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IN

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 18TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2021

PRESENT

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA

AND

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.SRISHANANDA

WRIT APPEAL NO.3834/2019

BETWEEN:

HIP BAR PVT. LTD.,

REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR
MR.PRASANNA NATARAJAN
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
NO.34, 1ST FLOOR
B.RAMACHANDRA ADITHANAR ROAD
(4TH MAIN ROAD)
GANDHI NAGAR, ADYAR
CHENNAI-600 020

AND HAVING ITS BRANCH OFFICE AT:

NO.602, 2ND FLOOR, 3RD B CROSS
6TH MAIN, 2ND BLOCK, HRBR
BANGALORE-560 043
…APPELLANT

(BY SRI.K.G.RAGHAVAN, SR. ADV., FOR

SRI.HITESH KUMAR AND
SMT.NIVEDITA SHENOY, ADV.)

AND:

STATE OF KARNATAKA
THROUGH THE COMMISSIONER
EXCISE DEPARTMENT
2ND FLOOR, TTMC BUILDING
A BLOCK, BMTC, SHANTHINAGAR
BANGALORE-560 027
… RESPONDENT

(BY SRI.I.THARANATH POOJARY, AGA)

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THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE

KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DATED 13/09/2019 PASSED BY THE LEARNED SINGLE JUDGE
OF THIS HON’BLE COURT IN WP NO.6448/2019 AND ETC.

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR

JUDGMENT, THIS DAY SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA J., PRONOUNCED
THE FOLLOWING:

JUDGMENT

The present writ appeal is arising out of the order passed

by the learned Single Judge in WP No.6448/2019 (HIP BAR Pvt.

Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka).

2. The appellant- Hip Bar Pvt. Ltd. before this Court is

a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013. It is

a FinTech Company offering a Semi-Closed Pre-paid Instrument

(Mobile Wallet) to its customers.

3. The facts of the case would reveal that the Reserve

Bank of India (RBI) has issued Certificate of authorization to the

appellant for operation of Semi-Closed Pre-Paid Instrument

Mobile Wallet under the Payments and Settlements Act, 2007

(hereinafter referred to as ‘PSS Act of 2007). The facts of the

case would further reveal that the appellant contended before

the learned Single Judge that appellant by itself does not sell

any goods and the transaction of sale takes place between the

user of the Mobile application and the owner of the licensed

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premises. The facts would further reveal that the appellant has

developed the Mobile Wallet which can be specifically used for

paying for purchase of alcoholic beverages in retail outlets as

well as Bars/Pubs, which have an arrangement with the

appellant company. It is further stated that through the mobile

wallet and platform designed by the appellant, the registered

users can also opt to have alcoholic beverages delivered to

their residence and for such users, the appellant delivers

alcoholic beverages to their doorstep after following a stringent

protocol for age and identity verification. It is further stated by

the appellant that after starting Mobile Wallet, the appellant

wrote to the respondent on 16.11.2016 explaining its proposed

service and the benefits of the appellant’s mobile wallet as a

payment mechanism for purchase of alcoholic beverages from

licensed retail outlets and also requested the respondent for a

meeting to explain the entire process. The respondent

requested the appellant/petitioner to approach the Liquor

Dealers Association vide letter dated 08.12.2016 with regard to

the benefits of the digital payments of the liquor trade and as

requested by the respondent, the appellant explained the use

of mobile application and technology and also informed the

respondent vide letter dated 17.02.2017 stating that the first

service of mobile wallet would be launched from 18.02.2017 in

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Bengaluru, Karnataka. The petitioner thereafter approached

the respondent in June, 2017 with its proposed business plans

for collection and concierge services for home delivery of

alcoholic beverages to the end customers and the appellant’s

contention is that though the consent was not required from the

respondent in terms of the provisions of the Act, the appellant

approached the respondent with a view to maintain

transparency and the larger objective of working in tandem with

the State authorities to achieve its objectives. The appellant

made a presentation at the office of the respondent on

23.06.2017 explaining the benefits of its mobile application,

which was followed by a detailed letter dated 04.07.2017 and

finally on 01.08.2017, a “Letter of Authority” (hereinafter

referred to as ‘LOA’ was issued by the respondent for “Online

Order processing and Delivery of Indian and Foreign Liquor

including Beer, Wine and LAB”. The appellant has further

stated that no such ‘Letter of Authority’ was required under the

Karnataka Excise Act 1965 or the Rules framed thereunder and

the regulations do not prescribe such a requirement and the

petitioner has not applied for any such letter of authority. It is

further stated that in the letter of authority certain conditions

were mentioned like selling liquor to underage, individuals,

prohibition of sale of liquor in public spaces, etc., The

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appellant has further stated certain information was sought

under the LOA and the same was replied vide letter dated

17.08.2017. That the appellant started service of delivering

alcoholic beverages to its consumers strictly by following the

protocol from September, 2017 (‘Home Delivery Service’) and

also permitted the respondent to access all the data of the

appellant including the orders placed by each consumer, live

tracking of the delivery executive and proposed delivery

destination, daily reports of deliveries made during the day

were provided to the respondent on the next business day by

email. The appellant further stated that vide letter dated

14.06.2018, the appellant sought for the renewal of the LOA as

it was valid up to 30.06.2018 and the LOA was renewed on

06.07.2018 for a period of one year up to 30.06.2019.

Thereafter, an order was issued by the respondent dated

03.11.2018 recalling the earlier letter of authority issued for the

year 2017-18 i.e., online order processing and delivery of Indian

and Foreign Liquor including Beer, wine and LAB from shop to

the door step of the consumer through mobile wallet was

withdrawn. The petitioner/appellant herein being aggrieved by

the aforesaid order dated 03.11.2018 filed a writ petition with

the following reliefs:

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“a. Stay the impugned Letter dated 03.11.2018

bearing ref. No.ICD/50/REV/GEN/2016-17 (Annexure-
AF);

b. Grant an interim injunction restraining

the Respondent from interfering with the business
of online order processing and delivery of Indian
and Foreign Liquor including Beer, Wine and LAB
carried out by the petitioner in the State of
Karnataka;

c. Pass such or further orders as this

Hon’ble Court deems fit in the interests of justice
and equity.”

4. A reply was filed on behalf of the respondent-State

in the writ petition. The respondent-State in its reply has

submitted that the petition itself was not maintainable and it

was further stated that the existence of a legal right of a person

which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for

invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India. It was contended that the petitioner has no fundamental

right to trade in liquor. It was further contended that Entry 8 of

List II Schedule VII of the Constitution empowers the State

Government to legislate with regard to intoxicating liquors i.e.,

production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and

sale of intoxicating liquors and Entry 51 empowers the State

legislature to levy duties of Excise and countervailing duties

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and under Entry 8, there may be an absolute prohibition of sale

of liquor. A citizen has no fundamental right to carry on trade

or business in liquors. Reply of the State further reveals that

the contention of the petitioner that he does not require licence

or permission to conduct business of online order processing

and delivery of Indian and Foreign Liquor including Beer, Wine

and Low Alcoholic Beverages (LAB) is not correct as Sections

13, 14 and 15 of the Act prohibits manufacture, possession and

sale of any excisable article without the licence. The respondent

has further stated that the petitioner does not have licence

granted by the RBI for sale and purchase of the liquor and the

contention of the petitioner that it is only a facilitator and

delivering liquor in respect of the purchase which has taken

place at the shop itself is not correct. The respondent has

admitted issuance of LOA dated 01.08.2017. Further, it has

been stated that initially letter of authority (LOA) issued to the

petitioner for processing online order and delivery was only on a

trial and experimental basis, he was operating only in

Bengaluru BBMP limits. The Excise Department at some point

of time felt that the same was not adaptable due to the huge

objections from existing licensed stake holders and media buzz

on social concerns. Reply further states that underage drinkers

were turning to online retailers to buy alcohol, which is not

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permissible in law and therefore keeping in view the various

