P06132 Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) – Independent Evaluation Provider

(NIEP) – Final Evaluation Report Vol. 1

Final Evaluation report prepared by WYG:

Kathleen Latimer (Team Leader, WYG); Sophie Timms (Evaluation Lead, WYG); Brendan
Whitty (Qualitative Research Lead); Alastair McPherson (Quantitative Research Lead); Umaru
Ibrahim Yakubu (National Research Lead); Chris Boyd (Project Director, WYG); Elbereth
Donovan (Associate Director WYG) with thanks to researchers from the Centre for Research
Documentation (CRD) in Kano (National Research Team), and special thanks to Mohammad
Bello (CRD Research Lead).

Acknowledgements:
The evaluation team would like to sincerely thank Patrick Merienne (SRO), DFID Nigeria and all
the staff of NSRP for their support and assistance throughout the evaluation process.

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Table of Contents
VOLUME 1 of 2:
TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................... III
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................ VI
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................................... VIII
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................................... VIII
LIST OF BOXES ..................................................................................................................................... VIII
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................................... IX
THE NIGERIAN CONTEXT ...................................................................................................................................... IX
OVERVIEW OF NSRP .......................................................................................................................................... IX
WHAT DID THE FINAL EVALUATION LOOK AT, AND HOW? ........................................................................................... X
WHAT DID THE EVALUATION FIND? ........................................................................................................................ X
IE focus area 1 - Strengthening the Peace Architecture ............................................................................ xi
IE focus area 2: Broadening Societal Participation ................................................................................... xii
IE focus area 3: Exerting Influence........................................................................................................... xiii
A NOTE ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ............................................................................ XIV
DID NSRP ACHIEVE VALUE FOR MONEY?............................................................................................................. XIV
LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................................................................................................................... XIV
1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT ......................................................................................................... 1
1.1 EVALUATION OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 NSRP PROGRAMME OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................ 2
Operational context ................................................................................................................................... 2
Programme design .................................................................................................................................... 7
Programme evolution ................................................................................................................................ 0
Legacy and sustainability........................................................................................................................... 0
2 METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................................. 2
2.1 PURPOSE OF EVALUATION ....................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................. 2
2.3 EVALUATION PROCESS ............................................................................................................................ 2
2.4 FOCAL AREAS ........................................................................................................................................ 3
2.5 RELATIONSHIP OF FOCAL AREAS TO THE THEORY OF CHANGE .......................................................................... 3
2.6 EVALUATION TIMING AND LIMITATIONS.................................................................................................... 10
2.7 EVALUATION AUDIENCES ....................................................................................................................... 10
2.8 NOTE ON DEVIATIONS FROM THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND EVALUATION DESIGN .......................................... 10
2.9 EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS ...................................................................................................... 12
The evaluation design .............................................................................................................................. 12
The evaluation methods .......................................................................................................................... 12
Method 1: Quality assurance, review and analysis of NSRP M&E data .................................................. 13
Method 2: RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA) Case Studies................................................................... 13
Method 3: Survey of NSRP platform members ........................................................................................ 15
Method 4: Qualitative comparative analysis .......................................................................................... 19
Additional methods ................................................................................................................................. 22
2.10 ANALYSIS AND TRIANGULATION .............................................................................................................. 22
2.11 INCLUSION, ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND DISSENTING VIEWS ................................................................... 23
3 EVALUATION FINDINGS................................................................................................................. 24
3.1 STRENGTHENING THE PEACE ARCHITECTURE .............................................................................................. 24
Headline findings ..................................................................................................................................... 24

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Evaluation questions................................................................................................................................ 25
Has NSRP resulted in conflicts resolved? ................................................................................................. 25
Case Study Evidence ................................................................................................................................ 26
Has NSRP strengthened the peace architecture? .................................................................................... 28
Communication........................................................................................................................................ 29
Composition ............................................................................................................................................. 29
Training and capacity .............................................................................................................................. 31
Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................................. 32
3.2 BRINGING ABOUT BROADER SOCIETAL PARTICIPATION................................................................................. 34
Headline findings ..................................................................................................................................... 34
Evaluation questions................................................................................................................................ 34
The evidence ............................................................................................................................................ 35
Participation by broader society .............................................................................................................. 43
Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................................. 44
3.3 NSRP EXERTING INFLUENCE ................................................................................................................... 45
Headline findings ..................................................................................................................................... 45
Evaluation questions................................................................................................................................ 45
What has NSRP achieved in the area of influence? ................................................................................. 46
How did the platforms set out to achieve influence over policy and practice change? .......................... 47
External factors facilitating NSRP’s capacity to effectively influence ...................................................... 53
External factors inhibiting NSRP’s capacity to effectively influence ........................................................ 54
Concluding remarks ................................................................................................................................. 54
4 VALUE FOR MONEY....................................................................................................................... 57
4.1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 57
4.2 CHALLENGES ....................................................................................................................................... 57
4.3 ECONOMY & EFFICIENCY ....................................................................................................................... 57
4.4 EFFECTIVENESS .................................................................................................................................... 58
Programme Costs by Budget and Geography ......................................................................................... 58
Qualitative Assessment ........................................................................................................................... 58
4.5 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 59
5 FINDINGS, LESSONS AND REFLECTIONS ......................................................................................... 60
5.1 CHALLENGES IN THE FINAL EVALUATION OF NSRP...................................................................................... 60
The limitations of the logframe: .............................................................................................................. 60
The limitations of the programme monitoring data: .............................................................................. 61
The limitations inherent to the IE: ........................................................................................................... 62
5.2 A NOTE ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY AND CONTEXTUAL FACTORS ................................................................ 62
5.3 FINDINGS FROM THE FINAL EVALUATION OF NSRP..................................................................................... 63
IE focus area 1: Strengthening the Peace Architecture ........................................................................... 63
Findings IE focus area 2: Broadening Societal Participation ................................................................... 65
Findings IE focus area 3: Exerting Influence ............................................................................................ 65
5.4 REFLECTIONS ON NSRP......................................................................................................................... 66
6 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 69

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VOLUME 2 of 2:

TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................... III

LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................ IV
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... VI
APPENDIX A ADDRESSING THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS .................................................................. 1
APPENDIX B RAPID OUTCOME ASSESSMENT CASE STUDIES .............................................................. 8
APPENDIX C ANNUAL PERCEPTION SURVEY METHODOLOGY ........................................................ 155
APPENDIX D PLATFORM SURVEY DETAILED FINDINGS ................................................................... 161
General Findings from Platform Survey (Woman’s Groups and All Other Groups), including Social
Network Analysis.................................................................................................................................... 161
APPENDIX E VALUE FOR MONEY (EFFECTIVENESS)........................................................................ 259
Output 1: Security and Governance ....................................................................................................... 259
Output 2: Economic and Natural Resources .......................................................................................... 259
Output 3: Women and Girls in Peacebuilding and Conflict Management ............................................. 260
Output 4: Research and Advocacy, Media and Conflict Sensitivity ........................................................ 260
APPENDIX F VALUE FOR MONEY (COSTS) ..................................................................................... 262
APPENDIX G VALUE FOR MONEY (QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT) ..................................................... 264
APPENDIX H ORGANISATIONS CONSULTED ................................................................................... 266

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List of Acronyms

ACLED Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project

APS Annual Perception Survey
BC British Council
CBO Community-Based Organization
CHRICED Resource Centre for Human Rights and Civic Education
CPP Community Peace Partnership
CRD Centre for Research Documentation
CSC Conflict Sensitive Communications
CSO Civil Society Organization
CV Coefficient of Variation
CVE Countering Violent Extremism
DFID UK Department for International Development
DM Dialogue Mechanism
DMC Dialogue Mechanism Committee
DSCMA Delta State Conflict Management Alliance
EEGM Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meeting
EMT Environmental Monitoring Team
EQ Evaluation Question
EQUALS Evaluation Quality and Learning Services
EU European Union
EWS Early Warning System
FCAS Fragile and Conflict-Affected States
FCT Federal Capital Territory
GBP Great British Pound
IA International Alert
ICA Inclusion, Coordination and Accountability
KII Key Informant Interview
KWPSN Kano Women’s Peace and Security Network
KSCMA Kano State Conflict Management Alliance
LGA Local Government Area
LWU Land and Water Use Dialogue
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MoWA Ministry of Women’s Affairs
MSP Multi-Stakeholder Platform
MTE Mid-Term Evaluation
NAP National Action Plan
NIEP Nigeria Independent Evaluation Provider
NGO Non-Governmental Organizations
NIPSS National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies
NPSF National Peace and Security Forum

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NSRP Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme

NSS National Security Strategy
OAS Organization of American States
ONSA Office of National Security
PE Political Economy
QA Quality Assurance
QCA Qualitative Comparative Analysis
ROA RAPID Outcome Assessment
RSSDA Rivers State Sustainable Development Agency
SAP State Action Plan
SCMA State Conflict Management Alliance
SDD Social Development Direct
DFID’s Independent Quality Assurance Service for Evaluation Outputs, now known as
SEQAS
EQUALS
SNA Social Network Analysis
SRO Senior Responsible Officer
TOC Theory of Change
TOR Terms of Reference
USAID United States Agency for International Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNSCR UN Security Council Resolution
UQ Upper Quartile
VAWG Violence Against Women and Girls
VfM Value for Money
WPS Women Peace and Security
WPSN Women Peace and Security Network

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List of Tables
TABLE 1.1 RESPONDENTS STATING THAT THE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE IS MORE SEVERE THAN IN PRECEDING 12 MONTHS (% RESPONDENTS BY
NSRP TARGET STATE) ...................................................................................................................................................... 4
TABLE 1.2 KEY ACTIVITIES DELIVERED THROUGH NSRP’S PLATFORMS AND INITIATIVES .......................................................................... 9
TABLE 1.3 OVERVIEW OF IE CASE STUDIES OVERVIEW OF IE CASE STUDIES ....................................................................................... 10
TABLE 2.1 ADDRESSING THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS (GREYED OUT EQS NOT INCLUDED IN FTE, WITH JUSTIFICATION NOTED) ................... 6
TABLE 2.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FTE EVALUATION QUESTIONS AND TOC ..................................................................................... 9
TABLE 2.3 DEVIATIONS FROM TOR ........................................................................................................................................... 11
TABLE 2.4 PRINCIPAL METHOD SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................. 13
TABLE 2.5 SURVEY SAMPLE (GEOGRAPHICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL) ............................................................................................ 16
TABLE 2.6 BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 18
TABLE 2.7 QCA CONDITIONS AND RATIONALE ............................................................................................................................. 20
TABLE 2.8 QCA DATA SOURCES AND ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................ 21
TABLE 2.9 EVIDENCE WEIGHTING SCALE ..................................................................................................................................... 23
TABLE 3.1 ACTIVITIES AND OUTCOMES OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PLATFORMS..................................................................................... 25
TABLE 3.2 FIVE INDICATORS OF DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE................................................................................................................ 35
TABLE 3.3 Q11.2 RESPONDENT GENDER ................................................................................................................................... 36
TABLE 3.4 Q11.4 - WHAT TYPE OF ORGANISATION DO YOU REPRESENT ON THIS PLATFORM? .............................................................. 37
TABLE 3.5 Q4.2 - CONSIDERING ALL THE PLATFORM MEETINGS YOU HAVE ATTENDED, WHICH GROUPS ARE USUALLY PRESENT? ................. 37
TABLE 3.6 Q4.3 - CONSIDERING ALL THE PLATFORM MEETINGS YOU HAVE ATTENDED, HOW OFTEN DO THE FOLLOWING GROUPS CONTRIBUTE
TO THE ISSUES BEING DISCUSSED?..................................................................................................................................... 38
TABLE 3.7 Q4.5 - THINKING ABOUT 2-3 YEARS AGO, HOW INCLUDED DID YOU FEEL THEN IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACEBUILDING
DECISION-MAKING? ....................................................................................................................................................... 38
TABLE 3.8 Q4.4 - HOW INCLUDED DO YOU FEEL IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND PEACEBUILDING DECISION-MAKING?............................. 39
TABLE 3.9 Q5.2 - DURING PLATFORM MEETINGS, HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU FEEL ABLE TO SPEAK UP AND EXPRESS YOUR VIEWS WHEN YOU
HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY? ............................................................................................................................................. 39
TABLE 3.10 Q6.2 - HOW FREQUENTLY WOULD YOU SAY THAT PLATFORM MEETINGS HELP YOU TO BETTER UNDERSTAND THE OPINIONS OF
OTHER PARTICIPANTS? ................................................................................................................................................... 40
TABLE 3.11 Q6.3 - FOLLOWING DISCUSSION AT A PLATFORM MEETING, HOW OFTEN DO YOU FIND THAT YOUR OPINION HAS CHANGED? ..... 40
TABLE 3.12 Q 7.3 - HOW OFTEN DO YOU FEEL THAT MEMBERS TRY TO DISRUPT THE WORK OF THE PLATFORM? ...................................... 41
TABLE 3.13 Q8.6 - HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU FEEL THE PLATFORM SCRUTINISES AND CHALLENGES THE ACTIONS OF RELEVANT ACTORS? .... 43
TABLE 3.14 TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCASIONS THAT INFLUENCE HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BY NSRP’S PLATFORMS/ INITIATIVES ............................ 47
TABLE 5.1 PROGRAMME DESIGN .............................................................................................................................................. 67
TABLE 5.2 PROGRAMME IMPLEMENTATION................................................................................................................................ 68

List of Figures
FIGURE 1.1 RESPONDENTS STATING THAT INCIDENCES OF VIOLENCE IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVELY DEALT WITH (%
RESPONDENTS AWARE OF VIOLENT INCIDENTS HAVING OCCURRED) ........................................................................................... 5
FIGURE 1.2 OUTPUT DIAGRAM................................................................................................................................................... 8
FIGURE 2.1 PROGRAMME LEVEL THEORY OF CHANGE (DEVELOPED WITH NSRP – MAY/JUNE 2015)....................................................... 5
FIGURE 2.2 SURVEY SAMPLE (STAKEHOLDER TYPE) ....................................................................................................................... 17
FIGURE 3.1 KEY ACTIVITIES DELIVERED THROUGH NSRP’S PLATFORMS AND INITIATIVES – MAPPING THE DSCMA, KADUNA SOUTH CPP, AND
BOKKOS CITY/DAFFO LWU DM ...................................................................................................................................... 29
FIGURE 3.2 INCREASED SKILLS AND CAPACITIES OF PLATFORM MEMBERS* ........................................................................................ 32
FIGURE 3.3 COMBINATION OF ACTIVITIES DELIVERED .................................................................................................................... 48

List of Boxes
BOX 2.1 ROA CASE STUDIES ................................................................................................................................................... 14
BOX 2.2 EXTRACT FROM PROTOCOL PROVIDED TO CRD ON PRE-SURVEY PREPARATION ....................................................................... 17
BOX 3.1 EXAMPLES OF THE VARYING SKILLS AND CAPACITIES OF PLATFORM CONVENORS...................................................................... 39

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In 2013 the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) contracted WYG International
(WYG) and The Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD) to conduct the Independent
Evaluation (IE) of the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme (NSRP). NSRP is an
experimental five-year (2012-2017) programme delivered by a consortium headed by the British
Council (BC), with International Alert (IA) and Social Development Direct (SDD), that:
• Supports Nigerian-led initiatives to manage conflict non-violently; and
• Seeks to reduce the negative impacts of violence on the most vulnerable.

The Nigerian context

Nigeria has a population of 184 million with 250 different ethnic groups living in 36 autonomous
states, with a population split evenly between Christianity and Islam, and three broad socio-cultural
areas. High levels of poverty, joblessness, growing numbers of frustrated youth, and the degradation
of natural resources and climate stressors all contribute to a high level of violence (80,8441 violence
deaths were recorded in Nigeria between 2012 and 2017). Conflict also does not affect all groups
equally. Throughout the country violence against women and girls (VAWG) is widespread and
structural (Nigeria Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Coalition, 2008: 66; British Council,
2012), with three out of five women aged between 15 and 24 having been the victim of violence
(British Council, 2012: 47).

Overview of NSRP
NSRP operates at federal, state and local government authority level in eight2 of Nigeria’s most
conflict-affected states. NSRP aims to:
1. Improve conflict management mechanisms through broader societal participation and
increased oversight,
2. Mitigate drivers of conflict, specifically as they relate to economic and natural resources,
3. Increase participation of women and girls in peacebuilding and reduce violence against them,
4. Improve conflict prevention policy and practice through disseminating research, training
media partners and increasing conflict sensitivity.
NSRP supports existing or creates new opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage
through multi-stakeholder’s platforms (MSP). Although these platforms adopted different packages
of interventions, activities tended to primarily focus on either:
•Targeted influencing and persuasion amongst powerholders, citizens and protagonists of
conflict e.g. advocacy, mobilisation sensitisation, awareness-raising and training of conflict
sensitive action; or
• Convening platforms and bringing people together e.g. bringing together key
powerholders into longer term organisation/ platforms, providing a space for mediation,
dialogue and collective decision-making.
NSRP did not aim to set up new entities or structures, but to support and enhance those in existence.

1 www.nigeriawatch.org. The trend of violence deaths recorded was highest in 2014 with 22,839 deaths. The figures
receded in 2015 (17,652 deaths) and 2016 (11,546 deaths). 7,867 violence deaths had been recorded by 1 November
2017.
2 The eight states include Borno and Yobe (North-East Nigeria), Kano and Kaduna (North-West Nigeria), Plateau (North-

Central Nigeria), and Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta (South).

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What did the final evaluation look at, and how?

The final evaluation looked at three areas of particular interest to DFID-Nigeria; that is how NSRP’s
integrated approach:
1. Strengthened social institutions (the peace architecture) working to resolve and mediate
conflict (IE focus areas 1);
2. Involved broader society including marginalised communities (particularly women and youth)
in conflict resolution (IE focus areas 2);
3. Influenced policy and practice in managing conflict (IE focus areas 1).
The evaluation also focused extensively on the form, activities and outcomes of platforms to
understand what works, in what context and why, and to identify lessons. This was done by drawing
on NSRP’s internal monitoring and other research data and a perception survey of the population in
the target areas, undertaking nine in-depth case studies of supported platforms, a survey of platform
participants, key informant interview (KII) and a review of documentation

What did the evaluation find?

Notes on the findings
• The findings in this report are based on data collected by NSRP up to March 2017, which
was made available to the IE in June 2017. Although NSRP provided additional data in late
August 20173, this was not included in the final evaluation report as the IE was not able to
verify this data within the timescale remaining4; the later data is referenced in footnotes.

• It is necessary to point out that although NSRP was a five-year programme, there was a
lengthy research and design phase and some programme components did not become
operational until the third year.

• Despite significant recommendations made by the Independent Evaluation partner (IEP) to

NSRP at the midterm evaluation point around M&E systems and key areas for improvement,
monitoring data remained weak at the final evaluation phase. Although NSRP was designed
as an innovative programme, the level of reflection and review expected when using an
innovative approach was not evident throughout the life of the programme.

• The IE acknowledges that changes to the ToC and logframe were made following the MTR,
however, the IE rejects the claims that this significantly changed the nature of the
programme, the results or the period over which results should have been measured;
although the indicators changed during the life of the programme the objectives did not.

• As case study selection process was oriented towards more successful programmes which
could generate evidence on the theory of change as a whole5; findings informed by the case
studies might not be representative of the wider programme.

3 NSRP provided a figure of 124 conflicts prevented / resolved in August 2017 (against 89 in March 2017) and 54 policy
changes in August 2017 (against 38 in March 2017). The IE did not deem it appropriate to include this data without an
opportunity for verification, in part due to the concerns around the robustness of M&E systems in place.
4 The Final Evaluation was due 31 August 2017, and DFID was not able to agree to an increase in scope.
5 Positive examples of success in which a range of stakeholders could be engaged in the research and which offered

opportunities to explore the factors that facilitated and inhibited success were actively sought out by the evaluators.

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IE focus area 1 - Strengthening the Peace Architecture

There has been a large reduction in perceived violence in the programme target areas during the
life of the programme (and NSRP cites influence in the prevention/resolution of specific instances);
there has also been tangible strengthening of the peace architecture as a result of NSRP activity.
However, there is limited evidence on how far these are connected, and what contribution NSRP
may or may not have made through strengthening social institutions working to resolve and mediate
conflict.

Headline finding: A series of positive changes were made to the peace architecture in the target
area and across the eight programme focal states 89 conflicts were prevented / resolved by NSRP6.
However, challenges in demarcating the size and scale of a conflict and a lack of comparative data
from similar programmes makes it problematic to judge the significance of this figure.

Key findings:
1. Good results were achieved in establishing spaces that bring state and non-state actors
(including marginalised groups such as women and youth) together in a coordinated and
focussed fashion.
2. Where platforms are broadly inclusive, are meeting regularly and are appropriately convened
this contributed to strengthened coordination, communication and flow of information
between state and non-state actors, which contributed to stakeholders coming to shared
positions. It is however unclear if this is sustainable without ongoing funding.
3. Platform members and the peace architecture more broadly have benefitted from
involvement in platforms because of new / enhanced knowledge, understanding, skills and
capacities which improve their role as contributors to the conflict management process.
4. At the local level a broad mix of stakeholders is important for the successful functioning of
the platforms, enhancing trust and legitimacy; the importance of a broad mix is less
pronounced at federal and state level. At all levels (federal, state and Local Government
Authority (LGA) level), certain stakeholders (state security institutions, Community Based
Organisation (CBO), traditional and religious institutions) are persistently perceived to be
important and influential.
5. Platforms are able to bring about change through convening and mediation functions,
although results are not guaranteed; political drivers and lack of incentives amongst
stakeholders can be insurmountable obstacles.
Challenges
Two challenges related to evaluating the success of NSRP’s engagement to strengthen the peace
architecture should be flagged:
• The indicators in the result framework (logframe) are methodologically problematic, for
several reasons e.g. a ‘conflict’ has no obvious temporal or social bounds making it hard to
demarcate and count; it is difficult to identify when a conflict has been resolved vs. when a
conflict has been temporarily halted and might re-emerge; and the value of the prevention or
resolution is unclear as this depends on the scale and severity of the conflict, which is not
captured in a simple numeric indicator (supporting qualitative records on the nature of the
conflicts resolved/prevented were not systematically captured and therefore were not
available for analysis by NSRP or IE);
• In addition to weaknesses in the M&E systems identified in the midterm review (MTR), the
final evaluation also pointed to systemic weaknesses in operational follow up activities, which

6
The evaluation drew on data up to end March 2017, which was made available by NSRP to the IE in June 2017. At end
August NSRP self-reported a total of 124 incidences based on more recent data, but the IE was not in a position to validate
this within the timeframe of the evaluation.

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demonstrate that platforms did not systemically track resolutions of conflicts; there is thus a
possibility that the programme has under reported on its results.

IE focus area 2: Broadening Societal Participation

Women are rarely drivers of conflict in Nigeria, and NSRP’s focus on women is primarily based on
the concept that women can provide more to society than they currently do, because they are
marginalised. NSRP views the marginalisation of large sections of the Nigerian population
(specifically women and youth) as inappropriate and potentially a driver of conflict, and seeks to
overcome this by broadening participation in peacebuilding, and, as a result, improving functioning
of peacebuilding mechanisms.

Headline finding: Although NSRP supported platforms have a) provided an effective forum for
different stakeholder groups (both state and non-state) to come together and b) been effective in
facilitating democratic dialogue, evidence of resulting behaviour changes amongst platform
participants is as yet limited, and improved societal participation beyond the NSRP supported
platforms is not evident.

Key findings:
1. NSRP supported platforms have provided a space for a wide range of different stakeholder
groups (including the marginalised) to come together around issues of conflict management,
and are broadly characterised as spaces for open and conflict-free discussion conducted in
good faith; this is a significant achievement which should not be underestimated.
2. Platform members surveyed felt the platforms offered opportunities for better understanding
the opinions of others, and resulted in 61% of respondents reporting that they changed or
modified their own opinions as a result of their platform membership and engagement7.
3. Marginalised groups, specifically women and youth, have been able to effectively engage in
platforms - but the participation of different groups of actors was not always equal, with state
actors wielding greater power in many cases.
4. Involvement of other marginalised groups (e.g. disabled groups) was not evident across the
platforms based on the evidence available to the IE.
5. Except for activities with media partners, the success of NSRP interventions in bringing about
participation in conflict management and resolution amongst society more broadly (i.e.
amongst those not directly involved in the platforms) was limited.
Challenges
Three challenges related to evaluating the success of NSRP activities aimed at broader societal
participation should be flagged:
• It should be acknowledged that widespread societal participation in conflict management
mechanisms and a reduction in violence affecting vulnerable groups are both medium to long
term endeavours which are likely to only become evident beyond the timeframe of this
evaluation.
• NSRP programme monitoring data only indicated the presence of different groups at platform
meetings, and did not paint an accurate picture of the extent to which participation took place
or was meaningful/genuine; the evaluation addressed this through deep dive case studies
and the survey of platform participants.
• A lack of data on the NSRP small grant scheme did not allow the evaluation to comment on
the reach, beneficiaries or outcome of this component, or on the broader societal participation
or inclusion of marginalised groups which might or might not have been achieved through
this scheme.

7
See section 2 for a discussion of the limitations of the survey of platform members.

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IE focus area 3: Exerting Influence

NSRP is working at the local government authority, state and federal levels to increase the capacity
of its platforms, initiatives, interventions and society more broadly to influence key actors/institutions
in the conflict arena and to bring about positive changes in policy and practice, which will result in
enhanced stability and reduced violence.

Headline finding: NSRP monitoring data indicated that NSRP has successfully influenced policy or
practice change 38 times8; it is unclear to what extent positive influence is sustainable.

Key findings:
1. The ability to build, leverage and sustain strong relationships with champions of change and
within institutions to capitalise on windows of opportunities – including, for example, the
desire by communities to find alternative solutions to conflict - have facilitated NSRP’s
capability to influence policy and practice change; dependence on individual not systemic
relationships are however a risk to sustainability, which NSRP acknowledged.
2. Wider socio-economic, political-economy and cultural factors, and in some instances NSRP’s
failure to respond to these realities or shift its focus, are factors that have confounded better
results; opportunities to reflect on learning about what was working or not and to adapt
accordingly were also missed.
3. The assumption that access to and use of better data and evidence will lead directly to
changes in policy and practice did not hold true in some cases; instead, changes in policy
and practice were to a greater extent as a result of use of a wider range of advocacy and
lobbying techniques. Research seems to have played a relatively minor role alongside
various other aspect of the advocacy strategy and other factors such as growing media
attention due to certain egregious cases.
4. Although policy changes are necessary to achieve long term reduction in conflict and
violence, they are on their own not sufficient; dedicated resources to implement, monitor and
bring about changes in behaviour are also required.
5. The design and implementation of some of NSRP’s initiatives inhibited success in certain
cases; e.g. a lack of clarity on what certain peace clubs were trying to achieve, and an
absence within the State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMA) of a system to ensure
actions are taken and conflict resolutions are recorded following a report of violence are two
examples.
Challenges
Three challenges related to evaluating the success of NSRP activities aimed at influencing policy
and practice should be flagged:
• Evidence from the IEP case studies suggests that NSRP has successfully influenced key
actors and institutions in the conflict arena in certain instances resulting in key policy and
practice changes that have enhanced stability and reconciliation. However, the evidence for
this is weakened by positive bias with IEP case studies specifically selected as examples of
successful engagement.
• Similar to the challenge in measuring the number of conflicts, the indicators measuring
influence in NSRP’s result framework (logframe) are methodologically problematic and does
not take into account the fact that one instance of influencing can be very different from
another, more or less significant and/or more or less likely to have longevity.
• As with other areas of the programme, low levels of reporting were problematic, which could
mean NSRP’s contribution to policy change is underestimated.

8
The evaluation drew on data up to end March 2017, which was made available by NSRP in June 2017. At end August
NSRP self-reported 54 incidences, but the IE was not in a position to validate this data.

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A note on the political economy and contextual factors

In a programme of NSRP’s nature it is expected there will be contextual and political economy (PE)
factors that impact on success. The evaluation identified five barriers to long term success which fell
outside the control of the programme; both Nigerian decision makers / stakeholders and future
peacebuilding programmes in Nigeria should take these into account:
1. The persistent marginalisation of large sections of the Nigerian society, particularly women,
2. A patriarchal social context which creates a harsh, disabling environment,
3. High levels of drug abuse and unemployment amongst the youth, which inhibited youth
participation in certain states and which is likely – in some cases – to negatively impact on
the sustainability of outcomes achieved to date,
4. Population growth, which increases pressure on national resources, and is likely to negatively
impact on the sustainability of solutions, and
5. Entrenched incentive systems which serve as impermeable barriers.

Did NSRP achieve Value for Money?

As at August 2017, NSRP spent £28.5M9 of the £33M10 budget earmarked by DFID. The full extent
of programme value for money (VfM) is unclear due to weak M&E systems, and systemic difficulties
associated with measuring the influence of diverse and complex programme activities. While the
NSRP held relatively good data on inputs to outputs, insufficient data on outputs to outcomes was
available to measure VfM effectiveness. Although NSRP’s effort to drive VFM in terms of efficiency
and economy is recognised, available evidence suggests the programme has achieved VfM
effectiveness at a moderate to high cost per output, and therefore a low to moderate VfM overall at
this level.

Lessons and recommendations

The evaluation has aimed to identify key lessons and recommendations of value to both future
peacebuilding programmes, and complex programmes operating in dynamic political environments;
there are also clear lessons to both local and international actors.

