September 2014

Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems

in Contested Environments
A Vulnerability Analysis

Joint Air Power

Competence Centre
JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 i
 Cover picture © Northrop Grumman Corporation

© This work is copyrighted. No part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission. Inquiries should be made to: The Editor,
Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), [email protected]

Disclaimer
This publication is a product of the JAPCC. It does not represent the opinions or policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and is
designed to provide an independent overview, analysis, food for thought and recommendations regarding a possible way ahead on the subject.

Author
Major André Haider (DEU A), JAPCC

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ii JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

FROM:
The Executive Director of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC)

SUBJECT:
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments

DISTRIBUTION:

JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CENTRE

All NATO Commands, Nations, Ministries of Defence and Relevant Organizations

Over the past two decades, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) have been fielded in
increasing numbers across many nations and military services. From the first operational
deployment of the MQ-1 Predator during Operation Deliberate Force in 1995 to Operation

von-Seydlitz-Kaserne I Römerstraße 140 I 47546 Kalkar I Germany/Allemagne I Tel +49 (0) 2824 90 2201 I Fax +49 (0) 2824 90 2208 I www.japcc.org
Unified Protector over Libya in 2011, their flight hours have grown exponentially, providing
distinctive capabilities with reduced risk and extensive time on station in comparison with
manned systems.

In contrast to ground and manned aviation operations, recent RPAS missions have been
conducted in a permissive air environment only, where Allied forces did not anticipate
vigorous enemy Air Defence assets. Based on the assumption that in the future, NATO will be
forced to deal with something other than an inferior or outgunned enemy, adversaries will
have the capability and intent to oppose or disrupt NATO air operations and will represent a
serious threat to Allied RPAS assets.

NCN: +234 or 239 2201 I E-Mail: [email protected]

Joint Air Power Competence Centre I centre de compétence de la puissance aérienne interarmées
Therefore, this study provides a detailed assessment of current RPAS components’ limitations
and vulnerabilities, addressing operational, technical and legal questions. It outlines a
vision of possible future conflict scenarios and compares these predicted threats with
current capabilities. The study focuses on Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) and
High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) RPAS. However, the identified risks and threats, as
well as the given recommendations, may apply to other classes of RPAS as well.

We welcome your comments on our document or any future issues it identifies.

Please feel free to contact the RPAS section of the Combat Air Branch at the JAPCC staff
via email: [email protected].

Joachim Wundrak
Lieutenant General, DEU AF
Executive Director, JAPCC

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 iii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Aim................................................................................................................................................................................................................7
1.2 Assumptions............................................................................................................................................................................................7
1.3 Limitations................................................................................................................................................................................................7

CHAPTER II
Definitions
2.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.............................................................................................................................................8
2.2 RPAS Classifications.............................................................................................................................................................................9
2.3 Operational Environments..............................................................................................................................................................9

CHAPTER III
Operational Environment Background
3.1 Balkan Operations.............................................................................................................................................................................11
3.2 Iraq Operations...................................................................................................................................................................................12
3.3 Afghanistan Operations.................................................................................................................................................................12
3.4 Libya Operations................................................................................................................................................................................12

CHAPTER IV
Possible Future Conflict Scenarios – Strategic and Operational Challenges
in Future Combat Environments
4.1 Proliferation of Air Defence Technology..............................................................................................................................14
4.2 State and Non-State Actors.........................................................................................................................................................15
4.3 Proliferation of Advanced Technology.................................................................................................................................15
4.4 Proliferation of RPAS Technology.............................................................................................................................................16
4.5 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Warfare........................................................................................................................................16

CHAPTER V
Threat and Vulnerability Identification Methodology
5.1 Defining the Threat Level.............................................................................................................................................................17
5.2 Determining the Vulnerability Level .....................................................................................................................................18

CHAPTER VI
Threat Identification
6.1 Surface-Based Air Defence Systems......................................................................................................................................21
6.2 Combat Aircraft..................................................................................................................................................................................24

iv JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 6.3 Anti-Satellite Weapons...................................................................................................................................................................27
6.4 Electronic Warfare.............................................................................................................................................................................31
6.5 Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Munitions..................................................................................................................................35
6.6 Man-Portable Air Defence Systems........................................................................................................................................38
6.7 Asymmetric Forces...........................................................................................................................................................................41
6.8 Cyber-Warfare......................................................................................................................................................................................44
6.9 Adversary RPAS....................................................................................................................................................................................47
6.10 Public Perception and Legal Dispute.................................................................................................................................50

CHAPTER VII
Vulnerability Identification
7.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft..............................................................................................................................................................53
7.2 Payload.....................................................................................................................................................................................................57
7.3 Human Element ................................................................................................................................................................................61
7.4 Control Element.................................................................................................................................................................................65
7.5 Data Links...............................................................................................................................................................................................71
7.6 Support Element................................................................................................................................................................................77

CHAPTER VIII
Threat and Vulnerability Consolidation
8.1 Threat Summary.................................................................................................................................................................................79
8.2 Vulnerability Summary...................................................................................................................................................................80
8.3 Consolidated Criticality Assessment Matrix......................................................................................................................81

CHAPTER IX
Recommendations
9.1 Enhancing Remotely Piloted Aircraft Survivability.......................................................................................................82
9.2 Enhancing Payload to Improve System Survivability..................................................................................................87
9.3 Enhancing Survivability of the Human Element............................................................................................................90
9.4 Enhancing Control Element Survivability...........................................................................................................................91
9.5 Enhancing Data Link Survivability...........................................................................................................................................94
9.6 Enhancing Support Element Survivability.........................................................................................................................97

CHAPTER X
Conclusions
10.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Payload..............................................................................................................................99
10.2 Ground-Based RPAS Elements............................................................................................................................................. 102
10.3 Command, Control, Communications and Computers ..................................................................................... 103
10.4 Automation and Human Interaction............................................................................................................................... 104
10.5 Final Remarks.................................................................................................................................................................................. 104

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 v

 ANNEX A–H
Recommendations by Threat Type
A. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against SBAD Threats................................................... 112
B. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against
Combat Aircraft and Adversary RPAS Threats................................................................................................................ 114
C. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against ASAT Threats.................................................... 116
D. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against EW Threats........................................................ 117
E. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against SSBM Threats................................................... 118
F. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against MANPADS Threats........................................ 119
G. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against Asymmetric Threats.................................... 120
H. Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability against Cyber Threats.................................................. 121

ANNEX I–K
Recommendations by Implementation Timeframe
I. Short-Term Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability.......................................................................... 122
J. Mid-Term Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability............................................................................. 123
K. Long-Term Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability........................................................................... 125

ANNEX L–N
Recommendations by Application Area
L. Technical Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability.............................................................................. 126
M. Operational Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability........................................................................ 128
N. Education & Training Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability.................................................... 130

ANNEX O
Acronyms and Abbreviations......................................................................................................................................................... 131

vi JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

EXECUTIVE this was completed, the vulnerabilities of the indi-
vidual RPAS elements were outlined in detail with

SUMMARY reference to the matrix. To assess the individual RPAS

element’s vulnerabilities, the ‘Survivability-Kill-Chain’
methodology was used. This methodology was adopt-
Purpose of the Study
ed from Prof. Robert E. Ball’s book, ‘The Fundamen-
Over the past two decades, Remotely Piloted Aircraft tals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and De-
System(s) (RPAS) have been fielded in i­ncreasing num- sign’. Each identified threat and vulner­ability was
bers across many nations and military services. RPAS rated as either ‘low’, ‘moderate’ or ‘high’ and used the
provide distinctive capabilities for the Joint Force Com- common ‘traffic lights‘ colour system. All individual
mander (JFC) with reduced risk and extensive time on ratings of the identified threats and their respective
station in comparison to manned systems. In contrast to RPAS element vulnerabilities were correlated and
ground and manned aviation operations, current RPAS consolidated in a final ‘criticality ­assessment matrix‘.
missions are conducted in a permissive environment Recommendations were outlined following the ‘Sur-
only, where Allied forces do not anticipate a robust en- vivability-Kill-Chain’ structure used in the ­vulnerability
emy Air Defence network. This study provides a detailed analysis chapter. As the study lists more than one
assessment of current RPAS limitations and vulnerabili- hundred detailed recommendations, a quick refer-
ties. It addresses ­operational and technical, as well as le- ence was added as an annex. Finally, the study con-
gal questions, outlines a ­vision of possible future conflict cludes with a strategic vision for future RPAS opera-
scenarios and compares these predicted threats with tions in NATO.
current capabilities. The study focuses on Medium Alti-
tude Long E­ ndurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long
Background
Endurance (HALE) RPAS. However, the identified risks,
threats and recommendations may apply to other class- RPAS have been used in support of NATO operations
es of RPAS also. since 1995-96, when the first unarmed RPAS were
deployed in support of Allied operations during the
Bosnian War. The real turning point for RPAS came
Assumptions
after 9/11 when the United States initiated Opera-
This study is based on the assumption that future tion Enduring Freedom (OEF). Unmanned Intelli-
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations gence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capa-
will be forced to deal with something other than an bilities became critical in the global fight on
inferior or outgunned enemy. It is assumed that future terrorism. These operations were almost uniformly
adversaries have the capability and intent to oppose characterized by a permissive air environment. It
or disrupt NATO air operations. It is also assumed that must be noted this permissive air environment may
they are on a similar technological level and represent have negatively influenced the most recent devel-
a serious threat to Allied forces. opments in RPAS technology. This may have resulted
in exploitable vulnerabilities in newly fielded or soon
to be fielded RPAS.
Methodology
The study provides assessments of possible scenari-
Possible Future Conflict Scenarios
os for future conflict derived from recent strategic
studies. Based on these assessments, individual It is difficult to predict future security threats. If NATO
threats to RPAS were identified and analysed in more ­decides to intervene in interstate conflicts, it can be
detail. As RPAS typically consist of several individual assumed that state actors are capable of confronting
system elements, a matrix was set up to identify us with similar capabilities. Furthermore, the escalat-
which threat affected a given RPAS element. Once ing number of actors gaining access to advanced and

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 1

 dual-use technologies increases the potential for combat aircraft as they are designed to detect and en-
asymmetric attacks against the Alliance by those who gage aircraft at long ranges. However, even Rocket-
are unable to match Western military technology. It Propelled Grenades (RPGs) or sniper rifles could cause
can also be assumed that an adversary will probably catastrophic damage to the airframe and payload if an
avoid NATO’s strengths and gravitate towards areas of adversary were within range. Each RPA is one of many
perceived weaknesses. Therefore, it is likely an adver- nodes in the overall RPAS network, each of which is
sary will avoid conventional military operations and vulnerable to cyber-attacks and the corruption of
attack in an irregular or asymmetric manner. ­microelectronics supply chains.

Human Element and Support Element

Threat Identification
The identified threat dimensions for RPAS can be Attacking personnel rather than the RPA may be a
subdivided into symmetric, asymmetric and system- favourable option for an adversary. Depending on
ic. A symmetric threat is commonly defined as an the mission, RPAS personnel may be working at dif-
­attack on a comparable military level (i.e. force on ferent locations. Within the Area of Operations
force) which abides by the Laws of Armed Conflict (AOO), adversaries may engage RPAS personnel with
(LoAC). The most probable adversary that can deliver any available weapons, e.g. combat aircraft, artillery
a symmetric attack is a state actor. In the NATO Glos- or infantry. The vulnerability of RPAS personnel is
sary of Terms and Definitions (Allied Administrative equal to that of any other military personnel de-
Publication 06, AAP-06), an asymmetric threat is ployed to the AOO. RPAS remote split operations
­defined as a ‘threat emanating from the potential ­offer different opportunities for an adversary to con-
use of dissimilar means or methods to circumvent or duct covert attacks. Special Operations Forces (SOF)
negate an opponent‘s strengths while exploiting assets or other means of asymmetric force can be
their weaknesses to obtain a disproportionate result.’ employed on mission critical RPAS personnel in non-
Lastly, there are systemic limitations that may have secure (civilian) environments. This study could not
an impact on future RPAS operations as well, e.g. the identify protective measures currently in place for
public perception of RPAS is influenced by the legal off-duty and/or non-deployed personnel, but count-
and moral aspects of their use. less references were found revealing the names
and identities of RPAS personnel during ­interviews
and other press-related activities, indicating there is
Vulnerability Identification
­ample information to support such attacks.
In addition to the aircraft itself, all RPAS consist of
several common components, which are the pay- Control Element
load, human element, control element, data links
and support element. RPAS share many of the same The Control Element consists of physical infrastruc-
limitations manned aircraft have and have addition- ture (external hardware), computer systems (inter-
al unique vulnerabilities. This study analyses the nal hardware) and non-physical software. All may be
vulnerabilities of each individual RPAS component subject to different types of attack. The physical
listed above. hardware may be attacked by kinetic weapons
while the non-physical software may be subject to
Remotely Piloted Aircraft and Payload attack through cyber-warfare. Due to their unique
size and shape, the hardware components may be
The vulnerabilities of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) positively identified as RPAS components to an alert
and their attached payload are quite similar to those adversary. Their persistent radio transmissions may
of manned aircraft. The highest risk to airborne RPA also reveal their location to enemy electronic recon-
will come from enemy Air Defence (AD) systems and naissance.

2 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

The Control Element’s computer systems often in- ability summary are correlated. The individual ratings
clude Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) components. are displayed according to the standard ‘traffic light
Identifying the multiple layers of contractors, subcon- colour system’. (cf. Table 1) Red indicates a highly criti-
tractors and suppliers contributing to the design or cal issue which affects current RPAS operations and
fabrication of a specific chip is difficult; tracing all of should be addressed as a high priority. Yellow indi-
the contributors for a complete integrated circuit is cates a moderately critical issue which is not yet ­highly
even more difficult. This widely dispersed supply critical, but may become so as technology evolves.
chain may provide an adversary with opportunities to Green indicates a less critical issue, meaning the RPAS
manipulate those components or penetrate the dis- could sustain attacks from threats listed in this ­category
tribution chain with counterfeit products. or they are not expected to face these threats.

The software components necessary to operate an

Recommendations
RPAS are not limited to the Ground Control Station
(GCS), but also include the aircraft, satellites and ground This study identified more than one hundred individual
stations if applicable, as well as support systems for lo- recommendations throughout the entire scope of RPAS.
gistics, maintenance or Processing, Exploitation and Dis- They include measures in the air, ground and cyber-do-
semination (PED). This variety provides an adversary mains. However, there is no single solution that is suita-
with a broad spectrum of possible entry points into the ble for all types of remotely piloted systems currently in
RPAS network. Although current protective measures use by NATO nations. Some recommendations may be
are thought to ensure an ­adequate level of cyber-secu- easily and quickly adopted whereas others are expected
rity, they cannot guarantee absolute security. to take years of development and integration. The an-
nexes provide tables with an overview of all recommen-
Data Link dations sorted by RPAS elements, threat types, applica-
tion areas and expected implementation timeframes.
Data links connect RPA with the GCS and enable the op- They also provide the reader with a reference to the re-
erators to remotely control the RPA and receive trans- spective chapter number of the individual recommen-
missions. Possible Electronic Warfare (EW) targets for the dation for further details.
adversary include the GCS, RPA, satellites and satellite
ground segments. From the enemy’s perspective, the
Conclusions
satellite’s receiving antenna and the RPA’s Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) antenna appear to be the most Remotely Piloted Aircraft
promising targets for EW engagements. Regarding the
exploitation of transmitted RPAS signals, multiple dis- It is very unlikely there will be a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solu-
coveries of pirated RPA video feeds have proven that tion for RPAS operations in a contested environment.
militant groups have adapted their tactics and have In addition to Reconnaissance RPAS, which are ex-
regularly intercepted Full-Motion Video (FMV) feeds. pected to be upgraded and continue the role of cur-
Shortly after these security issues were revealed, encryp- rent MALE/HALE systems, this study envisions the fol-
tion of FMV streams was designated as a high priority. lowing categories of future RPAS which are optimized
However, even today, not all currently fielded RPAS are for specific purposes:
capable of transmitting encrypted video feeds.
Deep Penetration RPAS - designed for full electro-
magnetic stealth, designated to conduct reconnais-
Consolidated Criticality
sance and air strikes deep inside enemy territory;
Assessment Matrix
To determine the most critical effects on RPAS opera- Combat RPAS - designed for high G-forces and ma-
tions, the respective ratings of the threat and vulner- noeuvrability, designated to conduct air-to-air and air-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 3

 to-ground combat in non-permissive and hostile air they can be launched and recovered from inside
environments; NATO territory.

Swarm RPAS - designed for expendability and oper- This study did not identify protective measures cur-
ating in large numbers, forming a swarm; rently in place for off-duty personnel. Pre-emptively
deterring threats for home-based RPAS infrastructure
Carrier RPAS - designed to carry an immense stock of and personnel must not be considered a military-only
long-range, precision-guided air-to-air and air-to- task. Military Force Protection Conditions (FPCON)
ground munitions, designated to project military should be complemented with additional protective
power like naval aircraft carriers. measures provided by local civilian authorities. Com-
prehensive and joint civil and military force protection
Ground-Based RPAS Elements and Personnel measures should also encompass the domestic envi-
ronment to include families of RPAS personnel.
To improve the survivability of deployed RPAS ground
components, users should employ established and Command, Control,
proven measures such as camouflage and dispersion Communications and Computers
of equipment, reducing radio transmissions or in-
creasing mobility to facilitate leapfrog operations. Improvement of RPAS Command, Control, Communi-
However, the best way to protect RPAS ground ele- cations, and Computer (C4) security must be compre-
ments would be to not deploy them at all. Therefore, hensive and should encompass the physical compo-
the range of RPA must be significantly improved so nents required for RPAS communication, the

Table 1 – Consolidated Criticality Assessment Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

4 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

computer systems (to include their software packag- for software and hardware) should be as restrictive as
es), the electromagnetic spectrum they operate in, necessary to defend against intrusion attempts or ex-
and any personnel with access to the RPAS. They may ploitation of human carelessness.
be all subject to different types of attacks and require
different levels of protection. Physical components Automation and Human Interaction
should follow the same principles of camouflage, dis-
persion and mobility like any other ground-based ele- Achieving higher levels of automation is a prerequi-
ment aiming to avoid detection. COTS computer site in enabling many of the recommendations made
hardware should be thoroughly balanced against the in this study; however, what is technically possible is
inherently superior security of proprietary systems. If not necessarily desirable. The automated release of
COTS systems are preferred, trustworthy supply chains lethal weapons should be considered very judiciously
for these hardware components and their sub-com- with respect to legal, moral and ethical questions. This
ponents must be ensured. Capable, trustworthy and study recommends two fundamental types of lethal
updated security software suites are essential in de- weapons release, i.e. deliberate attack and automated
fending computer networks. In addition to these de- defence. For any target that requires approval by the
fensive measures, offensive and pre-emptive cyber- Joint Targeting Process, a deliberate human decision
operations should be conducted to eliminate threats for weapon release must be enforced. Conversely,
in advance. Future RPAS development should focus auto­mated weapon release should be approved for
on reducing radio communications dependency by any target that is actively engaging the RPA. The
introducing new means of data transmissions and in- threshold of what is considered an active attack
creasing RPA automation. To prevent corruption, ad- should follow the same principles as for manned
versary recruitment or blackmail attempts which may combat aircraft. This study refrains from recommend-
lead to a breach of security, RPAS personnel should ing an ‘Automated Attack’ mode for RPAS. Such an
receive mandatory training to raise awareness of automated attack mode would entail a multitude of
those issues. Computer system access policies (both legal, moral and ethical questions.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 5

 © US Air Force, Lance Cheung
CHAPTER I f­ orces are dependent on accurate and timely informa-
tion and therefore reliant on the capabilities RPAS p
­ rovide.5

Introduction The original purpose of RPAS was surveillance, recon-

naissance and target acquisition. Their development
Over the past two decades, RPAS have been fielded in was driven by Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and
increasing numbers across many nations and m ­ ilitary ­Enduring Freedom (OEF). Their primary role today re-
services. From the first operational deployment of the mains unchanged. Therefore, current RPAS are still
MQ-1 Predator1 during Operation Deli­ berate Force based on their legacy design and have only been
(ODF) in 1995 to Operation Unified Protector (OUP) over modified to conduct precision strike operations. Un-
Libya in 2011, their flight hours have grown exponen- challenged by enemy Air Defences, RPAS have been
tially and this growth continues today. RPAS provide dis- able to reach far into insurgent territory, where it
tinctive capabilities for the JFC with reduced risk. Some would have been difficult to insert ground forces.6
of these capabilities include surveillance, reconnais- However, current RPAS have had little or no s­ urvivability
sance, precision targeting and precision strike.2,3,4 features incorporated into their designs. New designs
incorporate basic stealth technology to help reduce
The enormous increase in RPAS mission flight hours susceptibility, but little attention has been paid to re-
shows how important remote flight has become to ducing vulnerability.7
the JFC. RPAS in combat and the information they
­provide have transformed the view of these systems. RPAS designed specifically for attack operations are
Once viewed as simply an expendable tool, they have currently in development but have not yet been
now become an invaluable asset. NATO’s military ­fielded. Fielded RPAS architectures were not designed

6 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

for operations in higher threat environments, leaving 1.2 Assumptions
them vulnerable to enemy forces.
This study assumes that NATO’s global interests and
Current RPAS doctrine, Tactics, Techniques and Proce- responsibilities will endure and threats to those will
dures (TTP) were fostered by the absence of a robust continue. Furthermore, the study assumes that fu-
enemy AD capability. The current success of RPAS ture military operations will no longer deal with an
­employment is highly dependent on maintaining air inferior or outgunned enemy. It is likely the Alliance
superiority over the AOO. If airspace superiority is not will face an enemy that is able to project a viable
possible, depending on RPAS to provide the same threat to Alliance air assets. More clearly stated, this
capability in future combat operations will be
­ assumption means an adversary has the capability
­challenging. Regardless, RPAS involvement in future and the intent to oppose or disrupt friendly air op-
operations is expected to increase and the JFC will be erations.
even more dependent on remotely piloted weapons
systems than they are today.,8,9,10
1.3 Limitations
This document focuses on RPAS use in possible ­future To keep this publication on an unclassified level, the
combat environments where the threat is ­higher than research and analysis supporting this study used
what was seen in recent military operations. It pro- publicly available (unclassified) reports, studies and
vides concepts for the continuing develop­ment and roadmaps. If classified sources were used, only un-
employment of RPAS across all military domains. It classified information was extracted. Additional infor-
also delivers operational and technical recommenda- mation was acquired from various RPAS manufactur-
tions. ers during conferences, exhibitions and personal
interviews, but only used if permission for public
­release was granted.
1.1 Aim
This document aims to:
1. The General Atomics MQ-1 Predator is a class II MALE UA initially conceived in the early 1990s for recon-
naissance and forward observation roles. The Predator carries cameras and other sensors but has been
• provide a detailed assessment of current RPAS com- modified and upgraded to carry and fire missiles or other munitions.
2. R. C. Owen, Deliberate Force – A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning, 2000.
ponents’ limitations and vulnerabilities; 3. U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, 2011.
• provide inputs to identify future RPAS requirements; 4. Headquarters, United States Air Force, RPA Vector: Vision and Enabling Concept 2013-2038, Feb. 2014.
5. Major Jaysen A. Yochim (US Army), US Army Command and General Staff College, ‘The Vulnerabilities
• provide guidance to facilitate RPAS operations in of Unmanned Aircraft System Common Data Links to Electronic Attack’, Jan. 2010. [Online]. Available:
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-vuln.pdf. [Accessed 16 Apr. 2013].
contested air environments; 6. P. C. Nolin, Countering the Afghan Insurgency: Low Tech Threats, High-Tech Solutions, NATO Parliamentary
• address operational, technical and legal questions; Assembly, 2011.
7. Kevin R. Crosthwaite, ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Survivability Enhancement Workshop’, Aircraft
• outline a vision of possible future conflict scenarios Survivability, pp. 6-9, Fall 2005.
8. National Defense Magazine, ‘Efforts Under Way to Harden Unpiloted Aircraft for Contested Airspace’, Jul.
and compare these predicted threats with current 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/July/Pages/Effort-
capabilities. sUnderWaytoHardenUnpilotedAircraftforContestedAirspace.aspx. [Accessed 12 Apr. 2013].
9. Vice Admiral William Burke, AUVSI Annual Conference, Las Vegas, NV, 2012.
10. A. Carter, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 2012.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 7

© US Air Force, Airman 1st Class Jonathan Steffen

CHAPTER II fers to use the term Remotely Piloted Aircraft System

(RPAS) and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) instead of
UAS and UA. RPAS can be defined as systems whose
Definitions components include the RPA, the supporting network
This document uses specific terminology with regards and all equipment and personnel necessary to control
to RPAS and its components, threat levels and types of the RPA.2 In addition to the aircraft, RPAS consist of
operations. Not all of this terminology is defined with- ­several common components. (cf. Fig. 1) These addi-
in the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions AAP-06. tional components are the payloads, human element,
Different organizations may use different terminology control element, data links and support element. The
for the same concept, even within a single nation. The following sections briefly describe these components.3
following chapter introduces terminology and pro-
vides definitions as they are used for this study. If 2.1.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft
­applicable, this document uses existing NATO termi-
nology and definitions from the AAP-06.1 The RPA does not carry a human operator and is capa-
ble of flight under remote control or automated pro-
gramming. It can be a rotary, fixed wing, or lighter-
2.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft
than-air aircraft. It includes integrated equipment
Systems such as propulsion, avionics, fuel, navigation, and
The idea that Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are ‘un- communication systems.4
manned’ is a misnomer. While the Unmanned Aircraft
(UA) itself is not manned, the system is manned and the An RPA is an aircraft which is remotely controlled by a
aircraft is remotely controlled. Therefore this study pre- pilot who has been trained and certified to the same

8 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

standards as the pilot of a manned aircraft.5 RPAs are
typically operated by the air force.

Remotely
In contrast to RPA, Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA) Piloted
Aircraft
are remotely controlled by an operator who has not
Support
been trained nor certified to the same standards as Element
Payload

RPAS
the pilot of a manned aircraft. ROAs are typically op-
erated by services other than the air force. For the
purposes of this study, the term RPA will include Data Link
Human
Element
ROA as well.
Control
Element

2.1.2 Payload

The payload includes sensors, communications

Figure 1 – RPAS Elements.
equipment, weapons and/or cargo. They are carried
­either internally or externally by the RPA.6 2.1.6 Support Element

2.1.3 Human Element The Support Element includes all of the prerequisite
equipment to deploy, transport, maintain, launch and
The Human Element consists of the aircraft’s pilot and recover the RPA and enable communications. These
the payload operator. RPAS personnel also include tasks are typically conducted by Launch and Recovery
maintainers, mission commanders and intelligence Units (LRU).10
analysts.7

2.2 RPAS Classifications

2.1.4 Control Element
RPAS function at all levels of operations (tactical,
The Control Element handles multiple aspects of the ­operational, and strategic.) There is a strong correla-
mission, such as Command and Control (C2), mission tion between categorization as specified in the NATO
planning, payload control and communications. It can RPAS Classification Guide (based on take-off weight
be ground-based, sea-based or airborne. The portion and operating altitude) and the level of operation a
of the Control Element where the aircraft’s pilot and specific RPAS influences. (cf. Table 2) This document
the payload operator are physically located is referred will focus on MALE, HALE and Strike RPAS normally
to as the GCS. The physical location of the GCS can employed at the Strategic and Operational level. The
vary greatly and depends if Line of Sight (LOS) or conclusions and recommendations in this document
­Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) communication is estab- may also be applicable to other classes of RPAS.
lished. If the RPA is controlled via BLOS Satellite
­Communication (SATCOM), the GCS can be located
2.3 Operational Environments
outside the AOO.8
NATO differentiates between permissive, non-permis-
2.1.5 Data Links sive and hostile environments. These terms are defined
in the AAP-06 and used in this document as follows:
Data links include all means of communicating
among the RPA, the Control Element and every relay 2.3.1 Permissive Environment
station and network node in-between them. They are
used for any means of data transfer. The RPA data links In a permissive environment, friendly forces anticipate
can be transmitted via either LOS or BLOS.9 no obstructions to, or interference with, operations. A

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 9

 permissive environment does not necessarily imply within a permissive environment, where NATO forces
absence of threat.12 do not anticipate enemy AD activity. This document
assumes that NATO must expect non-permissive and
2.3.2 Non-Permissive Environment even hostile environments during air operations in
­future conflicts.
In a non-permissive environment, friendly forces antici-
pate obstructions to, or interference with, operations.13
1. NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-06), 2012.
2.3.3 Hostile Environment 2. Ibid.
3. JAPCC, Strategic Concept of Employment for Unmanned Aircraft Systems in NATO, 2010.
4. Ibid., p. 3.
5. NATO Joint Capabilities Group Unmanned Aircraft Systems (JCGUAS), 2013.
In a hostile environment, an adversary has the capa- 6. Ibid. 3, p. 4.
bility and intent to oppose or disrupt operations of 7. Ibid. 3.
8. Ibid. 3, p. 4 f.
friendly forces.14 9. Ibid. 3, p. 5.
10. Ibid. 3, p. 5.
11. NATO Joint Capabilities Group Unmanned Aircraft Systems (JCGUAS), 2009.
In contrast to ground and manned aviation opera- 12. Ibid. 1.
13. Ibid. 1.
tions, RPAS missions have largely been conducted 14. Ibid. 1.

Table 2 – NATO RPAS Classification Guide.11

Class Category Normal Normal Normal Primary Example Platform

Employment Operating Mission Supported
Altitude Radius Commander

CLASS I MICRO Tactical PIatoon, Up to 200 ft 5 km (LOS) PIatoon, Black Widow

< 150 kg <2 kg Section, Individual AGL Section Mikado
(single operator) SpyArrow

MINI Tactical Sub-unit Up to 3K ft 25 km (LOS) Company, Scan Eagle

2-20 kg (manual launch) AGL Squadron Skylark
Raven

SMALL Tactical Unit (employs Up to 5K ft 50 km (LOS) Battalion, Luna

>20 kg launch system) AGL Regiment, Hermes 90
Brigade Skylark II

CLASS II TACTICAL Tactical Formation Up to 200 km (LOS) Brigade Hermes 450

150 kg - 10,000 ft Seeker 400
600 kg AGL Shadow 600

CLASS III Strike/ Strategic/National Up to Unlimited Theatre Predator B

> 600 kg Combat 65,000 ft (BLOS) COM Predator C
MSL

HALE Strategic/National Up to Unlimited Theatre Global Hawk

65,000 ft (BLOS) COM
MSL

MALE Operational/Theatre Up to Unlimited JTF COM Predator A

45,000 ft (BLOS) Heron
MSL Hermes 900

10 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force, Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson

CHAPTER III in support of Allied operations in the Bosnian War.3

During Operation Allied Force (OAF) in 1999, six na-
Operational Environment tions operated RPAS over the former Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. RPAS were employed in OAF to detect
Background land mines, conduct damage assessments and gather
There has been an immense growth in the develop- intelligence on the movement of forces, equipment
ment and fielding of acquired RPAS since 9/11. (cf. Fig. 2) and refugees.4 While highly vulnerable to AD, RPAS of-
RPAS have been very effective in anti-terrorist opera- fered two key advantages: they helped limit collateral
tions, as these groups were effectively incapable of pre- damage by improving precision in the identification
senting a viable air threat. As such, RPAS operations were of targets for air strikes and they reduced allied casual-
almost uniformly characterized by a permissive air envi- ties by providing reconnaissance, which otherwise
ronment. This permissive air environment may have could only have been delivered by low-flying manned
negatively influenced recent RPAS development. For aircraft highly vulnerable to AD.5
more than a decade, the focus to further improve RPAS
was primarily on sensor capability, imagery exploitation RPAS were flown as low as 1,000 ft above enemy troop
and aircraft endurance rather than on survivability. This positions gathering real-time video and imagery to
may have resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities. enable immediate attacks by manned aircraft. Several
RPA were lost when they descended into the lethal
envelopes of Serb Anti-Aircraft-Artillery (AAA) or Man-
3.1 Balkan Operations
Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). At least
RPAS were used in support of NATO operations since four MALE RPA were shot down by Surface-to-Air Mis-
1995-96, when the first unarmed RPAS were deployed siles (SAM). RPA were eventually restricted to operat-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 11

 500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100
9/11
50

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Thousands of USAF RPAS Flight Hours

MQ-1, MQ-9, RQ-4 RPAS

Figure 2 – US Air Force RPAS Flight Hours and MALE/HALE Systems.1,2

ing in a designated airspace. This resulted in a predict- this global fight against terrorism.9 On 14 November
able pattern that was easily recognized by Serbian 2001, the first strike of an armed RPA took place in Af-
forces. This led to additional RPA losses.6 ghanistan, when a combined F-15/Predator attack
killed key Taliban and al-Qaeda decision makers re-
sponsible for the attacks of 11 September 2001. Since
3.2 Iraq Operations
then, RPAS have become an integral part of military
During the beginning of operations in Iraq in 2003, efforts in Afghanistan.10
aging first-generation RPA were used as decoys to ex-
pose Iraqi AD and stir up Iraqi fighters.7 RPAS were The most prominent role of RPAS in Afghanistan con-
used in joint manned/unmanned missions for the first tinues to be ISR, in which their remote sensing capa-
time. Also, RPAS directly supported US Army Counter bilities are utilized to the fullest extent. Additionally,
Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) task forces by us- armed RPAS were frequently switched from the pri-
ing Electro-Optical and Infrared (EO/IR) sensors to de- mary ISR role into a strike asset. Often employed in
tect and identify insurgents placing Improvised Explo- coordination with troops on the ground, they have
sive Device(s) (IED) under the cover of night.8 eliminated insurgent leaders and destroyed critical
enemy infrastructure.11

3.3 Afghanistan Operations

3.4 Libya Operations
The real turning point for RPAS came after 9/11 when
the United States was attacked and initiated OEF. Un- The air campaign to enforce a no-fly-zone over ­Libya
manned ISR capabilities became a critical capability in was supported by both armed and unarmed RPAS.

