in which all state-
ments, from tl1e most creative to the most banal, emerge. The
archaeologist is, therefore, concerned only with wl1at statements
can reveal about the rules of discursive formations. Since the
most original statement embodies the relevant rules no more
and no less than its hackneyed repetitions, the question of inno-
vation is of η ο interest to archaeology.
In this way, Foucault provides a basis in pήnciple for the
disdain of.hunts for precursors we noted in his preliminary cri-
tique of subjective means of transmitting ideas. This moves be-
yond Canguilhem's point that such hunts are frequently based
on overinterpretation of superficial (e.g., verbal) similarities. If
this were the only problem, then the search for precursors might
still form an integral part of the archaeology of knowledge, pro-
vided it was carried out (as by Canguilhem himselfin his work on
the refl.ex) witl1 sufficient sensitivity and acuity. Foucault allows
(ΑΚ, 143-44) that studies like Canguill1em's are legitimate ap-
proaches to history of science, but even so they have no place in
the realm of archaeological analysis, which operates on a level
where questions of who thought what first are simply irrelevant.

C ontradictions
The search for an underlying coherence beneath apparent con-
tradictions is basic to historians of ideas' methodology. Within a
given book, an author's oeuvre, or an intellectual tradition, they
seek to view conflicts and disagreements as illusory or accidental
when seen in the light of tl1e fundamental principles of the dis-
course in question. Sometimes, the search for an underlying co-
herence fails and instead leads to a discovery of the discourse's
basic contradiction, a "secret law that accounts for all minor con-
tradictions and gives them a firm foundation" (ΑΙ\., 150-51). In
either case, history of ideas never accepts conflicting statements
on their own terms; it must either reconcile tl1em or understand
their conflict as a manifestation of a deeper contradiction. Con-
sider, for example, the case of the apparent confl.ict in Classical
natural history between fixist and developmentalist views of spe-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

cies. Historians of ideas either try to show that "beneath this oppo-
sition ... everyone accepted a number offundamental theses (the
continuity and plentitude of nature, the correiation between
recent forms and climate, the almost imperceptible transition
from tl1e non-living to the living)"; or else tl1ey try to show that
the 'Όpposition reflects, in the particular domain of Natural His-
tory, a more general conflict that divides all eighteenth-century
thought (the conflict between the theme of an ordered creation,
acquired once and for all ... and the theme of a prolific na-
ture ... gradually deploying itself through history)" (ΑΚ, 151-
52). But the archaeologist of knowledge takes neither of these
approaches: "For archaeological analysis, contradictions are nei-
ther appearances to be overcome, nor secret principles to be un-
covered. They are objects to be described for themselves .... "
(ΑΚ, 151). Archaeology is concerned rather with describing the
discursive structures that make the conflict possible. Thus, in the
case of Classical fixism and developmentalism, it will show (as
Foucault did in ΟΤ) how the disagreement corresponds to a
"point of diffraction" in the discursive formation ofClassical natu-
ral history- how, tl1at is, the formation rules for desCΓibing spe-
cies allow for these two incompatible views oftheir oήgin. Instead
of explaining (or explaining away) the contradiction, the archae-
ologist describes the discursive conditions of its possibility.

Change and discontinuity

Foucault (and, even more, some of his commentators) has em-

phasized the central role that discontinuity plays in his approach
to the history of thought. At the beginning of ΑΚ, he says:

One of the most essential features of the new history is probably

this displacement of the discontinous: its transference from the
obstacle to the work itself; its integration into the discourse of the
histoήan, where it no longer plays the role of an external condi-
tion that must be reduced, but that of a working concept.... It is
no longer the negative of the historical reading ... but the posi-
tive element that determines its object and validates its analysis.
(ΑΚ, g)

This insistence ση discontinuity has led many of Foucault's read-

ers to think that his archaeological approach allows no place for
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 247
gradual traηsfσrmatiσηs σr cσηtiηuσus develσpmeηts, that it sees
the histσry σf thσught as a series σf quaηtum leaps frσm σηe self-
cσηtaiηed discursive fσrmatiση tσ aησther. (Cσmpare the similar
reactiση σf readers σf Thσmas Kuhη tσ l1is ησtiση σf the iηcσm­
meηsurability σf paradigms. 13) But such aη idea is clearly a mis-
represeηtatiση, as we caη appreciate by seeiηg the precise rσle
discoηtiηuity plays iη Fσucault's cσηceptiση σfhistσry. First σf all,
as Y\7e ησted abσve, the emphasis ση discσηtiηuity l1as special im-
pσrtaηce as a curreηt strategy fσr writiηg the histσry σf thσught.
Traditiσηal histσry σfideas has emphasized the coηtiηuity σfhu­
maη thσught thrσugh the ceηturies by readiηg it as "hσmσge­
ηeσus maηif~statiσηs σf a siηgle miηd σr σf a cσllective meηtality."
Uηdermiηiηg this sσrt σf cσηtiηuity has beeη a ηecessary part σf
the ηew history σf thσught that questiσηs the privileged rσle σf
the humaη subject. Accσrdiηgly, "beηeath the great cσηtiηuities
σfthσught ... , σηe is ησw tryiηg tσ detect the iηcideηce σfiηter­
ruptiσηs" (ΑΚ, 4). Fσr such aη eηterprise, "the great prσblem is
ησt hσw cσηtiηuities are established, ... hσw fσr sσ maηy differ-
eηt, successive miηds there is a siηgle hσrizση . . . - the prσblem
is η σ lσηger σηe σf traditiση, σf traciηg a liηe, but σηe σf divisiση,
σflimits" (ΑΚ, 5). But such aη em phasis ση discσηtiηuity is merely
a strategy preseηtly apprσpriate fσr the histσry σf thσught. As we
l1ave seeη, σther sσrts σfhistσry have, ση the coηtrary, elimiηated
the ceηtral rσle σf the subject by emphasiziηg lσηg-term cσηtiηu­
ities that are iηdepeηdeηt σf the fl.ux σfhumaη actiση. "Fσr maηy
years ησw histσriaηs have preferred tσ turη their atteηtiση tσ lσηg
periσds ... , the mσvemeηts σf accumulatiση aηd slσw saturatiση,
the great, sileηt, mσtiσηless basis that traditiσηal histσry has ςσv­
ered with a thick layer σf eveηts" (ΑΚ, 3). Thus, iη priηciple, ηση­
subject-ceηtered history caη (depeηdiηg ση the strategic situa-
tiση) emphasize either cσηtiηuity σr discoηtiηuity.
Fσucault further makes it clear that aη archaeσlσgy σfthσught
is coηcerηed with chaηges frσm σηe discursive fσrmatiση tσ aη­
σther aηd that these chaηges may σccur agaiηst a backgrσuηd σf
sigηificaηt cσηtiηuities. He agrees that iη certaiη seηses archaeσ-

13. The question of similarities between Foucault and Kuhn is potentially fruitful
but can easily trick us into making too much of superficial resemblances. For
aπ exceHent start on a compaήson of tlιe two tlιinkers, cf. Ian Hacking, "Mi-
c!ιel Foucault's immature science," NOUS 13 (1979), 39-51. There are also
some remarks on tlιis topic in G. Gutting, "Continental philosophy of science"
in Ρ. D. Asquith and Η. Ε. Kyburg, eds., Current research in plιilosoplιy of science
(East Lansing, Mich.: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979), 94-117.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

logical analysis works synchronically: Rules of discursive forma-

tions may remain the same for long periods, and the order the
archaeologist discovers in a set of statements may not corre-
spond to the order in which tl1e statements appeared temporally.
But, he insists, though "there is a suspension of temporal succes-
sion ... , this suspension is intended precisely to reveal the rela-
tions that characterize the temporality of discursive formations"
(ΑΚ, 167). Further, these relations will typically involve the conti-
nuity of various discursive elements through a given change:

Το say that one discursive formation is substituted for anotl1er ...

is to say that a general transformation of relations l1as occurred,
but that it does not necessarily alter all tl1e elements; it is to say
tl1at statements are governed by new rules of formation, it is not
to say that all objects or concepts, all enunciations or all tl1eoretical
choices disappear .... We must not forget that a rule of forma-
tion is neither the determination ofan object, nor the characteriza-
tion of a type of enunciation, nor tl1e form or content of a con-
cept, but the principle of their multiplicity and dispersion. One of
these elements- or several of tl1em- may remain identical ... ,
yet belong to different systems of dispersion, and be governed by
distinct laws of formation. (ΑΚ, 173)

This concern with continuities through change is evident, for

example, in OTs discussions of Adam Smith's treatment oflabor
and Lamarck's of character in the transition from Classical to
modern empirical sciences.
So archaeology does not differ from traditional history of
ideas by ignoring change and continuity. But it does differ by
taking difference and discontinuity as seriously as it does conti-
nuity. According to Foucault, traditional history of ideas tries to
reduce all apparent discontinuity to a series of incremental
changes, all contributing toward a finally achieved enlighten-
ment. Here he seems to have specifically in mind the long-
dominant tradition of "Whiggish" history, which presents a
cumulative progression of achievements, with the numerous
errors and misdirections that undeniably occurred as unimpor-
tant background noise. Like Braudel, Foucault rejects this proj-
ect of "total history," which assumes that the phenomena it
deals with are unified around a single center (the progress of
mankind, final scientific truth) in favor of "general history"
(ΑΚ, g-ιο). The latter allows that its phenomena may form
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 249
disparate series that caηησt be reduced tσ a uηity, but withσut
iηsistiηg that these series are eηtirely iηdepeηdeηt. Geηeral iη­
tellectual histσry seeks tσ describe the cσmplex iηteιτelatiσηs σf
mutually iιτeducible discursive fσrmatiσηs.
Giveη that archaeσlσgy is cσηcerηed with cl1aηge, the questiση
arises σf hσw tσ explaiη it. What sσrt σf causes dσes Fσucault see
as driviηg fσrces σf the histσry σf thσught? As we have seeη, he
has little regard fσr the iηflueηces, spirits σf the times, Weltaπ­
scΛauungen, aηd sσ ση, that are cσmmσηly appealed to by histσri­
aηs σf ideas. Fσr σηe thiηg, their status is σfteη little shσΓt σf
magical; they are sσ amσrphσus aηd ubiquitσus as tσ explaiη
almσst aηy iηtellectual develσpmeηt at all (cf. ΟΤ, Fσrewσrd tσ
the Eηglish Editiση, xiii). Mσre impσrtaηtly, eveη wheη such
causal factσrs are prσperly iηvσked, they will explaiη the develσp­
meηt σf thσught σηly ση the level σf the subject aηd sσ will have
ησ archaeσlσgical sigηificaηce.
Frσm Fσucault's earlier excursiσηs iηtσ causal questiσηs (iη
FD, BC, aηd eveη ΜΜΡ), it seems clear that his iηcliηatiση is to
lσσk fσr aηswers iη the relatiσηs σf thσught aηd discσurse tσ
factoΓs that lie σutside them (e.g., iηstitutiσηal structures). Eveη
thσugh ΟΤ deliberately avσids questiσηs σf causality, Fσucault
says there that the discσηtiηuσus cl1aηge that prσduces a ηew
episteme "prσbably begiηs with aη erσsiση frσm σutside, frσm
that space which is, fσr thσught, ση the σther side" (ΟΤ, φ).
Αηd, as we shall see, ΑΚ iηsists ση a clσse tie betweeη the discur-
sive aηd the ησηdiscursive. Hσwever, iη bσth ΟΤ aηd ΑΚ, he is
reluctaηt tσ say much abσut the way ησηdiscursive causal factσrs
σperate. (Sσme hiηts σf the directiση σf his thiηkiηg are appar-
eηt iη his cσmmeηts ση tl1e relatiση betweeη discursive fσrma­
tiσηs aηd ησηdiscursive practices, wl1ich we discuss belσw). His
view is that we ηeed to develσp arcl1aeσlσgy mσre fully as a
descriptiση σf the traηsfσrmatiσηs that have σccurred iη the
l1istσry σf thσught befσre we mσve to questiσηs σf their causal
explaηatiση (cf. ΟΤ, xii aηd 51). Foucault later returηs to the
questiση σf causality wheη, iη DP aηd later wσrks, he fσcuses
explicitly ση tl1e cσηηectiση σf kησwledge aηd pσwer.

Archaeology and the history of science

Ιη priηciple, Fσucault's archaeσlσgical appΓOach is applicable tσ
aηy sσrt σf discσurse at all-literary, philσsσphical, pσlitical, aηd
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

sσ ση. Ιη fact, hσwever, he had, up tσ the time he wrσte ΑΚ,

applied the apprσach σηly tσ scieηces (σr wσuld-be scieηces). Fσr
this reasση, we ηeed tσ pay special atteηtiση tσ the relatiση σf
archaeσlσgy tσ σηe part σf traditiσηal histσry σf ideas: the his-
tory σf scieηce. Fσucault apprσaches this questiση by reflectiηg
(ΑΚ, 178ff) ση the cσηηectiση betweeη the scieηces aηd the
discursive fσrmatiσηs (pσsitivities) that are the cσηcerη σf archae-
σlσgy. We might thiηk that pσsitivities simply are scieηces σr, at
least, what Fσucault calls "discipliηes"- that is, "grσups σf state-
meηts that bσrrσw their σrgaηizatiση frσm scieηtific mσdels,
which teηd tσ cσhereηce aηd demσηstrativity, which are ac-
cepted, iηstitutiσηalized, traηsmitted, aηd sσmetimes taught as
scieηces" (ΑΚ, 178). But Fσucault deηies that discursive fσrma­
tiσηs are iη geηeral discipliηes σf aηy sσrt, whether scieηtific,
pseudσscieηtific, σr prescieηtific. He cites as aη example his
early wσrk (iη FD) ση madηess. Here the relevaηt discipliηe was
clearly the psychiatry that emerged at the begiηηiηg σf the ηiηe­
teeηth ceηtury. Fσucault's archaeσlσgical aηalysis did reveal that
psychiatry was based ση a discursive practice aηd a cσrrespσηd­
iηg discursive fσrmatiση. But this practice "is ησt σηly maηi­
fested iη a discipline pσssessiηg a scieηtific status and scieηtific
pretensiσηs; it is alsσ fσuηd in σperatiσn in lega1 texts, in litera-
ture, iη philσsσphy, iη pσlitical decisiσηs, aηd iη the statemeηts
made aηd the σpiniσηs expressed iη daily life" (ΑΚ, 179). Fur-
ther, Fσucault fσund that, iη the seveηteeηth aηd eighteeηth
ceηturies, althσugh there was ησ siηgle discipliηe that dealt with
madηess (ησ precursσr σf psychiatry), "there were a discursive
fσrmatiση aηd a pσsitivity perfectly accessible tσ descriptiση"
(ΑΚ, 179). Sσ, thσugh discursive fσrmatiσηs may be iηtimately
related tσ scieηces, they caηησt be ideηtified with them. Νσr caη
they be ideηtified as "prσtσtypes σf future scieηces," sσ that we
caη thiηk σf a discursive fσrmatiση as a grσupiηg σf "all the
heterσgeηeσus aηd dispersed elemeηts whσse cσmplicity will
prσve tσ be ηecessary tσ the establishmeηt σf a scieηce" (ΑΚ,
18σ). Fσr a siηgle scieηce may be fσrmed frσm elemeηts σf a
wide variety σf discursive fσrmatiσηs. Thus, the scieηce σf biσl­
σgy, which first appeared iη the ηiηeteeηth ceηtury, cσmbiηes
elemeηts derived ησt σηly frσm Classical ηatural histσry but alsσ
frσm the seveηteenth- aηd eighteeηth-ceηtury aηalysis σf reflex
mσvemeηt, theσry of germs, aηd explanatiση σf aηimal aηd vege-
tal grσwth- all σf which were develσped iη discursive fσrma-
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 2 51

tions very different from that underlying the taxonomic classifi-

cations of natural history. Foucault accordingly concludes tl1at
"discursive formations can be identified ... neither as sciences,
nor as scarcely scientific disciplines, nor as distant prefigurations
of the sciences to come, nor as forms that exclude scientificity
from the outset" (ΑΚ, 181).
Foucault's positive account of the relationsl1ip of discursive
formatiόns to sciences is based on the special sense he gives to
the distinction between connaissance and savoir. By connaissance
he means (in accord with ordinary French usage) any particular
body of knowledge such as nuclear physics, evolutionary biol-
ogy, or Freudian psychoanalysis; thus, connaissance is what is
found in what Foucault characterized as disciplines. Savoir, on
tl1e other hand, refers to the discursive conditions that are nec-
essary for the development of connaissance, to, in Foucault's
words, "the conditions that are necessary in a particular period
for this or that type of object to be given to connaissance and for
this or 'that enunciation to be formulated" (cf. ΑΚ, 15, transla-
tor's note 2). In Foucault's view, a particular science (or, more
generally, a discipline) is the locus of connaissance whereas a
discursive formation is the locus of savoir. As such, the savoir of
a discursive formation provides the objects, types of cognitive
authority (enunciative modes), concepts, and themes (theoreti-
cal strategies) that are necessary for a body of scientific connais-
sance. Or, we might say, a discursive formation provides the pre-
knowledge (savoir) necessary for the knowledge (connaissance)
achieved by a science. This latter locution is justified by Fou-
cault's talk of savoir as the "basis" or "precondition" of connais-
sance. But it is important that we not think of savoir in this role
as an epistemological given (donnee), "a lived experience, still
implicated in the imagination or in perception" (ΑΚ, 182). Fou-
cault's savoir/connaissance distinction is not a version of the phe-
nomenologist's idea that we begin with uncritical "immediate
knowledge" that is transformed by rigorous method into apodic-
tic scientific knowledge. The savoir presupposed by a science is
not "that which must have been lived, or must be lived, if the
intention of ideality proper to [the science] is to be established."
Savoir is rather "that which must have been said- or must be
said- if a discourse is to exist that complies ... with the ex-
perimental or formal criteria of scienti:ficity" (ΑΚ, 182). Con-
naissance is an achievement of an individual or a group con-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