For future peacebuilding programmes

• Appropriate result indicators need to be in place: Narrow quantitative result indicators on their
own are problematic from a methodological perspective, and more focus should be given to
underlying networks of relations in peacebuilding programmes. In addition, where monitoring
frameworks are designed to capture supporting qualitative data, this should be captured, analysed
and responded to. Future programmes should experiment with more appropriate mix method
approaches to monitor progress and performance and should ensure programme partners are
able to implement these approaches appropriately.
• Legacy & sustainability should be more appropriately addressed from design: Although
results have been achieved, an absence of clear legacy strategies for platforms, a lack of wider
societal participation, and a dependence on individual relationships rather than the development
of institutional process based solutions, is likely to have impacted negatively on the ability of the
programme to lead to long term systemic and sustainable change. These aspects should be
addressed in future programmes.
• Behavioural change takes time and requires support: Although it is important to bring actors
together and create safe spaces for democratic dialogue, emphasis on supporting sustained
behavioural change amongst platform participants is needed and support to implement policy
changes are required; future programme should aim to more explicitly explore and measure the

9
The total figure at 31 March 2017, the cut off for evaluation data, was not available.
10
We note that the DFID business case for NSRP was £38M, including other costs such as evaluation.

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success of a range of initiatives to bring about behavioural changes. Donors should also
acknowledge the lengthy time periods and extend of the ongoing support which might be required
to achieve systemic and behavioural change.
• Support to give a voice to marginalised groups should be complemented with support to
improve processes and capacity amongst those who hold power. The convening of multiple
stakeholders, including those from marginalised groups, are important for legitimacy, adding value
to the functioning of the platforms, in particular at local level; however, power relationships means
some actors are more influential than others and are more able to drive forward policy change.
Future programmes should seek opportunities to exploit this, and should consider a multipronged
approach which combines giving a voice to marginalised groups while focussing on capacity
development of influential actors.
• The limitations inherent in the platform model needs to be understood: Platform models are
attractive solutions to enable locally led, bottom up reform; however, the limitations of the platform
model should be explored and acknowledged, and appropriate support to enable platforms to
flourish (e.g. ongoing, tailored training to conveners, more support to conveners and platform
chairs in establishing and using systems that effectively document actions and following up on
resolutions and outcomes) must be built into the programme design. More thought should be given
to long term sustainability of platforms, and the risk of platforms being co-opted by a dominant
stakeholder(s) should be acknowledged.

For other complex programmes in dynamic environments

• Robust M&E systems and adequate M&E capacity is required: Persisting challenges in
accessing M&E data significantly impacted on NSRP’s ability to accurately assess programme
performance, possibly resulting in underestimating results; future programmes should ensure the
value of ongoing M&E – and regular reflection on data to inform operational decisions – is clear
to all involved, and that adequate capacity to gather and interrogate appropriate data on an
ongoing basis exists. Not only should implementing partners (IPs) ensure M&E is viewed as
important and adequately resources, but thought should could be given to building in time and
funds to develop M&E capacity amongst partners from the onset, and how to clearly demonstrate
in what way data should be used on an ongoing basis.
• Real time learning is needed: The extent to which real time learning took place -and the way in
which it is supported by IE’s – could have been improved; this way of working requires more
ongoing engagement and quicker feedback loops, and is a lesson for both IPs and IEs.
• Programmes should adapt as a result of changes in context and learning: An inability to
identify impermeable barriers and an absence of a reflective culture most likely resulted in missed
opportunities to focus efforts in areas where greater change might have been possible. As
implementation progresses, political and other significant confounding factors or even
impermeable barriers will arise; programme should not persist in trying to address these, but
should acknowledge them and adapt to ensure resources are focussed on opportunities where
impact can be achieved. Programmes should also aim to understand what is working and what
not through appropriate and robust M&E, and should not hesitate to change or stop that which is
not achieving or unlikely to achieve impact.
• The dissemination of information is only one component of bringing about change: The
provision of quality information and research, support to engage with and utilise this, is only one
component in bringing about policy change; convening and advocacy activities are also important.
For Nigerian decision makers / stakeholders
• Peacebuilding initiatives will achieve maximum change as part of coordinated strategy
linked to related policy areas: initiatives aimed at peacebuilding and conflict resolution should
continue to strengthen connections with related activities as part of a holistic strategy that
maximises impact and which includes addressing the marginalisation of women, a fair approach
to resource distribution, an increased focus on job creation, specifically for youth, and an
appropriate strategic response to population growth.

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• Some actors within supported platforms are more influential than others and are a priority
for support (these actors vary by geographical level and platform as noted in the body of
the report): although there is a need for capacity development for all stakeholders, some
stakeholders are better placed to drive systemic changes.
• Opportunities to ensure sustainability and long-term effectiveness of the platform,
extending and continuing widespread membership, adapting membership/platform focus as
needed in response to changing circumstances should be explored.
• Opportunities to share lessons between local / state / federal levels of government and
between different parts of the country should be identified and acted upon.

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1 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1.1 Evaluation overview
In 2013 WYG International11, in association with the CRD based in Kano, Nigeria, was contracted
by DFID to conduct the independent evaluation of NSRP.
NSRP is an experimental five-year (2012-2017) programme funded by DFID to support Nigerian-led
initiatives to manage conflict non-violently and reduce the negative impacts of violence on the most
vulnerable. Operating at federal, state and local government authority (LGA) level in eight12 of
Nigeria’s most conflict-affected states, NSRP is delivered by a consortium headed by the BC and
including IA and SDD.
The purpose of the independent evaluation is to critically examine the individual and cumulative
delivery and outcomes of NSRP interventions, generating learning on the effectiveness of NSRP’s
integrated peacebuilding approach in relation to what works, for who, in what context and why. The
specific objectives of the evaluation are detailed in section 2.
The evaluation commenced in July 2013, when NSRP was still very much at a nascent stage. The
mid-term evaluation (MTE) was conducted in September/October 2015. This final evaluation report
is the culmination of the evaluation’s research and findings over the full evaluation period (2013-
2017).
Through the course of the evaluation, the specific objectives, approach and methods have evolved;
specifically, at the MTE the evaluation team worked with NSRP to retrospectively develop a
programme level Theory of Change (TOC) which elaborated the ‘missing middle’ between NSRP’s
inputs, activities and outputs and the anticipated outcome. This TOC was refined and validated at
the MTE Planning Workshop held in Abuja in May 2015; the evaluation questions (EQs) were
subsequently revised and agreed. The final evaluation, however, remains true to the spirit of the
original terms of reference (TOR) and deviations from the original TOR, the rationale for changes,
and the process for agreeing changes, are set out in detail in section 2.8.
The NSRP TOC considers how different NSRP interventions come together to change policy and
practice which, in turn, enhances the non-violent resolution of conflict. Appendix A sets out a review
of the evidence against the TOC.
Overall, the evaluation process has addressed 15 EQs which are informed by the programme TOC;
these questions are set out in Table 2.1 in section 2.5. Nine priority questions have been identified
for the final evaluation13, and the relationship between these EQs and the TOC is shown in Table
2.2 in section 2.5. These nine questions address the higher levels of the TOC (the MTE addressed
the other six EQs, mostly at output or the lowest level of outcomes).
The EQs are explored in relation to three focal areas of NSRP of interest for DFID-Nigeria:
• Strengthening the Peace Architecture, in other words, the social institutions working to
resolve and mediate conflict (section 3.1);
• Broader Societal Participation, that is, the involvement of marginalised communities in the
programme (section 3.2); and lastly,
• Exerting Influence, that is, the influence of NSRP on policy and practice in managing conflict
(section 3.3).

11
In 2013 WYG made a substantial investment in Upper Quartile; the supplier contracted by DFID as Independent
Evaluation Provider (NIEP) to NSRP. The Upper Quartile team is now fully integrated into WYG International as its M&E
division.
12 Bayelsa, Borno, Detta, Kaduna, Kano, Plateau, Rivers and Yobe.
13 The other questions were priority questions at the MTE stage.

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This final evaluation also focuses extensively on the platforms for engagement that NSRP has
sought to establish or strengthen14: their form, activities and outcomes; the extent and nature of
participation by platform or initiative type; and the factors and that have facilitated and inhibited
success.
In addition to drawing conclusions on the success of NSRP, from this focus – on the peace
architecture, societal participation, exerting evidence and the platforms for engagement – the
evaluation synthesises lessons to inform future programming, both with respect to peace building
and the design of complex programmes delivered in dynamic political environments.
The evaluation design is a hybrid theory-based/case-based design. It uses a mixed method
approach whose strategy is to triangulate the internal monitoring data collected through the NSRP’s
own systems with other evidence: primarily a series of nine case studies and a perception survey of
the population in the target areas, and a survey of platform participants; supported by additional KKIs
and a review of relevant documents. The evaluation design, the specific methods used, and the
approach to ensuring quality and inclusion are set out in section 2.
As agreed with DFID, the evaluation drew on monitoring data up to the quarter ending March 2017
(made available by NSRP in June 2017); subsequent data was not available for review within the
timelines for the final evaluation but is referenced in footnotes where appropriate.

1.2 NSRP programme overview

In this section, the report outlines the diverse context and the landscape of violence within which
NSRP is working, drawing on NSRP’s Annual Perception Survey (APS). It describes the programme
design, and how that design responded to these operational realities by developing a structure of
principles, platforms and processes working across multiple levels, geographies and forms of
violence.

Operational context
Diverse & Populous Country: Nigeria is a diverse country with 250 different ethnic groups living in
36 autonomous states, with a population split evenly between Christianity and Islam, and three broad
socio-cultural areas. It is also very large, with 184 million inhabitants living under conditions of
systemic and structural inequality15. The country’s state institutions are weak; oppressive military
rule is a recent memory; and civil society and the state have had to overcome significant antagonistic
relations (Falola & Heaton, 2008: 210-242). As the NSRP programme Business case observes, this
represents a “combustible mix” (DFID, 2012: 1).
Economic Context: Nigeria’s economy grew by 2.7% in 2015, significantly below its growth of 6.3%
in 2014. Since the fall in oil prices in mid-2014, growth has been on a downward spiral, and the
economy is currently in recession16. Nigeria’s economy is expected to grow by about 1% in 2017
and 2.5% in 2018, based on an expected increase in oil output, as well as the accelerated
implementation of public and social investment projects by the Federal Government.
Political Context: Nigeria returned to democratic rule in 1999 after decades of military rule. The fifth
consecutive national elections, held in March and April 2015 and won by an opposition party, marked
the first peaceful transfer of power between two political parties in Nigeria’s history. The
administration, led by President Muhammadu Buhari, identifies fighting corruption, increasing
security, tackling unemployment, diversifying the economy, enhancing climate resilience, and
boosting the living standards of Nigerians, as its main policy priorities ibid 15.
Development Challenges: Broad challenges include restoring macro-economic resilience and
growth, requiring stabilization and recovery measures, while at the same time, addressing the

14 These
platforms are evident across NSRP’s Outputs and at all operational levels.
15
Poverty levels remain stark, with Nigeria holding a quarter of Africa’s extreme poor.
16 World Bank (2017) The World Bank in Nigeria, www.worldbank.org, accessed October 2017.

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country’s medium and long-term development agenda, including efforts to improve security and
combat corruption. Specific inter-related issues include: development of the private sector;
addressing the employment needs a large young population; educational and skills development,
infrastructure development, environmental protection; social inclusion and equitable access to a
range of health, education and other public services.
Prevalent Violence: High levels of poverty (despite its huge oil reserves17, 69%18 of Nigerians live
in poverty), joblessness, growing numbers of frustrated youth, and the degradation of natural
resources and climate stressors all contribute to a high level of violence. The nature and causes of
this violence are as diverse as the country, encompassing political, economic, inter- and intra-
community, domestic and sectarian conflicts, and do not affect all groups equally. For instance, it is
noted that one in three women aged between 15 and 24 has been the victim of violence (British
Council, 2012: 47).
Nigeria continues to face terrorist attacks in the northeast (although improved), a restive insurgency
in the Delta region, and perennial inter-communal violence across the middle belt. More than 187
incidences of ethno-religious conflicts were recorded in Nigeria between 1999 and 2009, many of
which occurred in the north19. Also, 80,84420 violence deaths were recorded in Nigeria between 2012
and 2017: an average of 13, 474 violence deaths per year.
Violence in Nigeria is partly driven by high poverty rate, social exclusion and unequal distribution of
oil revenues21. This situation is further exacerbated by the preponderance of corruption, bad
governance and high unemployment rate among youths22. High youth unemployment and social
exclusion have rendered youths readily available to politicians and groups like Boko Haram and
Niger Delta militants to perpetrate violence. Election violence in Nigeria is mainly perpetrated by
youths who are manipulated by unscrupulous politicians.
Competition over resources, land and water in most cases, has also fuelled violent conflicts in many
parts of the country. The situation is compounded by weak conflict prevention structures in
communities as groups compete to access available resources23. Conflict between farmers and
herders is an example of such a case that has persisted in the north, but has recently spread to
southern states. State response, through legislation, has not been comprehensive or effective.
As stated in the NSRP Business Case (2012), the incidence and causes of violence differ
significantly across the 36 states of Nigeria. However, the ethnic and religious configuration of a
state and the distinction often drawn between so-called ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ serve as drivers of
conflict. There is wide-spread systematic discrimination against non-indigenes, preventing them from
access to government jobs, education scholarships and other services. Thus, states with sharp inter-
group divisions become particularly vulnerable to violence.
Violence Against Women and Girls: Finally, throughout the country, violence against women and
girls (VAWG) is widespread and structural (NGO Coalition, 2008: 66; British Council, 2012). The
NSRP’s own Output 3 logic document cites a complex rationale for this situation, with widespread
absence of women from peacebuilding and conflict management mechanisms, their greater

17
NSRP Business Case (2012) reports 36 billion barrels as Nigeria’s oil reserves.
18
National Bureau of Statistics (2010). Nigeria Poverty Profile.
19 David, N.A. and Manu, Y. A.(2015) “Democracy, Youth and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”: A Critical

Analysis in Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Science Vol.5, No 2. Pp. 159-171.
20 www.nigeriawatch.org. The trend of violence deaths recorded was highest in 2014 with 22,839 deaths. The figures

receded in 2015 (17,652 deaths) and 2016 (11,546 deaths). 7,867 violence deaths had been recorded by 1 November
2017.
21 David, N.A. and Manu, Y. A.(2015) “Democracy, Youth and Violent Conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic”: A Critical

Analysis in Journal of Research on Humanities and Social Science Vol.5, No 2. Pp. 159-171.
22 Bukola, A.O. (2010). Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, Activities and Politics, International Journal of Politics and Good

Governance, Vol. 1, No.1.1. pp1-16. Also, see National Bureau of Statistics: Unemployment/Under-employment Watch,
Q1, 2015.
23 See NSRP Business Case, 2012. Also, see UNDP (2006) Niger Delta Human Development Report

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vulnerability to gender-based violence, and argues that gender inequality is itself a cause of conflict
(NSRP, 2014, VAWG, Output 3: Programme Logic, November, NSRP: Abuja p4,6).Perceptions of
Violence: NSRP’s APS offers a comprehensive and statistically representative sample survey24 of
the effectiveness of Nigeria’s peace architecture as perceived by citizens within the target
programme areas25 (see Table 1.1, and methodology section 2.9 for further information on the APS).
Table 1.1 Respondents stating that the impact of violence is more severe than in preceding 12 months (%
respondents by NSRP target state)
APS Year
Region State 2014 2015 2016 2017
Borno 52% 20% 5% 3%
North East
Yobe 24% 9% 4% 4%
Kano 19% 19% 15% 12%
North West
Kaduna 37% 18% 8% 11%
North Central Plateau 53% 21% 17% 3%
Bayelsa 2% 14% 19% 10%
South Delta 7% 10% 18% 8%
Rivers 13% 13% 33% 9%
All target states 25% 16% 15% 8%

Source: NSRP Annual Perception Surveys. NB: question (and data) not available for 2013.
Overall, the proportion of the population who think that violence has worsened in the previous year,
has reduced in NSRP target states over the lifetime of the intervention (Table 1.1) We note the
limitation in this question in referring to relative changes of perception violence year on year, and not
absolute change in levels of violence. Nonetheless, the data is useful as a board indicator of the
perceived worsening, or not, of violence year on year.
The overall trend masks a differing sub-trend for the states in the south (Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers)
show an increase in the proportion for respondents who think violence is more severe in the previous
year up to 2016, followed by a reduction in the proportion perceiving increased severity of violence
in the last year to 2017. This pattern is consistent with the development of conflict in that region.
The APS data suggests several things about the functioning of the peace architecture (understood
as the institutions that work to address conflict and generate peace). Firstly, the APS shows an
increase in the proportion of citizens reporting that incidences of violence in the previous 12 months
have been effectively dealt with: increasing to 45% in 2017 compared with 26% in 2013 (Figure 1.1).
Taken together with a fall over 2014-2017 in the perceived severity of violence in the last 12 months
(as indicated in Table 1.1), this makes an apparent case that the peace architecture has had some
responsibility for the reduction in the violence.
Secondly, the change is typically less in the states of the south than those of the north. This is
consistent with the steady decrease in perceptions of violence in the north over the past four years
compared with the south’s perceptions of a spike in 2015/16.

24
Certainly, the most comprehensive assessment that the authors are aware of within the target states
25
The APS has been conducted annually since 2013 and is representative of selected urban and rural LGAs within the
eight target states.

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Figure 1.1 Respondents stating that incidences of violence in the last 12 months have been effectively dealt
with (% respondents aware of violent incidents having occurred)

2013 2017

80% 74%
70% 66%

60%

50% 45% 47% 47%

38% 39%
40% 34% 35% 33% 35%
32% 31% 29%
30% 26% 24%
20% 15%

10% 3%
0%
All target Borno Yobe Kano Kaduna Plateau Bayelsa Delta Rivers
states

Source: NSRP Annual Perception Surveys 2013 (n=5,000) & 2017 (n=3,419)

Violence by Region: This is to be expected, as the drivers of the conflicts in each of the states
differs significantly, as documents produced by NSRP and others have set out; that is:
• North-East (Borno, Yobe): The insurgency in the north-east region has been contained by
the government and the presence of the Nigerian military, which appears to explain the
reduction in the severity of violence in Borno and Yobe States in recent times. However, the
peace architecture has also changed, with the involvement of locals and communities
(civilians) in regional security matters. Government efforts in the region have largely focused
on reconstruction and re-settlement of displaced persons. The federal government has
recently established the North-East Development Commission to manage and receive funds
allocated by the government and donor agencies for resettlement, rehabilitation, integration
and reconstruction of the victims of insurgency26. Also, the government has responded to the
situation by instituting a number of initiatives including the Presidential Initiative on the North
East (PINE), Presidential Committee on Distribution of Relief Materials and the Safe School
Initiative among others27. The federal government, through the Institute for Peace and
Conflict Resolution (IPCR) and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)
also organized series of peace dialogues and initiatives in the region.
More generally, there is a significant donor presence in the north east following the
suppression of the Boko Haram insurgents in the region. However, many donor and
humanitarian organisations such as OXFAM, International Organization for Migration and the
World Food Program (WFP) and the World Bank28 are focused on post-conflict reconstruction
and resettlement of internally displaced persons in the north east;
• North West (Kano): Kano also has a history of violence even before the emergence of Boko
Haram. Violence in Kano assumes different forms including ethno-religious, electoral and

26
Premium Times, October 25, 2017. Accessed at www.premiumtimesng.com.
27
Ibrahim, S.G. and Ayodele, O.I. (2015). ‘The Political Economy of Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of North Eastern
Nigeria in the Post Boko Haram Era: The Gap in Contributions between Africa and Europe.’ International Journal of
Multidisciplinary Research and Modern Education, Vol 1, Issue 1. Pp179-190.
28 The World Bank pledged to spend $US 800 for reconstruction in the North East. See Thisday online, April 1 2016.

www.thisdaylive.com

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farmers/herders conflicts29. The 2011 post-election violence in Kano is still fresh in the
memory of the people30. Like the North-East, Kano had been badly affected by the Islamist
insurgency, and relieved by the subsequent military successes against militants. Violence
has since receded, due amongst other things to community peace engagements and the
election of President Buhari in 2015; a Muslim from the North. Also, to reduce the incidence
of ethno-religious conflicts, the traditional institution in Kano (Kano Emirate Council) instituted
a non-formal structure, Non-Indigenous Community Traditional Leadership Structure, for
managing conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims in the state31. Government efforts in
tackling violent conflict in the state largely involve the use of law enforcement agencies;
• North West (Kaduna), North Central (Plateau): Both states are characterised by deep-
rooted ethnic and sectarian differences, which lead to ongoing conflicts and which are
exploited for political gains. Political crisis over ‘indigene’ rights and political representation
in Jos, capital city of Plateau State, has developed into protracted communal conflict affecting
most parts of the state32. The conflict in Plateau State, which has become intractable, is
generally characterised as ethno-religious. The manipulation of these socially constructed
categories triggers and drives conflict in the state33. Generally, conflicts in Plateau State are
rooted in competition over resources, electoral competition, fear of religious domination and
land rights which have merged into an explosive mix34. Kaduna was the only state to see an
increase in perception of violence from 2015-2016. In both Kaduna and Plateau, the election
itself was a trigger for violence, and the subsequent fall may be attributed to the election
violence subsiding, as well as to the new state governments’ actions to respond to and
reduce the violence;
There is also little donor presence in the north central. ‘Search for Common Ground’
implemented an EU supported project in Plateau State to address the underlying drivers of
conflict in the state through dialogue involving community leaders, women and youth
leaders35; and
• South (Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers): Conflict in the Niger Delta is driven by a mixture of weak
governance, systemic corruption, under-development and economic inequality36. Also,
environmental degradation arising from decades of oil exploration and state neglect have
created an impoverished, marginalised and exploited citizenry which has produced a
resistance movement, of which the youth has been in the vanguard37. The region produces
the oil wealth that accounts for the bulk of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings, yet the
livelihoods of the people there have not improved. This has contributed to increasing violence
and youth restiveness in the region38. There is no single explanation for the perceived spike
in violence in 2015-2016 or its subsequent fall. Increased cultist activities are accompanied
by militant attacks on pipelines and a growing incursion of herdsmen due to climate change
and the insurgency in the north.39 Recently, federal government engagement with militant

29
Jacob, I. and Saad, S. (2011) Ethnic Conflicts in Nigeria: Constitutional Law and the dilemma of decision making.
Malaysian Journal of Society and Space Vol 7 (2), p28-36
30 Ehrhardt, D. (2016). Janu’s Voice: Religious leaders, framing and riots in Kano. Cont Islam 10, p333-356.
31 Aliyu, A. Moorthy, R. and Idris, N. A. (2016). The Role of Kano Emirate council in managing ethnic and religious conflict

in Kano state-Nigeria. Journal of Social and humanities Vol 11 (1) p1-12.

32 Krause, J. (2011) A deadly cycle: Ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state, Nigeria. Working paper GD-ES
33 Osaretin, I. and Akov, E. (2013), Ethno-Religious Conflict and Peace Building in Nigeria: A Case Of Jos, Plateau State.

Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol 2(1) p346-360

34 Krause, J. (2011) A deadly cycle: Ethno-religious conflict in Jos, Plateau state, Nigeria. Working paper GD-ES
35 Search for Common Ground (2015). ‘Final Evaluation Report: Plateau Will Arise! Building an Architecture for Peace and Tolerance’.
AN EU-funded project, implemented by Search for Common Ground in Plateau State.
36
www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/about-the-niger-delta.
37
Ikelegbe, A. (2005). The Economy of conflict in the oil rich Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Nordic Journal of African
Studies, Vol 14 (2) p208-234
38 UNDP (2006) Niger Delta Human Development Report.
39 Due to climatic changes and insurgency in the north.

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groups appears to have slowed attacks on the pipelines and this may account for the
decrease in violence and improvement in perceptions of conflict management.
In the Niger Delta region, government response to curb violence has largely been through
military crackdown. However, in recent times, the federal government had sustained
interactions with leaders of the regions to ensure that oil pipelines are secured from militants’
attacks40., including amnesties with militants. Also, the government has instituted a
programme to clean-up polluted environment in Ogoni land41 arising from oil spills, although
the effectiveness is uncertain.
There is little donor presence in the Niger Delta region. The European Union42 supported a
peacebuilding project in the region which was intended to create stability and functioning
peace architecture in the region. The Foundation for Partnership Initiative in Niger Delta
(PIND) as well as other non-governmental organizations as the Stakeholder Democracy
Network (SDN) and the Academic Associates Peace Works (AAPW), have been working to
address the lingering conflict issues in the region.

Programme design
The authors of the NSRP Business case explicitly designed the project to respond to the variability
and complexity in the landscape of violence outlined above. Briefly, NSRP intends to reduce the
incidence of violence by enhancing the capacity, coordination and accountability of conflict
management institutions, both state and non-state – “the peace architecture” – and to foster
sustainable, inclusive processes. The programme works vertically at federal, state and community
level; horizontally across different forms of conflict; and geographically across eight different states
and local government areas (LGAs). In this way, the GBP £39 million budget43 programme is
intended to reduce violence and improve stability across the country, but specifically in certain target
areas, within its five-year duration (2012-2017).
Believing that violence was multi-layered and multi-faceted, the NSRP design also adopted a
selective approach based on four main principles (DFID, 2012: 14-15), that is:
• Being strategic: entailing the design and support of interventions with a demonstrative
effect, which will show how conflicts can be resolved non-violently, and influence others
locally and nationally to adopt these approaches;
• Playing a facilitating role: the programme was designed to facilitate constructive dialogue
for change, bringing together those involved in violence, those involved in managing violence
and those who must live with its consequences;
• Building on what is working and supporting champions of change: rather than
constructing an architecture from scratch, it would build on the effectiveness / scope of
already established interventions wherever possible; and
• Operating with political neutrality: in this way exemplifying conflict sensitivity.
As noted, the programme’s approach is multi-layered. It supports interventions at a federal level but
it also focuses on eight of Nigeria’s most conflict-affected states. These states were selected to
include those with high levels of conflict but also with opportunities and local capacities that NSRP
could help scale-up and strengthen. These are also states that are critical to Nigeria’s regional or
national economy (Kano, Kaduna and Delta). In addition, the states are those where there is a need

40
Gaffey, C. Nigeria Oil: Militants will Give Peace A Chance and Stop Attacks in Niger Delta (6/29/2017). Newsweek,
accessed at www.newsweek.com
41 Ogoni land is known for a sustained resistance to the activities of oil companies and the federal government over the

pollution of the area. The environmentalist and human right activities from the area, Ken Saro Wiwa was killed by the
government during the Abacha regime due to protest he led against the government.
42 Search for Common Ground implemented the EU supported project; ‘Tomorrow is a New Day, Phase II: Building a

Peace Architecture in the Niger Delta for 2015 and Beyond’.

43 Of which £33M was allocated to NSRP and £28.5M was spent

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and desire to increase resilience to risk factors (e.g. cross border militancy and ideology in Yobe and
Borno). Finally, the selected states are those with a concentration of other DFID-supported
programmes.44
As Figure 1.2 shows, there are four programme output streams/core areas of work, each of them
designed to be complementary. In keeping with the principle of building on what exists, across each
of its operating areas and Outputs, NSRP established (or ideally strengthened) a range of existing
multi-stakeholder platforms/initiatives.45
In turn, NSRP has provided financial and technical support to engage platforms / initiatives at
different administrative levels and in different geographies. These platforms / initiatives are intended
to bring together state and non-state actors (including those representing marginalised groups) to
identify, resolve and prevent violent conflict in their area. By platforms, we mean the institutions
supported by the NSRP at Federal, State and Local level including e.g. National Peace and Security
Forum (NPSF), State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMAs), Women Peace and Security (WPS),
etc. These platforms received different modalities of support and were engaged around a varying
range of issues (as set out an inception in NSRP (2014) Programme Logic and Linkages, November,
NSP: Abuja).
Figure 1.2 Output diagram

Broadly speaking, the IE found that the platforms / initiatives adopted slightly different packages of
intervention. The platforms under Output 1 and 2 tended to focus on convening and mediation (right-
hand column, Table 1.2) with some advocacy and sensitisation work. Outputs 3 and 4 tended to
focus on advocacy and lobbying, expanding into sensitisation and convening (left-hand column,
Table 1.2). In other words, Outputs 1 and 2 started in the bottom right and expand up and left;
Outputs in 3 and 4 started in the top left and expanded down and right.

44 To ensure effective use of resources, NSRP has not targeted states in which other donors are most active – e.g. Bauchi
is a priority state for USAID.
45 The range of supported platforms, their makeup and function is described in depth in the MTE report (Upper Quartile,

2016: 17) and summarised above.

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Table 1.2 Key activities delivered through NSRP’s platforms and initiatives

For ease of reference, a brief summary of the nine case studies have been provided below (Table
1.3); full copies are available at Appendix B. The next section provides an overview of the
methodology used for the IE, and presents the findings and evidence for programme achievements
across the three evaluation focal areas, starting with Strengthening the Peace Architecture
(section 3.1), before moving to Broader Societal Participation (section 3.2) and finally Exerting
Influence (section 3.3).

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Table 1.3 Overview of IE Case Studies Overview of IE case studies

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Programme evolution
Although a five-year programme, NSRP was implemented in three broad phases. The programme
award and mobilisation took place in 2012, followed by a research and analysis phase in 2014 and
design and testing in 2014. Full implementation took place in 2014-2015, with a MTR report delivered
in early 2016 (key findings are summarised below); a year later, in early 2017 the decision was made
by DFID to halt the programme and the programme was completed in September 2017. As indicated
elsewhere, data up to end March 2017 was used to inform the final evaluation.
Key findings from the MTR

• NSRP rolled out the full range of activities, but implementation and engagement are
inconsistent,
• Programme governance and management processes have many strengths and some
weaknesses,
• Weaknesses in programme and project level M&E systems exists,
• There are positive examples of NSRP-supported platforms contributing to greater
communication and coordination,
• Limited evidence of improved alignment in priorities and actions of key actors are visible,
• Activity to engage marginalised groups cuts across all output streams but full assessment of
the reach is hampered by data limitations,
• Evidence of changing behaviours towards the inclusion of marginalised groups is weak at
this stage,
• There is strong and consistent evidence that NSRP’s CS & CG approaches is relevant to
stakeholders, but NSRP’s capacity to maintain and scale the approach appears limited,
• There is evidence of positive behaviour change as a result of CSC training and mentoring,
but sustainability is a concern.
• Research activities resulted in engagement and discussion, and can serve as a catalyst.
Following the MTR, a validation workshop was held, and a range of actions were agreed by the
programme partners. This included revising the logframe and ToC; however, although the indicators
changed during the life of the programme the objectives did not.