12 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

They were used primarily to conduct ISR operations significant contributions of the United States Air
similar to those in Afghanistan. Additionally, most of Force.14
the strike targets by manned aircraft were identified
by RPAS. For example, the capture of Colonel Muam- 1. U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2011-2036, 2011.
2. U.S. Department of Defense , Defense Budget Priorities and Choices - Fiscal Year 2014, Apr 2013.
mar Gaddafi was facilitated by an RPAS. Manned air- 3. P. C. Nolin, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and Challenges for the Alliance, NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, 2012.
craft attacked Gaddafi’s convoy as he attempted to 4. Ibid.
flee the city of Sirte on 20 October 2011.12 Neverthe- 5. Ibid.
6. B. S. Lambeth, NATO‘s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, Rand, 2001.
less because of their high vulnerability and the im- 7. National Defense Magazine, ‘Efforts Under Way to Harden Unpiloted Aircraft for Contested Airspace’, Jul.
2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2011/July/Pages/Effort-
minent threat of the Libyan SA-24 missiles, RPAS sUnderWaytoHardenUnpilotedAircraftforContestedAirspace.aspx. [Accessed 12 Apr. 2013].
were not employed until a more favourable situa- 8. P. C. Nolin, Countering the Afghan Insurgency: Low Tech Threats, High-Tech Solutions, NATO Parliamentary
Assembly, 2011.
tion was achieved.13 Additionally, the Libyan conflict 9. Ibid. 3.
10. Ibid. 8.
revealed RPAS capacity shortfalls in most of NATO’s 11. Ibid. 8.
European member states. The growing demand for 12. Ibid. 3.
13. Ibid. 7.
RPAS capability requirements was only filled by the 14. Ibid. 3.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 13

 © Astrelok, Shutterstock.com
CHAPTER IV Third World satellites and surrogates, they possessed
the largest global inventory of SAM systems, SAM war
Possible Future Conflict stocks and supporting radars. The economic crisis
that ensued after this disintegration resulted in the
Scenarios – Strategic and loss of state funded cash flow for manufacturing and
Operational Challenges in maintenance of military systems. This resulted in a
Future Combat Environments global ‘fire sale’ of all types of AD equipment and
component war stocks. Nations that were previously
It is hard to predict future security threats. No matter denied access to top end Soviet equipment suddenly
how thorough we are in our plans or how diligently found themselves being offered whatever they could
we prepare, there will always be surprises and the afford, and more.3
­future is not certain. The next threat may be another
strategic surprise or 'wildcard' incident. The Japanese AD systems and anti-access technologies became
attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the al-Qaeda attacks more widely available to state and non-state actors
on the World Trade Center in 2001 are examples of through official arms trade or via arms smuggling.
this type of event.1,2 While Western Nations remain strongly wedded to
Cold War era controls on weapons exports, Russian,
Chinese and those of many former Soviet republics
4.1 Proliferation of Air Defence
industries operate without such constraints. The
Technology ­variety of AD systems ranges from small man-portable
The Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact disintegrated systems up to highly advanced stationary or mobile
more than two decades ago. Together with their SAM systems. The main challenge is, once these

14 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

weapons are outside of governmental control, it is have to deal with rogue states, but also with non-sover-
­often extremely difficult to track their movement and eign entities that exercise significant economic, political,
control who has access to them. This is especially true or social power and influence at a national or even inter-
with small, mobile and man-portable systems.4 national level. Although it is more likely NATO will be
threatened by instabilities versus a full scale convention-
Western nations have not been confronted by mod- al war, the consequences of these regional conflicts may
ern, state-of-the-art AD equipment since the early have a significant impact on the security of the Alliance.7
1970’s Vietnam War. Aside from some legacy Russian
style Surface-Based Air Defence (SBAD) systems in the Sophisticated adversaries may use asymmetric capa-
1999 Kosovo war, the air campaign against the Taliban bilities, to include electronic and cyber-warfare,
in late 2001 was effectively uncontested, as was the ­ballistic and cruise missiles, advanced AD systems and
invasion of Iraq in 2003.5 Sophisticated AD systems other methods of warfare. Some proliferation of
could dramatically shift the balance of power in a cer- ­sophisticated weapons and technology may extend
tain region and may even prevent projection of air to non-state actors as well.8
power by Allied forces. As a result, NATO may face in-
creasing difficulty in ensuring and maintaining a per-
4.3 Proliferation of
missive air environment.
Advanced Technology
The availability and proliferation of advanced technol-
4.2 State and Non-State Actors
ogy will provide adversaries with high end capabilities
Despite the possibility of strategic surprise, a large-scale like never before. Non-state entities have already used
conventional confrontation with NATO as a whole is un- more advanced missile systems to target state adver-
likely. There are potential interstate conflicts in the Mid- saries, e.g. Hezbollah against Israel. The proliferation
dle East, the Caucasus, and East and South Asia which of precision technologies and longer-range delivery
may involve NATO air operations.6 NATO may not only platforms puts Allied forces increasingly at risk. Further­

Figure 3 – Proliferation of RPAS.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 15

 more, significant advances in technology can cut both 4.5 Symmetric vs. Asymmetric
ways. It can increase the capabilities of the Alliance
Warfare
while also improving the enemy’s ability to attack
NATO systems and networks. Therefore, a deter- If NATO decides to intervene in interstate conflicts, it
mined adversary who wants to achieve a strategic can be assumed that state actors are capable of at-
surprise may exploit this technology against NATO’s tacking with nearly symmetric capabilities. These ca-
interdependent systems and infrastructures. Attack- pabilities may include ballistic missiles, manned and
ing those information systems may create a ‘digital’ remotely piloted aircraft, electronic warfare, cyber-ca-
Pearl Harbor.9 pabilities and even anti-satellite weapons. The impli-
cations on the Alliance may be exacerbated by state
actors who supply advanced arms to non-state actors
4.4 Proliferation of RPAS Technology
and terrorist organizations. The escalating number of
‘Those worried about drone proliferation must face actors gaining access to advanced and dual-use tech-
facts. We are no longer in a world where only the US nologies increases the potential for asymmetric at-
has the technology, and we are not moving toward tacks against the Alliance by those who are unable to
a future in which the technology is used only in the match Western military technology.14
same way we use it now.’
Peter Warren Singer It can be assumed that an adversary will probably
Director of the Center for 21st Century Security and avoid NATO’s strengths and gravitate towards areas of
Intelligence at the Brookings Institution perceived weaknesses. Therefore, it is likely an adver-
sary will avoid conventional military operations and
Approximately 80 countries currently possess RPAS, of will attack in ways we might consider irregular or
which fewer than a dozen operate systems that can asymmetric.15 Some political entities also subscribe to
be armed. This number has increased from approxi- ideologies that welcome martyrdom. This raises many
mately 41 countries in 2004 to at least 76 countries in questions about deterrence and force protection.16
2012.10,11 (cf. Fig. 3) This trend is expected to continue.
The number of countries running their own RPAS de-
velopment programs or are actively trying to achieve
RPAS technology can only be estimated. It can be as- 1. 38th IFPA-Fletcher Conference on National Security Strategy and Policy, ‘Air, Space, & Cyberspace Power in
the 21st-Century’, 2010.
sumed this number is higher than those states already 2. NATO, Allied Command Operations, Multiple Futures Project, Navigating towards 2030, Apr. 2009.
using RPAS technology. 3. Dr. Carlo Kopp, ‘Proliferation of Advanced Air Defence Systems’, Defence today, pp. 24 - 27, Mar. 2010.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. A. C. Transformation, ‘Strategic Foresight Analysis Report’, 2013.
Adversaries may obtain Alliance RPA, reverse engineer 7. Ibid. 2.
8. ‘Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense’, United States Department of De-
the captured aircraft and exploit the information to fense, Washington, 2012.
copy the technology and develop systems or counter- 9. Ibid. 1.
10. L. Brooke-Holland, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones): an introduction, U.K. House of Commons, 2013.
measures. Iran, for example is actively researching 11. U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), NONPROLIFERATION - Agencies Could Improve Information
Sharing and End-Use Monitoring on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports, GAO, 2012.
shaping methods to reduce the detectability of its 12. Hamid Heidar, Naser Moradisoltani, Omid Alihemati, ‘Simulation and reduction of radar cross section
RPA.12 In addition, an insurgent force may score a strate- the unmanned aerial vehicle in X-band using Shaping technique’, Majlesi Journal of Telecommunication
Devices, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 132-137, Dec. 2012.
gic communications victory by displaying a captured 13. Major Jaysen A. Yochim (US Army), US Army Command and General Staff College, ‘The Vulnerabilities
of Unmanned Aircraft System Common Data Links to Electronic Attack’, Jan. 2010. [Online]. Available:
RPA in their propaganda. Therefore, recovery or de- http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-vuln.pdf. [Accessed 16 Apr. 2013].
struction of lost RPA should be considered a high prior- 14. Ibid. 1.
15. Ibid. 2.
ity mission due to security and strategic concerns.13 16. Ibid. 1.

16 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force, Airman 1st Class Benjamin Wiseman

CHAPTER V 5.1.1 Availability

Threat and Vulnerability ‘Availability’ describes the probability that an adver-

sary possesses certain weapons, weapon systems or
Identification Methodology military force which is required to produce a threat to
Chapters VI and VII will identify possible threats to and the RPAS.
vulnerabilities of RPAS and will conclude with an
­assessment of the respective threat or vulnerability 5.1.2 Accessibility
level, which will be expressed as ‘low’ (green), ‘moder-
ate’ (yellow) or ‘high’ (red). ‘Accessibility’ describes the probability that an adver-
sary can get into striking distance to cause physical
damage, disrupt or interfere with any component of
5.1 Defining the Threat Level
the RPAS.
The threat level is expressed as the probability of an at-
tack and is depicted at the end of the respective chap- Table 3 – Threat Levels Examples.
ters in a vulnerability matrix. To determine the probabil-
ity of an attack, there are two factors being considered: Availability Accessibility Probability
‘Availability’ and ‘Accessibility’. The ‘probability of attack’ High High High
factor does not consider the possibility of success or High Moderate Moderate
­failure. It merely rates the likelihood that possible future
Low High Low
adversaries are in possession of certain weapons and
NATO can anticipate their use against Allied RPAS. Low Low Low

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 17

 5.1.3 Probability of Attack The ‘Survivability Kill Chain’ defines survival conditions
in chronological order, i.e. Threat Suppression, Detec-
The ‘Availability’ and ‘Accessibility’ factors affect each tion Avoidance, Engagement Avoidance, Hit Avoid-
other. For example, if a weapon system is highly avail- ance and Hit Tolerance.1 (cf. Fig. 4)
able, but the adversary is unable to get access to the
RPAS with that weapon system, the overall probability 5.2.1 Survivability Kill Chain Tiers
of attack will be assessed as ‘low’. Therefore, the prob-
ability of attack is derived from the lower rating of ei- To assess an RPAS element’s vulnerability, the ‘Surviv-
ther the ‘Availability’ or ‘Accessibility’ factor. (cf. Table 3) ability Kill Chain’ must run through all five tiers until a
survival condition is met. The ‘Survivability Kill Chain’
tiers are as follows:
5.2 Determining the Vulnerability
Level 5.2.1.1 Threat Suppression. The first tier determines
The ‘Survivability Kill Chain’ methodology taken from if an active threat is present. If the threat can be sup-
the reference book, ‘The Fundamentals of Aircraft pressed or eliminated in advance, the survival condi-
Combat Survivability Analysis and Design’ by Robert E. tion is met and the RPAS element survives this tier.
Ball, is used as the foundation in determining the vul- Assuming a contested environment typically consists
nerability level for this analysis. The vulnerability level of active threats which cannot be easily suppressed or
is depicted in the matrix at the end of the respective eliminated, the next tier is always applied for the pur-
chapters. pose of this study.

Figure 4 – ‘Survivability Kill Chain’ by Robert E. Ball (2003).

YES
Threat Suppression Can the threat be supressed?
NO

YES
Detection Avoidance Can detection be avoided? Low Critical
NO

YES
Engagement Avoidance Can engagement be avoided? Survival
NO

YES
Hit Avoidance Can a hit be avoided?
NO

Hit Tolerance Can the hit be sustained? YES Moderately Critical

NO

Kill Highly Critical

18 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

5.2.1.2 Detection Avoidance. The second tier deter- er RPAS elements. If the RPAS is able to sustain or ab-
mines the visibility of the RPAS element to the threat. sorb the attack, it survives. Otherwise, it’s destroyed.
If the RPAS element can avoid detection, it will survive
the engagement. If the RPAS element cannot avoid If any of the survival conditions of the first four tiers
detection, the next tier is applied. are met, the vulnerability rating of the respective
RPAS element will be ‘low’ as it is assumed the threat
5.2.1.3 Engagement Avoidance. The third tier deter- will be completely negated. If the fulfilment of a sur-
mines the possibility that the RPAS element could vival condition is uncertain, the vulnerability rating
avoid its engagement in combat activities. If combat for that tier is set to ‘moderate’ and the next tier is
can be avoided, the RPAS element will survive the en- applied to identify additional vulnerabilities. If the
gagement. Otherwise, the next tier is applied. fifth tier is reached, the vulnerability rating will be
defined as ‘moderate’ if the RPAS is expected to sus-
5.2.1.4 Hit Avoidance. The fourth tier determines the tain the attack. It is rated as ‘high’ if the RPAS is ex-
chances that the RPAS element will be affected by the pected to be destroyed, rendered inoperable or the
threat (i.e. kinetically, electronically, etc.). If the RPAS mission is expected to fail in any way.
element can avoid the threat effects, it survives the
engagement. If not, the next tier is applied.

5.2.1.5 Hit Tolerance. The fifth and last tier estimates

1. Robert E. Ball, Ph.D., The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, 2nd Edn,
the magnitude of the attack including effects on oth- Blacksburg, Virginia: Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Oct. 2003.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 19

 CHAPTER VI An asymmetric threat is defined in the AAP-06 as a
threat emanating from the potential use of dissimilar
means or methods to circumvent or negate an oppo-
Threat Identification nent’s strengths while exploiting their weaknesses to
’All warfare is based on deception. When confronted obtain a disproportionate result.1
with an enemy one should offer the enemy a bait to
lure him; feign disorder and strike him. When he However, asymmetric attacks are not necessarily less
concentrates, prepare against him; where he is dangerous if aimed at crucial points. Cyber-warfare for
strong, avoid him.‘ example, if directed properly, may have devastating
Sun Tzu effects to network centric systems. Finally, there are
systemic limitations which may have an impact on fu-
Deducing the threat dimensions for the RPAS from pos- ture RPAS operations as well.
sible future challenges outlined in chapter IV, they can be
subdivided into symmetric, asymmetric and systemic. This chapter lists the identified threats to RPAS and
outlines which system components will be affect-
A symmetric threat is commonly defined as an attack ed. A successfully conducted attack on one of the
on a comparable military level (i.e. force on force) system’s components usually has an impact on
which abides by the Laws of Armed Conflict. The most other components as well. The table below illus-
probable adversary that can deliver a symmetric at- trates those possible points of attack and their im-
tack is a state actor. plied effects.

Table 4 – RPAS Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Targeted Component
Secondary Effects

20 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © Siarhei Fedarenka / Shutterstock

6.1 Surface-Based has b

­ ecome more widely available to possible future
adversaries. This access could be attributed to the ex-
Air Defence Systems
ports of Russian and Chinese armament industries or
Surface-Based Air Defence (SBAD) systems are directed remnants of the Cold War era.
against the RPA by physically destroying the airframe,
degrading its ability to fly or averting the aircraft from its 6.1.2 Current SBAD Capabilities
mission. As a secondary effect, it also degrades the func-
tionality of the carried payload or renders it useless. A number of key trends in Russian and Chinese Inte-
grated Air Defence Systems (IADS) that exploit the
6.1.1 General Overview globalized market for higher technology have been
identified. Commercially and strategically driven
An SBAD system consists of one or more sensors and a ­developmental activity in the Russian and Chinese
shooting element, e.g. missile launchers or AAA. The defence industries have been observed in the previ-
sensors usually include wide area coverage by radar ous decade. These are outlined below.3
and may be reinforced by other active and passive sen-
sors, e.g. Infrared Search and Trackers (IRST) or passive 6.1.2.1 High Mobility of all Key Components. Re-
radars for detecting and localizing electronic emissions cently developed SAM systems are self-propelled and
from aircraft. SAMs are launched toward the area where expected to be capable of changing their firing-posi-
the target is expected to be. If the SAM is not self-guid- tions in less than 5 minutes. Acquisition radars are pre-
ing (such as infrared or active radar missiles), the final sumed to be capable of redeploying in less than 15
target data and intercept parameters are sent to the minutes. Mobility upgrades for legacy systems are
missile via data link during flight. They are further up- also available and exported.4
dated before the terminal intercept to respond to eva-
sive manoeuvres and countermeasures dispensed by 6.1.2.2 Phased Array and Active Array Antenna
the target.2 As outlined in chapter 4.1.1, AD technology Technology increasing the effectiveness of SAM en-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 21

 gagement radars. Phased arrays are capable of jam be additionally defended by Short-Range Air Defence
resistant, high precision angle tracking and high up- (SHORAD) which makes the site virtually immune to
date rate angle/range tracking of multiple targets.5 standoff attack by precision-guided weapons. Mod-
ern systems are also designed to operate effectively
6.1.2.3 Increased Radar Power and Operation in even when subjected to severe countermeasures and
Lower Frequency Bands to provide counter-stealth Electronic Attack (EA), which makes them especially
capabilities. Operating in lower frequency bands and difficult to suppress.11
increasing radar power aids in defeating stealth shap-
ing and coatings optimised for S-band6 and X-band7 6.1.3 Availability of SBAD Systems
threats. Most EW self-protection systems jam below
the S-band due to antenna size limitations.8 Acquisition of sophisticated AD technology and its inte-
gration and operation in an IADS require a lot of skill,
6.1.2.4 Emitter Locating Systems capable of track- resources and an infrastructure which can usually only
ing all electromagnetic emissions from the aircraft, in- be provided by a state-actor. Therefore, non-state actors
cluding jammers. ISR platforms are especially vulnera- and terrorist organizations are very unlikely to acquire
ble to tracking by such systems due to their extensive AD systems other than MANPADS or perhaps individual
radio transmissions while providing imagery and FMV.9 non-integrated AD systems. However, in a contested
environment, Allied RPAS must be prepared to face a
In addition, modern SAMs are capable of outmanoeu- variety of adversary SBAD systems. Due to their wide-
vring any modern fighter aircraft and can also effec- spread proliferation through both legal exports and
tively intercept short- and medium-range ballistic ­illegal arms trading, these systems are determined to be
missiles that would be targeting the site. AD sites may highly available to potential future adversaries.

Figure 5 – Air Defence Weapon Envelopes and Estimated Costs per Round.10

$1 $3,000 $20,000 $100,000 $1,000,000 $2,500,000

ALTITUDE
[kft ]
30

20
SA-8

SA-13
“Trash Fire Envelope”
10 AAA SA-3 SA-2 SA-10b SA-10c SA-5
MANPADS SA-11 SA-4 SA-12a/b
SA-6
SA-10a

Low Level Penetration Corridor

0 10 20 30 40 50 60
RANGE [NMI]

22 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

6.1.4 Accessibility of RPAS by SBAD Systems of Allied RPAS to the threat SBAD systems present has
also been assessed as ‘high’. Accordingly, the estimat-
Operating in an IADS environment requires a combina- ed overall threat level for SBAD systems against RPAS
tion of stealth and stand-off capabilities to penetrate and their payload is also ‘high’. (cf. Table 5)
adversary SBAD systems or to engage them outside of
detection range. To survive in a modern IADS environ-
1. NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-06), 2012.
ment, a Radar Cross Section (RCS) in the range from -35 2. Defense Update, ‘Net Centric Air Defense Systems’, 28 Nov. 2004. [Online]. Available: http://defense-
update.com/features/du-2-04/SHORAD-netcentric.htm. [Accessed 24 Jun. 2013].
dBsm to -45 dBsm12 is required as a minimum. This 3. Dr. Carlo Kopp, ‘Surviving the Modern Integrated Air Defence System’, Air Power Australia, 2009. [Online].
means that only 0.01% to 0.001% of the incoming radar Available: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-2009-02.html. [Accessed 23 Oct. 2013].
4. Ibid.
energy will be reflected. Such performance is currently 5. Ibid.
6. The S-band is defined by an IEEE standard for radio waves with frequencies that range from 2 to 4 Giga-
only demonstrated by the F-22A and the B-2A.13,14,15 hertz (GHz). It is used by weather radar, surface ship radar, and some communications satellites.
7. In radar engineering, the X-band frequency range is specified by the IEEE at 8.0 to 12.0 GHz.
8. Ibid. 3.
Sophisticated AD systems are highly capable of detect- 9. Ibid. 3.
10. Dr. Karlo Kopp, ‘GPS Aided Guided Munitions’, Air Power Australia, 1996, 2005, 2008. [Online]. Available:
ing, tracking and engaging even the most advanced http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-GPS-Guided-Weps.html. [Accessed 24 Jun. 2013].
11. Tamir Eshel, ‘How Dangerous is the S-300 Syria is About to Receive?’, Defense Update, 18 May 2013. [Online]. Avail-
combat aircraft. Therefore, it can be concluded that cur- able: http://defense-update.com/20130518_how-dangerous-is-the-s-300.html. [Accessed 24 Jun. 2013].
rent MALE and HALE RPAS are no challenge for SBAD 12. dBsm or dB(m2) – decibel relative to one square meter measuring the RCS of a target. The power reflected by the
target is proportional to its RCS. Stealth aircraft and insects have negative RCS measured in dBsm, large flat plates or
systems. Consequently, it is assessed that RPAS are non-stealthy aircraft have positive values.
13. The B-2A, sometimes called the ‘Stealth Bomber’, was designed using sophisticated low-observable
highly accessible to adversary SBAD systems. (cf. Fig. 5) technologies that give the aircraft a very low RCS. The B-2A is capable of delivering both conventional
and nuclear weapons against heavily defended targets. ‘NORTHROP B-2A Fact Sheet’, U.S. Air Force, 20
Aug. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=2757.
6.1.5 Threat Assessment [Accessed 22 Apr. 2014].
15. The Lockheed Martin F-22A Raptor is the world's first stealthy air dominance fighter. Its radar, weapons
control and electronic warfare systems work together as one integrated unit. ‘LOCKHEED MARTIN F-22A
The availability of SBAD systems to possible future ad- RAPTOR Fact Sheet’, U.S. Air Force, 7 Feb. 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=8389. [Accessed 22 Apr. 2014].
versaries has been assessed as ‘high’. The accessibility 15. Ibid. 3.

Table 5 – SBAD Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 23

 © US Air Force, Sgt. Jason Robertson

6.2 Combat Aircraft 6.2.2 Current Combat Aircraft Capabilities

Combat Aircraft may be directed against all physical
components of the RPAS (i.e. the RPA and its payload, Modern combat aircraft are essentially high perfor-
the control element and the support element) by mance sensor and weapons platforms, equipped with
delivering kinetic effects to destroy or degrade its radar, IRST, Electronic Support Measures including Ra-
functionality. In addition, attacks against the Control dar Warning Receivers (ESM/RWR), Electronic Counter
or Support Element will most likely result in casual- Measures (ECM) for signal jamming, Missile Warning
ties of friendly RPAS personnel as well. Secondly, System (MWS), Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) ther-
combat aircraft may also employ EW capabilities mal imaging, a laser designator, Air-to-Air and Air-to-
against the RPAS data link to disrupt sensors and Ground Ordnance. Comprehensive sensor suites, the
communications. ability to fuse data from multiple sensors and defeat
the opponent‘s sensors, enable modern combat air-
6.2.1 General Overview craft to engage in ‘Beyond Visual Range (BVR)’ combat
in addition to their established dogfight capabilities.1
Combat aircraft are aircraft designed and used for
combat, causing different effects on the enemy Threats from combat aircraft to an RPAS arise from the
through armament or equipment. Combat aircraft in- following capabilities:
clude both fixed and rotary wing platforms. Based on
the currently available technology, both types of air- 6.2.2.1 Air-to-Air. Sensors and Weapons enable com-
craft are capable of posing a credible threat to the air bat aircraft to detect, track and engage RPA from great
or ground segment of an RPAS if they are properly distances while being able to generally fly faster and
armed and employ specific TTPs. at higher altitudes than current remotely piloted sys-

24 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

tems. The RPAS operator’s lack of situational aware- manufactured aircraft. In conclusion, the availability of
ness compared to the pilot of a manned aircraft makes combat aircraft for possible future adversaries is as-
the combat aircraft superior in air-to-air combat. sessed as ‘high’.3

6.2.2.2 Air-to-Ground. Combat sensors and weap- 6.2.4 Accessibility of RPAS to Combat Aircraft
ons enable manned aircraft to engage ground tar-
gets from great distances. Adversaries may also be Only nations with strategic air assets have the capabil-
capable of employing Precision-Guided Munitions ity of conducting strategic air strikes. Hence, it is ­highly
(PGM) using laser guidance or the GPS unencrypted unlikely that most potential adversaries will be capa-
signals or other global satellite navigation systems ble of conducting an attack by combat aircraft on Mis-
like the Russian ‘GLONASS’ or the Chinese ‘BeiDou’2 to sion Control Elements (MCE), GCS and communica-
engage RPAS ground components, i.e. the LRU, the tions infrastructure deep inside NATO territory.
GCS and airport or logistic infrastructure hosting the
Support Element. Conversely, the RPA, GCS and other supporting
equipment deployed to the AOO are highly acces-
6.2.2.3 Electronic Warfare. ECM equipment may sible to enemy aircraft. It can be assumed even
­enable manned aircraft to disrupt communication ­legacy combat aircraft with a fairly low level of tech-
­between the RPA and the GCS, rendering the RPA nology will impose a viable threat to any deployed
helpless against an impending kinetic attack. RPAS due to their capabilities in air-to-air and air-to-
ground combat. The accessibility of deployed RPAS
6.2.3 Availability of Combat Aircraft elements to adversary combat aircraft is therefore
assessed as ‘high’.
In 2014, roughly 10,000 combat aircraft and 9,300
combat helicopters are listed in the active duty inven- 6.2.5 Threat Assessment
tories of air services from more than 120 nations out-
side the United States and Western Europe. (cf. Fig. 6) The availability of combat aircraft for possible future
Most of th ose countries are equipped with Russian adversaries has been assessed as ‘high’. The accessi-

Figure 6 – World's Air Forces.4

North America Europe Russia & CIS

Combat Aircraft 2,804 Combat Aircraft 2,320 Combat Aircraft 1,852
Combat Helicopters 5,810 Combat Helicopters 3,432 Combat Helicopters 1,216

Latin America Africa Middle East Asia Pacific

Combat Aircraft 629 Combat Aircraft 1,002 Combat Aircraft 1,250 Combat Aircraft 4,931
Combat Helicopters 1,210 Combat Helicopters 1,335 Combat Helicopters 1,247 Combat Helicopters 4,576

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 25

 Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

Table 6 – Combat Aircraft Threat Matrix.

bility of home-based RPAS elements to adversary sary combat aircraft against any element of the
combat aircraft has been assessed as ‘low’ while it RPAS is assessed as ‘high’. (cf. Table 6)
has been assessed as ‘high’ for the deployed ele-
ments. The overall threat assessment takes the high- 1. Dr. Carlo Kopp, ‘Measures of Fighter Capability’, 1999 - 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.ausair-
power.net/air-superiority-3.html. [Accessed 24 Jun. 2013].
er rating for the deployed RPAS elements into ac- 2 .International Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems, ‘Current and Planned Global and Re-
gional Navigation Satellite Systems and Satellite-based Augmentations Systems’, United Nations Office
count because the main focus of potential for Outer Space Affairs, New York, 2010.
adversaries is estimated to be inside or close to the 3. Flightglobal Insight, ‘World Air Forces 2014’, 2014. [Online]. Available: http://www.flightglobal.com/
products/insight/. [Accessed 14 Aug. 2014].
AOO. Therefore, the overall threat rating for adver- 4. Ibid.

26 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © Nick Stevens, http://spaceart1.ning.com/profile/NickStevens

6.3 Anti-Satellite Weapons signed to incapacitate or destroy the satellite while

Current BLOS RPAS operations are entirely dependent DEW are designed to permanently damage or disrupt
on a reliable satellite data link network, provided by the satellite’s communications or sensors. ASAT weap-
either commercial or military satellites. A single Global ons range from direct-ascent and co-orbital intercep-
Hawk, for example, requires 500 Mbps bandwidth, tors to high-power radio-frequency and high-energy
which equates to five times the total bandwidth of laser emitters. It is also possible to use the Electromag-
the entire U.S. military used during the 1991 Gulf War.1 netic Pulse (EMP) and radiation from a high altitude
This demand cannot be satisfied by military satellites nuclear detonation to destroy any unshielded satellite
alone. This is why civilian providers have widened in line of sight of the explosion. ASAT attacks can re-
their business segment and offer their services for sult in a range of damaging effects. For example, they
RPAS applications.2 In 2001, an estimated 60 % of the may cause temporary, reversible interference or they
military’s satellite communications during OEF went may cause permanent destruction. They may target
through commercial satellites.3 Destroying or disrupt- the satellite, the ground station, or any of the links be-
ing this communications infrastructure would elimi- tween them.4 This chapter only discusses the use of
nate BLOS RPAS operations. In addition, RPAS naviga- KEW and DEW intended to physically degrade or de-
tion also relies on satellite signals, i.e. GPS. stroy the satellite system or its critical components.
The use of non-destructive directed-energy devices is
6.3.1 General Overview discussed in chapter 6.4 ‘Electronic Warfare’.

Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons can be subdivided into 6.3.2 Satellite Orbits

Kinetic-Energy Weapons (KEW) or Directed-Energy
Weapons (DEW). Both types of ASAT weapons can be Depending on their purpose, satellites operate in various
ground-, air- or space-based. KEW are usually de- orbital altitudes, speeds and inclinations. The common

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 27

 Earth Radius 6378 km LEO

Figure 7 – Orbital Altitudes of Satellites.18

orbits are the Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit 6.3.3.1 Laser Attacks. High-power lasers can subject
(MEO) and the Geostationary Orbit (GEO). (cf. Fig. 7) satellites in LEO to large amounts of laser energy. The
resulting heat can upset the delicate thermal balance
Satellites in LEO operate at altitudes of between ap- of the satellite long enough to damage the satellite’s
proximately 150 km and 2,000 km.5 LEO satellites have components. If it is sufficiently intense, it can damage
orbital periods of 90-120 minutes with an orbital a satellite’s structure.
speed of up to 7,800 m/s. Due to the relatively low al-
titude, the satellites field of view is limited and the 6.3.3.2 Ground-Based Kinetic Energy Attacks.
over flight time is very short. Consequently, a satellite Also referred to as Direct-Ascent Attacks, Ballistic
network is required to provide coverage of the entire missiles can carry a warhead above the atmos-
earth’s surface. Therefore this orbit type is most com- phere into LEO and release it in the direction of
monly used by satellites which provide observation the target satellite. It is then detonated in the vi-
and not for communication satellites.6 cinity of the satellite with the objective of creating
an inert collision or ejecting a large cloud of pel-
Satellites in MEO have altitudes from roughly 2,000 km lets into the satellite’s path.9 China (2007) and the
to 36,000 km. A special type of MEO is the semi syn- US (1980’s and 2008) have already demonstrated
chronous orbit, which has a period of 12 hours, an al- this capability.
titude of roughly 20,000 km and an orbital speed of
3,900 m/s. The United States’ GPS, the Russian Glonass 6.3.3.3 Space-Based Kinetic Energy Attacks. Also
navigational satellites and the European Galileo navi- referred to as ‘Space Mines’ or ‘Kill Vehicles’, these types
gation system use this orbit.7 of ASATs are used in all orbits up to GEO and are de-
ployed in space well before they are intended to be
Satellites in GEO have an orbital period equal to the Earth’s used. They are capable of delivering the same effects
rotation which makes them appear as a fixed point in the as Ground-Based Kinetic Energy Attacks, but, by plac-
sky. The GEO is at roughly 36,000 km with an orbital speed ing them in a crossing orbit, the kinetic energy is
of 3,100 m/s. In GEO three satellites can provide world- much greater.10 Every enemy satellite in the same or-
wide coverage, excluding the Polar Regions. The area of bital regime as the target could potentially be used as
visibility of the satellite covers about 43% of the Earth’s a kinetic kill vehicle.
surface. Most SATCOM systems use the GEO, e.g. the U.S.
Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS).8 6.3.3.4 High-Altitude Nuclear Explosion. The in-
tense EMP resulting from a nuclear explosion would
6.3.3 ASAT Capabilities likely destroy all unshielded satellites in LEO that are
in line of sight. In addition, the explosion would
Depending on the satellite’s orbit, disruption of satel- generate a persistent radiation environment
lite communication and navigation signals may be (months to years) that would slowly damage
achieved by the following types of attacks. unshielded satellites.11

28 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

MEO HEO

6.3.4 Availability of ASAT Weapons 6.3.5 Accessibility of Satellites to ASAT Weapons

ASAT weapons are most likely available to state-actors Critical military satellite infrastructures such as GPS or the
only. Depending on whether the potential adversary U.S. DSCS use either semi synchronous or geostationary
is a space faring or a non-space faring nation, the orbits12 and are well out of range for any ground-based
availability of certain ASATs and the effective employ- KEW or DEW. Only the LEO satellites are currently in range
ment of those ASATs may differ significantly. As only a of these types of weapons. However, it may take a signifi-
handful of nations possess space capabilities, the cant number of ASATs to disrupt those networks, as they
availability of ASAT weapons to possible future adver- typically consist of a very large number of satellites, e.g.
saries is assessed as ‘low’. Iridium (66 satellites) or Globalstar (32 satellites).

Table 7 – ASAT Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 29

 Satellites in LEO are well within range of ballistic mis- sessed as ‘low’. This is because these systems typically
siles and possibly in range of non-space faring na- operate in geostationary orbit outside the range of
tions. Conversely, access to the MEO and GEO, as well current ASAT weapons. Satellites operating in lower
as employment of any space-based weapon system, orbits (e.g. GPS) may be more accessible, but are gen-
is limited to space-faring nations only, as it requires erally part of a constellation which must be destroyed
technology which exceeds that of normal ballistic in its entirety to render it inoperable. Therefore, the
missiles. Nations currently capable of launching satel- overall accessibility rating of the RPAS data link is still
lites into space are the United States, Russia, China, assessed as ‘low’.
India, Japan and the European Union.13,14 However, it is
questionable whether space-faring nations which 6.3.6 Threat Assessment
have their own interests in space exploitation are will-
ing to destroy satellites and cause orbital debris which The availability of ASAT weapons as well as the acces-
would cause a cascading effect through space.15 For sibility of satellites providing the data link connectivity
example, China successfully conducted an ASAT for RPAS to potential future adversaries have both
weapon test in 2007 by destroying a Chinese weather been assessed as ‘low’. Therefore, the estimated overall
satellite on an 850 km orbit. The event created more probability of attack for ASAT weapons against the
than 3,000 traceable debris fragments. This cloud of RPAS is ‘low’. (cf. Table 7)
debris (ranging from 200 km up to 4,000 km) endan-
gers other spacecraft orbiting at these altitudes with
the potential of catastrophic damage.16
1. Jeremiah Gertler, ‘U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems’, Congressional Research Service, 2012.
Delivering high intensity laser energy to satellites in 2. Telesat, Briefing on Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Mar. 2011.
3. ‘U.S. Government Market Opportunity for Commercial Satellite Operators: For Today or Here to Stay?’,
LEO requires a powerful laser, a large mirror for focus- Futron Corporation, 29 Apr. 2003.
4. David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, ‘The Physics of Space Security’, American Academy of
ing the beam and adaptive optics to reduce atmos- Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
5. Different sources may use different altitude ‘bands’.
pheric effects. Satellites in GEO are protected from 6. Ibid. 4.
structural damage by ground-based lasers due to 7. Ibid. 4.
8. Mission and Spacecraft Library, ‘Defense Satellite Communications System III (DSCS III)’, NASA, [Online].
their extreme altitudes. Analysis of laser attacks re- Available: http://space.jpl.nasa.gov/msl/QuickLooks/dscs3QL.html. [Accessed 29 Oct. 2013].
9. Ibid. 4.
veals that kilowatt-class lasers are required as a mini- 10. Ibid. 4.
mum to inflict substantial damage on unshielded sat- 11. Ibid. 4.
12. Clayton K.S. Chun, Chris Taylor, Defending Space, U.S. Anti-Satellite Warfare and Space Weaponry, Osprey
ellite components in LEO. Developing a laser ASAT Publishing Limited, 2006.
13. Ibid. 4.
system for these types of attacks is difficult and ex- 14. Ibid. 4.
pensive. Thus, such attacks are determined to be re- 15. Jan Kallberg, Ph.D., ‘Designer Satellite Collisions from Covert Cyber War’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, pp.
124-136, Spring 2012.
stricted to technically sophisticated countries.17 16. James Dunnigan, ‘The Chinese Conspiracy in Orbital Space’, 21 Jun. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://
www.strategypage.com/dls/articles/The-Chinese-Conspiracy-In-Orbital-Space-6-21-2013.asp. [Ac-
cessed 24 Jun. 2013].
The accessibility of satellite systems that support RPAS 17. Ibid. 4.
18. Wikipedia, [Online]. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Orbitalaltitudes.jpg. [Accessed 4 Nov.
operations to threats from potential adversaries is as- 2013].

30 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © Meoita / Shutterstock.com

6.4 Electronic Warfare directed against RPAS data links (cf. Fig. 8) in order to
'The EM-cyber environment is now so fundamental disrupt the communications between the GCS and
to military operations and so critical to our national the RPA or to disrupt GPS signals. Either of these
interests that we must start treating it as a warfight- could disable RPAS operations entirely. Ground
ing domain on par with – or perhaps even more im- troops may also have transmissions sent directly
portant than – land, sea, air, and space. Future wars from the RPA disrupted.
will not be won simply by effectively using the EM
spectrum and cyberspace; they will be won within 6.4.1 Principal Types of Electronic Attack
the EM-cyber domain.'
Admiral Jonathan Greenert, RPAS consist of three communication nodes. These
Chief of US Naval Operations are the RPA, the satellite and the GCS. Signals sent
from the GCS to the satellite are referred to as the up-
Electronic Warfare (EW) is defined as ‘military action link, those from the satellite to the GCS as the down-
to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encom- link. There are primarily three ways to interfere with
passing: the search for, interception and identifica- electromagnetic signals. They are ‘jamming’, ‘spoofing’
tion of electromagnetic emissions, the employment and ‘meaconing’.
of electromagnetic energy, including directed ener-
gy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electro- 6.4.1.1 Jamming refers to disrupting communication
magnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effec- by overpowering the signals being sent from a trans-
tive use by friendly forces.’1 In contrast to kinetic mitter to a receiver by using a signal at the same fre-
weapons, EW usually does not cause permanent quency, but with higher power. The jamming signal
physical damage to its target. EW capabilities can be overloads the targeted frequencies with so much

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 31

 Figure 8 – RPAS Data Links.

electronic noise that communications cannot get 6.4.1.3 Meaconing is a composite term from ‘mislead’
through to the intended receivers.2,3,4,5 Simple jam- and ‘beacon’. It refers to the interception and delayed
mers are inexpensive to make or to purchase. For ex- rebroadcast of navigation signals. Global Navigation
ample, GPS jammers available on the commercial Satellite Systems (GNSS) operate on the basis of time
market can reportedly interfere with receivers 150– of arrival ranging. Introducing a signal delay falsifies
200 km away. Additionally, instructions for construct- the user’s computed position which results in location
ing an inexpensive GPS jammer are currently available errors. In the worst case, the RPA can be misdirected or
on the Internet.6 A document allegedly written by al- forced to land in an enemy controlled area. Unfortu-
Qaeda on how to defend against RPAS claimed they nately, even encrypted military GPS signals are not
used legacy Russian radio transmitters to successfully entirely protected from sophisticated meaconing at-
disrupt satellite communications in the local area.7 tacks.9,10,11,12

6.4.1.2 Spoofing mimics the characteristics of the 6.4.2 Accessibility of RPAS

original signal so the user accepts the spoofed signal Receivers to Electronic Attack
instead of the correct one. Spoofing devices are tech-
nically complex since they must be able to mimic the EW does not stop the transmitter from sending its sig-
original satellite signal in detail. In spite of this, GPS nals. EW attacks are always directed against the receiv-
simulators that can spoof GPS receivers can also be er to prevent it from receiving the intended signals. To
purchased commercially.8 be effective, the attacker must be within the area from

32 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

which broadcast signals originate. It must also be able from an aircraft or another satellite. Depending on the
to direct its spurious signal to the intended receiver. GCS’ antenna alignment, an attack may also be con-
As common directional antennas are usually only able ducted from an appropriately high point on the
to accept signals from roughly their boresight direc- Earth’s surface. For both cases, since the attacker is lo-
tion, the positioning of the attacking transmitter is cated several hundreds to a thousand times closer to
critical to ensure the signal won’t be filtered out by the receiver than the satellite, less power is needed to
the targeted receiver. override the original satellite signal.