objections from all corners, the LOA was withdrawn. Further, it

has been stated by the respondent that the Excise Act does not

provide online selling of alcohol and the petitioner being the

user of the mobile application initiated the sale transactions by

purchasing the liquor from CL-2 licence holder and in turn had

sold the same to the end consumer meaning thereby the liqour

has not been sold directly by the CL-2 licence holder to the end

use consumer, which is not permissible under the Act. The

respondent further stated that the petitioner cannot be

permitted to trade in liquor without obtaining a licence under

the Act and the Rules made thereunder. It is prerogative of the

State Government to deal with the IMFL and it has statutory

power to grant CL-2 license to a person to sell the liquor in a

licensed premises. The respondent has further stated that the

petitioner on one hand makes statement that there is no

requirement for any permission for selling the liquor through

and mobile application and is on the other hand is challenging

revocation of LOA as bad in law. It is further stated that the

Excise Department is the sole authority of controlling the liquor

trade in the State of Karnataka and therefore the petitioner

cannot be permitted to carry out liquor business without having

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any licence under the Excise Act and the Rules framed

thereunder.

5. A rejoinder was also filed in the matter and this

Court has taken into account the grounds raised by the

petitioner.

6. The learned Single Judge, after taking into account

the statutory provisions governing the field has dismissed the

writ petition. Paragraphs-21 to 25 of the judgment reads as

under:

“WRIT OF MANDAMUS:

21. It is settled law that writ of mandamus cannot be

granted unless the existing legal right of an applicant
or an existing duty of the respondent has been
established. The writ cannot be issued to create or
establish a legal right, but to enforce that stood already
established. The petitioner is neither a licensee

under the provisions of the Act, 1965 to carry on trade

in liquor nor has a legal right under the statute to
enforce its performance. Unless the legal right is
established, corresponding legal duty imposed under
the statute cannot be invoked. No prohibition for liquor
in the State would not mean absolute liberty to deal in
liquor trade. The business model of the petitioner
cannot be held that it does not require authorization
under any of the provisions of the Act, 1965. The
petitioner taking shelter under the PSS Act cannot give
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a go-bye to the provisions of the Act, 1965. Indeed, the

Act, 1965 do not permit home delivery of alcohol either
for oneself or as an agent of another. Hence, no writ of
mandamus can be issued as prayed.

22. At this juncture, it is beneficial to refer to the

judgment of Kandath Distilleries, supra. The relevant
paragraphs are extracted hereunder for ready
reference;

“30. The Legislature when confers a

discretionary power on an authority, it has to
be exercised by it in its discretion, the
decision ought to be that of the authority
concerned and not that of the Court. Court
would not interfere with or probe in to the
merits of the decision made by an authority
in exercise of its discretion. Court cannot
impede the exercise of discretion of an
authority acting under the Statute by
issuance of a Writ of Mandamus. A Writ of
Mandamus can be issued in favour of an
applicant who establishes a legal right in
himself and is issued against an authority
which has a legal duty to perform, but has
failed and/or neglected to do so, but such a
legal duty should emanate either in discharge
of the public duty or operation of law. We
have found that there is no legal duty cast on
the Commissioner or the State Government
exercising powers under Section 14 of the Act
read with Rule 4of the 1975 Rules to grant
the licence applied for. The High Court, in our
view, cannot direct the State Government to
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part with its exclusive privilege. At best, it

can direct consideration of an application for
licence. If the High Court feels, in spite of its
direction, the application has not been
properly considered or arbitrarily rejected,
the High Court is not powerless to deal with
such a situation that does not mean that the
High Court can bend or break the law.
Granting liquor licence is not like granting
licence to drive a cab or parking a vehicle or
issuing a municipal licence to set up a
grocery or a fruit shop. Before issuing a writ
of mandamus, the High Court should have, at
the back of its mind, the legislative scheme,
its object and purpose, the subject matter,
the evil sought to be remedied, State’s
exclusive privilege etc. and not to be carried
away by the idiosyncrasies or the ipse dixit of
an officer who authored the order challenged.
Majesty of law is to be upheld not by bending
or breaking the law but by strengthening the
law.”

23. In the case of Dr. Rai Shivendra, supra, the

Hon’ble Apex Court has held thus;

“5. A great deal of controversy was raised

before us as to whether the Statues framed
by the University under Section 20 of the
University of Bihar Act have or have not the
force of law and whether a writ under Article
226 of the Constitution has a legal right to
the performance of a legal duty by the
respondents. In order that mandamus may
issue to compel the respondents to do
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something it must be shown that the Statutes

to enforce its performance. It is, however,
wholly unnecessary togo into or decide this
question or to decide whether the Statutes
impose on the Governing Body of the College
a duty which can be enforced by a writ of
mandamus because assuming that the
contention of the appellant is right that the
College is a public body and it has to perform
a public duty in the appointment of a
Principal, it has not been shown that there is
any right in the appellant which can be
enforced by mandamus. According to the
Statutes all appointment of teachers and staff
have to be made by the Governing Body and
no person can be appointed, removed or
demoted except in accordance with Rules but
the appellant has not shown that he has any
right entitling him to get an order for
appointment or reinstatement. Our attention
has not been drawn to any article in the
Statutes by which the appellant has a right to
be appointed or reinstated and if he has not
that right he cannot come to Court and ask
for a writ to issue. It is therefore not
necessary to go into any other question.”

24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Rajasthan

State, supra, has observed thus;

“24. The primary purpose of the writ is to

protect and establish rights, and to impose a
corresponding imperative duty existing in
law. It is designed to promote justice, (ex
debito justiceiae) and its grant or refusal is at
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the discretion of the court. The writ cannot be

granted unless it is established that there is
an existing legal right of the applicant, or an
existing duty of the respondent. Thus, the
writ does not lie to create or establish a legal
right but, to enforce one that stood already
established. While dealing with a writ
petition, the court must exercise discretion,
taking into consideration a wide variety of
circumstances, inter-alia, the facts of the
case, the exigency that warrants such
exercise of discretion, the consequences of
grant or refusal of the writ, and the nature
and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by
such grant or refusal. Hence, discretion must
be exercised by the court on grounds of
public policy, public interest and public good.
The writ is equitable in nature and thus, its
issuance is governed by equitable principles.
Refusal of relief must be for reasons which
would lead to injustice. The prime
consideration for issuance of the writ is,
whether or not substantial justice will be
promoted. Furthermore, while granting such a
writ, the court must make every effort to
ensure from the averments of the writ
petition, whether proper pleadings are being
made. Further in order to maintain the writ of
mandamus, the first and foremost
requirement is that, the petition must not be
frivolous and it is filed in good faith.
Additionally, the applicant must make a
demand which is clear, plain and
unambiguous. It must be made to an officer
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having the requisite authority to perform the

act demanded. Furthermore, the authority
against whom mandamus is issued, should
have rejected the demand earlier. Therefore,
a demand and its subsequent refusal, either
by words, or by conduct are necessary to
satisfy the court that the opposite party is
determined to ignore the demand of the
applicant with respect to the enforcement of
his legal right. However, a demand may not
be necessary when the same is manifest from
the facts of the case, that is, when it is an
empty formality, or when it is obvious that
the opposite party would not consider the
demand.”