Legacy and sustainability

The intension of NSRP was not to create institutions, or to operate in parallel to already existing
structures. Instead, the focus was on creating ‘space for convergence of actors and institutions, with
the expectation that these institutions would learn and imbibe the value of consultation and
coordination46’. Sustainability seems to have been viewed by NSRP as ‘beyond continuation of the
platform qua platform but [rather] continuation of processes and practices of coordination and
consultation’.
Based on this definition – and in the absence of a formal sustainability strategy - sustainability
appears to have been expected as an inherent outcome of the platform approach; this however
seemed to have assumed a level of behavioural change and systemic ownership which the IE has
not observed, and which, in retrospect was perhaps overly ambitious within the life of the
programme.
Setting aside the expectation of greater societal engagement (which has not been observed) NSRP’s
view of sustainability hinged on the assumption that 1) platform participants would recognise the
value of the platform and find a way or guise in which to continue this type of engagement, 2) the

46
NSRP management response to the first draft of this Final Evaluation, 11 Sept 2017.

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functions of the platforms would be integrated in a more formal or official structure i.e. the voice of
marginalised people would be included in mainstream discourse, or 3) the change would be of such
an extent that the platform itself was no longer required, but was superseded by something else – a
change in policy, processes and/or behaviour. Although some anecdotal evidence of (1) was
encountered and some instances of policy and process changes have been reported, the IE has not
found evidence of wholesale systemic adoption or changes in behaviour which argues that long term
sustainability or legacy has been achieved.

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2 METHODOLOGY
2.1 Purpose of Evaluation
The purpose of the independent evaluation is to explore the TOC that the combined effect of NSRP
activities will contribute to the programme purpose, as articulated in the programme logframe. That
is, it will explore the application of improved policies and practices that help to manage conflict non-
violently more often in target states. This will include:
• Unpacking the processes and mechanisms by which NSRP contributes to change, and the
factors facilitating and inhibiting this contribution;
• Considering unanticipated/unintended positive or negative effects of NSRP intervention; and
• Achieving the above considering, where possible/ appropriate, the programme in its entirety
and looking in-depth at one or more of the interventions under NSRP’s Outputs.

2.2 Scope
In keeping with the purpose identified above, all NSRP activity falls within the potential scope of the
evaluation. While the evaluation will provide a holistic assessment, the breadth and complexity of
the programme has prompted the NIEP to focus in on certain areas which are of particular interest.
To this end, the scope and focus of the evaluation has been established through a collaborative
process, with the Independent Evaluation Provider working with DFID to deliver the learning required
to inform future programming decisions, and also with NSRP – while maintaining independence.

2.3 Evaluation Process

The evaluation process is summarised as follows:
• The final evaluation builds on the MTE. During the MTE design phase (March-June 2015)
the NIEP and NSRP co-developed a programme level TOC and associated EQs (see further
below), which addressed NSRP’s Outputs and their contribution to the intermediate
outcomes of the TOC47 (which had not hitherto been well-defined) (see Figure 2.1). The MTE
addressed seven EQs, each exploring the lower reaches of the theory of change48. The final
evaluation builds on this, in a manner consistent with the timing of the evaluation.
• A key finding from the MTE was the weakness of internal systems (particularly M&E). A
crucial part of the ongoing post-MTE evaluation work has been regular independent quality
assurance (QA) of the refreshed logframe/results indicator framework and supporting
systems that were put in place by NSRP in response to the MTE findings.
• Following the MTE, three broad evaluation focal areas were developed to address specific
areas of interest to DFID, and to support wider learning from the experience of NSRP. The
focal areas were developed in consultation with DFID. These focal areas help coordinate
responses to the EQs and direct the methods by which the EQs will be answered.
We note that the evaluation team was able to work freely and without interference, and we
acknowledge the support and cooperation of all stakeholders in carrying out the evaluation.
The implications of this evaluation process for changes to the TOR are addressed below.

47 NSRP had already developed a programme level logic document as well as logic documents for each of its Outputs.
Drawing on these, the evaluation team worked with NSRP to retrospectively develop a programme level TOC which
elaborated the ‘missing middle’ between NSRP’s inputs, activities and outputs and the envisaged outcome. This TOC was
refined and validated at the MTE Planning Workshop in Abuja in May 2015.
48 Evaluation Questions 1,2,3,4,6,8 and 11.

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2.4 Focal Areas

The process described above resulted in the following three themes being identified as key focal
areas for the final evaluation, within the scope of the wider, holistic programme-level assessment:
▪ Strengthening the Peace Architecture: NSRP’s contribution to strengthening the peace
architecture at federal, state and local level and; the conditions necessary for the sustainable
creation of platforms for engagement that support non-violent conflict management;
▪ Broader Societal Participation: participation in, and oversight by, non-state actors
(including marginalised voices) in the peace architecture; to what extent has this been
achieved and with what effect; and
▪ Exerting Influence: how, and how far, NSRP platforms and interventions have been able to
influence policy and practice in conflict management.
In addition, the evaluation sought to learn lessons from NSRP experience which will be applicable
for future programme decisions.
Each of the focal areas address aspects of both the EQs and the TOC (see Table 2.1 and Table
2.2). The final evaluation report is structured around these three focal areas and draws on evidence
from across NSRP’s relevant interventions to arrive at programme level conclusions. The following
section demonstrates how the focal areas provide an analytical perspective on the TOC.

2.5 Relationship of focal areas to the theory of change

The programme-level TOC (as developed at the MTE design phase) is the framework guiding the
evaluation and its key lines of enquiry. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, the relationship between NSRPs
Outputs and intended outcome/impact is neither direct nor linear. The EQs focus on the key links
and assumptions of the TOC from outcome Levels 1 to 4.
At outcome level 1 we see the ‘building blocks’ for change: improved communication and information
sharing between stakeholders; broader societal participation and the inclusion of marginalised
voices; building the capacity of media platforms to deliver more frequent and more gender and
conflict sensitive coverage; and the uptake of knowledge on conflict related issues.
Key assumptions at this level are that: stakeholders are willing to work with NSRP; capable and
credible ‘agents of change’ exist at the federal, state and LGA levels; marginalised groups are able
and willing to come together around conflict resolution and peace-building issues; stakeholders are
willing to use new knowledge on conflict and peace-building; and, that the media are aware of their
capacity to inflame conflict.
• Focal Area, Strengthening the Peace Architecture: the evaluation considers these
outcomes in relation to NSRP’s platforms/interventions which are intervening directly to
prevent/ resolve conflict; similarities and differences between and within platform/intervention
types and operational levels are explored.
• Focal Area, Broader societal participation: the evaluation identifies how the involvement
of marginalised voices has been promoted.
At outcome level 2, a ‘virtuous circle’, whereby outcomes are occurring simultaneously and are
mutually reinforcing, is envisaged. The intention is that regular, meaningful and sustained dialogue
among stakeholders results in improved alignment in strategic priorities and actions of these
stakeholders and a move towards the institutionalisation of engagement platforms.
Simultaneously, as societal participation broadens and becomes more regular, capacity to effectively
use knowledge, influence and advocate for change is built. This process of demand-driven
empowerment is facilitated by, and encourages further development and use of, knowledge and
information on conflict-related issues from media sources and through NSRP commissioned
research. Access and uptake of knowledge and evidence, coupled with increasing public pressure
for change influences decision makers, who engage with the full spectrum of stakeholders via
institutionalised platforms; thus, completing the circle.

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The common point between all the processes outlined here is dialogue; achievement of each Level
2 outcome relies on meaningful, sustained and inclusive dialogue and debate.
The assumptions are that: state and non-state actors perceive benefits from listening to broader
society (including marginalised groups); that ‘spaces’ can be opened for inclusive dialogue and that
these spaces act as a catalyst for individuals and organisations to act; increased inclusion of
empowered groups leads to more public scrutiny and public demand for change; and, that the media
are willing to play their part in deterring violence and in not inflaming conflict.
• Focal Area, Broader societal participation: the evaluation will identify how the involvement
of marginalised voices has influenced demand for changed conflict management policies and
practices.
• Focal Area, Exerting influence: the evaluation will explore how platforms have successfully
exerted influence, identifying specific factors that have been instrumental in this.
At level 3 we once again see multiple and mutually reinforcing outcomes. It is theorised that newly
acquired knowledge and increased participation in inclusive dialogue mechanisms will result in
increased capacity and resilience of communities to manage and resolve conflict non-violently. This
process will, in turn, contribute to the increased accountability, capacity and responsiveness of
decision makers, through more widespread dialogue, debate and public scrutiny as well as access
to more and better evidence around conflict issues.
• Focal Area, Broader societal participation: the evaluation will explore, insofar as possible,
the degree to which societal participation of marginalised groups has been institutionalised;
• Focal Area, Exerting influence: the evaluation will establish, insofar as is possible, the
manner in which networks of influence can be sustainably created.
The combined effect of this participation, empowerment, capacity, evidence and accountability
across all stakeholders is intended to be tangible changes in policy, practice and narrative around
violence. The assumptions that apply here are: that stakeholders are willing and able to change their
behaviours and act to address grievances; and that there is appetite, will and capacity amongst
decisions makers to use the evidence base for improved, more evidence-based policy and practice.
Finally, at the upper outcome level (level 4) it is theorised that, if stakeholders work together at
federal, state, LGA and community levels to achieve intermediate outcomes at levels 1-3, then the
combined effect will be that targeted state and non-state, formal and traditional conflict management
institutions will manage conflict non-violently more often, and the negative impacts of conflict,
especially on the most vulnerable, will be reduced.
• Focal Area, Strengthening the Peace Architecture: the evaluation considers this outcome
in relation to NSRP’s platforms/interventions which are intervening directly to prevent/ resolve
conflict; similarities and differences between and within platform/intervention types and
operational levels are explored.

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Figure 2.1 Programme level theory of change (developed with NSRP – May/June 2015)

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Table 2.1 Addressing the Evaluation Questions (Greyed out EQs not included in FTE, with justification noted)

Participation
Architecture
The Peace

Evaluation
Influence
Exerting
Broader
Societal

Final
Justification for not including EQ as an evaluation focal area going
Evaluation Question
forward

Not a focus for the evaluation going forward. Significant evidence was gathered during
To what extent is NSRP support being utilised as
EQ1 the MTE and the evaluation is now focused on the higher outcome-level, as opposed
envisaged?
to the activity level.
To what extent, and in what ways, have channels
EQ2 for communication and information sharing been As above.
strengthened?
The MTE found positive evidence of more and more frequent conflict sensitive (CS)
and gender sensitive (GS) activity by stakeholders and internally within NSRP itself,
To what extent, and in what ways, has NSRP and strong and consistent evidence that the approach is relevant to a diverse range
encouraged stakeholders and NSRP itself to adopt of stakeholders. The challenge for NSRP is in sustaining and building on outcomes
EQ3 and apply a conflict and gender sensitive achieved. Given the evidence from the MTE, this will not be a focus for the evaluation
approach? going forward. The Final Evaluation will, however, utilise NSRP’s M&E data where
possible to build on the MTE findings and draw conclusions on institutionalisation and
sustainability of CS/GS outcomes.
The MTE found some evidence that, at the basic level, research is being taken up by
What is the evidence that NSRP commissioned
EQ4 stakeholders (i.e. interest, engagement and discussion). Going forward the focus of
research is being/will be taken up by stakeholders?
the evaluation will be on the influence of research on policy and practice (see EQ11).
To what extent, and in what ways, have
coordination, and alignment of strategic priorities
EQ5   
and actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?
NB: Wording of EQ has been refined.49
To what extent, and in what ways, has regular,
meaningful and sustained participation in dialogue
EQ6  
and debate, including the voices of marginalised
groups, been achieved?
To what extent, and in what ways, has the capacity
EQ7 of broader society to use knowledge, influence and   
advocate for change been built?
To what extent are NSRP’s media partners a). The MTE found strong evidence of the relevance of NSRP’s approach to a broad range
EQ8 aware of their capacity to inflame conflict and b). of stakeholders; of increased awareness amongst stakeholders of their capacity to
proactive in reducing, not inflaming violence? inflame conflict; and of more frequent and more conflict sensitive media coverage as

49
The wording of EQ5 has been adjusted to reflect the focus of the programme on increasing coordination (as well as alignment) amongst security institutions and civil society at the
federal, state and community levels.

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Participation
Architecture
The Peace

Evaluation
Influence
Exerting
Broader
Societal

Final
Justification for not including EQ as an evaluation focal area going
Evaluation Question
forward

a result of NSRP-supported activity. The challenge will be in further growing and

sustaining positive outcomes given NSRP’s finite resources. Given evidence from the
MTE (and wider) in relation to this type of activity, this will not be a focus for the
evaluation going forward. The Final Evaluation will, however, draw on NSRP’s M&E
data where possible to build on the MTE findings and draw conclusions on the
sustainability of CSC outcomes and any demonstration effect observed.
What is the evidence that NSRP has contributed to
communities’ capacity to manage and resolve
EQ9   
conflicts non-violently?
NB: Wording of EQ has been refined.50
This EQ was developed to test high-level assumptions of the TOC which informed the
MTE.
The programme logic document contends that NSRP’s integrated approach will
support a process of increased responsiveness and accountability amongst those
institutions with a mandate for conflict management and peace-building; brought about
through enhanced communication, coordination and inclusion:
“interventions to support greater coordination among security institutions and civil
society at federal level are being reinforced by similar interventions at state and local
What is the evidence that accountability, capacity levels. The rationale is that if the apex security decision makers and service providers at
EQ10 and responsiveness among decision makers has the federal level become more coordinated, inclusive and accountable, the change will
increased? have multiplier effects at state and local levels, particularly if there is also demand from
state and local civil society for these changes.” (NSRP, 2014:10).
Outcomes are sought specifically in relation to conflict-management and peace-
building processes, as opposed to wider governance issues. The EQ as it stands is
considered too broad to be answered satisfactorily by the evaluation. Realistically, this
EQ is best addressed through EQ5 (which will consider the extent to which the
capacity of key stakeholders (including security institutions and civil society) has been
built through increased coordination and alignment); EQ6 (which will provide
evidence/analysis on the extent to which broader societal participation has ‘genuinely’

50 The wording of EQ9 has been adjusted to something that the NIEP can more realistically explore. In addressing the EQ, as it now stands, the NIEP will draw on NSRP’s M&E data in relation to conflicts
managed or mitigated non-violently via supported Platforms/interventions (i.e. verified examples of where Platforms or other interventions (such as youth employment interventions, Peace Clubs or community
level small grants) have led to/contributed to non-violent conflict management). This could potentially be analysed in conjunction with APS data looking at wider trends on effective conflict management as well
as the data collected by the NIEP through KIIs and FGDs in relation to other evaluation focal areas (i.e. those which consider the specific ‘contribution’ of NSRP processes of change). The balance of evidence
available will allow comment/conclusions regarding NSRP’s effectiveness in specific intervention areas. The extent to which we will be able to comment on any ‘cascade effect’ or outcomes for wider
communities as a whole will be limited.

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Participation
Architecture
The Peace

Evaluation
Influence
Exerting
Broader
Societal

Final
Justification for not including EQ as an evaluation focal area going
Evaluation Question
forward

been achieved within NSRP-supported Platforms); and EQ11 (which will consider the
willingness and capacity of key actors/institutions to act in response to areas that
NSRP-supported Platforms/interventions are trying to influence). For these reasons
EQ10 has been dropped as a standalone EQ.
To what extent have NSRP’s Platforms/initiatives
(including research) influenced key
actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in
EQ11  
changes in policy and practice that enhance
stability and reconciliation? NB: Wording of EQ
has been refined.51
To what extent have perceptions of (and responses
to) violent conflict changed in target states and
EQ12 
LGA’s over NSRP’s lifetime, why, how and with
what effect?
To what extent is the NSRP TOC considered to
EQ13 
have held true in practice?
What evidence is there that NSRP’s observed
EQ14 contribution to the process of change will be 
sustained post NSRP intervention?
What are the key lessons from NSRP which may be
transferred to maximise the relevance, efficiency,
EQ15 effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, impact and 
sustainability of future conflict resolution and peace-
building programmes in Nigeria and elsewhere?

Source: NIEP Way Forward Concept Note [040816] pp9-11.

51 This EQ has been broadened since the MTE. Originally focused solely on the influence of research and evidence on policy and practice, the revised question now aligns more closely to the programme’s
broad approach to delivering policy and practice change which includes research, Platforms and initiatives cutting across all four outputs streams.

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Table 2.2 Relationship Between FTE Evaluation Questions and TOC

FTE Evaluation questions Theory of change
EQ6. To what extent, and in what ways, has regular, meaningful and sustained participation in dialogue L1: Broader Societal Participation, including marginalised
and debate, including the voices of marginalised groups, been achieved? voices
L1 Uptake of knowledge on conflict related issues and
EQ7. To what extent, and in what ways, has the capacity of broader society to use knowledge, influence capacity to use that knowledge
and advocate for change been built? L2 Engagement platforms are institutionalised & societal
capacity to use knowledge / influence is built
EQ5. To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination and alignment of strategic priorities/ actions L2 Improved alignment of strategic priorities and actions
among NSRP stakeholders improved? NB: Wording of EQ refined post MTE. of stakeholders
L2 Decision makers have access to more / better
evidence & are influenced by this & public pressure for
EQ10. What is the evidence that accountability, capacity and responsiveness among decision makers
change
has increased?
L3 Increased accountability capacity and responsiveness
of decision-makers
L2 Decision makers have access to more / better
EQ11. To what extent have NSRP’s Platforms/initiatives (including research) influenced key evidence & are influence by this as well as by increasing
actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in changes in policy and practice that enhance stability public pressure for change
and reconciliation? NB: Wording of EQ refined post MTE. L3 Changes in policy and practice and narrative around
violence
EQ9. What is the evidence that NSRP has contributed to communities’ capacity to manage and resolve L3: Communities are empowered; their voices are heard
conflicts non-violently? NB: Wording of EQ refined post MTE. and their capacity and resilience to manage conflict
L3 Changes in policy, practice and narrative around
EQ12. To what extent have perceptions of (and responses to) violent conflict changed in target states violence
and LGA’s over NSRP’s lifetime, why, how and with what effect? L4 Conflict is managed non-violently more often in
NSRP’s target states
EQ13. To what extent is the NSRP TOC considered to have held true? L1-L4
EQ14. What evidence is there that NSRP’s observed contribution to the process of change will be
L4
sustained post NSRP intervention?
EQ15. What are the key lessons from NSRP which may be transferred to maximise the relevance,
efficiency, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness, impact and sustainability of future conflict resolution and n/a
peace-building programmes in Nigeria and elsewhere?

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2.6 Evaluation timing and limitations

Following the MTE52, the decision was taken for the NIEP to maintain regular contact with NSRP,
conducting regular evaluative activity culminating in a final evaluation product in mid/late-2017. This
timescale was set under the assumption that NSRP would receive a one-year no cost extension
taking programming through until July 2018. Providing the evaluation findings in mid/late- 2017 was
intended to provide DFID with the evidence to inform decision making and the design of any
successor programme.
In January 2017, the NIEP was informed that NSRP would not be awarded a no cost extension, and
that the programme would close in mid-2017. At this point the NIEP compressed its work
programme, completing the remainder of its planned primary research by end-April 2017. This
ensured that the NIEP could access stakeholders and beneficiaries while they were still actively
involved in programme activities and that evaluation requirements, as far as possible, did not place
additional burden on staff during the programme close-down process.
Use is made of NSRP monitoring data through to the quarter ending March 2017 (made available
June 2017). Programme results achieved beyond this time could not be included within the
evaluation reporting schedule. This should be noted as a limitation of the findings. However, it is our
view that the scale of results in the final, winding-up period of the programme, would need to be
significantly different from the prevailing trend to alter the evaluation conclusions. We have no
grounds to assume that this has been the case.

2.7 Evaluation audiences

The main audience for the evaluation is DFID and other donors who are engaged in the design and
management of interventions to address conflict in Nigeria and other fragile and conflict-affected
states (FCAS).
In addition, this report has been written with a view to encouraging reflection and the uptake of key
learning by NSRP’s consortium partners (especially the British Council which is embarking on a
European Union (EU) funded conflict management and peace-building programme in north east
Nigeria).
The executive summary is suitable for stand-alone publication and is intended for two different
audiences: those with programme specific knowledge, including NSRP personnel and grantees
(many of who will continue to be involved in conflict management and peace-building activity in
Nigeria); and development practitioners involved in the delivery of complex, adaptive programming.
Learning from NSRP will have value to both these groups.

2.8 Note on deviations from the terms of reference and evaluation

design
The independent evaluation of NSRP has evolved considerably over the course of its design and
delivery. This evolution has been driven by programme delivery timescales and changes, DFID
requirements, evaluation resources and the emerging evidence base.
These changes have not been documented in a revised TOR. Rather, at each turning point
developments/ changes to the evaluation have been agreed in writing with the DFID-Nigeria Senior
Responsible Officer (SRO). Developments/ changes are also set out clearly in the NIEP’s formal
outputs53.

52
The terms of reference set no timescale for the MTE. The timing– in late-2015 – was dictated primarily by the need to
ensure that implementation had progressed sufficiently to allow something of substance for the MTE to explore, while also
ensuring that enough time remained for NSRP to incorporate key learning into its programming.
53 NSRP-IEP Way Forward Workplan (August 2013a); NSRP-IEP Inception Report (November 2013b); NSRP-IEP Mid-

term evaluation design document (May 2015); NSRP-IEP Way Forward Concept Note (August 2016); NSRP-IEP Progress
Reports #1 - #4 (October 2016-July 2017).

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Although the evaluation approach and the wording of specific aims and objectives have changed,
the final evaluation remains true to the spirit of the original TOR – all deviations have been to ensure
the feasibility of the evaluation and the utility of the evidence. Table 2.3 outlines the major deviations
from the TOR.
Table 2.3 Deviations from TOR

Deviation from
Comment on deviation
TOR
Inception phase During the inception phase, it was agreed with DFID/NSRP to postpone the detailed
deliverables differ evaluation design. Programme implementation was at a nascent stage and it was felt
significantly from better to wait and see the direction of travel so that an appropriate evaluation design
those envisaged in could be shaped around the programme as it evolved. A revised focus for the
the TOR inception phase was agreed. The NIEP’s inception outputs reflect this focus.
Given the change in focus for the evaluation inception phase, and the decision to
postpone the MTE design, TOR requirements for baseline data collection and a
Baseline data baseline report were not fulfilled. The rationale came from the fact that at the time of
collection and a the inception phase NSRP’s activities were just beginning and it was not clear where
baseline report the focus of the evaluation would be. The evaluation has therefore proceeded in the
absence of a bespoke evaluative baseline. This was agreed with DFID in the inception
phase.
The TOR requires a ‘rigorous mixed method approach’. It is not explicit in the TOR
that quantitative primary data collection is a requirement of the NIEP, but it is
suggested. The NIEP’s original tender for the evaluation proposed quantitative
primary data collection to supplement NSRP’s internal M&E system and potentially
Methodology engage a comparison group. Post Tender Clarification negotiations with DFID
removed this element to reduce the tender value. As part of the final evaluation, to
address a recognised gap in NSRP’s data, the NIEP did conduct a survey of NSRP
platform participants. Resource for this was originally ring-fenced for in-depth case
study research.
In agreement with DFID the evaluation approach was transformed post-MTE. The
NIEP has produced a final evaluation report (this document) containing an executive
summary and recommendations as required, but this is not based on a single
summative wave of data collection. Instead, this output draws on evidence from the
MTE and the various evaluative activities that have been conducted over the year
from August 2016 (when the Way Forward Concept Note was submitted and
approved).
Data collection, analysis and synthesis for the final evaluation centres on the key focal
Final evaluation areas of interest to DFID Nigeria – the evaluation questions are answered within this
deliverables broader framework.
Rather than a dissemination event, the NIEP will hold an evaluation validation
workshop with DFID, the consortium partners and core NSRP staff in late-August.
Changes to the evaluation approach mean that no further resource is available for
wider dissemination/communication activities or production of peer review
publications54. The NIEP (and its individual team members) may be willing to take
part in communication/dissemination activity at the invitation of DFID or the NSRP
consortium. This will be discussed and agreed when the opportunity arises.

In addition, it is worth noting that some elements of the MTE design (approved by SEQAS55 in May
2016) that could not be fulfilled at the MTE stage, have been picked up and addressed as part of the
final evaluation.
Firstly, the MTE design proposed a significant volume of analysis of NSRP programme monitoring
data. It was intended that this analysis would be conducted at the MTE stage with follow up for the
final evaluation. At the MTE stage, this analysis was very limited. This was due to inconsistencies,

54
Although this may be taken forward independently by individual NIEP team members operating outside of WYG.
55
DFID’s independent quality assurance service for evaluation outputs, now known as EQUALS.

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missing data and concerns over the quality and objectivity of some sources. Post-MTE, the NIEP
has engaged with the NSRP M&E team on a quarterly basis to review M&E data, making
recommendations each quarter to improve data quality.
Analysis drawing on NSRP monitoring data is, as a result, much more prominent at this final
evaluation stage. However, the analysis is still not of the scale envisaged by the MTE design
document. This is discussed in the NIEP Final Evaluation Analysis Plan, submitted and signed off
by DFID in December 2016. Second, the MTE design proposed ‘simple network analysis’ as a
component of the evaluation. While this was not possible at the MTE stage, this has been completed
for the final evaluation using data from the NIEP’s survey of NSRP platform participants.

2.9 Evaluation Design and Methods

The evaluation design
The evaluation design is a hybrid theory-based/case-based design. This design was selected at the
MTE stage to address the exploratory and learning orientation required of the evaluation;
programme attributes and operational context (NSRP is a complex programme56 operating in
diverse and challenging environments, the evaluation design must be flexible enough to
accommodate this); and the available design options57. This overarching design was retained for
the final evaluation. This design has allowed evaluation to take place at programme level as well as
looking in-depth at a smaller number of specific activities and programme elements. This approach
satisfies the requirements of the TOR58.

The evaluation methods

The evaluation uses mixed-methods, combining desk-based analysis of secondary source data with
primary data collection, both qualitative and quantitative (see Table 2.4). Overall the strategy has
been twofold:
First, to draw on the NSRP M&E System while providing support ‘little and often’. The NIEP
team provided regular oversight and QA of NSRP M&E data. Monitoring data has been collated and
analysed to inform the final evaluation.
Second, to add value and fill gaps with specifically designed evaluative work: Activity homed
in on the key focal areas and corresponding EQs/ aspects of the TOC. This included:
• Case studies: to provide in-depth context and trace causal links within the TOC, identifying
the conditions for success and failure, and offering explanatory value to the monitoring data.
• Platform participant survey: a multi-faceted survey of platform participants which cuts across
the focal areas and all levels of the TOC. The survey considers the activity of NSRP
platforms, the extent to which participation of different groups happens and is ‘genuine’ (focal
area, broadening societal participation), and members’ perceptions of the key behavioural
changes in policy and practice which will lead to the non-violent resolution of conflict (focal
area, strengthening peace architecture). From this we also analyse the strengths and
weaknesses of particular networks.
• Qualitative Comparative Analysis: to explore the conditions associated with platform success
and provide a programme level overview which reinforces the insights from in-depth case
studies and the perception survey (focal area, strengthening peace architecture).

56
The MTE Design Document sets out various dimensions of programme complexity, noting: multiple and diverse activities
with dynamic and unpredictable lines of causation; customised non-standard activities; working ‘indirectly’ through ‘agents’;
intended outcomes are difficult to measure and in parts intangible; overlap with other interventions; likely impacts are long
term; working in areas of limited understanding/experience [Upper Quartile, 2015: p20 (unpublished)].
57 Drawing on the work of Stern et al 2012: p24.
58
The process of selecting the evaluation design is set out in the MTE Design Document [Upper Quartile, 2015
(unpublished)].

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These core methods are supplemented by documentary review, KIIs with NSRP staff and consortium
partners, and insights from the MTE. The core methods, and the limitations of the data, are discussed
individually below.
Table 2.4 Principal Method Summary

NSRP

comparative analysis
QA NSRP M&E data

platform participants
ROA Case Studies

of

Qualitative
Survey
Strengthening the peace architecture ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Broader societal participation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Exerting influence ✓ ✓
Learning from NSRP experience Triangulated analysis

Method 1: Quality assurance, review and analysis of NSRP M&E data

The MTE highlighted weaknesses in NSRP’s internal M&E data, systems and processes. As a result,
NSRP overhauled the M&E system, producing a refreshed Logframe and Results Indicator
Framework with a focus on monitoring and evidencing outcomes. Over the course of the final
evaluation the NIEP conducted independent QA reviews of NSRP’s M&E systems on a quarterly
basis. The aim was to ensure useful and high-quality evidence of programme benefits was being
gathered, identifying areas of weakness and making recommendations for improvement.
At each review point a three-stage process was employed. Step 1: Consultation with M&E staff; Step
2: Data review; Step 3: Assessment. The output was a dashboard of findings which noted the areas
where positive progress had been made (green), areas for improvement (amber) and areas for
review or action (red). Over the course of three reviews59 the NIEP made a series of
recommendations most of which were taken forward by NSRP.
In May-June 2017 the NIEP received final monitoring data and supporting evidence (where available)
from NSRP. This included datasets and headline findings from the 2017 Annual Perception Survey
(APS). Data analysis has been undertaken in line with a detailed analysis plan60. This plan matched
data sources to the EQs and final evaluation focal areas, set out the types of analysis to be
undertaken and the limitations of the data sources.
An important element of the NSRP monitoring approach is the APS: the APS offers a comprehensive
and statistically representative sample survey of the effectiveness of Nigeria’s peace architecture as
perceived by citizens within the target programme areas. The APS has been conducted annually
since 2013 and is representative of selected urban and rural LGAs within the eight target states.
Detailed methodology for the APS is noted in Appendix C.