sciousπess aπd so is πaturally the focus of a subject-ceπtered

eπterprise such as traditioπal history of scieπce. Savoir, by coπ­
trast, is the coπcerπ of Foucault's archaeology: 'Ίπstead of ex-
ploriπg the coπsciousπess/kπowledge (coππaissance)lscieπce axis
(which caππot escape subjectivity), archaeology explores the dis-
cursive practice/kπowledge (sάvoir)lscieπce axis" (ΑΚ, 183).
Archaeology's coπcerπ with savoir rather thaπ connaissance
meaπs ποt oπly that it operates οπ a differeπt epistemic level
from that of traditioπal history of scieπce but also that it has a
wideι· scope. History of scieπce will rightly deal oπly with disci-
pliπes that are scieπtific; a "scieπtific domaiπ" (the object of the
history of scieπce) excludes literary aπd philosophical texts that
do ποt meet the accepted scieπtific πorms of their periods. But
aπ "archaeological territory" will exteπd to texts of all the disci-
pliπes, scieπtific aπd πoπscieπtific, that are coπditioπed by the
savoir it aπaiyzes. "Kπowledge [savoiτ] is to be fouπd ποt oπly iπ
[scieπtific] demoπstratioπs, it caπ also be fouπd iπ fictioπ, re-
flexioπ, πarrative accouπts, iπstitutioπal regulatioπs, aπd politi-
cal decisioπs" (ΑΚ, 183-84).
Thus, from aπ archaeological view, a scieπce is just οπe, local-
ized formatioπ iπ the "epistemological site" that is a discursive
formatioπ. Scieπce πeither supersedes ποr exhausts the dis-
cursive formatioπ that is its backgrouπd. Further, the process
whereby a scieπce is "articulated" οπ a discursive formatioπ is
just οπe of several possible episodes iπ the history of a discur-
sive formatioπ. Foucault iπ fact distiπguishes four stages or
thresholds relevaπt to the historical reality of discursive forma-
tioπs. Prior (logically, though ποt πecessarily temporally) to the
"threshold of scieπtificity" are the "threshold of positivity" aπd
the "threshold of epistemologizatioπ." The former is simply the
emergeπce of the discursive formatioπ as aπ iπdividual, autoπo­
mous system goverπiπg the formatioπ of statemeπts; the latter
iπvolves the developmeπt of epistemic πorms (e.g., for coher-
eπce aπd verificatioπ) that claim to provide staπdards of validity
for kπowledge. The threshold of scieπtificity is crossed wheπ to
the basic epistemic πorms of the discursive formatioπ there are
added specific rules for coπstructiπg propositioπs iπ accord
with the caπoπs of a scieπtific methodology. These caπoπs iπtro­
duce staπdards of precisioπ aπd rigor beyoπd those of mere
epistemologizatioπ aπd defiπe the 'Όbjectivity" aπd the "system-
aticity" proper to a scieπce (ΟΤ, 365). Fiπally, there is the
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 253
"threshold of formalization," which is crossed when the scien-
tific dimension of a discursive formation is able to exl1ibit its
structures in axiomatic form. Foucault does not want these
tlπesholds to be taken as regular, successive stages in the inevita-
ble development of discursive formations. True, there may be
cases in whicl1 all four stages of positivity, epistemologization,
scientificity, and formalization follow one another in that order,
and it makes no sense for logically subsequent stages to occur
before prior ones (e.g., formalization before epistemologiza-
tion). But different discursive formations develop at different
and very irregular rates and some may not have the capacity to
reach all four thresholds. Further, a discursive formation may
pass through two or more thresholds at the same time. Foucault
cites the extreme case of mathematics, which, he says, simulta-
neously crossed all four thresholds. More common are cases in
which a new discursive formation emerges with norms of epis-
temic valuation and perhaps even canons of scientific method.
Then the discursive formation passes at once the thresholds of
positivity, epistemologization, and perhaps scientificity. Foucault
thinks this happened when the discursive formation of modern
biology succeeded the discursive formation of Classical natural
history (ΑΚ, 188). Foucault emphasizes the complex variety of
ways his threshold schema applies to specific discursive forma-
tions. It is not a univocal model, applying in the same way to all
discursive formations.
The connaissance!savoir distinction and the distinction between
the threshold of scientificity and the threshold of epistemologi-
zation provide Foucault with the means of clearly separating
archaeological analysis from history of science as practiced by
Bachelard and Canguilhem. Whereas the latter deals only with
connaissance, witl1 bodies of scientific knowledge, archaeology
studies the savoir that provides tl1e conditions of possibility for
such knowledge. Because of its concern with savoir, archaeology
is not, like history of science, restricted to the domains ofknowl-
edge defined by past and present scientific disciplines but can
reveal structures common to various disciplines. Moreover, it
can even map the ground common to scientific and nonscientific
forms of discourse, as Foucault did in FD and at the beginning of
BC.
With regard to the distinction of thresholds, Foucault points
out that Bachelard and Canguilhem are concerned only with
254 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

disciplines that have passed the threshold of scientificity. They

accept as normative the concepts and rational standards of cur-
rent scientific disciplines and write the history of how these con-
cepts and standards won out over prescientific prejudices and
misunderstandings. Their purpose is "to discover how ... a sci-
ence was established over and against a prescientific level, which
both paved the way and resisted it in advance, how it succeeded
in overcoming the obstacles and limitations that still stood in its
way" (ΑΚ, 190). Such history evaluates past scientific work as
true or false, rational or irrational, progressive or regressive in
terms of the bestjudgment of current science.
Foucault labels the history ofBachelard and Canguilhem "epis-
temological history," since it begins from the norms provided by
an epistemological analysis of the concepts and methods of cur-
rent science. These norms are not themselves critically evaluated
but are applied to judge past scientific work. By contrast, ar-
chaeologicall1istory of science is primarily concerned with discur-
sive formations that have passed the threshold of epistemologi-
zation but not that of scientificity. Its purpose is to describe in a
neutral way the process whereby cognitive norms (whetl1er genu-
inely scientific or not) are formed. Consequently, "at this level
[that of archaeological history ], scientificity does not serve as a
norm" (ΑΚ, 190). This is no doubt what Canguilhem had in
mind when he said, in his review of ΟΤ, that "there is today no
philosophy less normative than that of Foucault." 14 But such a
claim is true only in the sense that archaeology does not, like the
history practiced by Bachelard and Canguilhem, judge tl1e past
on the basis of the norms of current science. On the other hand,
archaeological analysis is centrally concerned with norms as
themselves the products of historical developments. "Such an
analysis sets out ... to outline the history of the sciences on the
basis of a description of discursive practices; to define how, in
accordance with which regularity, and as a result ofwhich modifi-
cations, it was able to give rise to the processes of epistemolo-
gization, to attain the norms of scientificity, and, perhaps, to
reach the threshold of formalization" (ΑΚ, 1go-g1).
Here we find what is no doubt the most fundamental way in
which Foucault moves beyond the approach of Bachelard and

14. Georges Canguilhem, "Mort de l'homme ou epuisement de cogito?" Critique

24 (1967), 612.
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 255
Canguilhem. For him the norms found in (purportedly) scien-
tific disciplines are not unquestioned givens for historical reflec-
tion but theιnselves the outcome of contingent historical pro-
cesses. Unlike Bachelard and Canguilhem, he undertakes the
writing of the history of science (or what claims to be science)
without presupposing the norms of the domains he is dealing
with. Bachelard had criticized philosophical claims, based on out-
dated science, about necessary limitations on knowledge. Fou-
cault opens the way to a historical critique of current scientific
norms thems~lves as something less than absolute conditions for
the possibility of knowledge. In this way, Foucault transforms
the history of science in accord with his ultimate goal of dissolv-
ing constraints on human freedom.
However, even here the move away from Bachelard and
Canguilhem is not as decisive as it might seem. Foucault's cri-
tiques of norms are not directed at the "noble" sciences of phys-
ics and chemistΓy that were Bachelard's concern. Nor does l1e
raise any questions about the standards of modern biology in
itself as distinct from certain of its applications in medical prac-
tice. Foucault does not move his archaeological critique of scien-
tific norms in the direction of a debunking of scientific rational-
ity as such. Rather, his cήtique is exclusively directed toward the
dubious disciplines of psychiatry, medicine, and the human sci-
ences. (And even here he is willing, as we have seen, to allow a
certain level of objectivity and trutl1.) With regard to the well-
established natuτal sciences, Foucault seems content to accept
the approacl1 of Bachelard and Canguilhem.
Nevertheless, archaeology does suggest a new way of looking
at the question of the justification of the noΓms of even the most
well-established sciences. As we saw, neither Bachelard nor Can-
guilhem was able to offer a satisfactory account of the basis of
scientific norms. From the viewpoint of archaeology, it might be
suggested that this is because they seek such an account on the
level of the subject, whether construed as an individual or as a
social group. Thus, as we saw in Chapter 1, Bacl1elard speaks of
objective norms deriving from the move from the individual
cogito to the collective cogitamus. For Foucault, by contrast, norms
presumably derive from archaeological structures antecedent to
the cognitive activities of subjects. Specifically, they no doubt
originate at the point of interaction between discursive forma-
tions and the nondiscursive factors (e.g., social institutions, eco-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

nomic causes) tl1at, along with discourse, constitute our practical

involvement with the world. We will return to this topic in the
next section.

Discourse and the nondiscursive

The focus of ΑΚ is on discursive formations - that is, on knowl-
edge as the outcome of linguistic practices. However, the book
also frequently asserts a close connection between discourse and
nondiscursive practices. Here Foucault resumes a theme that is,
as we saw, prominent in FD but increasingly muted in BC and,
especially, ΟΤ. He presents archaeology as providing a distinc-
tive approach to the relations between discourses and nondis-
cursive domains such as "institutions, political events, economic
practices and processes" (ΑΚ, 162). History of ideas explains
such relations via eitl1er symbolic or causal analysis. The former
sees a discourse (e.g., that of clinical medicine in the late eigh-
teenth century) and nondiscursive factors (e.g., tl1e political, eco-
nomic, and institutional developments of the eighteenth cen-
tury) as sharing a common form or meaning in virtue of which
each reflects the other. The latter tries to "discover to wl1at ex-
tent political changes, or economic processes, could determine
the consciousness of scientists" (ΑΚ, 163)- for example, how
nineteenth-century industrial capitalism's need for large num-
bers of workers caused the medical profession to think and
speak of the origin and cure of diseases in social terms. Archaeol-
ogy, as we would expect, is concerned rather with the discursive
formation as a condition of the possibility of such symbolic and
causal connections. Specifically, with respect to the latter, this
means that archaeology "wishes to show not how political prac-
tice has determined the meaning and form of ... discourse, but
how and in what form it takes part in its conditions of einer-
gence, insertion, and functioning" (ΑΚ, 163). Thus, BC's archae-
ology of early nineteenth-century medicine shows how social
phenomena such as conscripted armies and public-assistance hos-
pitals for the poor provided the context for the emergence of the
statistical norms of health discussed by clinical medicine. On
another level, the special authority ofthe doctor (as "virtually the
exclusive ... enunciator of [medical] discourse"- ΑΚ, 164) is
connected with the nineteenth-century institutions ofhospitaliza-
tion and private practice.
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 257
Foιιcault's arcl1aeological approach to tl1e relation of scientific
discourse to nondiscιιrsive factors differs in two very imρortant
ways from that of most contemporary sociology of science (e.g.,
tl1e Edinburgl1 "strong program"). For one thing, as we have
already noted, l1e is not concerned witl1 tl1e inflιιence of social
factors on tl1e content of scientific tl1eories (e.g., the influence of
seventeenth-century political institutions ο η Newton's laws of me-
chanics); arcl1aeology works on the more fundamentallevel of
the definition ofbasic objects and concepts, tl1e cognitive author-
ity of the scientist, and tl1e social function of science. More impor-
tantly, Foucault is reluctant to cl1aracterize science as straigl1tfor-
wardly determined by social caιιses. Ratl1er, l1e speaks of social
factors as 'Όpen[ing] up new fields for tl1e mapping of [scien-
tific] objects" (ΑΚ, 16 3) and of a scientific practice as "articulated
on [social] practices tl1at are external to it" (ΑΚ, 164). But tl1is
idea is not developed since, as we l1ave seen, Foucault is not yet
prepared to extend archaeology to causal questions. Nonethe-
less, he is clearly trying to make intellectual ωοm for a discussion
of science and society that will soιnehow connect the two on
fundamentallevels but not reqιιire tl1e redιιctionists' presupposi-
tion of social determinism.
In any case, it is precisely at tl1is point of connection tl1at the
issue of the origin an·d basis of scientific norms might be frιιitfully
raised. Perhaps, for example, we could show how sιιch norms are
essentially connected witl1 social practices so fundamental that, at
least for a given culture, tl1ey define tl1e essential nature ofl1uman
reality. Of course, Foucault would be suspicious on principle of
any norms tl1at claim sucl1 a basic status. But not all suspicions
turn out to be well-founded, and l1is acceρtance of tl1e objectivity
of at least the natural sciences seems to require tl1e admission tl1at
some norms are genιιinely regιιlative of our knowledge. If so,
nondiscιιrsive social practices that express, at least for the time
being, the nature of our fundamental engagement witl1 tl1e world
would be plaιιsible candidates as tl1e groιιnd for scientific norms.
The sort of practices relevant here migl1t, for example, be Fou-
cault's parallel to Habermas's cognitive inteΓests. Perhaps our fιιn­
damental practical orientations toward controlling nature, under-
standing one another, and emancipating oιιrselves from arbitrary
psychological and social constraints pωvide tl1e basis for tl1e
norms of scientific objectivity.
Such suggestions are, of coιιrse, only speculations about how
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

Foucault might respond to questions that in fact he never directly

addressed. His own interest was clearly much more in undermin-
ing illegitimate normative claims than in grounding legitimate
ones. 15 However, there is one important problem facing any ac-
count of scientific objectivity that Foucault does (bήefly) discuss.
This is the question of the relation of science to ideology. On the
one hand, he says that archaeology enables us to see ideology as a
natural accompaniment of any science. Α science's origin from a
discursive formation that also provides intellectual space for non-
scientific (e.g., political, religious) practices makes it inevitable
that there will be deep similarities and important practical connec-
tions between the sciences and the political, economic and reli-
gious ideologies of an era. Thus, to cite a standard example, it
should come as no surprise that "political economy has a role in
capitalist society, that it serves the interests of the bourgeois class,
that it was made by and for that class, and that it bears the mark of
its origins even in its concepts and logical architecture" (ΑΚ, 185).
But, on the other hand, archaeology enables us to see that even
strong ideological connections need not exclude the scientificity
of a discipline: 'Ίdeology is not exclusive of scientificity. Few dis-
courses have given so much place to ideology as clinical discourse
or that of political economy: this is not a sufficiently good reason
to treat the totality of their statements as being undermined by
error, contradiction, and a lack of objectivity" (ΑΚ, 186). Α given
scientific discipline will have a certain ideological significance and
function precisely because of the way it is related to other dis-
courses rooted in its discursive formation. But this need not alter
the fact that the discipline in itself is governed by norms of scien-
tific objectivity. (Ν ote how Foucault consistently rejects a teleologi-
cal interpretation of the role of ideology in science. It is not a
question of, for example, some class using the science for its pur-
poses but of a common presubjective origin for both the science
and the ideology.) It may even be (though Foucault does not
explicitly say so) that the ideological function of a science requires
it to meet certain standards of objectivity. For example, history
designed to further the claims of a religious institution competing
15. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter 7, there is another approach to the
problem of norms- one denying the need for a philosophical grounding-
that is more in accord witl1 Foucault's own inclinations. But it is still worth
noting tl1at 11is archaeological approacl1 does not exclude in pήnciple some
sort of philosophical basis for norms.
 ΤΗΕ ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 259
for allegiance in a pluralistic society may need to be objective to
obtain the ideological goal of gaining the respect and attention of
nonbelievers. Of course, ideology may also cause defects of objec-
tivity in a science. But, Foucault holds, eliminating the defects
need not destroy the ideological connections: ''τhe role of ideol-
ogy does not diminish as rigour increases and error is dissipated"
(ΑΚ, 186). Thus, he moves away from the standard view that
there is a deep gap between valid science and ideologically influ-
enced inquiry and leads us to see scientific objectivity and ideologi-
cal bias as two intertwined aspects of a discipline's rootedness in a
discursive formation.
We arrived at Foucault's analysis ofideology from a discussion
of the connections between discursive and nondiscursive factors
in knowledge. It is striking, however, that his analysis makes no
mention of the nondiscursive sources of ideology but seems to
treat it as an autonomous discursive phenomenon. Later, Fou-
cault expressed strong reservations about the concept of ideology,
saying "this is a notion that cannot be used without circumspec-
tion." Among his reasons is that "ideology stands in a secondary
position relative to something which functions as its infrastruc-
ture, as its material, economic determinant, etc." 16 His point here
is clearly directed against AK's treatment of ideology.
This treatment of ideology is, moreover, an example of one of
AK's major flaws. Although the book insists in principle on the
intimate tie between discursive formations and nondiscursive
factors such as institutions, there is no serious discussion of the
nature of the nondiscursive factors and of the influence they
exert. ΑΚ offers a full-blown methodology for a history of
thought that, like ΟΤ, treats it as a set of autonomous systems of
discourse. But it does not do justice to histories (like FD and the
beginning of BC) that deal with the interrelations of discourse
and nondiscursive practices. It recognizes the existence of such
interrelations and even (in its treatment of the formation of
objects, concepts, enunciative modalities, and theoretical op-
tions) notes some specific points of interaction. But there is no
elucidation of the fundamental nature and ultimate significance
of the link between the discursive and the nondiscursive.
This issue (and the closely related one of the source of change

16. ''Yruth and power," in Colin Gordon, ed. Power/lιnowledge (New York: Pan-
tlιeon, 1g8o), 118.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

in the l1istory of thought) becomes central for tl1e 11ext stage of

Foucault's work. From DP througl1 tl1e first volume of HS, he
suppleme11ts the archaeological analysis of discourse with a com-
plementary analysis (dubbed "ge11ealogical") of the relatio11 of
discursive knowledge to the power structures of society. This
focus 011 "power/knowledge" takes Foucault considerably be-
yo11d his earlier work. But i11 ma11y ways it remai11s a11 explicit
developme11t of what is implicit i11 the books from FD through
ΑΚ. The next chapter, which is primarily a philosophical evalua-
tion of the archaeological method, will also offer a few further
comme11ts 011 its relation to Foucault's later genealogical work.

· Conclusion
It is clear that, at a mi11imum, ΑΚ is importa11t as an explicit
formulation of the approacl1 to the history of thought that Fou-
cault developed i11 FD, BC, a11d ΟΤ. As we l1ave seen, its method-
ology does not e11tirely accord with the practice of the preceding
case studies; but it is a reco11struction faitl1ful to tl1e central
features of that practice. Beyo11d tl1is, although AK's methodol-
ogy is primarily oriented toward the description of discuΓSive
formations, the book does point- with ma11y unclarities a11d
hesitatio11s- toward Foucault's later efforts to come to terms
with 11ondiscursive causal factors i11 the history of thougl1t. ΑΚ
thus appears as a methodological essay that both sums up Fou-
cault's previous historical work a11d moves halti11gly toward his
later, genealogical work.
It may, however, seem that ΑΚ is something more than a
historia11's articulatio11 ofhis methodology. In particular, we may
be inclined to regard it as an effort to provide a philosop11ical
basis or justification for this methodology. On sucl1 a view-
implicit, for example, in Dreyfus a11d Rabi11ow's discussion of
ΑΚ- Foucault's goal is to grou11d his historical practice i11 a
philosophical accou11t of k11owledge a11d la11guage. Ι will express
my reservatio11s regardi11g this i11terpretatio11 of ΑΚ in the
course of my evaluation of his archaeological approach i11 the
next, co11cludi11g chapter.
 7
~ ~ ----------------------
REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

Readers of Foucault are likely to question the value of his work

on at least three levels. First, alternatively befogged by the tortιι­
ous opacities of l1is prose and dazzled by the seeming gratιιitous­
ness of his audacious claims, they may well ask if there is any-
thing at all here worth their while. Do his writings, beneath all
the fireworks and attendant billows of smoke, in fact express a
position of sufficient clarity, plausibility, and interest to merit
sustained attention? The preceding chapters represent my own
effort to provide an affirmative answer to this question. By care-
ful analysis of all the major books Foucault wrote through the
ιg6os, Ι have tried to show that they do express a col1erent and
challenging approach to the l1istory of Western thought. The
next sort of question likely to confront Foucault's readers is that
of his historical accuracy. Here an adequate response would re-
quire detailed specialist investigations beyond both the scope of
this book and tl1e competeήce of its author. However, Ι have
offered a general framework for the histoΓical evaluation ofFou-
cault's work, based on a distinction of the levels of specific his-
tory, constructive history, and critical history. Moreover, Ι have
discussed some typical difficulties raised by historians concern-
ing the first two levels and have offered fulleΓ evaluations of the
σitical history of FD and οτ. My tentative overall assessment is

261
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

that, at alllevels, Foιιcaιιlt's history is sιιfficiently responsible and

challenging to be wortl1 serioιιs attention, bιιt it is also often
greatly oversimplified and lacking in evidential sιιpport.
Βιιt, at least for the philosophically minded reader, there re-
main serioιιs evalιιative qιιestions. For Foιιcaιιlt does not claim
merely to offer interesting and plaιιsible accoιιnts of some data
in tl1e history of Western thoιιght. He also sιιggests that his
accoιιnts sιιpport a new view of reason as a l1istorical phenome-
non and, correspondingly, a new conception of philosophical
reflection. The qιιestion is whether this accoιιnt of reason and
this conception of philosophy are ones we oιιgl1t to accept.
At the heart of his view of reason and philosopl1y is Foιιcaιιlt's
distinctive appropriation of Kaι~t's conception of philosophy as
the critical ιιse of reason. As we saw in the Introdιιction, he
ιιltimately presented his intellectιιal enterprise as a self-critical
continιιation of the Enlightenment project of seeking aιιtonomy
throιιgh reason. Like Kant, he accepts reason as the key to free-
dom and aιιtonomy. Βιιt, in characteristic postmodern fashion,
he also sees the ways in which reason itself can tyrannize rather
than libeΓate and sets l1imself the task of employing reason to
overcome its own destrιιctive tendencies.
Given this ιιnderstanding ofFoιιcaιιlt's project, two central criti-
cal qιιestions directly arise. First, is the archaeological method that
Foιιcaιιlt developed from the implicit practice ofFD throιιgh the
explicit methodological reflection of ΑΚ, in fact consistent witl1
and an appropriate vehicle for his philosophical project? We may
sιιspect, for example, that Foιιcaιιlt's late fω·mιιlation ofwhat he
was trying to do does not fit well with what he in fact did from
fifteen to twenty-five years earlier. Second, even given the inter-
nal compatibility of Foιιcaιιlt's explicit philosophical telos and his
archaeological practice, is the telos itself viable? Some of the most
acιιte and challenging criticisms of Foιιcaιιlt (e.g., those formιι­
lated by Jίirgen Habermas and by Charles Taylor) sιιggest that his
philosophical telos is itself incoherent, that it embodies a fatal self-
referential inconsistency.