CONCLUSION:

25. In the light of the aforesaid judgments, it is

clear that no writ of mandamus can be granted in
the circumstances of the case. The petitioner is
not entitled to carry on business of online order
processing and delivery of liquor to the consumers
in the State of Karnataka in the absence of
enabling provision available under the Karnataka
Excise Act, 1965 to grant such licence or
permission.

For the foregoing reasons, both the questions

framed are answered against the petitioner.

In the result, writ petition is dismissed. No order as

to costs”
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7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length.

Perused the record.

8. The appellant, before this Court, is a company

incorporated under the Companies Act, 2013. Undisputedly, a

FinTech Company was offering a Semi-Closed Pre-aid

Instrument (Mobile Wallet) to its customers. The appellant-

company submitted an application to the RBI and the RBI under

the provisions of Payment and Settlement Act, 2007 (for short

‘PSS Act’) issued Certificate of Authorization (COA) to the

appellant on 22.08.2016 permitting to operate mobile wallet.

The appellant-company was meeting minimum requirement of

Rs.15 Crores prescribed to obtain RBI authorization and has

about 50 staff employed for development and operation of the

mobile application. The statutory provisions which are relevant

for adjudication of the present writ appeal are reproduced as

under:

i) Section 15, 39(1) and (2) of the Karnataka Excise Act, 1965,

ii) Rule 3 of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign

liquors) Rules, 1968

iii) Rule 21 of the Karnataka Excise (Possession,Transport, Import

and Export of Intoxicants) Rules, 1967

iv) Rule 5, 10 of the Karnataka Excise Licences (General

Conditions) Rules, 1967
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i) Section 15, 39(1) and (2) of the Karnataka Excise Act,

1965,

“15. Sale of excisable articles without

licence prohibited.- (1) No intoxicant shall be sold
except under the authority and subject to the terms
and conditions of a licence granted in that behalf:

Provided that, subject to such restrictions and

conditions as the Excise Commissioner may by general
or special order specify,-
(a) a person having the right to the toddy
drawn from any tree may sell such toddy
without a licence to a person licensed to
manufacture or sell toddy under this Act;

(b) a cultivator or owner of any plant from

which an intoxicating drug is produced
may sell without a licence those portions
of the plant from which the intoxicating
drug is manufactured or produced, to any
person licensed under this Act to sell,
manufacture or export the intoxicating
drugs or to any officer, whom the Excise
Commissioner may generally or specially
authorise.

(2) A licence for sale under sub-section (1), shall be

granted,-

(a) by the Deputy Commissioner, if the

sale is within a district, or

(b) by the Excise Commissioner, if the sale

is in more than one district:

Provided that subject to such conditions as may

be determined by the Excise Commissioner, a licence
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for sale granted under the Excise law in force in any

other State may be deemed to be a licence granted
under this Act.

(3) Nothing in this section shall apply to the sale

of any liquor lawfully procured by any person for his
private use and sold by him or on his behalf or on
behalf of his representatives in interest upon his
quitting a station or after his decease.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-

sections (1) and (2), no club shall supply liquor to its
members on payment of a price or of any fee or
subscription except under the authority of and subject
to the terms and conditions of a licence granted in that
behalf by the Excise Commissioner and on payment of
such fees according to a scale of fees to be fixed by the
State Government in this behalf.

39. Manufacture, sale or possession by one

person on account of another.- (1) Where any
intoxicant has been manufactured or sold or is
possessed by any person on account of any other
person and such other person knows or has reason to
believe that such manufacture or sale was or that such
possession is, on his account, the article shall, for the
purposes of this Act, be deemed to have been
manufactured or sold by or to be in the possession of
such other person.

(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall absolve any person

who manufactures, sells or has possession of any
intoxicant on account of another person from liability to
any punishment under this Act for unlawful
manufacture, sale or possession of such article.
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ii) Rule 3 of the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and

Foreign liquors) Rules, 1968

“Licences – Licences for the vend of [Indian

Liquor (other than arrack)] or Foreign liquor or both
shall be of the following descriptions, namely-
[(1) x x x x
(1-A) x x x x x ]

(2) Retail off shop licences for vend of Indian

liquor or Foreign or both not to be drunk on the
premises – Under these licences granted in Form C.L.2,
the sale of liquor in sealed bottles to any person in a
quantity less than 0.180 litres at a time is prohibited.

(3) x x x x x

(4) Licence to Clubs – The Agent, Secretary or

Manager or any other person entrusted with the
management of the business of the club shall apply
and obtain licence in Form CL-4 from the Deputy
Commissioner.

Explanation – For the purpose of this clause, a

club means a body of persons registered under the
Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960

Provided that no such licence under this clause

shall be granted by the Deputy Commissioner, unless
the following conditions are satisfied-

(1) the club shall have been registered under the

Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 for a period
of not less than five years and there must be atleast
100 permanent members.

(2) It shall have its own land and building or

shall have obtained it on lease for a term of eleven
years or more.

(3) It shall have facility for outdoor games

like, Tennis, Badminton, Volleyball etc., and indoor
games like Carrom, Table Tennis etc. and a reading
room or a library.

(4) It shall have adequate faciliites for

catering food and drinks to the members.
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(5) It shall have separate toilet with running

water facilities for men and women:

Provided further that existing clubs to whom

licences are granted under this clause for the excise
year 2001-2002 shall be allowed to renew their licences
under the rule existing prior to the commencement of
the Karnataka Excise (Sale of Indian and Foreign
Liquors) (First Amendment) Rules, 2002”.

(iii) Rule 21 of the Karnataka Excise (Possession, Transport,

Import and Export of Intoxicants) Rules, 1967

“21. Case where permit or licence is not

required.- No permit or licence, under these rules,
shall be required for the possession or transport of the
following quantities of liquors.

Liquor Quantity
1 Toddy, in such areas of the State where the sale of 2.5 Litres
toddy to public is allowed under sub-rule (4) of
Rule 3 of the Karnataka Excise (Trapping of Trees)
Rules, 1991
2 xxxxx
3 xxxxx
4 Country Beer 18.2 litres
5 Brandy, Whisky, Gin, Rum, Milk-Punch and such 4.6litres
other liquors manufactured in Karnataka State or
manufactured in other places in India and imported
to Karnataka State, excluding Foreign liquors
(imported)
6 Foreign Liquors (Imported) 9.1 litres
7 Denatured Spirit 750 Mililitres
8 xxxx
9 Wines (including mass wine and sacramental wine) 9.0 litres
10 Fortified Wine 4.5 Litres

(iv) Rule 5, 10 of the Karnataka Excise Licences (General

Conditions) Rules, 1967

“5. Restriction in respect of location of shops.- (1) No

licence for sale of liquor shall be granted to a liquor
shop or premises selected within a distance of 100
metres from any religious or educational institution or
Hospital or any Office of the State Government or
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Central Government or Local Authorities or in a

residential locality, where the inhabitants are
predominantly belonging to Scheduled Castes or
scheduled Tribes or within a distance of 220 metres
form the middle of the State Highways or National
Highways.

Provided that where a shop is sanctioned to a

village the population of which is less than two
thousand five hundred, such shop shall be located
outside the residential locality of the village.

10. Liquor not to be sold to certain persons, etc.-

(1) No liquor shall be sold or otherwise given to the
following persons, namely.-

(a) insane persons;

(b) persons known or believed to be drunk;

(c) persons known or suspected to be about to take

part in a riot or disturbance of public peace or any
other crime;

(d) Excise Officials, Police Officers, Railway Servants

and Motor Bus Chauffeur, on duty, or in uniform;

(e) persons below the age of (twenty one years)

(2) No quantity of liquor shall be allowed to be taken

out of the shop except to the extent permitted by the
rules under Karnataka Excise Act, 1965.