Method 2: RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA) Case Studies

The NIEP has developed a series of case studies looking at specific NSRP interventions. These
provide ‘depth’ and a rich qualitative evidence base to the evaluation. The methodology might be
described as “ROA Plus”: that is, the RAPID Outcome Assessment (ROA) supplemented by
additional components.

59
The third (and final) review was conducted in February 2017 using NSRP data complete/verified to December 2016.
60 The
final evaluation analysis plan was submitted to DFID as part of quarterly IEP outputs in December 2017

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The core ROA approach identifies the key actors who are influential in respect of a particular area
of policy. It explores changes in behaviour actor by actor along a timeline, before establishing what
factors contributed to observed/perceived changes, and the overall outcomes in the policy or practice
environment. The “plus” part in the NIEP’s methodology involves exploration of important aspects of
the NSRP TOC61.
ROA challenges direct causality, focusing on contribution rather than attribution. This is useful for
NSRP which could only ever be one of a number of factors contributing to a process of change. ROA
is conducted in three stages:
• Background research and preparation – Document/data review and a series of informal
conversations to develop an outline case history.
• Collaborative ROA workshop/individual interviews62 to identify the boundary partners
(i.e. those to be influenced); their current behaviours; the key policy or practice change
processes they are engaged in; the ‘progress markers’ that demonstrate change is occurring;
and the external factors at play in the wider environment.
• Validation and follow-up for researchers to refine the stories of change.
In total, nine case studies were developed over the evaluation life-cycle (five to inform the MTE and
four post-MTE) (see Box 2.1). Case selection at the MTE stage was based on a five-dimensional
scoring criteria63. Twenty potential cases were proposed by NSRP and the NIEP selected five which
offered a spread across NSRP’s Outputs and operational locations, and which directly addressed
the priority EQs for the MTE.
Post-MTE, the selection process drew on NSRP’s revised monitoring data (now capturing instances
of policy/practice change) with input from NSRP staff and partners/platform convenors. These case
studies have focused on ‘influence’ (a focal area for the final evaluation), specifically, NSRP’s
success in exerting influence in relation to conflict resolution/peace-building policy and practice
change, the factors facilitating and inhibiting success.
Box 2.1 ROA Case Studies

▪ Case study 1: Outcomes of Peace Clubs on countering violence against persons living with
disability.
▪ Case study 2: Outcomes of CPPs on peaceful conduct during the 2015 elections in Kaduna
South LGA.
▪ Case study 3: Outcomes of research on De-radicalisation on the government's programme on
countering violent extremism.
▪ Case study 4: Outcome of conflict sensitivity training on reporters’ coverage of the 2015
elections.
▪ Case study 5: Adoption of code of principles and standards on government employment
programmes.
▪ Case study 6: The Role of Dialogue Mechanism Committees in the Prevention and Resolution of
Land and Water Use Conflict Between Farmers and Pastoralists in Bokkos City and Daffo,
Plateau State
▪ Case study 7: The impact of the Eminent Persons and Expert Group Meetings on national
security policy and practice: development of a comprehensive, inclusive, coordinated National
Security Strategy
▪ Case study 8: Changes in Policy, potential in practice: Delta State Conflict Management Alliance
and the Herdsmen/Farmer Conflict

61
Since NSRP’s TOC is predicated on inter-linkages across its various output streams and operating levels, the case
study methodology (more so post-MTE) considers these linkages specifically as well as the quality and extent of
participation.
62 Ideally the workshop would be a collaborative exercise. Practical and logistical constraints prevented this in some cases.
63
NSRP were asked to present cases that met some/all of the following: (1) areas of high resource intensity for NSRP; (2)
cases potentially demonstrating added value as a result of integration with other programme components; (3) ‘green
shoots’ (i.e. cases where NSRP believed they contributed/will contribute to positive outcomes); (4) cases with a limited
existing evidence base and opportunities for key learning; and (5) cases in locations accessible to the local and
international team for primary research.

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▪ Case study 9: Changes in policy and practice: Kano and the Women’s Peace and Security
Network

The main limitation of the ROA approach is that the workshops and interviews offer a subjective
account of the process of change, mainly from parties with an interest in the cases. The NIEP has
sought to validate findings (stage 3 of the ROA process) where possible in follow-up face to face and
telephone interviews.
The case studies make clear the source and relative strength of the evidence underpinning findings
and conclusions. Further, case studies offer an in-depth look at small components of NSRP
programming, in specific contexts and at one point in time; they may not be valid at programme level.
Cross-case analysis, exploring similarities and differences across the nine case studies, informed
the final evaluation. Case study evidence is used to illustrate key points throughout this report.
Standalone case study reports are included at Appendix B.
The section of cases also relies on NSRP advice regarding appropriate case, and as such, despite
the nest of intention, is inevitably open to a degree of potential selection bias. We acknowledge this
and address potential case selection bias through triangulation by method.

Method 3: Survey of NSRP platform members

The NIEP designed and administered a survey to members of NSRP’s multi-stakeholder platforms
in early 2017. All platforms, including direct intervention and advocacy platforms, were in scope for
the survey. The survey addressed two focal areas:
• Broader Societal Participation: the survey addressed gaps in NSRP’s monitoring data in
relation to participation and “the voice” of platform members64. To this end, it considered key
indicators of democratic dialogue (inclusivity, safe space, learning, good faith and
empowerment65) as a means of exploring the extent to which “genuine” (as opposed to
“tokenistic”) participation has been achieved.
• Strengthening the peace architecture: Questions were included in the survey in relation to
the outputs and outcomes of platform activity66, coordination with other organisations,
accountability67, and sustainability. In addition, the survey considered the establishment and
maintenance of productive networks among Nigeria’s conflict management institutions, and
the nature and quality of these relationships.
The survey was developed by the NIEP and was subject to several rounds of comment from NSRP.
In February 2017, the NIEP met with NSRP in Abuja, Nigeria to finalise the survey script and conduct
training for field researchers from CRD. The survey commenced in March 2017 (following 2 pilots at
NSRP platforms in Kano). The survey concluded at the end of April 2017.
A statistically representative sample was not achievable within the resource available. Therefore, a
purposive and convenience sample was adopted. The aim was to maximise reach and achieve a
credible (as opposed to a statistically robust and representative) sample. This was a pragmatic
option given the lack of a comprehensive sample frame68, the fact that NSRP grants were coming to

64
NSRP monitoring data on the functionality, activity and outcomes of its platforms relies on minutes of platform meetings.
There was no data source that included the “voice” of platform members. Further, at the time the survey was designed,
the Inclusion, Coordination and Accountability (ICA) tool remained the soul means of assessing participation. The MTE
demonstrated weaknesses in the design/implementation of this tool and did not to use this data. The tool was subsequently
discarded by NSRP.
65 Governing Principals of Democratic Dialogue' from 'A practical guide to democratic dialogue', OAS and UNDP (2013:

P12)
66 As a means to triangulate NSRP’s monitoring data.
67 Given that NSRP’s ICA tool is now no longer in use.
68 There was no comprehensive sample frame from which to draw a sample: platforms have institutional/organisational

members and different individuals frequently represent their organisation at meetings; meeting minutes often do no list

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an end and there was limited time to engage platform members, and resource implications for the
NIEP69.
It is noted that the survey results do not support inferences to the wider, full population of platforms
and platform members. The results only apply to those platforms and members surveyed and this
should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. Nonetheless, the results provide valuable
insights into the view of the selected platform members.
The sample was selected at the level of the platform (not the individual) and sought a spread in terms
of geography (one state in each of the North East, North West, North Central, and Southern operating
areas) and operational level (federal, state and LGA-level) (see Table 2.5). The survey was
administered at 22 platforms, capturing data from 271 respondents.
Table 2.5 Survey sample (geographical and operational level)

Operating level
Region State Federal State Local
WPSN SCMA MSP CPP LWU EMT
FCT Abuja n/a 2 - - - - - -
North East Yobe - ✓ ✓ - 2 - -
North West Kano - ✓ ✓ - 2 - -
North Central Plateau - ✓ ✓ - 2 2 -
South Bayelsa - ✓ ✓ ✓ 2 - 1
% of all NSRP
100% 47% 25%
platforms
Some 65% of survey responses were from men and 35% from women. This compares well with the
average gender breakdown across platform meetings (to the extent it is possible to assess this using
programme monitoring data). A majority of survey respondents represent non-state actors (Figure
2.2). The programme monitoring data does not allow comparison with the average composition of
platform meetings70.

attendees and even though NSRP monitoring requires platform convenors to submit attendance data (including the number
of males vs. females in attendance, the number of organisations represented and the stakeholder group (state security,
government agency, traditional and religious institutions, CSO etc) significant gaps remain in the data.
69 Large-scale quantitative research was not envisaged in the original budget.
70 Programme monitoring (where available) records the number of institutions/organisations represented at individual

meetings not the number of individuals representing different institutions/organisations.

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Figure 2.2 Survey sample (stakeholder type)

Local Platforms (n=132) 20% 70% 10%

State Platforms (n=112) 26% 67% 7%

Federal Platforms (n=20) 10% 80% 10%

All platforms (n=264) 22% 70% 9%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

State Actors Non-State Actors Traditional and Religious Institution

Source: NIEP survey of platform participants (2017)

Within individual platforms, the aim was to achieve responses from a broadly representative cross
section of attendees. Researchers were guided by a fieldwork protocol71 which set out the following
sampling procedure (Box 2.2):
Box 2.2 Extract from protocol provided to CRD on pre-survey preparation

1. Request attendance lists (if available) for two most recent meetings of the platform.
2. Group attendees according to key stakeholder categories to show the general split of
attendees that should be requested to complete. Key points to keep in mind:
▪ Aim to complete the survey with 15 group members (or all if less than 15 present).
▪ Ideally no more than one response from a single organisation.
▪ As much as possible aim to achieve gender balance in responses.
▪ The focus is on core conflict-management/peace-building stakeholders (e.g. in
selecting government agencies, focus on those with a significant role in conflict
management)
3. Based on attendance lists, complete the target sample template for each platform72 and
aim to achieve this on the day of the survey. A pragmatic and flexible approach may be
required depending on who is in attendance and willing to take part.

The mode of administration was interviewer facilitated self-completion. In most instances field
researchers attended scheduled platform meetings (although members of some platforms were
convened specifically for the survey if no meeting was scheduled in the period). This modality
brought both benefits and limitations as indicated in the table below.

71
The protocol contained instruction for survey set up, preparation, administration, data validation and upload. It also
included a statement on the survey purpose and process and a declaration of consent to be read and agreed to by all
participants.
72 A target breakdown was provided as follows: government (2), security sector (2), traditional/ religious leaders (2),

community groups (2), women’s groups (2), youth groups (2), other CSOs (1), academia (1), private sector (1) = 15 per
platform.

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Table 2.6 Benefits and Limitations

Benefits Limitations
• Reach: attending scheduled • Convenience sample: the sample at each
meetings allowed access to more platform was drawn from the group that was
participants than would otherwise be present.
possible. • In groups that were convened specifically,
• Minimising the burden by positive selection bias, as convenors
conducting the survey as an ‘agenda were relied upon to contact and invite
item’ at the platform meeting rather participants (guidance on group
than asking for additional time. composition was provided)
• Self-completion: ensuring answers • Social desirability bias: possibility that
to sensitive questions were not respondents answer in the manner they feel
inhibited by the presence of a will be viewed positively by others (the
researcher. importance of honest response, even if
• Interviewer facilitation to introduce negative, for learning purposes was
and discuss the concepts with the stressed in the survey preamble)
group to ensure shared • Poor recall: In some questions sets
understanding. respondents were asked to make
comparison between the situation now and
that pre-NSRP supported platforms.
• Lack of explanatory data: to maximise the
response rate questions were largely
binary, rating scale or multiple choice.
The survey was administered on tablets using Qualtrics software for offline data collection. The
survey was available in English and local languages. Researchers were on hand to support
respondents in the event of literacy issues or that respondents lack confidence to use the tablet73.
Supplementary social network analysis (SNA) on the survey data has explored the network
properties of NSRP platforms and their member organisations. The web-based application, ‘Kumu’,
was used74. Data informing the network analysis was drawn from the survey of platform members
(specifically questions 9.3 and 9.575). The analysis is therefore subject to the same limitations as the
survey data.
SNA characterises networked structures in terms of elements (organisations within the network) and
the connections (relationships or interactions) between them. The analysis assesses the strength
and depth of linkages and identifies those members that act as ‘local connectors’ or ‘hubs’.
The SNA generates a visual representation of the network in which elements are represented as
points or circles and connections as lines. The colour and/or width of the circle/line represents the
strength of a measure or relationship.

73
This was not reported to have been an issue at any of the platforms.
74
See www.kumu.io
75
Q9.3: (‘How often does your organisation meet with a representative from the following organisations?’) (answer
provides one choice on Likert scale ‘weekly’, ‘monthly’, ‘2 to 3 times per year’, ‘once per year or less’, ‘never/ not
applicable’). Q9.5: (‘Which organisations does your organisation work with most successfully in relation to conflict
management and peace-building?’) (answers provide top three organisations in rank order). Frequency of contact was
scored from 1 to 5 (‘does not meet’ to ‘meets weekly’) and successful working relationship was scored from 1 to 3 (3rd most
successful working relationship to most successful working relationship). The higher scores represented the ‘stronger’
association.

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In addition, metrics are presented as ‘degree centrality’ within the networks. Degree centrality counts
the number of connections an element has76. This information assists in consideration of the current
and potential effectiveness of platforms. See Appendix D for further detail.

Method 4: Qualitative comparative analysis

The NIEP has drawn on the principles of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) as a framework to
consider the factors facilitating and inhibiting the success of NSRP’s multi-stakeholder platforms
(specifically the direct intervention platforms under Outputs 1). The analysis builds on anecdotal
evidence and the assumptions of key stakeholders (emerging from the MTE and in subsequent
operational research by NSRP).
QCA is a case-based method77 that bridges the gap between qualitative and quantitative
approaches. Using QCA, complex data can be reduced/simplified allowing cases to be
systematically compared to identify factors (or configurations of factors) which contribute to the
success or otherwise of an intervention. Put another way, QCA can identify the factors/ conditions
that are both necessary and sufficient for a given outcome to be achieved in a given context (Baptist,
Befani, 2015: p1). This is valuable for a complex programme like NSRP where multiple pathways
from outputs to outcomes may be observed. QCA is also suited to small samples, as we have with
NSRP’s platforms78.
The conditions to be included in the QCA were agreed with NSRP in a collaborative workshop in
December 2016. These are summarised in Table 2.7.
The time period considered by the QCA is August 2016 (the point at which revised monitoring
templates from NSRP were rolled out) to end-March 2017 (the cut off point for NSRP monitoring
data analysed by the NIEP).
For each case (i.e. a platform), each condition is dichotomous; it is either present (1) or absent (0).
The QCA requires many assumptions79. These assumptions have been determined largely by the
NIEP (with some level of consultation with NSRP) and are open to scrutiny. The data sources and
assumptions of the QCA are set out in Table 2.8. Data analysis was conducted using FsQCA.
The QCA approach is subject to a number of limitations and caveats, as follows:
• Reliance on a proxy to determine the presence or absence of the Outcome of interest.
• Missing and incomplete data from NSRP’s internal monitoring templates (see footnotes with
Table 2.8 for details). The QCA was intended as an experimental method to help organise
and systematically process data, and to triangulate with other sources. Challenges in defining
the conditions, identifying and collating data were known from the outset80.
• The survey of platform participants was completed with selected platforms only. QCA for
each platform type has been conducted twice – with and without condition 6. The sample
size when condition 6 is included is very small.
• Stringency/ leniency of conditions. QCA, as the name suggests, requires differences in the
presence/absence of conditions and outcome across the cases so that comparison is
possible. In some cases, cut-offs for conditions were set very low (e.g. condition 5 where
relatively little is recorded in NSRP monitoring data) or very high (e.g. condition 6 were
relatively high satisfaction was recorded across the board).

76
In general, those elements with high degree are ‘local connectors / hubs’ (but aren't necessarily the best connected to
the wider network). Degree has been adjusted using connection weights. When weighted, degree represents the total
value of an element's connections instead of just the count.
77 Case-based methods explore the effects of an intervention, how and why outcomes have accrued in a specific case.

Their context specific nature is however a limitation as findings may not be transferrable and wider learning restricted.
78 As suggested by Ragin (1987) no less than 5 but no more than 50 cases should be analysed.
79 For example, suitable indicators/ proxies, data sources, data interpretation, how to deal with missing data and cut offs.
80 These are reported in NSRP-IEP Progress Reports #1-4 October 2016 - July 2017.

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• Resolve contradiction. One instance of resolve contradiction was observed; SCMA data for
Kaduna and Yobe. Both platforms had the same conditions present but not the same
Outcome. To resolve the contradiction, all criteria/ cut-off needs to be reassessed for each
condition. Condition 3 slightly changed to allow this contradiction to be solved.
Given these limitations, no conclusive statements are made on the basis of the QCA. Instead, it has
been used as a framework to organise data, to triangulate or reinforce other sources of evidence.
The results are discussed in section 5 ‘Learning from NSRP experience’.
Table 2.7 QCA conditions and rationale
Platform type

Condition Rationale for inclusion of condition

SCMA

CPP
Platforms may be most effective in locations where a).
violence is pertinent and institutions/organisations/
Background level of individuals are motivated to work together to find solutions
1
stability but b). the overall level of stability is improving and there is
hope for change (in the most highly volatile locations such
platforms may not be feasible1).
Operational research conducted post-MTE by International
2 Urban: Rural Alert suggested that CPPs may be more successful in rural
locations2.
Anecdotal evidence from the MTE (KIIs and focus group
discussions) suggests that platforms in which the ‘chair’ is
Position of platform
3 held by an official from a State institution may have greater
‘chair’
power of influence and achieve better buy in across relevant
actors. This is assumed to improve effectiveness.
Core to the NSRP TOC is the assumption that broader
societal participation (including marginalised voices) in, and
oversight of, conflict management mechanisms will increase
4 Platform composition
their effectiveness. Targets were set at the outset for the
composition – state and non-state actors – to be achieved at
platform meetings.
Anecdotal evidence from the MTE (KIIs and focus group
Dynamism/
discussions) highlighted the importance of ‘personalities’
5 commitment of the
and the motivation of individual members as a factor
membership
contributing to effectiveness.
Building on condition 4, the extent to which ‘genuine’ as
6 Genuine participation opposed to ‘tokenistic’ participation is achieved within
platform structures
Total number of conditions 4 4
Notes:
1. This assumption comes from observations in the north east where platform activity stepped up significantly in recent
times as background stability improved. This assumption also emerged in KI interviews with NSRP staff undertaken for the
MTE.
2. NSRP staff observed that the effectiveness of the CPPs [ ] varies depending on the location. For instance, in Rivers,
staff reported that the rural CPPs tend to be more active than the urban one, though in urban settings they seem more
interested in outreach activities. Similarly, in Plateau, rural areas are more appreciative of CPP activities and trainings,
while in urban areas a proliferation of NGOs and other activities compete for CPP members’ time [In Plateau it was
observed that in rural areas peace is more appreciated as conflict directly impacts on their life i.e. access to water and the
success of their farm, whereas urban areas with water taps are less vulnerable. The capital also has more effective police
and security forces, so there are less referrals required by the CPPs in the cities, where violence tends to be more related
to politics (including political appointments to different groups) than land (Naujoks, J. (2016)).

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Table 2.8 QCA data sources and analysis

Condition Data source Analysis
Analysis reflects the number of “violent deaths” and the number of
Nigeria Watch and
‘violent incidents” (leading to a least one death. Data were combined to
ACLED (Armed
reflect the absolute average number of ‘violent deaths’ per violent
Conflict Location
1 incident’ in each of NSRP’s eight target states (see note 2). If violence
and Event Data
has been stable over time with a low magnitude of violence (e.g. stability
Project) (see note
of violence has remained low), the condition is present (1); all other
1)
combinations (0).
Local expert Classification is based on a number of indicators- predominant business
2 knowledge (see activities, infrastructure, access to basic amenities etc. Rural =1; Urban
note 3) or Semi-urban = 0.
If the platform Chairperson has been a representative of a State actor
Consultation with
3 for more than 60% of the period (Aug 2016 to Mar 2017) (see note 4)
NSRP staff
the condition is present (1). Otherwise 0.
If data shows that government agencies, security sector institutions,
NSRP Monitoring representatives of more than one CSO and of traditional/religious
4
Data institutions have been represented together at, at least, 60% of platform
meetings, then the condition is present (1) (see note 5) Otherwise 0.
There is no readily available measure of ‘dynamism’/’commitment’. A
proxy indicator had to be agreed. In consultation with NSRP the decision
was to use NSRP monitoring data; the frequency that ‘issues raised’ at
platform meetings result in ‘action’ by the platform (see note 6).
NSRP Monitoring
5 Classification is as follows: If no issue discussed, then the condition is
Data
absent (0); If one or more issue(s) raised, at least one action must be
taken (or a resolution achieved) for the condition to be present (1).
Overall, the condition is present (1) if it has been true for at least 50% of
meetings.
This indicator draws on “the voice” of marginalised participants (see note
7) It is a composite indicator which considers perceptions of the extent
to which:
• Marginalised groups are present at platform meetings;
• They are involved in meaningful dialogue;
NIEP survey of • Their concerns are addressed.
6 platform Analysis is by platform type, computed as an index of perceptions
participants against 5 indicators of democratic dialogue (inclusivity, safe space,
learning, good faith and empowerment) plus accountability. For each
measure, if at least 80% (SCMA and LWU) or 60% (CPP) (see note 8)
of respondents report that they are satisfied “always” or “most of the
time” the condition is present (1). Otherwise 0. Overall, if at least 4 out
of the 6 issues are fulfilled, the overall condition is present (1). Otherwise
0.
The aim was to align the outcome measure for the QCA with that of
NSRP/it’s platforms (to the extent possible). The outcome of interest is
then considered to be “application of improved policies and practices
that help to manage conflict non-violently more often in NSRP target
states” (NSRP Logframe (Result O1)).
Outcome NSRP APS The NIEP selected an indicator from the APS to act as a proxy for this
outcome (see note 9).
“In your view, have incidents of violence in the last 12 months been
effectively dealt with?’” (APS Q3).
Analysis is by platform type and a specific cut-off is applied for each type
(generally based on the average across all platforms) (see note 10).
Notes:
1. Some events were disregarded i.e. fire/explosion (if those events were accidents), road traffic accidents, other accidents,
and events with no death.
2. There are two ways to consider the background level of stability: (1) Overall stability over time (by looking at the
coefficient of variation (CV) and calculating the mean of the CV. If the CV> mean of the CV, then the State is considered
as “unstable”. Otherwise it is “stable”); (2) Magnitude of violence over time (by computing the mean and the median, then
computing the mean of the means and the medians. If the mean/median is above the mean/median of the means/medians,

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then the magnitude of violence is “high”. Otherwise “magnitude” of violence is low). (1) and (2) are then compared for
consistency:
3. No formal urban/rural classification could be identified. Classification was by the NIEP’s national research lead.
4. If the platform only became operational during this period, the time since the platform was established is considered
5. Missing data is a significant issue for this condition. When no data is recorded on the monitoring template, the meeting
is disregarded from the analysis, reducing the number of meetings for which the analysis is performed.
6. The assumption of the NIEP is that discussion, action and outcome may be under-reported in NSRP monitoring data.
This is due to the reliance on minutes from platform meetings to populate the templates and differences in the capacity of
convenors to take minutes and understand/comply with monitoring requirements
7. Survey responses for non-state actors (community based organisations, traders and producers, women’s groups, youth
groups and other civil society groups) are used in this analysis.
8. In order to have mixed representation of the condition, a different cut-off had to be applied to different platforms
9. The APS was chosen as the outcome measure as this is independent from NSRP monitoring data (which has informed
some of the QCA conditions)
10. For SCMAs, if at least 45% of respondents in each state said ’yes’ then the Outcome is present (1). Otherwise, 0; For
CPP, if at least 51.79% of respondents said ‘yes’ then the Outcome is present. Otherwise, 0.

Additional methods
The evaluation team supplemented the core methods with additional data sources, both primary and
secondary:
• MTE findings: The final evaluation builds on evidence generated by the MTE. The MTE
findings, its research methods and the limitations of the evidence are set out in detail in the
MTE report (Upper Quartile, 2016 [unpublished]).
• Review of documents: Review of newly available NSRP documentary sources has been
ongoing since the MTE, ensuring the NIEP is up to date on programme developments and
broadening the base of evidence sources. Sources include, but are not limited to, operational
research conducted following the MTE (specifically in relation to CPPs and output stream 3);
DFID Annual Review (2016); NSRP Impact Assessment of Conflict Sensitivity (December
2016); NSRP Impact Reports Outputs 1-4 (June 2017); and NSRP Platform Observation
Reports (July 2017).
• Programme level KIIs: KIIs were conducted with members of the NSRP Consortium Board
(BC,IA, SDD) to explore the NSRP delivery model and key learning from it, the successes
and challenges in implementing different elements of the programme, the partner’s views on
internal and external factors that have impacted and any lessons for partner’s and for DFID
in contracting and managing complex programmes.
• A semi-structured interview technique was used, ensuring consistency while allowing
flexibility for interviewees to discuss the issues that are pertinent to them. Unlike the MTE,
formal KIIs were not conducted with NSRP staff at the final evaluation stage; ongoing
engagement since the MTE negated the need for this except in relation to the evaluation’s
in-depth case studies (see Method 2).
• A note of organisations consulted during the course of the evaluation programme is included
in Appendix H.

2.10 Analysis and triangulation

Analysis of the evaluation evidence was on a method by method basis as data sources became
available (for example, case studies 6 and 7 were complete by December 2016, with case studies 8
and 9 added to the series in June 2017; cross-case analysis was completed in July 2017; analysis
from the survey of platform members and the SNA began in May following completion of the survey;
analysis of NSRP programme monitoring data (including the APS) was conducted through June and
July when this data became available).
For all methods, the specific EQs (which emanate from the TOC) and the overarching focal areas
provided the framework for the analysis. Where possible and appropriate data is disaggregated by
sex, youth, stakeholder group, target state or operational level (federal, state and local).

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The NIEP came together in Edinburgh on the 6 July 2017 to begin the process of synthesising and
interpreting the evidence. This session generated questions and potential recommendations to be
answered/tested in KIIs with NSRP consortium partners (see additional methods).
In order to process the significant volume of data generated by the evaluation, prioritise and distil
the key findings systematically and consistently, a simple evidence rating scale has been devised
as noted in the table below (Table 2.9).
Table 2.9 Evidence weighting scale

Consistent perceptions and multiple corroborated examples across

Strong evidence
stakeholder groups and from more than one research strand

Corroborated examples emanating from at least one stakeholder

Moderate evidence
group or research strand with no evidence to the contrary

Corroborated (if isolated) examples, but conflicting evidence/inference

Limited evidence
from other stakeholder groups/research strands

Mixed of inconclusive Uncorroborated/anecdotal examples and/ or conflicting

evidence evidence/inference from other stakeholder groups/research strands

No evidence No evidence

2.11 Inclusion, ethical considerations, and dissenting views

All research carried out by WYG (formerly Upper Quartile) and CRD in the course of this evaluation
was conducted in accordance with DFID Ethics Principals for Research and Evaluation (DFID,
2011). All of the participants consented to take part and were given the option to withdraw at any
time81. No individual is named in the report and care has been taken to preserve anonymity to the
extent possible.
All researchers who conducted primary research were trained to ensure consistent application of the
evaluations’ conflict and gender sensitive approach, integrity in the application of research methods
and maintenance of ethical research standards.
The evaluation endeavoured to ensure the inclusion of a broad range of informants, including males
and females; youth and adults; those representing marginalised groups; a geographical spread of
views; donors, implementers and beneficiaries.
Independence: The team has worked freely in the conduct of the evaluation. There are no known
conflicts of interest to declare.
There are no significant dissenting views within the evaluation team. A draft version of this report
was circulated to DFID and NSRP. We are grateful for detailed feedback provided by DFID and
NSRP on the draft of this evaluation report and we note that any dissenting views were taken fully
into consideration in providing our analysis, conclusions and recommendations.

81
In the case of children and youth (under the age of 18) consulted as part of detailed ROA research, a responsible adult
was also required to grant written consent. Only children aged 14 years and over were included as informants, all at the
MTE stage.

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3 EVALUATION FINDINGS
3.1 Strengthening the peace architecture
Headline findings

Finding 1: Good results have been achieved in establishing spaces to bring state and non-state
actors together in a coordinated and focused fashion. There is strong evidence that where
platforms have been formed, are broadly inclusive, and are meeting regularly, the convening
function has mobilised and contributed to strengthened coordination, communication and
information flow between a wide range of conflict management stakeholders, including mixes of
state and non-state actors depending on the environment and context. These relations are crucial
to the peace architecture. Although their views may not always strategically align, stakeholders
do, in many cases, come to shared positions on the matters to hand. It is unclear whether these
arrangements are sustainable without ongoing funding for platforms.

Finding 2: There is strong evidence that platform members, and the peace architecture more
broadly (including the media and other donor programmes), have benefited from their involvement
in NSRP-supported platforms because of new/enhanced knowledge, understanding, skills and
capacities which are supporting their role as effective contributors to the conflict management
process.