Archaeological method and Foucault's

philosophical project
One soιιrce of tension between archaeological method and Foιι­
caιιlt's Enlightenment conception of liberating philosophy is his
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

fascination with madness - the foil of reason- as the locus of the

ultimate truth of human reality. As we saw in Chapter 2, al-
tl1ough most of FD deals with conceptions of madness developed
from the standpoint of reason, there is also a recurring "coun-
tertheme," dominant at the end of the book, of the mad's own
experience of their madness. Here Foucault strongly suggests
that this experience has access to a pήvileged truth about the
reality of madness. He further suggests tl1at this trut}J., particu-
larly as expressed through the literatιιre of madness, is the key to
an understanding of human reality that willlead us beyond the
arbitrary restrictions of mere reason. Thus, he speaks of the
works of such writers as Hδlderlin, Nerval, Roussel, Nietzsche,
and Artaud as "lightning flashes" that reveal the "sovereign en-
terprise of unreason" and effect a "total contestation" of West-
ern cultιιre that promises an escape from the "gigantic moral
imprisonment" that is the life of reason (FD, 530; MC, 278).
Such a view maintains the project of human liberation but,
contrary to Foucault's position in "What Is Enlightenment?",
makes this project not the work of but a revolt against reason.
Foucault's goal appears to be not a self-critical continuation of the
Enlightenment struggle for rational autonomy but, in the manner
of romantic irrationalism, an infrarational vision of ultimate
truth. Further, in the original Preface to FD (omitted in the sec-
ond edition), Foucault seems to suggest that the.historical method
employed in that book (i.e., archaeology) is itself meant to func-
tion as an instrument of this enterprise, establishing contact witl1
the "pure" experience of madness in its own right. He does not go
so far as to say that archaeology can simply restore this experi-
ence: ''τhe wild state [ofmadness] can never be restored in itself"
but remains an "inaccessible primitive purity" (FD, vii). But he
does claim that through a "structιιral stιιdy of the historical
ensemble- notions, institιιtions, juridical and police measures,
scientific concepts- "we can "get back to the decision thatsimulta-
neously connects and separates reason and madness" and "dis-
cover the perpetιιal exchange, the obscure common root, the
original confrontation that gives meaning [sens] to both the unity
and the opposition of sense [sens] and the senseless [l'insensee]"
(FD, vi). This at least suggests that archaeology is meant to exca-
vate the oracle of madness.
If this were the true significance of Foucault's arcl1aeological
method, then it would obviously not be an appropriate instru-
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

ment for his later project of a self-critique of autonomous rea-

son; it woιιld be rather a means of reaching a fιιndamental trιιth
bιιried far beneath the realm of reason. Βιιt however mιιcl1 tl1e
Foιιcaιιlt of FD was taken with this naive idea of a privileged
experience of madness, sιιch an experience cannot be plaιιsibly
regarded as the primary object of that book's histoήcal analysis.
Despite the claims of the Preface, these in fact focιιs almost
exclιιsively on the ways the nonmad view the mad. Only in brief
reflections on De Sade's writings and Goya's paintings is there
any serioιιs effort to evoke madness as the mad live it. Accord-
ingly, even thoιιgh Foιιcaιιlt does hold in FD tl1at there is a
privileged expeήence of madness that provides fιιndamental
infrarational trιιth, his archaeological history of madness is not a
history of this experience.
As a matter of fact, the idea of finding tl1e trιιth in some
special infrarational experience is one that lingers for a consider-
able time in Foιιcaιιlt's thoιιght. At tl1e end of ΟΤ, for example,
he evokes the figιιre of "madness as it is posited in the modern
expeήence, as its trιιth and alterity." In this figιιre, he says, we
encoιιnter "the very hollowness of οιιr existence ... , the finitιιde
ιιpοη the basis ofwhich we are, and think, and know, is sιιddenly
there before ιιs: an existence both real and impossible" (ΟΤ,
375). This view may also be connected with OTs qιιasi-mystical
effιιsions sιιggesting a postmodern salvific retιιrn of langιιage,
not as an instrιιment of reason bιιt as an aιιtonomoιιs reality.
The same theme emerges even in ΑΚ, which in other ways is
the high tide of Foιιcaιιlt's flirtation with rationalist strιιctιιral­
ism. There he does insist that archaeology is not a matter of
"writing a history of the referent" and that, for example, "we are
not trying to reconstitιιte what madness itself might be, in the
form in which it first presented itself to some primitive, fιιnda­
mental, deaf, scarcely articιιlated experience" (ΑΚ, 47). And, in
a footnote to this passage, he says: "This is wήtten against an
explicit theme of my book [FD], and one that recιιrs particιιlarly
in the Preface" (ΑΚ, 4 7, n.1). However, even here Foιιcaιιlt's
point is merely that archaeology is concerned only with discιιr­
sive systems, not with the real referents of these systems, sιιch as
"madness itself." He does not deny that there are sιιch referents
or even that we may have some access to them. In fact, immedi-
ately after saying, "we are not trying to reconstitιιte what mad-
ness might be," he adds: "Sιιch a history of the referent is no
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

doubt possible; and Ι have no wish at the outset to exclude any

effort to uncover and free these 'prediscursive' experiences from
the tyranny ofthe text" (ΑΚ, 47).
It is, nonetheless, important that in ΑΚ Foucault explicitly
recognizes that, whatever prospects there may be for a discovery
of pure, prediscursive madness in itself, tl1is has nothing to do
with his work as an archaeologist of thought. Presumably, what-
ever revelation may be in store for us will derive from art, not
Foucault's archaeology. 1 In this regard, it is significant that Fou-
cault mentions the Preface but not the concluding sections ofFD
in his self-critical footnote. Even though the latter have much
more to say about madness in itself, it is only the Preftιce that
suggests that Foucault's own historical investigations- not only
tl1e "lightning flashes" of great art- may reveal the truth of
madness. Accordingly, even though Foucault seems to have long
nurtured a romantic irrationalism, he eventually realized (what
his actuall1istorical work bears out) that it l1ad no essential con-
nection with the philosophical project of his archaeology.
Nevertheless, Foucault's prolonged fascination with the idea
of an infrarational truth does have a significant- and, in my
view, negative- influence on his work from FD through ΑΚ. It
accounts, Ι think, for much of the obscure and self-indulgent
writing we find in these books. Even though the purpose of
archaeological method is to analyze madness, disease, life, labor,
and language as intellectual and social constructs, Foucault all
too often befogs his discussion with an incantatory rhetoric striv-
ing to evoke a sense of the realities in themselves that he thinks
lie beneath the rational constructs. The result is to obscure the
clarity and blunt the precision ofwhich his archaeological analy-
ses are capable. Significantly, after Foucault definitely shook off
the cl1arm of infrarational ultimate truth, his writing (in DP and
HS- especially the second and the third volumes of the latter)
becomes much leaner and more lucid.
Foucault's philosophical project is rationalist in the sense that
it involves an acceptance of reason as the primary means of
human liberation. This is why what Ι have called the temptation
of romantic irrationalism is a temptation. But the project is also
historical and critical; that is, it is based on the idea that reason
1. For an excellent discussion of Foucault's cl1anging views on art (particularly
modernist literature), cf. J ohn Rajchman, Michel Foucault: tlιe freedom ofp!ιiloso­
phy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), Chapter 1.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

itselfis a historical phenomenon whose norms are always open to

challenge through critical analysis. Since such analysis is itself an
exercise of reason, it follows that, from the standpoint of Foιι­
cault's philosophical project, it too mιιst be regarded as histori-
cally sitιιated in the discιιrsive and nondiscιιrsive practices of a
particιιlar age. As sιιch, it corresponds to a specific, historically
limited perspective and is not a disengaged ''view from nowhere"
that offers an absolιιte, ahistorical body of theoretical trιιth. In
view of this, it may well seem that the archaeological approach
Foιιcaιιlt develops from FD throιιgh ΑΚ cannot be the vehicle of
the critical analysis his philosophical project reqιιires. For it
seems that archaeology claims to be precisely the sort of neιιtral,
ahistorical theoretical knowledge to which Foιιcaιιlt's later pl1ilo-
sophical project allows no place.
Here we find Foιιcaιιlt encoιιntering what Ι will call the structur-
alist temptation. There is no doιιbt that his increasingly explicit
development of the archaeological approach in the ιg6os was
very closely tied to his fascination with and enthιιsiasm for strιιc­
tιιral analysis. We know that he was particιιlarly impressed by the
work ofDιιmezil ο η ancient religions, ofLevi-Straιιss on pήmitive
cιιltιιres, and ofLacan ο η psychoanalysis. Also, as we saw in Chap-
ter 6, he thoιιght of his archaeology as a historical coιιnterpart of
strιιctιιralism, effecting in the history of thoιιght the kind of de-
centering of the sιιbject that the strιιctιιralists had achieved in
other domains. Strιιctιιralist analyses generally presented them-
selves as scientific resιιlts, and the strιιctιιralist approach as a
whole was widely regarded as fιιlfilling the hope for an objective
theoretical ίιnderstanding of hιιman beings (genιιine hιιman sci-
ences). As a resιιlt it was easy for Foιιcaιιlt (and his readers) to
think of his archaeology as one fιιrther step along this path to
objective, theoretical knowledge of oιιrselves.
Sιιch a view of archaeology is fιιrther reinforced by Foιιcaιιlt's
tendency in ΑΚ to present his work as a more adeqιιate sιιccessor
of major philosophical efforts, in the phenomenological and her-
meneιιtical traditions, to provide a fιιndamental ιιnderstanding
of hιιman reality. He deploys the fιιll apparatιιs of a traditional
"discoιιrse on metl1od," delimits the domain of his research via a
complex categorization of the "rιιles" governing discoιιrse, and,
throιιgh his accoιιnt of the statement and discιιrsive formations,
seems to offer a groιιnding of his entire enterprise in a philoso-
phy of langιιage. All of this strongly sιιggests that archaeology is
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

meant to take its place in tl1e imposing series, from Plato to

Η usserl, of philosophical theoήes designed to catch once and for
all the essential features of human existence.
It is, then, both tempting and possible to read Foucault's ar-
chaeological method - especially as he articulates it in ΑΚ- as
directed toward the very sort of general tl1eoretical understand-
ing of human beings (social scientific or philosophical) that his
later philosophical project is committed to undermining. If we
do this, we will conclude that Foucault's archaeology succumbs to
the structuralist temptation and is indeed incompatible with his
philosophical project. Moreover, archaeology so construed is
open to the sort of devastating philosophical criticisms that Drey-
fus and Rabinow develop in their study ofFoucault. 2
What is not so clear, however, is whether archaeology need
be - or is best- construed along the theoreticallines correspond-
ing to the structuralist temptation. Such a construal is perhaps
inevitable if, like Dreyfus and Rabinow, we present Foucault's
work as essentially a response to the efforts of twentieth-century
philosophers and social scientists to achieve a theoretical under-
standing of human beings. There is no doubt that this is an
important perspective for understanding some aspects of Fou-
cault's enterprise. But, even where the force of the structuralist
temptation is at its strongest (at the end of ΟΤ and in ΑΚ), there
is reason to think that Foucault never entirely succumbs to it.
Moreover, our study of his development of the archaeological
approach has shown that it is primarily a method of concrete
historical analysis, not of general social scientific or philosophical
theorizing.
There is no doubt that the concluding chapter of ΟΤ is a
very strong endorsement of structuralist human science. Levi-
Strauss's cultural anthropology, Lacan's psychoanalysis, and a
(hoped-for) new form of structuralist linguistics are presented
as the engines that will finisl1 off the modern episteme's central
concept of man and clear a new space for constructive thought.
It is striking, however, that even here Foucault insists that the
new structuralist countersciences cannot be regarded as bodies
of neutral scientific knowledge. As we saw, he maintains that
both of the currently existing countersciences are essentially

2. Η. Dreyfus and Ρ. Rabinow, Miclιel Foucault: beyond structuralism and lιermeneu­

tics, 2d ed. (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1983), Chapter 4·
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

tied to practices specific to our current social, cultural, and

political situation. Psychoanalysis depends on tl1e special rela-
tionship between doctor and patient, and ethnology on the
dominant world-role of the Western democracies. As a result,
Foucault holds tl1at tl1e knowledge generated by these coun-
tersciences has an even lower status than that of the human
sciences, which themselves fall far short of the standards of full
scientific objectivity. He particularly emphasizes that the struc-
turalist countersciences must not be taken to provide anything
like general theories of human nature.
Accordingly, even if archaeology is viewed in relation to Fou-
cault's enthusiasm for structuralism, it can at best be regarded
as another counterscience, just as limited as tl1e others in its
scientific significance. In fact, it seems likely that, in terms of
the account of ΟΤ, archaeology would find its natural place as
a counterscience to the modern discipline of history. As we saw
in Chapter 5, Foucault presents the latter as the discipline that
shows how all tl1e l1uman sciences, including itself, have validity
only within a restricted temporal and cultural domain. Arcl1ae-
ology can be plausibly regarded as the non-subject-centeΓed
counter to this history, performing a parallel function for the
likewise non-subject-centered structuralist countersciences. As a
counterscience, archaeology would have the same kind oflimita-
tions as history itself and the other countersciences. It would
have to give up its "claim to validity within the element of
universality" (ΟΤ, 371). This would make it quite impossible
for Foucault to present it as a neutral, universally valid body of
theoretical knowledge.
With regard to ΑΚ itself, it is important to Γemember that all
the theoretical analyses of the statement and of the rules of
discursive formations are explicitly presented as part of an effort
to articulate an alternative to certain standard approaches to the
history of thought. Since these approaches have been often
based on philosophical accounts (Hegelian, Sartrean) of the hu-
man subject, it makes sense for Foucault to sketch an alternative
philosophical picture corresponding to his new approach to his-
tory. But the primary focus of the book, as the entire second half
makes clear, is to distinguish Foucault's way of doing the history
of thought from standard approaches, not to justify it on philo-
sophical grounds. In reply to the question (posed at the end of
ΑΚ), Is he doing history or philosophy?, Foucault responds tl1at
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

l1e is certainly not doing philosophy in tl1e sense of providing a

foιιndation for his arcl1aeological practice: "For the moment,
and for as far ahead as Ι can see, my discoιιrse ... is avoiding the
groιιnd on which it coιιld find sιιpport" (ΑΚ, 205). Thejιιstifica­
tion offered for archaeology- as Foιιcaιιlt's constant references
to his previoιιs case stιιdies sιιggest- is rather the frιιitfιιlness of
its specific applications. What might appear to be foιιndational
philosop1Ίical theories (oflangιιage, for example) are better con-
strιιed as no more than attempts to show that the archaeological
approach can be coherently formιιlated withoιιt relying on the
modern philosophical category of the sιιbject. The role, there-
fore, of AK's theoretical discιιssions is not to prove that archaeol-
ogy is the right method of history, mιιch less to establish a finally
adeqιιate theory of l1ιιman reality. Their pιιrpose is merely to
exhibit the appropriateness of archaeology as the method of a
history that will move ιιs beyond the modern concept of man.
This interpretation not only fits the predominantly historio-
graphical, rather than philosophical, emphasis of ΑΚ; it also
explains the ironic, self-distancing tone the book often exl1ibits
toward its enterprise. 3 This tone is particιιlarly evident in the
introdιιctory and conclιιding dialogιιes with an imagined critic
(ΑΚ, 17, 199-211), which pιιt the main body of the text in self-
qιιestioning brackets. Sιιch passages are a device for backing
away from the high philosophical serioιιsness that might be sιιg­
gested by the book's technical and systematic character. They
sιιggest tl1at the philosophical analyses are not in fact an effort at
final theoretical ιιnderstanding bιιt merely instrιιments for clari-
fying a specific approach to the history of thoιιght.
The strongest sιιpport for the conclιιsion that Foιιcaιιlt's ar-
chaeological method does not sιιccιιmb to the strιιctιιralist temp-
tation lies in its close connection witl1 Cangιιilhem's history of
concepts. As we have seen in detail, the method develops as an
extension and transformation of Cangιιilhem's methodology as a
historian of science. Faced with the problems of writing histories
of madness, disease, and the hιιman sciences that woιιld do jιιs­
tice to featιιres ignored by standard histories of ideas, Foιιcaιιlt

3· Allan Megilll1as particularly emphasized tl1e irony of ΑΚ. Cf. 11is "Foucault,
structuralism, and tl1e ends of history," journal of Modern History 51 (1979),
451-503 and Proplιets of extremity (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984), Chapter 4· In my view, however, he is incorrect in reading the irony as
a sign of radical irrationalism.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

adapted and revised Canguilhem's method to meet specific histo-

riographical needs.4 Thus, the archaeological method derives
much more from Foucault's efforts to deal with concrete histori-
cal data than from general philosophical theory. Moreover, as
we have seen, the historiographical needs that formed Foucault's
archaeology are intimately tied to the project for a historical
critique of reason formulated much later. Archaeology is, from
the beginning, an instrument of a critical history that accords
with the philosophical telos laid down in the essay "What Is
Enlightenment?" Accordingly, we can confidently conclude that
Foucault'_s archaeological method does not represent a yieldi-ng
to the structuralist temptation of pure, ahistorical theory and
does work as an appropήate instrument ofhis critical philosophi-
cal project.
Α remaining question concerns the relation of archaeology to
the genealogy that figures so prominently in Foucault's work af-
ter 1970. An adequate response to this question would require a
thorough study of Foucault's practice of genealogy (especially in
DP) and ofhis many scattered- and not obviously mutually con-
sistent- comments about it in essays and interviews. Ι think, how-
ever, that a careful analysis would support an account rougl1ly
along the following lines. Archaeology, as the preceding chapters
have characterized it, continues to play a key role in Foucault's
later work. It is, however, applied not only (as in Ο τ) to discursive
practices but also to nondiscursive practices. Thus, reflection on
DP's account of the modern practice of punishing criminals by
imprisonment reveals it to involve the four key features of discur-
sive formations. It constitutes new classes of objects (e.g., delin-
quents), characterized in terms of a set of distinctive concepts
(e.g., criminal character); it distinguishes practices with different
sorts of authority (that of the judge, .of prison officials, of parole
boards); and it defines alternative lines of strategic action (for
example, different approaches to the use ofsolitude and ofwork
in the treatment of prisoners). This application of archaeological
analysis is not an innovation but rather a return to the approach
of FD, where, for example, archaeology showed the common
structure of Cartesian philosophical discourse and the Classical