9. The petitioner-company though was having COA in

respect of mobile wallet like other mobile wallets in the country,

however started a new mobile App “Hip Bar” for delivering

alcohol beverages to the end use consumer. In the State of

Karnataka, the sale, purchase, possession, transportation and

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import of intoxicants are governed under the Karnataka Excise

Act, 1965 read with Karnataka Excise (Possession, Transport,

Import and Export of Intoxicants) Rules, 1967. The relevant

statutory provisions which are necessary for adjudication of the

present writ appeal has already been reproduced earlier.

10. Undisputedly, the RBI has issued Certificate of

Authorisation in favour of the appellant-company exclusively to

set up and operate payment system for semi-closed prepaid

payment instruments services in India. The relevant extract of

the Certificate of Authorisation is quoted as under:

“In exercise of the powers conferred on the Reserve

Bank of India by Section 7 of the Payment and
Settlement Systems Act, 2007, Hip Bar Private Limited,
Chennai is hereby granted Certificate of Authorisation
to set up and operate payment system for semi-closed
prepaid payment instruments services in India with
effect from August 22, 2016 as per the guidelines
issued by Reserve Bank of India and subject to
compliance with the terms and conditions given on the
reverse of this certificate”.

11. The appellant wanted to venture delivery of liquor

from the shop to the end use consumer with the use of mobile

wallet, approached the respondent-State by submitting a

representation on 23.06.2017 and sought permission to carry

out the business. The appellant also made a live presentation

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before the Commissioner and finally on 01.08.2017 the

respondent (Excise Commissioner) issued Letter of Authority

(LOA) or online order, processing and delivery of Indian and

Foreign liquor including Beer, Wine and LAB. The statutory

provisions under the Karnataka Act read with Rules does not

have any provision for issuance of such letter of Authority.

11.1 That the appellant started services of delivery of

alcohol beverages to its consumers in terms of protocol. The

LOA dated 01.08.2017 was valid up to 30.06.2018 and the

appellant vide letter dated 14.06.2018 sought renewal of LOA.

The respondent-State thereafter renewed the LOA on

06.07.2018 for a period of one year up to 30.06.2019. The

respondent-State (Excise Commissioner) ultimately withdrew

the LOA vide letter dated 03.11.2018 and the petitioner being

aggrieved by the withdrawal of LOA has filed a writ petition

before this Court and the learned Single Judge has dismissed

the writ petition.

11.2 The facts of the case reveal that the petitioner was

having Certificate of Authorisation (COA) under the provisions of

the PSS Act of 2007 and the aforesaid Act provides for payment

system and it does not provide for purchase of goods from a

shop and to deliver to its end use consumer. The appellant

wants processing and delivery of online order in respect of

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Foreign liquor including Beer, Wine and LAB. The PSS Act of

2007 was enacted with a view to regulate and oversee the

various payment and settlement systems in the country

including those operated by non-banks like Clearing Corporation

of India Ltd. (CCIL), card companies, other payment system

providers and the proposed umbrella orgranisation for retail

payments. Section (c), (e), (h), (i) and (q) of the PSS Act of

2007 reads as under:

“(c) “electronic funds transfer” means any transfer of

funds which is initiated by a person by way of
instruction, authorisation or order to a bank to debit or
credit an account maintained with that bank through
electronic means and includes point of sale transfers,
automated teller machine transactions, direct deposits
or withdrawal of funds, transfers initiated by telephone,
internet and card payment;

(e)”netting” means the determination by the system

provider of the amount of money or securities, due or
payable or deliverable, as a result of setting off or
adjusting, the payment obligations or delivery
obligations among the system participants, including
the claims and obligations arising out of the
termination by the system provider, on the insolvency
or dissolution or winding up of any system participant
or such other circumstances as the system provider
may specify in its rules or regulations or bye-laws (by
whatever name called), of the transactions admitted for
settlement at a future date so that only a net claim be
demanded or a net obligation be owned;
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https://indiankanoon.org/doc/97606241/
(h) “payment obligation” means an indebtedness that
is owned by one system participant to another system
participant as a result of clearing or settlement of one
or more payment instructions relating to funds,
securities or foreign exchange or derivatives or other
transactions;

(i) “payment system” means a system that enables

payment to be effected between a payer and a
beneficiary, involving clearing, payment or settlement
service or all of them, but does not include a stock
exchange;
Explanation .—For the purposes of this clause,
“payment system” includes the systems enabling credit
card operations, debit card operations, smart card
operations, money transfer operations or similar
operations;

(q)”system provider” means a person who operates an

authorised payment system.”

12. The PSS Act of 2007 empowers issuance of COA by

the RBI only for a limited purpose of making online payments.

The Act nowhere empowers a person to deliver the goods. It is

only a payment system through electronic mode and therefore

once the COA under the PSS Act, 2007 does not empower

processing/delivery/facility of online order in respect of foreign

liquor including Beer, Wine and LAB, the appellant cannot be

permitted to deliver liquor by making online payment to end use

consumer.
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13. Learned counsel for the appellant placing reliance

upon the judgment delivered in the case of Sodexo SVC India

Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and others

(2015) 16 SCC 479, contended that he is also entitled to

deliver liquor to the purchaser as he is simply act as a facilitator

and the medium between the affiliater and the consumers.

14. In the aforesaid case, the appellant was doing

business for providing preprinted meal vouchers to its

customers i.e., establishments/companies having a number of

employees on their rolls and had arrangements with various

restaurants, departmental stores, shops etc. (affiliates) for

utilization of vouchers. The appellant resisted imposition of

local body tax (LBT) on the ground that establishments with

whom it had entered into contracts was for providing services

and not for sale of any goods. In those circumstance, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the appellant was only a

medium between the affiliater and the consumers and was

providing service.

15. In the present case, this Court is dealing with sale

purchase and transport of liquor and the same has to be done

keeping in view the statutory provision under the Karnataka

Excise Act, 1965 read with Karnataka Excise Licenses (General

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conditions) Rules, 1967, the trade of liquor is having various

restrictions imposed under the statutory provisions and delivery

of liquor from shop to end use consumer cannot be compared

with vouchers which were the subject matter in the judgment

delivered in Sodexo’s case (supra). Hence, the judgment

distinguishable on facts.

16. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed

reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of Coffee

Board, Karnataka, Bangalore v. Commissioner of

Commercial Taxes, Karnataka and others (1988) SCR

Sup(1) 348 in respect of essentials involved in the elements of

sale. Paragraph-27 and 43 of the aforesaid judgment reads as

under:

“27. It was submitted by the learned Additional

Solicitor General that these cases, namely, Bhavani Tea
Estate (supra) and Vishnu Agencies (supra) would have
no application within the set up of the Coffee Act
because the provisions of the statute expressly provide
that there could be no sale or contract of sale, yet the
High Court had for purposes of Sales Tax assumed
(notwithstanding the statutory prohibition) that the
transaction contemplated by the statute in the present
case, the mandatory delivery, would be a sale. It was
submitted that where a statute prohibited a registered
owner from selling or contracting to sell coffee from
any registered estate, there could be no implication of
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any purchase on the part of the Coffee Board of the