Finding 3: The NSRP monitoring data suggests that the programme resolved / prevented a total
of 8982 conflicts across all platforms over the three-year implementation period (with some
individual platforms reporting very few resolutions at all). Of course, this figure does not tell us
about the nature of the conflicts prevented and their significance at a local or state level. However,
we know there are significant limitations in the monitoring data (i.e. gaps in the record and
incomplete narrative sections accompanying the numbers. In addition, the case studies do indicate
significant instances of conflict resolution/prevention that are not fully captured in the indicators.
Taken together, this suggests that the monitoring results may not accurately reflect the frequency
or significance of the programme impact on conflicts and may underestimate the true value of the
programme (although we cannot quantity this with any certainty).

Finding 4: Building on finding 3, the evaluation found that the key indicators in NSRP’s results
framework and logframe for resolving or preventing conflicts are problematic on both
methodological and conceptual grounds; compounding this, the monitoring work has suffered from
poor implementation (despite improvements towards the final stages of programme
implementation). Monitoring focus in future interventions would benefit from a greater focus on
changes in the underlying networks of relations, rather than limited-value measures of conflicts
resolved/prevented.

Finding 5: A lack of focus on gathering high-quality monitoring data and follow-up (until the latter
stages of the programme), compounded by the ambitious nature of the programmes and limited
evidence of an ability to adapt within platform interventions, suggests concerns about how far mid-
stream lesson learning has been a priority for programme management. Although an innovative
approach was applied, the expected level of reflection was not evident.

82
NSRP self-reported 124 conflict resolved by end August 2017; it was not possible to validate this figure within the
timeframe for the final evaluation.

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Evaluation questions
The programme operating context outlined in section two showed a changing pattern of violence.
This section considers first how far these changes are a result of the conflict resolution institutions
(the peace architecture), and what contribution NSRP made to these changes.
Summarising the findings, the evidence suggests that 89 conflicts were prevented / resolved by
NSRP, but that this should not be taken at face value, due to the weakness in the data. It is hard to
conclude precisely how influential the programme has been, but at this stage the conclusion should
be that impact is relatively modest.
The section turns attention to the interim steps needed to deliver the forms of outcome identified in
the case studies reported in Appendix B – that is in convening and strengthening the peace
architecture and the relationships and institutions that this requires – and addresses two EQs in
particular:

EQ5. To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination and alignment of strategic priorities/
actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?
EQ10. What is the evidence that accountability, capacity and responsiveness among decision
makers has increased?

In this we focus in particular on those directly involved in the platforms. NSRP has granted £8.6m in
grants83 in support of this activity, with a further £19.9m of other inputs, totalling £28.5m of
programme expenditure to August 201784 (against a budget of £33m and an approved business case
of £38m).

Has NSRP resulted in conflicts resolved?

NSRP’s monitoring data provides some insight into the activities and achievements of its platforms
and initiatives (Table 3.1)85. A total of 89 conflicts has been reported as resolved over three years,
with a relatively low percentage of the conflicts discussed having led to any recorded action by the
platforms86. The numbers would suggest that NSRP platforms have not been major contributors to
reduced violence or non-violent conflict resolution over the intervention life-cycle to date, and are
unlikely in themselves to account for the large reduction in perceived violence as illustrated in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1 Activities and outcomes of multi-stakeholder platforms
% issues followed
taken by Platform
issues discussed

% of successful
No. of conflicts
up with action
No. of conflict

No. of actions
No. meetings
No Platforms

Platform type
prevented
resolved/

actions

National Peace and Security Forum (NPSF) 1 20 56 28 50% 1 4%

State Conflict Management Alliances (SCMA) 8 110 179 88 49% 10 11%

Community Peace Partnerships (CPP) 27 279 334 145 43% 44 30%

Land and Water Use (LWU) Dialogue Mechanisms

13 69 58 50 86% 34 68%
(DM) (Plateau state only)

83
NSRP (2017) NSRP Value for Money Report 2017, August, NSRP: Abuja p3.
84
The evaluation data focus on the period to 31 March 2017; the expenditure figure for this period was not available
85 Caution in the interpretation of this data is recommended given significant challenges in the implementation of NSRP’s

monitoring system. See section 3 for details.

86 Among output 1 platforms only around 50% of discussion points have been followed up with an action.

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Multi-Stakeholder Platforms on Oil Spills (Southern

3 20 26 6 33% 0 0%
states only)

Total 52 498 653 317 52% 89 23%

Source: NSRP Monitoring Data (March 2017)

Of course, this headline monitoring figures do not tell us about the nature of the conflicts prevented
and their significance at a local or state level, and they do not factor in that some programme
elements did not become operational until well into the 5-year period (see Finding 3).
To expand, despite improvements in programme monitoring processes, the monitoring challenges
that dogged the programme at the mid-term evaluation continue to have a legacy impact, i.e. partial
recording of results over the programme life-time, and some ongoing inconsistency in reporting by
programme area. There are also systematic weaknesses in the operational follow-up processes
needed to identify change (see case study 8).
Second, the indicators tracked in the monitoring data and recorded in the programme logframe are
methodologically problematic without the intended accompanying narrative sections in the reporting
templates, and analytical interrogation of those narrative accounts87 (see Finding 4):
• A “conflict” has no obvious temporal or social bounds making it hard to reify and count. For
example, the herdsmen and farmer conflict in Delta (case study 8) was part of a social trend
triggered by the insurgency and climate change, was state-wide and expressed through
multiple flashpoints over months, involving multiple different groups of herdsmen and
communities. How these conflicts may be carved up and counted is not obvious;
• Linked to that, it is not possible to count meaningfully the success of an intervention that
successfully addresses an ongoing social tension resulting in repeated outbreak of violence.
In the LWU Bokkos/Daffo case study (case study 6), for example, the positive outcomes
identified is in relation to a reduction in tensions amongst previously conflicted groups. How
can these be meaningfully enumerated?
• The value of the prevention / resolution of any given conflict depends entirely on the scale
and severity of the conflict, which is not captured – and no two conflicts are commensurate;
and,
• A conflict resolved is fundamentally a negative, a cessation of violence, and as such is hard
to confirm when the conflict is in fact ‘over’, or how long the solution put in place will remain
adequate.
The management utility of the overall number of conflicts resolved/prevented is very limited. It does
not correspond to any very useful indication of the success of the platforms or the programme overall.
There is an important operational implication of this finding: weak conflict tracking would not have
been conducive to informed decision-making at the level of the platform or the programme (see
Finding 5).

Case Study Evidence

The low conflict resolution figures presented at the outset of this section may be tempered by
moderately positive case study evidence. The case studies provide moderate evidence88 that the
platforms have helped to dissipate rising tensions and/or address factors that may have agitated
tensions in future. Consider the two relevant case studies below:
• Case Study 2: the Kaduna South CPP mobilised ahead of the 2015 elections89, mapping and
monitoring rising tensions; facilitating inclusive inter-community/ inter-faith dialogue; and

87
For example, the following indicator: ‘Number of occasions when violent conflict has been prevented, managed non-
violently or brought to an end as a result of NPSF activity’
88 Corroborated examples emanating from one at least one stakeholder group or research strand, with no evidence to the

contrary.
89 The 2015 elections were widely recognised as a potential trigger for violence.

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sensitising communities on the importance of peace and tolerance during the electoral
period. This led to a widely-perceived reduction in violence between Muslim and Christian
youth groups;
• Case Study 6: this addressed – amongst other issues – the interaction between herdsmen
and farmers. The Dialogue Mechanism Committee (DMC) incorporated local traditional
leaders and representatives of the herdsmen, and successfully identified and mediated the
development of specific, pragmatic and detailed changes to water access timetables and
cattle droving roots, through dialogue. The case study notes that these positive changes were
supported by local powerholders, were being embraced and acted upon by the protagonists,
and appeared to have generated lasting changes in behaviour, reducing local levels of
violence.
Both these cases suggest that the platforms have the potential to bring about changes that respond
to the causes of conflict and which have the potential to be sustainable, through convening and
mediation functions. The platforms have not always been successful, however, as illustrated by the
following example:
• Case Study 8: Delta State Conflict Management Alliance (DSCMA) – dominated primarily by
state civilian and security agency representatives but with civil society members – sought to
convene dialogue sessions and to mediate between farmers and herdsmen. This, as NSRP
comments have noted, is a highly sensitive political matter, given the President’s ethnic
background is considered to be the same as that of the herdsmen, and the increase in
numbers of herdsmen and violence. Although they convened multiple conflict sensitisation
sessions, and actively engaged the police, they were unable to make sustained headway
due – the research suggests – to hidden political support lying behind the herdsmen and
driving an escalation in their intrusions into the (also driven by environmental and wider
conflictual factors in the north). The police refused to prosecute.
Ultimately, the research suggests that since there was no risk of arrest to the herdsmen, the
conflict persisted. While the efforts were dominated by sensitisation, on occasion the DSCMA
sought to but was unable to broker a lasting settlement. It is unclear how far it would have
been possible to circumvent the political obstacles given the extremely sensitive context, but
no evidence existed of the ability to adapt their approach. Indeed, there is limited evidence
more broadly that NSRP convenors are willing or able to adapt or shift their approach. Despite
this case as being identified as one of the most positive changes achieved by the DSCMA,
subsequent exchanges with NSRP suggest that efforts to resolve the conflict were
overreached – they suggest partly due to pressure to obtain measurable results.
The comparison between the Delta SCMA and the LWU in Bokkos/Daffo cases above are instructive:
each suggests that convening the relevant power-holders and protagonists is important, and that
failing to ensure that all interests are addressed in the mediation (as in the case of the Delta SCMA)
is fatal to the achievement of a long-term solution. Even then, favourable conditions and fortuitous
external relationships are to some extent necessary to generate the desired change (in some cases,
the door is just closed, cf. Carden 2009), and creative responses to obstacles and persistence will
be required. At some point, a decision must be made whether to persist or to shift resources
elsewhere. As NSRP officials noted, this divergence is in part built into the design of the NSRP,
which never envisaged the SCMAs as conflict mediation; it also shows the inevitably fine distinctions
between sensitisation work and active mediation.
The case studies therefore show some moderate evidence that the platforms have been successful,
under some circumstances. However, this point should be treated with caution, since the case
selection process was oriented towards more successful programmes which could generate
evidence on the theory of change as a whole90, and we cannot say how representative they are of
all platform activities.

90
Positive examples of success in which a range of stakeholders could be engaged in the research and which offered
opportunities to explore the factors that facilitated and inhibited success were actively sought out by the evaluators.

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Has NSRP strengthened the peace architecture?

With no robust evidence of the overall effectiveness of NSRP’s work (in terms of the frequency and
type of conflict resolution), the evidence focuses instead on the interim outcomes achieved by the
programme. The programme TOC suggests the integration and alignment of stakeholders; it shifts
the focus away from the conflicts, and towards the network of relationships, which when convened
and turned to address conflict through proper processes, will prevent and respond to conflicts non-
violently. These are the links that compose the peace architecture and which are crucial to the long-
term goal of resolving conflicts – in the case of many of the platforms, no space existed to bring state
and non-state actors together in a coordinated and focused fashion, and there was a history of
antagonism between state and civil society (Falola and Heaton, 2008). Progress in this area is an
achievement in itself that should not be underestimated.
The following analysis addresses the convening function, which is the centrepiece of the NSRP
programme; and then explores the additional contribution made by supporting the key powerholders
through additional training. It draws on the IEP platform participant survey and network analysis 91,
the NSRP perception survey, monitoring data drawn from the NSRP’s internal systems, and is
supplemented by case study evidence.
To understand this fully, this section will focus on the functions of convening the platforms and on
training, which are crucial to the operation of the peace architecture (see Figure 3.1). These are
expressed in the right-hand column of the figure. The NSRP platforms (as addressed through the
case studies) exhibited multiple intervention strategies. For example, the LWU DMs in Bokkos/Daffo
convened a wide range of key stakeholders and local powerholders; undertook mediation efforts
around specific conflicts; undertook sensitisation and delivered conflict-sensitivity trainings.
The DSCMA combined convening state-level powerholders, many of them from the state security
apparatus, with direct involvement in particular instances of conflict notably between the herdsmen
and farmers. We focus here on how the convening function has improved communication between
stakeholders, on the nature of the inclusivity of the platform; and on the extent to which the platforms
have improved the capacity of those involved.

91
Network analysis was conducted using data from the IEP’s survey of platform participants and allows us to analyse the
frequency and perceived significance of different stakeholders. Details of the research methodology and data limitations
are available in section 2.

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Figure 3.1 Key activities delivered through NSRP’s platforms and initiatives – Mapping the DSCMA, Kaduna
South CPP, and Bokkos City/Daffo LWU DM

Communication
The evaluation has strong evidence92 that, where platforms have been formed and are meeting
regularly, this has contributed to a strengthening of channels for communication and information
flow93 (see Finding 1). The theory underpinning NSRP’s design has this as a critical first step in
strengthening the peace architecture. This finding is demonstrated by the Nigeria Independent
Evaluation Provider (NIEP’s) survey of platform participants in which over half of respondents
indicated that the relevant platform was an important forum where they could engage with other
actors in the conflict management sphere; this sentiment was particularly felt amongst government
agencies, the security services, traditional and religious leaders and civil society organisations94.
The network analysis also demonstrates an overall high frequency of contact between survey
respondents (and the organisations they represent) and a full spectrum of stakeholders operating in
the conflict management sphere (although the extent of this varies by platform). Relationships
between state and non-state actors are both present and, in many cases, perceived as successful;
particularly at the state and local level (further detail from the platform survey and network analysis
is appended in Appendix D).

Composition
There is some evidence that networks have changed their composition to focus on the more
influential stakeholders (as defined on page 17), over the past 2-3 years. Some 95% of respondents
to the platform survey indicated that there had been a change to the top three organisations with

92 Consistent
perceptions and multiple corroborated examples across stakeholder groups & from more than one research
strand.
93 Lack of communication and information sharing between key stakeholders was identified as a barrier to the effective

delivery of security services, the prevention and resolution of violence (NSRP, 2014a: 9). This sits among the lower level
outcomes of the NSRP theory of change.
94 For each of these groups between 50-60% of respondents report that they engage with these partners as part of the

platform, compared to around a quarter who engage them in other coordination platforms and under a fifth who engage
them one-to-one.

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whom they had worked most successfully (as self-defined by the respondent, in relation to conflict
management and peace-building) over that time.
However, while widespread, the changes are shallow in nature: there has been a more limited
change in the composition of those platform members that are regarded as most ‘influential’ (in terms
of being successful work partners), with an increased role for government agencies at the federal
level and an increased role for those representing marginalised groups at state/local level but little
more.
The combinations of influential stakeholders within different platforms reflects the varying loci of
power at different levels and also shows success in engaging a range of powerful actors. It is possible
to identify four broad groups of stakeholders, in declining order of influence or importance to
achievement of the goals:
1. Consistently important: Certain stakeholders are consistently perceived to be important
and influential. The NIEP platform survey and companying network analysis suggests that
top ‘influencers’ by quality of relationship are broadly the same across geographies:
Traditional and Religious Institutions, CBO’s, State Security Institutions (including Army,
Police, Joint Task Force), Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level), and Youth
Groups. Some groups are marginal at federal level, but locally important (e.g. Vigilante
Groups, Hizbah Boards).
Top ‘influencers’ (by quality of relationship) do vary by platform, but Traditional and Religious
Institutions, and State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task Force) appear
in the top 5 of all platforms. CBO Organisations appear in the top 5 of all but one platform
(Environment Monitoring Team (EMT)) (see Appendix D for full detail of the network
analysis). These findings suggest the programme recognises a broad mix of stakeholders
with different sources of legitimacy as being crucial to their work.
The network analysis corroborates citizen perception data (via the APS) which suggests
across the period (2013-2017) the army, police and traditional leaders consistently emerge
as among the five most significant institutions/organisations in keeping the peace and
managing conflict (unprompted APS responses). The APS also notes that there is little
change in the perceived effectiveness of these institutions year on year95
2. Government agencies as platform chairs: The Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
suggests that within state and LGA level having a state actor as the platform chair is a
necessary although not sufficient condition for the success of the platform, and – particularly
at the federal level – the network analysis, at least for the NPSF, supports the important role
of government agencies as drivers of change, supported to a lesser extent by a range of
other stakeholders96 (a relatively small group of stakeholder organisations are identified by
respondents as the most successful work partners within the NPSF, with Government
Agencies the most prominent, although this was less the case for the FWPSN (see Appendix
D)
3. Variably important: There is a band of stakeholders that are more important in some
platforms than in others97. For SCMA and CPP platforms, traditional and religious authorities
and youth groups were perceived to be more important. Others yet are intensely networked
but are not seen as the most successful or important partners in peoples’ work, including
women’s groups (SCMA, CPP) and vigilante groups (CPP). Such groups are less crucial for
achieving change but are active members of the network, perhaps a function of their relative

95
On a four-point scale where 4 is very effective and 1 is not at all effective, the average score achieved by each institution
is around 3 or above in each year of the survey (NSRP APS Data 2013-2017).
96 A point reinforcing finding from the MTE which questioned the wider quality of communication and information flow

among members of the NPSF and from the NPSF to the SCMA’s (Upper Quartile, 2016)
97 Citizens view these institutions with equal importance to security agencies in maintaining peace (NSRP APS data 2014-

2017) yet they do not feature strongly in the NPSF network map (Appendix D); Of the 20 NPSF meetings convened, there
were only 3 occasions where traditional and religious institutions were known to be represented (NSRP Monitoring Data,
March 2017)

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lack of power. The LWU DMs are something of an outlier in this. When considering the
presence of actors in meetings, although 100% of SMCA meetings and 83.7% of the CPPs
included at least a representative from state security, from civilian government, from civil
society and a traditional leader, this was only 40.7% for LWU DMs.
4. Little perceived importance: Others yet – the media, private sector actors – are neither
strongly networked nor are they seen to be particularly important partners for the
achievement of success.
How to interpret the differences in the platform composition? The first point to note is that the very
fact of ongoing and inclusive collaboration and communication between state and non-state actors
is an important achievement, and is precisely the kind of broad-based programming that is central
to the accountability and alignment of interests that the NSRP TOC proposes. Several of the
important stakeholders appear to be organisations that prima facie is marginal to society: CBOs are
systematically identified as key stakeholders for success; Women’s and Youth Groups are engaged
frequently, and at times are identified as important for success, particularly Youth Groups. This is
evidence that these marginal groups are embedded in the peace architecture. The following sections
look in more detail as to their meaningful participation and extent to which they have been positively
influenced.
Second, the varying composition of the platforms suggests an effort to be broadly inclusive – not
simply to give voice, but also because it is important for effective programming. The instrumental
value appears to differ by platform; at LGA level for example it helps to increase legitimacy and trust.
It is notable that the QCA identifies the breadth of platform composition as a factor, if not a necessary
condition, for platforms working at the local level (CPP and LWUs), one may speculate that this is
due to a lack of government representation at the community level, but we lack sufficient data to
substantiate this. At the higher level, a relatively narrower bandwidth of key stakeholders is
necessary for success. It seems that there has not been a great deal of change in the stakeholders
whom the platforms engage.
Third, the strategic priorities – understood as the basic goals – of many of the institutions represented
at the platforms do not appear to have changed dramatically. This is to be expected: the platforms
are there to make compromise between actors with differing perspectives and priorities. Changes
are minimal. For example, while in the DSCMA case there was no evidence that the key state actors
had changed their strategic priorities as a result of the intervention from NSRP, the platform did react
to the conflict reports it received through the EWS, shifting focus from the moribund efforts to
persuade the government to fund the Peace and Vigilante Law towards the farmer/herdsmen conflict.
While a flexibility in agenda-setting shows a minimum level of alignment of priorities, the overall
suggestion is of a focus on a particular suite of approaches without addressing how they may
change.

Training and capacity

In each of the three case studies focusing on the peace architecture, the work to convene platforms
was supported by training and capacity building of the platforms members.
There is strong evidence that platform members have benefited from their involvement in NSRP-
supported platforms because of new/enhanced knowledge, understanding, skills and capacities
which support their role as effective contributors to the conflict management process (see Finding
2). This is supported by a number of specific instances of learning from of the case studies. Figure
3.2 presents evidence from the survey of platform participants.

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Figure 3.2 Increased skills and capacities of platform members*

Greater awareness/ understanding of my role and 90%

responsibilities in relation to conflict management
Increased confidence/capacity to raise issues of concern 87%
with relevant actors
Greater awareness/ understanding of conflict management 84%
processes

83%
Enhanced skills and knowledge of gender issues

81%
Enhanced skills and knowledge of conflict sensitivity

77%
Enhanced skills in mediation and conflict resolution

74%
Better information on the factors which may lead to conflict
Increased confidence and capacity to challenge relevant 68%
actors when they are not fulfilling their responsibilities
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

* (% respondents who strongly agree that as a result of their participation in the platform, their capacity has been built in
the following areas). Source: NIEP survey of platform members (N=268)

NSRP’s work to conflict sensitise the Nigerian media provides another strong example of NSRP’s
capacity to support key stakeholders, this time through training in conflict sensitive ways of
action (Case 4). Individuals within all NSRP’s partner radio stations are now adopting and applying
Conflict Sensitive Communication (CSC) principles and approaches as a result of workplace
mentoring and training. There have been marked improvements in the conflict sensitivity of radio
discussion programmes and, in total, NSRP support has resulted in 11 key internal practice changes
across 15 radio stations (NSRP, 2017d). With the 2017 APS data revealing that 65% of citizens
believe that a ‘more conflict sensitive media’ has helped resolve conflict – a link that is well
established in the literature – it is plausible that these positive changes in practice are contributing
to enhanced stability (NSRP, 2017d:9).

Concluding remarks
To conclude this section, while it is not possible to meaningfully measure the reduction in violence
achieved by NSRP, the NIEP case studies suggest NSRP’s platforms and initiatives have resulted
in the reduction or prevention of violence in some cases – although as the case of the Delta SCMA’s
efforts to resolve the herdsmen/farmer conflict shows, politically driven conflicts where not all the
actors are apparent may be intractable. Moreover, the survey suggests that the right combination of
stakeholders have generally been successfully convened, and that stakeholders benefitted from
training and capacity support provided by NSRP, leading to improved communication and dialogue
between stakeholders and common efforts to address the triggers of violence. There is therefore a
case for cautiously validating the theory of change.

EQ5. To what extent, and in what ways, have coordination and alignment of strategic priorities/
actions among NSRP stakeholders improved?

• There is strong evidence of vibrant platforms with facilitated cross-platform communication

involving a broad spread of stakeholders from differing standpoints (i.e. significant movement
towards the conditions for coordination and alignment facilitated via support of a number of
platforms).

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• Significant progress has been made in developing the relations necessary for the TOC to be
realised at this level (i.e. creating conditions necessary for alignment through support of the
forums, associated dialogue, and development and agreement around require actions and
priorities, if limited evidence for delivery against these to date).
• Many of the important stakeholders for success are socially marginal, suggesting inclusive
programming (i.e. the foundations for coordination and alignment of NSRP stakeholder
strategic priorities/actions has improved by the systematic and meaningful inclusion of groups
representing marginalised persons.

EQ10. What is the evidence that accountability, capacity and responsiveness among decision
makers has increased?

• There is some evidence that the format/composition of the platforms itself leads to greater
accountability and responsiveness of the decision-makers that are present in the platforms
to the limits of the platform agenda.
• There is evidence that platform participants have increased their capacity through the training
and support work provided through the NSRP platforms.
Weaknesses in implementing monitoring and limited evidence of adaptability in programming prompt
the need for considerable caution in over-claiming the scale of the effect beyond limited results.
While convening platforms marks a considerable advance, it remains to be seen whether these gains
are sustainable following the withdrawal of funding. This is addressed in section 3 below.
It should also be acknowledged that in-depth development of the peace architecture and the nature
of the high-level changes envisaged by the programme (reduction in violence affecting vulnerable
groups) may only be fully realised in the medium to long term (and with favourable external
conditions). It may well be that further achievements would have been recorded by the programme
beyond the final evaluation point, and had the programme continued. However, tangible evidence of
a significant shift in levels of violence, that can be clearly attributed to the programme, was not
available at the FTE point.

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3.2 Bringing about broader societal participation

Headline findings

Finding 6: NSRP-supported platforms have provided an accessible and well-functioning forum

(across various dimensions of democratic dialogue) for different stakeholder groups (including
marginalised voices specifically women and youth), to come together around issues of conflict
management policy and practice: a significant achievement. The operation of the platforms can be
broadly characterised as having been effective in facilitating democratic dialogue across a number
of dimensions

Finding 7: However, with reference to the findings of focal area one, while participation and mutual
understanding have been facilitated, evidence of resulting behaviour change is, as yet, limited.

Finding 8: Evidence for NSRP influence in improved societal participation beyond the platforms
is also lacking.

Evaluation questions
NSRP considers that the marginalisation of large sections of the Nigerian population a key driver of
conflict. The NSRP Business Case suggests that 80% of society – predominantly women and youth
– are marginalised (DFID, 2012: 6). NSRP’s four output streams each seek to overcome this,
countering exclusion through increased participation in peacebuilding. The assumption that
improved functioning of conflict management mechanisms will be brought about by achieving
broader societal participation in, and oversight of, these mechanisms is core to the TOC
underpinning NSRP. The wider evidence in this area suggests that inclusion in peacebuilding efforts
and conflict resolution is crucial to lasting political peace insofar as and to the extent that any
excluded group has the capacity to threaten the political settlement (Castillejo, 2014; Putzel and
DiJohn, 2012)98. This applies whether the group is defined ‘vertically’ in the form of an ethnic or other
section of society, or ‘horizontally’, in the case of a class of society.
This issue was a focus of the MTE but findings were inconclusive99. The final evaluation looks again
at this issue in order to address two EQs in particular:

EQ6. To what extent, and in what ways, has regular, meaningful and sustained participation in
dialogue and debate, including the voices of marginalised groups, been achieved?
EQ9. What is the evidence that NSRP has contributed to communities’ capacity to manage and
resolve conflicts non-violently?

98
There is little evidence suggesting that gender-based violence drives wider political conflict, but rather that the two arise
together (Herbert, 2014).
99 At the MTE stage, NSRP’s M&E data suggested that the programme had been broadly successful in achieving

‘representation’ of marginalised groups in its supported Platforms. Elements of the MTE primary research also suggested
meaningful participation was being achieved in some cases. However, weaknesses in programme level M&E data meant
it was not possible to draw programme level conclusions as to whether broader societal participation was being achieved,
and with what effect. This issue was also highlighted in operational research of Output 1 which commented that “the issue
is the quality of participation and overcoming inequalities rather than tokenistic numerical presence”. This was followed by
observations on the “presence” but “minimal participation” of women at CPP meetings (Naujoks, 2016). Further, it was not
possible to comment in any meaningful way on the scale and nature of participation as a result of NSRP small grants due
to a lack of credible M&E data.

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The evidence
Programme monitoring data provides only a narrow indication of genuine participation, focusing on
“presence” of different groups at NSRP platform meetings while providing no insight into the extent
to which participation is meaningful. Validated data regarding the reach of NSRP’s small grants
(including the extent to which marginalised groups are among the beneficiaries) is also lacking.
The discussion that follows here focuses on NSRP-supported platforms and the participants directly
engaged (both direct intervention platforms (Type A) and advocacy platforms (Type B) are
considered), drawing largely on the NIEP’s platform participant survey and the case studies (The
methodology for these techniques is described in section 2. Detailed findings from the platform
survey and associated social network analysis (SNA) are included in Appendix D. The discussion is
framed around key indicators of democratic dialogue100 which are indicative of a process which has
achieved genuine, as opposed to ‘tokenistic’, participation (Table 3.2). Broader societal participation,
outside of supported platforms, is then considered where the evidence allows.
Table 3.2 Five indicators of democratic dialogue

Inclusivity Balanced representation (as appropriate) in composition of the platform

Extent to which participants feel confident to express their views without fear of criticism
Safe space
or reprisal.
If, and the extent to which, participants’ own views change as a result of hearing and
Learning
seeking to understand the views of others.
Extent to which participants perceive that processes/activities are conducted in good
Good faith faith (i.e. that all show integrity in sharing their knowledge and attitudes, hopes/agendas
of the process).
Extent to which participants are empowered to participate in conflict management
Empowerment
processes.

Inclusivity: Thinking firstly about the inclusivity of marginalised groupings in the platforms, the
evaluation evidence is somewhat mixed, with conflicting evidence from different research strands.
The discussion of platform participants that follows is split around two platform ‘types’: women’s
platforms (the federal and state women’s peace and security networks (WPSNs), and all other
platforms (the platform survey is described in section 2). This distinction is made because of the
difference in function and design of these platforms: the WPSNs specifically focus on achieving a
membership comprised of women and on mobilising a particular marginalised group whereas the
other platforms/initiatives seek to draw representation from a range of stakeholders.
For non-women’s platforms, NSRP platform monitoring data (where available) suggests that, across
the board, on average one third of platform participants at NSRP platform meetings are women
(NSRP Monitoring data, March 2017). Among the SCMAs and CPPs specifically (the platforms for
which the most comprehensive, disaggregated data is available) the disparity is wider, with three
quarters male to one quarter female. Regional variation is also apparent, with representation of
women significantly lower in the north east.
These findings are not unexpected given that: men tend to hold decision making positions in many
of the government, state security and traditional/religious institutions which are core to the platform’s
remit; and that cultural/religious tradition and norms in northern states perpetuate the marginalisation
of women. The presence of women in these at all is a positive achievement. With regards other
marginalised groups, NSRP monitoring templates do not contain information on the numbers of
youth and persons with a disability in attendance at platform meetings.
In terms of institutional/organisational attendance in non-women’s platforms, on average, just under
half (45%) of the institutions in attendance are non-state civil society actors (this includes community
based organisations (9%), women’s groups (11%), youth groups (8%) and other CSO’S (17%)).

100
Based on ‘Governing Principals of Democratic Dialogue' from 'A practical guide to democratic dialogue', OAS and
UNDP (2013: P12); and 'Measuring Empowerment: Ask Them?' (SIDA, 2010).