The RPAS contains several receivers within the differ- 6.4.2.2 Uplink. The receiving antenna of the satellite
ent elements of the remotely piloted system. De- is aligned to face the location of the ground-based
pending on the receiver’s alignment relative to the transmitter (i.e. RPA or GCS). A geostationary satellite
other components’ transmitters, an attacker must be can usually cover approximately one-third of the
positioned in a very specific location to successfully Earth’s surface in its field of view. Any location within
conduct an EW attack. the satellite’s coverage area can be used to conduct
an EW attack on an unprotected satellite’s uplink.
6.4.2.1 Downlink. The receiving antennas of the RPA Military satellites usually use phased-array antennas
and the GCS are aligned to face a satellite usually in and nullifying techniques to reject signals from
GEO. To inject a spurious signal into the antennas, the transmitters outside the specified area. Therefore,
attacker must be positioned at a higher altitude than the attacker must be located near the AOO. As the
the RPA or GCS and be aligned between the RPA/GCS attacker’s signal must travel the same distance to the
and satellite. Such an EW attack may be conducted satellite as the target, the one with more power will

Table 8 – EW Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 33

 displace the genuine signal when it arrives at the sat- 6.4.4 Threat Assessment
ellite’s receiver.
The availability of EW equipment to potential future
Due to the alignment of the RPA’s receiving antenna, adversaries as well as the accessibility of RPAS data
accessibility of the aircraft to adversary EW is estimat- links to electromagnetic interference have both been
ed to be quite low. In contrast, the RPAS ground ele- assessed as ‘high’. Therefore, the overall probability of
ments as well as the geostationary satellites are as- EW attacks against Allied RPAS is estimated to be ‘high’.
sessed as highly accessible to electromagnetic (cf. Table 8)
interference. Disrupting only one communications
element of the RPAS will severely impact overall func-
tionality. Consequently, the accessibility of RPAS data
links to adversary EW is estimated as ‘high’. 1. NATO Standardization Agency, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-06), 2012.
2. David Wright, Laura Grego, and Lisbeth Gronlund, ‘The Physics of Space Security’, American Academy of
Arts and Sciences, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
6.4.3 Availability of EW Equipment 3. ‘Iran government jamming exile satellite TV’, Iran Focus, 14 Jul. 2005. [Online]. Available: http://www.
iranfocus.com/en/?option=com_content&task=view&id=2852. [Accessed 25 Jun. 2013].
4. Peter de Selding, ‘Libya Pinpointed as Source of Months-Long Satellite Jamming in 2006’, Space News,
9 Apr. 2007. [Online]. Available: http://www.space.com/3666-libya-pinpointed-source-months-long-
EW equipment comes in a variety of forms. From satellite-jamming-2006.html. [Accessed 25 Jun. 2013].
low-cost commercial to high-grade military prod- 5. Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., ‘Lack of Protected Satellite Communications Could Mean Defeat for Joint
Force In Future War’, Lexington Institute, 14 Apr. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.lexingtoninsti-
ucts, this capability is even available to non-state ad- tute.org/lack-of-protected-satellite-communications-could-mean-defeat-for-joint-force-in-future-
war?a=1&c=1171. [Accessed 25 Jun. 2013].
versaries. Simple jammers can be obtained for less 6. Ibid. 2.
than $100 or be home built using detailed instruc- 7. al-Qaeda, Abdallah bin Muhammad, al-Qaeda paper on drones found in Timbuktu, Mali, 17 Jun. 2011.
8. Ibid. 2.
tions from the internet. It has been assessed that 9. Mark L. Psiaki, Steven P. Powell, Brady W. O’Hanlon, ‘Correlating Carrier Phase with Rapid Antenna Motion’,
1 Jun. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://gpsworld.com/innovation-gnss-spoofing-detection-correlating-
even these simple devices work well against unpro- carrier-phase-with-rapid-antenna-motion/. [Accessed 30 Oct. 2013].
tected receivers.13 Non-military satellite ground sta- 10. Daniel Marnach, Sjouke Mauw, Miguel Martins, Carlo Harpes, ‘Detecting Meaconing Attacks by Analysing
the Clock BIAS of GNSS Receivers’, itrust consulting s.à r.l. & University of Luxembourg, Jun. 2013.
tions may also be used for EW by directing their 11. Melissa Mixon, ‘Todd Humphreys‘ Research Team Demonstrates First Successful GPS Spoofing of UAV’, The
University of Texas at Austin, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.ae.utexas.edu/news/archive/2012/
transmissions against enemy satellites.14 Traditional- todd-humphreys-research-team-demonstrates-first-successful-gps-spoofing-of-uav. [Accessed 25 Jun.
2013].
ly, EW has always been characterized by a type of 12. John Roberts, ‘GPS at risk from terrorists, rogue nations, and $50 jammers, expert warns’, FoxNews.com,
arms race. Unfortunately, EW attack has historically 23 Feb. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/02/23/gps-emerging-threat/.
[Accessed 25 Jun. 2013].
required less sophisticated technology than is need- 13. NovAtel White Paper on Anti-Jam Technology, ‘Mitigating the Threat of GPS Jamming’, novatel.com, Jun.
2012.
ed to defend against that attack.15 Because of this, 14. Pierluigi Paganini , ‘Hacking Satellites … Look Up to the Sky’, INFOSEC Institute, 18 Sep. 2013. [Online].
the availability of EW equipment to potential future Available: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hacking-satellite-look-up-to-the-sky/. [Accessed 08
Jan. 2014].
adversaries is assessed as ‘high’. 15. Ibid. 2.

34 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © Major André Haider, JAPCC
6.5 Surface-to-Surface those of military grade mortars. Usually improvised
Ballistic Munitions mortars lack the precision of their professionally built
Surface-to-Surface Ballistic Munitions (SSBM) can counterparts.
be directed against the ground-based infrastruc-
ture required to maintain, launch and recover the 6.5.1.2 Military Mortars have a maximum effective
RPA. This consists of the Support Element (LRU and range of roughly eight kilometres. Modern systems
GCS equipment) as well as the hangars and run- are usually as accurate as artillery guns while older
ways for the RPA. SSBMs may be also directed systems may have a larger Circular Error Probable
against RPA undergoing maintenance, before (CEP) and need observer adjustment.1
launch or after recovery.
6.5.1.3 Artillery Guns have a maximum effective
6.5.1 General Overview and SSBM Capabilities range from 25 km up to 40 km with extended range
munitions.2 Modern artillery guns are capable of au-
SSBM may range from homemade shells fired by tonomous ballistic trajectory computation delivering
makeshift mortars up to sophisticated artillery guns, precisely predicted fire without the necessity for ob-
rocket launchers and ballistic missiles with high range server adjustment.
and precision.
6.5.1.4 Rocket Launchers range from man-porta-
6.5.1.1 Makeshift Mortars. Metal cylinders or tubes ble RPGs with a range hardly more than 1,000 m to
can be turned into very simple, but well-functioning self-propelled multiple rocket launchers with rang-
improvised mortars. Depending on the munitions es up to 100 km depending on rocket type and
used, their range may not necessarily be less than calibre.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 35

 ICBM

MRBM

SRBM
India
Iran Afghanistan Iraq
Israel Armenia Kazakhstan Taiwan
North Korea Bahrain Libya Turkmenistan
China Pakistan Belarus South Korea Ukraine
Russia Saudi Arabia Egypt Syria United Arab Emirates

Figure 9 – Global Ballistic Missile Arsenals outside NATO.11

6.5.1.5 Ballistic Missiles can be subdivided into and rocket launchers are an inherent part of almost
short (less than 1,000 km), medium (1,000-3,000 km) any modern army. Additionally, the threat from
and intermediate (3,000-5,500 km) range missiles. short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic
Missiles with maximum effective ranges greater than missiles (SRBM s, MRBM s and IRBM s) is growing
5,500 km are considered Intercontinental Ballistic steadily. (cf. Fig. 9) In 2011, excluding the inventories
Missiles (ICBM).3,4 of Russia and China, the total number of ballistic
missiles outside NATO was estimated more than
With some exceptions, SSBM typically carry an ex- 5,900.7,8,9 Correspondingly, the availability of SSBM
plosive payload to deliver a kinetic effect on their to a potential future adversary is assessed as ‘high’.
target (blast, heat and fragmentation). SSBM may
detonate either in an air-burst or ground-burst mode 6.5.3 Accessibility of RPAS to SSBM
to damage the target’s exterior or with a delayed
fuse which permit it to penetrate the target and de- Any personnel and material supporting RPAS opera-
stroy it from within. tions in the AOO will most likely be accessible to the
effects of SSBM as long as it is in firing range of those
6.5.2 Availability of SSBM weapons. Adversary target acquisition of RPAS infra-
structure such as shelters, runways and GCS satellite
Next to small arms, RPGs and mortars have been the dishes may also be quite easy as they usually cannot
weapons of choice of most non-state actors in re- be hidden from view.
cent conflicts. Almost 50 countries have manufac-
tured one or more types of mortars, making it the Satellite antennas needed for communication be-
most widely produced light weapon worldwide. In- tween the GCS, the satellite and the RPA may be the
surgent and terrorist groups have used mortars with most valuable targets for an adversary as they are in-
deadly effect in almost all conflicts since the Second herently sensitive components and vulnerable to
World War. Mortars have found favour among these fragmentation and blast.
groups given their wide availability, longevity, ease
of operation, and low cost. Regardless, currently no 6.5.4 Threat Assessment
non-state armed group is known to use or possess
guided mortars.5 SSBM inflict serious damage to any unprotected
RPAS ground equipment and personnel inside the
Artillery guns, rocket launchers and ballistic missiles AOO. Nations with regular armed forces are likely to
are usually found only in the inventories of state- be capable of delivering high precision surface-to-
actors. Nearly 40 countries have produced or still surface strikes. Ballistic missiles may also deliver ki-
produce artillery systems.6 Towed guns, howitzers netic effects outside the AOO (such as against a

36 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

neighbouring nation that hosts logistics or airport 1. ‘Small Arms Survey Research Notes Number 2’, Graduate Institute of International and Development
infrastructure in support of RPAS operations.) Addi- Studies, Geneva, Feb. 2011.
2. John M. Matsumura, Randall Steeb, John Gordon IV, ‘Assessment of Crusader, The Army‘s Next Self-
tionally, attacks with RPGs and mortars are often Propelled Howitzer and Resupply Vehicle’, RAND, Washington, D.C., 1998.
3. ‘Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles’, Federation of American Scientists, 25 Oct. 1998. [Online]. Available:
conducted by insurgents and terrorist groups as http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/missile/icbm.htm. [Accessed 04 Nov. 2013].
4. Colonel Robert P. Wade, ‘Missile Defense Capability: Can We Effectively Counter the Threat?’, United States
they are easy to hide, transport and set up for a Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2012.
quick ‘hit and run’ ambush. Although not very pre- 5. Ibid. 1.
6. ‘List of artillery by country’, Wikipedia, [Online]. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_artil-
cise, they may inflict serious damage to unsheltered lery_by_country. [Accessed 04 Nov. 2013].
7. ‘The Threat’, Missile Defense Agency, [Online]. Available: http://www.mda.mil/system/threat.html. [Ac-
personnel and material.10 As both the availability of cessed 05 Nov. 2013].
SSBM to possible future adversaries as well as the 8. U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) Fact Sheet’, 2010.
9. Andrew Wade, ‘Global Ballistic Missile Arsenals’, Center for American Progress, 08 May 2007. [Online].
accessibility of all RPAS ground components to Available: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2007/05/08/3082/global-ballistic-
missile-arsenals-2007/. [Accessed 05 Nov. 2013].
those weapons has been assessed as ‘high’, the over- 10. Jerry Meyerle, Carter Malkasian, ‘Insurgent Tactics in Southern Afghanistan’, CNA’s Center for Naval Analy-
all probability of attacks by SSBM is estimated as ses, Aug. 2009.
11. Andrew Wade, “Global Ballistic Missile Arsenals,” Center for American Progress, 8 May 2007. [Online].
‘high’. (cf. Table 9) Available: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2007/05/08/3082/global-ballistic-
missile-arsenals-2007/. [Accessed 5 Nov. 2013].

Table 9 – SSBM Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 37

 © copyrighted
6.6 Man-Portable
commonly proliferated MANPADS can easily fit into
Air Defence Systems the trunk of an automobile.2,3
MANPADS are lightweight anti-aircraft weapons. Like
any AD, MANPADS are directed against the (remotely 6.6.2 MANPADS Capabilities
piloted) aircraft by physically destroying the airframe
or degrading its ability to fly. As a secondary effect, it Depending on their type, MANPADS are effective only
also degrades the functionality of the carried payload over ranges less than about seven kilometres and at
or renders it useless. an altitude of less than 15,000 ft above their launch
point. The majority of MANPADS are thermally-guided
6.6.1 General Overview and the targeted aircraft must be within view of the
operator. Because MANPADS are intended to be car-
MANPADS are surface-to-air missiles that can be ried and deployed rapidly by ground forces, they are
fired by an individual or a small team of people low cost, light, compact and mobile. The amount of
against aircraft.1 MANPADS typically consist of three explosive in a MANPADS missile is quite small. How-
components: a disposable carriage and launch tube, ever a combination of effects, including blast, frag-
containing a single missile; a disposable thermal bat- mentation and the energy of the missile hitting the
tery or battery-coolant unit, which provides electri- aircraft at high speed can have a significant destruc-
cal power to the system prior to firing and a grip- tive impact. They require only a single operator to use,
stock assembly. Fully assembled, a MANPADS and can be very effective against low or slow aircraft.4
typically weighs 15–20 kg and is less than 2 metres in
length. These factors make the weapon relatively While MANPADS ranges and altitudes are modest
easy to transport and conceal. Some of the most compared to larger missile systems, they are large

38 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

Figure 10 – Approximate MANPADS Engagement Envelope Around an Airport Runway.10

enough to have significant implications for the safety groups as well as state-actors are likely to possess
of aircraft taking off or landing. Figure 10 shows the MANPADS or at least have the ability to acquire them
approximate area around a runway from which a when needed. Therefore, the estimated availability
MANPADS could be fired with some likelihood of strik- rating is ‘high’.
ing an aircraft.5
6.6.4 Accessibility of the RPAS to MANPADS
The same characteristics that make MANPADS suita-
ble for battlefield use also make them useful to terror- Like most weapon systems, MANPADS require a basic
ist groups and insurgents. They have been used in ter- level of operator skill to be used effectively. The batter-
rorist attacks against civilian aircraft in a number of ies generally provide power for less than a minute,
documented cases and have been employed as effec- and the operator must be able to acquire a target and
tive weapons in Afghanistan and Iraq.6 launch the missile before the battery runs out. This
can be challenging without continued practice. Many
6.6.3 Availability of MANPADS of the MANPADS on the black market are early-gener-
ation designs that require a rear-aspect shot to have a
MANPADS have been exported widely and licensed high probability of locking onto the target. This limits
for production in a number of countries. It is estimat- the ability of the shooter to find a suitable firing posi-
ed that worldwide inventories include between tion. This may explain why hit rates in Iraq and Af-
500,000 and 750,000 MANPADS developed or pro- ghanistan have been low compared to the number of
duced under licence by a number of countries. Most missiles fired.9
are part of their national military inventories while
others have been safely decommissioned. However, Engaging an RPA is only possible if it is in the MAN-
some are known to have been illegally traded to third PADS operator’s field of view. RPA are usually more
parties, including non-state actors.7 difficult to detect due to their smaller size and lower
noise level as compared to a manned combat air-
Non-state actors are able to acquire MANPADS in a va- craft. At decent operating altitudes, MANPADS can-
riety of ways, including from grey/black markets, arms not successfully engage RPA. Although low speed,
dealers, front companies, trans-shipment, intermedi- limited manoeuvrability and lack of protective meas-
aries, end-use certificate falsification and corrupt gov- ures could make RPA highly susceptible to MANPADS
ernment officials. Terrorist groups and other non-state attacks, based on the historical successful engage-
actors are demonstrating increasingly sophisticated ment rates in recent operations, the estimated ac-
and aggressive approaches towards acquiring MAN- cessibility of the RPA to MANPADS is determined to
PADS.8 Therefore, it is assessed that non-state armed be ‘moderate’.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 39

 6.6.5 Threat Assessment and the accessibility of the RPA and its carried payload
to those weapons has been assessed as ‘moderate’,
The threat from MANPADS can be reduced to zero by the overall probability of attacks by MANPADS is esti-
flying at operating altitudes outside their envelope. mated as ‘moderate’. (cf. Table 10)
This should be the case with most MALE RPAS. The
1. ‘MANPADS at a Glance’, Arms Control Association, Mar 2013. [Online]. Available: https://www.armscon-
probability of the RPAS being successfully engaged by trol.org/factsheets/manpads. [Accessed 16 Jun. 2014].
a MANPADS is significantly higher during launch and 2. Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), Man-
Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) - Countering the Terrorist Threat, Jun. 2008.
recovery operations. This is because the RPA will be 3. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, ‘MANPADS: Combating the Threat to Global
Aviation from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems’, 27 Jul. 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.state.
within the engagement zone of the MANPADS. Force gov/t/pm/rls/fs/169139.htm. [Accessed 05 Nov. 2013].
4. Ibid. 2.
protection measures applied to secure military airport 5. Ibid. 2.
infrastructure and its surroundings should make this 6. Ibid. 2.
7. Ibid. 2.
risk negligible. As the availability of MANPADS to pos- 8. Ibid. 3.
9. Ibid. 2.
sible future adversaries has been estimated as ‘high’ 10. Ibid. 2.

Table 10 – MANPADS Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

40 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © MCD, Sgt Sjoerd Hilckmann
©UN Photo

6.7 Asymmetric Forces though there is neither an academic nor an interna-

Asymmetric force may be directed towards soft com- tional legal consensus regarding the definition of the
ponents of the RPAS accessible to armed groups, terror- term itself.1,2,3,4 Aside from the legal considerations,
ists and other non-state actors. Asymmetric force may (which are not within the scope of this paper), all
also be employed by Special Operations Forces (SOF) aforementioned groups may impose a viable threat to
as part of the adversary’s armed forces. As the airborne RPAS personnel. The domestic (civilian) environment
RPA is usually far out of range to engage and the Con- of RPAS personnel may also be affected, either inten-
trol Element is usually well secured by its surrounding tionally or through collateral damage.
military compound, asymmetric forces may opt to at-
tack RPAS operators, contractors or supporting compa- 6.7.2 Possible Targets of Asymmetric Attacks
nies in the non-military or domestic environment.
The following list gives examples of targets vulnerable
6.7.1 General Overview to asymmetric attacks in the military and non-military
environment.
Attacks by SOF against RPAS personnel outside their
operational location are considered legitimate. Armed 6.7.2.1 Individuals. Attacks may be directed against
groups engaging in combat without the legitimate ‘on-duty’ or ‘off-duty’ personnel such as pilots, sensor
authority of a recognized state are considered illegal operators or contractors. They may be identified by
or unlawful combatants and violate International Hu- traditional intelligence means, but also by exploiting
manitarian Law (IHL) even if they attack legitimate social media and the internet. Once identified, the in-
military targets. Violence directed indiscriminately dividual may be tracked until a window of opportu-
against civilians is commonly known as terrorism, al- nity to conduct an assault becomes available.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 41

 6.7.2.2 Domestic Environment. Attacks may be di- obviously have a negative impact on RPAS operations
rected against the targeted individual’s ‘domestic en- being initiated against enemy forces.
vironment’ as well, such as family, relatives, neigh-
bours or friends. It may take longer to conduct 6.7.3 Threat Assessment
additional intelligence on the domestic environment,
but it offers the possibility for blackmailing the target. The probability of accessing exposed ground–based
The target’s domestic environment may also be ex- RPAS components such as satellite antennas or un-
posed to lethal danger if an attack is conducted on protected RPA is assessed as ‘moderate’. Although
the targeted individual. they are easy to spot from a distance and may be en-
gaged from outside the military compound with RPGs
6.7.2.3 Associated Companies. Non-military com- or sniper rifles, they most certainly will have robust
panies that provide services such as satellite commu- force protection measures in place to protect them. It
nications may also be subject to bombing or may suf- is more difficult to identify a GCS shelter than it is to
fer attacks against their employees. An attacker may identify the more exposed RPAS components. Hence,
opt for engaging the civil satellite ground station the rating is reduced to ‘low’. Access to ‘on-duty’ RPAS
rather than taking the risk of an attack against a well personnel is assessed accordingly as either ‘moderate’
secured military GCS. or ‘low’ depending on whether they are working in-
side protected areas.
6.7.2.4 Unhardened Ground Installations. Soft tar-
gets such as parked RPA or satellite dishes may be de- RPAS personnel, based in their home country, usually
liberately attacked by asymmetric forces. This would work in shifts. In contrast to their deployed colleagues,

Table 11 – Asymmetric Forces Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical

42 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

they may commute between their home and as- tack against RPAS personnel in their domestic envi-
signed base and switch back and forth between com- ronment is considered ‘high’. (cf. Table 11)
bat operations during the day and family life in the
evening.5,6,7 Military personnel usually enjoy the secu- 1. ‘Definitions of terrorism’, Wikipedia, [Online]. Available: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definitions_of_
terrorism. [Accessed 1 Jul. 2013].
rity of a well-guarded base when on-duty. Unless their 2. ‘Article 44 — Combatants and prisoners of war’, in Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12th
family lives in ‘on-base’ quarters, their family homes are Aug. 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977.
3. United States Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2012, May
most likely unprotected. The same is probably true for 2013.
4. Dean C. Alexander, ‘Al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-Inspired, Homegrown Terrorism
employees of associated civilian companies. Unpro- in the United States’, in Defence Against Terrorism Review (DATR), NATO Center of Excellence - Defence
Against Terrorism, 2012, pp. 31-46.
tected civilian environments can be assessed as high- 5. Denise Chow, ‘Drone Wars: Pilots Reveal Debilitating Stress Beyond Virtual Battlefield’, livescience.com,
ly susceptible to asymmetric forces. Additionally, so- 05 Nov. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.livescience.com/40959-military-drone-war-psychology.
html. [Accessed 06 Nov 2013].
phisticated weapons are not required to kill an 6. Jefferson Morley, ‘Boredom, terror, deadly mistakes: Secrets of the new drone war’, Salon Media Group
Inc., 03 Apr. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.salon.com/2012/04/03/boredom_terror_deadly_
individual, which means possible attackers can mistakes_secrets_of_the_new_drone_war/. [Accessed 06 Nov. 2013].
choose from a variety of available threats to suit their 7. Mark Bowden, ‘The Killing Machines - How to think about drones’, The Atlantic, 14 Aug. 2013. [Online].
Available: http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/09/the-killing-machines-how-to-
needs. The resulting probability of an asymmetric at- think-about-drones/309434/. [Accessed 06 Nov. 2013].

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 43

 © Vectomart / shutterstock
6.8 Cyber-Warfare they commonly agree the core of cyberspace consists
of globally connected networks of hardware, software
兵之形，避實而擊虛 and data.1 NATO has yet to formally recognize ‘Cyber’ as
'Avoid strength, attack weakness.' a domain or agree on a definition. For the purpose of
Sun Tzu, The Art of Warfare this study, a cyber-attack may be defined as the unau-
thorized penetration of computer and communications
It is well known that a system is only as effective as its systems belonging to individuals or organizations for
weakest link. In an increasingly integrated electronic- the purpose of espionage and information theft, in or-
based and connected world, the ability to effectively der to damage or disrupt the functioning of these sys-
command and control force packages is highly de- tems or to damage other systems dependent on them,
pendent on the electro-magnetic spectrum and relat- even to a point of causing actual physical damage.2
ed computing and sensing technologies. The RPAS is
not exempt from this dependency. With this depend- 6.8.1 General Overview
ency comes vulnerability and risk to RPAS effectiveness.
Cyberspace is rapidly becoming a central focus for fu-
Cyber-warfare is conducted in a non-physical environ- ture wars and hostile actions undertaken by a variety
ment created by computer systems, usually referred to of adversaries. These may include terrorist organiza-
as cyberspace. Although there are a wide range of defi- tions, although historically these have relied primarily
nitions from the dictionary to state-approved terms, on physical violence to promote their goals.3

44 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

Cyber-threats to RPAS may be categorized according malware for future use. Such an electronic backdoor
to the attacker’s intention: or modern day version of a Cold War ‘sleeper’ is virtu-
ally undetectable by existing defensive technologies.
• Intelligence. Attackers could intercept and monitor It requires long term maintenance and preservation
the unencrypted data or information the RPA trans- because of the continuous update process of the de-
mits to the ground in order to derive intelligence. fensive systems designed to uncover malicious ele-
• Disruption of the RPAS. Intentional modification of ments or activity.5
computer systems by use of malicious code, e.g. Vi-
ruses, Trojans, or Worms taking advantage of familiar 6.8.2.2 Interconnection of Military Networks with
weaknesses of commercial operating systems. Commercial Infrastructure. Critical military network
• Takeover of the RPAS by taking over communica- infrastructure is typically separated (physically and/or
tion layouts and exploiting the system‘s bugs, or by logically) from all other networks, especially from the
way of ‘smart entry’ into the GCS and its computer internet. Therefore, it is more difficult if not impossible
systems or RPA’s avionics.4 to gain regular access to those networks without hav-
ing physical access to one of the military network’s
6.8.2 Accessibility of Computer Related Systems components. In contrast, the separation of commercial
to Cyber-Attacks networks and sensitive civilian operational systems is
not sufficiently established. This is a security vulnerabil-
6.8.2.1 Computer Networks. A network attack is ity that allows attackers a great deal of access to civilian
most effective if there is regular access to it over time. network infrastructures. In turn, the integration of mili-
This can provide the adversary with high quality intel- tary and commercial systems offers opportunity for ac-
ligence that allows the surreptitious installation of cess and therefore exploitation of military networks.6

Table 12 – Cyber-Warfare Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 45

 6.8.2.3 Supply Chain Corruption. A way of inserting sponsored organizational skills and resources. How-
malicious code into cyber-infrastructures is by engi- ever, since only COTS equipment is needed to con-
neering that code into common-use commercial inte- duct cyber-attacks, the availability of cyber-weapons
grated circuits. The microelectronics supply chain is is assessed as ‘high’.
extremely diffuse, complex and globally dispersed.
This makes it difficult to verify the trust and authentic- 6.8.4 Threat Assessment
ity of electronic equipment. An increasing concern is
state-sponsored attempts to corrupt supply chains to Critical military network infrastructure is usually well
gain access to sensitive networks and communica- secured and physically and/or logically separated
tions, or to create the ability to control or debilitate from any external network. Therefore, the adversary’s
critical systems.7 accessibility to those protected networks is limited.
Given that RPAS GCSs are usually part of secured mili-
6.8.2.4 Commercial Satellite Communications tary networks, access to the RPAS by means of adver-
(COMSATCOM). SATCOM services are often provided sary remote access is difficult, but cannot be ruled
by civilian or commercial service providers. These sat- out. The availability of cyber-weapons to possible fu-
ellite capabilities are designed for the purpose of max- ture adversaries has been estimated as ‘high’. Despite
imizing services and bandwidth, and ultimately, reve- network security measures, the accessibility of RPAS
nues. The result is less consideration for the ‘hardening’ network infrastructure to intrusion is also estimated as
of satellite system elements leaving their infrastruc- ‘high’ because infections of the GCS have already tak-
ture vulnerable to security threats. Gaining access en place.8 Therefore, the overall probability of cyber-
could result in the disruption of operations or take- warfare attacks against RPAS is also estimated as ‘high’.
over of an RPAS through re-engineering of C2 trans- (cf. Table 12)
missions and re-transmitting them via the compro-
mised satellite.
1. Rain Ottis, Peeter Lorents, ‘Cyberspace: Definition and Implications’, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Cen-
6.8.3 Availability of Cyber-Weapons tre of Excellence, Tallinn, Estonia.
2. Gabi Siboni, Y. R., ‘What Lies behind Chinese Cyber Warfare’, in Cyberspace and National Security, Tel Aviv,
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Jun. 2013, pp. 45-60.
3. Yoram Schweitzer, Gabi Siboni, Einav Yogev, ‘Cyberspace and Terrorist Organizations’, in Cyberspace and
Commercially available computers or other devices National Security, Tel Aviv, Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Jun. 2013, pp. 17-25.
can be readily turned into some form of cyber-weap- 4. Dror Ben-David, ‘Cyber Takeov er of large UAVs’, Israeli Defense, no. 15, pp. 46-47, Aug. 2013.
5. Ibid. 2.
on. Although it is theoretically possible for an individ- 6. Ibid. 2.
7. Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, George Bakos, ‘Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabili-
ual to do so, it is generally believed the conduct of ties for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage’, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and
cyber-attacks which could inflict serious damage to Security Review Commission by Northrop Grumman Corp, 2012.
8. Noah Shachtman, ‘Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet’, WIRED.com, 10 Jul. 2011. [Online]. Available:
military operational capabilities requires at least state http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/virus-hits-drone-fleet/. [Accessed 07 Jan. 2014].

46 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © AFP Photo, Odd Anderson

Figure 11 – German Chancellor Angela Merkel (1st, L) and Defence Minister Thomas de Maiziere (1st, R) Watch
a Quadcopter Crashing onto the Stage During an Election Campaign Event of Her German Christian Demo-
cratic Union (CDU) Party in Dresden, Eastern Germany on 15 September 2013.1

6.9 Adversary RPAS 6.9.1 Micro and Mini RPAS

Unmanned technology does not only offer new Commercially available RPAS do not usually exceed 20 kg,
opportunities; it also presents challenges and har- classifying them as ‘Micro’ or ‘Mini’ RPAS according to NA-
bours potential threats. Adversary remotely piloted TO’s RPAS classification guide. Payloads range from a few
systems in the MALE / HALE category could impose hundred grams to a few kilograms for larger models. De-
the same threat to friendly RPAS operations just like pending on the transmitter and receiver installed, the air-
any other combat aircraft, i.e. air-to-air and air-to- craft can be remotely controlled at ranges of up to 10 km.
ground strikes as well as employing EW capabilities. Typically, Micro and Mini RPAS do not operate above
Those threats have already been outlined in chapter 3,000 ft, are usually powered by a rechargeable battery,
6.2.2, so this chapter will focus on the emerging and have a low operating time of approximately one
threats from smaller RPAS which are not only re- hour. Military grade Micro and Mini RPAS share most of
stricted to military use, but are also available com- the same limitations as their commercial counterparts al-
mercially. Small, low and slow flying RPAS could in- though their range and endurance are usually greater.
troduce new strike capabilities to the military and
non-state armed groups. They could also be direct- 6.9.2 Detecting the RPAS Threat – A Real Challenge
ed against ground-based elements of the RPAS, i.e.
personnel, the GCS and the RPA itself if it is not Current MALE and HALE RPAS will most likely be de-
airborne. tected by radar because they share the size, speed

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 47

 Raven2 (mil) Skylark3 (mil) QR4004 (COTS) XLC V25 (COTS)

Take-off weight 1.9 kg 7.5 kg 1.6 kg 17 kg

Payload 180 g 1 100 g 500 g 7 500 g

Mission radius 10 km 20 - 40 km 5 km 10 km

Endurance 90 min 180 min 30 min 45 min

Engine Electrical Electrical Electrical Combustion

Manufacturer Aero Vironment Elbit Systems Walkera VARIO Helicopter

Table 13 – COTS and Military Grade RPAS.2,3,4,5

and operating altitude with legacy, non-stealthy RPAS doesn’t require formal pilot training; it’s as simple
combat aircraft. In contrast, Micro and Mini RPAS are as flying a model plane. Hence, the availability of mi-
very small, can be flown at very low altitudes and cro and mini RPAS is assessed as ‘high’.
slow speeds. Even if a low flying object is detected,
AD systems usually filter out those targets too slow 6.9.4 Accessibility of Friendly RPAS by Adversary
and too small, in order to eliminate clutter and false Micro and Mini RPAS
indications. This filtering technique opens a window
of opportunity for Micro and Mini RPAS to operate Micro and Mini RPAS are man-portable and the opera-
undetected until they are in visual range. When con- tor can easily hide as no large ground control equip-
sidering RPA size, this visual range can be assumed to ment is necessary. Depending on the RPAS range, the
be quite close. Destroying such a small object will adversary only has to be located somewhere in the
most likely be a significant challenge. During German vicinity of a possible target, which can be up to 10km
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s election campaign in with current COTS models. Although endurance is
2013, her security service was completely taken by limited, there may still be time to loiter undetected
surprise when a commercial quadrocopter RPAS was above the target to strike when the opportunity aris-
flown towards the stage and almost crashed into her. es, e.g. when personnel leave their shelter. Due to the
What fortunately turned out to be a joke clearly illus- challenge of timely detection of Micro and Mini RPAS,
trated the possible threat that Micro and Mini RPAS the accessibility of friendly RPAS elements to those
impose.6 (cf. Fig. 11) systems is assessed as ‘high’.

6.9.3 Availability of Micro and Mini RPAS 6.9.5 Threat Assessment

Usually still referred to as model aircraft, small RPAS Even the smallest RPAS can carry small payloads of
can be acquired easily by anyone. A simple internet some hundred grams of explosives and can cause
search for the terms ‘drone’ or ‘quadrocopter’ reveals fatal injuries to personnel and catastrophic damage
hundreds of those small aircraft for purchase starting to external GCS communications equipment or air-
at less than $100. (cf. Table 13) Operating commercial craft on the ground. They may be a weapon of choice

48 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

not only for non-state armed groups or terrorists, but plosives. The availability of both Micro and Mini RPAS
also for military SOF to take out critical communica- to possible future adversaries as well as the accessi-
tions infrastructure such as RPAS GCS or Satellite bility of friendly RPAS elements to those systems has
Ground Stations. been assessed as ‘high’. Therefore, the overall proba-
bility of attacks by adversary Micro and Mini RPAS is
Perhaps the most unsettling aspect of Micro and estimated as ‘high’. (cf. Table 14)
Mini RPAS is their inherent unpredictability. This is
due to the lack of detectable and observable pat- 1. ‘German “Pirates” stage mini-drone stunt at Merkel rally’, 17 Sep. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://rt.com/
news/pirates-drone-stunt-merkel-953/. [Accessed 14 Nov. 2013].
terns during planning or execution of adversary op- 2. ‘RQ-11B Raven’, AeroVironment, Inc., [Online]. Available: https://www.avinc.com/uas/small_uas/ra-
erations using such commonly available platforms. ven/. [Accessed 24 Apr. 2014].
3. ‘Skylark® I LE - Mini UAS’, Elbit Systems, [Online]. Available: http://www.elbitsystems.com/elbitmain/
Terrorist groups may provide no trail regarding their area-in2.asp?parent=3&num=279&num2=279. [Accessed 24 Apr. 2014].
4. ‘QR X400’, walkera, [Online]. Available: http://www.walkera.com/en/goods.php?id=444. [Accessed 24
preparations. It is definitely much more difficult to Apr. 2014].
5. ‘XLC V2’, Vario Helicopter, [Online]. Available: http://www.vario-helicopter.biz/us1/product_info.
obtain a firearm in most countries than to buy a Mini php?products_id=100031. [Accessed 24 Apr. 2014].
RPAS capable of delivering a suitable amount of ex- 6. Ibid. 1.