4· Cf. the discussions of Foucault's method at the ends of Chapters 2, 3, and 5

above.
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

nondiscursive practice of confinement and revealed the moral

import of the nineteenth-century asylum.
The simultaneous application of archaeology to discursive
practices (e.g., those, such as criminology, leading to the under-
standing of criminals) and to nondiscursive practices (e.g., those,
such as the prison system, leading to the control of criminals)
enables Foucault to establish an essential symbiotic relation be-
tween knowledge and power. This connection, of course, be-
comes the centralleitmotiv of his work during the 197os. Given
tl1is connection, Foucault was able to return to the question,
bracketed in ΟΤ, of the cause of changes in discursive forma-
tions (and epistemes). Like other historians, he sees changes in
nondiscursive practices as due to a wide variety of economic,
social, political, and ideological causes. But, contrary to many
standard accounts, he maintains that these causes cannot be fit
into any simple unified teleological scheme (e.g., the rise of the
bourgeoisie, the ambition of Napoleon). Rather, he holds that
nondiscursive practices change because of a vast number of
small, often unrelated factors (ad hoc adjustments of existing
procedures, the chance discovery of a new implement or technol-
ogy), the sorts of "petty causes" Nietzsche made the concern of
his genealogy. Thus, changes in tl1e nondiscursive practices that
constitute a society's power structure must be understood as due
to an immensely complex and diffuse variety of microfactors (a
"micro-physics of power"). (τhis approach does for nondiscur-
sive practices what archaeology did for discursive practices: It
eliminates the role of a central, controlling "subject.") The action
of the microcauses can · eventually lead to fundamentally new
sorts of discursive practices and to a corresponding revolution in
the correlated discursive practices (a new episteme).
It seems, then, that Foucault's development of a genealogical
approach to history is a matter of (1) returning archaeology to its
role of describing both discursive and nondiscursive practices,
(2) thereby exhibiting an essential tie between knowledge and
power, and (3) exploiting this tie to provide a causal explanation
of changes in discursive formations and epistemes. Accordingly,
genealogy does not replace or even seriously revise Foucault's
archaeological method. It rather combines it with a complemen-
tary technique of causal analysis.
If the above account is essentially correct, then archaeology
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

continues to hold a central place even in Foucault's genealogical

work. This would strongly support our claim that arcl1aeology is
compatible with Foucault's later formulation ofl1is pl1ilosophical
project.

Is Foucault's critique of reason self-refuting?

So far we have been discussing a question ofrelative consistency:
Is the archaeological method compatible with the critique of
reason for which Foucault wants to employ it? An even more
fundamental line of criticism, developed in different ways by
many writers, raises tl1e question of the absolute consistency of
Foucault's project: Doesn't his historical critique of reason wind
up refuting itself? Isn't it a self-referentially inconsistent project?
The most straightforward formulation of tl1is objection comes
from critics who think Foucault is a universal skeptic or total
relativist who p.enies tl1at tl1ere are any objective truths at all and
so must, if he is consistent, deny the objective truth of his own
position. Thus, J. G. Merquior says: "So at bottom Foucault's
enterprise seems stuck on the horns of a huge epistemological
dilemma: if it tells the truth, then all knowledge is suspect in its
pretence of objectivity; but in that case, how can the theory itself
vouch for its truth? It's like the famous paradox of the Cretan
liar- and Foucault seemed quite unable to get out ofit." 5 Hilary
Putnam offers a similar criticism, based on the idea that Foucault
is a "modern relativist" who "should end up by regarding his
own utteranς:es as mere expression of feeling." 6 The much more
elaborate and sophisticated critiques of Charles Taylor and Jίir­
gen Habermas also make use of tl1e self-refuting nature of what
they take to be Foucault's relativism. 7
Despite their popularity, such criticisms, based on the charge
of global skepticism or relativism, are unfounded. They ignore
three aspects of Foucault's work that definitely distinguish it
from any universal assault on the notion of truth. First, tl1ere is

5· J. G. Merquior, Foucault (London: Fontana, 1985), 147.

6. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Trutlι, and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), 163.
7. Cf. J. Habermas, The p!ιilosop!ιical discourse of modemity, translated by F. Law-
rence, (Cambridge, Mass.: ΜΙΤ Press, 1987), Chapters 9 and 10; and Charles
Taylor, "Foucault on freedom and truth," Politίcal Theory 12 (1984), 152-83,
reprinted ίη David Hoy, ed., Foucault: α critical reader (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1986).
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY 273
ιl1e explicitly local or regional nature of his analyses. His histori-
cal critiques of reason are always directed toward very specific
upplications (psychiatry, clinical medicine, the human sciences),
witl1 no suggestion that the inadequacies of any one domain can
be extrapolated to others. Second, Foucault's focus is always on
tl1e domains of "dubious disciplines" dealing with human beings.
There is no suggestion that he thinks his archaeological method
could be applied to sciences like physics or chemistry to show
tl1at their claims to truth and objectivity are questionable. There
is, in fact, strong reason to think that Foucault on the whole
accepted the objectivist view of these disciplines held by Bache-
lard and Canguilhem. Moreover, in ΟΤ, he accepts the modeΓn
empirical disciplines (biology, economics, and philology) as do-
mains of objective scientific knowledge.
Third, even for the dubious disciplines that are the objects of
l1is critique, Foucault does not deny all truth and objectivity. He
says, for example, that, even though the human "sciences" (un-
like the empirical disciplines on which they aΓe modeled) do not
meet "the formal criteria of a scientific form of knowledge," tl1ey
nonetheless do belong "to the positive domain of knowledge"
(ΟΤ, 365). He even allows, as we saw in Chapter 2, that modern
psychiatry may have a degree of"scientific validity." More gener-
ally, we saw how he insists (in ΑΚ) that even strong ideological
bias is compatible with the attainment of objective truth.
So the short answer to these criticisms is simply that Foucault
does not espouse the universal skepticism or relativism they
suppose l1e does. It might, nonetl1eless, be maintained that,
given other views he holds, Foucault ought to accept these self-
destructive positions. Here critics have frequently cited three of
Foucault's views that they think lead logically to skepticism or
relativism: that there are no facts independent of interpreta-
tion, that different periods of W estern thought have been ruled
by radically different epistemes, and that all knowledge is essen-
tially tied to nondiscursive social structures (the connection be-
tween knowledge and power).
Regarding the first point, critics frequently cite a passage in
Foucault's Royaumont lecture, "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," on the
pervasiveness of interpretation: 'Ίf interpretation can never be
completed, this is quite simply because there is nothing to inter-
pret. There is nothing absolutely primary to interpret, for after
all everything is already interpretation, each sign is in itself not
274 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

the thing that offers itself to interpretation but an interpretation

of other signs."B
Those who cite this passage as proof of Foucault's relativism
fail to realize that, in it, Foucault is not speaking in his own
name. He is engaged in an exposition of the "system of interpre-
tation the nineteenth century founded," 9 and the passage cited is
a statement of the second of what he presents as the three funda,..
mental principles of this system as it was developed by Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud. The discussion is a historical one (corre-
sponding to the later remarks on modern hermeneutics in ΟΤ)
and is not meant to express Foucault's own views. This, of
course, is precisely what we should expect, given Foucault's rejec-
tions of hermeneutic interpretation, particularly in BC and ΑΚ.
Indeed, if he did hold that there is nothing but interpretation
"all the way down," there would be no place for his archaeologi-
cal method, designed to describe discursive formations as objec-
tive structures quite apart from any meanings tl1at subjects may
give to them. This point is in fact implicit in the last paragraph of
"Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," where Foucault points out that "her-
meneutics and semiology are two fierce enemies," since semiol-
ogy precisely denies the infinity of interpretations and "believes
in the absolute existence of signs." 10 At a minimum, semiology
here means the structuralist approach to language and other
signs, for which Foucault at this time surely had more sympathy
than he did for hermeneutics. But Foucault no doubt also has in
mind his own archaeological method, which he characterizes (in
ΑΚ) as a "pure description" of signs just as they exist in them-
selves. There is, accordingly, no basis in this text for thinking
that Foucault denies a distinction between facts and our interpre-
tations of them.
Foucault does hold- with Bachelard, Canguilhem, most cur-
rent Anglo-American philosophers, and of course Kant- that
there are no simply given facts (e.g., sense impressions) apart
from concepts that fit them into some broader categorical
scheme. In this sense, he would agree that there are no uninter-
preted facts. But this surely does not entail the skeptical or
relativist conclusion that there are no genuinely objective facts.

8. "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," translated by J. Anderson and Gary Hentzi, Criti-

cal Texts, 3 ( ιg86), 3·
g. Ibid., ι.
10. lbid., 5·
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY 275
Indeed, it may be, as Kant and many philosopheΓs afteΓ him
have maintained, that falling under a categorical scheme is a
condition of objectivity.
But Foucault does not merely maintain, like Kant, that our
thoughts and experiences occιιr only within fixed categorical
boundaries. He also holds, contrary to Kant, that these bound-
aries are themselves contingent products of our history and that,
in different epochs, there have been radically diverse systems
(epistemes, in his terminology) governing thought and experi-
ence. Does this not, we may ask, entail that views held within one
particular episteme (e.g., our own) can have validity only relative
to that episteme? Here there are three key points to be made on
Foucault's behalf. First, as we have seen, he is far from denying
all continuity in changes from one episteme to another. In ΟΤ
he explicitly presents the work of thinkers such as Lamarck,
Smith, and Jones as having a transitional character. And his
account in ΑΚ makes explicit room for objects, concepts, enun-
ciative modalities, and theories that exist in different discursive
formations. Second, Foucault can argue, like Bachelard, that
discontinuity does not in itself exclude progress, that, in particu-
lar, discoveries made in one episteme may be permanent in the
sense that they will have to be included (appropriately reformu-
lated) in any subsequent episteme. Third, even if Foucault's spe-
cific studies of "dubious disciplines" were to show that, in these
cases, there have been charges so radical that their results are
entirely relative to their historical epochs, a parallel claim does
not follow for other disciplines. There is no reason to suppose
that the results of an archaeological analysis of the natural sci-
ences, for example, would yield the same sorts of results as an
archaeology of the sciences of man.
Α final assessment of the alleged skeptical or relativist implica-
tions of Foucault's views on the connection between knowledge
and power would require a full discussion of this connection that
is beyond the scope of this book. However, there are two points
worth noting. First, even though Foucault apparently sees all
bodies of knowledge as originating from nondiscursive practices
of social control, he also allows tl1at some disciplines have been
able to free themselves effectively from this connection. For ex-
ample, the natural sciences, he maintains, arose in the sixteenth
century from the methods of judicial investigation employed by
the Inquisition. But, in the course of their development, they
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

became autonomous modes of knowledge. 'Ίn becoming a tech-

nique for the empirical sciences, the investigation has detached
itself from the inquisitorial procedure, in which it was histori-
cally rooted" (DP, 226). Tl1is specific account of the origins of
modern natural science may be dubious. But the important fact
for our purposes is Foucault's recognition that a body of knowl-
edge may come to exist in essential independence of the social
power structures that gave rise to it.
Second, there is sιιrely no general objection to essential connec-
tions between bodies of objective knowledge and nondiscursive
social practices. Certainly, even the least controversial instances
of scientific knowledge are intimately connected with complex
institutions and other social strιιctures. As Foιιcaιιlt pointed out
in one of his very last interviews, even "mathematics is linked, in
a certain way and without impairing its validity, to games and
institutions of power" (127). (Indeed, as we sιιggested in our
discιιssion of ΑΚ, the very norms ofscientific objectivity may be
grounded in nondiscιιrsive social practices.) Given this, the only
question is what sorts of social strιιctures and practices are com-
patible with some degree of objective knowledge. Foιιcaιιlt's stud-
ies in fact sιιggest that a significant degree of objective trιιth can
be based on even major instruments of social control. This is
why, as we have seen, he can allow that even psychiatry may have
a certain degree of scientific validity.
It may be ιιrged that, even if there is objective trιιth in some
sense, its close association with power will always make it subservi-
ent to social mechanisms of power. Charles Taylor, for example,
cites Foιιcaιιlt's assertion that "we are forced to produce the
trιιth of power that our society demands, of which it has need, in
order to fιιnction" and comments: "This regime-relativity of
truth means that we cannot raise the banner of trιιth against our
regime. There can be no sιιch thing as a truth independent of its
regime, unless it be that of another."II
In one sense, Foιιcault would agree with this. Our ways of
knowing are always connected with social power strιιctures, and
we would not know the trιιths we do if these strιιctιιres did not
exist. But this does not imply, as Taylor seems to think, that
Foucault regards the truths in qιιestion as somehow valid only
11. Taylor, 94· The citation from Foucault is from C. Gordon, ed., Power/
knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1980), 93·
 REASON AND PHILIOSOPHY 277
within the regime in which they arise. We need to distinguish the
relativity of the means whereby truths can be attained from the
relativity of their validity. Foucault maintains that the metl1ods
and occasions of obtaining any truth will ultimately depend on
some aspects of a society's power structure (tl1ougl1 he would
surely agree that there may be differιent structures in different
societies adequate for the discovery ·of a given trutl1). But he
does not hold that the truth thus obtai.ned is inevitably valid only
within the society in question. Some "tt.ruths" may be of this sort,
but others may have an objective validity that transcends any
particular regime. Admittedly, as th<e text Taylor cites says, a
society will generate truths that function to support its power
structures. But this does not imply th:at such truths by that very
fact lack objective validity or that the s<Dciety generates oπly truths
that support it. Α regime's system for tt.he production of support-
ive truths may- precisely because the Ύalidity of a truth need not
be restricted to the regime producimg it- also lead to truths
capable of undermining it.
There is, therefore, ample reason to deny that Foucault is a
universal skeptic or relativist. Wl1y then have so many critics,
including some of the best, persisted im this view of him? Primar-
ily, it seems, because they incautiously ascribe to Foucault an
extreme version ofNietzschean perspectivism. Taylor, for exam-
ple, says: 'Ίn the end, the final basiis of Foucault's refusal of
'truth' and 'liberation' seems to be a Nietzschean one. This is not
all of Nietzsche .... But at least in thιe Frδhliche Wisserιschaft we
have a doctrine that Foucault seems to have made his own ....
Foucault espouses both the relativistic thesis from this view, tl1at
one cannot judge between forms of life/tl1ought/evaluation, and
also tl1e notion that these different forms involve the imposition
of power." 12 Similarly, Habermas m:aintains that 'Όnly in the
context of his interpretation of Nietzsche does Foucault yield to
the familiar melody of a professiπg irrationalism." 13
There is, however, no basis for moΎing from Foucault's obvi-
ous admiration for Nietzsche to the c<Dnclusion that he espouses
relativism or skepticism. The main locus of Foucault's treatment
of Nietzsche is his 1971 essay, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History."
The first point to notice is that this essay is entirely devoted to
12. lbid., 93·
13. Habermas, 278.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

the exposition and interpretation of Nietzsche's views. At no

point does Foucault express his own agreement with the position
he is discussing. The specific passage Habermas cites as sl1owing
Foucault to be a "professing irrationalist" is quite explicitly a
summary ofNietzsche's view ofl1ow tl1e allegedly objective enter-
prises of history can be revealed to be based ο η "instinct, passion,
the inquisitor's devotion, cruel subtlety, and malice." The pas-
sage ends with the striking claim "that all knowledge rests upon
injustice (that there is no right, even in the act of knowing, to
truth or foundation of truth)." 14 Not only is much of the lan-
guage of this passage Nietzschean, but also a footnote cites spe-
cific passages in three of Nietzsche's books. Even though we
know that Foucault was very sympathetic to Nietzsche, there is
no basis for simply attributing the view expressed in this text to
him.
Moreover, even if we do attribute tl1e position stated in tl1is
passage to Foucault, it is by no means clear that the position itself
amounts to relativism or skepticism. It can very plausibly be read
as nothing more than the thesis, discussed above, that the origins
of knowledge are always tied to power structures. An act of
knowing may have no "right to truth" in the sense of some essen-
tial (nonaccidental) orientation to truth in virtue of its noble,
disinterested origin. But it may nonetheless attain at least some
degree of truth.
The fact remains, of course, that Foucault does undermine
much of the authority of important domains of human knowl-
edge, even if he does not assert a total skepticism or relativism.
This suggests a more limited form of the objection we have been
considering: that Foucault's archaeological analyses undermine
the authority of precisely the sort of knowledge to which they
themselves lay claim. His arcl1aeological critiques are, after all,
directed toward all modern efforts to know l1uman beings. But
surely archaeology itself is just such an effort. It offers accounts
of specific features of our intellectual history (how we distin-
guish reason from unreason, how we think about disease, how
we have conceived of ourselves as both subjects and objects of
our knowledge). Moreover, taken as a whole, these accounts
suggest an overall picture of what human reality is like: radically
14. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in D. F. Bouchard, ed., Language, Counter-
memory, Practice (Itl1aca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 163.
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY 279
historical, formed by structures beyond the control of subjectiv-
ity, subject to sharp epistemic breaks.
Of course, Foucault can point out that his approach differs
from the modern human sciences because it is not based on the
concept of man and so does not employ the conception ofhistory
connected with that concept. But surely he must admit that his
enterprise, even if it has moved beyond the limitations of tl1e
modern episteme, is constrained and distorted by the limitations
of another, postmodern episteme. Indeed, these limitations are
the more insidious since we are not yet in a 11istorical position
even to begin to see what they might be. Perhaps Foucault can
accept a broadly Bachelardian account that allows the natural
sciences to be significantly independent of any particular epi-
steme (in virtue of their progress and the permanence of their
results over epistemic breaks). But his work is not in physics or
chemistry but in the same historicalline as the human sciences
that are the objects of l1is critique. What reason is there to think
that a twenty-first century successor to Foucault would not be
able to carry out on archaeology the same sort of critical analysis
that Foucault himself has carried out on the modern human
sciences?
Α similar point can be made regarding the connection of
knowledge and power. Even though there may be knowledge (in
the natural sciences) tl1at l1as escaped its origins in social power
structures, there is surely no reason to think that Foucault's own
archaeological and genealogical studies have effected any such
escape. Ν ο doubt they have a somewhat different relation to the
current nexus of power than the human sciences they analyze
and criticize. But it would be entirely arbitrary for Foucault to
maintain that his own work does not have some significant rela-
tionship to power. It may, for all we know, bejust another, as yet
undetected, instrument of the very power mechanisms it seems
to be undermining. Certainly, Foucault's own analyses of such
enterprises as psychiatry and criminology show how knowledge
that seems liberating can be actually dominating.
Foucault sometimes suggested that his effort is to recognize
and develop marginal, alternative bodies of knowledge associ-
ated with resistance to current power structures.l 5 But his own
accounts show how systems of power can make use of even what
15. Cf. "Two Lectures," in Gordon, 82.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