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State actors (government agencies and security sector institutions) account for a further 31%,
followed by traditional and religious institutions (16%) (academia, the private sector and ‘others’
make up the remaining institutional attendees). There is some suggestion from one case study (Case
study 8) that civil society involvement may have been restricted in some cases (there is an indication
that limited seats were made available to civil society in the DSCMA).
On a platform by platform/meeting by meeting basis, there is considerable variation in composition
of the platforms101 - although the possibility to analyse this in detail is compromised by the
considerable volume of missing data in NSRP’s monitoring templates (based on a spot check of
M&E templates and supporting evidence). However, in general, NSRP-platforms appear to have
made good progress in bringing a broader cross-section of actors to the table, but this has not been
achieved consistently.
Drawing on the survey of platform members, from the perspective of women’s platforms, and in
relation to the issue of inclusivity, the gender composition of women’s platforms is reversed
compared to all other platforms: just under two-thirds are female (65% of respondents) (Table 3.3).
Therefore, as may be anticipated, the gender balance reflects the focus of the platforms, but not
exclusively so.
Table 3.3 Q11.2 Respondent Gender
Women’s Groups Other
Male 33.33% 19 73.30% 151
Female 64.91% 37 26.70% 55
I would rather not say 1.75% 1 0.00% 0
Total Total 57 Total 206
Source: Platform Survey

It is noted that, like other platforms, women’s platforms draw members from a spectrum of
stakeholder organisations. However, in the women’s platform, there is a higher concentration of
members from civil society organisations (the most prominent group) and women’s organisations
(second most prominent) as compared with all other platforms (see Table 3.4). Akin to other platforms,
other key participants in the women’s platforms include Government Agencies, and Youth Groups
(demonstrating a crossover with other marginalised groups). However, State Security Institutions are
less commonly represented (as reflected in platform survey respondents), compared with all other
platforms.

101
The ideal platform composition is when at least one representative of state actor, security actor and civil society are
present at the same time during the meeting. This has been achieved in approximatively in 60% of the meetings held
between August 2016 and March 2017 for 5 SCMAs, 11 CPPs and 2 Lwus.

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Table 3.4 Q11.4 - What type of organisation do you represent on this Platform?
Women’s Other
Groups
Government Agency (Federal, State or LGA level) 8.77% 5 12.14% 25
State Security Institution (including Army, Police, Joint Task 3.51% 2 9.71% 20
Force)
Hizbah Board 0.00% 0 2.43% 5
Vigilante Group 1.75% 1 1.94% 4
Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary and 1.75% 1 1.94% 4
Sharia courts)
Traditional and Religious Institution 1.75% 1 10.68% 22
Academia 3.51% 2 5.83% 12
Media 1.75% 1 0.97% 2
Private Sector Organisation (including oil companies) 1.75% 1 1.94% 4
Trader’s/ Producer’s Group (including farmers /pastoralists) 0.00% 0 4.37% 9
Community Based Organisation 17.54% 10 15.05% 31
Women’s Group 19.30% 11 11.17% 23
Youth Group 8.77% 5 10.68% 22
Other Civil Society Group 24.56% 14 6.80% 14
Secret Society/Cult 0.00% 0 0.00% 0
Other (please specify) 5.26% 3 4.37% 9
Total Total 57 Total 206
Source: Platform Survey

However, when respondents of the NIEP platform survey were asked which groups are usually
present, there is little difference between women’s platforms and all other platforms, with a wide
range of stakeholders attending (Table 3.5). In terms of who contributes at meetings, traditional and
religious institutions play a less prominent role in women’s platforms, as do state security institutions,
but with civil society groups gaining a stronger voice (see Table 3.6).
Table 3.5 Q4.2 - Considering all the Platform meetings you have attended, which groups are usually
present?
Women’s Other
Groups
Government Agencies (Federal, State or LGA level) 10.47% 45 9.17% 156
State Security Institutions (including Army, Police, Joint Task 8.60% 37 9.81% 167
Force)
Hizbah Boards 2.09% 9 2.17% 37
Vigilante Groups 3.02% 13 7.87% 134
Judiciary (including representatives of Formal, Customary 7.67% 33 3.23% 55
and Sharia Courts)
Traditional and Religious Institutions 7.44% 32 9.58% 163
Academia 4.19% 18 5.82% 99
Media 9.07% 39 5.52% 94
Private Sector Organisations (including oil companies) 3.02% 13 2.47% 42
Trader’s/ Producer’s Group (including farmers /pastoralists) 2.33% 10 6.87% 117
Community Based Organisations 10.23% 44 8.93% 152
Women’s Groups 11.63% 50 9.69% 165
Youth Groups 9.53% 41 10.16% 173
Other Civil Society Groups 10.47% 45 7.70% 131
Secret Societies/Cults 0.00% 0 0.53% 9
Other (please specify) 0.23% 1 0.47% 8
Total Total 430 Total 1,702
Source: Platform Survey

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Table 3.6 Q4.3 - Considering all the Platform meetings you have attended, how often do the following
groups contribute to the issues being discussed?
Other Groups Women’s Groups
A A lot A A lot
great great
deal deal
Government Agencies 8.03% 53 7.57% 44 9.25% 16 9.24% 17
(Federal, State or LGA
level)
State Security 11.67% 77 11.02% 64 7.51% 13 8.15% 15
Institutions (including
Army, Police, Joint Task
Force)
Hizbah Boards 2.42% 16 1.55% 9 2.31% 4 2.17% 4
Vigilante Groups 6.67% 44 7.57% 44 1.16% 2 4.35% 8
Judiciary (including 2.12% 14 2.75% 16 8.67% 15 6.52% 12
representatives of
Formal, Customary and
Sharia Courts)
Traditional and Religious 11.36% 75 9.12% 53 6.36% 11 8.70% 16
Institutions
Academia 6.21% 41 5.34% 31 4.05% 7 5.43% 10
Media 4.70% 31 6.37% 37 8.67% 15 8.70% 16
Private Sector 0.61% 4 2.58% 15 0.58% 1 4.35% 8
Organisations (including
oil companies)
Trader’s/ Producer’s 5.91% 39 7.40% 43 0.58% 1 1.63% 3
Group (including farmers
/pastoralists)
Community Based 10.91% 72 8.43% 49 12.14% 21 10.33% 19
Organisations
Women’s Groups 10.00% 66 9.81% 57 15.61% 27 10.33% 19
Youth Groups 10.91% 72 11.88% 69 10.40% 18 9.78% 18
Other Civil Society 7.88% 52 8.09% 47 12.72% 22 10.33% 19
Groups
Secret Societies/Cults 0.30% 2 0.17% 1 0.00% 0 0.00% 0
Other (please specify) 0.30% 2 0.34% 2 0.00% 0 0.00% 0
Total Total 660 Total 581 Total 173 Total 184
Source: Platform Survey

For women’s groups, similar to all other platforms, perceptions of inclusion in conflict management
and peacebuilding decision-making have risen from around two-thirds feeling somewhat or very
included 2-3 years ago, to almost all feeling that way now (see Table 3.7 and Table 3.8).
Table 3.7 Q4.5 - Thinking about 2-3 years ago, how included did you feel then in conflict management and
peacebuilding decision-making?
Question Women’s Other
Groups
Very included 31.58% 18 47.14% 99
Somewhat included 33.33% 19 20.00% 42
Neither included nor excluded 12.28% 7 4.29% 9
Somewhat excluded 8.77% 5 4.76% 10
Very excluded 12.28% 7 7.14% 15
I was not involved in conflict management/ peace-building 2 to 3 1.75% 1 16.67% 35
years ago
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

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Table 3.8 Q4.4 - How included do you feel in conflict management and peacebuilding decision-making?
Question Women’s Groups Other
Very included 63.16% 36 80.95% 170
Somewhat included 36.84% 21 13.33% 28
Neither included nor excluded 0.00% 0 3.33% 7
Somewhat excluded 0.00% 0 1.43% 3
Very excluded 0.00% 0 0.95% 2
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

Safe spaces: State-actors feel most able to speak up and express their views at platform meetings:
approximately 80% of state actors report that they “always” feel able to speak up and express their
views. This is compared to 62% of non-state actors and 59% of those representing traditional or
religious institutions. However, it is not suggested that other members are overly anxious about doing
so (see Table 3.9). This is evident in the survey data and there is no indication to the contrary from
the case studies. The primary explanation for why individuals do not feel able to speak up and
express their view is that someone has already made their point. Nearly three quarters of survey
respondents answered this way. Only four individuals suggest that they do not speak up because
they are intimidated, all non-state actors operating at local level.
Despite these power dynamics, the available evidence is that NSRP-platforms are considered safe
spaces. Rather, opportunity to speak up may be the issue and in this sense the role of the platform
convenor and chair comes to the fore. It is convenor/chair’s role to preside over inclusive meetings,
to ensure that discussions stay on track, that those wishing to speak can interject and that they are
not shut down or their views dismissed. The skills of platform convenors/chairs in this regard vary
considerably (see Box 3.1 and section 5).
Table 3.9 Q5.2 - During Platform meetings, how frequently do you feel able to speak up and express your
views when you have something to say?
Question Women’s Groups Other
Always 63.16% 36 64.76% 136
Most of the time 28.07% 16 26.67% 56
About half the time 1.75% 1 1.90% 4
Sometimes 7.02% 4 6.19% 13
Never 0.00% 0 0.48% 1
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

Box 3.1 Examples of the varying skills and capacities of platform convenors

Observation undertaken by NSRP at the Yobe SCMA suggests that the convenor is failing to
facilitate the creation of a safe, inclusive space where members are respected and heard. The
convenor’s failure to facilitate the group to participate in decision-making and come to collective
decisions around what actions to take was highlighted through this observation. More concerning,
there is a suggestion that the convener is making decisions about actions on its own and that
these decisions do not always reflect the views expressed by the platform members. The report
also highlights the authoritative, uncollaborative manner of the convener, who at times has
instructed individuals to follow-up on specific matters without these members acknowledging or
agreeing to follow up. In sum, there appears to be very limited participation in determining actions
and responsibilities and a consequential lack of ownership amongst platform members in
decisions and actions.
Observation of other platforms, however, indicates the presence of more effective convenors. At
the CPP in Jere, Borno, for example, it is noted that decisions are proposed by the convenor
following wide consultation including multiple interventions and contributions by platform
members. These decisions are repeatedly verified by the convenor with the platform members
until an agreed-upon outcome is identified.

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The NIEP platform participant survey also reveals some interesting findings about the role of the
convenor in enabling/prohibiting genuine participation. In Yobe - an area where multi-stakeholder
dialogue and civilian involvement in security matters (through NSRP and more widely) is a more
recent development and where the capacity of convening organisations is limited (KII, NSRP,
MTE) - only 40% of survey participants felt they are “always” able to speak up. In contrast, in
Plateau an above average number of respondents stated that they “always” feel able to speak up
(79%).

Learning: In a dialogue process which achieves genuine participation, learning is an important

element. In the case studies, there were limited shifts or adaptations in posture or approach by the
platforms themselves, nor did participants’ perceptions of the top successful partners change greatly.
What of the stakeholders themselves? Participants should be willing to learn from other, to
understand their respective points of view (step 1) and be open to changing their own position (step
2).
There is some positive evidence102 that NSRP platforms have been successful in this regard. Almost
exclusively survey respondents report that platform meetings help them to better understand the
opinions of others (97% of respondents report this to be true on “all” or “most” occasions), and for
61% of respondents the discussions result in them changing or modifying their own opinions most
of the time (see Table 3.10 and Table 3.11). In two of the case studies, there was also some evidence
that the participants adapted their behaviour and attitudes to others.
Interestingly, at a wider operational level there is limited evidence of any shift in the convenors’
approaches (resulting from learning from the platform/ platform members).
Table 3.10 Q6.2 - How frequently would you say that Platform meetings help you to better understand the
opinions of other participants?
Question Women’s Groups Other
Always 50.88% 29 60.95% 128
Most of the time 40.35% 23 36.19% 76
About half the time 7.02% 4 0.00% 0
Sometimes 1.75% 1 2.38% 5
Never 0.00% 0 0.48% 1
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

Table 3.11 Q6.3 - Following discussion at a Platform meeting, how often do you find that your opinion has
changed?
Question Women’s Groups Other
Always 7.02% 4 24.29% 51
Most of the time 50.88% 29 37.62% 79
About half the time 7.02% 4 4.76% 10
Sometimes 33.33% 19 28.57% 60
Never 1.75% 1 4.76% 10
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

Good faith: There are many possible reasons why openness to learning, learning itself and action
as a result of learning may be impeded. When exploring if participation is indeed ‘genuine’, the issue
of good faith is an important consideration: are participants truly working towards the same shared
goal?
Generally speaking, the evidence is that NSRP platforms have been conducted in good faith. It is
unrealistic to think that vested interests will not in any way influence the behaviours of individuals
and institutions operating in a highly political space, but there is certainly no compelling evidence of

102Corroborated
(if isolated) examples, but conflicting evidence/inference from other stakeholder groups/research strands.

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actors actively trying to disrupt platform activity (see Table 3.12). Over half of respondents (59%)
report that other members of the platform ‘always’ participate in meetings with the genuine intention
of findings solutions to the points raised, a further 32% felt this was the case ‘most of the time’.
Nineteen individuals feel that all members are working with the genuine intention of findings solutions
to the issues raised on only half or less of occasions.
However, non-state actors tend to be a little more sceptical that all platform members are working
towards shared goals.
Table 3.12 Q 7.3 - How often do you feel that members try to disrupt the work of the Platform?
# Question Women’s Groups Other
5 Always 3.51% 2 6.67% 14
6 Most of the time 3.51% 2 9.52% 20
7 About half the time 1.75% 1 2.38% 5
8 Sometimes 43.86% 25 27.62% 58
9 Never 47.37% 27 53.81% 113
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

While there is no evidence of members actively disrupting activity, the suggestion in some case
studies is that vested interests have affected the traction that platforms are able to get on some
issues. For example, Case study 8 reports that the police openly support the SCMA agenda to
resolve the herdsmen/farmer conflict in Delta state but are, tactically, not pursing the herdsmen in
the event of encroachment and aggression.
Key informants suggest that the state response is influenced by vested interests (high ranking
members of the government own cattle and it is not in their interest to enforce restrictions). In this
case the work of the SCMA to find peaceful resolution to the conflict is welcomed, but without the
active, genuine support of the state, outcomes will continue to be limited. In the case of the Kano
WPSN, the level of commitment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs(MoWA) was thrown into doubt
following a change in leadership, despite the promulgation of the State Action Plan (SAP) and the
creation of a committee nominally to implement the programme.
These examples, and the weak governance system within Nigeria, suggest that other disjuncture
between public commitments and practice may be expected from all stakeholders. However, these
are explicitly part of the problem and the NSRP platforms are there precisely to engage the
organisations in relatively transparent processes, that will gradually resolve such disjuncture.
Empowerment: The final indicator is empowerment. That is, are platform members empowered to
participate in conflict management processes? How meaningful is their participation?
Section 3 on Strengthening the Peace Architecture, notes that different stakeholders are perceived
to be important partners for success. These correspond for the most part to traditional, religious,
state security, or civilian organisations. However, CBO’s are also consistently emphasised as key
stakeholders (see Appendix D Social Network Analysis). For SCMAs and CPPs, youth groups are
also cited in the top five partners for success; women’s groups are consistently less important, but
are intensively involved (that is, they are not seen to be crucial to achieving change, but are frequent
engagers in the programme). The QCA analysis also notes that while traditional holders of power
from state security and civilian branches and traditional leaders are consistently seen as crucial for
the effectiveness of the platforms, a broader spread is crucial for the platforms’ successful operation
at the LGA level.
If this indication of who is important is to be taken as a yardstick, it shows that community-based,
youth and women’s groups are considered important to success. Among participants themselves,
the perception is of multiple and diverse “contributors”103 to platform meetings (respondents to the
NIEP’s primary research survey were asked to think about all the platform meetings they have
attended and to comment on the level of input that different groups of stakeholders tend to make,

103.

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see Appendix Tables D.7 and D.8) Organisations representing youth are suggested to be the most
frequent contributors (82% of respondents feel they contribute “a great deal” or “a lot” in platform
discussions), followed by security sector institutions and women’s groups (79% of respondents feel
they contribute “a great deal” or “a lot” in platform discussions).
On further exploration of the data, two things stand out. First, state actors perceive that their
contribution to the discussion process is high: these actors project a sense of power in the process.
Their perception of their own contribution is above the sample average. Among state-actors, 84%
and 76% feel that state security institutions and government agencies respectively contribute “a great
deal” or “a lot” to platform meetings. This is compared to the sample average of 79% and 61%.
The second point of note is the significant contribution of those representing youth and women as
viewed by state-actors. Some 84% and 71% of state actors report that youth and women’s groups
respectively contribute “a great deal” or “a lot” to meetings.
In contrast, among civil society respondents104 the perceived contribution of women’s and youth
groups is quite a bit lower (around two thirds of respondents from this groups feel that women’s
groups and youth groups make a significant contribution); this group do not feel they are contributing
as much as state-actors think they are. This is in keeping with case study evidence which questions
inclusivity and the power civil society actors wield in some cases.
Around 80% of respondents feel that the platform is used to scrutinise and challenge the actions of
conflict management stakeholders (see Table 3.13). This response was particularly prominent among
those operating at local and state level. Some 82% of respondents from local level platforms and
80% from state level report that the platform is used to scrutinise and challenge the actions of other
relevant actors “all” or “most of the time”. This is compared to 54% of respondents at federal level
(NB: small sample size here).
However, case studies provide little evidence to back up this claim and it is not captured in
programme monitoring data. Programme monitoring data does record instances of policy practice
influence by individual platforms (a proxy of sorts for the responsiveness of the state (top-down
accountability)). Taking NSRP’s direct intervention platforms (the NPSF, SCMAs, CPPs, LWUs,
MSPs and EMTs) only 13 instances of policy practice influence are noted during programme
implementation to date. If scrutiny and pressure was being applied by the platforms, success
appears to have been limited.
Across NSRP target states perceptions of the extent to which platforms are used to
challenge/scrutinise vary: for example, 62% of respondents in Bayelsa believe this to be the case “a
majority of the time” compared to 97% in Yobe. Expectations, external context and intervention
duration may be relevant explanatory factors.
In Bayelsa, activity of NSRP platforms did not really start/step up until late in the intervention period
(the frequency of SCMA meetings seem to have stepped up from August 2015 and the CPPs were
established from late 2016). The platforms are relatively young in this state and may not yet have
established themselves as an accountability mechanism. Also, the external context in which
secretive cultist activities are on the rise and the perceived impact of violence has increased will
likely impact the views of platform members.
By contrast, Yobe state also has relatively young platforms (the SCMA was established in May 2014
before a long gap in activity until August 2015; the CPPs were established in early/mid- 2016) but
come from a position of high violence and low oversight of conflict management processes. In Yobe,
any positive change is likely to be viewed favourably.

104
The CSO group includes women’s groups, youth groups, community based organisations and other civil society
organisations.

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Table 3.13 Q8.6 - How frequently do you feel the Platform scrutinises and challenges the actions of relevant
actors?
Question Women’s Groups Other
Always 17.54% 10 34.29% 72
Most of the time 59.65% 34 45.71% 96
About half the time 14.04% 8 5.71% 12
Sometimes 8.77% 5 12.38% 26
Never 0.00% 0 1.90% 4
Total Total 57 Total 210
Source: Platform Survey

Participation by broader society

Looking beyond NSRP’s supported platforms, there is strong evidence that some NSRP
interventions have contributed to broader societal participation in dialogue and debate around
conflict drivers, conflict management and peace-building more widely. The strongest examples come
from work with the broadcast media. Case study 4 demonstrates a contribution of NSRP in efforts
by supported media partners to facilitate dialogue on gender issues and include women’s voices on
the air. Further, MTE key informants spoke of instances where young people involved in NSRP
supported Peace Clubs (as well as members from other platforms) have been interviewed on air in
relation to peacebuilding, gender and social inclusion (including disability), and in relation to the
adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325105 (UQ, 2016: 67). Through these
activities NSRP has extended its reach, taking dialogue and debate into the wider community and
providing knowledge for others to take forward and use.
The success of other NSRP interventions is certainly more limited. For example, Case study 5 noted
the increased inclusion and empowerment of marginalised youth around the development of a Code
of Principles for Youth Employment programmes; however, in the absence of endorsement and
adoption of the Code by government agencies wider outcomes are limited.
Unfortunately, the evaluation presents no evidence on the role of NSRP small grants in support of
broader societal participation and the inclusion of marginalised groups (other than activity based
reporting). As noted at the MTE, NSRP holds no collated and validated source of evidence that
confirms the reach, beneficiaries and outcomes as a result of its small grant programme. This source
of evidence was also absent at the FE.
Given the above, the balance of evidence is not sufficient to suggest that NSRP, as a whole, has
contributed to broader societal participation in conflict management processes (beyond the
immediate beneficiaries of its interventions and members of its platforms) as envisaged at the higher
levels of the theory of change (see Finding 9). This assertion is backed up by the APS which shows:
• Wider community involvement in conflict management institutions/processes remains low106.
• Involvement in conflict management institutions/processes is markedly higher for males than
females and it varies by state (on average, involvement is lowest in Kano and highest in
Borno). Differences are less pronounced for other socio-economic characteristics.
• As may be expected, wider community involvement is most frequently through community
development councils, women’s groups, youth groups and vigilante groups rather than the
police, courts etc.
• There is low recognition of NSRP supported platforms.

105
The resolution reaffirms the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations,
peacebuilding, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and in post-conflict reconstruction and stresses the importance of
their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.
106 APS data shows that 7% of respondents in 2013 were involved with some kind of institution/organisation with a role in

conflict management. This figure increased to 15% in 2016, before returning to 9% in 2017.

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• Perceived ease of access to conflict management stakeholders has not varied greatly over
the 5-year period of the APS. Non-state actors, traditional and religious institutions are
generally considered more accessible than state security and government actors107.

Concluding remarks

EQ6. To what extent, and in what ways, has regular, meaningful and sustained participation in
dialogue and debate, including the voices of marginalised groups, been achieved?

The operation of the platforms can be broadly characterised as having been effective in facilitating
democratic dialogue across a number of dimensions (see Finding 6). Overall, NSRP-supported
platforms have provided a space for different stakeholder groups, including those considered to
represent marginalised voices specifically women and youth, to come together around issues of
conflict management, resolution, policy and practice change. The operations of the platforms are
broadly characterised as safe spaces and demonstrate good faith in their conduct. This is a
significant achievement.
Within platforms, power continues to reside with state-actors who may have entrenched views on
the ‘appropriate’ or necessary level of contribution that non-state actors, civil society should be
afforded. However, other actors are also seen to be important partners to success, and a broad
composition is particularly important at the LGA.
While discussions and contributions are skewed towards state actors, there is space for others to
articulate their views and a wider group of stakeholders are considered by participants as key
partners for success. Finally, with some exceptions (such as support to broadcast media), the ability
of NSRP platforms and interventions to reach beyond those directly engaged has been inconsistent
and there is no evidence of a significant contribution to broader societal participation (see Finding
8).
However, despite providing, to a significant extent, ostensibly effective forums for democratic
dialogue around issues of conflict management policy and practice (including engagement of non-
state actors and marginalised groups), reference to the findings from focal area one, suggest little
evidence that these forums have (as yet) led to impactful behaviour change (see Finding 7).
It should also be acknowledged that widespread societal participation and the high-level changes
envisaged by the programme (reduction in violence affecting vulnerable groups) may only be fully
realised in the medium to long term (and with favourable external conditions). It may well be that
further achievements would have been recorded by the programme beyond the final evaluation point,
and had the programme continued. However, tangible evidence of a significant shift in levels of
violence, that can be clearly attributed to the programme, was not available at the FTE point.

107 Over 80% of respondents feel the following stakeholders are “very” or “easily” accessible (in descending order): youth
groups, local religious leaders, vigilante groups, community development councils, Hizbah boards, traditional rulers,
women’s groups and religious umbrella organisations. The list of less accessible institutions includes: police, army, LGA
officials, formal courts, media, federal government and state government.

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3.3 NSRP exerting influence

Headline findings

Finding 9: The evaluation research finds a range of examples at all levels of where NSRP has
successfully influenced key actors/ institutions in the conflict arena resulting, in some cases, in
key policy and practice changes that have enhanced stability and reconciliation. However, this
evidence is drawn almost entirely from the evaluation case studies and is weakened somewhat
as a result of positive bias.

Finding 10: Stepping above the nine deep-dive case studies and looking more broadly across
the programme, at first glance NSRP’s influence appears limited, with NSRP’s programme
monitoring data recording only 38108 instances of influence across the three-year implementation
period. Occasions of reported policy or practice change are particularly low for Output 1 and 2
platforms/initiatives; in contract eight NAP policy practice changes were achieved. However, the
numbers suffer from similar problems (methodologically and conceptually) as those pertaining to
the peace architecture. Accurately assessing the extent of NSRP’s contribution is also made more
difficult as a result of potentially low levels of reporting through NSRP’s M&E system which in turn
are resulting in NSRP’s contribution in this area being underestimated.

Finding 11: A range of factors have facilitated NSRP’s capacity to influence policy and practice
change, most notably: building, leveraging and sustaining strong relationships with champions of
change; and the capacity of the platforms/initiatives to identify and capitalise on ‘windows of
opportunity’ and ‘spaces for influence’. There are important structural risks associated with
relationship-building and the inevitable departure of key champions of change, however, which
highlight the fragility of policy and practice change and its dependency on lasting, institutionalised
relationships. Key factors that have stilted results include wider socio-economic, political-
economy, and cultural factors; and, in some cases, NSRP’s failure to respond appropriately to
these realities and shift its focus/approach.

Finding 12: Looking specifically at EQ7, NSRP’s TOC assumes that access to better information
and evidence is improved, this will be used to influence policy and practice; specifically, if society
more broadly is equipped with more information, they will be able to influence and advocate for
change more effectively. Case 9 however directly contravenes these assumptions. More broadly,
although anecdotal and isolated examples of NSRP’s research influencing changes in practice do
exist (drawn from the NSRP monitoring tools), evidence in this area is weak; evidence and
research were only one of the tools in a wider set of mediation and advocacy approaches used to
influence policy and practice.

Finding 13: Looking towards sustainability, the research highlights that policy change is
necessary but not always sufficient to achieve the long-term reductions in conflict and violence
sought by NSRP. Other components - such as dedicated resources to implement policy change;
ongoing monitoring of policy implementation; and significant buy-in and change in action by
government – are also important and necessary steps in the journey towards changing practices
and reducing conflict. It is important to note, however, that although policy change may on its own
not be sufficient to contribute immediately to conflict reduction, it is still a highly valuable step in
the journey and end in itself.

Evaluation questions
Given the focus of the programme on exerting influence, and the associated assumptions
underpinning the NSRP TOC i.e. that a) NSRP/ partners have capacity to achieve this and b) that

108
The evaluation drew on data up to end March 2017. At end August NSRP self-reported 54 incidences, but the IE was
not in a position to validate this data within the timeframes of the evaluation.

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decision makers are willing and able to listen/act; this was identified as an area of interest for the FE
by both NSRP and DFID.
NSRP is working across all four of its output streams, in all eight focal states, at the community, state
and federal levels to increase the capacity of its platforms, initiatives and interventions – and the
capacity of society more broadly - to exert influence over key actors/institutions in the conflict
arena with the intention of bringing about positive changes in policy, practice and
programming. Ultimately, these changes are intended to result in enhanced stability and reduced
violence.
The issue of influence was not a focal area at the time of the MTE, which in general focused on lower
level outcomes and the building blocks required to increase capacity to influence109. Following the
MTE, exerting influence was thus identified as one of three key focal areas for the evaluation during
its final phase110.
In analysing and untangling the extent to which – and in what ways - NSRP has successfully
influenced policy and practice change, this section draws again on Figure 1.2 and Table 1.2 as an
analytical framework, looking at the different types of platforms/initiatives; whether different platforms
have deployed different packages of interventions in their quest to influence policy and practice
change; and to what end.
This section firstly presents the evidence of NSRP’s achievements in relation to influencing policy
and practice change, as captured in NSRP’s monitoring, data before focusing in on the different
combinations of activities/interventions/approaches deployed by the platforms/initiatives. Finally, it
considers key external factors (often outside the control of NSRP) that have facilitated and inhibited
platform success in this area.
This section addresses Evaluation Questions 7 and 11:

EQ7. To what extent, and in what ways, has the capacity of broader society to use knowledge,
influence and advocate for change been built?

EQ11. To what extent have NSRP’s platforms/initiatives (including research) influenced key
actors/institutions in the conflict arena, resulting in changes in policy and practice that enhance
stability and reconciliation?

What has NSRP achieved in the area of influence?

NSRP’s revised Results Framework was set up to capture results in relation to NSRP’s influence on
policy and practice and, in turn, on enhanced stability or reconciliation111. Table 3.14 provides a
summary of the total number of occasions that influence has been achieved across NSRP’s different
platforms and initiatives, as reported in the Results Framework and monitoring tools (up until March
2017).
The data demonstrates that over the course of the near 5-year programme period NSRP’s platforms/
initiatives have collectively influenced policy or practice change on 38 occasions; this total however
hides the fact that in Year 4 of implementation only four instances of policy or practice change were
recorded across the programme portfolio.
In simplistic, numerical terms Output 4 have had the most success in achieving influence (in terms
of number of occasions that influence has precipitated change), while occasions of reported policy
or practice change are particularly low for Output 1 and 2 platforms/initiatives: the NPSF is recorded

109 The one area of the MTE that did look at influence was in relation to NSRP’s research. The evidence base here was
limited with only isolated, often anecdotal/ vague examples of research evidence influencing policy and practice.
110 See NSRP-IEP Way Forward Concept Note (August 2016)
111 The revised Results Framework includes new indicators measuring influence leading to policy/ practice change in

relation to the NPSF, SCMAs, CPPs, LWU Dialogue Mechanisms, MSPs and EMTs, WPSNs at federal and state level,
NAP and SAP initiatives, the Observatories, NSRP’s research, Strategic Partnerships, and Media Platforms.