coffee delivered pursuant to the mandatory provisions
of section 25(1) of the Act. It was urged that section 17
of the Coffee Act read with sections 25 and 47 enacts
what since 1944 is a total prohibition against the sale
of coffee by growers and corresponding purchase of
coffee from growers. In view of section 17 read with
section 25, purchase by the Coffee Board of coffee
delivered under section 25(1) was also impliedly
prohibited. It is in view of this express prohibition of
sale and corresponding implied prohibition of purchase
that the Act provided the only method of disposal of
coffee, viz., by the delivery of all coffee to the Coffee
Board with no rights attached on such delivery, save
and except the statutory right under section 34. It was
also argued that the Legislature has made a conscious
difference between acquisition of coffee by compulsory
delivery by the growers under Section 25(1) of the Act
and purchase of coffee by the Board under Section
26(2) and, as such, compulsory delivery of coffee under
Section 25(1) cannot constitute a sale transaction as
known to law between the growers and the Coffee
Board. We are, however, unable to accept the
submissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General.
All the four essential elements of sale-(1) parties
competent to contract, (2) mutual consent-though
minimal, by growing coffee under the conditions
imposed by the Act, (3) transfer of property in the
goods and (4) payment of price though deferred,-are
present in the transaction in question. As regards the
provisions under Section 26(2) empowering the Coffee
Board to purchase additional coffee not delivered for
inclusion in the surplus pool, it is only a supplementary
provision enabling the Coffee Board to have a second
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avenue of purchase, the first avenue being the right to

purchase coffee under the compulsory delivery system
formulated under Section 25(1) of the Act. The scheme
of the Act is to provide for a single channel for sale of
coffee grown in the registered estates. Hence, the Act
directs the entire coffee produced except the quantity
allotted for internal sale quota, if any, to be sold to the
Coffee Board through the modality of compulsory
delivery and imposes a corresponding obligation on the
Coffee Board to compulsorily purchase the coffee
delivered to the pool, except:

(1) where the coffee delivered is found to be

unfit for human consumption; and
(2) where the coffee estate is situated in a far
off and remote place or the coffee grown in
an estate is so negligible as to make the sale
of coffee through compulsory delivery an
arduous task and an uneconomical provision.

43. The levy of duties of excise and customs under

sections 11 and 12 of the Coffee Act are inconsistent
with the concept of compulsory acquisition. Section
13(4) of the Coffee Act clearly fixes the liability for
payment of duty of excise on the registered owner of
the estate producing coffee. The Board is required to
deduct the amount of duty payable by such owner from
the payment to the grower under section 34 of the Act.
The duty payable by the grower is a first charge on
such Pool payment becoming due to the grower from
the Board. Section 11 of the Act provides for levy of
duty of customs on coffee exported out of India. This
duty is payable to the Customs authorities at the time
of actual export. The levy and collection of this duty is
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not unrelated to the delivery of the coffee by the

growers to the Board or the pool payments made by
the Board to the growers. The duty of excise as also the
duty of customs are duties levied by Parliament in
exercise of its powers of taxation. It is not a levy
imposed by the Board. It is a fact that the revenue
realised from the levy of these duties form part of the
Consolidated Fund of India and can be utilised for any
purpose. It may be utilised for the purpose of the
Coffee Act only if Parliament by appropriation made by
law in this regard so provides. The true principle or
basis in Vishnu Agencies case applies- to this case.
Offer and acceptance need not always be in an
elementary form, nor does the law or contract or of
sale of goods require that consent to a contract must
be express. Offer and acceptance can be spelt out from
the conduct of the parties which cover not only their
acts but omissions as well. The limitations imposed by
the Control order on the normal right of the dealers and
consumers to supply and obtain goods, the obligations
imposed on the parties and the penalties prescribed by
the order do not militate against the position that
eventually, the parties must be deemed to have
completed the transaction under an agreement by
which one party binds itself to supply the stated
quantity of goods to the other at a price not higher
than the notified price and the other party consents to
accept the goods on the terms and conditions
mentioned in the permit or the order of allotment
issued in its favour by the concerned authority.“

17. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid

judgment. In the aforesaid case, that the Coffee Board has

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contended that compulsory delivery of coffee by grower to the

Board under the Coffee Act. 1942 extinguishing all marketing

rights of the growers was compulsory acquisition and not sale

or purchase to attract levy of purchase tax. It was further

contended that the appellant was only a trustee or agent of

growers not exigible to purchase tax and that all export sales

were in the course of export” immune to tax under Article 286

of the Constitution.

18. The Division Bench of Karnataka High Court held

that an element of consensuality subsists even in compulsory

sales governed by law and once there is an element of

consensuality, however minimal that may be, whether express

or implied, then that would be sale or purchase for purposes of

Sale of Goods Act and the same would be exigible to sales or

purchase tax as the case may be under the relevant sales tax

law of the country.

19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has upheld the view

taken by the High Court of Karnataka. Therefore, the aforesaid

judgment again does not help the appellant as sale and

delivery of liquor is governed in the State of Karnataka under

the Excise Act and Rules thereunder. Liquor cannot be

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compared with other commodities like Coffee or other goods

where no restrictions are imposed by the statutory provisions.

20. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed

reliance upon the judgment delivered in New India Sugar

Mills v. Commissioner of sales Tax (1963 SCR Sup.(2)

459 which deals with the issue of definition of sale.

Paragraphs-56, 57, 58 and 59 of the aforesaid judgment reads

as under:

“56. I shall now analyse the whole transaction and see

how the element of compulsion and control affect the
existence of a sale. First there is the fixation of price by
the Controller. Can it be said that there is no sale
because the price is fixed by a third person and not by
the buyer and seller. This is the old controversy
between Labeo and Proculus that if price is fixed by a
third person a contract of sale results or not. Labeo
with whom Cassius agreed, held that there was not,
while Proculus was of the contrary opinion :

"Pretium autem certum esse debet. nam

alioquin si its inter nos convenerit, ut quanti
Titius rem aestemasuerit, tanti sit empta,
Labeo negavit ullam uim hoc negotium
habere, cuius opinionem Cassius probat.
Ofilius et earn emptionem et uenditionem
cuius opinionem Proculus secutus est." (Gaius
III, 140).

This was solved by justinian holding that there was :

"Sed nostra decisio its hoc constituit." (Inst. III, 23, 1)

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57. I do not think the modem law is any different. So

long as the parties trade under controls at fixed rice
and accept these as any other law of the realm
because they must, the contract is at the fixed price
both sides having or deemed to have agreed to such a
price. Consent under the law of contract need not be
express it can be implied. There are cases in which a
sale takes place by the operation of law rather than by
mutual agreement express or implied. See Benjamin on
Sale (8th Edn. p. 91). The present is just another
example of an implied contract with an implied offer
and implied acceptance by the parties. What I have
said about price applies also to quantity and quality.
The entry 48 of List II Seventh Schedule dealt with sale
of goods in all its forms. We have seen above how
numerous are these forms. The entry was expressed in
six simple words but was meant to include a power to
tax sale of goods in all its forms. It was not meant to
operate only in those elementary cases where there is
offer by A and an acceptance by B with the price as
consideration. The concept of taxes on sale of goods is
more complicated and the relations of people do not
always take elementary forms. When the Province after
receiving the permit telegraphed instructions to
despatch sugar and the mill dispatched, it, a contract
emerged and consent must be implied on both side's
though not expressed antecedently to the permit. The
indent of the Province was the offer to purchase sugar
of such and such quality and quantity. The mills by
quoting their stocks offered to sell sugar. The controller
brought the seller and purchaser together and gave
them his permission with respect to a particular
quantity and quality. There was thus an implied
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contract of sale in the words of the Digest (XL, 1,1, IX,

4):

'Si cui libera universorum negotiorum

administratio a domino permissa fuerit, isque
ex hic negotiis rem vendiderit et tradiderit
facit cam accipientis."

58. No doubt, there is compulsion in both selling and

buying, perhaps more for the mills than for the
Provinces. But a compelled sale is nevertheless a sale
as was held by the House of Lords in New Castle
Breweries v. inland Revenue Commissioner. The case in
Kitkness V. John Hudson & Co. Ltd, was different
because the section there interpreted required a “sale”
and there was no sale express or implied when the
wagons were taken away and compensation was paid
in the shape of transport stock. There a sale in its
ordinary forms wag, obviously meant though it was
recognise that sale in other context has other
meanings.