seems to be opposition to strengthen their position. And, in any

case, if Foucault is right about the essential tie of knowledge to
power, then alternative bodies of knowledge must be associated
with alternative systems of power and so will bring tl1eir own sort
of domination.I6
Foucault can, of course, reply that, even if his own results are
on the same epistemic level as those of the disciplines he is analyz-
ing, this does not deny them all authority. As we have seen, he
does not maintain that there is no objectivity or truth attained by
the human sciences. They are, in spite of all their limitations,
genuine bodies of knowledge; therefore tl1e same can presum-
ably be said of his own archaeology and genealogy. So even if
Foucault must admit that there is an epistemic parity between his
own analyses and those of the disciplines he is criticizing, this
does not undermine the cognitive status of his results. In this
sense, his position is still not self-referentially inconsistent.
This would be an entirely adequate response if Foucault's goal
was simply a body of historical knowledge. Such knowledge
could complement and correct similar bodies ofknowledge even
ifit had no privileged status with respect to them. But Foucault's
work is not directed toward the mere construction of yet another
domain of knowledge. The knowledge he achieves is meant to be
deployed to further the cause of human liberation, to remove
arbitrary limitations and constraints imposed by other bodies of
knowledge. But if his own knowledge can claim no privileged
position over the disciplines it criticizes, why should we prefer
the limitations and constraints that it no doubt brings to those
that it opposes? Foucault may be perfectly right in maintaining
that psychiatry, criminology, and the modern human sciences in
general are major obstacles to human liberation. But it is also
true- though he tends to ignore the fact- that these same disς:i­
plines have in other ways worked for human liberation.I 7 The
Classical treatment of the mad, for example, involved, on Fou-
cault's own account, numerous restrictions (both conceptual and
physical) that were in fact eliminated by modern psychiatry. Simi-
larly, he could hardly deny that the modern decline of represen-
tation opened up possibilities for human thought and action that
the Classical episteme had excluded. What reason does Foucault
16. Cf. Habermas, 281.
17. Taylor makes this sort of point very effectively.
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

have for thinking that archaeological and genealogical knowl-

edge will not be similarly ambivalent between liberation and
domination?
He might, of course, maintain that archaeology and genealogy
will at least effect a net gain in liberation over domination. But it
is hard to see how he could defend any such claim. His own
studies suggest that each stage of development (from tl1e Renais-
sance through the Classical Age to the Modern era) has involved
greater, if more subtle, domination. If so, why should we expect
the next stage to be any better? Here his neglect of the liberating
role of modern disciplines is again relevant. What reason does he
have for thinking that, from the standpoint ofpostmodern disci-
plinary systems, modern "humanitarianism" will not take on the
sort of nostalgic glow that he seems to find in the Renaissance
and the Classical Age?
The difficulty can also be formulated in terms of the problem
of norms that we have seen to be so fundamental for Bachelard
and Canguilhem as well as for Foucault. Archaeology is, as we
l1ave noted, a method for analyzing the l1istorical development
of norms. Το this extent, it provides a neutral historical account
of a society's norms that may reveal their contingent character.
This serves the purposes of Foucault's philosophical project of
historical critique by identifying unnecessary constraints on hu-
man freedom. But the mere fact that a constraint is historically
contingent and hence can be eliminated does not entail that it
should be eliminated. Το draw this conclusion we need, first, the
judgment that constraints on human freedom are wrong and,
second, the judgment that the constraints we propose to elimi-
nate are worse than those our action would put in their place.
Consequently, Foucault's project for a critique of reason cannot
simply criticize given norms; it must also propose norms of its
own. As Nancy Fraser says, "Why is struggle preferable to sub-
mission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only with the
introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what
is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we
ought to oppose it." 18 The question is where Foucault's philo-
sophical project finds thejustification for its own norms and how
it shows these norms to be preferable to those that it σiticizes.
18. Nancy Fraser, "Foucault ση Modern Power: Empirical lnsights and Norma-
tive Confusions," Praxis International1 (1981), 283.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

One possible response to this question would be for Foucault

'to maintain, along the lines suggested in Chapter 6, that the
relevant norms are grounded in fundamental social practices,
practices that, at least for now, really do define boundaries that
we cannot transgress. The idea would be that even the most
rigorous and thorough historical critique might find some limita-
tions ο η reason that do not turn out to be contingent (or, if they
are contingent in some ultimate sense, nonetheless have the
force of necessity for us). One way of developing this idea would
be to undertake archaeological and genealogical studies of the
natural sciences with a view to discovering the social basis for the
norms that govern their privileged sort of truth and objectivity.
The hope would be that such norms could also be shown to
support the normative judgments of Foucault's critique of rea-
son. Another line of development would be to show that the very
project of a historical critique of reason (quite apart from any
particular judgments it might make) requires an acceptance of
certain norms (e.g., norms definitive ofrational discourse itself).
The first approach would effect a "quasi-naturalistic" grounding
of Foucault's normative judgments, since it would (following
Bachelard and Canguilhem) take for granted the objectivity and
validity of the natural sciences. The second would be a Fou-
caultian version of Habermas's "quasi-transcendental" ground-
ing of norms in the conditions of any rational discourse.
Although the above sort of response does not seem to be logi-
cally excluded as a possibility for Foucault, it does not fit well
with the strongly antitheoretical and antifoundational direction
of his thought. Another response, more in keeping with his
spirit, is simply to deny the need for any sort of philosophical
grounding for normative judgments. The idea here is not that
normative judgments are arbitrary choices. It is rather that the
specific evaluations defining the goals of our struggle for human
liberation are grounded in our concrete experiences of oppres-
sive institutions and practices, quite independent of any justifica-
tion by philosophical theorizing. We do not need a philosophical
theory to establish that the oppression and exploitation of fac-
tory workers, prisoners, or the mad are wrong or that the situa-
tion would be genuinely improved if specific changes could be
made in the regimes governing tl1em.
This sort of response does still, however, include a crucial role
for philosophy. Projects of liberation are opposed by bodies of
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

expert knowledge (psychiatry, criminology, economics) telling us

tl1at tl1e changes we envisage are simply not possible because
they violate established trutl1s about human natιιre, society, and
so on. Tl1e role of philosopl1y - tl1at is, the histoήcal critique of
reason- is to examine such claims of impossibility, showing the
extent to which they are bogus and tl1ereby clearing tl1e path to
liberation. The generic normative judgment that liberation is
worthwhile and the numerous specific normative judgments re-
garding the changes needed to achieve it are not pι-ovided by
philosophy but rather define the context in which pl1ilosophy
operates. Philosophy is not the foundation of the project of lib-
eration but an underlaborer clearing the path for it.
This sort of response to the problem of the basis for normative
judgments fits in well witl1 Foucault's insistence, in his essay on
enlightenment, that the project of tl1e historical critique of rea-
son must be "experimental" in the sense of continually putting
itself "to the test of reality, of contemporary reality." Tl1is con-
tact witl1 contemporary reality, complementing "tl1e realm of
historical inquiry" that the project opens up, enables it "botl1 to
grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to
determine the precise form this change should take." 19 Wl1at
Foucault says here can be plausibly read as asserting tl1e priority
of the contem porary reality of struggles for liberation over philo-
sophical refl.ection.
Such a reconception of the role of philosophy is not without
its difficulties. If we simply accept, without cήtical scrutiny, the
norms implicit in our struggles for liberation, what guarantee
do we l1ave that these norms are sound? And how are we to
adjudicate confl.icting normative judgments by those partici-
pating in these struggles? Foucault's own concrete jιιdgments
about what is oppressive and what not conform fairly well with
the standard views of leftist intellectuals. For him the major
threats to human freedom are such things as bourgeois moral-
ity and the exploitation of workers. But why should we prefer
his judgments to those of rightists who think labor unions, por-
nography~ abortion, and international Communism are the real
problems? Surely we cannot just blindly assert our judgments
in face of widespread challenges to them. And what alternative

19. "vVI1at is Enlightenment?" in Ρ. Rabinow, ed., Tlιe Foucault reader (New York:
Pant!Ίeon, 1984), 46.
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

to blind assertion is there otl1er than the defense of our own

views on the basis of a fundamental philosopl1ical analysis of
human nature and values?
The alternative for Foυcault is precisely the grounding, men-
tioned above, of our normative judgments in our concrete expe-
riences of domination. Instead of basing our normative judg-
ments on general philosophical principles, we can ground them
in our direct, practical encounters with alleged sources of domi-
nation. Το find out if prisons and asylums or pornography and
abortion are major obstacles to l1uman liberation, we need to
encounter them as concrete realities, not as instances of general
philosophical principles or theories. There is surely reason to
think that the intensity of Foucault's own commitment on these
matters, which surfaces in even his most austere archaeological
analyses, is rooted in such things as his own observations of
asylums, investigations of the causes of prison riots, and experi-
ences of society's attitude toward homosexuals.
There are, of course, many errors to whichjudgments formed
from direct experience are susceptible. But these errors are
much more limited and more readily corrected by further experi-
ence than are judgments rooted in general philosophical theo-
ries. Indeed, such theories have themselves proved to be among
the greatest dangers to human freedom. 'Ίη fact we know frqm
experience that the claim to escape from the .system of con-
temporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of an-
other society or another way of thinking ... has led only to tl1e
return of the most dangerous traditions."2° Normative judg-
ments grounded only in direct practical experiences will not
have the scope or radicality of those based on profound and
comprehensive philosophical theories. As a result they willlead
us only to very specific, local transformations of our society. 'Ί
prefer even these partial transformations that have been made
in the correlation of historical analysis and tl1e practical attitude,
to the programs for the new man that the worst political systems
have repeated through the twentieth century."2 1
It seems, then, that Foucault's preferred response to the ques-
tion of the ground of his normative judgments is one that rejects
the traditional role of philosophy as somehow providing the

20. lbid.
21. lbid.,47·
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

founding truths for our pι-actical commitments. Just as, for

Bacl1elard, scientific knowledge is not underwritten by p11iloso-
ρl1y, so, for Foucault, practical normative judgments are not
justified by philosopl1ical principles. In botl1 cases, philosoplη
enters only in a context that has already been defined by anotheΓ
sort of activity.
Foucault proposes, in the end, a twofold transformation oftl1e
traditional concept of pl1ilosophy. First, he tuΓns it away fΓOm
tl1e effort at an a priori determination of the essential limits of
l1uman thought and action and instead makes it a histoΓical dem-
onstΓation of the contingency ofwhat pΓesent themselves as nec-
essary restrictions. Second, he no longer asks it to provide the
justification for the values that guide our lives but instead em-
ploys it to cleaΓ tl1e path of intellectual obstacles to the achieve-
ment of those values. This Γeconception of philosophy is particu-
larly significant for tl1ose of us who see scant pΓOspects for a
fulfillment of pl1ilosophy's traditional goal of legitimating knowl-
edge claims and actions via a body of fundamental truths. While
eschewing tl1is goal, Foucault is still able to assign philosophy an
important role in the enlightenment and liberation of l1uman
beings.
TheΓe are, nonetheless, two impoΓtant questions that need to
be Γaised regaΓding this tempting reconception. The first is
whetheΓ it even makes sense to think of the histoΓicocritical proj-
ect Foucault proposes as "philosophy." It would seem to be notl1-
ing more than intellectual history caπied out fοΓ the sake of very
specific political and social goals. Why, then, should those who
practice it be Γegarded as the legitimate successors of Plato, AΓis­
totle, Aquinas, DescaΓtes, Hume, Kant, and Hegel? Doesn't an
enterpΓise that gives up on tl1e gΓand and ultimate questions of
human existence and contents itselfwith l1istorical contingencies
rather tl1an eteΓnal, necessary trutl1s by that very fact cease to be
philosophy?
Το this objection Ι tl1ink theΓe aΓe two lines of Γesponse. First,
although it is tΓUe tl1at traditional philosophy aimed at knowl-
edge of ultimate tnιth, tl1e point of seeking sucl1 tΓUth has tradi-
tionally been the freedom and happiness ofhuman beings. From
Plato's vision of the FoΓms, through Aquinas's contemplation of
the divine essence, to Hegel's return to tl1e Absolute, knowledge
offundamental truth has been pursued for tl1e sake oflibeΓation
and fulfillment. Foucault's project can be regarded as a new,
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

more modest (and realistic) v.ray of seeking these traditional

pl1ilosophical goals.
Second, even though the searcl1 for foundational trutl1s has
been abandoned, Foucault's enterprise requires many of the
same intellectual skills and virtues as traditional philosophizing.
Meticulous analysis of concepts, rigorous assessment of argu-
ments, dialectical flair and imagination- these are all requisites
for Foucault's critical philosopher as mucl1 as for the traditional
constructive philosopher. Tl1ere is, indeed, one respect in whicl1
Foucaultian pl1ilosopl1y is closer to the grand tradition than
much current philosophizing. Whereas the latteΓ frequently iso-
lates itself in the narrow and rarified space of its specialized
problems, the former requires the very sort of bωad cultural
and historical awareness that we find in the great figuΓes of
traditional philosophy.
But tl1e fact remains tl1at, in most cases, there would be very
little overlap or similarity betv.reen tl1e actual work of a Fou-
caultian and a traditional philosopher. Certainly, very few of
those currently calling tl1emselves philosophers l1ave eitheΓ the
ability or the inclination to carry out the sort of historical
inquiries that Foucault did. This leads to the second question
we musι ask regarding Foucault's reconception of ·philosophy:
What place, if any, does it allow for the kind of work that in
fact has traditionally occupied philosophers? Is there,,foΓ exam-
ple, room for such standard fare as solutions to the mind-body
problem, proofs of God's existence, refutations of skepticism,
and so on? Aren't these precisely the sorts of efforts to answer
fundamental questions that Foucault's project would have us
abandon? Such an abandonment may well be understandable in
face of the long and sad story of failed pretensions that is the
history of philosophy. But surely a great deal would be lost by
giving up the enterprise.
In my view, however, there is no reason to think that accepting
Foucault's reconception of philosophy requires giving up the
sorts of investigations that have occupied traditional philoso-
phers. For one thing, Ι do not see how the Foucaιιltian can rule
out in principle the possibility of our someday actually finding
answers to the great, ultimate questions. He cannot base his skep-
ticism about traditional philosopl1y on anything other than the
historical fact that pl1ilosophers l1ave for centuries failed to solve
the deep problems tl1ey have set themselves. Το go furtheΓ and
 REASON AND PHILOSOPHY

suggest that there is some fundamental feature of the mind or

the world that excludes ultimate pl1ilosopl1ical tΓUtl1 in principle
would be itself a philosophical claim in the traditional mode.
Since success in answeΓing traditional philosopl1ical questions is
not excluded (however unlikely it may be) and would surely be
of immense value, it is only Γeasonable to accept continιιing work
on these qιιestions. Moreover, an important lesson of our philo-
sophical past is that such woΓk, even when unsuccessful, has
many positive side effects. For example, it refutes inadequate
theories and impΓOves οuΓ intellectual resources by introducing
new concepts and claΓifying old ones. Sιιcl1 side effects will often
be of great value fοΓ the Foucaultian philosopher's projects of
historicocritical analysis.
It seems, then, tl1at acceptance of Foιιcault's reconception of
philosophy need iωt exclude traditional philosopl1ical woΓk. We
can not only toleΓate but encouΓage and even profit from such
work, .all the while, of course, maintaining a healtl1y skepticism
regaΓding its ultimate success and being aleΓt to its possibilities
fοΓ constΓaining human freedom.

Conclusion
What, finally, are we to make of Foucault's woΓk? Α crucial pΓe­
liminaΓy point is that, despite many obscurities and deficiencies,
it does deserve our serious attention. Foucault is notjust anotheΓ
Left Bank magician, dazzling us with the latest versions of tl1e
standard intellectual tΓicks. He is prone to fads and gimmicks
and sometimes displays the quirks and pΓejudices of the Parisian
intelligentsia at its least attractive. More impoΓtantly, theΓe are,
as we have seen, major gaps in his aΓguments fοΓ many of his
central 11istorical and pl1ilosophical claims. Nevertheless, our
close studies of 11is main wΓitings througl1 ιg6g show that they
offer a body of thougl1t that is not only intelligible and col1erent
but also remarkably perceptive and challenging in its analyses of
the last tlπee hundred years of intellectual history. As such, it
offers numerous insights into many specific domains of histoΓi­
cal and philosophical inquiry.
Beyond this, Ι think that tl1ree general aspects of Foucault's
achievement promise to be paΓticularly fruitful for those who
come afteΓ him. First, l1is idea of writing the history of thought
on an arcl1aeological level beneath that of human sιιbjectivity
 FOUCAULT'S ARCHAEOLOGY

opeπs up aπ importaπt πew dimeπsioπ for uπdeΓstaπdiπg our

past. It should ποt (as Foucault's rhetoric sometimes suggests) be
regarded as a replacemeπt fοΓ otheΓ, staπdard approacl1es to the
history of ideas. But it does represeπt a particularly νaluable
meaπs of deνelopiπg πew historical perspectiνes aπd for correct-
iπg- aπd sharpeπiπg νiews from old oπes.
Secoπd, Foucault's use of histories of thought for the critical
purpose of questioπiπg the authority of majoΓ bodies of coπtem­
porary kπowledge is a νaluable couπter to some of tl1e best hid-
deπ aπd most effectiνe mecl1aπisms of domiπatioπ iπ our society.
Particularly importaπt, iπ my νiew, is Foucault's iπsisteπce οπ the
l1ighly specific, regioπal character of his critiques. Uπlike the
typical reνolutioπary, he does ποt see οπe all-perνadiπg eπemy,
wl1ose existeπce corrιιpts eνerytlliπg aπd whose elimiπatioπ will
solνe all our problems. Ratl1er, he thiπks tl1e liberatioπ ofhumaπ
beiπgs requires aπ uπeπdiπg series of local battles agaiπst aπ
eνer-chaπgiπg series of particular eνils. "My poiπt is ποt," he
oπce said, "that eνerythiπg is bad, but tl1at eνerytl1iπg is daπger­
ous."22 His techπiques of critical history proνide a model for how
we caπ maiπtaiπ ΟUΓ awareπess of tl1e daπgers implicit iπ all
bodies of kπowledge aπd effectiνely oppose those that, at a giνeπ
time, haνe become sources of eνil.
Fiπally, his reconceptioπ of philosophy as a historical critique
of reasoπ iπ the serνice of humaπ freedom eπables 'us to maiπ­
taiπ the ideals aπd utilize the distiπctiνe iπtellectual νirtues of
traditioπal philosophiziπg, altl1ough we remaiπ dubious regard-
iπg the graπd claims oftllis eπterprise. Through this πew coπcep­
tioπ of philosophy he offers our skeptical age the hope tl1at, eνeπ
without the Truth, >ve may still be made free.
22. Afterword (1983) to Dreyfus and Rabinow, 231.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Tl1e fσllσwiηg list cσηtaiηs all σf Fσucault's aηd Caηguill1em's bσσks aηd
all σf Bacl1elaι-d's ση tl1e pl1ilσsσpl1y σf scieηce. τl1e list σf secσndaητ
publicatiσηs (aηd σf Fσucault's essays aηd iηteι-views) is a ι-epι-eseηtative
selectiση, witl1 paι-ticulaι- empl1asis ση wσι-ks ι-elevaηt to topics discussed
iη this bσσk. Fσι- mσι-e cσmpι-eheηsive bibliσgι-aphies ση Bacl1elaι-d and
Caηguill1em, see J .-C. Maι-gσliη, Baclιelard, Β. Saiηt-Seι-ηiη, ed., Canguil-
lιem (special issue- σf Revue de mέtajJlιysique et de nιorale 9σ [1985], aηd
C. Μ. Ρ. Μ. Heι-tσgh, Baclιelard en Canguillιem. Οη Fσucault, tl1eι-e is tl1e
spleηdid wσι-k σf Micl1ael Claι-k, Miclιel Foucault: αη annotated bibliogra-
jJ!ιy, New Υσι-k: Gaι-laηd Pι-ess, 1983. Tl1is pωvides aη esseηtially cσm­
plete listiηg σf pι-imaι-y aηd secσηdaι-y sσuι-ces tlπσugh 1981, aηd tl1e
aηησtatiσηs aι-e iηvaluable. Fσι- mσι-e ι-eceηt cσmpι-el1eηsive listiηgs σf
just Fσucault's publicatiσηs, see J. Lagι-aηge, "Les σeuπes de Micl1el
Fσucault," Critique 42 (1986), 942-62, aηd J. Beι-ηaueι- aηd Τ. Keeηaη,
"The Wσι-ks σfMichel Fσucault: 1926-1984," PlιilosojJ!ιy and Social Criti-
cism 12 (1987), 23σ-69. Αησtl1eι- useful bibliσgι-apl1y σf wσι-k by aηd
abσut Fσucault is J. Nσι-dquist, Miclιel Foucault: α bibliograjJlιy, Saηta
Cι-uz, Calif.: Refeι-eηce aηd Reseaι-ch Seι-vices, 1986.
290 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bachelard

Ι. Books by Bachelard on plιilosop!ιy of science

Essai sur la connaissance approcMe. Paris: Vri11, 1928.