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as influencing policy/ practice on only one occasion over the near 5-year period; only two instances
of policy/practice change are recorded across NSRP’s SCMAs and CPPs; only three across LWU
DMs; and the MSP and EMT DMs report no results (see Finding 10).
Table 3.14 Total number of occasions that influence has been achieved by NSRP’s platforms/ initiatives
Output Stream NSRP Platform/ Total # of instances where Total # of instances of
Initiative platform/ initiative has influence per Output
influenced Stream
1 NPSF 1
SCMAs 1 3
CPPs 1
2 LWU Dialogue
3
Mechanisms
Mutli-Stakeholder 3
Platform/EMT 0
Dialogue Mechanisms
3 NAP/SAP activities 8
9
Observatory activities 1
4 Research 17
Strategic Partner
4 23
Institutions
Media platforms 2

However, the numbers suffer from similar problems as those pertaining to the peace architecture, in
that methodologically instances of influencing are difficult to distinguish and enumerate; and
conceptually a shift in policy may be have a very significant impact on behaviour or may be very
limited.
This low level of reporting on the number of instances could also equally be a function of the
methodological and conceptual difficulties of recording the counterfactual, or a reflection of an M&E
system that is failing to accurately capture results which in turn is resulting in NSRP’s contribution in
this area being underestimated Unfortunately, it is not possible to estimate with any certainty the
extent of under-reporting nor the extent to which methodological and conceptual difficulties are
inhibiting a true picture of programme success or progress in this area.
The limited results reported in NSRP’s Results Framework are, however, somewhat moderated by
the NIEP case study work, which provides moderate evidence112 of NSRP platforms/ initiatives
successfully influencing policy/practice change at all levels (federal, state and LGA). The following
section draws on these examples to demonstrate the different programmatic approaches and
mechanisms employed by a range of different NSRP platforms/ initiatives to command influence
(see Finding 9).

How did the platforms set out to achieve influence over policy and practice change?
As alluded to previously, looking across the range of NSRP platforms/initiatives it is noticeable that
different initiatives have employed different combinations of a wide range of activities and
interventions in seeking to influence policy and practice change. Drawing on the NIEP case study
research – which specifically looked at the different factors and actors that may have contributed to
changes in policy and practice in relation to nine platforms/initiatives - it is possible to roughly group

112
Corroborated examples emanating from at least one stakeholder group or research strand, with no evidence to the
contrary.

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and plot the cases onto the matrix below (Figure 3.3) to demonstrate the different combinations of
activities delivered.
Figure 3.3 Combination of activities delivered

In general, Output 3 and 4 initiatives/ platforms (those in green) fall into the left-hand column in
Figure 3.3 (as a result of their focus on targeted influencing and persuasion). In seeking to influence
behaviours, practices and policy they tend to deploy different combinations of: advocacy, research,
mobilisation, network-building, strategic partnerships, sensitisation, awareness-raising and
training on conflict sensitivity. Broadly speaking, these platforms/ initiatives also have in common
their focus on addressing violence indirectly through policy and practice change. Consider the
following three examples:
• The state-level Kano Women’s Peace and Security Network (KWPSN) (Case 9) provides a
strong example of where grassroots mobilisation, targeted advocacy work, ongoing individual
lobbying, continual media presence, and wider network-building (to bring on board allies and
champions within and outside of government) have been effectively deployed to positively
influence policy change. With a clear policy change in mind – the formal domestication of
Nigeria’s National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security - the KWPSN successfully
and significantly contributed to: raising the issue of VAWG within the political discourse and
media in Kano, increasing public pressure for change, and opening up a political window; the
development of a climate amenable to policy change; and, ultimately, to the domestication of
the National Action Plan (NAP) through the launch of the Kano SAP in May 2016.

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The positive outcomes achieved here also result from the KWPSN working through and
together with the Kano SCMA (KSCMA) to increase their visibility, credibility and leverage.
The KWPSN used their membership of the SCMA - and, in particular, the creation of an
SCMA sub-committee - as a platform to approach and influence key actors and push for the
SAP. Leveraging this relationship undoubtedly leant the WPSN wider credibility and
influence. The approach deployed by the KWPSN that is described here provides a strong
example of complementarity across NSRP’s output streams; however, beyond this example
the evaluation found limited other examples of cross-working across the output streams. This
is discussed in more detail in section 2.2.
A further noteworthy finding from this case relating to EQ7113 is that decision makers were
not influenced by the data and evidence on VAWG (as was assumed in the programme TOC);
as such, this case study does not represent an example of evidence being deployed to
influence/ change decision-maker’s viewpoints, nor yet to inform advocacy and accountability
efforts. Indeed, evidence on the incidence of VAWG is not particularly prevalent and played
a minimal role in the discourse. What mattered in case 9 was the nature of the relationships
that were created through the KWPSN’s ongoing lobbying work (see Finding 12).
• NSRP’s work to increase conflict sensitivity amongst the Nigerian media provides a strong
example of NSRP’s capacity to positively influence step changes in practice, this time through
training in conflict sensitive ways of action (Case 4). Individuals within all NSRP’s partner
radio stations are now adopting and applying CSC principles and approaches as a result of
workplace mentoring and training. There have been marked improvements in the conflict
sensitivity of radio discussion programmes114 and, in total, NSRP support has resulted in 11
key internal practice changes across 15 radio stations115. With the 2017 APS data revealing
that 65% of citizens believe that a ‘more conflict sensitive media’ has helped resolve conflict
– a link that is well made in the literature - it is plausible that these positive changes in practice
are contributing to enhanced stability (NSRP, 2017: 9).
• There are anecdotal examples of NSRP’s research influencing change through identifying
and targeting key powerholders (as would-be users of research and evidence) in the conflict
management arena. NSRP’s research on Rural Banditry and Conflict in Nigeria (NSRP,
2015) is perceived to have influenced police practices in Gombe116. Separately,
recommendations made in NSRP’s research Winners or Loser? Assessing the Contribution
of Youth Employment and Empowerment Programmes in Reducing Conflict Risk in Nigeria
(NSRP, 2014c) is perceived to have influenced the Rivers State Sustainable Development
Agency (RSSDA) - a state-level government agency - to establish a Technical Working Group
to enhance coordination amongst key actors on peacebuilding and employment
programmes. The government’s National Directorate of Employment also drew on this
research to improve and refine their recruitment process. Plateau States’ MoWA also cited
by NSRP as drawing on NSRP’s research on What Violence Means to us: Women with
Disabilities Speak (NSRP, 2015b) to inform the SAP.
In contrast, Output 1 and 2 initiatives/platforms (those in red, Figure 3.3) tend – in general – to focus
not on resolving conflict indirectly through influencing high-level policy change but on directly
resolving specific conflicts, often through practice change. These initiatives/platforms largely fall into
the right-hand column (Figure 3.3) and core activities include convening key powerholders into

113
EQ7: To what extent, and in what ways, has the capacity of broader society to use knowledge, influence and advocate
for change been built?
114 NSRP report a “marked improvement in the level of conflict sensitivity of radio discussion programmes” with an “average

score of 3.8 (out of maximum score of 5) in 2017 on the NSRP media scorecard compared to a baseline of 1.3 in 2013”
(NSRP, 2017: 8).
115 These changes in practice include media partners conducting regular editorial meetings and ‘post mortems’ of

completed programmes, practices previously conspicuous by their absence.

116 Drawing on the report recommendations, the police adopted the practice of holding conflict resolution meetings with

the community when disputes arise, something they were previously not engaging in.

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longer term organizations/ platforms; mediation, dialogue, reconciliation and collective

solution- and decision-making with the stakeholders affected by and involved in targeted
conflicts; and ongoing relationship-building with communities. These activities are often
combined with elements of sensitisation work, as is the case with the DSCMA, Kaduna South CPP
and the LWU DMs in Bokkos City and Daffo.
The case studies illustrate that different combinations of these activities have been effectively
employed to influence. Take the following examples:
• The LWU DMs in Bokkos City and Daffo (Plateau State), which have influenced significant
changes in practice amongst farmers and pastoralists - two key groups involved in conflict in
these LGAs. Practice changes include the development of timetables for water use by
farmers and pastoralists and the subsequent rotational use of streams; and the demarcation
of cattle routes and water sources (case 7).
These practices were not in place in these communities prior to the DMs and are seen to
have resulted in a reduction in local-level conflicts and improvements in community-level
conflict management. The shifts in practice described here were facilitated by the very
presence of the DMs and driven by the ongoing sensitisation, negotiation and mediation work
conducted by the DMs. The DMs focus on working with communities and the protagonists of
conflict to agree on these new rules for sharing resources was identified as key here.
Shifts in practice have also been observed amongst the DM members themselves117, all of
whom are key conflict management stakeholders. Traditional leaders – who play a highly
significant role in LWU conflict resolution – in particular have shifted towards a more inclusive,
coordinated approach to conflict management as a result of their membership of and training
received through the DM.
• Case 6 – which looks at the development of the National Security Strategy (NSS) -
demonstrates NSRP’s capacity to contribute to and influence federal-level security policy and
strategy development. Over the case study timeline, we see the development of a new, more
inclusive, more comprehensive NSS that builds significantly on any preceding it and which
was developed through a more inclusive, coordinated approach than any of its predecessors.
Indeed, the picture presented in this case is one in which the approach to drafting and
developing NSS in Nigeria changed substantially.
What, though, was NSRP’s contribution? This case provides a good example of a project
working through the “building blocks” of the NSRP TOC to achieve the higher-level outcome
of influence. That is, NSRP successfully:
o Engaged influential, committed ‘agents of change’ in its delivery partner, NIPSS, and
in Office of National Security (ONSA);
o Brought together a wide range of state and non-state stakeholders to debate
prescient peace and security issues, in this case, the need for a new NSS and
approach;
o Enhanced communication and coordination amongst these stakeholders; and,
o Enabled network members to better understand each other’s remit.
By providing the space for these actors to come together, NSRP enabled them to work in a
problem-driven, coordinated, inclusive and aligned way and to develop a more coordinated,
inclusive NSS. As well as contributing to the process through the provision of financial and
technical inputs118, NSRP positively aided, pushed forward and influenced the process
through its strong, ongoing focus on inclusion; its ongoing proactivity and its knowledge of
local systems119; through leveraging its sister platforms - the NPSF and Civil Society

117
Including traditional leaders, community leaders, religious leaders and security agents.
118
NSRP provided financial and technical inputs to the EEGMs and the NSS drafting process.
119 This case demonstrated that NSRP and the expertise of its staff are highly valued by their partners and those

stakeholders they have engaged.

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Organization (CSO) Peace and Security Network; and through ongoing capacity building and
advocacy work with civil society.
• The Kaduna South CPP (case 2) brought together the different conflict parties (including
youths, and people of different religions and ethnicities) and engaged directly with the
instigators of violence. Through including and actively working with these actors, the CPP
contributed to critical changes in practice witnessed amongst youths and youth leaders in the
lead up to the 2015 election which resulted in less violent, more peaceful behaviour.
• Findings from the QCA further validate the effectiveness of this approach: at the local level
the QCA found that a wide and diverse platform composition is a key factor, if not a necessary
condition, for platform success.
In “categorising” NSRP’s platforms/ initiatives, there are exceptions to the rule. Case 5, for example,
falls under Output 2 but sits apart from the majority of other Output 2 platforms/ initiatives in terms
of its programmatic approach: here the focus of NSRP’s partner Resource Centre for Human Rights
and Civic Education (CHRICED) has been on advocating and lobbying to government agencies for
more transparent and fair employment and empowerment programmes.

A note on sustainability: Case 6

The positive strides made in relation to the policy-change implied by the NSS (as described above
and in more detail in Case 6) are significant, especially when looking back to the context and
highly closed approach to security strategy- and policy-making pre-2012.
However, whether the NSS is being effectively implemented, and whether these positive steps are
being followed through and are sustainable is less clear. Since the launch of the NSS in 2015
Nigeria has seen a General Election and a change in President and ruling party. The case study
provided anecdotal evidence that these changes have posed challenges for the implementation
of the NSS - changes to ONSA’s architecture and staff in 2015 were, in particular, seen to have
stalled progress. Those engaged in the case research (including participants from the key
government agencies leading on NSS implementation) were unable to say whether or not the NSS
was at that time being successfully implemented under President Buhari’s administration.
One point that did emerge strongly was the absence of any form of ongoing review or monitoring
of NSS implementation. A monitoring plan was not put in place when the NSS was being
developed and the NSS has not been reviewed since its launch; this was identified as a key factor
likely to prevent effective implementation. It must however be acknowledged that policy changes
and subsequent changes in behaviour requires time, and the relative success of NSRP in this
area will be more apparently over the coming years
A note on sustainability: Case 9
The issue of sustainability is also raised in Case 9 which looked at the KWPSN. The case
acknowledges the development and launch of the SAP in Kano as a significant achievement and
an important and necessary step in the journey towards embedded changes in practice and a
reduction in violence. However, on its own, this change in policy is insufficient i.e. it will not bring
about long-term changes in practice and a reduction in violence on its own. Indeed, as of yet, the
domestication of the SAP has yet to translate into significant changes in action by government or
into resources dedicated to implement the SAP and there remain considerable problems with
prosecution. As with case 6, the real impact on NSRP in this area will become evident over a
longer period of time (see Finding 13).

The positive examples of policy and practice influence outlined above are, as to be expected given
the ambitious timeframe, counterbalanced by case study examples demonstrating less success in
this area. Case 8, for example – which charts the role of the Delta SCMA (DSCMA) in responding to
the running conflict between Fulani herdsmen and communities - demonstrates the significant,
inhibitive impact wider PE and contextual factors (that are often outside the control of NSRP) can
have on a platform’s capacity to influence the practices of key actors.

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As mentioned in section 3.1, this case found evidence to suggest the police are reluctant to pursue
and arrest herdsmen (the acknowledged aggressors in the conflict) due to vested political interests.
Several interviewees suggested that these entrenched behaviours mean that no sustainable
resolution of the conflict is possible, and the case concluded that the conflict between the herdsmen
and farmers has proved to be impermeable to permanent solution as a result of the key interests
supporting the herdsmen.
There is also evidence that, in some cases, the capacity of NSRP’s initiatives/ platforms to
successfully operate and influence as planned is inhibited by the design and implementation of the
projects themselves.
• Case 1 - which looked at the peace clubs in Kaduna South and North - highlights a project
that lacks conceptual clarity and whose design is confused. The case concludes that it was
not clear what the peace clubs are trying to achieve, one (or all?) of the following: increased
participation in peace initiatives? Creation of a platform where women and girls are socially
included in development? A reduction in VAWG only (as opposed to both sexes)? And/ or
reductions in violence against persons living with a disability (again, focusing on both sexes
or just girls)?
• Similarly, Case 8 highlighted what it saw as a key flaw in the DSCMA model relating to the
absence of any system to ensure actions are taken (and recorded) following the reporting of
cases of violence. The DSCMA set up what appeared to be a simple and efficient EWS which
provides a platform for communities to report hotspots or incidences of violence, with these
reports subsequently shared by the DSCMA with the relevant police control room/Department
of State Services (DSS) and police posts for further action – in principle, a positive initiative.
However, the DSCMA has failed to develop and put in place any sort of follow up process for
those cases raised through the EWS; as such, the DSCMA is failing to systematically follow
up on and track what action has/ has not been taken by the security agencies in relation to
the cases reported through the EWA. Not only does this have implications for the DSCMA in
terms of its ability to generate data about what actions and results are being achieved through
the EWS, but it also reduces the accountability of the DSCMA to those communities it
represents and, furthermore, has implications in relation to the accountability and
transparency of the security services.
Indeed, the case highlights growing discontent and a lack of trust in the security agencies
amongst communities as a result of the lack of prosecutions and ongoing weaknesses in the
police’s implementation of policies. In this example, it seems that the platform itself as well
as the police have embraced the beginnings of a change in practice (through establishing
and using the EWS) but have failed to see this change through to fruition, which is impacting
negatively on relationships between state and non-state actors / communities.
The examples explored above demonstrate that there is no “one size fits all” approach to
programming within the NSRP model; the platforms/ initiatives appear to deliver a range of activities
that are aligned to their mandate and the chosen approach to influencing (be it direct or indirect). It
also shows that one combination of activities isn’t necessarily more effective than another. What
does emerge when considering success is the way in which the platform/initiative encounters the
external environment, which we turn to in the section below, exploring those external factors that
have facilitated success in this area and second, those that have inhibited success.
More broadly the analysis above – in the round - suggests that NSRP has a “basket” or range of pre-
defined activities/ interventions and that different combinations of these are selected for use for the
different platforms/initiatives. There is little evidence of platforms/initiatives ever deviating
significantly from the “basket” of activities and embracing diversely different approaches. This is
worth noting for the development of future programmes.

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External factors facilitating NSRP’s capacity to effectively influence

Building, leveraging and sustaining strong relationships with ‘champions of change’
First, and perhaps most prominent, is the importance of building, leveraging and sustaining strong
relationships with champions of change (typically from state institutions) (see Finding 11). We see
this in platforms/ initiatives across all four of NSRP’s Output streams.
• In the case of the KWPSN (Case 9) the Governor of Kano as well as a number of key actors
within MoWA were open and receptive to WPSN’s advocacy efforts. Over time and through
persistent lobbying the KWPSN built strong relationships with these champions, was highly
respected and valued by them, had easy access to them, and was able to leverage these
relationships to command influence. The case study highlights that in identifying, building
and maintaining relationships with positive ‘champions of change’, determination,
perseverance and an element of ‘being in the right place at the right time’ are required.
• Case 3 – which looks at the contribution of NSRP-funded research on Radicalisation,
Counter-radicalisation and De-radicalisation to Nigeria’s changing approach to countering
violent extremism (CVE) – also highlights the importance of relationships with champions of
change who share the same vision. In this case, NSRP formed a strong relationship with the
intellectual designer of the government’s CVE programme within ONSA at a time when
ONSA was hungry for research evidence to inform programming.
In highlighting the importance of relationships, these cases (and others) simultaneously underscore
the structural risks associated with relationship-building. In Case 3, the aforementioned champion
stepped down from post mid-way through the NSRP programme and there were justified concerns
that in the absence of this ‘internal champion’ the research study, its findings and recommendations
would be unable to maintain the visibility and buy-in needed to drive change.
The case studies demonstrate the ongoing fragility apparent in some of the platforms/ initiatives’
institutionalisation. Risks of this nature can only be mitigated by persistence and by extending the
pattern of personal linkages and relationships within the government to more long-term, formally
recognised relationships at the institutional level. Indeed, in the case of the KWPSN, while the
success of the platform’s policy agenda was vulnerable to turnover and churn amongst the key power
holders (with the removal of one MoWA Commissioner stalling the programme and weakening the
KWPSNs influence), the existence of a wider network has given the KWPSN the resilience to persist
with a lobbying strategy and maximise the ability to capitalise on the next opportunity.
Identifying and capitalising on ‘windows of opportunity’
The second ‘faciliatory’ factor identified by the case study research was the ability to identify and
capitalise on ‘windows of opportunity’ and ‘spaces for influence’. In some cases, NSRP’s platforms/
initiatives have been able to recognise when gaps or spaces for influence are opening up (and even
create these spaces themselves, as in the case of the KWPSN) and take opportunities when they
arise.
Programming of this nature is by no means straight-forward and requires particular skill-sets,
approaches and systems, including - but by no means limited to - a strong, ongoing understanding
of the changing context and the capacity to use this information on a real-time basis; the ability to
remain agile and react to opportunities; and the capacity to be comfortable with potentially higher
levels of risk than normal. Section 5 provides some key lessons in relation to this area and some
suggestions around how future programmes might work in this way.
The memory of past violence and a desire for change
A ‘desire for change’ was identified across the cases as an important factor facilitating some of the
positive changes observed, in particular in relation to positive changes in practice.
• Case 7 highlights that communities in Bokkos City and Daffo were tired of years of violence
that have claimed many lives and destroyed property. The protagonists of the conflict (the
farmers and pastoralists) accepted dialogue as an alternative to violence in the resolution of
LWU conflict because they wanted an end to this ongoing violence.

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• In Case 2 (which tracks the outcomes of the Kaduna South CPP on peaceful conduct during
the 2015 elections), the memory and experience of the 2011 electoral violence as well as
people's experience of ongoing violence in Kaduna South were considered key factors
driving people's desire for peace. Communities were hungry to know what they could do to
ensure peace.

External factors inhibiting NSRP’s capacity to effectively influence

Political economy and contextual factors
In a programme of NSRP’s nature, it is expected there will be contextual and political economy (PE)
realities, events, trends and shocks – often outside the control of NSRP - that have the potential to
impact on the programme’s capacity to deliver results as intended. The NSRP TOC and Results
Framework catalogue many of these as ‘risks’ or ‘assumptions’. Contextual and PE factors raised
through the evaluation research include:
• The perpetual marginalisation of large sections of Nigerian society (in particular,
women). This was highlighted in the MTE as a barrier to NSRP’s activities.
• A patriarchal social context. Cases 9 (on the Kano WPSN), Case 1 (Kaduna South and
North peace clubs) and Case 7 (LWU DMs in Bokkos City and Daffo) all refer to the
patriarchal social context within which NSRP is operating, and the harsh, disenabling
environment that this presents.
• High levels of drug abuse and unemployment. In both Bokkos City and Daffo, drug abuse
and unemployment among youths remain high and are well recognised as key factors
motivating youths to perpetrate violence. The presence of high levels of drug use and
unemployment are believed to have inhibited youth participation in the DMs (participation
was low despite efforts to engage youths) and, as Case 7 concludes, there is a strong chance
these factors may negatively affect the extent to which outcomes achieved by the DMs (so
far) will be sustained.
Both DMs have been unable to significantly influence a reduction in usage amongst young
people despite working to sensitise youths on the dangers of drug abuse. If these issues are
not addressed and well-managed, a relapse of the achievements of the DMs recorded to
date is likely.
• Population growth. Looking again at Case 7, population growth – clearly beyond the control
of the NSRP - is seen as a factor that could negatively impact the outcomes achieved by the
DMs. Bokkos City and Daffo are both seeing steady population growth resulting in the need
for more farming land and contributing to increasing cultivation of cattle routes by farmers.
As the population continues to grow and demand for land increases, farmers may revert to
the cultivation of cattle routes thereby violating existing agreements on the demarcation of
cattle routes.
• Institutions or actors whose behaviour is driven by entrenched incentive systems. In
those scenarios such as Case 8, where the SCMA came head to head with significant,
longstanding and seemingly impermeable barriers, it begs the question of whether NSRP, its
partners and platforms are able to respond accordingly, pivot and work around and/or change
approach/ focus accordingly. With the DSCMA, there is little evidence that NSRP adapted its
approach or shifted its focus in response to what the case study identifies as an impermeable
barrier in the police’s behaviour. Section xx looks at the issue of adaptation in more detail
and across the programme more broadly.

Concluding remarks
The evidence presented here demonstrates a range of examples of where NSRP has influenced key
actors/ institutions in the conflict arena, resulting, in some cases, in important policy or practice
changes that have enhanced stability and reconciliation. Indeed, specific examples demonstrating
NSRP’s influence over policy and practice at the LGA, state and federal levels are available.

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However, this evidence is drawn almost entirely from the evaluation case studies and is weakened
somewhat as a result of positive bias120.
Stepping above the nine deep-dive case studies and looking more broadly across the programme,
NSRP’s programme monitoring data recorded 38 instances of influence across the three year of
programme implementation. However, the numbers suffer from similar problems as those pertaining
to the peace architecture: methodologically instances of influencing are difficult to distinguish and
enumerate; and conceptually a shift in policy may have a very significant impact on behaviour or
may conversely be very limited. This poses significant challenges for accurately assessing the extent
of NSRP’s contribution.
Low levels of reporting (38 instances of influence over three years, with only four instances in Year
4) could be a reflection of an M&E system that is failing to accurately capture results which in turn is
resulting in NSRP’s contribution in this area being underestimated; it could also be a function of the
methodological and conceptual difficulties associated with measuring results in this area which
NSRP have not been able to adequately address; or, it could be a result of a genuine lack of progress
and results being achieved. Accurately assessing the extent of underestimation or the extent to
which methodological and conceptual difficulties are clouding a true picture of programme success
or progress in this area has not been possible.
Looking to the factors that have facilitated NSRP’s capacity to influence policy and practice change,
most notable are: the strong relationships some platforms/ initiatives have developed with champions
of change; and the capacity of the platforms/initiatives to identify and capitalise on ‘windows of
opportunity’ and ‘spaces for influence’. Key factors that have stilted results include wider socio-
economic, political-economy, and cultural factors; and, in some cases, NSRP’s inability to respond
appropriately to these realities and shift its focus/approach. The departure of key champions of
change is also a key risk factor that can undermine progress; this highlights the fragility of policy and
practice change and its dependency on lasting, institutionalised relationships.
Looking specifically at EQ7, NSRP’s TOC assumes that access to better information and evidence
is improved, this will be used to influence policy and practice; specifically, if society more broadly is
equipped with more information, they will be able to influence and advocate for change more
effectively. Case 9 directly contravenes these assumptions: decision makers were not influenced by
the data and evidence on VAWG and evidence was not deployed to influence/ change decision-
maker’s viewpoints, nor yet to inform advocacy and accountability efforts (see Finding 12).
More broadly, although anecdotal and isolated examples of NSRP’s research influencing changes
in practice do exist (drawn from the NSRP monitoring tools), evidence in this area is weak; evidence
and research were only one of the tools in a wider set of mediation and advocacy approaches used
to influence policy and practice.
The research also highlights key findings in relation to sustainability, including that policy change is
necessary but not always sufficient to achieve the reductions in conflict and violence sought by
NSRP; policy changes can also take time to result in behavioural changes and may only be visible
after the timescale for a programme such as NSRP. Other components - such as dedicated
resources to implement policy change; ongoing monitoring of policy implementation; and significant
buy-in and change in action by government – are also important and necessary steps in the journey
towards changing practices and reducing conflict.
In both the NSS and KWPSN case studies, there is a concern that the significant strides made in
relation to policy change may not have been/ may not be fully implemented without these other
components in place; a definitive answer will however only be available some time after the
completion of NSRP. It is important to note, however, that although policy change may on its own
not be sufficient to contribute immediately to conflict reduction, it is still a highly valuable step in the
journey and end in itself.

120
In selecting the cases the NIEP sought out NSRP’s most significant, positive instances of influence.

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In addition, it is of value to Nigerian stakeholders to note that peacebuilding initiatives will achieve
maximum change as part of coordinated strategy linked to related policy areas: initiatives aimed at
peacebuilding and conflict resolution should continue to strengthen connections with related
activities as part of a holistic strategy that maximises impact and which includes addressing the
marginalisation of women, a fair approach to resource distribution, an increased focus on job
creation, specifically for youth, and an appropriate strategic response to population growth. In
addition, although here is a need for the creation of opportunities for multiple stakeholders to engage
and to develop capacity of all stakeholders, some stakeholders are better placed to drive systemic
change forward and accordingly, opportunities to build capacity and support for the latter should be
further investigated.
Finally, it is important to note that the conclusions presented in this section have been rooted in and
informed by a strong consideration of the starting context and the influence of this context on
achieving results. When assessing the effectiveness of conflict prevention and peacebuilding
interventions, this is key. Ultimately, the kinds of policy and practice changes sought by NSRP
require institutional and societal change that is long-term, even generational, in nature.

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4 Value for Money

4.1 Introduction
This section provides an update to the Value for Money (VfM) assessment provided in the MTE
report, with an additional focus on ‘effectiveness’. The NSRP 2017 VfM Report (completed by NSRP
in August 2017) provides the main source of information informing this section. The report analyses
the VfM performance of NSRP over the period November 2012 through to May 2017.
The first part of this section comments on the analysis presented in the NSRP VfM Report 2017. As
with the MTE, the intention here is not to reproduce the work which NSRP has undertaken, but to
highlight key issues and conclusions to be drawn from the work. The interested reader is referred to
the NSRP VfM Report 2017 document for the full VfM analysis.
The second part of this section presents a qualitative analysis of VfM, using examples identified from
NSRP, KI interviews and case study analysis. The aim is to provide evidence, where available, of
areas in which NSRP’s approach and activities can be considered cost effective (or not), and to draw
any lessons for future programmes in Nigeria and elsewhere.

4.2 Challenges
NSRP recognises a number of challenges in measuring the VfM of the programme, including:
• The absence of reliable benchmarks, both externally (in comparison to similar interventions)
and internally (in terms of comparing VfM across its eight states);
• Difficulties measuring the results of prevention interventions and attributing results to
interventions; and
• Difficulties in monetising the programme outcomes.
In addition, NSRP notes challenges in assessing VfM driven by the nature and timing of results, and
the complexity and cost of gathering and disaggregating data.
These challenges were accepted by the evaluation team at MTE and they remain valid to a significant
degree. We also note the limitations of nominal scoring of conflicts prevented in section 3.1: this
doesn’t provide any measure of the scale, quality or timing an action. However, while these remain
significant challenges, we would expect to have seen improved reporting against VfM, encouraged
by the MTE evaluation M&E recommendations and subsequent NIEP M&E guidance provided to
NSRP. This has been partially achieved, as the discussion below identifies.

4.3 Economy & Efficiency

The MTE indicated a number of highlights of NSRP’s VfM performance, including:
• A reduction in the ratio of programme management spend as a proportion of total programme
spend from 49% in year 1 to 18% in year 2 (an efficiency indicator);
• A reduction of 3-4% in the costs of delivering training and/or workshops across five states
(an efficiency indicator); and
• Utilisation of a range of cost-saving measures (captured under economy) including co-
location with the J4A programme from the start of the implementation phase (saving an
estimated GBP £120,000 over the period under review) and use of office space and partners’
premises for organising events (saving an estimated GBP £5,000 over the period).
For the first of these highlighted areas of VfM performance, results have been maintained in the most
recent period, as noted by NSRP: “Based on data up to 31 May 2017, the ratio of programme
management to total expenditure is 21% which is considerably lower than the original contract
benchmark of 23.5%’, and that “Programme management costs stabilised in Year 3 under the
planned threshold and this trend has been maintained ever since” (NSRP, 2017e: 5).