Table 14 – Adversary RPAS Threat Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 49

 © a katz / Shutterstock.com

6.10 Public Perception tions of the target population as a result of RPAS

and Legal Dispute strikes, dissent about the legitimacy of certain types of
RPAS operations and the concern about using civil
‘Every one of these dead non-combatants repre- service providers (contractors) for former military tasks
sents an alienated family, a new desire for revenge, within the remotely piloted system.
and more recruits for a militant movement that has
grown exponentially even as drone strikes have in- 6.10.1 Radicalization
creased.’
David Kilcullen, former advisor to Some studies claim that RPAS strikes are likely to in-
US General David Petraeus crease terrorism and create a new desire for revenge
and radicalism due to the perception they cause
The public perception of RPAS (the legal and moral high collateral damage. They identified a correlation
aspect of their use) does not directly endanger RPAS between RPAS strikes and terrorist attacks and found
deployment. It may lead to negative attitudes towards it likely that RPAS strikes provide motivation for re-
their use and therefore indirectly influence friendly taliation. A substantive relationship between the in-
RPAS operations. Some European countries have de- creasing number of RPAS strikes and retaliation at-
layed or even refrained from acquiring RPAS because tacks was found.1,2 In contrast, another study on the
of their national public debate on the moral, ethical same subject claims that RPAS strikes are generally
and legal questions of their use. associated with a reduction in the rate of terrorist at-
tacks. They are also associated with a reduction in
This study identified three major concerns shaping the number of people killed as a result of terrorist
the public perception of RPAS. These are radicaliza- attacks and tend to be linked to decreases in the use

50 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

of particularly lethal and intimidating tactics, includ- taining weapon systems, etc., employing them as
ing suicide and IED attacks.3 RPAS operators or intelligence analysts is controver-
sial.9,10 Employing civilians as RPAS operators began
6.10.2 Legitimacy during the Balkans operations when the first Predator
and Global Hawk RPAS were fielded around 1995. Cur-
There is opposition, internationally as well as within rently, some RPAS manufacturers offer ‘Contractor
individual nations, about the legitimacy of RPAS preci- Owned – Contractor Operated’ (COCO) contracts pro-
sion strike operations.4 (cf. Fig. 12) This dispute is actu- viding the military, not only with RPAS, but also com-
ally a non-sequitur; the RPAS is a delivery platform. pany ‘Field Service Representatives’ (FSR) including
Like any other air platform it can kill, disable, support aircrew for operating the RPA.11,12 This development
troops on the ground, destroy, harry, hinder, deny ac- raises questions concerning the legal consequences
cess, observe and track. Like pilots providing close air of civilian participation in armed conflict. IHL states
support, firing missiles, or dropping bombs, RPAS op- that civilians enjoy immunity from attack during inter-
erators are expected to respect the LoAC, striking national armed conflict ‘unless and for such time as
based on clear information, including assessment of they take a direct part in hostilities’. Civilians directly
the potential for collateral damage.5 participating in hostilities may be legally targeted and
are labelled ‘unlawful combatants’.13
The probability of mistakes and unintended attacks
Figure 12 – Amnesty International, Report on US
is significantly reduced compared to engagements
RPA Operations in Pakistan.14
from manned aircraft. This is due to the increased
operational and tactical level interfaces involved in
an armed RPAS engagement. The extended loiter
time of RPAS contributes even further to the already
robust decision cycle because more time is available
to assess available information and employ addition-
al resources.

Another issue which is falsely associated with RPAS

operations is the perceived targeting methodology
and decision making process for obtaining permis-
sion to execute a lethal strike. There are a variety of
stakeholders, organizations and political parties which
refer to using the RPAS precision strike capability
against human targets in non-belligerent states as ex-
trajudicial and claim they are not in accordance with
IHL.6,7 To the contrary, there are extensive assessments
issued by national authorities assuring the legality of
using lethal RPAS capabilities.8

6.10.3 Contractors
© Amnesty International

There is also dissent on the current use of civilians to

conduct combat-related tasks which historically have
been conducted by military personnel. Although civil-
ians have played a central role in recent combat op-
erations by providing combat service support, main-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 51

 Unfortunately, ‘direct participation in hostilities’ is not 1. International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice
Clinic at Nyu School of Law, ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone
clearly defined and is interpreted differently. As a Practices in Pakistan’, Sep. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/10/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf. [Accessed 16 Sep. 2013].
common baseline from various studies, it can be de- 2. Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, Matt Flannes, ‘Drone Warfare: Blowback from the New American Way of
War’, Middle East Policy Council, [Online]. Available: http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-
fined as any action which is intended to cause actual archives/drone-warfare-blowback-new-american-way-war. [Accessed 16 Sep. 2013].
harm to enemy personnel or equipment. This defini- 3. Patrick B. Johnston, Anoop K. Sarbahi, ‘The Impact of U.S. Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan and Af-
ghanistan’, RAND Corporation, Jul. 2013.
tion, not only includes RPAS personnel directly inflict- 4. Amnesty International, ‘Will I be Next? US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, Amnesty International Publications,
London, Oct. 2013.
ing damage, but also includes other personnel in- 5. Jacqueline L. Hazelton, ‘Drones: What Are They Good For?’, 2013.
volved in gathering intelligence for the purpose of 6. Kenneth Roth, ‘What Rules Should Govern US Drone Attacks?’, Human Rights Watch, 11 Mar. 2013. [On-
line]. Available: http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/11/what-rules-should-govern-us-drone-attacks.
selecting targets for attack.15,16 [Accessed 17 Sep. 2013].
7. Peter Maurer, President of the ICRC, ‘The use of armed drones must comply with laws’, International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 10 May 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
6.10.4 Threat Assessment documents/interview/2013/05-10-drone-weapons-ihl.htm. [Accessed 17 Sep. 2013].
8. U.S. Department of Justice, ‘Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a
Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa‘ida or An Associated Force (White Paper Draft)’, 8 Nov. 2011. [Online].
Available: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf. [Accessed 17 Sep. 2013].
The public debate regarding RPAS is often driven by 9. John Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War: Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces,
emotion rather than fact. Dissent concerning the legal George Washington University Law School, 2004.
10. Keith E. Tobin, Piloting the USAF‘s UAV Fleet, Pilots, Non-Rated Officers, Enlisted, or Contractors?, Ala-
issues of employing lethal force from RPAS also adds bama: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University Maxwell Air Force Base, Jun. 1999.
11. Chris Pocock, ‘UK Royal Navy Is Latest Customer for Scan Eagle UAS’, AINonline, AIN Defense Perspec-
fuel to their negative reputation within the public do- tive, 05 Jul. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/ain-defense-perspec-
main. An adversary may also leverage that debate by tive/2013-07-05/uk-royal-navy-latest-customer-scan-eagle-uas. [Accessed 19 Nov. 2013].
12. ‘Field Operations & Logistics’, Insitu Inc., [Online]. Available: http://www.insitu.com/services/field-
spreading disinformation and propaganda through operations-and-logistics. [Accessed 19 Nov. 2013].
13. Michael N. Schmidt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or
global mass media and the internet to exploit public Civilian Employees, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2004-2005.
14. Ibid. 4.
opinion for its own purposes. If an adversary succeeds 15. Ibid. 9.
in winning the propaganda war, they may influence 16. Ibid. 13.

decision makers in their willingness to employ RPAS.

Eventually, this may result in restrictions to RPAS op-
erations or even halt RPAS acquisition plans.

52 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force

CHAPTER VII Section (RCS). RCS is defined as the measure of a target's

ability to reflect radar signals in the direction of the radar
receiver.1,2 Current MALE RPAS display an average RCS of
Vulnerability Identification slightly less than one square meter. This is comparable
RPAS share many of the limitations of manned aircraft, to regular non-stealth type fighter aircraft, e.g. McDon-
but also have additional vulnerabilities which are nell Douglas F/A-18, Dassault Rafale or Eurofighter Ty-
unique to them. The separation of the pilot from the phoon.3,4,5 Although some RPAS have been built with
cockpit and the reliance on sufficient data links create stealth technology and radar absorbing materials, the
completely new issues not yet known to manned vast majority of current systems lack any of those pro-
aviation. This chapter outlines the system compo- tective measures. The overall visibility of existing RPAS to
nents’ limitations and vulnerabilities. radar systems is therefore assessed as ‘high’.

7.1.1.2 Visibility in the Infrared Spectrum. The abil-

7.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft
ity of weapons systems to discriminate between IR
To physically destroy an airborne RPA, an adversary emissions from the target and the surrounding back-
can employ SBAD systems, MANPADS, Combat Air- ground leads to successful target detection. Hot en-
craft or other RPAS. However, engaging the RPA by any gine parts, exhaust plumes, the rear fuselage area and
of the above-mentioned methods requires the RPA to aerodynamically heated skin are the key sources of
first be detected. aircraft IR emissions. The intensity of IR-radiation is not
uniform in all directions. When viewed from the front
7.1.1 Detection Avoidance and sides, the exhaust plume and airframe are the
most visible source of IR energy. When viewed from
7.1.1.1 Visibility to Radar Systems. The visibility of an the rear, the engine hot parts become the major
object to a radar system is measured by the Radar Cross source. In general, aircraft with a jet engine have the

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 53

 highest IR intensity. For the same thrust level, turbojets at which an aircraft can be seen by the human eye can
have a larger IR signature level (IRSL) than turbofans, be mathematically predicted from its size and contrast
and turbofans have a larger IRSL than turboprops.6 to the background. Given a perfect black & white con-
trast, an MQ-9 Reaper can be detected at a distance of
The majority of MALE RPAS configurations have a turbo- almost 10 km. Lowering the contrast to 50% (grey &
prop engine fitted to the back of the RPA, dispersing the white) reduces the detection range to roughly 5 km. (cf.
exhaust through the pusher propeller. Compared to a Fig. 13) As military aircraft are typically camouflaged to
turbojet powered aircraft, this design results in a much blend in with the surrounding sky, it can be assessed
lower ISRL. Hence, visibility in the IR spectrum is estimat- that visual detection of RPAS without electro-optical
ed as ‘moderate’. However, those RPAS are not necessar- support is limited to ranges of less than 5km and is un-
ily immune to attacks by IR-guided missiles. Modern IR- likely at altitudes above 15,000 ft.13 The probability of
detection technology with its increased sensitivity is visual aircraft recognition is therefore assessed as ‘low’
capable of detecting IR radiation in a wider spectrum for normal operating altitudes of current MALE systems.
and is capable of locking-on to aircraft from all aspects.7 This rating may elevate to ‘moderate’ or even ‘high’ if cer-
tain RPAS missions or sensor constraints require low
7.1.1.3 Acoustic Detectability. Many RPAS are still pro- level flight or during launch and recovery.
peller driven and generate a significant amount of noise.
Depending on their altitude, the noise emissions of a 7.1.1.5 RPA on the Ground. During ground handling,
propeller can be so strong the propeller noise alone RPA may be exposed to observation and engagement
may attract the attention of ground personnel. This can by adversaries if parked in the open or while taxiing
generate unwanted attention or a potential attack on between their parking position and the runway. As this
low flying RPAS.8 A report on the effects of US ‘drone’ situation is not different from any other aircraft on a
strike policies in Pakistan also claims that current RPAS military airbase, force protection measures are usually
operations are clearly audible from the ground.9 RPAS in place and support RPA operations as well.
propeller noise can be measured by a ground based sta-
tionary microphone which uses the Doppler Effect in Figure 13 – Threshold range as a function of
contrast for aircraft.17
the acoustic spectrum to compute the aircraft’s altitude,
speed and actual revolutions per minute of the engine. 50.0
Real-time computations on such signals can be carried
out with modern digital signal processing hardware and
advanced algorithms.10 As the noise perceptibility can
be mitigated by operating at higher altitudes, the acous-
tic detectability is rated as ‘low’ for normal operating alti- 10.0
tudes of current MALE systems. This rating may elevate
Threshold Range (km)

to ‘moderate’ or even ‘high’ if certain RPAS missions or

5.0
sensor constraints require low level flight.

7.1.1.4 Visual Aircraft Recognition. The range at B-747

which aircraft can be detected, recognized and identi- C-17
MQ-9
fied varies with the size, shape and colour of the aircraft, F-16
FireScout
viewing aspect, visibility conditions, its motion relative 1.0
to and contrast with the background and eventually the
visual acuity of the observer. Depending on these fac- 0.5
tors, aircraft can be seen at long ranges in clear weather.
When there is rain, snow, fog, dust or haze, the visibility
5 10 20 50 100
range may be reduced to zero.11,12 The largest distance Aircraft Contrast (percent)

54 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

7.1.1.6 Avionics. Avionics built without cyber-security previously acquired sensor data. However, the RPAS will
considerations may be vulnerable to cyber-attack. Auto- remain operational as long as a substitute RPA is availa-
pilot systems have not changed since they were intro- ble. For single-aircraft RPAS, the magnitude of losing the
duced in manned aerial vehicles and cyber-security was RPA is assessed as ‘high’ because the entire RPAS will be
not a design priority. Therefore, current RPA avionics may rendered useless. The magnitude of losing a single RPA
be subject to cyber-attack either by clandestinely install- in a multi-aircraft RPAS is estimated as ‘moderate’ be-
ing malicious hardware components or by gaining con- cause the effect on the overall system may be compen-
trol via the RPAS data link.14 Gaining access to the RPAS sated by the use of substitute aircraft. The loss of an RPA
data link is discussed in chapter 7.5 whereas the exposure also includes the danger of revealing classified technol-
of RPAS hardware and software components to cyber- ogy to the adversary. Remnants of the downed aircraft
attacks is outlined in chapters 6.8.3, 7.4.2 and 7.4.3. may be exploited through reverse engineering to repli-
cate the RPA or gather intelligence about frequencies
7.1.2 Engagement Avoidance used, encryption techniques or stored data.

With a few exceptions, current RPAS are not equipped 7.1.5 Vulnerability Assessment
with a threat warning system to detect and avoid
threats such as AD systems, MANPADS and combat 7.1.5.1 Vulnerability to SBAD, Combat Aircraft &
aircraft. Integration of equipment from manned avia- RPAS. The RPA itself is by design highly vulnerable. Cur-
tion may be problematic due to RPA Size, Weight and rent systems were never intended to operate in contest-
Power (SWaP) limitations. ed environments. The highest risk to RPA comes from
enemy AD systems and combat aircraft as they are de-
7.1.3 Hit Avoidance signed to detect aircraft at long ranges and can engage
the RPA with radar or IR-guided missiles. Given their high
Most of the current MALE RPAS share 1980’s design prin- radar visibility and their limited airspeed and manoeuvra-
ciples that sought to optimize long endurance and low bility, this leads to an overall ‘high’ vulnerability to adver-
fuel consumption. The most prominent features are sary SBAD and combat aircraft. As the magnitude of los-
wings with a very high aspect ratio combined with a ing an RPA is rated as ‘moderate’ to ‘high’, the overall
rear mounted, fuel efficient propeller engine. Together, vulnerability rating with respect to SBAD and combat
these provide the desired flight characteristics but bring aircraft is assessed as ‘high’. The higher rating was chosen
with them certain disadvantages. High aspect ratio to reflect the possibility of complete – but at least tempo-
wings have a fairly high amount of inertia that prevents rary – mission failure in the case of losing an RPA. Adver-
the RPA from conducting flight manoeuvres with a high sary RPAS may be capable of air-to-air combat and may
roll angular acceleration and G-force.15 Additionally, the be able to detect and engage friendly RPA. However, cur-
average cruising speed of propeller driven RPAS is quite rent systems offer very limited capabilities in that regard,
low, e.g. 70 knots (kts) for the MQ-1 Predator or 200 kts which is why the vulnerability rating with reference to
for the MQ-9 Reaper.16,17 Therefore, the RPA is unable to adversary RPA is reduced to ‘moderate’. (cf. Table 15)
conduct ‘last ditch’ manoeuvres and becomes a rigid tar-
get when compared to manned fighter aircraft. 7.1.5.2 Vulnerability to MANPADS. MANPADS engage-
ment towards an RPA has two perspectives, normal air-
7.1.4 Hit Tolerance borne operations and launch and recovery. Typically, the
operating altitude of MALE RPA is higher than the visual
RPAS are typically capable of operating more than one acquisition range of ground personnel and therefore the
RPA at a time. So the loss of a single RPA may only result threat of MANPADS may be easily mitigated. This situation
in failure of the current mission if a substitute RPA is not is different when the RPA is operating at lower altitudes
available for mission completion. Any payload attached such as during launch & recovery or when it is required for
to the RPA will also be lost. This may result in the loss of operational reasons. If the RPA is in spotting range of the

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 55

 adversary and visually identified, it will be within firing 1. http://www.rfcafe.com/references/electrical/ew-radar-handbook/radar-cross-section.htm
2. IEEE Standard Definitions of Terms for Antennas, IEEE Standards Association, 1993.
range of MANPADS. Accordingly, this study assesses that 3. ‘RCS Simulation of the Predator UAV’, Efield AB, Kista, Sweden, 2010.
4. ‘Radar Cross Section (RCS)’, Global Security, 11 July 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.
RPA engagement by MANPADS might be possible and is org/military/world/stealth-aircraft-rcs.htm. [Accessed 25 Nov. 2013].
5. Allen J. Bric, ‘Imaging a BQM-74E Target Drone Using Coherent Radar Cross Section Measurements’, Johns
therefore assessed as ‘moderate’. (cf. Table 15) Hopkins APL Technical Digest, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 365-376, 1997.
6. Shripad P. Mahulikar, Hemant R. Sonawane, G. Arvind Rao, ‘Infrared signature studies of aerospace vehi-
cles’, Progress in Aerospace Sciences, vol. 43, no. 7-8, pp. 218-245, Oct. 2007.
7.1.5.3 Vulnerability to Asymmetric Forces, Air-to- 7. Ibid.
8. M. Drela, J. Gundlach, R. Parks and A. S. Ehrmantraut, ‘System and Method for Reducing the Noise of
Ground and Surface-to-Surface Weapons. Like any Pusher Type Aircraft Propellers’. United States Patent 20120292441, 2012.
other aircraft, RPA are high value targets for an adversary. 9. International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice
Clinic at Nyu School Of Law, ‘Living Under Drones: Death, Injury and Trauma to Civilians from US Drone
If parked in the open, they are highly visible and there- Practices in Pakistan’, Sept. 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/
uploads/2013/10/Stanford-NYU-Living-Under-Drones.pdf. [Accessed 16 Sept. 2013].
fore vulnerable to a kinetic engagement. Even RPGs or 10. S. Sadasivan, M. Gurubasavaraj and S. Ravi Sekar, ‘Acoustic Signature of an Unmanned Air Vehicle - Ex-
sniper rifles could cause catastrophic damage to the air- ploitation for Aircraft Localisation and Parameter Estimation’, Aeronautical Development Establishment,
28 Feb. 2001. [Online]. Available: http://publications.drdo.gov.in/ojs/index.php/dsj/article/down-
frame and its payload if an adversary can get within the load/2238/1198. [Accessed 26 Nov. 2013].
11. Headquarters Department of the Army, ‘Visual Aircraft Recognition FM 3-01.80 (FM 44-80)’, 17 Jan.
range of those types of weapons. As force protection 2006. [Online]. Available: https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-01-80.pdf.
measures are typically in place for military airfields, the 12. Reg Austin, Unmanned Aircraft Systems: UAVS design, development and deployment, John Wiley & Sons
Ltd, 2010.
vulnerability assessment for kinetic attacks against RPA 13. Andrew Watson, Cesar V. Ramirez, Ellen Salud, ‘Predicting Visibility of Aircraft’, PLoS ONE, vol. 4, no. 5, May
2009.
on the ground is lowered to ‘moderate’. (cf. Table 15) 14. Alan Kim, Brandon Wampler, James Goppert, Inseok Hwang and Hal Aldridge, ‘Cyber Attack Vulner-
abilities Analysis for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana and Sypris
Electronics, Tampa, Florida.
7.1.5.4 Vulnerability to Cyber Attacks. The RPA is one 15. John D. Anderson, Jr., Fundamentals of Aerodynamics (5th Edn), 2010.
16. ‘MQ-1B Predator Fact Sheet’, U.S. Air Force, 20 July 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.af.mil/Abou-
of many nodes in the overall RPAS network. Concluding tUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104469/mq-1b-predator.aspx. [Accessed 26 Nov. 2013].
17. ‘MQ-9 Reaper Fact Sheet’, U.S. Air Force, 18 Aug. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/
the network is only as strong as its weakest link and that FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx. [Accessed 25 Nov. 2013].
corruption of microelectronics supply chains has not yet 18. Ibid. 13, p. 13.

been adequately addressed, the vulnerability to cyber-

attacks is assessed as ‘high’. (cf. Table 15)

Table 15 – RPA Vulnerability Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

56 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © Northrop Grumman

7.2 Payload Even older EO/IR sensor equipment was able to

The RPA’s payload consists primarily of EO/IR and/or achieve a GRD of less than 40 cm per image pixel at
radar sensor devices and – if applicable – a set of slant ranges of roughly 25-30 km and altitudes above
weapons. Payload capabilities and limitations contrib- 55,000 ft.3 Current average operational altitudes of
ute directly to the overall survivability of the RPA, pri- MALE RPAS in Afghanistan have been in the range of
marily in terms of detection and engagement avoid- 20,000 ft to 25,000 ft. These operating altitudes deliv-
ance. This section discusses those sensor and weapon ered even better GRD for positive target identifica-
issues which influence RPA vulnerabilities mentioned tion.4 However, depending on haze, dust and other
in the previous chapters. vision-obscuring conditions, the effective slant ranges
can be considerably lower.5
7.2.1 Detection Avoidance

7.2.1.1 EO/IR Sensor Stand-Off Capabilities. The Figure 14 - Sensor Ranges.11

EO/IR sensors primarily conduct ISR and Target Acqui-
sition tasks. The major difference between these two
applications is the field of view and the range to the
target. ISR providing long-term imaging of the ground
ge
an

is usually conducted from a vertical perspective. Tar-

tR
an
Sl

get acquisition is typically performed from a horizon-

tal perspective. Independent from the viewing angle
and target range, only the slant range to the threat
directly influences RPAS survivability. (cf. Fig. 14) The
maximum possible slant range depends on the oper- Angular Resolution
Field of View
ational requirements of the desired target resolution.
Target Resolution
This is expressed via the National Interpretability Rat-
ing Scale (NIIRS) or Ground Resolved Distance (GRD).1,2 Target Range
(cf. Table 16)

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 57

 NIIRS GRD (m) Nominal Capability
1 > 9.00 Detect medium sized port
2 4.50 - 9.00 Detect large buildings
3 2.50 - 4.50 Detect trains on tracks
4 1.20 - 2.50 Identify railroad tracks
5 0.75 - 1.20 Identify theatre ballistic missiles
6 0.40 - 0.75 Identify spare tire on truck
7 0.20 - 0.40 Identify individual rail ties
8 0.10 - 0.20 Identify windshield wiper
9 < 0.10 Identify individual rail spikes

Table 16 – Sensor Resolutions.

7.2.1.2 Synthetic Aperture Radar Sensor Stand- contributor to its maximum range. Consequently, the
Off Capabilities. In contrast to EO/IR sensors, Syn- same type of a LGB or JDAM will have a shorter range if
thetic Aperture Radar (SAR) technology can provide released from an RPA than if released from a combat
high-resolution imagery in inclement weather, at aircraft. (cf. Fig. 15)
night and/or at higher ranges. As a result of the com-
plex information processing capability of modern 7.2.2 Engagement Avoidance
digital electronics, SAR imagery can deliver a strictly
vertical view of the target independent of the actual 7.2.2.1 Situational Awareness. The RPA's sensors are
viewing angle.6,7 Given the same slant range, a SAR the operators’ ‘eyes and ears’. Sensors are the only di-
can operate at considerably higher target ranges than rect source of information to build situational aware-
EO/IR sensors and achieve the same imagery resolu- ness. Although the RPA sensor suite can take a very
tion. Although only the slant range actually contrib- detailed look of a very small area, the viewer has no
utes to the stand-off capability of the sensor, SAR may awareness of anything outside the ‘soda straw’ view of
be preferred if target range is a challenge (e.g. when the aircraft's sensors. Boresight cameras mounted on
border crossing issues are a factor). the RPA’s nose or tail provide the crew with a broader
view of the flight direction, but they still do not re-
7.2.1.3 Weapon Stand-Off Capabilities. In current ceive the kind of cues they get from their propriocep-
operations, many RPAS can be armed with Air-to- tive senses.12,13,14
Ground Missiles (AGM), Laser-Guided Bombs (LGB)
and/or Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM). Unlike Increased automation can lower an operators’ task load
self-propelled munitions (i.e. guided missiles), the range to the point where vigilance is negatively affected and
of a LGB or JDAM depends exclusively on the airspeed boredom may result. As increased automation shifts con-
and altitude of the delivery platform. Current propeller- trollers into system management positions, monotony,
driven MALE RPA have a cruising speed of about loss of vigilance and boredom are more likely to occur.
200 kts8 and future jet-propelled RPA are expected to With recent advances in automation, it is not uncommon
achieve speeds of up to 400 kts9. Modern manned for an RPAS operator in search and reconnaissance mis-
fighter aircraft are capable of bomb releases at high sions to spend the majority of the mission merely waiting
subsonic or even supersonic speeds and at higher alti- for a system anomaly to occur and to only interact with
tudes.10 The total potential (altitude) and kinetic (air- the system occasionally. This reduced need for interac-
speed) energy of the weapon at release is the main tion can result in a lack of sustained attention, which can

58 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

have a negative impact on the mission. Moreover, bore- amount of electrical power. Current models of HALE/
dom may be a factor that induces complacency, which is MALE RPAS could easily handle these requirements,
also a significant concern in supervisory control sys- considering there is always a trade-off between the
tems.15 In ninety-five Predator mishaps and safety inci- RPA’s maximum payload capacity and the additional
dents reported to the US Air Force over an eight-year capability these systems provide.18 Although self-pro-
period, 57 % of crewmember-related mishaps were con- tection suites used on manned aircraft are available,
sistent with situational awareness errors associated with few RPAS are currently equipped with them. One ex-
reduced perception of the environment.16 ception is the Global Hawk. It is designed and
equipped with a self-protection suite consisting of an
7.2.2.2 Warning Receivers. RPAS sensors have not RWR, jamming system and towed decoy.19,20,21
yet been designed for threat detection. This is a funda-
mental limitation when the remotely piloted system 7.2.3 Hit Tolerance
might be facing a threat. Moreover, the recent suc-
cesses of ISR RPAS in relatively benign environments The payload is attached to the airframe and therefore
have led to a focus on the improvement of sensor an inherent part of the RPA itself. Physical destruction
payloads rather than on development of self-protec- of the payload will most certainly cause catastrophic
tion capabilities.17 Current state-of-the-art RWR sys- damage to the airframe as well. The consequences of
tems weigh less than 100 lbs and consume a minimal downing the RPA were outlined in chapter 7.1.4.

Figure 15 – Stand-Off Ranges of GBU-38 JDAM, 30 degree impact angle, on-axis release.22

ALTITUDE
[kft ]
30

20
SA-8

SA-13
“Trash Fire Envelope”
10 AAA SA-3 SA-2 SA-10b SA-10c SA-5
MANPADS SA-11 SA-4 SA-12a/b
SA-6
SA-10a

Low Level Penetration Corridor

0 10 20 30 40 50 60
RANGE [NMI]

Aircraft Release speed Altitude Range (R)

Predator B (cruising speed) 102 m/s 30,000 ft 7.7 NMI

Predator B (maximum speed) 128 m/s 40,000 ft 11.6 NMI

F-18 257 m/s 40,000 ft 16.6 NMI

F-22 510 m/s (supersonic) 50,000 ft 26.5 NMI

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 59

 7.2.4 Vulnerability Assessment Research B, vol. 2, pp. 27-60, 2008.
7 .‘Synthetic Aperture Radar’ [Online]. Available: http://www.radartutorial.eu/20.airborne/ab07.en.html.
[Accessed 29 Nov. 2013].
8. ‘MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B’, General Atomics Aeronautical, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.ga-asi.
RPAS sensor vulnerability cannot be assessed sepa- com/products/aircraft/pdf/Predator_B.pdf. [Accessed 09 July 2013].
9. ‘Predator C Avenger’, General Atomics Aeronautical, 2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.ga-asi.com/
rately from the RPA, as they are an inherent part of the products/aircraft/pdf/Predator_C.pdf. [Accessed 09 July 2013].
airframe. A threat to and vulnerability of the airframe 10. ‘JDAM Airspeed/Altitude Capability (U)’, in GBU-31, GBU-32 AND GBU-35 Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM), (Secret) Information extracted is unclassified, NAWS China Lake, CA 93555-6100, Naval Air War-
is also a threat to or vulnerability of the payload as fare Center, Weapons Division, 2002.
11. Ibid. 3.
well. Sensor limitations contribute to the RPA’s vulner- 12. Flight International, ‘USAF: Current unmanned aircraft irrelevant in the Pacific’, 06 Dec. 2012. [Online].
abilities and affect its survivability in terms of stand-off Available: http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-current-unmanned-aircraft-irrelevant-in-
the-pacific-379839/. [Accessed 15 Apr. 2013].
capability (detection avoidance) and threat detection 13. Navy Captain Greg Maguire, Exercise Blue Knight, Nellis Test and Training Range, Nevada, 2011.
14. Anthony P. Tvaryanas, William Platte, Caleb Swigart, Jayson Colebank, Nita Lewis Miller, ‘A Resurvey of
(engagement avoidance). However, this study could Shift Work-Related Fatigue in MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aircraft System Crewmembers’, Naval Post-
not identify any sensor packages currently in use that graduate School, Monterey, 2008.
15. M.L. Cummings, C. Mastracchio, K.M. Thornburg, & A. Mkrtchyan, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
contribute to a reduction in the overall vulnerability of ‘Boredom and Distraction in Multiple Unmanned Vehicle Supervisory Control’, 2013. [Online]. Available:
http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/papers/BoredomDistraction_SEP2012.pdf. [Accessed 16 Apr.
the RPA so the vulnerability assessment of the sensor 2013].
package is equal to that of the RPA. (cf. Table 17) 16. Anthony P.Tvaryanas, William T. Thompson, ‘Recurrent Error Pathways in HFACS Data: Analysis of 95 Mis-
haps with Remotely Piloted Aircraft’, Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine Vol. 79, No. 5, May
2008.
1. James B. Campbell, Randolph H. Wynne, Introduction to Remote Sensing, Fifth Edn, Guilford Press, 2012, 17. Robert Haffa Ph.D., Anand Datla, ‘6 Ways to Improve UAVs’, Haffa Defense Consulting, LLC, 2012.
pp. 103, 287 f. 18. Paddy G. Forrest, ‘Light Weight Low Cost Threat Warning for UAV, Aerostat and other small Platforms’,
2. ‘National Image Interpretability Rating Scales’, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 16 Jan. 1998. Teledyne Defence Limited, Shipley.
[Online]. Available: https://www.fas.org/irp/imint/niirs.htm. [Accessed 23 Apr. 2014]. 19. ‘LR-100 RWR/ESM/ELINT Receiver System’, Northrop Grumman, [Online]. Available: http://www.north-
3. Lockheed Martin, Presentation on UAS EO/IR Sensor Capabilities, 2002. ropgrumman.com/Capabilities/LR100/Pages/default.aspx. [Accessed 04 July 2013].
4. ‘Predator RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper UAV’, airforce-technology.com, 2013. [Online]. Available: http:// 20. ‘Global Hawk’, Northrop Grumman, [Online]. Available: http://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabili-
www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/. [Accessed 29 Nov.2013]. ties/GlobalHawk/Pages/default.aspx. [Accessed 04 July 2013].
5. ‘Video Synthetic Aperture Radar (ViSAR)’, DARPA Strategic Technology Office, [Online]. Available: http:// 21. Andreas Parsch, ‘Designations of U.S. Military Electronic and Communications Equipment’, [Online]. Avail-
www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/STO/Programs/Video_Synthetic_Aperture_Radar_(ViSAR).aspx. [Ac- able: http://www.designation-systems.net/usmilav/electronics.html#_JETDS_AN_Listings. [Accessed
cessed 29 Nov. 2013]. 04 July 2013].
6. Y. K. Chan, V. C. Koo, ‘An Introduction to Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)’, Progress in Electromagnetics 22. Range Calculations by Boeing Company on Request of the Author, 2013.

Table 17 – Payload Vulnerability Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

60 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force, Rich McFadden

7.3 Human Element cent’ following the December 2009 attack on a US

'You shoot a missile, you kill a handful of people and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) base in Khost that
then, this is what is strange, you go home. Your shift killed seven CIA officers.2 RPAS personnel can be
is over. You get in your car and drive 30 minutes to classified in three categories: the LRU, the MCE
the northern suburbs of Las Vegas and you mow the and the PED element. Depending on the mission,
lawn, talk to your kids, you go to church.' these RPA personnel may be working at different
Mary Cummings, former U.S. Navy Pilot locations.