Etude sur l'evolution d'un probleme de plzysique: la propagatiO?~ tlιeι·mique dans
les solides. Paris: Vri11, 1928.
La valeιιr indιιctive de la relativite. Paris: Vτin, 1929.
Le pluralisme colιerent de la clιimie moderne. Paris: Vrin, 193 2.
L'intuition de l'instω~t. Paris: Stock, 1932.
Les iι~tuitions atomistiques. Paris: Boivin, 1933·
Le 1~ouvel esprit scientijique. Paris: Alcan, 1934. (τJιe New Scientijic Spirit,
tra11slated by Α. Goldl1ammeτ. Boston: Beacon Pτess, 1984.)
La dialectique de la duree. Paris: Boivin, 1936.
L'experience de l'espace dαι~ la plιysique contemporaiι~e. Paris: PUF, 1937.
La fonnation de l'esprit scientifique. Paτis: Vτi11, 1938.
La ps)Jc/ιanalyse dιιfeu. Paris: NRF, 1938. (τ!ιe psyclιoaMlysis offire, tτa11s­
lated by Α. C. Μ.
Ross. Boston: Beacon Pτess, 1964).
La plιilosoplιie du 1~on.
Paris: PUF, 1940. (τJιe plιilosoplιy of no, tτa11slated
by G. C. Watersto11. New Υοτk: Οτiο11 Press, 1969.)
Le ratioι~alisιne ajJplique. Paris: PUF, 1949.
L'activite rationaliste de la p!ιysique contemporaine. PaΓis: PUF, 1951.
Le materialisme rationnel. PaΓis: PUF, 1953·
Bachelard: epistemologie. Textes cl1oisies paτ D. Lecouτt. PaΓis: PUF,
1971-
L'engagemeι~t rationaliste (a postl1umous collectio11 of texts witl1 preface
by G. Canguilhem). PaΓis: PUF, 1972.

2. Books and articles about Baclιelard

Bhaskaτ, R., "Feyeτabe11d a11d Bachelaτd: two philosophies of science,"

New Left Review, 94 (1975).
Bouliga11d, G., et al., Hommage α Gaston Baclιelard. Paris: PUF, 1957.
Canguilhem, G., "Suτ u11e epistemologie concoτdataiτe," in Bouligand,
et al., Hommage α GastonBaclιelard, 4-12.
"L'histoiτe des scie11ces dans l'oeuvre epistemologique de Gaston
Bachelard," Annales de l'Universite de Paris, 110.1, 1963. Repτinted i11
Etudes d'lιistoire et de plιilosoplιie des sciences, 173-86.
"Gasto11 Bachelaτd et les philosophes," Sciences, no. 24, 1963. Re-
pri11ted i11 Etudes, 187-95.
"Dialectique et pl1ilosophie de 11011 cl1ez G. Bachelaτd," Revue inten~a­
tionale de plιilosoplιie 4 ( 1963). Repτi11ted in Etudes, 196-207.
"Gaston Bachelaτd, psychanalyste da11s la cite scie11tifique?" Il Pro-
tagora 24 (1984), 19-26.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dagognet, F., "Μ. Gaston Bachelard, pl1ilosopl1e de l'imagination," Re-
vue internationale de p!ιilosop!ιie 4 (1960), 32-42.
"Le materialisme rationnel de Gaston Bachelard," Calιiers de l'institut
des scie1ιces έconomiques appliquees, 126 (1962), 17-31.
Gastoπ Baclιelard, sa vie, son oeuvτe, avec uπ exposέ de sa p!ιilosop!ιie. Paris:
. PUF, 1965.
Gaukroger, S. W., "Bachelard and the problem of epistemological analy-
sis," Studies iπ History απd Plιilosop!ιy of Scieπce 7 (1976), 189-244.
Ginestier, Ρ., Ροuτ connaftre la pensέe de Baclιelard. Paris: Bordas, 1968.
Grieder, Α., "Gaston Bacl1elard- 'phenomenologue' of modern sci-
ence," journal oft!ιe Bτitislι Society fοτ Pheπ01nenology 17 (1986), 107-
23.
Gutting, G., "Gaston Bacl1elard's philosophy of science," Iπternational
Studies iπ tlιe Plιilosop!ιy of Scieπce 2 (1987), 55-71.
Hertogl1, C. Μ. Ρ. Μ., Baclιelard eπ Caπguillιem. Amsterdam: VU Uit-
geveru, 1986.
Hyppolite, J., "Gaston Bachelard ou le romantisme de l'intelligence,"
Revue philosop!ιique, 1954, 85-96. Reprinted in G. Bouligand, et al.,
L'lιom11!age a Gasto1ι Baclιelaτd.
"L'epistemologie de Gaston Bachelard," Revue de l'lιistoiτe des scieπces et
de leιιτs applicatioτιs, 12 ( 1964).
Lalande, Μ., La tMoτie de la coππaissaπce scieπtifique selon Gaston Baclιelaτd.
Montreal: Fides, 1966.
Lecoω·t, D., Baclιelard, le jour et la πuit. Paris: Grasset, 1974-
Ροιιτ uπe cτitique de l'epistemologie (Baclιelaτd, Caπguilhe1n, Foucault).
Paris: Maspero, 1972. (Marxism απd epistemology: Baclιelard, Canguil-
!ιem, and Foucault, translated by Β. Brewster. London: NLB, 1975.)
Loi, Μ., "Bachelard et les matl1ematiques," ΙΖ Pτotagora 5 (1984), 45-57.
Margolin, J .-C., Baclιelaτd. Paris: Seuil, 1974.
Quillet, Ρ., Gastoπ Baclιelard. Paris: Seghers, 1964.
Smitl1, Roch C., Gaston Bac!ιelard. Boston: Twayne Publisl1ers, 1982.
Tiles, Mary, Baclιelard: science απd objectivity. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1984.
Vadee, Μ., Baclιelaτd ou le nouvel idealisme epistemologique. Paήs: Editions
sociales, 1975.

Canguilhem

r. Books by Caπgιιil!ιe1n

Essai sur quelques pτoblemes coπcernaπt le nornιal et le patlιologique. Stras-

bourg: Publications de la Faculte des Lettres, 1943.
Le Noτmal et le patlιologique. (the preceding thesis, along with an essay,
"Nouvelles reflexions sur le normal et le pathologique"). Paris:
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
PUF, 1966. (On t!ιe normal απd t!ιe patlιological, translated by C. Faw-
cett. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978.)
La connaissance de la vie, 2nd ed. Paris: Vrin, 1969.
La formation du coπcept de τefiex aux XVII e et XVIII e siecle, 2nd ed. Paris:
Vrin, 1977.
Ιdeologie et τatioπalite. Paris: Vrin, 1977.
Etudes d'lιistoiτe et de p!ιilosop!ιie des sciences, 5th edition. Paris: Vτin, 1983.

2. Wτitiπgs about Caπguillιem

Foucault, Μ., "Introduction" to G. Canguill1em, On t!ιe noτmal and t!ιe

patlιological, tτanslated by C. Fawcett. Dω·drecht: Reidel, 1978. Α
somewhat diffeτent Fτench veτsion appeared in Revue de la metaph)•-
sique et de 1noτale 90 (1985), 3-14.
Heτtogl1, C. Μ. Ρ. Μ., Baclιelaτd eπ Canguillιe1n. Amsteτdam: VU Uit-
geverij, 1986.
Lecourt, D., Ροuτ uπe cτitique de l'epistemologie (Baclιelaτd, Caπgιιillιem,
Foucault). See complete listing undeΓ "Books and aΓticles about
Bacl1elaΓd."
Macheτey, Ρ., "La pl1ilosopl1ie de la science de Geω·ges Canguill1eιn,"
preceded by a "Presentation" by Louis Altl1usseΓ, La Peτιsee 113
(1964). 54-75·
Saint-Seτnin Β., ed., Canguil!ιem (special jouΓnal issue), Revue de la
metaphysique et de moτale 90 (1985).
SpickeΓ, S. F., 'Άn intτoduction to the medical epistemology of Georges
Canguilhem: moving beyond Micl1el Foιιcault," Tlιe] ournal ofMedi-
cine and P!ιilosop!ιy 12 (1987), 397-411.

Foucault

r. Β oolι.s wτitteπ by F oucault

Maladie mentale et peτsonnalite. PaΓis: PUF, 1954.

Folie et deτaison: Histoiτe de lafolie α l'age classique. Paris: Plon, 1961. Second
edition (with new preface and appendices): Histoiτe de la folie α l'age
classique. Paris: Galliιnard, 1972. Second edition repΓinted witl1out
appendices, 1976. (Madness απd civilizatioπ, tΓanslated by R. Howard.
New York: Pantheon, 1965. Α gΓeatly abΓidged tΓanslaιion.)
Maladie mentale et psyclιologie. PaΓis: PUF, 1962. Revised veτsion of
Maladie mentale et peτsonnalite. (Mental illness and psyc!ιology, trans-
lated by Α. Sheridan, foτewoτd by Η. Dreyfus. BeΓkeley, Calif.:
University of Califoτnia Pτess, 1987.)
Naissance de la cliniqtιe: une aτcheologie du τέgατd medical. PaΓis: PUF,
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 293
1963. (ΤΛe birtΛ oftl~e clinic, translated by Α. Sl1eridan. New York,
Vintage, 1973.)
Rαymond Roussel. Paris: Gallimard, 1963. (DeαtΛ αnd tl~e lαb)'rintΛ: tl~e
world of Rαymond Roussel, translated by C. Ruas. Garden City, Ν. Υ.:
Doubleday & Company, 1986. Also includes an interview witl1
Foucault.)
Les mots et les cl~oses: une ατcl~eologie cles sciences l~umαi1~es. Paris: GallimaΓd,
1966. (ΥΛe order of tΛings, translated by Α. Sl1ericlan. New York:
Rar1dom House, 1970.)
L'αrclιέologie du sαvoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1969. (Tl~e αrcl~αeology of lιnowl­
edge, translated by Α. Sl1eΓidan. New York: Pantl1eon, 1972.) Also
includes "The Discourse on Language," a tΓanslation of L'ordre du
discours, Foucault's inaugural address at the College de France.
Paris: Gallimard, 1971.
Ceci n'est pas une pipe: deux lettres et quαtre desseiπs de Rene Mαgτitte. Mont-
pellier: Fata Morgona, 1973. (Yl~is is not α pipe, translated and edited
by J. Harkness. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press,
1981.)
Surveiller et punir: nαissαnce de lα prison. Paris: Gallimard, 1975. (Discipline
α1~d jJιιnisΛ, translated by Α. Sheridan, New York: Pantheon, 1977.)
Histoire de lα sexuαlite. 1: lα volonte de sαvoir. Paris: Gallimard, 1976. (Yl~e
l~istory of sexuαlit)', Vol. 1: Απ i?~troduction, translated by R. Hurley.
New York: Pantheon, 1978.)
L'usαge des plαisirs: l~istoire de lα sexuαlite, to1ne 2. Paris: Gallimard, 1984.
(ΤΛe Use of Pleasure, translated by R. Hurley. New York: Pantheon,
1985.)
Le souci de soi: Λistoire de lα sexuαlite, tome 3· Paris: Gallimard, 1984. (TI~e
cαre of tΛe self: l~istoΎ)' of sexuαlit)', Vol. 3· Translated by R. Hurley.
New York: Pantl1eon, 1986.)

2. Books edited by Foucαult

Moi, Pierre Riviere, αyαnt egorge mα 1nere, mα soeur et mon frere: une cas de
jJαrricide αu X!Xe siecle. Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1975. Includes a
Foreword and an essay by Foucault. (/, Pierre Riviere, l~αving slαugl~­
tered my 1notΛer, my sister αnd 1ny brotl~er: α case of pαrricide in tl~e Ι 9tl~
century, translated by F. Jellinik. New York: Pantl1eon, 1975.)
Herculine Bαrbin, dite Alexinα Β. Paris: Gallimard, 1978. (Herculine Bαr­
bin: being tΛe recently discovered 1nemoirs of α nineteentl~-century Frencl~
l~ermαpl~rodite,translated by R. McDougall. New York: Pantl1eon,
1980. Includes an Introduction to the English edition and a note by
Foucault.)
(Witl1 Α. Farge) Le desordre des fαmilles: lettres de cαcl~et des Archives de lα
Bastille. Paris: Gallimard-Julliard, 1982.
294 BIBLIOGRAPHY

3· Collections of essays by and iπterviews witlι Foucault

Laπguage, couπter-?nemo'Y')', practice, edited and with a foreword by D. Bou-
chard. Ithaca, Ν.Υ.: Cornell University Press, 1977.
Miclιel Foucault: power, trutlι, απd stτateg;ι, edited by Μ. Morris and Ρ. Pat-
ton. Sydney, Australia: Feral Publications, 1979. Also includes some
essays about Foucault.
Powerlkπowledge: selected iπlerviews and otlιer wτitings, I9J2-I9JJ, edited
and with an Afterword by C. Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980.
ΤΙΜ Foucault reader, edited by Ρ. Rabinow. New York: Pantl1eon, 1985.
Politics, p!ιilosop!ιy, απd culture: iπteπ;iews απd otlιer wτitiπgs, I977-r984.
New York: Roιιtledge, 1988.

4· Selected articles and otlιer essays

"Introduction" to L. BinswangeΓ, Le reve et l'existeπce, tΓanslated by J.
Verdeaux. Bruges: Desclee de BΓOuwer, 1954, 9-_128. ("Dream,
imagination, and existence," translated by F. Williams, Review of
Existential Psyclιology and Psyclιiat'Y')' 19 (1984-85), 29-78.)
"La rechercl1e psychologique et la psycl1ologie," in Des clιeτclιeurs fraπyais
s'iπterrogent, edited by J-E. Morere. Paris: PUF, 1957, 171-201.
"La folie, l'absence d'oeuvre," La table ronde, no. 196, May, 1964, 11-21.
Reprinted in the second edition of Histoire de lafolie, 575-82.
"Nietzsche, Freud, Marx," in Nietzsclιe: calιiers de Royaumoπt, Philosopl1ie,
Tome VI. Paris: Seuil, 1967, 183-200. ("Nietzscl1e, Freud, Marx,"
translated by J. Anderson and Gary Hentzi, Critical Texts 3 ( 1986),
1-5.) .
"Sur l'archeologie des sciences: reponse au cercle d'epistemologie,"
Calιiers pouτ l'analyse 9 (1968), 5-4. ('Όη the archaeology of tl1e
sciences,'~ τlιeoretical Practice 3/4 (1971), 108-27.)
"Reponse a une question," Esprit 36 (1968), 850-74. ("Politics and the
study of discourse," translated by R. Boyers and C. Gordon, lcleol-
ogy απd consciousπess 3 (1978), 7-26.)
"Qu'est-ce qιι' un auteur?" Bulletiπ de la Societe frαnfαise de Plιilosoplιie 63
(1969), 73-95 (followed by a discussion, 96-104). ("What is an
author?" in Laπguage, couπter-memo'Y')', practice.)
"Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu," Paideia, Sept., 1971. Α revised version is
reprinted in the second edition of Histoire de la folie, 583-603. ("My
body, ιhis paper, this fire," translated and introduced by G. Ρ.
Bennington, Oxford Litera'Y')' Review 4 (1979), 5-28.)
"Nietzsche, la genealogie, l'histoire," in H01nmage a]ean Hyppolite. Paris:
PUF, 1971, 145-172. ("Nietzscl1e, genealogy, history," inLaπguage,
counter-memOΎ')', practice.)
"Gaston Bachelard, le philosophe et son ombre: 'pieger son propre
culture,' "Le Figaro litteraire, Sept. 30, 1972, 16.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 295
"Governmentality," translated by R. Braidotti, Ideolog;' and c011ScioH.S?ιess
6 (1979), 5-21.
'Όmnes et singι.ιlatim: towards a criticism of 'political reason'," in
S. MacMurrin, ed., Tlιe Tanner lectures on lιuman values. New Υω·k:
Cambridge University Pι-ess, 1981, 224-54.
''Yhe subject and power: Ι. why study poweι-? tl1e question of the sub-
ject; Π. how is power exercised?" in Η. Dι-eyfus and Ρ. Rabinow,
Michel Foucault: beyond structuralisnι and henne1ιeutics, 2d ed. Cllicago:
Univeι-sity of Chicago Press, 1983, 208-226.
"Un cours inedit: Qιι'est-ce que les Lumieres?" (from a lecture given at
tl1e College de France, Jan. 5, 1983), Magazi1ιe litteraire, no. 207,
1984, 35-39. (Translated as "Kant on enlightenment and ι-evolu­
tion" by C. Gordon, Econ01ny and Society, 15 (1986), 88-96.)
"La vie: l'experience et la science," Revue de metap!ιysique et de morale 90
(1985), 3-14. Tllis is a slightly revised version of tl1e Introduction
to G. Cangι.ιilhem, On tlιe Nonnal and tlιe Pat!ιological, translated by
C. R. Faν,rcett. Reidel, 1978.
"What is Enliglltenment?" translated by C. Pω·ter, in Ρ. Rabinow (ed.),
τ!ιe Foucaιιlt reacler. Ν ew York: Pantl1eon, 1984. (Translation from
an unpublisl1ed French original.)