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For the second, VfM performance has also been maintained, with NSRP noting that “The cost per
head per week/day of training/workshops in local currency has been maintained across our target
states during the implementation phase. The overall costs in pound terms reduced due to the
significant devaluation of the Naira in 2016. Managing SCMAs and WPS networks through grants
and use of partner offices, government institutions and Local NGO offices as venues instead of
hotels and commercial spaces have been key factors” (NSRP, 2017e: 6).
For the third, significant savings have been identified through the continued benefit of the co-location
with J4A (estimated at over GBP £200k in August 2017), as well as other initiatives, notably:
• Annual savings of GBP £30k through establishment of a cost benchmarking mechanism for
Abuja and NSRP target states;
• Savings of GBP £200k through rationalisation of budgets using the key cost indicators; and
• Annual savings of GBP £30-35k by managing NSRP-supported platforms through a grants
framework.

4.4 Effectiveness
It is noted that at the MTE there was an inability to conclude anything meaningful on NSRP’s
effectiveness in VfM terms, driven by a lack of robust data on programme reach and outcomes
achieved. While a number of claims were made by NSRP regarding the outcomes achieved at that
time, little substantive supporting evidence was available to verify these.
A degree of progress has been achieved by NSRP in reporting against effectiveness, although the
estimates are heavily caveated, for the reasons outlined above, and for the significant reason that,
as NSRP acknowledge, “The capture of specific output and outcome-focused results only began in
a systematic way in mid-2016” (NSRP, 2017e: 6).
A number of highlights of NSRP’s VfM effectiveness performance are noted by Programme Output
in Appendix E (spend and outputs by programme area).
Effectiveness reporting by NSRP is sporadic. For Output 1, SMCA and - to a limited extent - CPP
effectiveness is reported, but not for the NPSF. For Output 2, the effectiveness of one LWU platform
is reported but not the other operational LWUs nor Youth Employment Programmes or MSP. For
Output 3, WPSN and Peace Clubs are reported. For Output 4, effectiveness of research activities is
reported but work with strategic partners or media work is not. Additional assessment of
effectiveness is presented by the NIEP for the NPSF, CPPs and MSPs.
Where effectiveness evidence is available, significant levels of spend and low to moderate outputs
results in generally very high unit costs (although as noted, little can be said on the value of the
intangible outcomes that may or may not be linked to an individual output such as a specific instance
of conflict avoidance/reduction).

Programme Costs by Budget and Geography

To provide some perspective on the relative costs associated with NSRP’s implementation to date
the evaluation team has updated MTE analysis of the programme budgets. This is presented in
Appendix F.

Qualitative Assessment
To compensate for limitations on robust effectiveness data for all programme areas, the FE has
identified examples of where NSRP’s activities have led to qualitative benefits such as catalytic
effects, crowding-in, combination effects from integration, efficiency (and effectiveness) gains,
reduced duplication and enhanced sustainability. These are presented in Appendix G and show
moderate gains through catalytic effects, demonstration effects, and efficiency gains, but limited
benefits through effective integration across Output areas, a degree of duplication of effort and
concerns over the sustainability of platforms.

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4.5 Conclusion
As at the MTE, NSRP continued to have relatively good data on the input side of the VfM equation
(inputs to outputs). However, on the outputs side of the equation (outputs to outcomes), while
improvements in data capture have occurred, they are not sufficient to comment comprehensively
on the effectiveness of the programme. Instead there is partial evidence of moderate to low
effectiveness within particular programme components during the final phase of programme activity
(2016-17), and many of these results have been at considerable unit cost.
Further, the improving trend reported by the NSRP for some programme areas must be regarded
cautiously given the weakness of the data collection up to late 2016. There remains an absence of
effectiveness measures for a number of key programme activity areas; and the available
effectiveness measures generally relate to immediate outputs within the logic chain, rather than the
broader outcomes around reduced levels of conflict and increased levels of societal participation
(although the difficulties in measuring these and the possibility of further results beyond the life of
the programme are acknowledged).
Where effectiveness measures are available they generally exhibit what at face value appear as
moderate to low cost-effectiveness i.e. moderate to high costs per output. However, as noted, there
is an absence of suitable benchmark data with which to make comparisons with similar programmes.
In addition, it has not been possible to conduct cost-benefit analysis of benefits such as violence
reduction, due to the scarcity of data, inherent difficulty in monetising such benefits, and difficulty in
attributing benefits to NSRP interventions (i.e. developing a robust counterfactual in order to assess
the difference the programme made relative to what would have happened anyway in the absence
of the programme). There are also limits on the extent that the cumulative effect of the various
programme elements has combined to play a part in the reduced level of perceived violence in target
districts and states.
However, an assessment of qualitative dimensions of VfM reports a number of positive benefits
including catalytic effects and demonstration effects, although how widespread these are is
uncertain. What limited evidence is available for efficiency gains is also mixed. A degree of
programme duplication is suggested and there is uncertainty over the sustainability of many
programme elements.
Therefore, somewhat improved monitoring now permits an overall assessment that the programme
exhibits low to moderate VfM at the level of outputs, but that the full extent of programme benefits
remains obscure due in part to weak M&E systems and procedures over the majority of the
programme operational period, and intrinsic difficulties in measuring the influence of such a diverse
and complex set of programme activities.
As noted for the focal areas of the evaluation, it may well be that further achievements would have
been recorded by the programme beyond the final evaluation point, and had the programme
continued (this improving programme VfM). However, tangible evidence of a significant shift in
planned outputs, as well as levels of violence, that can be clearly attributed to the programme, was
not available at the FTE point.

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5 Findings, lessons and reflections

This section highlights the challenges the IE faced in the final review of NSRP and summarises the
key findings in each of the three focal areas of the IE; we also detail reflections on aspects outside
the control of the programme that influenced success and sustainability. We further draw out
recommendations for NSRP implementing partners and DFID-Nigeria – on both the three focal areas
of the IE, and to a lesser extent on the programme design and delivery – and share reflections of
relevance to future peacebuilding programmes and other programmes working on equally complex
problems in politically dynamic environments.

5.1 Challenges in the final evaluation of NSRP

Key challenges faced by the IE relate to the limitations of the logframe, the lack of M&E data, and
the restrictions posed by the timing of the IE.

The limitations of the logframe:

As discussed in section 3.1 (on page 25), the indicators in the result framework (logframe) as it
relates to peace building are methodologically problematic, for several reasons e.g. a ‘conflict’ has
no obvious temporal or social bounds making it hard to demarcate and count; it is difficult to identify
when a conflict has been resolved vs. when a conflict has been temporarily halted and might re-
emerge; and the value of the prevention or resolution is unclear as this depends on the scale and
severity of the conflict, which is not captured in a simple numeric indicator. Similar, the indicators
measuring influence in NSRP’s result framework (logframe) do not take into account the fact that
one instance of influencing can be very different from another, more or less significant and/or more
or less likely to have longevity.
However, the quantitative indicators were never intended to stand alone - the monitoring templates
developed by NSRP allowed for narrative descriptions to accompany the numerical data. But the IE
found that there was no systemic recording, analysis of, or response to this qualitative data,
rendering the quantitative indicators on their own of limited value in terms of understanding the
nature of the processes; this could therefore only be examined by the IE through the nine case
studies, and not across the programme.
Other indicators and associated tools that were intended to capture ‘soft’ process around the
operation of platforms were not developed or implemented in any systematic way, as planned by the
NSRP. The IE mitigated the lack of data through the delivery of the platform survey - but this
presented a snapshot at the end of the programme, and could not fully substitute for a proper
monitoring process.

Recommendations:
1. For future programmes, the design of indicators which explores the underlying networks of
relations, and which maps and tracks the depth and breadth of conflict resolution and
influencing should be explored. Indictors which measure the longevity of resolutions and the
change in behaviour, as well as the tangible outcome of influencing activities over time should
also be considered.

2. Careful attention should be paid to the way in which both quantitative and qualitative indicators
and data collection interface, and care should be paid to ensure both quantitative and
qualitative data are collected; adequate support should also be provided to ensure
implementing partners understand the need to collect this data and is able to do so.

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The limitations of the programme monitoring data:

As discussed in section 2.6, the MTE found the NSRP M&E system to have a number of problems
that seriously limited the system’s capacity to provide strong evidence that answered evaluative
questions and informed programme decision-making. Subsequent support by the IEP recommended
some 18 areas for action, including:
• Increased capacity for M&E and clarification of M&E roles and responsibilities within NSRP,
• Further refinements to make the programme logframe and result frameworks more
manageable including the reduction in number of indicators and revision of specific
indicators,
• Review of the target setting processes and the development of realistic and challenging
targets,
• A range of improvements in the administrative arrangements for data collection, storage, and
utilisation,
• Discontinuation of a number of primary research activities that were not fit for purpose (i.e.
Cohort Studies),
• Development of additional primary research activities to be conducted by NSRP or
implemented with the support of the IEP (e.g. the platform member survey); and development
of the grants database to include an assessment of supported project outcomes.
Following the MTR, the IEP provided extensive feedback and guidance, adapting the evaluation
approach in response to NSRP needs. NSRP similarly increased dedicated M&E inputs, and
quarterly review of NSRP M&E systems found significant progress in developing and implementing
the recommendations which have permitted an improved picture to emerge of programme activities,
outputs and outcomes. However, this improvement a) could not retroactively make up for lost
monitoring and b) there continued to be M&E implementation issues that were not fully resolved
despite support notably: effective cross-referencing between monitoring tools and evidence sources,
limiting the confidence in reported indicators; and development of the grants database to include an
assessment of supported project benefits beyond activity measures. A range of supplementary
activity to support the final evaluation (e.g. stakeholder consultation, QCA, case studies, and platform
survey) were therefore undertaken by the IEP.
In addition, to the challenges posed for evaluation, the very late stage development of a more robust
M&E system reduced the ability of all stakeholders to fully answer evaluative questions, learn from
experience, and improve programme decision-making.

Examples of weaknesses in the M&E data

In the evaluation of the peacebuilding architecture (IE focus area 1), evidence pointed to systemic
weaknesses in operational follow up activities, which demonstrate that platforms did not
systematically track resolutions of conflicts; there is thus a possibility that the programme has
under-reported on the number of conflicts resolved.
Similarly, NSRP programme monitoring data for IE focus area 2 only indicated the presence of
different groups at platform meetings, and did not paint an accurate picture of the extent to which
participation took place or was meaningful/genuine; this impacted on the ability to measure
participation of different groups. Elsewhere there was a lack of data on beneficiaries of the NSRP
small grant programme and the outcomes of projects supported through grants which made it
impossible to measure if/how these grants increased broader societal participation

Recommendations:
3. DFID should ensure detailed operational plans for M&E systems are in place early in the
programme life cycle. The DFID Smart Rules now allows for ongoing amendments to the
logframe which allows experimental programmes such as NSRP to improve and adapt its

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logframe as the programme evolves, while ensuring a joint understanding of ‘what success
looks like’ from inception and a clear record of the changes in the level of ambition and focus
areas of the programme over time.

4. In addition, implementing partners should put in place adequate senior management oversight
for M&E activities, to ensure monitoring to an appropriate standard is undertaken throughout
the life of the programme, as demonstrated by the improvements made by NSRP after the
MTR.

5. Both DFID and implementing partners should ensure sufficient resources (including time,
funds and skilled and experienced human resources) are in place throughout the programme
period and across the implementing organisations. This might include allocating funds for M&E
support to and capacity development of local partners from the outset.

The limitations inherent to the IE:

As discussed in section 2.6, even after careful design and mitigation of risks, some residual
limitations remained in the approach underpinning the IE.
• IEP case study selection was purposely orientated to NSRP’s more successful projects and
initiatives; it is therefore not possible to say how representative the cases are of all platform
or influencing activities.
• Due to the time lag between the collection and analysis of M&E data and the availability of
data for review, the IE had to use datasets which were collected at end March 2017, and
made available in June 2017, and not the final dataset available at the end of August 2017.
• It should be acknowledged that widespread societal participation in conflict management
mechanisms and a reduction in violence affecting vulnerable groups are both medium to long
term endeavours which are likely to only become evident beyond the timeframe of this
evaluation.
Recommendations:
6. It is necessary to acknowledge that programmes which aims to solve deep-rooted problems
and bring about change in behaviour require time to achieve results; DFID could consider
increasing the lifespan of programme and/or earmarking funds for further evaluation of
completed programmes beyond the life of the programme to understand long term impact.

5.2 A note on the political economy and contextual factors

In a programme of NSRP’s nature it is expected there will be contextual and political economy factors
that impact on success. The evaluation identified five barriers to long term success which fell outside
the control of NSRP (as discussed in section 3.3 on page 54):
1. The persistent marginalisation of large sections of the Nigerian society, particularly women,
2. A patriarchal social context which creates a harsh, disabling environment,
3. High levels of drug abuse and unemployment amongst the youth, which inhibited youth
participation in certain states and which is likely – in some cases – to negatively impact on
the sustainability of outcomes achieved to date,
4. Population growth, which increases pressure on national resources, and is likely to negatively
impact on the sustainability of solutions, and
5. Entrenched incentive systems which serves as impermeable barriers.

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Recommendations:
7. The design and implementation of future programmes should take into account economic and
contextual factors outside its control; this should be done through for example ongoing political
economy analysis. Programmes should clearly acknowledge the political and contextual
factors that can impact on the achievements of results, and should not be averse to change
direction or approach (i.e. ‘work with the grain’) to ensure resources are focussed on activities
where impact can be achieved; DFID should also consider how it enables and incentivises
(not punish) programmes to shift focus or resources to where return is likely to be greatest.
This does not mean only focussing on ‘the low hanging fruit’ but instead acknowledging
impermeable barriers to success.

8. DFID should ensure it takes a strategic and long-term view across its portfolio (and incentivise
programmes to do so), engineering opportunities for programmes within its portfolio and those
of other donors working in the same geographical area to collaborate more effectively;
opportunities for example might have existed for NSRP to dovetail with programmes focussed
on youth employment, drug rehabilitation or even family planning to reduce the impact of
contextual factors.

9. Local Nigerian stakeholders should acknowledge that peacebuilding initiatives will achieve
maximum change as part of coordinated strategy linked to related policy areas: initiatives
aimed at peacebuilding and conflict resolution should continue to strengthen connections with
related activities as part of a holistic strategy that maximises impact and which includes
addressing the marginalisation of women, a fair approach to resource distribution, an
increased focus on job creation, specifically for youth, and an appropriate strategic response
to population growth.

5.3 Findings from the final evaluation of NSRP

This section summarises the finding from the final evaluation across the three focal areas.

IE focus area 1: Strengthening the Peace Architecture

Although there has been a large reduction in perceived violence during the life of the programme, it
is necessary to look at how far these changes are a result of the peace architecture, and what
contribution NSRP may or may not have made through strengthening social institutions working to
resolve and mediate conflict (see section 3.1).

Headline finding: A series of positive changes were made to the peace architecture in the target
area and across the eight programme focal states 89 conflicts were prevented / resolved by NSRP121.
However, challenges in demarcating the size and scale of a conflict and a lack of comparative data
from similar programmes makes it problematic to judge the significance of this figure.

Other key findings:

• Good results were achieved in establishing spaces that bring state and non-state actors
(including marginalised groups such as women and youth) together in a coordinated and
focussed fashion.
• Where platforms are broadly inclusive, are meeting regularly, and are appropriately
convened, this contributed to strengthened coordination, communication and flow of

121
The evaluation drew on data up to end March 2017, which was made available by NSRP to the IE in June 2017. At
end August NSRP self-reported a total of 124 incidences based on more recent data, but the IE was not in a position to
validate this within the timeframe of the evaluation.

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information between state and non-state actors, which also contributed to stakeholders
coming to shared positions. It is however unclear if this is sustainable without ongoing
funding.
• Platform members and the peace architecture more broadly have benefitted from
involvement in platforms because of new / enhanced knowledge, understanding, skills and
capacities which improve their role as contributors to the conflict management process.
• At the local level a broad mix of stakeholders is important for the successful functioning of
the platforms enhancing trust and legitimacy; the importance of a broad mix is less
pronounced at federal and state level. At all levels (federal, state and Local Government
Authority (LGA) level), certain stakeholders (state security institutions, Community Based
Organisation (CBO), traditional and religious institutions) are persistently perceived to be
important and influential - and there is little change in the perceived effectiveness of these
three institutions year on year.
• Platforms are able to bring about change through convening and mediation functions,
although results are not guaranteed; political drivers and lack of incentives amongst
stakeholders can be insurmountable obstacles.
Recommendations:
11. Although an experimental programme, NSRP is not the only programme* to utilise a ‘platform’
approach with the aim of increasing dialogue amongst a wide range of stakeholders, or to
influence policy and practice through mediation and advocacy activities. Future programmes
should place greater emphasis on learning in addition to M&E, and should actively engage
with other programmes testing similar approaches to ensure cross portfolio learning; DFID
should also ensure programmes are incentivised to learn, and have the time and resources to
do so. This can be done through for example earmarking funds for learning activities and/or
setting outcomes and indicators related to learning. * See DFID Zimbisa in Zimbabwe, DFID
Strengthening Action Against Corruption (STAAC) in Ghana, and DFID Sustainable
Agricultural Intensification Research and Learning in Africa (SAIRLA) as examples
12. Sustainability of platforms should be more explicitly considered from design, and exist and
legacy strategies should be developed and implemented in a timely fashion. Opportunities to
ensure sustainability and long-term effectiveness of the platform, extending and continuing
widespread membership, adapting membership/platform focus as needed in response to
changing circumstances should be explored by Nigerian stakeholders.
13. Training and capacity development support is able to improve the effectiveness of platforms,
and the ability of conveners’ impact on function; greater emphasis on ongoing support (i.e. in
the documenting of follow up activities and outcomes) and skills development should be
considered in future programmes. It is however necessary to acknowledge that some actors
within supported platforms are more influential than others and better placed to drive systemic
changes, and accordingly, opportunities to build capacity and support for the latter should be
further investigated.

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Findings IE focus area 2: Broadening Societal Participation

NSRP views the marginalisation of large sections of the Nigerian population (specifically women and
youth) as a key driver of conflict, and seeks to overcome this by broadening participation in
peacebuilding, and, as a result, improving functioning of peacebuilding mechanisms (see section
3.2).

Headline finding: Although NSRP supported platforms have a) provided an effective forum for
different stakeholder groups (both state and non-state) to come together and b) been effective in
facilitating democratic dialogue, evidence of resulting behaviour changes amongst platform
participants is as yet limited, and improved societal participation beyond the NSRP supported
platforms is not evident.

Other key findings:

• NSRP supported platforms have provided a space for a wide range of different stakeholder
groups (including the marginalised) to come together around issues of conflict management,
and are broadly characterised as spaces for open and conflict-free discussion conducted in
good faith; this is a significant achievement which should not be underestimated.
• Platform members felt the platforms offered opportunities for better understanding the
opinions of others, and resulted in 61% of respondents reporting that they changed or
modified their own opinions as a result of their platform membership and engagement.
• Marginalised groups, specifically women and youth, have been able to effectively engage in
platforms - but the participation of different groups of actors was not always equal, with state
actors wielding greater power in many cases.
• Involvement of other marginalised groups (e.g. groups with disabilities) was not evident
across the platforms.
• Except for activities with media partners, the success of NSRP interventions in bringing about
participation in conflict management and resolution amongst society more broadly (i.e.
amongst those not directly involved in the platforms) was limited.

Recommendations:
14. Future programmes should consider how marginalised groups other than women and youth
(e.g. groups with disabilities) can be involved in programmes from the onset, and should
develop relationships and generate opportunities for greater involvement. There might also be
a need to address factors which might limit engagement in programme activities (e.g. physical
access) and programmes should develop sustainable mechanisms to do this.
15. Engagement with the media was particularly successful in NSRP; this is an area which future
programmes should consider further exploiting.

Findings IE focus area 3: Exerting Influence

NSRP is working at the local government authority, state and federal levels to increase the capacity
of its platforms, initiatives, interventions and society more broadly to influence key actors/institutions
in the conflict arena and to bring about positive changes in policy and practice, which will result in
enhanced stability and reduced violence (see section 3.3).

Headline finding: NSRP monitoring data indicated that NSRP has successfully influenced policy or
practice change 38 times122; it is however unclear to what extent positive influence is sustainable.

122
The evaluation drew on data up to end March 2017, which was made available by NSRP in June 2017. At end August
NSRP self-reported 54 incidences, but the IE was not in a position to validate this data.

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Other key findings:

• The ability to build, leverage and sustain strong relationships with champions of change and
to capitalise on windows of opportunity – including, for example, the desire by communities
to find alternative solutions to conflict - have facilitated NSRP’s capability to influence policy
and practice change; dependence on individual not systemic relationships are, however, a
risk to sustainability.
• Wider socio-economic, political-economy and cultural factors, and in some instances NSRP’s
failure to respond to these realities or shift its focus, are factors that have stilted results.
• The assumption that access to and use of better information and evidence will lead to
changes in policy and practice did not hold true in some cases; instead, changes in policy
and practice were to a greater extent as a result of use of a wider field of advocacy and
lobbying techniques.
• Although policy changes are necessary to achieve long term reduction in conflict and
violence, they are on their own not sufficient; dedicated resources to implement, monitor and
bring about changes in behaviour are also required
• The design and implementation of some of NSRP’s initiatives inhibited success; e.g. a lack
of clarity on what certain peace clubs were trying to achieve, and an absence within the
SCMA’s of a system to ensure actions are taken and conflict resolutions are recorded
following a report of violence are two examples.

Recommendations:
16. The importance of developing relationships with ‘champions of change’ when aiming to bring
about change in policy and processes should not be underestimated; however, neither should
the risk of dependence on individual not systemic relationships. Programmes need to aim to
identify opportunities to move from individual to systemic relationships more effectively, and
more frequently. One way to do this is through tacit / codified knowledge e.g. development of
shared strategies and plans (as NSRP has done) - and support to embed this; an alternative
approach is for better donor coordination, which allows longer term funding and support to
platforms, thereby bringing about resilience and longevity.
17. Donors and implementers should aim to better understand the process by which policy and
process changes are achieved, and should acknowledge 1) the support decision makers need
to engage with information and research**, 2) that the use of research and evidence is only
part of the tools at programmes’ disposal to influence policy, and 3) that there is a need to
provide ongoing support and monitoring throughout the policy and process uptake process to
achieve behavioural and systemic change; programmes should have time and resources
available to provide support, at the very least periodically, throughout the uptake process. **
See DFID Building Capacity to Use Research Evidence (BCURE)
18. Opportunities to share lessons between local / state / federal levels of government and
between different parts of the country should be identified.

5.4 Reflections on NSRP

Although the final evaluation focussed predominantly on the three focal areas covered above, the
IEP have engaged with the programme over a period of four years; it is therefore prudent to draw
out a few brief reflections on the broader programme, its design, the management and
implementation.

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Table 5.1 Programme Design

Programme design

NSRP was ambitious in scope, working across eight states and four output areas over a five-year
period; DFID and the implementing partners should reflect on the possibility that the programme
was spread too thin. An alternative option for future programmes might be to limit the breadth of
the programme (number of states), or to reduce the scope (number of outputs); another option is
not to try to do everything everywhere, focussing on certain activities in certain places.
An associated question is: if the programme had access to the necessary skills and resources to
service all programme areas; the MTE for example raised questions about resource deficiencies
in gender and peacebuilding. Although the programme on paper might appear to have covered all
skillsets required, it will be beneficial for implementing partners to reflect if the right skills were
accessed, to the right extent, at the right time – and if not, why not. It is notable, for example, that
most regional, long-term technical and programme management positions were occupied by BC
staff, with a small number of posts filled by SDD and IA.

A related topic is the ability of the programme to appropriately integrate the diverse components,
and the operational capacity to manage a programme with so many moving parts. We would
encourage DFID to explore further if the sum of the parts were greater than the parts, and if
opportunities to achieve sustainable impact was enhanced or diluted by the demands of managing
such a large, multidimensional programme. Lessons from the ability to manage and share
knowledge adequately (or not) across the different components should also be further explored.

The need to design programmes with a longer timeframe (e.g. seven years not five), should also
be considered. NSRP’s yearlong design phase in 2012 and establishment of regional offices in all
operating areas proceeded well, but despite these achievements, programming at scale did not
really get going until late 2014/15; this in essence left a two-year period during which the
programme aimed to address complex challenges and achieve results which required a change
in mindset and behaviour amongst participants.

One example of the inability to scale up activities in a complex programme such as NSRP was the
fact that no grants were awarded in the first year against a budget of £2M. Innovative and complex
programmes have proven to have slow initial expenditure123, and NSRP was no exception. This
should be taken into consideration during the design, and programmes should guard against a
pressure to spend against ambitious forecasts to drive programme decisions.

123 See lessons from DFID Nigeria State

Voice and Accountability (SAVI) and DFID Legal Assistance for Economic Reform
(LASER)

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Table 5.2 Programme Implementation

Programme implementation
There is evidence from both the MTR and FE that capacity across NSRP partners varied
considerably, with variations seen in relation to a number of areas, including M&E, and illustrated by
significant differences in the quality of partner activity report sand monitoring data. Findings from the
NSRP platform participant survey also revealed interesting findings about the role and capacity of
the convener which enable/prohibits genuine participation, and some case studies demonstrated the
value of finding the right partner. In a programme such as NSRP where success depends to a great
extent on the quality of local partners, it is necessary to reflect on 1) if/how the selection of partners
could have been improved, 2) if the correct balance between using national and international experts
were achieved, 3) if there was an adequate understanding of the level of capacity and gaps amongst
partners, and subsequently 4) if adequate training and capacity development support was provided
to address these gaps.

Although an experimental programme in nature, there is not enough evidence to indicate that NSRP
was either a reflective or adaptive programme. The MTR and FE have highlighted the impact of poor
M&E systems on the ability of the programme to collect useful data, which would have impacted on
the ability of the programme to identify what was working and what not, and therefore what needed
to be changed, scaled up or shut down. More systematic learning, review and reflection – for example
through strategy testing124 - could potentially have allowed NSRP to focus resources on areas where
greatest impact could be achieved, thereby offering increased VfM to DFID. There is also some
evidence that NSRP missed opportunities for collaboration and adaptation.
NSRP was designed based on the premise that that there would be strong linkages between the four
output streams, and the three levels of engagement. Although there was some evidence of integration
between platforms which led to value add in terms of communication and information flow and positive
outcomes through effective cross-working and collaboration from case studies, the linkages are less
positive between state and federal level, and across and between the four outputs. There are
important considerations here for future programming, and DFID and NSRP should reflect on how
better integration could have been achieved; areas of exploration could include assumptions in the
design of the programme, the use/lack of appropriate systems, the availability/lack of appropriate
skills and leadership, the relationship between consortium partners, and programme incentives.
Uncertainty remains around the sustainability of NSRP. It took an extended period for NSRP to
identify and contract partners deemed suitably skilled and networked to convene multi-stakeholder
platforms, which reduced the time available to roll out programme activities and develop strong,
sustainable relationships. A lack of clear exit strategies to enable platforms to function without the
support of NSRP also appear apparent. Although platform and grant activities are attractive methods
to bring about bottom up engagement, both implementers and DFID should consider more openly
and earlier in the programme how sustainability will be achieved.

124
See DFAT / The Asia Foundation Strategy testing: an innovative approach to monitoring highly flexible aid programmes

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Jere, Borno)

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Final Report Structure

NSRP-IEP (2013b) Inception Report

NSRP-IEP (2015) Mid-term evaluation design document
NSRP-IEP (2016) Way Forward Concept Note
NSRP-IEP (2017) Progress Reports #1 - #4
OAS and UNDP (2013) Practical guide on democratic dialogue [online]. Available from:
http://www.oas.org/es/sap/dsdme/pubs/guia_e.pdf [Accessed July, 2016]
Putzel, James, and Jonathan Di John. (2012) Meeting the challenges of crisis states. The London
School of Economics and Political Science.
Ragin, Charles c. (1987) The Comparative Method. Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative
Strategies. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press.
Social Development Direct (2016) Review of Output 3, NSRP. London: Social Development Direct.
SIDA (2010) Measuring Empowerment? Ask Them – Quantifying qualitative outcomes from people’s
own analysis. Sweden: SIDA.
Stern, E., Stame, N., Mayne, J., Forss, K., Davies, R. & Befani, B (2012) Broadening the range of
designs and methods for impact evaluation, Working Paper 38 [online] Department for
International Development.
Upper Quartile (2013a) Independent Evaluation Provider (IEP) to the Nigeria Stability and
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) Way Forward Workplan, August 2015 [unpublished]
Upper Quartile (2013b) Independent Evaluation Provider (IEP) to the Nigeria Stability and
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) Inception Report, November 2013 [unpublished]
Upper Quartile (2015) Independent Evaluation Provider (IEP) to the Nigeria Stability and
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) Mid-Term Evaluation Design Document, September 2015
[unpublished]
Upper Quartile (2016) Independent Evaluation Provider (IEP) to the Nigeria Stability and
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) Term Evaluation Final Report, April 2016 [unpublished
Upper Quartile (2016b) Way forward Concept Note
World Bank, 2017. ‘The World Bank in Nigeria: Overview’.
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview#1
WYG (2016) Independent Evaluation Provider (IEP) to the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation
Programme (NSRP) Way Forward Concept Note, August 2016 [unpublished]
WYG (2016-2017) Independent Evaluation Provider (IEP) to the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation
Programme (NSRP) Progress Reports #1 - #4, October 2016-July 2017 [unpublished]

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Final Report Structure

Note: Appendices are included in a separate volume (Vol.2 of 2).

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