Although the RPA itself does not carry a human 7.3.1 Detection, Engagement and Hit Avoidance
crew, there are a lot of personnel involved in the op-
eration of the RPAS. For example, a MQ-9 Reaper 7.3.1.1 Launch and Recovery Unit. Depending on
Combat Air Patrol (CAP) consisting of four RPA has a the RPA’s effective range, the Launch and Recovery
strength of approximately 200 personnel. Roughly Unit (LRU) is usually located in or near the AOO. For
one-third of these personnel are deployed in or near smaller MALE RPAS, the LRU is most likely deployed
the AOO to launch, recover and maintain the air- inside the AOO. For larger MALE RPA with higher effec-
craft.1 Attacking the personnel rather than the RPA tive ranges and airspeeds, the LRU may be deployed
itself may also be a favourable option for an adver- to a neighbouring host nation. Currently, only HALE
sary. Attacking personnel involved in RPAS opera- RPA such as the Global Hawk have their LRU located
tions has already begun and has allegedly proven outside the AOO. Launching and recovering a MALE
successful. The leader of the Haqqani Network in RPA requires a LOS Data Link from a local GCS and a
Afghanistan claimed that ‘accurate drone-strike op- suitable airport infrastructure with a runway of r­ oughly
erations against the Mujahedeen decreased 90 per- 2,000 m. Like any other military aircraft, additional

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 61

 shelters for refuelling, arming and performing mainte- ual targets may be identified by traditional intelli-
nance are needed as well. The infrastructure needed gence, but also by exploiting social media and the in-
to operate RPAS is usually part of a military compound ternet.6,7,8,9 Additionally, they may be identified by
and LRU personnel working on-base are protected, as name tags, unit patches, or special insignia which
force protection measures are usually already in place. some countries award to their RPAS operators.10 (cf.
Fig. 16) Once identified, targeted RPAS personnel
7.3.1.2 Mission Control Element. After the RPA has along with their families, their social environment and
been launched, it may then be operated BLOS by a their private property may be subject to attack. De-
Remote Split Operations3 (RSO) squadron from a GCS spite the question of whether such an attack is a crim-
inside the home territory. Military installations hosting inal act, RPAS personnel may face a real threat in their
MCEs, GCSs or RPAS squadrons are often the topic of home countries. Furthermore, once an individual’s
public debate. Therefore, their locations are well family is identified, RPAS personnel may also be sub-
known.4 RSO squadron personnel and their GCS are ject to blackmail.
typically located inside military compounds protect-
ing them from unwanted access and immediate
threat. Home-based RPAS personnel enjoy the protec-
tion of their home country’s environment, which is as-
sumed to make enemy access more difficult. Howev-
er, the perceived threat level and level of alert for
military installations in the home country is usually
Figure 16 – US Air Force RPAS Pilot Wings.
lower compared to that of deployed locations, which
may be exploited by an adversary.
7.3.1.5 Currently Implemented Countermeasures.
7.3.1.3 Processing, Exploitation and Dissemina- Current force protection measures apply primarily to
tion Element. The data links that enable RPAS RSOs deployed RPAS personnel only. Home-based RPAS
also permit conducting PED from afar, via any network personnel must rely on their home country’s protect-
attached to the RPAS. Many nations operating RPAS ed environment and the security of the military instal-
use some kind of central ‘reach back’ intelligence or- lations they’re working in. This study could not iden-
ganization to conduct their PED. This is due to the vast tify any protective measures currently in place for
amount of imagery and FMV delivered by current non-deployed personnel in the off-duty environment.
RPAS.5 Centralized intelligence operating bases or of- On the contrary, countless references were found
fices usually have more robust protective measures clearly revealing the names and identities of RPAS per-
than typical military installations. Like the MCE, they sonnel during interviews and other press-related ac-
also enjoy the protection of their home country’s se- tivities.11,12,13,14
curity environment.
7.3.2 Hit Tolerance
7.3.1.4 Off-Duty Environment. Depending on the
alert state, LRU personnel deployed in or near the 7.3.2.1 Impact of RPAS Personnel Casualties. The
AOO are likely to wear uniforms and stay within the impact of casualties depends on the affected individ-
military base if they are off-duty. Force protection ual’s role in the RPAS mission. The attack may have a
measures for these personnel usually don’t change more significant effect if the individual is an operator
whether they are on- or off-duty. Conversely, MCE or in the LRU versus an image analyst in the PED ele-
PED personnel usually have the option of leaving the ment. RPAS usually have some redundancy if 24 hour
protected military environment while off-duty. This operations are required. The most critical element in
provides a window of opportunity for an adversary to the RPAS is the aircrew (pilot and sensor operator).15
strike when the individual is most vulnerable. Individ- Loss or incapacitation of a single aircrew member may

62 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

be temporarily absorbed by extending aircrew work RPA often loiter over targets for hours, and operators
cycles. The loss or incapacitation of more than one air- obtain close-up views of their areas of interest and of
crew member may degrade operational capability an attack’s aftermath to verify mission success. There-
and reduce availability of the RPAS until affected per- fore, RPAS personnel might be more psychologically
sonnel regain full strength. Depending on the loca- affected when striking targets than pilots flying
tion, the time required to reinforce affected personnel manned aircraft who drop bombs without seeing the
may differ significantly. Personnel in the home-based after effects of their attack.17
MCE or PED element may be reinforced much more
quickly than LRU personnel, who must first be de- In addition to experiencing traumatic events similar to
ployed to the AOO. those that may cause Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD) in traditional combatants, RPAS crew members
Depending on their role in the RPAS, personnel being may face an additional challenge unique to remote
blackmailed could seriously impair mission accom- operations: lack of deployment rhythm and of com-
plishment. For example, pilots may be forced to cause bat compartmentalization. The impact of fighting a
flight accidents or operators may be compelled to fal- war on-base and going home to family at night oblit-
sify mission data or to misfire weapons. erates the clear demarcation between combat and
personal life.18,19
7.3.2.2 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Even with
advanced RPAS technology, moral and emotional bur- In contrast to traditional expeditionary operations, in
dens fall on the minds of RPAS operators. While they which entire units deploy overseas, RPAS operators
may be physically safe from enemy threat, psycho- work in the social isolation of their rotating shifts in
logically, they’re still conducting combat operations.16 the GCS. Deployed units foster the development of

Table 18 – Human Element Vulnerability Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 63

 organizational identity and unit cohesion which may ability of RPAS personnel to attacks by asymmetric
help service members cope with the stresses of com- forces is estimated as ‘high’. (cf. Table 18)
bat. Social isolation of RPAS operations could diminish
unit cohesion and thereby increase susceptibility to
1. Lance Menthe, Amado Cordova, Carl Rhodes, Rachel Costello, Jeffrey Sullivan, ‘The Future of Air Force
PTSD.20,21 From 2005 through 2011, the percentages of Motion Imagery Exploitation’, RAND Corporation, 2012.
US Air Force RPAS pilots with mental health issues 2. PJ Neal, SMALL WARS JOURNAL, ‘From Unique Needs to Modular Platforms: The Future of Military Ro-
botics’, 19 Oct. 2011. [Online]. Available: http://smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/886-neal.pdf.
were higher than pilots from manned aircraft.22 [Accessed 16 Apr. 2013].
3. Remote Split Operations can be described as UAS operations that involve the geographical separation of
the launch and recovery sites from the mission control element.
7.3.3 Vulnerability Assessment 4. Ann Stefanek, Secretary of the Air Force Public Affairs, ‘Air Force announces basing candidates for remote
split operations squadron’, U.S. Air Force Public Affairs Office, 21 Oct. 2011. [Online]. Available: http://
www.shaw.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123276815. [Accessed 02 Dec. 2013].
5. Ibid. 1.
Within the AOO, adversaries may engage RPAS per- 6. Maj. Gabe Johnson, ‘Air Guard selects Predator pilot for Sijan Award’, Arizona National Guard, 22 Oct.
sonnel with any available weapons, e.g. combat air- 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.nationalguard.mil/news/archives/2009/10/102609-Air.aspx.
[Accessed 02 Dec. 2013].
craft, artillery or infantry. Therefore, the vulnerability of 7. Robert Riggs, ‘Predator Drone TV: Eye in the Sky Protects Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan’, 24 Sep. 2011.
[Online]. Available: http://robertriggs.com/2011/09/24/predator-drone-tv-eye-in-the-sky-protects-
RPAS personnel is equal to that of any other military soldiers-in-iraq-and-afghanistan/. [Accessed 02 Dec. 2013].
personnel deployed to the AOO. Hence, the vulnera- 8. Gary Parsons , ‘First Predator exchange pilot’, Air Forces Monthly, 09 Feb. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://
www.airforcesmonthly.com/view_article.asp?ID=1518. [Accessed 02 Dec. 2013].
bility rating of RPAS personnel within the AOO is as- 9. Maj. Gabe Johnson, ‘Pilot makes history after graduating from Weapons School’, Nellis Air Force Base, 17
Dec. 2009. [Online]. Available: http://www.nellis.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123182794. [Accessed 02
sessed as ‘moderate’ because this study assumes an Dec. 2013].
10. ‘UAV Operators Get Wings, Flight Pay’, 08 Oct. 2009. [Online]. Available: http://christianfighterpilot.com/
adequate level of force protection for deployed per- blog/2009/10/08/uav-operators-get-wings-flight-pay/. [Accessed 03 Dec. 2013].
sonnel. Conversely, RPAS RSOs offer different opportu- 11. Ibid. 6.
12. Ibid. 7.
nities for an adversary to conduct covert attacks. SOF 13. Ibid. 8.
14. Ibid. 9.
assets or other types of asymmetric force can be em- 15. Ibid. 1.
ployed against mission critical RPAS personnel in non- 16. Levi Newman, ‘Do Unmanned Aircraft Operators Suffer from PTSD?’, Veterans United, 2012. [Online].
Available: http://www.veteransunited.com/network/do-unmanned-aircraft-operators-suffer-from-
secure (civilian) environments. Due to the limited ptsd/. [Accessed 11 Jul. 2013].
17. P. C. Nolin, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Opportunities and Challenges for the Alliance, NATO Parliamentary
number of trained and experienced RPAS personnel Assembly, 2012.
available and their ability to be easily identified, air- 18. Hernando J. Ortega, Jr., MD, MPH, ‘Challenges in Monitoring and Maintaining the Health of Pilots En-
gaged in Telewarfare’, Medical Surveillance Monthly Report, vol. 20, no. 3, p. 2, Mar. 2013.
crews may be designated by an adversary as a high 19. Jean L. Otto, DrPH, MPH; Bryant J. Webber, MD (Capt, USAF), ‘Mental Health Diagnoses and Counselling
Among Pilots of Remotely Piloted Aircraft in the United States Air Force’, Medical Surveillance Monthly
value target. As this study could not identify any pro- Report, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 3-8, Mar. 2013.
tective measures currently in place for the off-duty 20. Ibid. 18.
21. Ibid. 19.
environment of non-deployed personnel, the vulner- 22. Ibid. 19.

64 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force, Master Sgt. Steve Horton

7.4 Control Element trols to operate the RPA and a satellite earth terminal
The Control Element consists of three components: for BLOS communications. Due to their unique size
the physical infrastructure (external hardware), com- and shape, the hardware components may serve as a
puter systems (internal hardware) and a non-physical means to positively identify them as RPAS compo-
(software) component. All of them may be subjected nents to an adversary. Additionally, their persistent
to different types of attack. The GCS and its associated radio transmissions may also reveal their location to
communication equipment form the physical part of enemy electronic reconnaissance.
the control element while the software running the
control element’s computer systems forms the non- Deployable GCS shelters usually have standard di-
physical part. The physical part may be subject to at- mensions of 12 ft or 24 ft to fit common transport re-
tack by kinetic weapons while the non-physical part quirements. They are similar in appearance to other
may be subject to attack through cyber-warfare. One military shelters used for a variety of purposes. Some
important difference between a kinetic and cyber-at- GCS also use a 30 ft trailer to house the hardware
tack is that a kinetic attack always requires the attacker components. This results in a more distinctive appear-
to be in relatively close proximity to the intended tar- ance as compared to other standard military C2
get. For a cyber-attack, this is not the case. equipment. However, the directional antenna used
for LOS communication may distinguish the GCS from
7.4.1 Detection and Engagement Avoidance other general purpose or C2 shelters.1

7.4.1.1 External Hardware Components. The Con- Non-deployable GCS integrated into a base’s exist-
trol Element’s prominent hardware components typi- ing infrastructure help to make them indistinguish-
cally consist of a shelter or trailer containing the con- able from other multi-purpose buildings. Although

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 65

 © Google
Figure 17 – Google Earth Imagery of Satellite Earth Terminals at a Military Airbase in Europe.3

roof mounted communication equipment may re- and to the PED element at Langley AFB, both in the
veal the purpose of the building, an adversary would United States.5 Conversely, deployed GCS usually have
need precise intelligence, e.g. the building’s blue- their own satellite earth terminal nearby and do not
prints, to locate the GCS inside the infrastructure. typically have a wired network infrastructure. De-
The most prominent characteristics of any GCS are ployed GCS are more exposed to detection by enemy
the BLOS satellite earth terminals which can have electronic reconnaissance as their radio transmissions
antenna diameters of several metres. For example, originate within or close to the AOO and therefore
the Predator Primary Satellite Link (PPSL) uses a within the possible range of an adversary. In summary,
20 ft / 6.1 m satellite dish. Communication antennas the probability of locating, identifying and engaging
of this size are easily recognizable, since they require an RPAS control element depends on its physical loca-
a minimum safety distance from surrounding equip- tion. Its exposure to enemy kinetic actions is ‘high’ if
ment and personnel due to the radiation hazard. the control element is located inside the AOO while it
Fixed installations of satellite earth terminals could is ‘moderate’ to ’low’ if it’s not. Home-based RPAS con-
even be identified by using publicly available trol elements may not be identified if they are located
­Google Earth pictures.2 (cf. Fig. 17) far from SATCOM equipment or if they are covertly
integrated into other military infrastructure.
Depending on the location of the GCS, the location of
the satellite earth terminal may vary. Fixed GCS instal- 7.4.1.2 Internal Hardware Components. Military
lations in the MCE may not have their own satellite computer systems similar to those used in the GCS,
dish. They could use a wired network infrastructure to Satellite Earth Terminals or Mission Control Centres of-
link them to a distant satellite earth terminal located ten include COTS components or sub-components
remotely (even on another continent). For example, although the complete system is usually adapted and
RPAS operations in the Middle East may use satellite configured to the military’s specific requirements. The
earth terminals at Ramstein Air Force Base (AFB) in Eu- supply chain for microelectronics is extremely diffuse,
rope for BLOS communication with the RPA and use complex, and globally dispersed, making it difficult to
the wired portion of the military network to connect verify the trust and authenticity of the electronic
the satellite earth terminal to the MCE at Creech AFB equipment used in the RPAS. Identifying the multiple

66 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © Sourcemap
Figure 18 – Example of a Microelectronics Global Supply Chain based on the Apple iPhone 5.9

layers of subcontractors and suppliers contributing to rupted supply chains has not yet drawn the appro-
the design or fabrication of a specific chip is difficult; priate attention that it should.10 Due to the preva-
tracing all of the contributors for a complete integrat- lence of COTS components inside military computer
ed circuit is even more so. Hence, this widely dis- systems, the vulnerability to this form of cyber-war-
persed supply chain may provide an adversary with fare is assessed as ‘high’.
opportunities to manipulate those components or
penetrate the distribution chain with counterfeit 7.4.1.3 Software Components. To destroy, disrupt or
products.6 (cf. Fig. 18) infiltrate the software portion of the Control Element,
an adversary must first gain access to the network, ei-
Deliberate modification of the product assembly and ther directly or remotely. The software components
delivery could provide an adversary with the prospect necessary to operate an RPAS are not limited to the
of gaining covert access and monitoring of sensitive GCS, but also include the aircraft, satellites and ground
systems, to degrade RPAS mission effectiveness, or to stations if applicable, as well as support systems for
insert false information or instructions that could logistics, maintenance or PED. This provides an adver-
cause premature failure or complete remote control sary with a broad spectrum of possible entry points
or destruction of the targeted RPAS.7 Hardware-level into the RPAS network.11
vulnerabilities can also be exploited to completely
sidestep software-based security countermeasures. Traditionally, each RPAS was procured as a fully inte-
For example, a team of university researchers recently grated, vendor-specific solution, consisting of the air
demonstrated that carefully chosen alterations in por- system, ground station, communications channels,
tions of a chip involved in encryption processing encryption technologies and payloads. These single-
could allow an attacker to extract encryption keys.8 system variants were typically ‘closed’ systems utiliz-
ing proprietary interfaces throughout the system ar-
This study could identify only one official initiative chitecture. To overcome this vendor-centric
aimed at establishing reliable and trustworthy sup- approach, an open RPAS architecture is currently un-
ply chains of microelectronics for military purposes. der development which should utilize common in-
This leads to the assumption the threat from cor- terface standards.12,13

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 67

 Another current development integrates different This may work well for a Control Element based in the
RPAS operating systems under one single platform. home country, but this study identified several public
This enables an operator to control several different discussions in the media revealing the current and
types of RPAS from a single control station. Depend- planned locations of RPAS Squadrons and Control Ele-
ing on the complexity of the RPAS, control may even ments across NATO.19,20,21 Achieving the same level of
be possible from a tablet computer or mobile protection for deployed GCS may be more difficult as
phone.14,15 Extensive experience with public com- they are typically within or near the adversary’s strik-
puter operating systems such as Microsoft Win- ing range. However, deployed GCS will benefit from
dows, Apple OS or Open Source Linux show that the the force protection measures available within the re-
more widely a software platform is used, the more it spective AOO, providing them with an appropriate
is subject to attack.16 Open architecture, common level of defence.
standards and cross-system operating systems for
RPAS may therefore increase the exposure of friend- 7.4.2.2 Internal Hardware Components. Currently,
ly computer systems to cyber-attacks, as an adver- cyber-security is considered a ‘software-only’ concern.
sary could focus his efforts on a commonly distrib- Although there are some national programs in place
uted platform more efficiently. to assure the secure production of the most sensitive
microchips, they are used for only a small fraction of
Eventually the human factor may be exploited to the chips in defence systems.22 The greatest supply
gain access to the RPAS. Even highly secured and chain security exposure for defence applications
physically separated military networks may be infil- comes not from the small fraction of chips designed
trated through the identification of potential individ- and manufactured uniquely for defence systems but
ual targets. These individuals can then serve as the from the massive flow of commercial chips into those
optimal channel to work for the adversary within the systems. Additionally, when purchasing computers,
targeted military organization. It would be preferable routers, navigation and communications equipment
for the adversary to have the target do this unwit- and most other electronics hardware, the military is
tingly, but they can also be manipulated through heavily reliant on the commercial supply chain and
blackmail, if necessary. The intelligence needed for therefore exposed to any associated vulnerabilities.
such an intrusion is usually gathered through social Yet the supply chain for commercial components is
networks or other open sources. This intelligence almost completely unprotected against intentional
would be used to construct a profile of the person to compromising. A skilled attacker could embed latent
be attacked and to identify penetration points. Such malicious functionality and could exploit it months or
information gathering and the construction of a suit- years later to disrupt a system containing the compro-
able profile requires comprehensive information mised chip.23
gathering based on good organizational skills and
resources.17,18 Although current protective measures 7.4.2.3 Software Components. As discussed in
– such as those discussed in the next chapter – en- chapters 6.8.2 and 6.8.4, military networks are usually
sure an adequate level of cyber-security, they cannot separated from the public internet. This is done to
guarantee absolute security. Hence, the exposure of provide the first line of physical or logical defence
the RPAS software components to cyber-attacks is as- and protect them from unauthorized remote access.
sessed as ‘moderate’. RPAS are one of many nodes in the entire network
centric environment and countermeasures providing
7.4.2 Hit Avoidance cyber-security are usually applied using a compre-
hensive approach. Current security software suites
7.4.2.1 External Hardware Components. The best offer a variety of methods to counter cyber-attacks.
way to protect the Control Element is to keep its loca- They typically include Antivirus, Configuration
tion or even its existence hidden from the adversary. Change Detection, Device Control, Host Intrusion

68 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

Prevention, Firewall and Rogue System Detection RPAS operation. Depending on the severity of the at-
Modules. Many of these modules are COTS applica- tack, it may be possible to lose the RPA if attempts to
tions integrated into the military security system.24 regain control of the aircraft and automated emer-
However, cyber-security is an extremely fast and gency flight procedures fail or the aircraft’s avionics
adaptive battlefield. Simple changes to a malicious are affected. In a worst case scenario, assuming all the
program’s footprint can reduce its detection even for deployed GCS of an RPAS necessary to launch and re-
heuristic search algorithms because they can only cover the RPA are inoperable or rendered useless and
defend against threats already known to the soft- no local control element redundancy is available;
ware, either by its signature or behaviour. Hence, RPAS operations could come to a halt in their respec-
regular security updates are essential in providing an tive AOO because current systems lack the capability
acceptable level of protection.25 of BLOS launch and recovery. Consequently, the mag-
nitude of control element failure is assessed as ‘high’
7.4.3 Hit Tolerance with respect to LOS operations in general and for de-
ployed GCS in particular. For remote BLOS operations
MALE RPAS conducting remote split operations usu- and home-based GCS, the magnitude is assessed as
ally have an inherent redundancy of their mission ‘moderate’ due to possible threat mitigation through
control infrastructure. Once the RPA is airborne and the use of redundant control elements.
linked to the satellite, it can be controlled by any GCS
that can establish a remote connection. However, the 7.4.4 Vulnerability Assessment
physical destruction of a single GCS or exploiting its
compromised hardware or software components to The Control Element’s satellite earth terminals with
produce system failures will likely disrupt the current diameters of up to several metres are easily recogniz-

Table 19 – Control Element Vulnerability Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 69

 able and may facilitate the positive identification of 1. ‘Ground Control Stations (GCS)’, General Atomics Aeronautical, [Online]. Available: http://www.ga-asi.
com/products/ground_control/index.php. [Accessed 05 Dec. 2013].
the GCS to an alert adversary. Deployable GCS may be 2. Google Earth, [Online]. Available: https://www.google.de/maps/. [Accessed 05 Dec. 2013].
3. Ibid. 2.
identified more easily because of the proximity of 4. Bryan William Jones, ‘Creech AFB UAV Operations’, 22 Feb. 2008. [Online]. Available: http://prometheus.
med.utah.edu/~bwjones/2008/02/creech-afb-uav-operations/. [Accessed 05 Dec. 2013].
their communications equipment. But even if it is not 5. Ibid.
possible to identify the GCS shelter, attacking the of- 6. Bryan Krekel, Patton Adams, George Bakos, ‘Occupying the Information High Ground: Chinese Capabili-
ties for Computer Network Operations and Cyber Espionage’, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and
ten highly exposed and unhardened satellite dish and Security Review Commission by Northrop Grumman Corp, 2012.
7. Ibid.
its receiver could cause enough damage to render the 8. Georg T. Becker, Francesco Regazzoni, Christof Paar, and Wayne P. Burleson, ‘Stealthy Dopant-Level Hard-
control element useless. Such an attack can be con- ware Trojans’, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA, TU Delft, The Netherlands and ALaRI - University
of Lugano, Switzerland, Horst Goertz Institut for IT-Security, Ruhr-Universitaet Bochum, Germany, 2012,
ducted with any weapon capable of delivering the 2013.
9. ‘sourcemap - where things come from’, Sourcemap Inc., [Online]. Available: https://sourcemap.com/
desired kinetic effect to the satellite dish. Depending view/4588. [Accessed 12 Dec. 2013].
on the range requirements, this could include high 10. ‘Trusted Foundry Program’, Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), [Online]. Available: http://www.
dmea.osd.mil/trustedic.html. [Accessed 06 Jan. 2014].
calibre sniper rifles. The control element’s vulnerability 11. Parag Batavia, Ph.D., Rich Ernst, Kerry Fisherkeller, Doug Gregory, Rob Hoffman, Ann Jennings, George
Romanski, Brian Schechter, Gordon Hunt, ‘The UAS Control Segment Architecture’, Raytheon, 2011.
to kinetic effects is assessed as ‘high’. 12. Ibid.
13. ‘UAS Control Segment (UCS) Architecture’, UCS Working Group, [Online]. Available: https://www.uc-
sarchitecture.org/pages/home. [Accessed 07 Dec. 2013].
The RPAS control element’s vulnerability against cy- 14. SANDRA I. ERWIN, ‘Pentagon Recruiting Software Developers For Drone “App Store”’, National Defense, pp.
26-27, Oct. 2013.
ber-attacks is closely linked to the vulnerabilities of 15. ‘BALLISTA | Unmanned Common Control System’, DreamHammer Inc., [Online]. Available: http://www.
the military network’s COTS hardware and software. dreamhammer.com/ballista.shtml. [Accessed 05 Dec. 2013].
16. ‘Sophos Security Threat Report’, Sophos Ltd., 2013.
Although GCS are usually not supposed to be con- 17. Gabi Siboni, Y. R., ‘What Lies behind Chinese Cyber Warfare’, in Cyberspace and National Security, Tel Aviv,
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Jun. 2013, pp. 45-60.
nected to the public internet, (making them largely 18 Geoffrey Ingersoll, ‘Defence Science Board Warns Of “Existential Cyber Attack”’, Business Insider Australia,
07 Mar. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.businessinsider.com.au/cyber-exploits-turn-weapons-
immune to viruses and other network security on-us-2013-3. [Accessed 13 Jan. 2014].
threats), it has been proven they were infected with a 19. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, ‘Revealed: 64 Drone Bases on American Soil’, WIRED.com, 13 Jun 2012.
[Online]. Available: http://www.wired.com/2012/06/64-drone-bases-on-us-soil/. [Accessed 16 Jun
key logging virus in 2011. The physical separation be- 2014].
20. ‘DoD Current and Future U.S. Drone Activities Map’, publicintelligence.net, 12 Jun 2012. [Online]. Avail-
tween classified and public networks has been com- able: http://publicintelligence.net/dod-us-drone-activities-map/. [Accessed 16 Jun 2014].
promised, largely through the improper use of discs 21. ‘RAF Reaper drone squadron stood up at RAF Waddington’, BBC News, 23 Oct 2012. [Online]. Available:
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-20039085. [Accessed 16 Jun 2014].
and removable drives. In late 2008, malicious code 22. Ibid. 10.
23. John Villasenor, ‘Compromised By Design? Securing the Defense Electronics Supply Chain’, Center for
was introduced to hundreds of thousands of US De- Technology Innovation (CTI) in Governance Studies at Brookings and Center for 21st Century Security and
fense Department computers and the disinfection of Intelligence (21CSI) in Foreign Policy at Brookings, Nov. 2013.
24. ‘Host Based Security System (HBSS)’, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), [Online]. Available:
the compromised systems took several years.26 The http://www.disa.mil/Services/Information-Assurance/HBSS. [Accessed 10 Dec. 2013].
25. David Harley, Andrew Lee, ‘Heuristic Analysis - Detecting Unknown Viruses’, ESET, [Online]. Available:
control element’s vulnerability to cyber-attacks is as- http://www.eset.com/us/resources/white-papers/Heuristic_Analysis.pdf. [Accessed 11 Dec. 2013].
sessed as ‘high’. (cf. Table 19) 26. Noah Shachtman, ‘Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet’, WIRED.com, 10 Jul. 2011. [Online]. Available:
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/virus-hits-drone-fleet/. [Accessed 07 Jan. 2014].

70 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force, Col. Marty Franc

7.5 Data Links The RPAS hardware and software components’ vul-
’Right now, most UAS don't even have Link-16, the nerabilities against cyber-threats have been outlined
NATO standard for data links first established in the in the previous chapter. These vulnerabilities also ap-
1990s. In the benign airspace over Afghanistan, Ma- ply to the data link’s network nodes used for BLOS
rine operators can control their Shadow drones just communications. Therefore, this chapter focuses on
fine but they must rely on voice communications the vulnerabilities of RPAS radio transmissions only.
over radio to talk to troops on the ground. The big- An adversary targeting RPAS radio transmissions has
gest number-one issue is we can't talk to the people two options; using transmissions to jam or spoof a
we need to... digitally. There are no encrypted data targeted receiver or using a receiver to exploit a
links.‘ transmitted signal.
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Murray,
Commanding Officer Marine UAS Squadron 1, 7.5.1 General Radio Antenna Characteristics
AUVSI Annual Conference 2012
The radio signals establishing communication be-
Data links connect the RPA with the GCS, enabling tween the RPA, the GCS and possibly the satellite are
operators to remotely control the RPA and receive usually transmitted and received by directional anten-
transmissions. Data links can be established either by nas. This is to ensure transmitters only broadcast in
radio for LOS communications or satellites and net- the direction of the intended receiver and receivers
work nodes for BLOS communications. The radio only receive transmissions from the intended trans-
transmissions may be subject to attack by EW where- mitter. Some RPA also use omnidirectional antennas
as the network nodes may be attacked by means of to broadcast their FMV stream in all directions to ena-
cyber-warfare. ble ground troops to receive the FMV signal.1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 71

 Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate an example of the lobe. With sufficient energy, a side lobe injection may
radiation patterns of directional and omnidirectional also exceed the receiver’s suppression threshold and
antennas, whereas the receiving pattern of the re- override the main lobe signal. However, even if side
spective antenna can be inferred, i.e. the antenna’s lobe attacks enlarge the angle for possible signal in-
receiving pattern is the same as the radiation pattern. jections, it is still narrow enough that an adversary
Directional antenna receivers usually use side lobe must locate the transmitter. The RPAS contains several
suppression to filter out unwanted signals below a receivers and, depending on their alignment, they
defined threshold and to only receive the preferred may be vulnerable to electromagnetic interference
main lobe signals. from a variety of angles.

Modern Ku-band antennas produce a narrow main 7.5.3.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft. RPA typically use
lobe beam of less than 10 degrees and low side two or more antennas to maintain their data link to
lobes. Jammers which do not enter directly into the the GCS and the satellite. Antennas to receive signals
main lobe of the antenna can be substantially at- from the GCS face downwards and may be direction-
tenuated. When received via side lobes, jammers are al or omnidirectional. Antennas to receive satellite
attenuated by approximately 20 dB for the first side signals face upwards and are typically directional.5 As
lobe and by an even greater amount for the addi- the omnidirectional LOS antennas are usually only
tional side lobes. Antennas designed for particularly used for launch and recovery, the timeframe to inter-
low side lobes reach an attenuation of greater than fere with the LOS data link is quite short. Unfortu-
40 dB, which means, if an adversary seeks to jam a nately, the RPA is vulnerable to a possible data link
signal via side lobe injection, it must be more than loss especially during the landing phase. This may
10,000 times stronger than the original signal re- cause the loss of control of a landing RPA and possi-
ceived by the main lobe.2 bly the loss of the aircraft. The directional antenna for
satellite communication can be considered less vul-
7.5.2 Detection Avoidance nerable to ground-based electromagnetic interfer-
ence, as neither its main lobe nor side lobes face the
To lower the probability of interception, radio com- ground. Successfully injecting signals into the RPA’s
munications between the RPAS transmitters and re- satellite antenna requires either airborne or space-
ceivers often use highly directional antennas with nar- based EW assets.
row beams and frequencies in the Extremely High
Frequency (EHF) spectrum. Additionally, the signal 7.5.3.2 Ground Control Station. Like the RPA, the
can either be spread over a wider spectrum or modu- GCS uses separate, directional antennas for LOS and
lated with a random noise pattern to make it appear BLOS communications. Depending on the position
noise-like. The signal can also be rapidly moved of the RPA or satellite, the LOS and BLOS antenna
around in the frequency spectrum to further reduce may have to be aimed at shallow angles and in the
its detection. These measures significantly reduce the
area from which an adversary could intercept RPAS 0°

communications.3,4
-45° 45°

7.5.3 Engagement Avoidance

To interfere with RPAS radio receivers, an adversary

must inject the spurious signal in line with the receiv- -90° 90°
-30 dB

-20 dB

-10 dB
-10 dB

-20 dB
-30 dB

0 dB

ing patterns of the targeted antenna. To attain the

0 dB

highest probability for a successful attack, the adver-

sary must inject the spurious signal into the main Figure 19 – Directional Antenna Radiation Pattern.

72 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

direction of enemy forces. This may possibly expose 7.5.3.4 Satellite Ground Segments. Ground seg-
the main lobe to electromagnetic interference. ment attacks or sabotage to disrupt space assets is an
Maintaining LOS communication with a low flying attractive option for low-technology or cash-strapped
RPA during recovery makes the LOS antenna even groups such as terrorists or transnational insurgents.
more susceptible to electronic attack. As previously Critical ground control facilities associated with space
discussed, disrupting LOS communication during re- systems, both military and civilian, are targets to ter-
covery operations may result in loss of aircraft. Un- rorist cells and adversary SOF. While military ground
fortunately, critical LOS communication links can be control facilities have the benefit of being operated
disrupted with commercially available equipment. and secured by military personnel, commercial
Simple disrupters made from 1950s technology can ground control facilities generally don’t have that lux-
be fabricated in a few hours with $200 worth of read- ury. Adversaries need only to determine which ground
ily available electronic equipment.6 COTS terrestrial facilities are critical to RPAS operations – especially
jammers can also be easily purchased commercially. those that offer non-redundant vulnerabilities – and
These jammers are known to have typical ranges of where they are located. Unfortunately, information on
3-5 km in urban areas. In rural areas, their range can many of these facilities is available in open-source ref-
be up to 20 km.7 erence materials.11

7.5.3.3 Satellite. Geostationary communication sat- 7.5.4 Hit Avoidance

ellites usually cover a large area of the Earth’s surface.
Although military satellites using phased-array anten- Immunity from the effects of jamming is an unrealistic
nas and nullifying techniques can tailor their coverage goal, but measures should be taken to minimize their
to the desired AOO and filter out signals from unwant- effects. Digital signal processing enables modern re-
ed sources, most satellite bandwidth has been pro- ceivers to discriminate radio signals from different
vided by civilian contractors in recent operations.8 To sources and to nullify interference from unexpected
disrupt satellite communications, an adversary could directions. It can also enable transmitters and receiv-
transmit spurious signals from any location inside the ers to encode, decode and hash the signal with a
satellite’s footprint. Military grade equipment is not computed checksum so that it can be distinguished
necessarily required to conduct an electronic attack from other signals and partial signal losses can be cor-
on receiving antennas. Any civilian broadcasting sta- rected.12 To prevent exploitation of RPAS broadband
tion is capable of interfering with the satellite uplink.9 transmissions, the data links of many, but not all, RPAS
The analysis of commercial SATCOM links over a are encrypted. Given a sufficient encryption key
16-month period during OIF found 50 documented length and complexity, current cryptographic meth-
instances of interference with military communica- ods can be classified as virtually immune against any
tions over commercial SATCOM; five of those attacks type of real-time exploitation.
were confirmed as originating from hostile sources.10
7.5.5 Hit Tolerance
0°
Depending on the level of automation and the mis-
-45° 45° sion phase, the impact of a data link loss can vary. Data
link disruption can also occur even in a benign envi-
ronment due to atmospheric disturbances. Therefore,
contingency procedures are typically designed into
-90° 90° the RPAS. In case of a temporary signal loss, current
-30 dB

-20 dB

-10 dB
-10 dB

-20 dB
-30 dB

RPAS operating in BLOS mode are usually programmed

0 dB
0 dB

to continue with their mission and head for their next

Figure 20 – Omnidirectional Antenna Radiation Pattern. assigned waypoint on their flight plan. If the disruption

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 73

 exceeds a given time span, the system will execute au- separate signal can be broadcasted from the RPA. The
tomated contingency flight manoeuvres. Some RPAS FMV stream is usually transmitted by an omnidirection-
climb to higher altitudes, some fly ascending circles or al antenna in order to provide the signal to a wider area.
reverse their trajectory to regain their data link. If these Like any radio transmission sent over great distances,
flight manoeuvres are unsuccessful in regaining the these signals may be subject to exploitation by the en-
data link, some RPAS automatically return to their base emy.16 Militants in Iraq have reportedly intercepted
or to a pre-programmed recovery site. Some smaller Predator RPAS video feeds by taking advantage of an
systems may simply eject a parachute and execute an unprotected communications link and using COTS
emergency landing on the spot. This loss may be com- software programs available for as little as $25.95 on the
pensated by another RPAS in the vicinity if it is availa- Internet. Multiple discoveries of pirated RPAS video
ble. If the data link is lost during a critical mission state, feeds on militant laptops have proven that militant
e.g. target tracking or weapon release, this option may groups have adapted their tactics and were regularly
result in mission failure. Recovery of RPAS is usually intercepting FMV feeds.17 Shortly after these security is-
conducted in the LOS mode to avoid the inherent la- sues were revealed, encryption of FMV streams were
tency of satellite communications. This latency may designated a high priority. Unfortunately, it is estimated
cause problems with delayed situational awareness the total U.S. RPAS fleet won’t see its communications
and reaction time during the RPA’s landing approach. secured until 2014 as the Remotely Operated Video En-
Data link disruption in this critical phase may result in hanced Receivers (ROVER) necessary to decrypt the
catastrophic damage and loss of the aircraft. new FMV feed must also be upgraded.18,19 (cf. Fig. 21)

7.5.6 Additional Considerations This study assumes not all currently fielded RPAS are
capable of transmitting encrypted video feeds. This is
7.5.6.1 Bandwidth Congestion. Current operational especially a concern for smaller systems with SWaP
requirements for FMV already exceed the bandwidth limitations that may prevent the installation of addi-
capacity of available military spacecraft. The develop- tional encryption equipment.
ment of new FMV feeds exacerbates this issue. Cur-
rent RPAS with wide-area surveillance sensors are able Figure 21 – ROVER System.
to produce 10 FMV streams simultaneously. That ca-
pability is expected to increase to greater than 50 FMV
streams simultaneously. More bandwidth is required
to facilitate ISR operations and the bandwidth pres-
sure will only increase as wide-area surveillance tools
grow more capable and new high definition sensors
and advanced radars are integrated in the RPAS. To try
to keep up, the military has leased bandwidth from
commercial carriers for more than a decade. It is fur-
ther estimated that demand for satellite communica-
© US Air Force, Staff Sgt. Angelique Pere

tions could almost triple a decade from now.13,14,15 Al-

though allocation of limited bandwidth has been a
known challenge in military operations (and is not
unique to RPAS operations), operations in contested
environments may further reduce the available elec-
tromagnetic spectrum due to enemy ECM.