59. It was argued that there must be mutuality. That

one party must be free to offer and must offer and the
other side must be free to accept and must accept the
offer before a sale can be said to arise. But sales often
take place without volition of a party. A sick man is
given medicines under the orders of his doctor and
pays for them to the chemist with tax on the price. He
does not even know the names of the medicines. Did
he make an offer to the chemist from his sick bed ? The
affairs of the world are very complicated and sales are
not always in their elementary forms. Due to short
supply or maldistribution of goods, controls have to be
imposed. There are permits, price controls, rationing
and shops which are licensed. can it be said that there
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is no sale because mutuality is lost on one account or

another? It was not said in 'the Tata Iron and Steel case
(1) which was a case of control, that there was no sale.
The entry should be interpreted in a liberal spirit and
not cut down by narrow technical considerations. The
entry in other words should not be shorn of all its
content to leave a mere husk of legislative power. For
the purposes of legislation such as on sales tax it is
only necessary to see whether there is a sale express
or implied. Such a sale was not found in "forward”
contracts and in respect of materials used in building
contracts. But the same cannot be said of all situations.
I for one would not curtail the entry any further. The
entry has its meaning and within its meaning there is a
plenary power. If a sale express or implied is found to
exist then the tax must follow. I am of the opinion that
in these transactions there was a sale of sugar for a
price and the tax was payable. I would, therefore,
dismiss these appeals with costs.”

21. This Court has carefully gone through the judgment

also. In the present case, the appellant takes an order from end

use consumer purchases liquor from the shop and delivers it to

the end use consumer. Technically as the appellant is having

authorization in respect of the mobile wallet, the amount is paid

at the shop through that wallet. However, delivery is given to

the appellant, who in turn delivers the goods to the end use

consumer at his residence and the entire chain establishes that

the sale in the instant case gets completed only after the

delivery is done to the end use consumer. Therefore, in the

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peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment

relied upon by the appellant again does not help the appellant

in any manner.

22. Learned counsel for the appellant has also placed

reliance upon the ju22. dgment delivered in Kerala Bar Hotels

Association and another vs. State of Kerala and others

(2015) 16 SCC 421 and has argued before this Court that the

right to trade any liquor is a right guaranteed under Article

19(1) of the Constitution of India. Paragraphs-30 to 33, 38 of the

aforesaid judgment reads as under:

“30. The next ground for challenge has been under

Article 19. The Learned Senior Counsel for the
Appellants, Mr. Aryaman Sundaram, has sought to
argue that a right under Article 19(1)(g) exists in the
business of liquor. In his detailed elucidation of the
decision in Khoday, he has contended that the State is
given three options. The first is prohibition, the second
is a State monopoly in manufacture or trade or both in
potable liquor, and the third, which is similar to the
case at hand, is that the State allows private
individuals into this business, in which event everyone
would have a right to partake in it. Reliance was placed
on the following paragraphs of Khoday: (SCC pp.606-
07, paras 55-56)

“55. The contention that if a citizen has no

fundamental right to carry on trade or
business in potable liquor, the State is also
injuncted from carrying on such trade,
particularly in view of the provisions of
Article 47, though apparently attractive, is
fallacious. The State’s power to regulate
and to restrict the business in potable
liquor impliedly includes the power to
carry on such trade to the exclusion of
others. Prohibition is not the only way to
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restrict and regulate the consumption of

intoxicating liquor. The abuse of drinking
intoxicants can be prevented also by
limiting and controlling its production,
supply and consumption. The State can do
so also by creating in itself the monopoly
of the production and supply of the liquor.
When the State does so, it does not carry
on business in illegal products. It carries
on business in products which are not
declared illegal by completely prohibiting
their production but in products the
manufacture, possession and supply of
which is regulated in the interests of the
health, morals and welfare of the people.
It does so also in the interests of the
general public under Article19(6) of the
Constitution.

56. The contention further that till

prohibition is introduced, a citizen has a
fundamental right to carry on trade or
business in potable liquor has also no
merit. All that the citizen can claim in such
a situation is an equal right to carry on
trade or business in potable liquor as
against the other citizens. He cannot claim
equal right to carry on the business
against the State when the State reserves
to itself the exclusive right to carry on
such trade or business. When the State
neither prohibits nor monopolises the said
business, the citizens cannot be
discriminated against while granting
licenses to carry on such business. But the
said equal right cannot be elevated to the
status of a fundamental right.”

31. Khoday also held that all rights under Article 19(1)
of the Constitution are not absolute, as they are
qualified by the respective clauses (2) to (6) of Article
19. Business in liquor is further regulated by the rigours
of Article 47. However, the categorization of dealing in
liquor as a “qualified fundamental right” cannot be
interpreted to indicate that a right under Article 19(1)
(g) does not arise. This is in line with the previous Five-
Judge bench decision in Krishan Kumar Narula, which,
as we previously discussed, returned the opinion that a
citizen can have a right to deal in liquor, subject to
reasonable restrictions in the public interest. Thus,
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since Five Star hotels are given a right to deal in liquor,

all other categories of hotels can claim on the grounds
of Article 19(1)(g), subject to the reasonable
restrictions allowed by Article 19(6). It has been
contended that the restrictions imposed herein are not
reasonable, for various reasons, including that the
relevant material has not been considered so the
restriction was arbitrary and unreasoned. The Division
Bench, while overturning the finding of the Single Judge
that the relevant materials were not considered, held
that “we cannot assume that the Government did not
consider the report at all.” The Appellants contend that
an assumption that the materials were considered
merely because nothing on the record definitively says
that they were not is erroneous.

32. We disagree with the submissions of the

Respondents that there is no right to trade in liquor
because it is res extra commercium. The interpretation
of Khoday put forward by Mr. Sundaram is, in our
opinion, more acceptable. A right under Article 19(1)(g)
to trade in liquor does exist provided the State permits
any person to undertake this business. It is further
qualified by Article 19(6) and Article 47. The question,
then, is whether the restrictions imposed on the
Appellants are reasonable.

33. We have had the privilege and indeed the pleasure

hearing the extremely erudite arguments of a galaxy of
senior counsel on both propositions on the
interpretation of our Constitution and the laws
pertaining to the right to carry on trade or business in
potable liquor by this Court. In Krishan Kumar Narula,
the Constitution Bench was of the opinion that dealing
in liquor is a legitimate business, although the State
can impose reasonable restrictions. A few years later,
however, in Khoday, the concept of res extra
commercium came to be accepted and applied to the
business of manufacture and trade in potable liquor.
This Court, however, did not place any embargo or
constraints on the State to transact this business.
History has painstakingly made it abundantly clear that
prohibition has not succeeded. Therefore strict state
regulation is imperative. The State of Kerala had in the
past forayed into prohibition, but found it to be
unimplementable. Thereafter, keeping in mind the
heavy consumption of alcohol within the territory, it
has experimented with other measures to user
temperance if not abstemiousness. So far as this trade
is concerned, Article 47 of the Constitution places a
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responsibility on every State Government to at least

contain if not curtail consumption of alcohol. The
impugned Policy, therefore, is to be encouraged and is
certainly not to be struck down or discouraged by the
Courts. How this policy is to be implemented, modified,
adapted or restructured is the province of the State
Government and not of the Judiciary. The consumption
of tobacco as well as liquor is now undeniably
deleterious to the health of humankind. Advertising
either of these intoxicants has been banned in most
parts of the world, the avowed purpose being to
insulate persons who may not have partaken of this
habit from being seduced to start. Banning pubic
consumption of either of these inebriants cannot be
constrained as not being connected in any manner with
the effort to control consumption of tobacco, or as we
are presently concerned, with alcohol. Vulnerable
persons, either because of age or proclivity towards
intoxication or as a feature of peer pressure, more
often than not, succumb to this temptation. Banning
public consumption of alcohol, therefore, in our
considered opinion, cannot but be seen as a positive
step towards bringing down the consumption of
alcohol, or as preparatory to prohibition.