5· Selected interviews witlι Foucault (in clιronological oτder)

Μ. Cl1apsal, 'Έntι-etien: Michel Foucault," Quinzaine litteraiτe, May 15,

1966, 14-15.
R. Bellour, 'Έntretiens: Micl1el Foucault-Les mots et les clιoses," Lettτes
fτanfaises, Μaι-. 31, 1966, 3-4. Repι-inted in R. Bellour, Le livre des
autres. Paris: L'Herne, 1971, 135-144.
"Deuxieme entretien avec Mic!Ίel Foucault: sur les faς:ons d'eσire
l'histoire", Lettresfrαnfαises, June 15, 1967, 6-9. Reprinted in R. Bel-
lour, Le livre des autres. Paris: L'Herne, 1971, 189-207.
]. Ρ. ΕΙ Kabbach, "Foucaιιlt repond a Sartre", Qιιinzaine litteraire, Mar. 1,
1968, 20-22. Cf. Foucault's objections to the publication of tllίs
interview: "Une mise au point de Micl1el Foucault," Quinzaine lit-
teraire, Mar. 15, 1968, 2.
J .-]. Brochier, "Micl1el Foucault explique son dernier livre [τ!ιe arclιaeol­
ogy ofknowledge]," Magazine litteτaire 28 (1969), 23-25.
J-M. Palmier, "La naissance d'un monde," Le Monde, May 3, 1969, sup-
plement, viii.
John Simon, 'Ίnterview witl1 Michel Foucault," PartisanReview 38 (1971),
192-200.
Fons Elders, 'Ήuman Natuι-e veι-sιιs power," a discussion witl1 Foucault
and Noam Chomsky, in F. EldeΓS, ed., Refiexive water: tlιe basic con-
cems ofmankind. London: Souvenir Press, 1974, 135-97.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Β.-Η. Levy, "Non au sexe roi," Nouvel observateuτ, 12 mars, 1977, φff.
("Power and sex: an intervieν.• witl1 Michel Foucault," translated by
D.J. Parent, Telos 10 (1977), 152-61.)·
G. Raulet, "Structuralism and post-structuralism," Telos 16 (1983), 195-
211.
Η. Dreyfus and Ρ. Rabinow, 'Άfterword (1983): on tl1e genealogy of
etl1ics: an overview of ν,rork in progress," in Η. Dreyfus and Ρ.
Rabinow, Miclιel Foucault: beyond stτuctuτalism and lιe1"!neneutics, 2d
ed .. Chicago: University of Cl1icago Press, 1983, pp. 229-264.
Μ. Jay, L. Lowenthal, Ρ. Rabinow, R. Rorty, C. Tayloι·, "Politics and
Ethics: an Interview" (Apr., 1983), in Ρ. Rabinow, Tlιe Foιιcault
τeadeτ, New York: Pantl1eon, 1984, 373-380.
Ρ. Rabinow, "Polemics, politics, and problemization," in Ρ. Rabinow,
ed., Tlιe Foucault τeadeτ. New Υω·k: Pantheon, 1984, 381-90.
R. Fornet-Betancourt, Η. Becker, and Α. Gomez-Mίiller, "L'etl1iqιιe du
souci de soi comme pratique de liberte (Jan. 20, 1984)," Concoτdia,
1984, 99-116. ("Tl1e etl1ics of care for tl1e self as a pι-actice of
human fι-eedom," tι-anslated by J. D. Gautllier, S.J., PΛilosop!ιy ancl
Social Cτiticism 12 [1987], 112-31.)
G. Baι-abedette and Α. Scala, "Le ι-etour de la mω·ale," Les Nouvelles,June
28-july 5, 1984, 36-41. ("Final Interview,." tΓanslated by Τ. Levin
and Ι. Lorenz, Raτiton 5 [1985], 1-13.)

6. Books about Foucault

Auzias, Jean-Maήe, Miclιel Foucault: Qui su~-je? Lyon: La Manufacture,
1986.
Baudrillard, Jean, Oublieτ Foucault. Paris; Edition Galilee, 1977. ("FoΓ­
getting Foucault," translated by Ν. Dufresne, Humanities i1ι Societ)' 3
[1980], 87-111.)
Blanchot, Maurice, Foucault/B lanclιot. Ν ew York: Zone Books, 1987. Con-
tains translations of Foucault's essay on Blanchot, "La pensee du
del1ors," and of Blanchot's "Michel Foucault tel que je l'imagine."
Brede, Rίidinger, Aussage und Discouτs: Unteτsuclιιιngen zu Discouτs- Tlιeo­
τie bei Miclιel Foucault. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1985.
Cooper, Barry, Michel Foucault: an intτoduction to lιis tlιouglιt. Toronto:
Edwin Mellen, 1981.
Cousins, Mark, and Athar Hussain, Miclιel Foucault. London: Mac-
millan, 1984.
Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1986. (Foucault.
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1988.)
Diamond, Ι., and L. Quinby, eds., Feminism and Foucault: τeflections on
τesistance. Boston: Northeasteι-n University Press, 1988.
Dreyfus, Η ubert L., and Paul Rabinow, Miclιel Foucault: beyond stτuctuτal-
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 297
is1nαπd hermeπeutics, 2d ed., Cllicago: University of Cllicago Press,
1983.
Gane, Mike, ed., Towαrds α cτitique of Foucαult. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1986. ·
Guedez, Annie, Foucαult. Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1972.
Hoy, David, ed., Foιιcαult: α criticαl τeαder. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Hug, J.-C., Michel Foucαult: ιιne Jιistoire de lα verite/coπceptioπ grαplιique.
PaΓis: SyΓOs, 1985.
KammleΓ, Clemens, Miclιel Foucαult: Eine kritisclιe Aπαl)'Se seines Weτke.
Bonn: Bouvier, 1986.
KΓemer-MaΓίetti, Angele, Foucαult et l'αrclιeologίe du sαvoir. ΡaΓίs: Seg-
11ers, 1974.
Michel Foucαult: αrclιeologίe et geneαlogίe. Paι-is: LίνΓe de Pocl1e, 1985.
Revised and expanded νeΓsίοη of the preceding book.
Lemert, Cl1aΓles C., and GaΓth Gillan, Miclιel Foucαult: sociαl tlιeo1y απd
tταnsgressioπ. New ΥοΓk: Columbia UniνeΓsity PΓess, 1982.
Lyantey, Ρ., Foucαult. PaΓis: Editions Universitaires, 1973.
Majω·-Poetzl, Pamela, JV!iclιel Foucαult's αrclιαeology of westeτπ culture. Cl1a-
pel Hill, N.C.: University ofNort\1 CaΓOlίna PΓess, 1983.
MeΓquioΓ, J. G., Foucαult. London: Fontana, 1985.
Peπot, Micl1el, ed., L'impossible prison: reclιerclιes sur le systeme peπiteπtiαire
αu XIXe siecle. Debαt αvec Miclιel Foucault. PaΓis: Seuil, 1980.
PosteΓ, MaΓk, Foucαult, Mαrxism, αnd lιistory. CambΓidge: Polity Press,
1984.
Racevskis, KaΓlis, lvfichel Foucαult αnd tlιe subveτsion oftlιe intellect. Itl1aca,
Ν.Υ.: CoΓnell UniveΓsity PΓess, 1983.
Rajcl1man, jol1n, Miclιel Foucαult: tlιe freedom of plιilosop!ιy. New ΥοΓk:
Columbia University Press, 1985.
Russ, J acque!ine, Histoire de lα folie: Miclιel Foucαult. Paris: Hatier, 1979.
SheΓidan, Alan, Miclιel Foucαult: tlιe will to trutlι. London: Tavistock,
1980.
SmaΓt, Baπy, Foucαult, Mαrxism, αnd critique. London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1983.
Miclιel Foιιcαult. London: Tavistock, 1985.

7. Issues ofjournαls οπ F oucαult

Ε volution psyclιiαtrique 3 6 ( 19 71), 2 : Lα coπceptioπ ideologίque de l'H istoiτe de
lα Folie de Miclιel Foucαult.
Mαgαziπe litterαire 101 (1975).
Critique 31 (1975), 343: Α propos d'un livre de Miclιel Foucαult [Surveiller et
puπir].
Humαnities in Society 3 (Winteι-, 198ο): OπFoιιcαult.
SCE Reports, Spring/Summer, 1982.
298 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Le debat 41 (Sept.-Nov., 1986).

Critique 42 (1986), 471-72: Miclιel Foucault du monde entier.
Plιilosophy and Social Criticism 12 (1987), η. 2-3: The final Foucault: studies
on Michel Foucault's last work.
τlιejournal of Medicine and Philosophy 12 (Nov., 1987): Miclιel Foucault
and the plιilosophy of medicine.

8. Selected articles and chapters οπ Foucault

Amiot, Μ., "Le relativisme culturaliste de Micl1el Foucault," Temps mod-
ernes 22 (1967), 1271-98.
Barthes, R., "Savoir et folie," Critique 17 (1961), 915-22. ("Taking
sides," in R. Barthes, Critical essays, translated by R. Howard. Evan-
ston, ΠΙ.: Northwestern University Press, 1972, 163-70.)
Beyssade, J.-M., "Mais quoi ce sont le fous: sur un passage controverse
de la 'Premiere meditation'," Revue de metaplιysique et de 1nσrale 3
(1973), 273-94·
Canguilhem, G., "Mort de l'homme ou epιιisement du cogito?" Critique
24 (1967), 599-618.
"Sur I'Histoire de la folie tant qu' evenement," Le Debat, Sept.-Nov.,
1986, 37-40.
Carroll, D., ''τhe subject of archaeology or the sovereignty of the
episteme," MLN 93 (1978), 695-722.
Casey, Ε. S., ''τhe place of space in The birtlι of the clinic," Tiιe Journal of
Medicine andPhilosophy 12 (1987), 351-56.
Cohen, R., "Merleau-Ponty, the flesh, and Foιιcaιιlt," Philosoplιy Today
28 (1984), 329-38.
Corvez, Μ., "Le strιιcturalisme de Michel Foucault," Revue thomiste 68
(1968), 101-24.
Cottier, G., "La mort de l'l1omme: une lecture de Mίcl1el Foucault,"
Revue thomiste 86 (1986), 269-82.
Dagognet, F., 'Άrcheologie ou histoire de la medicine," Critique 21
(1965), 436-47.
Dallmayr, F. R., Polis and praxis, Cambridge, Mass.: ΜΙΤ Press, 1984,
Chapter 3·
Daumezon, G., "Lecture historique de L'histoire de folie de Micl1el Foιι­
caιιlt," Evolution psychiatrique 36 (1971), 227-42.
Davidson, Α., "Conceptual analysis and conceptual history: Foucault
and philosophy," StanfordFrenclιReview 8 (1984), 105-22.
'Άrchaeology, genealogy, ethics," in D. Hoy, ed., Foucault: α critical
reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 221-34.
Deleuze, G., "Un nouvel archiviste," Critique 26 (1970), 195-209. Α
revised and expanded version appears as a chapter of Foucault.
'Έcrivain non: un nouveau cartographe," Critique 31 (1975), 1207-27.
Α revised and expanded version appears as a chapter of Foucault.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 299
Derrida, J., "Cogito et l'l1istoiΓe de la folίe," Revιιe de 1netaplιysique et de
morale 3-4 (1964), 460-94. Reprinted in J. Denida, Ecriture et la
difference. Paris: Seuil, 1967. (τΓanslated by Alan Bass as Writing
and difference. Chicago: Univeι-sity ofC11icago Press, 1978.)
Descombes, V., Modenι Frenclι p!ιilosophy, tΓanslated by L. Scott-Fox and
J. Μ. Harding. Cambridge: CambΓidge UniveΓsity PΓess, 1980,
Chapter 4·
Dews, Ρ., Logics of disintegrati01ι. London: Verso, 1987, Cl1apteΓs 5, 6, 7·
Dreyfus, Η., "Beyond Hermeneutics," in G. Sl1apiro, ed., Henneneutics.
Amherst, Mass: UniveΓsity of Massacl1usetts Press, 1984, 66-83.
"Foucault's critique of psychiatric ωedicine," τlιe journal of Medicine
andPhilosoplιy 12 (1987), 311-34.
DΓeyfus, Η., and Ρ. Rabinow, "What is maturity? Habermas and Fou-
cault on 'What is enlightenment?'," in David Hoy, ed., τlιe Foucault
reader. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986, 109-21.
ΕΙ Kordi, Μ., "L'arcl1eologie de la pensee classique selon Micl1el Fou-
cault," Revιιe d'!ιistoire economique et sociale 51 ( 1973), 309-35·
Ewald, F., 'Άnatomie et corps politiques," Critique 31 (1975), 1228-65.
Ey, Η., "Commentaires critiques sur L'lιistoire de la folie de Micl1el Fou-
cault," Evolution psyclιiatrique 36 (1971), 243-58.
Felman, S., "Madness and philosophy or literature's reason," Yale Fτenclι
Studies 52 (1975), 206-28.
Figliό, ·κ., Review of τlιe birtlι of tlιe clinic, Britislι j ounιal for tlιe History of
Science 10 (1977), 164-67.
Flal1erty, Ρ., "(Con)textual contest: Derrida and Foucault on madness
and tl1e Cartesian subject," Philosophy of Social Scieπce 16 (1986),
157-75·
Flynn, Β., "Micl1el Foucault and tl1e Husserlian problematic of a tΓanscen­
dental pl1ilosopl1y of histoΓy," Plιilosoplιy Toda)' 22 (1978), 224-38.
Frank, Μ., Was ist Neostrukturalismus? FrankfuΓt am Main: Sul1rkamp,
1983, Chapters 7-12.
FΓaser, Ν., "Foucault on modern power: empirical insigl1ts and norma-
tive confusions," P1·axis Internationalι (1981), 272-87.
"Foucault's body language: a post-l1ιιmanist political rhetoric?" Sal?na-
gιιndi 61 (1983), 55-70.
"Michel Foιιcaιιlt: a young conservative?" Etlιics 96 (1985), 165-84.
Gearhart, S., 'Έstablishing rationality in tl1e histoΓical text: Foucault
and tl1e problem of unreason," in τlιe open boundary of lιistory and
fiction: α cτitical approach to tlιe Frenclι Enliglιtenment. Princeton, Ν .J.:
PΓinceton University Press, 1984, 29-56.
Gordon, C., "BiΓtl1 of tl1e subject," Radical Philosop!ιy 17 (1977), 15-25.
"Question, etl1os, event: Foucault on Kant and enlightenment," Econ-
O?ny and Society 15 (1986), 71-87.
Greene, J., "Les mots et les cl1oses," Social Science Infonnation 6 (1967),
131-38.
300 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Guttiηg,G., "Cσηtiηeηtal ρl1ilσsσphy of scieηce," iη Ρ. D. Asquitl1 aηd
Η. Ε.Kyburg, eds., Cu1τent reseατclι in plιilosop!ι)• of science. East Laη­
siηg, Mich.: Pl1ilσsσphy σf Scieηce Assσciatiση, 1979, 94-117.
"Michel Fσucault aηd tl1e l1istσry σf reasση," iη Εrηaη McMulliη, ed.,
Constructi01ι αnd c01ιstrαint: the shαping of scientific ταtionαlity, ΝσtΓe
Dame, Ιηd.: Uηiversity σf Nσtre Dame Press, 1988.
"Cσηtiηeηtal apprσacl1es tσ l1istσΓy aηd pl1ilσsσphy σf scieηce," iη G.
Η. Caηtσr, et al., eds., C01npαnion to tlιe lιistory• of 1nodeτn science.
Chicagσ: UηiveΓsity σfChicagσ Press, 1989.
Habermas, J., "Takiηg Aim at the Heart σf tl1e PΓeseηt," Universit)•
Publislιing 13 (1984), 5-6. Repriηted iη David Ησy, ed., Foucαult: α
cτiticαl reαdeτ.
"Geηealσgical wΓitiηg σfl1istσry: ση sσme apσΓias iη Fσucault's theσΓy
σf pσweΓ," Cαnαdiαnjournαl of Politicαl αnd Sociαl τ!ιeση 10 (1986),
1-9·
Der p!ιilosop!ιiscΛe Dislιuτs der Moderne. FΓaηkfuΓt am Main: Sul1Γkamp,
1985, Cl1apteΓS 9 aηd 1σ. (τlιe plιilosojJ!ιicαl discoιιrse of nιocleτπity,
translated by F. Lawreηce. CambΓidge, Mass.: l\ιΠΤ PΓess, 1987.)
Hackiηg, Ι., "Micl1el Fσucault's immatuΓe science," NOUS 13 (1979),
39-5 1·
"BiσpσweΓ aηd tl1e avalaηcl1e σfprinted ηumbers," Hιιmαnities in Soci-
ety, 5 (1982), 279-95.
Hattiaηgadi, J. Η., "Laηguage philσsσpl1y: Hackiηg aηd Foucault," Diα­
logue 17 (1978), 513-28.
Hiley, D. R., "Fσucault and the questiσn σf enligl1teηmeηt," Plιilosoplι)•
αnd Sociαι'Cτiticis1n 11 (1985), 63-83.
HiΓSt, Ρ., aηd Wσσlley, Ρ., Sociαl τelαtions αnd lιu1nαn αctivities. Lσηdση:
Tavistσck, 1982, ChapteΓ 9·
Ησηηeth, Α., Κτίtί!ι der Mαclιt. FΓankfuΓt am Maiη: Suhrkamp, 1985,
ChapteΓs 4, 5, 6.
Huppert, Geσrge, "Divinαtio et eruditio: thσugl1ts ση Fσucault," Histoη
αnd Theoη 13 (1974), 191-2σ7.
J ay, Μ., 'Ίη the empire σf tl1e gaze: Fσucault aηd tl1e deηigΓatiση σf
visiσn iη tweηtieth-century Frencl1 tl1σught," in D. Ησy, ed., Fou-
cαult: α cτiticαl τeαdeτ.
KuΓzwill, Ε., "Micl1el Fσucault: stΓuctuΓalism aηd stΓuctures σf kησwl­
edge," in The αge of structurαlism: Levi-Stταuss to Foucαult. Ν ew ΥσΓk:
Cσlumbia UηiveΓsity Press, 198σ, 193-226.
Lacl1aΓite, Ν., 'ΆΓcheσlσgie du savσiΓ et stΓUctuΓes du langage scienti-
fique," Diαlogue 9 (197σ), 35-53.
Le Βση, S., "Uη pσsitiviste desesp6·e: Michel Fσucault," Te1nps 1nodenιes
22 (1967), 1299-1319·
LecσuΓt, D., "SuΓ l'aΓcheσlσgie et le savσiΓ (a pΓOpσs de Micl1el Fσu­
cault)," Pensee 152 (197σ), 69-87. (τΓaηslated iη D. LecσuΓt, Μαrχ-
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 301