7.5.6.2 RPAS Radio Transmissions Exploitation. To

enable ground troops to receive the FMV stream, a

74 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

7.5.6.3 Global Positioning System. Because RPAS contrast to the other highly directional antennas, a
use a GPS data link to determine its precise location, it typical GPS patch antenna must be able to receive sig-
is highly important this link is maintained to ensure nals from virtually the entire sky. The advantage of this
mission success. The GPS signal strength measured at design is that even signals from satellites which are
the surface of the Earth is about –160dBw, which is just above the local horizon can be received. Unfortu-
roughly equivalent to viewing a 25-Watt light bulb nately, this design is susceptible to a broad range of
from a distance of 10,000 miles. This weak signal can interference and misconfigured military GPS receivers
easily be jammed by a stronger power transmission in could be forced to use unencrypted signals, which
a similar frequency.20,21 The GPS signals are currently can then be spoofed if an adversary is capable of suc-
transmitted on two D-band frequencies or links. The cessfully jamming the encrypted signals.
signal used commercially is transmitted only on one
link whereas an encrypted military signal is transmit- Since a report on GPS vulnerabilities was released by
ted on both links. This encryption prevents military the U.S. Department of Transportation (known as the
GPS receivers from being spoofed by false GPS trans- Volpe-Report23) in 2001, many enhancements to en-
missions as long as these receivers are configured to sure GPS reliability have been developed. For exam-
use the encrypted signals only. However, those receiv- ple, modern Controlled Radiation Pattern Antennas
ers could also be configured to use the unencrypted (CRPA) capable of differentiating between the GPS
signals as an alternative if the encrypted one is too satellite signal, interfering signals from other sources
weak or disrupted.22 A military grade GPS receiver op- and providing substantial jam-resistance up to a cer-
erating with the encrypted GPS signals is virtually im- tain degree have been developed.24 The continuing
mune from spoofing attempts. Unfortunately, this modernization of the GPS system to include adding
does not prevent the receiver from being jammed. In additional frequencies and increasing GPS signal

Table 20 – Data Link Vulnerability Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 75

 strength aims to further enhance reliability and jam- 1. Major Jaysen A. Yochim (US Army), US Army Command and General Staff College, ‘The Vulnerabilities of Un-
manned Aircraft System Common Data Links to Electronic Attack’, Jan. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.
resistance.25 However, like any radio navigation sys- fas.org/irp/program/collect/uas-vuln.pdf. [Accessed 16 Apr. 2013].
2. Wolfgang W. Rochus, ‘UAV Data-Links: Tasks, Types, Technologies and Examples’, DaimlerChrysler Aerospace,
tem, GPS is vulnerable to interference that can only be Ulm, 1999.
3. R. Poisel, Modern Communications Jamming Principles and Techniques 2nd Edn, 2011.
reduced but not totally eliminated.26 The ability to jam 4. A.B. Glenn, ‘Low Probability of Intercept’, 2010.
communications is a simple question of power. If suf- 5. Steve Bonter, Diana R. Dunty, Jason Greene, and Dr. William Duff, ‘Predator UAV Line-Of-Sight Datalink Terminal
Radio Frequency Test Report’, Alion Science and Technology, Sep. 2004.
ficient power is available, any frequency within the 6. P. C. Nolin, Countering the Afghan Insurgency: Low Tech Threats, High-Tech Solutions, NATO Parliamentary As-
sembly, 2011.
electromagnetic spectrum can be jammed.27 7. Pierluigi Paganini , ‘Hacking Satellites … Look Up to the Sky’, INFOSEC Institute, 18 Sep. 2013. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/hacking-satellite-look-up-to-the-sky/. [Accessed 08 Jan. 2014].
8. Loren B. Thompson, Ph.D., ‘Lack of Protected Satellite Communications Could Mean Defeat for Joint Force In
7.5.7 Vulnerability Assessment Future War’, Lexington Institute, 14 Apr. 2010. [Online]. Available: http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/lack-
of-protected-satellite-communications-could-mean-defeat-for-joint-force-in-future-war?a=1&c=1171.
[Accessed 25 Jun. 2013].
Current systems are not yet fully automated or even 9. Ibid. 7.
10. Ibid. 7.
autonomous and their control is contingent on unin- 11. Lieutenant Colonel Karl Ginter, Space Technology and Network Centric Warfare: A Strategic Paradox, U.S. Army
War College, Feb. 2007.
terrupted communications. Although much effort has 12. Ibid. 3.
been spent on reliability measures such as anti-jam- 13. Noah Shachtman, ‘Pentagon Paying China — Yes, China — To Carry Data’, WIRED.com, 29 Apr. 2013. [On-
line]. Available: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/04/china-pentagon-satellite/?cid=co7577104.
ming, encryption or redundancy, the adverse effects [Accessed 13 Jan. 2014].
14. Joint Defense Science Board Intelligence Science Board Task Force, ‘Integrating Sensor-Collected Intelligence’,
of EW may not be completely averted. The communi- Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Washington, D.C., Nov. 2008.
cation nodes of RPAS are complex and their vulnera- 15. Marc V. Schanz, Air Force Magazine, ‘The Reaper Harvest’, Apr. 2011. [Online]. Available: http://www.air-
forcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2011/Apr.%202011/0411reaper.aspx. [Accessed 16 Apr. 2013].
bility to EW ranges from ‘low’ to ‘high’ depending on 16. Siobhan Gorman, Yochi J. Dreazen and Aug. Cole , ‘Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones’, The Wall Street Journal, 17 Dec.
2009. [Online]. Available: http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB126102247889095011. [Accessed 08 Jan.
the antenna type and alignment. As this study as- 2014].
17. Ibid.
sumes that a capable adversary would focus their ef- 18. ‘U.S. Army working to encrypt UAV video feeds’, Homeland Security News Wire, 21 Dec. 2009. [Online]. Avail-
forts on the most vulnerable areas, the overall vulner- able: http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-army-working-encrypt-uav-video-feeds?page=0,0.
[Accessed 08 Jan. 2014].
ability rating to EW attacks is assessed as ‘high’. 19. Noah Shachtman and David Axe, ‘Most U.S. Drones Openly Broadcast Secret Video Feeds’, WIRED.com, 29 Oct.
2012. [Online]. Available: http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/hack-proof-drone/. [Accessed 08
Jan. 2014].
Disrupting RPAS data links by taking out the origina- 20. ‘NAVSTAR GPS User Equipment Introduction’, Sep. 1996.
21. Jon S. Warner, Ph.D. and Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., GPS Spoofing Countermeasures, Los Alamos, New Mexico:
tors of the transmissions, i.e. the GCS, RPA and satellite, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Dec. 2003.
22. Ibid. 20.
or by acquiring access to any of these components by 23. John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre, ‘Vulnerability Assessment of the Transportation Infra-
means of cyber-warfare is also a viable option for an structure Relying on the Global Positioning System’, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy,
U.S. Department of Transportation, Aug. 2001.
adversary. The vulnerability assessments to those 24. Thales Aerospace Division, ‘TopShield - The ultimate GPS anti-jam solution’, 2009. [Online]. Available: https://
www.thalesgroup.com/en/content/top-shield-ultimate-gps-anti-jam-solution. [Accessed 09 Jan. 2014].
types of attacks have been addressed in previous 25. ‘GPS Modernization’, National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, 25 Sep.
chapters. Their respective assessments have been 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.gps.gov/systems/gps/modernization/. [Accessed 09 Jan. 2014].
26. Ibid. 23.
brought forward in the chart below. (cf. Table 20) 27. Ibid. 1.

76 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force, Col. Marty Franc

7.6 Support Element ters for refuelling, arming and maintenance. MALE
’The most valuable and, ironically, most ignored UAS RPAS usually also require an adequate airport infra-
target is the launch recovery site – the aircraft carrier structure with a runway of roughly 2,000 m. The in-
of the battlefield. Why focus on killing individual air- frastructure necessary to operate an RPAS is usually
borne platforms when the high payoff is to kill multi- part of a military compound. Support Element per-
ple airframes along with operators and sustainers in sonnel working on-base should be well protected
a single blow? Given the fact that the launch recovery from immediate threats as a result of force protec-
site is a vital component of the total system, kinetic tion measures already in place.
attack is a near-certainty for a capable enemy.‘
Lieutenant General (ret.) Michael F. Spigelmire, former 7.6.2 Engagement Avoidance, Hit Avoidance and
commander U.S. Army Special Operations Command Hit Tolerance
and VII Corps
The exposure of deployed Support Element person-
The Support Element includes all of the prerequisite nel and equipment, the precautions against threats as
equipment to deploy, transport, maintain, launch and well as the magnitude of personnel or equipment
recover the RPA and associated communications losses are identical to those that apply to the LRU and
equipment. the deployed MCE. These have already been discussed
in chapter 7.3.
7.6.1 Detection Avoidance
7.6.3 Vulnerability Assessment
The Support Element is typically deployed and lo-
cated in or near the AOO, depending on the RPA’s Support Element functions and tasks are typically
effective range. Like manned aircraft, RPAS typically conducted at the same location as the LRU. Therefore,
require an appropriate logistics footprint, e.g. shel- the Support Element and the personnel assigned to

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 77

 the LRU and MCE share similar threats. Therefore, the combat aircraft, artillery or infantry. This study
previous vulnerability assessments for deployed per- could not identify any unique vulnerability that
sonnel and equipment still apply. may apply specifically to RPAS support personnel;
their vulnerability is assessed to be the same as all
Inside the AOO, the adversary may engage RPAS other military personnel located in the AOO. (cf. Ta-
support personnel with all available weapons, e.g. ble 21)

Table 21 – Support Element Vulnerability Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

RPAS Elements EW
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

78 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

CHAPTER VIII RPAS component was used to determine the overall
‘Accessibility’ factor.

Threat and Vulnerability To determine the probability of attack, the lower over-
Consolidation all rating from either the ‘Availability’ or the ‘Accessibil-
ity’ was used. For example, if a weapon system was
8.1 Threat Summary estimated to be ‘highly available’ to a possible future
Chapter VI identified possible threats and their esti- adversary but at the same time it was determined that
mated probability of attack against an RPAS. The prob- the enemy couldn’t get ‘access’ to the RPAS with that
ability of attack ratings were derived from two key specific weapon system, the overall probability of at-
factors; ‘Availability’ and ‘Accessibility’. ‘Availability’ re- tack was rated as ‘low’. The ‘probability of attack’ rating
ferred to the probability that a given weapon, weap- does not consider the possibility of success or failure
on system or military force necessary to produce a of an attack. It merely rates the likelihood that possible
threat to the RPAS was obtainable for an adversary. future adversaries may be in possession of a given
‘Accessibility’ referred to the probability that an adver- weapon, weapon systems or military force and NATO
sary could get the weapon, weapon system or mili- should anticipate their use against friendly RPAS.
tary force into striking distance. If analysis determined
that a given threat delivered different ratings within The following table summarizes all threats and their
one factor, the highest rating was used in that specific overall probability of attack ratings previously dis-
factor. For example, if a deployed RPAS element was cussed in chapter VI. The individual ratings are dis-
estimated as more ‘accessible’ to a certain threat than played below using the standard ‘traffic light colour
if home-based, the higher rating for the deployed system’. (cf. Table 22)

Table 22 – Identified Threats and Overall Probability of Attack Ratings.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 79

 8.2 Vulnerability Summary duced in chapter 5.2. The following table summarizes
the overall vulnerability ratings which have been indi-
Chapter VII identified the vulnerabilities of the sepa- vidually discussed in chapter VII. The individual ratings
rate RPAS elements. The overall vulnerability level was are displayed according to the standard ‘traffic light
determined by applying Robert E. Ball’s ‘Survivability colour system’. (cf. Table 23)
Kill Chain’ methodology which was previously intro-

Table 23 – RPAS Elements’ Overall Vulnerability Ratings.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

80 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

8.3 Consolidated Criticality critical’ affect current RPAS operations and should be
addressed as a high priority.
Assessment Matrix
To determine the most critical effects on RPAS opera- Moderately Critical. Different vulnerability and
tions, the respective ratings of the threat and vulner- threat ratings in which the individual assessment is
ability summary are correlated. If the ratings differ not lower than medium are considered ‘moderately
from each other, the lower rating is used. For example, critical’. Issues assessed as moderately critical are not
if a specific threat is assessed as ‘high’ but the vulner- yet ‘highly critical’, but, as technology is continuously
ability to this threat is only assessed as ‘moderate’, evolving, may become so in the future. It is recom-
then the overall assessment will be ‘moderate’. Con- mended that ‘moderately critical’ issues are addressed
versely, if a threat is assessed as ‘low’ and the vulnera- on a mid-term perspective and with a lower priority
bility to this threat is assessed as ‘high’ the overall as- than ‘highly critical’ issues.
sessment will still be rated as ‘low’. The individual
ratings are displayed below according to the standard Low Critical. A low vulnerability of an RPAS element
‘traffic light colour system’. The resulting criticality lev- or a low probability that this element may be attacked
els are as follows: is rated ‘less critical’. It is assessed that RPAS can sustain
attacks from threats listed in this category or is not ex-
Highly Critical. A ‘high’ vulnerability assessment of a pected to face them. However, to enhance RPAS resil-
given element in combination with a ‘high’ probability ience, it is recommended that ‘less critical’ issues
assessment that this element may be attacked results should be addressed with a lower priority than ‘mod-
in a rating of ‘highly critical’. Issues assessed as ‘highly erately critical’ issues. (cf. Table 24)

Table – 24 Consolidated Criticality Assessment Matrix.

Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
Asymmetric
MANPADS
Threats

Forces
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW

RPAS Elements
Remotely
Piloted Aircraft

Payload

Human Element

Control Element

Data Link

Support Element

Low Critical
Moderately Critical
Highly Critical Indicated levels are not in accordance with the official NATO threat levels defined in the ACO Security Directive AD 70-1

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 81

 © NATO
CHAPTER IX tiredness or disorder resulting from the strains and
stress of missions, may be a safety factor on its own.1
Impaired attention and judgment, reduced physical
Recommendations endurance and reaction time, as well as a reduced
ability to assess risk and consequences of action,
This study identified more than one hundred individual may result in mission failure, mishap, or fratricide.
recommendations throughout the entire scope of RPAS. Appropriately scheduled crew rotations should be
The recommendations listed in this chapter are struc- maintained to avoid consequences from aircrew fa-
tured in the same way as the vulnerability analysis in tigue which negatively impact RPAS survivability.
chapter VII, i.e. by RPAS element. Within the respective
RPAS element, the recommendations are listed in ac- 9.1.1.2 Sustain Properly Trained Crews at All Times.
cordance with the ‘Survivability Kill Chain’ methodology Not all NATO nations are financially able to continu-
which was previously used in this document to identify ously train their RPAS personnel on a regular basis.
the RPAS elements’ vulnerabilities. As a result of this Some nations must conduct their RPAS flight training
methodology, there is some degree of repetition among just prior to operational mission deployment. This
the recommendations. To aid the reader, tables were means crews must relearn basic skills versus honing
added as annexes to provide a quick reference to the combat expertise required for operations in contested
individual recommendations. environments. In order for crews to maintain required
proficiency levels, continuous flight training should be
conducted year-round. Additionally, an annual profi-
9.1 Enhancing Remotely Piloted
ciency and readiness test should be administered to
Aircraft Survivability ensure that RPAS personnel meet the requirements for
9.1.1 Threat Suppression Measures operating RPAS in contested environments.

9.1.1.1 Ensure Crew Rotations are Properly 9.1.1.3 Use Proper Mission Planning Techniques
Scheduled. Aircrew fatigue, the physical or mental to Avoid Surface-/Air-Based Threats. The best way

82 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

to mitigate a threat is to avoid it altogether. This meth- lar resolution and the desired image quality. Image
od is effective in air mission planning techniques and quality is usually expressed in National Interoperabil-
can also be applied to RPAS operations in contested ity Rating Scale (NIIRS) or Ground Resolved Distance
environments. Reliable intelligence regarding the ad- (GRD). A lower minimum NIIRS/GRD directly contrib-
versary’s force structure, its air combat and AD capa- utes to a greater stand-off range, so mission planners
bilities as well as its order of battle are essential to suc- should always aim for the lowest NIIRS/GRD neces-
cessful mission planning. Wherever operationally sary to fulfil the Commander’s Critical Information
possible, RPAS should be planned to operate outside Requirements (CCIR).
of adversary weapon systems detection and engage-
ment envelopes. 9.1.1.8 Escort RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based
Threats. If a required capability is unique to an RPAS
9.1.1.4 Employ Sensor Capabilities to Detect Sur- and the RPAS itself cannot defend itself adequately, it
face-/Air-Based Threats. Many RPAS are capable of can be supported by manned combat aircraft provid-
employing a variety of payload modules. Due to SWaP ing SEAD, escort or fighter sweeps. Mission planners
limitations, mission planners must design the correct should weigh the required RPAS capabilities versus
payload module loadout for the expected threats. the additional risk to aircrew. Combined flight training
This may enable the RPAS to observe relevant threats should be conducted to improve the interoperability
and conduct proper evasive manoeuvres, if required. between RPAS and manned aircraft.

9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress 9.1.1.9 Incorporate a Self-Destruct Mechanism to
Surface-/Air-Based Threats. Equipping RPAS with Deter Enemy Exploitation of the RPA. Modern RPA
lethal air-to-air or air-to-ground weapons will force are complex systems consisting of highly advanced
the adversary to weigh the risk of losing equipment and classified technology. If the loss of an RPA cannot
and personnel versus the benefit of destroying the be avoided, an automated self-destruct mechanism
RPA. RPAS could also take the role of Suppression of should guarantee that classified technology or on-
Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) assets if armed with High- board data will not be compromised. A reliable denial
Speed-Anti-Radiation-Missiles (HARM). Due to their of adversary exploitation of friendly technology will
extended loiter time, they may be better suited to directly support suppression of future threats.
perform this mission than manned aircraft.
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of
9.1.1.6 Consider Visual and Aural Thresholds in RPAS to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats. Cur-
Mission Planning. The range from which an object in rently the stratosphere is out of range for most surface-
the sky can be spotted is dependent on its size, con- based threats. RPAS flying at stratospheric altitudes
trast, engine noise level and the atmospheric condi- could operate as very long endurance stationary
tions. RPAS can improve the likelihood of avoiding weapons and ISR platforms to conduct offensive op-
MANPADS engagements by remaining outside the erations and wide area surveillance. Equipped with
spotting range of airspace observers. Mission plan- sophisticated guided and homing air-to-surface and
ners must be aware of the RPAS’ visual and audible air-to-air missiles, stratospheric RPAS could project air
thresholds to determine the appropriate target range, power similar to today’s naval aircraft carriers.
slant range and route. These factors are especially
critical for missions with long, on-station loiter times. 9.1.2 Enhancing Detection Avoidance

9.1.1.7 Control Image / Video Resolution Re- 9.1.2.1 Incorporate Terrain Following Flight Tech-
quirements to a Reasonable Level to Improve nology to Avoid Radar Detection. Radars can typi-
RPAS Stand-Off Range. The altitude, target range cally only detect targets that are in direct line of sight.
and slant range are dependent on the sensor’s angu- An RPAS capable of highly automated, very low alti-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 83

 tude, terrain following flight could penetrate ground- 9.1.2.5 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s
based radars and climb to higher altitudes only to Visual Signature to Lower the Spotting Range.
conduct its actual mission. The required technology Low visibility is desirable for all military aircraft. It is
has been implemented in manned combat aircraft or usually achieved by colouring the aircraft so it
cruise missile systems for decades and should be blends in with its environment. Current RPA typically
adapted for RPAS as well. use a standard blue-greyish colour scheme to lower
their visibility against the sky. To further reduce the
9.1.2.2 Conduct Low Level Flights to Avoid Radar visual signature, modern digital or fractal camou-
Detection. In contrast to very low altitude (terrain flage schemes that break the symmetry axis should
following) flights which require a high degree of au- be applied to the RPA. Multi aircraft RPAS should
tomation and incorporation of sophisticated (expen- also consider using different day and night camou-
sive) avionics, RPA low level flights could be con- flage schemes to adapt even better to their opera-
ducted under remote control with currently available tional environment.
systems. Data link latency and reduced situational
awareness are limiting factors for conducting low 9.1.2.6 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s
level flights with RPAS. The possible degree of re- Thermal Signature to Impede Enemy Detection.
motely controlled low level flights with current RPAS Hot aircraft materials, such as engine exhaust or wing
should be tested and RPAS pilot training should be surfaces heated by friction with the air, emit IR / UV
adjusted accordingly. radiation that heat-seeking weapons can track. Re-
ducing the thermal signature requires that aircraft
9.1.2.3 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s parts and emissions, particularly those associated
Radar Signature to Impede Enemy Detection. with the engine, are kept as cool as possible. In order
Even small RPA can have a large RCS leaving them to accomplish this, the RPA’s design should use tech-
vulnerable to radar detection. The incident energy niques currently used by manned aircraft to reduce IR
returned to the enemy radar from the RPA should be signatures. These include embedding the (jet) en-
minimised to impede enemy detection. The absence gines into the fuselage or wings, incorporating extra
of a cockpit permits even better stealth shaping of shielding of hot parts; mixing cool air with hot ex-
the airframe than manned aircraft. New RPAS de- haust; directing hot exhaust upward, away from
signs should always incorporate stealth capabilities. ground observers; and the application of special
Radar absorbing coatings should be considered an coatings to hot spots to absorb and diffuse heat over
option to reduce signatures of current RPAS. How- larger areas.
ever, the benefit of a reduced radar signature should
be balanced against additional costs, aerodynamic 9.1.2.7 Limit RPAS Radio Transmissions to Avoid
weight and reduced payload. Detection in the Electromagnetic Spectrum.
RPAS require a reliable data link. This means a con-
9.1.2.4 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s tinuous emission of radio transmissions being ema-
Noise Signature to Lower the Range of Audibility. nated to and from the RPA. Reducing radio transmis-
To conduct ISR missions with long loiter times, the sions to an absolute minimum assists in promoting
RPA must be inaudible to ground observers. A quieter electromagnetic stealth. Future RPAS developments
RPA can operate at lower altitudes which can permit should consider fundamental changes in the meth-
better image quality. Current RPAS’ noise signatures ods currently used to communicate with the RPA.
and aural thresholds should be analysed and, if found These new methods should seek to minimize radio
to be audible by ground observers when flying at its transmissions through the use of waypoint naviga-
operational altitude, the noise signature should be re- tion, choosing from predefined flight manoeuvres
duced. New RPAS designs should consider noise sig- or using automated on-board sense and avoid ca-
nature reduction measures as well. pabilities.

84 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

9.1.3 Enhancing Engagement Avoidance though newer and smaller transponders especially
designed for RPA applications are already in use.3 In
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to areas where adversary aircraft operations are expect-
Counteract Crew Fatigue. Studies have shown that ed, IFF transponders should be installed into RPAS to
humans have difficulty maintaining focus during ex- help integrate them into air operations.
tended periods of relatively low task demand or over
long periods of inactivity. Even if the crewman is high- 9.1.3.4 Consider Employment of Decoy RPA to Dis-
ly motivated, it is impossible to maintain effective vis- tract from High Value or Mission Critical RPA. If a
ual attention on an unchanging object for more than specific high value RPA cannot be hidden from enemy
thirty minutes.2 The best way to maintain focus and detection, it may be concealed within a swarm of de-
physical stimulation is to implement an intermediate coy RPA. Decoy RPA should be re-usable, but expend-
level of automation which requires continuous hu- able, and provide the same or larger radar signature as
man involvement. However, a suitable balance be- the protected RPA. They could also actively radiate
tween manual and automated control must be false radio, IR or other signals to appear like a high
achieved as too little automation will negatively affect value aircraft. A swarm of decoy RPA should be capa-
aircrew focus and therefore, RPAS survivability. An ex- ble of being remotely piloted by a single operator. It
ample of this is an emergency situation where the also requires a high degree of automation for the de-
operator is unable to react quickly enough to an im- coy RPA swarm to automatically follow pre-defined
minent threat. In this case, the system could take full flight formations and reduce pilot workloads.
control until the situation is resolved or the system is
overridden manually. 9.1.3.5 Enhance Sensor Fusion to Improve the
Situational Awareness for RPAS Operators. RPAS
9.1.3.2 Incorporate Radar Warning Receivers to on-board sensor suites are usually non-comprehen-
Increase Situational Awareness. RWR enable RPAS sive due to SWaP constraints. As RPAS operations
operators to detect radars and manoeuvre the RPA typically take place in a network centric environ-
away from the threat before weapons can be em- ment, fusion of information from a diverse array of
ployed. RWR systems can also collect information on external sensors should compensate for this defi-
the adversary’s electronic order of battle and can con- ciency and should provide relevant, real-time situa-
tribute to the overall intelligence picture. Industry al- tional awareness. Command, Control, Communica-
ready offers relatively small and lightweight RWRs, al- tions, and Intelligence (C3I) systems must provide
though they will require a significant percentage of relevant, consumable information to RPAS operators
the RPAS’ available power. RWR should be installed on without latency.
all RPAS expected to encounter enemy radar systems.
To improve mission flexibility, RWRs should be modu- 9.1.3.6 Increase Operating Altitude to Avoid En-
lar and interchangeable with other payloads if the gagement by SAF, AAA and Low Tier SAMs. If the
RWR requirement is not anticipated. RPA flies higher, there will likely be fewer threats that
can reach it. As RPA operate at higher altitudes, more
9.1.3.3 Install Identification, Friend or Foe Tran- sophisticated and more expensive AD systems are re-
sponders. Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) tran- quired to successfully engage them. Due to the limit-
sponders permit the identification of friendly, enemy ed availability of expensive, high end SAMs, an adver-
and neutral forces by broadcasting a specific encrypt- sary may reconsider using them against relatively
ed signal that allows categorization of objects on the inexpensive RPAS versus using them against higher
battlefield or in the airspace. IFF may also support air- value targets. Hence, the operating altitude of RPA
space coordination measures allowing RPA to operate should be above 10,000 to 15,000 ft to escape Small
together with other airspace users. However, not all Arms Fire (SAF), AAA and low end SAMs in the so
current RPA are equipped with IFF transponders, al- called ‘trash fire’ envelope. (cf. Figure 5)

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 9.1.3.7 Consider RPAS Operations in the Strato- 9.1.4.3 Incorporate Automated Laser Warning
sphere to Avoid Engagement by Most Weapons. Systems. Like helicopters, slow and low flying RPAS
Currently, the stratosphere is out of range for most are exposed to surface-based laser range finders, laser
surface-based threats. RPAS operating at altitudes designators and laser beam riding weapons. In con-
above 100,000 ft could completely avoid or react trast to the helicopter pilot, the RPAS operator can
more effectively to enemy engagements. Using strat- only react to a threat with the delay of the C2 link’s
ospheric RPAS also offers additional benefits (cf. latency. To circumvent this problem, on board laser
9.1.1.10 and 9.5.5.2). warning systems can aid the RPAS operator by auto-
matically performing direct and immediate initiation
9.1.3.8 Increase RPA Operational Cruise and Top of countermeasures (cf. 9.1.4.5). Laser warning sys-
Speed to Enhance its Stand-Off Capabilities. Cur- tems should be considered for RPAS where operation-
rent weaponized RPA operate at an average speed al speeds and altitudes are similar to those of manned
of approximately 200 kts. The maximum range of a helicopters.
weapon released by an RPA is roughly only half of
one released from a fighter aircraft flying at signifi- 9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems. Mis-
cantly higher speeds. (cf. 7.2.1.3) Future armed com- sile Warning Systems (MWS) are effective in detecting
bat RPAS should be capable of operating at high, and informing the operator of incoming missiles re-
subsonic speeds to increase their stand-off weap- gardless of whether they are radar, IR, laser- or visually-
ons ranges comparable to that of manned combat guided. They can also provide information on the
aircraft. time to impact as well as the direction of the ap-
proaching missile. MWS only work after a weapon has
9.1.4 Enhancing Hit Avoidance been launched, which requires very quick reacting
countermeasures. Since RPAS operators can only react
9.1.4.1 Increase RPA Manoeuvrability. Once a to a threat with the delay of the C2 link’s latency, MWS
weapon engages an RPA, its survivability depends should be incorporated in combination with highly
largely on its ability to outmanoeuvre the threat. automated countermeasure systems (cf. 9.2.4.2).
Because an RPA is not constrained by human limi-
tations to acceleration and G-loading, the propul- 9.1.4.5 Incorporate Active Countermeasures
sion and airframe design possibilities offer better Against Thermal Detection and Tracking. To avoid
manoeuvrability. Future RPAS should employ being hit by heat-seeking weapons, measures to re-
blended wing bodies, laminar and active flow con- duce aircraft thermal radiation (c.f. 9.1.2.6) can be
trols to enable very responsive and manoeuvrable supplemented by active countermeasures. These
aircraft that can operate in ways impossible for methods are directed against enemy IR/UV detec-
manned aircraft. tion and tracking sensors. They also encompass IR/
UV jamming (i.e. active infrared missile countermeas-
9.1.4.2 Incorporate Aerial Combat Training for ures mounted near engine exhausts to confuse
RPAS Operators. RPAS operators may or may not heat-seeking missiles) and the use of decoy flares.
have a combat aircraft pilot background, and not all Combat helicopters, which operate at similar flight
nations currently require certified pilots to operate regimes, are particularly vulnerable to heat-seeking
RPA. Most RPAS operators are not experienced in air- weapons and have been equipped with infrared
to-air combat. RPAS operators should receive train- jamming devices for several decades.
ing in basic aerial combat manoeuvring. This will
help to improve situational awareness and an under- 9.1.5 Enhancing Hit Tolerance
standing of manoeuvrability limitations of current
RPAS in order to increase the likelihood of evading 9.1.5.1 Consider Partial Component Redundancy.
enemy threats. The installation of redundant components enhances

86 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

the survivability of an aircraft by reducing the impact tional costs, aerodynamic weight and reduced pay-
of aircraft system damage and increasing the aircraft load must also be considered.
hit tolerance. Due to SWaP restrictions, it is very un-
likely for RPA to be designed with total redundancy. 9.1.5.5 Incorporate Reconfigurable Flight Control
However, future RPAS should consider incorporating Systems. RPA rely solely on their flight control system
at least partial redundancy to prevent the loss of the software to provide steering commands for flight
RPA as a result of fatal damage to only one device, controls such as flaps, ailerons, canards, elevators or
part or mechanism. The miniaturization of system tails. Reconfigurable flight control systems refer to
components may facilitate further redundancy. software algorithms designed specifically to compen-
sate for failures or damage to flight controls or lifting
9.1.5.2 Minimize the Exposure of Critical System surfaces by using the remaining flight controls to gen-
Components. Minimizing the exposure of critical erate compensating forces and moments. These
components must be considered early in the design methods are well established in modern combat air-
phase of future RPAS. This technique serves primarily craft. To restore the RPA’s stability and performance
to reduce the likelihood of key components being after flight control damage, reconfigurable flight con-
critically damaged by enemy weapons. In order to im- trol systems should be incorporated into new RPAS.
prove the RPA’s damage tolerance, non-redundant
critical components should be oriented facing away 9.1.5.6 Develop Universal/Modular RPAS Assem-
from the most probable direction a kinetic weapon is blies to Quickly Repair Damaged Components.
likely to affect. Non-critical or ruggedized compo- The ability to rapidly repair combat damaged RPAS
nents should be oriented to shield the more vulnera- components after returning from missions ensures a
ble areas. Further miniaturization reduces the compo- high operational readiness rate. This can be facilitated
nent’s exposed surface area to the threat. by the development of modular components that
can be swapped as a unit versus repairing individual
9.1.5.3 Incorporate Passive Damage Suppression components on the RPAS. This can also be aided by
Measures. Passive damage suppression refers to fea- using standard universal modules that can be inter-
tures that either contain the level of damage or reduce changeable between different RPA models.
the effects of the damage. To improve ballistic toler-
ance, RPAS should incorporate passive damage sup-
9.2 Enhancing Payload to Improve
pression measures such as shielding of critical compo-
nents with armour, use of self-sealing coatings for fuel System Survivability
tanks and application of fire resistant materials. In or- 9.2.1 Threat Suppression Measures
der to save weight, shielding should only be installed
in the most likely direction of enemy weapons fire. The 9.2.1.1 Equip RPA With High-Speed Anti-Radiation
trade-off between additional costs, aerodynamic Missiles. Installation of HARM on RPA could enable
weight and reduced payload must be considered. them to deter enemy AD or EW systems from turning
on their active emitters. Current RPAS capable of carry-
9.1.5.4 Incorporate Active Damage Suppression ing 500 lb LGBs could also be armed with HARM. As a
Components. Active damage suppression includes prerequisite, the RPA must be equipped with an ap-
employment of sensors or other devices to sense the propriate warning system to provide the operator with
onset of a damage process. It activates mechanisms target acquisition data once a radiation source is de-
that contain the damage or reduces its effects, e.g. fire tected. Assuring the enemy is aware of this capability
detection and extinguishing systems. In order to con- may also contribute to RPAS survivability.
tain the damage once the RPA has been hit, incorpo-
ration of active damage suppression components 9.2.1.2 Incorporate Gunfire Detection Systems
should be considered. The trade-off between addi- and Self-Protection Missiles. The gunfire detection

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 87

 systems currently available are capable of pinpointing should also be a design consideration for future
enemy firing locations by either radar, acoustic or op- RPAS (cf. 9.1.2.3).
tical detection. Incorporating this type of system
could enable RPA to immediately and automatically 9.2.2.2 Consider Use of Micro-Munitions to Sup-
laser designate an enemy firing position. In combina- port Internal Payload Integration. Smaller and
tion with automatically launched self-defence mis- lighter than conventional missiles or bombs, micro-
siles, the RPA could instantly react to all gunfire direct- munitions could be carried internally, supporting
ed against it. The self-defence missiles should be small the stealth design of future RPA. They could also fa-
and lightweight enough to be carried in adequate cilitate reducing the overall size of future RPA air-
amounts, be capable of being launched off-boresight frames. The development of small and agile micro-
and have pinpoint accuracy to be effective. Assuring munitions may be a key enabling technology in the
the enemy is aware of this capability may also contrib- future. Micro-munitions could also support strikes
ute to RPAS survivability. with higher precision and lower collateral damage
than today’s RPAS armament. The development and
9.2.1.3 Consider Employment of Air-to-Air Weap- integration of micro-munitions for use on RPA should
ons in Future Combat-RPAS. In the future, advanced be encouraged.
combat RPAS could be used to gain control of con-
tested airspace. This requires very high performance 9.2.2.3 Incorporate Retractable Sensors. The re-
systems, operating at high speeds, which are agile quired flexibility and field of view of visual sensors
and automated. These capabilities would be required may prohibit a complete internal integration into the
to successfully conduct air-to-air engagements at RPA. As a compromise between stealth and sensor re-
both close and long ranges. Future combat RPAS quirements, the sensor payload could be employed
should integrate advanced air-to-air weapons to ena- only when needed and stored inside the airframe
ble them to operate in the full spectrum of air-to-air when not in use, e.g. during transit. Retractable sensor
combat. payloads could also be an option for current RPAS. Re-
tractable sensors should be considered for future and
9.2.1.4 Reduce the Size of Active Jamming Sys- current RPAS to reduce the RPA’s radar signature.
tems to Introduce ECM Capabilities to RPAS. Ene-
my tracking systems could be suppressed by the use 9.2.3 Enhancing Engagement Avoidance
of active jammers. Due to their sheer size and weight,
currently available ECM systems can only be incorpo- 9.2.3.1 Incorporate 360 Degree Field of View Opti-
rated into the largest RPAS, e.g. Global Hawk. To cope cal Systems. RPAS operators sense the RPA’s environ-
with the SWaP restrictions inherent to an RPAS, tech- ment via the FMV streams from on-board sensors. The
nological advancements must reduce the size of jam- limited field of view is often referred to as the ‘soda-
ming units and increase their power levels to facilitate straw’ view. RPAS should be upgraded with currently
future EW capabilities for RPAS. available optical sensors that can provide a full 360
degree view to significantly increase situational
9.2.2 Enhancing Detection Avoidance awareness.4 A 360 degree FMV stream should be dis-
played either on a circular set of multiple screens in-
9.2.2.1 Integrate Payloads Internally Into the side the GCS or on a head-up display (HUD) incorpo-
Airframe. The multiple edges and corners of exter- rated in glasses or a helmet. Future technologies
nal payloads attached to the RPA’s wing hard points should seek to achieve a ‘virtual presence’ for the RPA
are major sources of reflected radar energy. Stealth operator inside the RPA.
aircraft typically carry their payload in internal bays
to minimize their radar reflectivity. To reduce the 9.2.3.2 Improve Sensor Sensitivity and Angular
RPA’s radar signature, internal payload integration Resolution. Sensor performance has a direct effect

88 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

on the RPA’s stand-off range. There have been many 9.2.3.5 Consider Implementation of Extended
cases where an RPA was required to fly low to obtain Range Air-to-Ground Weaponry. Current RPAS typi-
better EO/IR imagery resolution.5 Given the same cally operate at lower speeds than manned combat
target resolution requirement, increasing the sensi- aircraft. Therefore, the release speed of carried weap-
tivity and angular resolution of the sensor will result ons is also lower. (cf. 9.1.3.8) This results in a smaller
in a greater slant range. As sensor technologies are weapon engagement range and a weak stand-off ca-
likely to improve rapidly, integration of better sen- pability. However, extended range munitions already
sors should be a continuous process. This should in- available for manned combat aircraft offer remarkable
clude consideration of the most recent COTS prod- increases in weapon ranges even at lower airspeeds.
ucts available to enhance the RPA’s stand-off Extended range munitions should be adapted for
capabilities. RPAS use to maximize their stand-off capabilities.