38. We now move to the arguments predicated on

Article 19 of the Constitution. We have already noted
that the business in potable liquor is in the nature of
res extra commercium and would, therefore, be subject
to more stringent restrictions than any other trade or
business. Thus while the ground of Article 19(1)(g) can
be raised, in light of the arguments discussed with
regard to Article 14, it cannot be said that the
qualification on that right is unreasonable.

23. The aforesaid judgment makes it very clear that the

State Government has a right to impose restrictions in respect

of liquor trade and it is not an absolute right and can be

subjected to restrictions by the State Governments. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court has also taken into account the

judgment delivered in Khoday Distilleries Ltd. and others v.

State of Karnataka and others reported in (1995) 1 SCC

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574 and the judgment nowhere says that a person is having

absolute right to trade in liquor, right has to be subjected to the

restrictions provided under the Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 read

with Karnataka Excise Licenses General Conditions Rules, 1967

and Karnataka Possession and Transportation Rules, 1967. The

judgment does not give a right to the petitioner to trade liquor

without fulfilling terms and conditions of the Karnataka Excise

Act read with Excise Rules.

24. Learned counsel for the appellant also placed

reliance upon the judgment delivered by the Madras High Court

in T.M.Thaniyarasu v. The Commissioner of Police and

others (2014) 1 Mad LJ 669 and his contention is that the

order passed by the Excise Commissioner withdrawing LOA is

violative under Article 19(1)(g) and the impugned order shows

non-application of the mind.

25. This Court has carefully gone through the aforesaid

judgment. However, in the present case, the State Government

(Excise Commissioner) has certainly granted LOA in spite of the

fact that the Excise Act and the Excise Rules did not provide for

granting of such LOA. Grant of LOA was void abinitio in the light

of the statutory provisions and therefore it was rightly

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withdrawn by the impugned order. The judgment also does not

help the petitioner in any manner.

26. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied

upon the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in

Krishan Kumar Narula v. State of J & K and others

reported in AIR 1967 SC 1368.

27. In the aforesaid case while dealing with the trade of

liquor and the interpretation of the trade or business under

Article 19(1g) and 19(6) it was held that standards of morality

can afford a guidance to impose restrictions but cannot limit the

scope of the right. It was also held that legislature can impose

restrictions on, or even prohibit carrying on of a particular trade

or business and the Court, having regard to the circumstances

obtaining at particular time or place may hold the restrictions or

prohibition reasonable. The aforesaid judgment also does not

help the appellant as he did not have any licence i.e., CL-2 and

CL-11(c), which entitles the a person to take liquor to public in

retail.

28. Learned counsel for the appellant also placed

reliance upon the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. The Chief

Election Commissioner, New Delhi and Others (1978) 1

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SCC 405 on the ground of violation of principles of natural

justice and fair play. It is contended that LOA was withdrawn

without following principles of natural justice and fair play. No

show cause notice was issued at any point of time.

29. In the considered opinion of this Court, the

judgment relied upon is again does not help. As in the first

place, the Excise Commissioner was not having any authority to

issue such LOA. The LOA could not have been issued as there

is no provision under the Excise Act nor under the Excise Rules

and under the Karnataka Excise Licences (General Conditions)

Rules, 1967 and therefore as there was no legal statutory right

in favour of the appellant for grant of LOA, the question of

violation of principles of natural justice and fair play does not

arise.

30. Lastly, reliance has been placed on the judgment

delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of

Customs (import), Mumbai v.Dilip Kumar and Company

and others (2018) 9 SCC 1. The contention of the learned

counsel for the appellant is that in case of ambiguity a taxing

statute should be construed in favour of the assessee.

31. The aforesaid judgment also deals with the

interpretation and strict construction of a statute. However, in

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the present case no such interpretation statutory provision of

law is involved. The statute does not permit a person who is

not authorized/not having licence issued under the Karnataka

Excise Act to trade in liquor/to deliver liquor/to act as a

facilitator, hence the question of issuance of LOA which is alien

to the Excise Act does not arise nor the petitioner can be

permitted to trade any liquor in the manner and method it has

been done by the appellant-company.

32. The statutory provisions which has been reproduced

earlier of the KST Act, 1965 makes it very clear that no

intoxicating drugs can be sold without licence and contrary to

the terms and conditions of the licence. The intoxicating drugs

are also defined under the Karnataka Excise Act and they

include bhang/ganja. If the plea canvassed by the learned

counsel for the appellant is accepted , then he will also be

entitled to act as a facilitator to supply bhang/ganja apart from

supply of liquor to the citizens of Bengaluru Township. It is

certainly not at all the intention of the legislature and

restrictions have been rightly imposed under the Excise Act. It

provides that no intoxicating drugs can be sold without licence

contrary to the conditions of the licence. The licence issued

under the Excise Act and the Rules framed thereunder in no

way authorizes any agent/intermediary to transport the liquor

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and under Rule 3 of the sale of Indian and Foreign liquor Rules,

1968 only CL-2 and CL -11(c) licensees are entitled to vend

licence to public in retail. It is only a take away transaction in a

sealed bottle for MRP from shop premises. Sections 39(1) of

the Excise Act provides that if any person possess for or sold to

the consumer any quantity (if not necessarily the quantity

stipulated under Rule 21), it is presumed to be possessed and

sold by the consumer and Section 39(2) provides that the

vendor of the manufacture is liable for penal action for such

possession or sale as indicated under section 39(1).

33. The appellant in the present case who is claiming

itself to be a facilitator is no doubt entitled to facilitate cashless

digital payments between the customer and the

merchant/vendor on its mobile wallet. Such digital payment is

permissible for which he has to obtain licence under PSS Act,

2007.

34. The aforesaid statutory provision of law does not

provide for delivery of article or goods, the appellant being a

‘system provider’ as defined in clause(q) of Section 2 of PSS Act

of 2007, is only authorized to maintain payment system.

35. The appellant-company has also contended that it is

having a licence under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006
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(for short ‘FSS Act of 2006). The licence under the FSS Act of

2006 is a licence to comply all safety and standards in respect

of food, it will not constitute a licence for trade in liquor.