is1n ωιd epistemology: Baclιelard, Canguil!ιem, Foucault, translated by

Ben Brewster. London: NLB, 1975·)
Leland, D., 'Όη reading and writing the world: Foucault's l1istory of
tl1ought," Clio 4 (1975), 225-43.
Levy, Β.-Η., "Le systeme Foucault," Magazine litteraire 101 (1975), 7-9.
Macherey, Ρ., 'Άuχ sources d.e 'L'l1istoire de la folie': une rectification et
ses limites," Critique 43 (1986), 752-74.
Margolin, J.-C., "L'l1omme de Michel Foucault," Revue des scie1ιces lιιι­
maines 128 (1967), 497-522.
Maslin, Μ., "Foucaιιlt and pragmatism," Raritan 7 (1988), 94-114.
McDonnell, D.J., 'Όη Foucault's pl1ilosophical metl1od," Canαdianjour­
nal of Plιilosoplι)' 7 (1977), 537-53·
Megill, Α., "Foucault, structuralism, and the ends of l1istory,"] ournal of
ModenιHistory 51 (1979), 451-503·
Proj;/ιets of extremity: Nietzsclιe, Heidegger, Foucaιιlt, Derricla. Berkeley,
Calif.: California University Press, 1984.
Midelfort, Η. C. Eric, "Madness and civilization in early modern Eu-
rope- a reappraisal of Micl1el Foucault," in Β. C. Malament, ed.,
After tlιe RefoτmatiO?ι, essa)'S in lωnor of]. Η. Hexter. Pl1iladelpl1ia: Uni-
versity ofPennsylvania Press, 1980,247-65.
Miel, J ., 'Ίdeas or epistemes: Hazard versus Foucault," Υale Frenclι Stιιd­
ies 49 (1973), 231-45·
Paden, R., "Locating Foucault- arcl1aeology versus structuralism," Plιi­
losoplιy and Social Criticism 11 (1986), 19-37.
Piaget,J.,Lestructuralisme. Paris: PUF, 168, 108-15. (Structuralis1n, trans-
lated by C. Mascl1ler. New York: Basic Books, 1970, 128-35).
Poynter, F. Ν. L., Review of La naissance du cliniqιιe, History of Science 3
(1964), 140-43·
Putnam, Η., Reaso1ι, trutlι, and lιistory. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1981. Cl1apter 7, esp. 155-62.
Pratt, V., "Foucaulι and tl1e l1istory of classification tl1eory," Studies in
Histo1y and Plιilosop!ιy of Science 8 (1977), 163-71.
Rajcl1man, J ., "Nietzscl1e, Foucault, and the anarcl1ism of power," Se7nio-
text(e), 3 (1978), 96-107.
'Έιhics after Foucault," Social Text 13/14 (1986), 165-83.
Reiser, S. ]., Review of Tlιe birtlι of tlιe clinic, Social Science and Medicine 10
(1976), 124·
Revel, J., and Bellour, R., "Foucault et les historiens," Magazine litteraire
101 (1975), 10-13.
Rorty, R., "Method, social science, and sociall1ope," Canadianjournal of
Plιilosoplιy 16 (1981), 569-88. Reprinted in Conseque?ιces ofpragma-
tism: essays I9J2-Ig8o, Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press,
1982, 191-210.
"Beyond Nietzsche and Marx," London Review of Boolιs 3 (1981), 5-6.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Foucault and epistemology," in David Hoy, ed., Foucαtιlt: α criίicαl
τeαdeτ, 41-49.
Rouse, ]., K1ιowledge αnd poweτ: towατd α politicαl p!tilosop!ty of science.
Ithaca, Ν.Υ.: Cornell University Press, 1987, especially Cl1apter 7·
Rousseau, G. S., "Wl1ose enlightenment? not man's: the case of Michel
Foucault," Eighteent!t-Century Studies 6 (1972-73), 238-56.
Said, Ε., 'Άbecedατium ctιltuταe: structuralism, absence, \Vriting," Triquατ­
teτly 20 (1971), 33-71. Reprinted in Beginnings: inte?ttio?t αnd 1net!tod.
New York: Basic Books, 1975.
"An etl1ics oflanguage," Diαcritics 4 (1974), 28-37.
"Linguistics and tl1e arcl1aeology of mind," Inίe11ιαtionαl P!tilosophicαl
Qιιατteτly 11 (1971), 104-34.
"Michel Foucault as an intellectual imagination," Boundα1y 2 1 (1972),
1-36. Reprinted in Beginτ~;ings: i?ιte?ιtion αnd 1nethod. Νeνν York: Ba-
sic Books, 1975.
"The problem of textuality: two exemplary solutions," Criticαl Inquiry
4 (1978), 673-714.
"Travelling tl1eory," Rαritαn 1 (1982), 41-67.
Sartre,J.-P., 'Jean-Paul Sartre repcind," Ατc 30 (1966), 87-96.
Scott, C., "Foucault's practice of tl1inking," Reseατclι i1ι Pltenomenology 14
(1984), 75-85.
Serres, Μ., "Geometrie de l'incommunicable: La Folie" and "Le retour
de la Nef" in Michel Serres, He1-τnes Ι: Lα Commuπicαtion. Paris:
Editions de Minuit, 1968, 167-90, 191-205.
Shaffer, Ε. S., "The archaeology of Michel Foucault," Studies i1ι History
αndPhilosophy ofScience 7 (1976), 269-75.
Shapir.o, Μ.]., "Michel Foucault and the analysis of discursive practice,"
in Michael J. Sha piΓO, Lαnguαge αnd politicαl undeτstαnding: tlιe politics
of discuτsive pταctices. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
1981, 127-64.
Shiner, L., "Foucault, phenomenology, and the question of oΓigins,"
Philosop!ιy Todαy 26 (1982), 312-21.
Silverman, Η., 'J ean-Paul Sartre versus Micl1el Foucault on civiliza-
tional study," Plιilosop!ιy αnd Sociαl Criticism 5 (1978), 161-71.
"Micl1el Foucault's nineteenth century system of thougl1t and the
anthropological sleep," Seminατ ΠΙ, 1979, 1-8.
Stone, L., "Madness," New Υοτk Review of Books, December 16, 1982,
36ff. Cf. also the subsequent 'Έxchange" between Foucault and
Stone, New YoτlιReview of Books, March 31, 1983,42-44.
Sztulman, Η., "Folie ou maladie mentale? Etude critique, psycl1opatl1o-
logique et epistemologique des conceptions de Michel Foucault,"
Evolution psyclιiαtrique 36 (1971), 25·9-77.
Taylor, C., "Foucault on freedom and truth," Politicαl Theory 12 (1984),
152-83. Reprinted in D. Hoy, ed., Foucαult: α criticαl τeαdeτ. Οχ-
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

ford: Basil Blackwell, 1986. Reprinted also in C. Taylor, P!ιilosop!ιi­

cal pajJeτs, Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985,
152-184. Cf. also tl1e ensuing "Micl1el Foucault: an excl1ange,"
witl1 W. Ε. Connolly, Political Tlιeo1y 13 (1985), 365-85.
Valdinoci, S., "Les incertitudes de l'archeologie: arcl1e et arcl1ive," Re-
vue de ?nέtap!ιysique et de moωle 83 (1978), 73-101.
Veyne, Ρ., "Foucault revolutionne IΊ1isιoire," appendix to C01nment on
έcτit l'lιistoiτe, 2d ed. Paris: Seuil, 1978.
Wahl, F., 'Ύ a-t-il une episteme structuraliste? ou d'une pl1ilosopl1ie en
deς:a du structuralisme: Michel Foucault," in Ducrot, Oswald, et al.,
Qu'est-ce que le stτuctιιτalisme? Paris: Seuil, 1968, 305-89.
Wartenberg, Τ. Ε., "Foucault's arc!Ίaeological metl1od: a response to
Hacking and Rorty," Plιilosoplιical Foτum (Boston) 15 (1984), 345-
64.
Watson, S., "Merleau-Ponty and Foucault: de-aestl1eticization of tl1e
work of art," PlιilosojJ!ιy Toda)' 28 (1984), 148-66.
"Kant and Foucault: on the ends of man," Th"dsclιτift vοοτ Filosofie 47
(1 9 8 5 ), 7 1-102.
White, Η., "Foucault decoded: notes from underground," History and
theo?)'. Reprinted in Hayden Wl1ite, Tτopics of discouτse: essays in
cultuτal cτiticis1n. Baltimore: jol1ns Hopkins University Press, 1978,
230-60.
"Power and tl1e Word," Canto 2 (1978), 164-72.
"Foucault's discourse: tl1e 11istoriography of anti-l1umanism," in
Η. Wl1ite, Tlιe content of t!ιe foτm. Baltimore: Jol1ns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1987.
 INDEX
act, epistemological, 19 5; vie;v ofknowledge, 147-
Aldrovandi, U., 144-5 8, 155-6; view oflanguage, 153-
Altl1usser, L., 13, 43 5, 157-62; vie'v of signs, 148-
analytic of finitιιde, 200 55
animality, 75-6 clinic, see medicine, clinical
Annales, 228, 229 cogito, 203-5
a priori, l1istorical, 242-3 commentary, 134, 145
arcl1aeology of!>no,νledge, 5~ 198, 227- Comte, Α., 9, 37, 202
9; ίη BC, 118,~134-6; ofC!assical mad- Condillac, Ε., 121-2, 170, 171
ness, 80-5; ίη ·FD, 79-80, 88, 102-3; concepts, rules governing [ormation of,
and genealogj\, 260, 270-2; and 11is- 235-7
tory of ideas, 244-9; and 11istory ο[ confinement, 72-3, 83-4, 100-1
science, 249-56; ίη ΟΤ, 163,217-21 connaissance, 251-2, 253
arcl1ive, 242-3 continuity, 21-2,40, 256-9
art, and madness, 98-9 countersciences, 214-17, 223-4
Artaud, Α., 99, 196 Cuvier, G., 190-93, 195
asylum, 91-5
Dagonet, F., 137n
Bachelard, G., ίχ-χίί, 12-32, 33, 38, 40- Darwin, C., 167, 192-3
1,45, 51-2, 229; relation to Foucault, Derήda,J., 78n
9-12,52-3,61,62,69, 111,220-1, Descartes, R., 13, 23-5, 28-9, 35-6, 73-
253-6 4, 80, 146, 151, 203
Bataille, G., 3 Destrutt de Tracy, 43, 170
Belon, Ρ., 176 Diderot, D., 39, 96, 167
Bichat, F., 128-32 DUksterl1uis, Ε., 37
Binswanger, L., 58, 59-63 Discipline and Punislι, 6, 225
biology, 168-9, 190-3, 250 discontinuity, 246-9
Bo!1r, Ν., 15-17 discursive formation, 231-8
Boole, G., 196 disease: anatomoclinical viev.• of, 127-
Bopp, F., 193-4 33; Classical view of, 112-15; clinical
Braudel, F., 248; see also Annales view of, 120-7
breaks, epistemological, 14-16, 40, 69, Doerner, Κ., 104
220 Don Quixote, 154
Broussais, F.-J., 46, 132-3 doubleι, empirico-transcendental, 200-3
Buffon, G., 144-5 dreams, 59-60
Burke, Ε., 83n Dreyfus, Η., χ, 241, 260, 267
Dumezil, G., 211, 266
Cabanis, Ρ., 43, 119
Canguilhem, G., 19, 20, 32-52, 67, 86, economics, 186-90; see also wealth, analy-
229, 245; relation to Foucault, 9-12, sis of
53-4, 100n, 101-2, 112, 117, 135-6, enlightenment, 11, 262; Foucault and,
137,210,218-21,230, 231n, 253-6, 1-2
269-70 enunciative modalities, 235-6
causality, in history ο[ thought, 100-1, episteme, 140; Classical, 146-7, 173-5;
249,257,271 modern, 181-4; Renaissance, 140-6
Cavailles, J., 5, 9-11 etl1nology, 214-16
change, ίη 11istory of thought, 246-9 evolution, 166-8
Classical Age: episteme of, 146-7, 173- experience, 70, 103
 INDEX

formalization, 195-6; thres11old of, view of, 195-8; Renaissance view of,
252-3 144-5, 197; see also generlli grammar;
Frankfurt Scl1ool, 11 1inguistics; p11i1o1ogy; signs
Fraser, Ν., 281 Las ι'vieninas, 152-3
Freud, S., 57,59-60, 95, 196, 214 Lavoisier, A.-L., 15, 33
Freudianism, 10-11 Lecourt, D., 12n
Levi-Strauss, C., 215, 217, 266
genelliogy,6-7,260, 270-2 life, see biology
genera1 grammar, 157-62 linguistics, 216-17
Goya, F., 98, 264 Linnaeus, C., 78, 165
Greene, J., 176n 1iterary analysis, 209, 210, 211
Gueroult, Μ., 229 literature, 196-7
Gutting, G., 51n, 247n Locke,J., 156
Gymp, 22 Lukacs, G., 11, 229

Habermas,J., 257, 272, 277-8, 280n Macherey, Ρ., 66n

I-Iacking, Ι., 179n, 247n madness: and anima1ity, 75-6; and art,
I-Iegel, G. W. F., 206 98-9; in the Classical Age, 69-70,
Heidegger, Μ., 59, 62, 63-4, 206, 223 72-87, 250; consciousness of, Classi-
Hertogh, C., 21n clli, 76-8; consciousness of, modern,
Hexter, J. Η., 179 88-91, 95; Foucau1t's early work on,
Λistoire peτimee vs. Λistoire sanctionnee, 19- 55-69; in itself, 95-99; 263-5; and
20,38,40-1 mentlli illness, 67-8, 85-7, 94-5;
histoιγ, 213-14; and arcl1ae:ology, 27-9, medical treatments of, 85-7; in the
244-56; of concepts, 32-4, 101-2, modern age, 87-95; in the Renais-
218-20; constructive, 175-9, 221; sance, 70-2, 104
and the l1uman subject, 228-31, 241- Madness and Civilization, 70n
2; of science, 162-3; subject-centeι-ed, Maladie mentale et personnalite, 55-9, 64-
228-31 6, 109, 249; differences from Maladie
History• of Sexualit:y, 6-7, 225 mentale et psycl!ologie, 66-9
Hδlder1in, F., 196, 206 Mallarme, S., 196, 197
Hopital Gene?·al, 69, 72 man, 198-200; death of, 207-8, 224
11uman sciences, 139-40, 208-17 Marx, Κ., 11, 43-4, 189-90, 192, 196,
Huppert, G., 176-7 202, 206
Husserl, Ε., 9-10, 59, 202, 204, 223 Marxism, 10-11, 64-7
mathesis, 155
ideologues, 43 Maupertuis, Ρ., 44, 167
ideology, 43-5, 258-9 medicine: anatomo-c1inica1, 127-33;
imagination, 61-3, 156 Classical, 112-15; cliniclli, 118-27;
internlliist vs. externlliist history of sci- Foucault's critique of, 136-7; during
ence,37 tl1e Frencl1 Revolution, 115-19
interpretation, 196, 273-5 Megill, Α., 269n
menta1 illness, 67-8; Foucau1t's ear1y
Jones, W., 193 work on, 55-66; and modern medi-
cine, 94-5
Kant, Ι., 2-4, 13, 133, 182, 184-5, 198- Merleau-Ponty, Μ., 5, 9, 202, 204, 222-
201,262,275 3
Koyre, Α., 9, 11 Merquior,J., 272
Kul1n, Τ., 16, 22, 33, 37, 50-2, 137, 247 Midelfort, Η. C. Ε., 104
Minkowski, Ε., 58
1abor, 186-90 money, 169-71
Lacan,J., 10, 214, 266
Lafitte, Ρ., 37 Nagel, Τ., 222n
Lamarck, J.-B., 15, 167, 190, 192-3 naturlli history, 162-9
language: Classical view of, 153-5, 157- Ν e'vton, Ι., 143
62; and clinical medicine, 124-7; and Nietzsche, F., 11, 71, 99, 196, 197, 206,
the death of man, 207-8; modern 207,208,271,277-8
 INDEX

ηoηdiscursive practices, 256-60 Ricardo, D., 187-9, 192

ηorms,21-2,45-52,254-6,281- Rousseau, G. S., 175, 177
5 Rotl1maη, D., 104
rules, ο[ discursive formatioηs, 234-8
objectivity of scieηce: Bachelard ση, 25- Russell, Β., 196
7; Foucaulι ση, 272-7
objects (ο[ discursive formatioηs), 234-5 Sade, Marquis de, 98, 264
obstacles, epistemological, 17-18, 41-2, Sartre,J.-P., 9-10, 61, 204, 229
220-1 Saussure, F. de., 239
origiη, retreat aηd returη of, 205-7 savoir, 251-2, 253
Searle,J., 240-1
Paracelsus, 143 Sellars, W., 22, 29
Pavlov, Ι., 55 Serres, Μ., 13, 229
perceptioη, ίη cliηical mediciηe, 124-7 Sl1eridaη, Α., χ, 72
pl1ilosophy: Foucault's coηceptioη ο[, ship ο[ [ools, 72, 104
284-7; moderη, 184-6, 208-9 Scl1opeηhauer, Α., 185
pheηomeηology, 202-3; Foucault aηd, signs: ίη Classical Age, 148-55; ίη cliηi­
68-9,222-3 cal mediciηe, 120-2; see also laηguage,
philology, 193-5 pl1ilology
Physiocrats, 171-3 similarity, see resemblaηce
Piηel, Ρ., 91, 93-5 Smitl1, Α., 186-7
Porter, R., 104 Smitl1, R. C., 12η
positivism, 185-6 social scieηces, see lnιmaη scieηces
positivities, 242, 250 sociology, 209,210,211
power, relatioη to kηowledge, 275-7, spatializatioη, 112-15
279-80 speecl1-acts, 240-1
precursors, 39-40, 244-5 Speηcer, Η., 44
Priestley,J., 33 statemeηts, 239-44
probability, iη cliηical mediciηe, 122-4 strategies, rules goverηiηg Γormatioη of,
profile, epistemological, 17-18 237-8
psychoaηalysis, 17η, 214-16; ofreasoη stroηg program, 257
(Bachelard), 17, 53; see also Freud structuralism, 10; Foucault's relatioη to,
psychology, 209, 210, 211; Foucault's cri- 10-11, 111-12, 228, 266-70
tique of, 105-9; aηd psychiatry, 65, Suarez, F., 177
67-8,97-8 subjective uηities, 229-31
Putηam, Η., 272
taxiηomia, 155-6
Quiηe, W .., 23 Taylor, C., 272, 276-7, 280
tl1resholds, 252-3
Rabiηow, Ρ., χ, 241, 260, 267 Tiles, Μ., 12η, 21η, 23η
Rajchmaη,J., χ, 265η Tuke, S., 91-5
Ramus, Ρ., 176
realism, metaphysical, 29-32 uηreasoη (deraison), 73-5
realism, scieηtific, 27-32 uηthougl1t, 203-5
refereηtial, 240 utilitariaηs, 171-3
reflex movemeηt, 34-7
relativism, Foucault aηd, 272-8 Vaη Gogh, V., 71
Reηaissaηce: episteme, 140-6; view of Velasquez, D.,-152-3
kηowledge, 142-4; view of laηguage, vitalism, 41-2
144-5, 197; view ο[ madηess, 70-2,
104; view ofwealth, 169 wealtl1, aηalysis of, 169-73; see also eco-
represeηtatioη, 149-53, 174-5, 181-6, ηomics
199,208-9 Weber, Μ., 11
resemblaηce, 140-2, 155-6 Willis, Τ., 36-7
 Modern
European
Philosophy MICHEL FOUCAULT

Thιs book ιs an unportant ιntrod uctιon το and cntιcal mterpretatιon

of the work of ιhe major French thinker Michel Fouca ulτ . Through
comprehensiνe and detailed analyses of such imponant texts as The
Hisιory ο/ Madness in ιhe Age ο/ Reason, The Birth ο/ ιhe C/ink, The
Order ο/ Things, and The Archtreology ο/ Knowkdge, Professor Gutting
provides a Jucid exposίt ion of Foucault's " archaeological" approach
to the history of thoughτ- a method for u ncoνering the "unconscious"
structures that set bouηdaries ση the τhinking of a given epoch.
Ί'he book also casts FOtJαιulτ in a new light, relaτ ing his work το
two major but ηeglected influences: Gasιon Bachelard's philosophy
of science and Georges Canguilhem 's history o f science . This per-
spective yields a new and valuable understanding of Foucault as a
historian and phiJosopher of science, balancing and complementing
ι:hc more common vίew that he was primarily a social critk and ιheorisι:.
An exι:ellent guιde for those first approaching Foucault's work, the
book will also be a chaUenging interpretation and evaluation for those
already famiJίar with hίs writings.

ISBN 0-521-3bb~8-4

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UNIVERSΠY

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