9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload 9.2.4 Enhancing Hit Avoidance

of HALE/MALE RPA. Depending on their sensor ca-
pabilities, HALE/MALE RPA may be forced to operate 9.2.4.1 Incorporate Adaptive Spectral Filters to Pro-
inside the engagement envelope of enemy weapon tect EO/IR Sensors from Being Hit by Laser Energy.
systems to provide the required image quality. Due to EO/IR sensors can be blinded by shining a laser beam
their size, they may be unable to avoid detection or into their optical components. Depending on the emit-
engagement. Very small Scout-RPA carried by and ted laser energy, this effect can be temporary or cause
launched from the HALE/MALE RPA could act as for- permanent damage. EO/IR sensors should be protect-
ward deployed sensor platforms. Because of their ed with adaptive spectral filters to shield the sensitive
small size, they could stay undetected while the optical components against harmful laser energy.
MALE/HALE RPA could remain out of range of the
threat. Scout-RPA should be expendable and could 9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Counter-
also carry a warhead for engaging targets of opportu- measure Packages. Warning systems are only effec-
nity or eventually self-destructing after use. Scout- tive if combined with appropriate countermeasures
RPAS could also be an option to enhance manned such as flares or chaff. Current homing interceptors
combat aircraft capabilities. are typically guided by radar, IR or laser. Depending
on the anticipated threat, appropriate countermeas-
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal ures must be selected in mission planning. A broad
Weapons to Minimize Collateral Damage and Gain spectrum of countermeasure packages for manned
Operational Flexibility. Conventional warheads of- combat and transport aircraft is already available
ten produce blast and fragmentation that may cause and should be adopted for RPAS. As RPAS operators
collateral damage beyond the intended target. Mod- can only react to a threat with the delay of the C2
ern weapons capable of detecting, tracking and en- link’s latency, the implementation of countermeas-
gaging aircraft are heavily reliant on microelectronics. ures should follow a highly automated approach to
These are not only vulnerable to kinetic effects, but gain valuable seconds when an incoming threat has
also to directed energy. Electromagnetic weapons been identified. To enable the RPA to adapt to differ-
could induce currents large enough to melt the cir- ent threat scenarios, countermeasure packages
cuitry of enemy weapon systems or communications should be modular.
infrastructure. The main advantage of electromagnetic
warheads is the duration of the pulse can be so short 9.2.5 Enhancing Hit Tolerance
they could spare human lives and leave buildings un-
damaged. This would lower the threshold for use of 9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Com-
friendly weapons to pre-emptively engage enemy pensate for Sensor Failures. Miniaturization could
threats and enhance operational flexibility. ease SWaP limitations and enable the installation of

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 89

 redundant payloads into the RPA. Redundant compo- espionage, blackmail or lethal actions. RPAS personnel
nents could support each other by combining their should receive training on how to deal with social me-
capabilities into greater functionality. An example dia and the internet in order to not contradict other
could be building grids from multiple small sensors force protection measures.
which together form a single perspective, compara-
ble to a fly’s compound eye. 9.3.1.3 Raise the Media’s Awareness of Asymmet-
ric Threats against Home-Based Combatants.
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Home-based RPAS personnel that actively take part in
Avoid Cascading Damage. To protect the RPA from remote combat operations are considered combat-
catastrophic damage in the event a payload package ants and legitimate targets for enemy operations. In a
has been hit and has ignited, incorporation of a payload globally connected world, publishing even unclassi-
emergency release mechanism should be considered. fied information may support enemy intelligence
This situation could be especially dangerous to the rest gathering. This could endanger personnel and their
of the airframe if explosives are involved. Sensor pack- families. The armed forces should actively approach
ages are usually designed as removable units so differ- the media and raise their awareness of enemy intelli-
ent sensor modules can be configured. Weapons at- gence gathering and asymmetric threats. The objec-
tached to the RPA’s hard points or stored in internal tive should be to enable reporters to responsibly bal-
bays are inherently prepared with a release mechanism. ance freedom of the press against putting RPAS
However, to avoid collateral damage, the emergency personnel at risk.
release mechanism should be initiated only by the op-
erator and not in an automated mode. 9.3.1.4 Consider RPAS Personnel’s Family Envi-
ronment when Applying Force Protection Con-
ditions Measures. From an enemy perspective,
9.3 Enhancing Survivability of the
home-based RPAS personnel may be more accessi-
Human Element ble and more vulnerable outside their assigned mil-
9.3.1 Threat Suppression Measures itary base. This may put the families of RPAS person-
nel at risk, either intentionally or accidentally
9.3.1.1 Protect Identities of RPAS Personnel. This through collateral damage. Force Protection Condi-
study found countless articles, interviews, images and tions (FPCON) usually encompass the military do-
videos clearly revealing names, units and home bases main only and do not reflect exceptional circum-
of RPAS personnel. Many of these can be attributed to stances of remote operations. To avert asymmetric
public media releases from the armed forces them- threats, FPCON should address protecting the fami-
selves. To protect RPAS personnel, public relations lies of RPAS personnel.
should be controlled to ensure no information is re-
vealed that could lead to identification of individual 9.3.1.5 Establish Close Cooperation with Civilian
personnel. Authorities. As asymmetric threats may include RPAS
personnel’s domestic environment, force protection
9.3.1.2 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Awareness for measures should be adjusted accordingly (cf. 9.3.1.4).
Dealing with Social Media and the Internet. Social This requires close cooperation with civilian authori-
media and the internet are open sources for enemy ties to accommodate military and civilian activities.
intelligence gathering. RPAS personnel must be aware
that any information they willingly share with the in- 9.3.2 Enhancing Detection Avoidance
ternet community may also arouse unwanted atten-
tion. Eventually this could enable an adversary to 9.3.2.1 Prohibit Proliferation of Commercial Sat-
identify and track individual RPAS personnel in their ellite Imagery of RPAS Installations. Satellite im-
domestic environment for further engagement, e.g. agery of the earth’s surface can be obtained from

90 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

commercial companies like Astrium, DigitalGlobe or 9.3.5 Enhancing Hit Tolerance
BlueSky.6 This imagery can be obtained directly or
over the internet by using services from Google or 9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified
Microsoft. This study found publicly accessible satel- RPAS Personnel in Reserve. To strengthen the hu-
lite imagery of various military installations hosting man element of RPAS operations as a whole, sufficient
RPAS and the adjacent housing areas which are likely reserve personnel should be trained and sustained. As
to accommodate military personnel. This imagery the physical requirements for RPAS pilots / operators
may be especially valuable to asymmetric forces that are lower than for operating manned aircraft, these
do not have access to satellite capabilities. To im- personnel may be recruited from physically disabled
pede enemy exploitation of commercially available or retired personnel.
satellite imagery, regulations should be established
prohibiting the distribution of imagery showing
9.4 Enhancing Control Element
friendly military installations and adjacent housing
areas. As different companies fall under the jurisdic- Survivability
tion of different nations, international consensus 9.4.1 Threat Suppression Measures
and eventually agreement is required.
9.4.1.1 Consider Pre-Emptive Cyber-Attack Opera-
9.3.2.2 Prohibit Wearing Name Tags, Badges or tions to Suppress Enemy Cyber-Capabilities. The
Uniforms Outside Military Compounds. Once a best way to mitigate a threat is to avoid it; this is also
military installation or housing area is revealed (cf. true for the cyber-domain. Suppressing cyber-threats
9.3.2.1), individual RPAS personnel and their fami- may require pre-emptive infiltration of enemy sys-
lies could be identified via on site clandestine op- tems with insertion of malicious code. If necessary,
erations. To avoid visual identification of RPAS per- the adversary’s cyber-weapon may then be terminat-
sonnel, name tags and unit badges should be ed before it can impose a cyber-threat to friendly sys-
removed outside military compounds. Dressing in tems. Hence, pre-emptive cyber-attacks should be
civil clothes before leaving the barracks should also considered as an option to suppress enemy cyber-
be considered. This measure may require detailed capabilities. This may require further legal assessment
legal assessment to mitigate infringement on IHL in and consensus within NATO to ensure compliance
terms of discrimination between combatants and with IHL.
civilians.
9.4.1.2 Apply NATO Class II Security Area Restric-
9.3.3 Enhancing Engagement Avoidance tions to the RPAS Control Element Infrastructure.
To prevent asymmetric forces from accessing the
No recommendations found. Control Element, the GCS and its immediate vicinity
should be protected independent from the given
9.3.4 Enhancing Hit Avoidance threat conditions of the surrounding military infra-
structure. This added protection should comply with
9.3.4.1 Protect the Work Areas of RPAS Personnel. NATO Class II Security Area7 restrictions at a minimum
Depending on their function, the areas where RPAS level and should apply to home-based and deployed
personnel usually work are GCSs, aircraft hangars or GCS as well.
staff buildings. At a minimum, all of these facilities
should be protected against direct fire or fragmenta- 9.4.2 Enhancing Detection Avoidance
tion. Considerations regarding protection of facilities
should not be limited to the AOO only. It should also 9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away
be considered for home-based infrastructure which from the GCS to Prevent Visual and Electronic
may be exposed to asymmetric attacks. Identification. Satellite antennas required to estab-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 91

 lish communications within an RPAS can be quite 9.4.3 Enhancing Engagement Avoidance
large, making them easy for enemy reconnaissance to
see. Currently, most RPAS rely on constant radio trans- 9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements
missions to control the aircraft, making the antennas to Leapfrog8 and Handover Command. Modern
vulnerable to enemy radio-location techniques as electro-optical or electronic reconnaissance is likely to
well. Locating satellite earth terminals adjacent to the locate active command posts after a certain amount
GCS would also endanger the GCS. Satellite antennas of time. To avoid being identified by enemy recon-
should be positioned at a reasonable distance from naissance, a regular change of GCS locations should
the GCS so that detection of the antenna does not al- be considered. This requires having at least two mov-
low an adversary to draw conclusions regarding the able GCS control elements per RPAS conducting regu-
actual GCS location. lar leapfrogs and handover of command.

9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions to Impede Lo- 9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy
cating the GCS by Electronic Reconnaissance. As in a Reasonable Timeframe. In recent asymmetric
most RPAS require constant communication with the conflicts, home-based mission control elements of
GCS, an adversary could detect these radio signals RPAS provided a high level of security simply by the
and employ direction-finding techniques to locate amount of distance from the AOO, but a more capa-
the source of transmission (cf. 9.4.2.1). Minimizing ra- ble opponent may be able to conduct attacks deep
dio communications would lower the risk of being inside NATO territory, e.g. by long-range ballistic mis-
detected electronically. However, this requires a high siles, stealth aircraft or even RPAS. Therefore, RPAS mis-
degree of automation, enabling the RPA to conduct sion control elements should be capable of redeploy-
its mission with only minimal human intervention and ing in a reasonable timeframe to evade enemy
eventually a minimum of radio transmissions (cf. engagement. A contingency plan for evacuating the
9.5.2.5). stationary military infrastructure and procedures to
continue operations with a mobile control element
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the nucleus should be considered a minimum require-
GCS. An RPAS encompasses several components. This ment.
enables an adversary to visually detect, identify and draw
conclusions where other elements may be located. Lo- 9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the
cating the GCS in the vicinity of other RPAS elements, e.g. GCS and Permit It to Be Quickly Relocated to Ham-
parked RPA, aircraft hangars or communications equip- per Adversary Electronic Reconnaissance. Modern
ment, may be convenient, but could also endanger the electro-optical or electronic reconnaissance is likely to
GCS. Whenever possible, the GCS should be placed in an locate any active command post after a certain
inconspicuous location where it blends in with other ge- amount of time (cf. 9.4.3.1). If it is not feasible to regu-
neric military equipment or infrastructure. larly move the GCS itself, relocating detached com-
munication antennas around a concealed GCS could
9.4.2.4 Remove Signs Indicating the Operational be a viable option. Although relocating detached ra-
GCS Location to Avert On-Site Espionage. Enemy dio antennas could confuse adversary electronic re-
intelligence gathering does not stop at the front gates connaissance, it may only delay locating and identifi-
of military compounds. The common practice of em- cation of the actual GCS.
ploying locals for non-military duties offers the oppor-
tunity for enemy on-site espionage. This tactic does 9.4.3.4 Consider the Use of Decoy SATCOM Anten-
not apply only to deployed operations, any signs indi- nas to Mislead the Adversary. Satellite dishes with a
cating the location of operational GCS should be re- diameter of several metres are difficult to hide, likely
moved to protect against enemy on-site espionage to be recognized by enemy reconnaissance and high-
activities. ly vulnerable to blast and fragmentation. This makes

92 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

them an easy and valuable target for an adversary, es- 9.4.4.2 Use Proprietary Software and Hardware
pecially in stationary installations. To confuse enemy for the Core Functions of RPAS to Minimize the
intelligence and mislead possible attacks, setting up Risk from Malicious Software. Viruses, Trojan Horses
decoys should be considered. and other malicious code are typically only executa-
ble in the environment they are specifically designed
9.4.3.5 Improve Latency and Reliability Issues As- for. Introducing a common RPAS operating system or
sociated with BLOS Communications. The main using commercial software and hardware solutions
reason for deploying a GCS to the AOO is the require- offers financial benefits, but could compromise sys-
ment for an instantaneous data link during launch tem security. Core system functionality like C2, naviga-
and recovery. This is currently only possible by using tion and control of kinetic weapons should use pro-
LOS communications. Further improving the latency prietary hardware and software solutions to minimize
and reliability issues associated with satellite commu- the risk of being infected by malicious software.
nications could enable RPAS operators to remotely
take off and land the RPA directly from inside their 9.4.4.3 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Cyber-Awareness
home country. This would make deployment of GCS to Prevent Infiltration of RPAS Computer Systems.
equipment unnecessary. Security software suites and computer system access
policies can only provide the foundation for RPAS
9.4.3.6 Incorporate a Fully Automated RPA computer system protection (cf. 9.4.4.1). Personnel
Launch And Recovery Capability to Permit Home with regular access to RPAS computer systems may be
Station GCS Operations. Most RPAS are dependent exploited by an adversary to circumvent protective
on a permanent data link, especially during launch measures, either unwittingly or unwillingly. To mini-
and recovery as there is no time to compensate for mize the risk of corruption, adversary recruitment or
link losses. Consequently, a deployed GCS capable of blackmail attempts, regular training that raises the
establishing an instantaneous LOS data link during awareness of those issues should be compulsory for
these critical phases is still required. Introducing a RPAS personnel. Keeping identities of RPAS personnel
fully automated launch and recovery capability classified could also help to avert those types of ac-
would permit using BLOS communications during tivities (cf. 9.3.2.2).
these phases and eventually eliminate the necessity
for a deployed GCS. 9.4.4.4 Shelter Stationary GCS Equipment from Ki-
netic Effects. Deployed control elements may be sus-
9.4.4 Enhancing Hit Avoidance ceptible to enemy surface-to-surface or air-to-surface
weapons. If the mission requires the control element
9.4.4.1 Improve Computer Security Techniques to be stationary and detection avoidance measures
and Policies to Defend Against Cyber-Threats. (cf. 9.4.2) are expected to be only temporarily effec-
Friendly RPAS have already inadvertently been infect- tive, the GCS should be reinforced against kinetic ef-
ed with malicious software through the careless use fects from direct fire or fragmentation.
of USB memory sticks.9 In order to minimize the risk of
RPAS computer systems being compromised by vi- 9.4.5 Enhancing Hit Tolerance
ruses, Trojan Horses and other malicious code, securi-
ty techniques and polices must be improved. Security 9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Ele-
software suites must use the most current updates to ment to Permit Failsafe Control in Case of GCS
cope with rapidly evolving cyber-threats. Computer Loss. The deployment of redundant GCSs at different
system access policies, not only on the software site locations contributes to RPAS survivability. If the active
but also on the hardware site, should be as restrictive control element were to come under enemy fire, a re-
as necessary to fend off intrusion attempts or exploi- dundant GCS could immediately take control of the
tation of carelessness. RPA and continue the mission. However, LOS or BLOS

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 93

 communication coverage of both control elements information if real time imagery is not required. It can
must be confirmed as a prerequisite for this option. also be useful during mission phases where commu-
nication is denied by the enemy, e.g. jamming (cf.
9.4.5.2 Isolate C2 Systems from Kinetic Weapons Pay- 9.5.5.4). A possible compromise could be streaming
loads to Minimize the Impact of Cyber-Attacks. If an low resolution video in real time for remote control
RPAS is the target of a successful cyber-attack, the ad- and sensor alignment while storing the high resolu-
versary may successfully take over the entire system tion video data in on-board memory for later analysis.
including C2, navigation, sensors and possibly kinetic
weapons. Surreptitiously inserted malicious software 9.5.1.3 Allow RPAS to be Operated from a
may overcome firewalls between the subsystems of Manned C2 Aircraft to Reduce BLOS SATCOM De-
the RPAS if those systems share the same physical pendency. The increased use of RPAS will require a
memory or processing units. Critical RPAS subsystems commensurate consumption of available band-
such as C2, sensors and kinetic weapons should al- width. This will require an improved information
ways be separated on the Open Systems Interconnec- transfer system. Allowing RPAS operation from
tion (OSI) model’s lowest possible layer10 to minimize manned C2 aircraft with LOS to the RPA could allevi-
the effects of successful cyber-attacks. ate bandwidth issues and would reduce the reliance
on satellites for BLOS SATCOM. Stationing the MCE in
a C2 aircraft could further enhance GCS survivability.
9.5 Enhancing Data Link
Experimentation is already ongoing in this area and
Survivability controlling the RPA’s sensor payload from an air-
9.5.1 Threat Suppression Measures borne platform is currently being tested.11

9.5.1.1 Incorporate Laser Communication Tech- 9.5.2 Enhancing Detection Avoidance

nology to Eliminate RPAS Radio Transmissions.
Laser communication can provide tremendous band- 9.5.2.1 Increase the Level of Automation to Mini-
width at data rates that are expected to be a thousand mize RPAS Radio Transmissions. An RPAS requires a
times greater than with current RF methods. Since la- reliable data link to be operated remotely. This results
ser communication does not operate in the RF spec- in continuous radio transmissions to and from the
trum, it is inherently a secure means of communica- RPA. Future RPAS should incorporate highly automat-
tion. To interfere with laser transmissions, an adversary ed functions such as waypoint navigation, pre-de-
must first detect the narrow laser beam. This is an es- fined flight profiles, active and passive countermeas-
pecially difficult challenge since the laser is very diffi- ures or on-board sense and avoid. These methods
cult to detect for observers outside the beam. To suc- would minimize the dependence on radio transmis-
cessfully disrupt or intercept laser communications, sions. However, the level of automation should be
an adversary must place an object in the laser beams thoroughly balanced against the necessity for human
path. Laser communication technology is likely to be interaction to ensure compliance with moral and le-
a future ‘game changer’ and should be incorporated gal issues associated with RPAS operations.
to all future RPAS.
9.5.2.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to
9.5.1.2 Use On-Board Data Storage and Subse- Lower the Probability of Intercept of RPAS Data
quent Analysis if Real Time Imagery is not Impera- Links. Deliberately spreading radio signals over a
tive. Legacy RPAS were not capable of providing real broad spectrum makes them highly resistant to jam-
time imagery and had to rely on pre-programmed ming unless the adversary has prior knowledge of the
flight routes. Their collected data was stored on-board spread characteristics. The signal should be modulat-
and analysed after recovery. Current and future RPAS ed and encrypted to make it appear like radio noise
should implement this traditional way of collecting and to mask it from an unwary adversary.

94 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

9.5.2.3 Use Frequency Hopping Techniques to data for their own purposes. The encryption should
Lower the Probability of Intercepting RPAS Data be strong enough to endure enemy decryption at-
Links. Frequency hopping techniques use the ability tempts for long enough time, so deciphered data is
to quickly shift the operating frequency to counter obsolete and operationally useless.
radio communications interference. It also hampers
triangulation of the transmitter by enemy electronic 9.5.3.2 Incorporate RPAS Transmitter-Receiver
reconnaissance. However, frequency hopping alone Authentication Processes to Improve Resistance
does not provide complete protection against eaves- to Deception. Feeding false data into RPAS receivers
dropping and jamming. To lower the probability of is arguably more dangerous than jamming as it pro-
data link interception, frequency hopping should be vides an adversary the potential of taking control of
used as a complementary method along with other the RPA. In addition to encrypting the data link (cf.
measures such as frequency spreading or encryption. 9.5.3.1); transmitters should be required to authenti-
cate themselves to the receiver with a unique au-
9.5.2.4 Reduce Radio Signal Strength to Lower thentication code embedded in the transmitted sig-
RPAS Data Link Detectability. The employment of nal. This would ensure the receiver only accepts
transmitter power management techniques offers signals from trusted sources, which would improve
the possibility of reducing the signal strength to the resistance to enemy deception attempts. Some of
absolute minimum required thereby lowering the the techniques that provide resistance to jamming
detectability of RPAS communications. Conversely, help to resist enemy deception attempts also (cf.
signal strength management also permits the in- 9.5.2.2 and 9.5.2.3).
crease of signal power if needed, e.g. to overpower
spurious signals. 9.5.3.3 Maximize On-Board Data Processing and
Data Compression to Minimize RPAS Radio Trans-
9.5.2.5 Reduce Duty Cycles of Radio Transmis- missions. Measures aimed at protecting the data link
sions to Lower RPAS Data Link Detectability. An and ensuring data link integrity typically increase the
excellent way to remain undetected is to eliminate all size of the data stream. This further consumes the
radio communications. This is an unlikely ability due available bandwidth. High-speed, on-board data pro-
to RPAS dependency on remote control or the de- cessing and data compression techniques could re-
mand for real-time imagery, so RPAS radio transmis- duce the demand for bandwidth by transmitting only
sions should be reduced as much as possible (cf. relevant data in a highly compressed manner, e.g.
9.4.2.2). This is accomplished through the use of im- only individual moving objects instead of an entire
proved data compression algorithms. It is especially FMV stream. This could enable improved counter-
beneficial for high resolution sensor data transfer. This measures and reduce the probability of intercept
would result in less data being transferred which re- which could help mask the RPA’s location. The amount
sults in lower duty cycles. of on-board data processing and data compression in
future RPAS should be maximized to reduce radio
9.5.3 Enhancing Engagement Avoidance transmissions.

9.5.3.1 Use Strong Encryption to Prevent Enemy 9.5.4 Enhancing Hit Avoidance
Eavesdropping or Exploitation of RPAS Transmis-
sions. To enhance RPAS data link survivability, all radio 9.5.4.1 Incorporate Larger Antennas with In-
transmissions to and from the RPA should be appro- creased Signal Power and Higher Focus to In-
priately encrypted. This includes downlinks from the crease Gain. In general, antennas must discriminate
RPA to ROVER or other types of ground-based, porta- between the preferred signals and unwanted noise.
ble receiver systems. This would deny an adversary Increasing the signal’s power and concentrating it
the ability to intercept and exploit the transmitted into a narrow beam increases the likelihood of over-

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 95

 coming enemy jamming. On the receiver side, a distributed group of stratospheric airships could
large, directional antenna ensures radio signals from form the backbone of a deployable airborne net-
outside the main lobe will be received with much work. These could provide redundant BLOS commu-
less energy and the preferred signal is intensified. nication for RPAS and other air platforms. Smaller
Larger antennas with a narrower focus increase the solar powered ‘relay RPA’ could boost the airborne
effective gain and ability to nullify enemy distur- network where required.14
bances. To overcome the size limitations of current
RPA, the airframe could be modified to accommo- 9.5.5.3 Increase Transmitter Power to Achieve Bet-
date larger antennas. ter RPAS Data Link Resistance to Enemy Jamming.
Increasing transmitter power is the forceful way to
9.5.4.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to overcome jamming. Simply stated, the objective is to
Improve RPAS Data Link Persistence. Spreading generate more transmitting power than the enemy
radio signals over a broad frequency spectrum not jammer. Although, this is easily achievable by ground-
only helps hide it from enemy interception, (cf. based transmitters, the SWaP restrictions of an RPA
9.5.2.2) it also makes the signal more resistant to nar- make this option less feasible. Despite the current
rowband interference. To successfully jam a broad limitations of RPA, incorporating stronger transmitters
frequency spectrum, the jammer must spread its in the RPAS ground (and eventually space) segments
power across the entire bandwidth. This results in should be considered.
the jamming signal being less effective and a corre-
spondingly better signal-to-noise ratio for friendly 9.5.5.4 Use On-Board Buffer Memory and Time-
RPAS communications. Shift Functionality to Restore Imagery after Data
Link Interruptions. The RPAS data link may be inter-
9.5.5 Enhancing Hit Tolerance rupted by atmospheric conditions, bad weather or
enemy electromagnetic interference. The RPA should
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne be capable of recording all relevant sensor data in an
Network to Maintain RPAS Data Link Connectivity on-board buffer and transmit it when connectivity is
under Adverse Conditions. In computer-based net- re-established. If the amount of buffered data is too
works, routing is the process of forwarding data pack- large to be re-transmitted within the available band-
ets from their source to their ultimate destination width, a time-shift capability should enable the oper-
through intermediate network nodes. Adaptive rout- ator to directly access a specific time of the buffered
ing algorithms compensate for network failures by video (cf. 9.5.1.2).
forwarding the data packages via alternative nodes. In
the future, any air platform could act as a node in an 9.5.5.5 Incorporate Additional Navigational
airborne network, capable of routing and forwarding Backup Systems to Continue Operating in GPS
network traffic. This would allow improved resistance Denied Environments. RPA require GPS satellite
against interference to the data link, extend the range signals to navigate. Loss of those signals can easily
of radio communications and enable a more flexible occur either by hostile jamming or simply due to at-
use of available bandwidth. mospheric disturbances. Inertial Navigation Sys-
tems (INS) provide an adequate level of accuracy to
9.5.5.2 Consider the Use of Stratospheric RPAS as continue flight operations but not for precision
Airborne Network Backbones to Strengthen strike operations. INS are not designed to provide
RPAS Data Links. Although not yet commercially the sole source of navigation information in GPS de-
available, stratospheric airships are already in devel- nied environments. Terrain mapping, star navigation
opment.12,13 They could act as substitutes for geosta- and INS navigation methods could be combined in
tionary satellites with the advantage of being re-de- RPAS to enable accurate navigation in GPS denied
ployable to meet operational requirements. A environments.

96 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

9.6 Enhancing Support Element erational routines like launch times, mission briefings,
Survivability lunch breaks, or location routines e.g. using RPA park-
ing areas or RPA launch and recovery corridors, offer a
9.6.1 Threat Suppression Measures great opportunity for an adversary to determine when
and where to strike. Unpredictability can serve to
No recommendations found. counter enemy intelligence efforts, to complement
force protection, and help to avoid enemy engage-
9.6.2 Enhancing Detection Avoidance ments. To keep an adversary from identifying time
and location related routines, routines should be
9.6.2.1 Develop a Mobile Operations Concept of changed often, but irregularly.
RPAS Ground Elements. The typical airport infra-
structure is easily located due to its sheer size. Al- 9.6.3.2 Introduce an RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Ca-
though RPAS ground installations benefit from being pability to Increase the Distance Between RPAS
part of the airport infrastructure, this may serve to re- Ground Elements and the AOO. Range is limited by
veal their presence to enemy reconnaissance. To the amount of fuel RPA can carry. The maximum dis-
avoid being detected, RPAS ground components tance between the launch and recovery site and the
should be capable of conducting mobile operations AOO is a direct consequence of this relationship. To
without relying on static airport infrastructure. increase the distance between the RPAS ground ele-
ments and the AOO, the RPA should be air-refuelable.
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance The first step in acquiring an RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling
Requirements to Permit the Use of Improvised Air- (AAR) capability could be the adoption of current AAR
strips. Current RPA typically require a prepared runway procedures and the use of a manned tanker aircraft to
of several thousand feet in length for launch and recov- refuel the RPAS. As a future capability requirement,
ery operations. As a pre-requisite for mobile operations fully automated AAR between solely remotely piloted
(cf. 9.6.2.1) the RPA must become independent from systems should be an objective.
prepared runways and have the capability of landing
and taking off on improvised airstrips. Reducing the 9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Con-
take-off and landing distance requirements permits cept to Minimize the Dependency on Deployed
greater flexibility in the use of improvised airstrips. Ground-Based Support Units. Once an RPA has re-
leased its weapons, it must land to rearm. This imposes
9.6.2.3 Camouflage and Disperse RPAS Ground Ele- limitations on RPA endurance and loiter time. (cf. 9.6.3.2)
ments to Obstruct Enemy Reconnaissance Efforts. Future RPA may incorporate internal weapon bays with
Unit camouflage and dispersion strongly reduces the a magazine-like functionality for standard munitions
detectability of RPAS ground components by blending which can be rearmed via a loading bay on the RPA’s
in with the natural environment or making them ap- top side. Fully automated docking manoeuvres be-
pearing unsuspicious (cf. 9.4.2.3). Although this is a very tween the RPA and an remotely piloted weapon carrier
basic military tactic, recent missions in the asymmetric airship are conceivable as a future vision. This could po-
environment have shown that combat units have not tentially minimize or eliminate the requirement to de-
followed this principle. To thwart enemy reconnais- ploy RPAS ground elements.
sance efforts, RPAS ground elements must consider
unit dispersion and camouflage techniques. 9.6.3.4 Consider Hypersonic Propulsion to Enable
Intercontinental Employment. Theoretically, hyper-
9.6.3 Enhancing Engagement Avoidance sonic propulsion could accelerate aircraft up to multi-
ple times the speed of sound. This would enable them
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Ene- to reach any destination on the planet within a couple
my Predictions on Future Actions. Establishing op- of hours. Hypersonic RPAS could conduct worldwide

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 97

 reconnaissance as well as combat missions and would fects from direct fires and fragmentation to improve
enable them to be launched and recovered from in- support element personnel survivability.
side the home country. This capability would com-
pletely eliminate the requirement for deploying 9.6.5 Enhancing Hit Tolerance
ground-based RPAS support elements.
9.6.5.1 Consider Installing Armour on Mobile RPAS
9.6.3.5 Consider Solar Powered Propulsion for Support Element Components. Static support ele-
RPAS to Maximize their Endurance and Range. If ment infrastructure could be hardened and sheltered
endurance is preferred over airspeed like during ISR to protect personnel and material from kinetic effects.
missions, solar powered propulsion may help to in- (cf. 9.6.4.1) When conducting mobile operations, the
crease on-station time to the maximum extent possi- support element must rely on their vehicles to provide
ble. RPAS operations would then be limited only by a minimum level of protection. In order to withstand
maintenance requirements. Solar powered ultra-long the impact of fragmentation and small arms fire, an ad-
endurance RPAS could eliminate the necessity for de- equate level of armour should be installed to all mo-
ploying RPAS ground elements entirely. However, due bile RPAS support element components.
to their low airspeed and the amount of surface area
required to accommodate solar panels, they might be 1. Christian G. Watt, Lt Col, USAF, ‘Aircrew Fatigue Management’, Air War College, Air University, 2009.
2. Tobias Nisser, Carl Westin, ‘Human Factors Challenges in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs): A Literature
as vulnerable to threats as current ISR RPAS and should Review’, Lund University School of Aviation, 2006.
3. ‘Raytheon’s Mini IFF Transponders to be Used on Korean Air UAVs’, Unmanned Systems Technology, 19
be designed with a focus on expendability. Although Jun. 2013. [Online]. Available: http://www.unmannedsystemstechnology.com/2013/06/raytheons-
this type of RPAS may require a very long travel time to mini-iff-transponders-to-be-used-on-korean-air-uavs/. [Accessed 01 Apr. 2014].
4. ‘Bublcam: 360º Camera Technology for Everyone’, Bubl Technology Inc., [Online]. Available: https://www.
its operational location, the virtually infinite endurance kickstarter.com/projects/bublcam/bublcam-360o-camera-technology-for-everyone. [Accessed 17 Feb.
2014].
that comes from using solar powered propulsion 5. Kine Seng Tham, Gary Langford, Ravi Vaidyanathan, ‘Enhancing Combat Survivability of Existing Un-
manned Aircraft Systems’, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2008.
would help to compensate for this capability limitation. 6. ‘Commercial Sources of Aerial/Satellite Imagery with Global Coverage’, Virtual Terrain Project (VTP), [On-
line]. Available: http://vterrain.org/Imagery/commercial.html. [Accessed 04 Mar. 2014].
7. NATO Class II Area restrictions are outlined in the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Security Directive 70-1
9.6.4 Enhancing Hit Avoidance 8. Leapfrog: to go ahead of (each other) in turn; specifically, to advance (two military units) by keeping one
unit in action while moving the other unit past it to a position farther in front
9. Noah Shachtman, ‘Computer Virus Hits U.S. Drone Fleet’, WIRED.com, 10 Jul. 2011. [Online]. Available:
9.6.4.1 Shelter RPAS Support Element Workspaces http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/virus-hits-drone-fleet/. [Accessed 07 Jan. 2014].
10. The Open Systems Interconnection model (OSI) is a conceptual model that characterizes and standardizes
from Kinetic Effects to Enhance Survivability. As the internal functions of a communication system by partitioning it into abstraction layers. The model
groups communication functions into seven logical layers. A layer serves the layer above it and is served
long as there is a requirement to deploy support units by the layer below it.
into theatre, they may be in range of enemy surface- 11. Jeremiah Gertler, ‘U.S. Unmanned Aerial Systems’, Congressional Research Service, 2012.
12. ‘High Altitude Airship’, Lockheed Martin, [Online]. Available: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/prod-
to-surface or air-to-surface weapons. If detection ucts/lighter-than-air-vehicles/haa.html. [Accessed 26 Mar. 2014].
13. ‘StratoBus – halfway between a drone and a satellite’, Thales Group, 10 Mar. 2014. [Online]. Available:
avoidance (cf. 9.6.2) and engagement avoidance (cf. https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/space/case-study/stratobus-halfway-between-drone-
9.6.3) measures are not an option, support element and-satellite. [Accessed 27 Mar. 2014].
14. ‘Atmospheric Satellites’, TITAN Aerospace, 2013. [Online]. Available: http://titanaerospace.com/. [Ac-
workspaces should be sheltered against kinetic ef- cessed 26 Mar. 2014].