36. Rule 5 of Karnataka Excise Licences (General

Conditions) Rules, 1967 provides for restriction in respect of

location of shops. It provides that no licence shall be granted for

sale of liquor to a liquor shop or premises within a distance of

100 mtrs. from any religious or educational institution or

Hospital as well as certain the other places. Therefore, if the

plea canvassed by the appellant-company is accepted, it will be

contrary to the statutory provisions as contained under Rule 5

of the Rules, 1967 and as there will be no restriction in respect

of place of location of shops, not only this, Rule 10 of the Rules,

1967 provides for restriction in respect of sale of liquor to

certain category of persons like insane persons, persons below

21 years of age etc., and the same can be checked in case

liquor is being bought from the authorized shops. It is going to

be very difficult to check persons like the appellant company

who are acting as alleged facilitator. The respondent-State has

also placed reliance on the judgments delivered in Khoday

Distilleries Ltd. (supra) and Kerala Bar Hotels Assn. (supra)

and it has been rightly contended that reasonable restrictions

can be imposed in respect of trading of liquor by the State and

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the same has been done on account of the statutory provisions

under the Excise Act and Rules framed thereunder. Reliance

has also been placed upon the judgment delivered in Coverjee

B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner, Ajmer and ors. AIR

1954 SC 220 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-7,

8, 9, 10,11 has held as under:

“7. Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution guarantees that

all citizens have the right to practise any profession or
to carry on any occupation or trade or business, and
clause (6) of the article authorises legislation which
imposes reasonable restrictions on this right in the
interests of the general public. It was not disputed that
in order to determine the reasonableness of the
restriction regard must be had to the nature of the
business and the conditions prevailing in that trade. It
is obvious that these factors must differ from trade to
trade and no hard and fast rules concerning all trades
can be laid down. It can also not be denied that the
State has the power to prohibit trades which are illegal
or immoral or injurious to the health and welfare of the
public. Laws prohibiting trades in noxious or dangerous
goods or trafficking in women cannot be held to be
illegal as enacting a prohibition and not a mere
regulation. The nature of the business is, therefore, an
important element in deciding the reasonableness of
the restrictions. The right of every citizen to pursue any
lawful trade or business is obviously subject to such
reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the
governing authority of the country essential to the
safety, health, peace, order and morals of the
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community. Some occupations by the noise made in

their pursuit, some by the odours they engender, and
some by the dangers accompanying them, require
regulations as to the locality in which they may be
conducted. Some, by the dangerous character of the
articles used, manufactured or sold, require also
special qualifications in the parties permitted to use,
manufacture or sell them. These pro positions were not
disputed, but it was urged that there was something
wrong in principle and objectionable in similar
restrictions being applied to the business of selling by
retail, in small quantities, spirituous and intoxicating
liquors. It was urged that their sale should be without
restriction, that every person has a right which inheres
in him i.e., a natural right to carry on trade in
intoxicating liquors and that the State had no right to
create a monopoly in them. This contention stands
answered by What Field J. said in Crowley v.
Christensen:

"There is in this position an assumption of a fact which

does not exist, that when the liquors are taken in
excess the injuries are confined to the party offending.
The injury, it is true, first falls upon him in his health,
which the habit undermines; in his morals, which it
weakens; and in the self-abasement which it creates.
But as it leads to neglect of business and waste of
property and general demoralisation, it affects those
who are immediately connected with and dependent
upon him. By the general concurrence of opinion of
every civilized and Christian community, there are few
sources of crime and misery to society equal to the
dram shop, where intoxicating liquors, in small
quantities, to be drunk at the time, are sold
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indiscriminately to all parties applying. The statistics of

every State show a greater amount of crime and
misery attributable to the use of ardent spirits obtained
at these retail liquor saloons than to any other source.
The sale of such liquors in this way has therefore been,
at all times, by the courts of every State, considered as
the proper subject of legislative regulation. Not -only
may a licence be exacted from the keeper of the saloon
before a glass of his liquors can be thus disposed of,
but restrictions may be imposed as to the class of
persons to whom they may be sold, and the hours of
the day, and the days of the week, on which the
saloons may be opened. Their sale in that form may be
absolutely prohibited. It is a question of public
expediency and public morality, and not of federal law.
The police power of the State is fully competent to
regulate the business-to mitigate its evils or to
suppress it entirely. There is no inherent right in a
citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail; it is not
a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the
United States. As it is a business attended with danger
to the community, it may, as already said, be entirely
prohibited, or be permitted under such conditions as
will limit to the utmost its evils. The manner and extent
of regulation rest in the discretion of the governing
authority. That authority may vest in such officers as it
may deem proper the power of passing upon
applications for permission to carry it on, and to issue
licences for that purpose. It is a matter of legislative
will only."

These observations have our entire concurrence and

they completely negative the contention raised on
behalf of the petitioner. The provisions of the regulation
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purport to regulate trade in liquor in all its different

spheres and are valid.

8. The contention that the effect of some of these

provisions is to enable Government to confer monopoly
rights on one or more persons to the exclusion of
others and that creation of such monopoly rights could
not be sustained under article 19 (6) is again without
force. Reliance was placed on the decision in Rashid
Ahmad v. Municipal Board of Kairana. That decision is
no authority for the Proposition contended for.
Elimination and exclusion from business is inherent in
the nature of liquor business and it will hardly be
proper to apply to such a business principles applicable
to trades which all could carry. The provisions of the
regulation cannot be attacked merely on the ground
that they create a monopoly. Properly speaking, there
can be a monopoly only when a trade which could be
carried on by all persons is entrusted by law to one or
more persons to the exclusion of the general public.
Such, however, is not the case with the business of
liquor. Reference in this connection may be made to
the observations of Lord Porter in Commonwealth of
Australia v. Bank of New South Wales. This is what his
Lordship said:

"Yet about this as about every other proposition

in this field a reservation must be made. For their
Lordships do not intend to lay it down that in no
circumstances would exclusion of competition so as to
create a monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth
agency or in some other body be justified. Every case
must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting
of time.”
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Further it seems to us that this argument suffers

from a fallacy. Under the rules every member of the
public who wishes to carry on trade in liquor is invited
to make bids. This is the only method by which carrying
on of liquor trade can be regulated. When the contract
is thrown open to public auction, it cannot be said that
there is exclusion of competition and thereby a
monopoly is created. For all these reasons we are of
opinion that the contention that the provisions of the
regulation are unconstitutional as they abridge the
rights of the petitioner to carry on liquor trade freely
cannot be sustained.

9. The next contention that the charge of fee by

public auction is excessive and is not in the nature of a
fee but a tax ignores the fact that that licence fee
described as a licence fee is more in the nature of a tax
than a licence fee. One of the purposes of the
regulation is to raise revenue. By the provisions of
section 24, duties can be imposed on the manufacture,
import, export and transport of liquor and other
excisable articles. Revenue is also collected by the
grant of contracts to carry on' trade in liquors and
these contracts are sold by auction. The grantee is
given a licence on payment of the auction price. The
regulation specifically authorises this. It is not a fee
levied without authority of law as was the situation in
Rashid Ahmad's case.

10. As regards the other contentions of the learned

counsel, it is sufficient to say that if there has been any
breach of the rules framed under the regulation by the
officers concerned, the remedy for such breaches is
provided for in the regulation itself. Mere irregularities
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committed in conducting an auction sale cannot be

said to have abridged the petitioner's fundamental
rights and so article 32 is not attracted. It is open to the
petitioner under article 226 to I approach the- High
Court for a mandamus if the officers concerned have
conducted themselves not in accordance with law or if
they have acted in excess of their jurisdiction. The
same is the answer to the petitioner's next contention
that the sale could not be confirmed by the Minister
and that under the rules it was only the Chief
Commissioner who was authorised to confirm it. The
point of discrimination was not seriously argued before
us.

11. For the reasons given above we see no validity in

this application and we accordingly dismiss it with
costs.”

37. In the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court

has held that Article 19 (1)(g) of the Constitution guarantees all

citizens a right to practice any profession or to carry on any

occupation or trade or business, and clause(6) of the article

authorizes legislation which imposes reasonable restrictions on

this right in the interests of the general public.

38. In the considered opinion of this Court, restrictions

under the Karnataka Excise Act, 1965 and Rules framed

thereunder are reasonable restrictions. By no stretch of

imagination the appellant-company can be permitted to trade in

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liquor as prayed under the relief clause. The learned Single

Judge was justified in dismissing the writ petition and no case

for interference is made out in the matter. Accordingly, the writ

appeal also stands dismissed.

(SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA)

JUDGE

(V.SRISHANANDA)
JUDGE
TL