98 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014

 © US Air Force

10.1 Remotely Piloted Aircraft

CHAPTER X and Payload
10.1.1 Critical Shortfalls and Vulnerabilities
Conclusions
Current RPAS were never intended to operate in con-
Enhancing RPAS survivability is a complex task that tested environments. Consequently, signature reduc-
not only involves the RPA itself, but includes all oth- ing measures, warning receivers, countermeasures,
er RPAS elements. This study identified more than high airspeeds and manoeuvrability were not a de-
100 individual recommendations throughout the sign priority. Payload improvements focused on incor-
entire RPAS. They encompass measures in the air, porating improved sensors for air-to-ground imagery
ground and cyber-domains. However, there is no but not focused on providing optimal situational
single or generic solution that is suitable for all awareness for the aircrew are also a concern. These
types of remotely piloted systems currently in use shortfalls make current systems not only highly visible
by NATO nations. Some recommendations may be to enemy radar systems, but also highly vulnerable to
easily and quickly adopted whereas others are ex- threats directed against them.
pected to take years of development and integra-
tion. This chapter summarizes the given recommen- 10.1.2 Improving the Performance of Existing RPA
dations with respect to the identified criticality
levels and the expected timeframe for successful Improving the performance of current and legacy RPA
implementation. requires a comprehensive approach. It should not

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 99

 only encompass technical upgrades, but also adjust- a network centric environment, not all information
ments to the operational use of RPA and implementa- must come directly from the RPA. It could also origi-
tion of combat oriented flight training for aircrews. nate from other sources. In addition to the fusion of
sensor information, future RPA designers should seek
10.1.2.1 Technical Possibilities. Due to their SWaP to achieve a ‘virtual presence’ of the aircrew in the
limitations, current RPA are not as ‘upgradable’ as RPA. A first step could be incorporating currently
manned aircraft. However, there are a lot of survivabil- available, 360 degree camera systems to eliminate
ity enhancement solutions originally developed for the so called ‘soda straw’ view.
manned aircraft that simply may be adapted to RPA
without too much effort. The first step to improve cur- 10.1.2.2 Operational Possibilities. Improving the
rent RPA should be to determine what techniques survivability of current RPA may be achieved by oper-
used for manned aircraft can be easily incorporated. ationally adapting to the threat environment as well.
Since fundamental changes of the airframe or engine This could be done by operating at higher altitudes,
are very unlikely, the focus of improving current RPA assigning manned fighter escorts or using RPAS in a
should be on integrating warning systems, counter- threat suppression role.
measures, weapons and improving operator situa-
tional awareness. • Higher Altitude. Current RPA already operate at alti-
tudes above the so-called ‘trash envelope’ of AAA,
• Warning Systems and Countermeasures. The ef- SAF or MANPADS. Further increasing the operational
fects from AAA, SAF and MANPADS can be avoided altitude would force an adversary to use more so-
by operating at appropriate altitudes, so warning phisticated and therefore more expensive weapons
systems should focus on detection of SAM and AAM. to successfully engage the RPA. An adversary may
As those systems typically use radars, RWR would be then elect to refrain from engaging an RPA due to a
the most appropriate choice. MWS that detect IR or negative cost-benefit analysis and save his weapons
Ultraviolet (UV) emissions from approaching missiles for higher valued targets. Aircrews, warning systems
may complement the RWR to trigger appropriate and countermeasures also benefit from increasing
countermeasures. the operational altitude due to an increased threat
• Weapons. Current RPAS operate at roughly compa- reaction time.
rable altitudes to manned combat aircraft but at a • Assigning Fighter Escorts. Aircraft which offer
significantly lower speed. This results in a reduced unique capabilities such as bombers, tankers or air-
weapon range which correlates to a reduced stand- borne early warning are usually protected by fighter
off range for the RPA in air-to-ground combat. To aircraft. These escorts temporarily provide local per-
mitigate this shortfall, current PGM should be up- missive airspace to operate those assets. Unique
graded with extended range kits. Upgrading current RPAS capabilities could be protected accordingly us-
RPA with air-to-air weapons would imply incorporat- ing similar TTP. However, defending RPAS capabilities
ing an entire air combat sensor suite as well. This should be judiciously balanced against the addition-
would most likely push current RPA to their SWaP al risk to manned escort aircraft.
limits. Additionally, most advanced air-to-air missiles • RPAS in a Threat Suppression Role. To temporarily
have unit costs which equal or exceed the value of provide a local permissive air environment for friend-
current RPA. Equipping current and especially legacy ly air operations, existing RPAS should be considered
RPAS with advanced air-to-air weapons is therefore for the SEAD mission. Although the size and weight
not recommended. of HARMs may only permit the installation of only
• Situational Awareness. Improving the situational one or two weapons, RPAS would offer greater en-
awareness of RPAS aircrew inherently results in a de- durance than manned aircraft. This could offer long-
mand for more bandwidth as more information from er on-station times for friendly air operations and
the RPA to the GCS must be transmitted. However, in would eliminate the risk to a pilot in this high threat

100 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
 scenario. As a prerequisite, the RPA must be equipped manned fighter aircraft. They could operate on their
with an RWR to provide the required situational own in non-permissive and hostile air environments
awareness of enemy radar sites. as well. The absence of a human in the aircraft would
allow Combat RPAS to sustain higher G-forces and
10.1.2.3 Training Possibilities. RPAS aircrews may or would be limited only by the airframe’s aerodynamics.
may not have a background as combat aircraft pilots Combat RPAS should incorporate comprehensive
as not all nations recruit them from manned aviation. sensor suites that can provide a real-time, compre-
Some nations have introduced a separate career for hensive air picture. This would enable them to react
RPAS personnel, qualifying them to fly only RPA. Those automatically to any incoming threats. Combat RPAS
RPAS aircrews have never experienced real air-to-air should be capable of conducting automated offen-
combat. Education and training syllabi for RPAS oper- sive and defensive flight manoeuvres, outperforming
ators should incorporate aerial combat on an elemen- any manned fighter aircraft. They should be capable
tary level to increase the probability of successfully of coordinating their flight manoeuvres as a formation
evading threats. automatically, enabling them to simultaneously at-
tack single or multiple targets. In order to enable the
10.1.3 Future Vision for Remotely Piloted Aircraft operator to cope in such a dynamic environment,
workload should be reduced to a minimum. For ex-
This study has determined that it is very unlikely there ample, it should only consist of choosing from multi-
will be a ‘one size fits all’ solution for future RPAS. Multi- ple pre-defined flight manoeuvres and approving the
role systems offering a multitude of capabilities are release of lethal weapons. Combat RPAS are expected
expected to be very expensive. This would contradict to be the most expensive and technologically ad-
the principle of RPAS expendability due to their sheer vanced RPAS.
unit price. This study recommends optimizing future
RPAS for specific purposes as outlined below. 10.1.3.3 Swarm RPAS. In contrast to highly expen-
sive Deep Penetration or Combat RPAS, Swarm RPAS
10.1.3.1 Deep Penetration RPAS. Deep Penetration should be relatively cheap and expendable. They
RPAS would conduct reconnaissance and air strikes should be designed to operate together in large num-
deep in enemy territory. They should be optimised for bers, forming a swarm to simply overwhelm the ad-
remaining undetected across the entire electromag- versary’s defensive capabilities. These are to be the
netic spectrum. This would require not only tradition- ‘system of choice’ for most dull, dirty and dangerous
al stealth shaping techniques and radar absorbing tasks. They may be individually armed, releasing their
materials, but also an extensively higher degree of munitions and returning to their base, or may consist
automation to reduce C2 communications to an ab- only of a warhead which will make the Swarm RPA an
solute minimum. As supersonic speed and very high individual strike asset. They could eventually take the
altitudes would further support the survivability of a SEAD role from manned combat aircraft. Unarmed
Deep Penetration RPAS, the incorporated sensors and versions could serve as decoys, luring AD sensors and
weapons would have to be capable of providing ap- weapons away from manned aircraft and high value
propriate results under these circumstances as well. assets. As a prerequisite, the swarm should be capable
Deep Penetration RPAS are expected to be high value of coordinating its flight manoeuvres automatically,
assets, not only in financial, but technological terms as permitting operation by a single aircrew. The swarm
well. To avoid revealing highly classified technology should also be capable of adapting to the loss of indi-
and data, a deep strike RPA must incorporate a reliable vidual RPA, reorganizing the remaining RPA as needed
self-destruct mechanism. during combat operations.

10.1.3.2 Combat RPAS. Combat RPAS could conduct 'Quantity has a quality all its own.'
air-to-air and air-to-ground combat alongside Russian saying

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 101
 10.1.3.4 Carrier RPAS. Aircraft carriers provide the eral thousands of miles away from hostilities, their
ability to project military power and deterrence glob- threat perception is lower. Home-based RPAS person-
ally. Carrier RPAS should use this concept to project nel are able to join their families and live their normal
military power in a similar way. Unlike their naval lives after their combat shifts conclude. It is because of
counterparts, they will not carry individual aircraft, but this reason the off-duty environment was identified as
will carry an immense stock of long-range, precision- a critical vulnerability. This study couldn’t identify any
guided air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions instead. protective measures currently in place for the off-duty
They may also carry air surveillance radars and act as environment. On the contrary, countless press-related
an armed, airborne early warning asset. Ultra long en- references were found clearly revealing names and
durance and a massive cargo lifting capability may be photos of RPAS personnel. This may open a window of
achieved by using a solar powered airship instead of a opportunity to identify and target RPAS personnel in
conventionally powered aircraft. Integrated into a fu- their home country. Attacks on RPAS personnel’s fami-
ture net-centric environment, other Allied manned lies, friends and homes cannot be ruled out.
and remotely piloted aircraft could have remote ac-
cess to the weapons load carried by the Carrier RPAS. 10.2.2 Improving Force Protection
This reach-back capability could enable unarmed
Swarm RPAS to employ weapons from the Carrier 10.2.2.1 Deployed RPAS Ground Elements. Im-
RPAS to engage hostile targets. Carrier RPAS should be proving the survivability of deployed RPAS ground
capable of defending itself to a certain degree, but components should employ established and proven
would be dependent on additional external assets measures such as camouflage and dispersion of
such as NATO’s Airborne Early Warning and Control equipment, reducing radio transmissions or increased
System (AWACS). mobility to facilitate leapfrog operations. However,
the best way to protect deployed RPAS ground ele-
10.1.3.5 Reconnaissance RPAS. Armed or unarmed ments would be to not deploy them at all, so the
Reconnaissance RPAS would continue providing the range of RPA must be significantly improved that they
capabilities that current MALE/HALE RPAS deliver, but can be launched and recovered from inside NATO ter-
with upgraded sensor suites to enable better situa- ritory. An automated air-to-air refuelling and rearma-
tional awareness than today’s systems. They would still ment capability for RPAS would be essential in achiev-
be required to operate in benign air environments and ing this goal. With the exemption of disposable Swarm
would be enabled by Swarm or Combat RPAS. Recon- RPAS, all envisioned future RPAS as described above
naissance in non-permissive or hostile environments (cf. 10.1.3) should strive for this capability.
would become a mission for Deep Penetration RPAS.
10.2.2.2 Home-Based RPAS Ground Elements. The
recommended key actions to protect home-based
10.2 Ground-Based RPAS Elements
RPAS infrastructure and personnel should focus on
10.2.1 Critical Vulnerabilities threat suppression and detection avoidance.

BLOS communications permit RPAS ground installa- • Threat Suppression. Pre-emptively deterring
tions to be located anywhere on the globe. RPAS ele- threats for home-based RPAS infrastructure and per-
ments located in the AOO share the threat and force sonnel must not be considered a military only task.
protection measures of other deployed combat sup- Military FPCON should be complemented with ad-
port troops. This study didn’t identify any risks unique ditional protective measures provided by local civil-
to deployed RPAS personnel. However, the vulnerabil- ian authorities. Comprehensive and joint civil and
ity assessment is significantly different for home-based military force protection measures should also en-
RPAS installations and personnel. Because home- compass the domestic environment to include fami-
based RPAS personnel remotely operate RPA from sev- lies of RPAS personnel.

102 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
• Detection Avoidance. RPAS ground components lo- cious software. This is most likely due to the prolific
cations and identities of RPAS personnel should be use of discs and removable drives. Once discovered, it
protected, deterring adversaries from obtaining infor- took several years to disinfect the compromised sys-
mation on where to strike. This requires adopting com- tems. Eventually, the human factor turned out to be
munication and classification guidelines as they are the weakest link for gaining access to even highly se-
established for other units particularly at risk. cured and physically separated military networks.

10.3.1.4 Corruption of Integrated Circuit Supply

10.3 Command, Control, Communi-
Chains. The supply chain for microelectronics is ex-
cations and Computers tremely diffuse, complex and globally dispersed. This
10.3.1 Critical Vulnerabilities makes it difficult to verify the trust and authenticity of
the electronic equipment used in the RPAS. Deliberate
RPA remote control is completely dependent on a reli- modification of the product assembly and delivery
able data link. This is in turn dependent on a reliable could provide an adversary with capabilities to com-
network and communication infrastructure. This infra- pletely sidestep any software-based security counter-
structure is dependent on secure computer and radio measures. For example, extraction of encryption keys
systems. An adversary could select a variety of vulner- by carefully modifying the involved integrated circuits
able points to attack. The following were identified as has already been demonstrated.
the most critical vulnerabilities.
10.3.2 Improving Command, Control, Communi-
10.3.1.1 Physical Destruction of SATCOM Equip- cations and Computer Security
ment. Large satellite terminals are easily recognizable
and fixed installations could be identified by publicly Improvement of RPAS Command, Control, Communi-
available, Google Earth pictures. Delivering enough cations, and Computer (C4) security must be compre-
kinetic effect to fatally damage a satellite dish does not hensive and should encompass the physical compo-
require sophisticated weapons. Depending on the nents required for RPAS communication, the
range, a high calibre sniper rifle could accomplish this. computer systems (to include their software packag-
es), the electromagnetic spectrum they operate in,
10.3.1.2 Interference with RPAS Radio Transmis- and any personnel with access to the RPAS. Any of
sions. RPAS radio communications utilise various them may be subject to different types of attack and
transmitters and receivers not only on the RPA, but require different efforts to protect them.
also the GCS, satellites and possibly relay stations. Dis-
rupting any one of those connections would compro- 10.3.2.1 Physical Components. GCS should follow
mise the data link of the respective RPAS. Completely the same principles of camouflage, dispersion and
repelling any jamming effect in this type of environ- mobility like any other ground-based element aiming
ment is highly unlikely. Given the right circumstances, to avoid detection. However, as they cannot be hid-
all radio systems can be jammed, it only takes 1950s den from view, satellite terminals should employ a dif-
technology to take out 21st century communications. ferent approach. They should apply remoteness, de-
ception and redundancy techniques.
10.3.1.3 Cyber-Attacks against RPAS Computer
Systems. Cyber-security is an extremely fast and 10.3.2.2 Computer Systems. The financial benefits of
adaptive battlefield. Simple changes to a malicious incorporating COTS computer hardware should be thor-
program’s footprint can reduce its detection even for oughly balanced against the inherently superior security
heuristic search algorithms. Reportedly, RPAS com- of proprietary systems. If COTS systems are preferred,
puter systems, as well as thousands of other military trustworthy supply chains for these hardware compo-
computers, have already been infected with mali- nents and their sub-components must be ensured.

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 103
 10.3.2.3 Software Packages. Capable, trustworthy in this study. Future RPAS are projected to perform au-
and updated security software suites are essential in tomated flight between waypoints selected by the
defending computer networks. Cutting off potential operator. This will significantly lower the need for radio
entry points into the RPAS, e.g. network bridges or re- communications as a permanent C2 data link, making
movable devices, would further improve cyber-secu- it no longer necessary. They are also predicted to auto-
rity. In addition to these defensive measures, offensive matically take-off, land, refuel, navigate and eventually
and pre-emptive cyber-operations should be con- conduct combat manoeuvres. These capabilities al-
ducted to eliminate threats in advance. ready exist, providing the prerequisites to introduce
them into future RPAS. Automated target identifica-
10.3.2.4 Electromagnetic Spectrum. Use of the tion and engagement was introduced a decade ago in
electromagnetic spectrum is required for all RPAS op- 155mm artillery sub-munitions. The automated take-
erations. This study strongly recommends the imme- off and landing of RPA on a carrier flight deck has re-
diate incorporation of already available protective cently been demonstrated by the U.S. Navy. Automat-
measures. Future RPAS development should focus on ed flight navigation is a common capability of many
reducing radio communications dependency by in- currently available business aircraft.
troducing new means of data transmissions and in-
creasing RPA automation. However, what is technically possible is not neces-
sarily desirable. The automated release of lethal
10.3.2.5 Human Personnel. To prevent corruption, weapons should be considered very judiciously
adversary recruitment or blackmail attempts, RPAS with respect to legal, moral and ethical questions.
personnel should receive mandatory training to raise This study recommends two fundamental types of
the awareness of those issues. Keeping the identities lethal weapon release, i.e. deliberate attack and au-
of RPAS personnel classified could also help to deter tomated defence.
those activities. In addition, computer system access
policies (both for software and hardware) should be • Deliberate Attack. For any target that requires ap-
as restrictive as necessary to defend against intrusion proval by the Joint Targeting Process (this includes
attempts or exploitation of human carelessness. pre-planned, dynamic and time-sensitive targets) a
deliberate human decision for weapon release must
be enforced.
10.4 Automation and Human
• Automated Defence. Automated weapon release
Interaction should be approved for any target that is actively en-
'In three years, Cyberdyne will become the largest gaging the RPA. The threshold of what is considered
supplier of military computer systems. All stealth an active attack should follow the same principles as
bombers are upgraded with Cyberdyne computers, for manned combat aircraft.
becoming fully unmanned. Afterwards, they fly with
a perfect operational record. The Skynet Funding Although technically feasible, this study refrains from
Bill is passed. The system goes online on August 4th, recommending an ‘Automated Attack’ mode for RPAS.
1997. Human decisions are removed from strategic Such an automated attack mode would entail a mul-
defense. Skynet begins to learn at a geometric rate. titude of legal, moral and ethical questions.
It becomes self-aware 2:14 AM, Eastern time, Au-
gust 29th. In a panic, they try to pull the plug.'
10.5 Final Remarks
Quote taken from the Movie
‘Terminator 2 – Judgment Day’ Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems are still in their in-
fancy. The current state of RPAS development is often
Future use of higher levels of automation is a prerequi- compared to the point at which the Wright Flyer first
site in enabling many of the recommendations made took flight in 1903. Academia, industry, regulatory au-

104 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
thorities as well as the military are working diligently study or any future issues it identifies. Please feel free
to improve RPAS and better integrate them into the to contact the author of this document at the JAPCC
civilian airspace and military force structures. The cur- staff via email: [email protected]
rent and future vulnerability issues highlighted in this
document are provided to help improve the effective- ‘War is not about fairness; it’s about inflicting dam-
ness, efficiency and overall safety of RPAS in future age on your enemy without suffering damage your-
combat operations and to stimulate further thought self. RPA provide one of those asymmetries...’
and analysis. We welcome your comments on this Lieutenant General (ret.) Dave Deptula, US Air Force, 2013

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 105
 ANNEX A
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability Against SBAD Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Short Term (< 1 year)
Education & Training

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.1 Ensure Crew Rotations are Properly Scheduled x x
9.1.1.2 Sustain Properly Trained Crews at All Times x x
9.1.1.3 Use Proper Mission Planning Techniques to Avoid Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.4 Employ Sensor Capabilities to Detect Surface-/ Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.6 Consider Visual and Aural Thresholds in Mission Planning x x
9.1.1.7 Control Image/Video Resolution Requirements to a Reasonable Level to Improve RPAS Stand-Off Range x x
9.1.1.8 Escort RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of RPAS to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.2.1 Incorporate Terrain Following Flight Technology to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.2 Conduct Low Level Flights to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.3 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Radar Signature to Impede Enemy Detection x x
9.1.2.4 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Noise Signature to Lower the Range of Audibility x x
9.1.2.5 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Visual Signature to Lower the Spotting Range x x
9.1.2.6 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Thermal Signature to Impede Enemy Detection x x
9.1.2.7 Limit RPAS Radio Transmissions to Avoid Detection in the Electromagnetic Spectrum x x
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to Counteract Crew Fatigue x x x
9.1.3.2 Incorporate Radar Warning Receivers to Increase Situational Awareness x x x
9.1.3.3 Install Identification, Friend or Foe Transponders x x
9.1.3.4 Consider Employment of Decoy RPA to Distract from High Value or Mission Critical RPA x x x
9.1.3.5 Enhance Sensor Fusion to Improve the Situational Awareness for RPAS Operators x x
9.1.3.6 Increase Operating Altitude to Avoid Engagement by SAF, AAA and Low Tier SAMs x x
9.1.3.7 Consider RPAS Operations in the Stratosphere to Avoid Engagement by Most Weapons x x
9.1.3.8 Increase RPA Operational Cruise and Top Speed to Enhance its Stand-Off Capabilities x x
9.1.4.1 Increase RPA Manoeuvrability x x
9.1.4.2 Incorporate Aerial Combat Training for RPAS Operators x x
9.1.4.3 Incorporate Automated Laser Warning Systems x x x
9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems x x x
9.1.4.5 Incorporate Active Countermeasures Against Thermal Detection and Tracking x x
9.1.5.1 Consider Partial Component Redundancy x x
9.1.5.2 Minimize the Exposure of Critical System Components x x
9.1.5.3 Incorporate Passive Damage Suppression Measures x x
9.1.5.4 Incorporate Active Damage Suppression Components x x
9.1.5.5 Incorporate Reconfigurable Flight Control Systems x x
9.1.5.6 Develop Universal/Modular RPAS Assemblies to Quickly Repair Damaged Components x x
9.2.1.1 Equip RPA With High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles x x x

106 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
 Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Short Term (< 1 year)
Education & Training

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.2.1.2 Incorporate Gunfire Detection Systems and Self-Protection Missiles x x
9.2.1.4 Reduce the Size of Active Jamming Systems to Introduce ECM Capabilities to RPAS x x
9.2.2.1 Integrate Payloads Internally Into the Airframe x x
9.2.2.2 Consider Use of Micro-Munitions to Support Internal Payload Integration x x
9.2.2.3 Incorporate Retractable Sensors x x
9.2.3.1 Incorporate 360 Degree Field of View Optical Systems x x x
9.2.3.2 Improve Sensor Sensitivity and Angular Resolution x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal Weapons to Minimize Collateral Damage ... x x x x
9.2.3.5 Consider Implementation of Extended Range Air-to-Ground Weaponry x x x
9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Countermeasure Packages x x
9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Compensate for Sensor Failures x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 107
 ANNEX B
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability Against
Combat Aircraft and Adversary RPAS Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.1 Ensure Crew Rotations are Properly Scheduled x x
9.1.1.2 Sustain Properly Trained Crews at All Times x x
9.1.1.3 Use Proper Mission Planning Techniques to Avoid Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.4 Employ Sensor Capabilities to Detect Surface-/ Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.8 Escort RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.1.9 Incorporate a Self-Destruct Mechanism to Deter Enemy Exploitation of the RPA x x
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of RPAS to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.2.1 Incorporate Terrain Following Flight Technology to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.2 Conduct Low Level Flights to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.3 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Radar Signature to Impede Enemy Detection x x
9.1.2.5 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Visual Signature to Lower the Spotting Range x x
9.1.2.6 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Thermal Signature to Impede Enemy Detection x x
9.1.2.7 Limit RPAS Radio Transmissions to Avoid Detection in the Electromagnetic Spectrum x x
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to Counteract Crew Fatigue x x x
9.1.3.2 Incorporate Radar Warning Receivers to Increase Situational Awareness x x x
9.1.3.3 Install Identification, Friend or Foe Transponders x x
9.1.3.4 Consider Employment of Decoy RPA to Distract from High Value or Mission Critical RPA x x x
9.1.3.5 Enhance Sensor Fusion to Improve the Situational Awareness for RPAS Operators x x
9.1.3.7 Consider RPAS Operations in the Stratosphere to Avoid Engagement by Most Weapons x x
9.1.3.8 Increase RPA Operational Cruise and Top Speed to Enhance its Stand-Off Capabilities x x
9.1.4.1 Increase RPA Manoeuvrability x x
9.1.4.2 Incorporate Aerial Combat Training for RPAS Operators x x
9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems x x x
9.1.4.5 Incorporate Active Countermeasures Against Thermal Detection and Tracking x x
9.1.5.1 Consider Partial Component Redundancy x x
9.1.5.2 Minimize the Exposure of Critical System Components x x
9.1.5.3 Incorporate Passive Damage Suppression Measures x x
9.1.5.4 Incorporate Active Damage Suppression Components x x
9.1.5.5 Incorporate Reconfigurable Flight Control Systems x x
9.1.5.6 Develop Universal/Modular RPAS Assemblies to Quickly Repair Damaged Components x x
9.2.1.3 Consider Employment of Air-to-Air Weapons in Future Combat-RPAS x x x x
9.2.1.4 Reduce the Size of Active Jamming Systems to Introduce ECM Capabilities to RPAS x x
9.2.2.1 Integrate Payloads Internally Into the Airframe x x

108 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
 Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.2.2.2 Consider Use of Micro-Munitions to Support Internal Payload Integration x x
9.2.2.3 Incorporate Retractable Sensors x x
9.2.3.1 Incorporate 360 Degree Field of View Optical Systems x x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x
9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Countermeasure Packages x x
9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Compensate for Sensor Failures x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x
9.3.2.1 Prohibit Proliferation of Commercial Satellite Imagery of RPAS Installations x x
9.3.4.1 Protect the Work Areas of RPAS Personnel x x x
9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified RPAS Personnel in Reserve x x x
9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away from the GCS to Prevent Visual and Electronic Identification x x x
9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions to Impede Locating the GCS by Electronic Reconnaissance x x
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the GCS x x x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements to Leapfrog and Handover Command x x x x
9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy in a Reasonable Timeframe x x x
9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the GCS and Permit It to Be Quickly Relocated … x x x
9.4.3.4 Consider the Use of Decoy SATCOM Antennas to Mislead the Adversary x x
9.4.3.5 Improve Latency and Reliability Issues Associated with BLOS Communications x x
9.4.3.6 Incorporate a Fully Automated RPA Launch And Recovery Capability … x x
9.4.4.4 Shelter Stationary GCS Equipment from Kinetic Effects x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element to Permit Failsafe Control in Case of GCS Loss x x x
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne Network to Maintain RPAS Data Link Connectivity … x x
9.6.2.1 Develop a Mobile Operations Concept of RPAS Ground Elements x x x
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance Requirements to Permit the Use of Improvised Airstrips x x x x
9.6.2.3 Camouflage and Disperse RPAS Ground Elements to Obstruct Enemy Reconnaissance Efforts x x x
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Enemy Predictions on Future Actions x x x
9.6.3.2 Introduce a RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability … x x x x
9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Concept to Minimize the Dependency on Deployed ... Units x x x x
9.6.3.4 Consider Hypersonic Propulsion to Enable Intercontinental Employment x x
9.6.3.5 Consider Solar Powered Propulsion for RPAS to Maximize their Endurance and Range x x
9.6.4.1 Shelter RPAS Support Element Workspaces from Kinetic Effects to Enhance Survivability x x
9.6.5.1 Consider Installing Armour on Mobile RPAS Support Element Components x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 109
 ANNEX C
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability Against ASAT Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne Network to Maintain RPAS Data Link Connectivity … x x
9.5.5.2 Consider the Use of Stratospheric RPAS as Airborne Network Backbones … x x x

110 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
ANNEX D
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability Against EW Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.2.7 Limit RPAS Radio Transmissions to Avoid Detection in the Electromagnetic Spectrum x x
9.1.3.5 Enhance Sensor Fusion to Improve the Situational Awareness for RPAS Operators x x
9.2.1.4 Reduce the Size of Active Jamming Systems to Introduce ECM Capabilities to RPAS x x
9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions to Impede Locating the GCS by Electronic Reconnaissance x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element to Permit Failsafe Control in Case of GCS Loss x x x
9.5.1.1 Incorporate Laser Communication Technology to Eliminate RPAS Radio Transmissions x x
9.5.1.2 Use On-Board Data Storage and Subsequent Analysis if Real Time Imagery is not Imperative x x x
9.5.1.3 Allow RPAS to be Operated from a Manned C2 Aircraft to Reduce BLOS SATCOM Dependency x x x x
9.5.2.1 Increase the Level of Automation to Minimize RPAS Radio Transmissions x x
9.5.2.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to Lower the Probability of Intercept of RPAS Data Links x x
9.5.2.3 Use Frequency Hopping Techniques to Lower the Probability of Intercepting RPAS Data Links x x
9.5.2.4 Reduce Radio Signal Strength to Lower RPAS Data Link Detectability x x
9.5.2.5 Reduce Duty Cycles of Radio Transmissions to Lower RPAS Data Link Detectability x x
9.5.3.1 Use Strong Encryption to Prevent Enemy Eavesdropping or Exploitation of RPAS Transmissions x x x
9.5.3.2 Incorporate RPAS Transmitter-Receiver Authentication Processes to Improve Resistance to Deception x x x
9.5.3.3 Maximize On-Board Data Processing and Data Compression to Minimize RPAS Radio Transmissions x x
9.5.4.1 Incorporate Larger Antennas with Increased Signal Power and Higher Focus to Increase Gain x x
9.5.4.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to Improve RPAS Data Link Persistence x x
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne Network to Maintain RPAS Data Link Connectivity … x x
9.5.5.2 Consider the Use of Stratospheric RPAS as Airborne Network Backbones … x x x
9.5.5.3 Increase Transmitter Power to Achieve Better RPAS Data Link Resistance to Enemy Jamming x x
9.5.5.4 Use On-Board Buffer Memory and Time-Shift Functionality … x x x
9.5.5.5 Incorporate Additional Navigational Backup Systems … x x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 111
 ANNEX E
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability
Against SSBM Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.3.2.1 Prohibit Proliferation of Commercial Satellite Imagery of RPAS Installations x x
9.3.4.1 Protect the Work Areas of RPAS Personnel x x x
9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified RPAS Personnel in Reserve x x x
9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away from the GCS to Prevent Visual and Electronic Identification x x x
9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions to Impede Locating the GCS by Electronic Reconnaissance x x
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the GCS x x x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements to Leapfrog and Handover Command x x x x
9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy in a Reasonable Timeframe x x x
9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the GCS and Permit It to Be Quickly Relocated … x x x
9.4.3.4 Consider the Use of Decoy SATCOM Antennas to Mislead the Adversary x x
9.4.3.5 Improve Latency and Reliability Issues Associated with BLOS Communications x x
9.4.3.6 Incorporate a Fully Automated RPA Launch And Recovery Capability … x x
9.4.4.4 Shelter Stationary GCS Equipment from Kinetic Effects x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element to Permit Failsafe Control in Case of GCS Loss x x x
9.6.2.1 Develop a Mobile Operations Concept of RPAS Ground Elements x x x
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance Requirements to Permit the Use of Improvised Airstrips x x x x
9.6.2.3 Camouflage and Disperse RPAS Ground Elements to Obstruct Enemy Reconnaissance Efforts x x x
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Enemy Predictions on Future Actions x x x
9.6.3.2 Introduce a RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability … x x x x
9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Concept to Minimize the Dependency on Deployed ... Units x x x x
9.6.3.4 Consider Hypersonic Propulsion to Enable Intercontinental Employment x x
9.6.3.5 Consider Solar Powered Propulsion for RPAS to Maximize their Endurance and Range x x
9.6.4.1 Shelter RPAS Support Element Workspaces from Kinetic Effects to Enhance Survivability x x
9.6.5.1 Consider Installing Armour on Mobile RPAS Support Element Components x x

112 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
ANNEX F
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability
Against MANPADS Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.1 Ensure Crew Rotations are Properly Scheduled x x
9.1.1.2 Sustain Properly Trained Crews at All Times x x
9.1.1.3 Use Proper Mission Planning Techniques to Avoid Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.4 Employ Sensor Capabilities to Detect Surface-/ Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.6 Consider Visual and Aural Thresholds in Mission Planning x x
9.1.1.7 Control Image / Video Resolution Requirements to a Reasonable Level … x x
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of RPAS to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.2.4 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Noise Signature to Lower the Range of Audibility x x
9.1.2.5 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Visual Signature to Lower the Spotting Range x x
9.1.2.6 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Thermal Signature to Impede Enemy Detection x x
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to Counteract Crew Fatigue x x x
9.1.3.6 Increase Operating Altitude to Avoid Engagement by SAF, AAA and Low Tier SAMs x x
9.1.3.7 Consider RPAS Operations in the Stratosphere to Avoid Engagement by Most Weapons x x
9.1.4.1 Increase RPA Manoeuvrability x x
9.1.4.2 Incorporate Aerial Combat Training for RPAS Operators x x
9.1.4.3 Incorporate Automated Laser Warning Systems x x x
9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems x x x
9.1.4.5 Incorporate Active Countermeasures Against Thermal Detection and Tracking x x
9.1.5.1 Consider Partial Component Redundancy x x
9.1.5.2 Minimize the Exposure of Critical System Components x x
9.1.5.3 Incorporate Passive Damage Suppression Measures x x
9.1.5.4 Incorporate Active Damage Suppression Components x x
9.1.5.5 Incorporate Reconfigurable Flight Control Systems x x
9.1.5.6 Develop Universal/Modular RPAS Assemblies to Quickly Repair Damaged Components x x
9.2.3.2 Improve Sensor Sensitivity and Angular Resolution x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x
9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Countermeasure Packages x x
9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Compensate for Sensor Failures x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne Network to Maintain RPAS Data Link Connectivity … x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 113
 ANNEX G
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability
Against Asymmetric Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x
9.1.1.6 Consider Visual and Aural Thresholds in Mission Planning x x
9.1.1.7 Control Image / Video Resolution Requirements … x x
9.1.1.9 Incorporate a Self-Destruct Mechanism to Deter Enemy Exploitation of the RPA x x
9.2.1.2 Incorporate Gunfire Detection Systems and Self-Protection Missiles x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal Weapons … x x x x
9.2.4.1 Incorporate Adaptive Spectral Filters to Protect EO/IR Sensors from Being Hit by Laser Energy x x
9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Countermeasure Packages x x
9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Compensate for Sensor Failures x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x
9.3.1.1 Protect Identities of RPAS Personnel x x x
9.3.1.2 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Awareness for Dealing with Social Media and the Internet x x
9.3.1.3 Raise the Media’s Awareness of Asymmetric Threats against Home-Based Combatants x x x
9.3.1.4 Consider RPAS Personnel’s Family Environment when Applying Force Protection Conditions Measures x x
9.3.1.5 Establish Close Cooperation with Civilian Authorities x x
9.3.2.1 Prohibit Proliferation of Commercial Satellite Imagery of RPAS Installations x x
9.3.2.2 Prohibit Wearing Name Tags, Badges or Uniforms Outside Military Compounds x x x
9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified RPAS Personnel in Reserve x x x
9.4.1.2 Apply NATO Class II Security Area Restrictions to the RPAS Control Element Infrastructure x x x
9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away from the GCS to Prevent Visual and Electronic Identification x x x
9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions to Impede Locating the GCS by Electronic Reconnaissance x x
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the GCS x x x
9.4.2.4 Remove Signs Indicating the Operational GCS Location to Avert On-Site Espionage x x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements to Leapfrog and Handover Command x x x x
9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy in a Reasonable Timeframe x x x
9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the GCS and Permit It to Be Quickly Relocated … x x x
9.4.3.4 Consider the Use of Decoy SATCOM Antennas to Mislead the Adversary x x
9.4.3.5 Improve Latency and Reliability Issues Associated with BLOS Communications x x
9.4.3.6 Incorporate a Fully Automated RPA Launch And Recovery Capability … x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element to Permit Failsafe Control in Case of GCS Loss x x x
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Enemy Predictions on Future Actions x x x
9.6.4.1 Shelter RPAS Support Element Workspaces from Kinetic Effects to Enhance Survivability x x

114 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
ANNEX H
Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability
Against Cyber Threats

Technical Development

Operational Planning

Long Term (> 5 years)

Mid Term (1 - 5 years)
Education & Training

Short Term (< 1 year)

Overall Criticality
Recommendation Chapter
9.4.1.1 Consider Pre-Emptive Cyber-Attack Operations to Suppress Enemy Cyber-Capabilities x x
9.4.4.1 Improve Computer Security Techniques and Policies to Defend Against Cyber-Threats x x x x
9.4.4.2 Use Proprietary Software and Hardware for the Core Functions of RPAS … x x
9.4.4.3 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Cyber-Awareness to Prevent Infiltration of RPAS Computer Systems x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element to Permit Failsafe Control in Case of GCS Loss x x x
9.4.5.2 Isolate C2 Systems from Kinetic Weapons Payloads to Minimize the Impact of Cyber-Attacks x x
9.5.3.1 Use Strong Encryption to Prevent Enemy Eavesdropping or Exploitation of RPAS Transmissions x x x
9.5.3.2 Incorporate RPAS Transmitter-Receiver Authentication Processes to Improve Resistance to Deception x x x
9.1.1.9 Incorporate a Self-Destruct Mechanism to Deter Enemy Exploitation of the RPA x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 115
 ANNEX I
Short-Term Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability

Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Combat Aircraft

Adversary RPAS
Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.1 Ensure Crew Rotations are Properly Scheduled x x x x
9.1.1.2 Sustain Properly Trained Crews at All Times x x x x
9.1.1.3 Use Proper Mission Planning Techniques to Avoid Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x x
9.1.1.6 Consider Visual and Aural Thresholds in Mission Planning x x x
9.1.1.7 Control Image / Video Resolution Requirements ... x x x
9.1.1.8 Escort RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.2.2 Conduct Low Level Flights to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.5 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Visual Signature ... x x x x
9.1.3.3 Install Identification, Friend or Foe Transponders x x x
9.1.3.6 Increase Operating Altitude ... x x
9.1.4.2 Incorporate Aerial Combat Training for RPAS Operators x x x x
9.2.3.5 Consider Implementation of Extended Range Air-to-Ground Weaponry x
9.2.4.1 Incorporate Adaptive Spectral Filters ... x
9.3.1.1 Protect Identities of RPAS Personnel x
9.3.1.2 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Awareness for Dealing with Social Media and the Internet x
9.3.1.3 Raise the Media’s Awareness of Asymmetric Threats ... x
9.3.1.4 Consider RPAS Personnel’s Family Environment ... x
9.3.1.5 Establish Close Cooperation with Civilian Authorities x
9.3.2.1 Prohibit Proliferation of Commercial Satellite Imagery of RPAS Installations x x x x
9.3.2.2 Prohibit Wearing Name Tags, Badges or Uniforms Outside Military Compounds x
9.3.4.1 Protect the Work Areas of RPAS Personnel x x x
9.4.1.1 Consider Pre-Emptive Cyber-Attack Operations ... x
9.4.1.2 Apply NATO Class II Security Area Restrictions ... x
9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away from the GCS ... x x x x
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the GCS x x x x
9.4.2.4 Remove Signs Indicating the Operational GCS Location .. x
9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the GCS ... x x x x
9.4.3.4 Consider the Use of Decoy SATCOM Antennas to Mislead the Adversary x x x x
9.4.4.1 Improve Computer Security Techniques and Policies ... x
9.4.4.3 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Cyber-Awareness to Prevent Infiltration of RPAS ... x
9.4.4.4 Shelter Stationary GCS Equipment from Kinetic Effects x x x
9.6.2.3 Camouflage and Disperse RPAS Ground Elements ... x x x
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Enemy Predictions on Future Actions x x x x
9.6.4.1 Shelter RPAS Support Element Workspaces from Kinetic Effects ... x x x x
9.6.5.1 Consider Installing Armour on Mobile RPAS Support Element Components x x x

116 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
ANNEX J
Mid-Term Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability

Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.4 Employ Sensor Capabilities to Detect Surface-/ Air-Based Threats x x x x
9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x x x
9.1.1.9 Incorporate a Self-Destruct Mechanism to Deter Enemy Exploitation of the RPA x x x x
9.1.2.1 Incorporate Terrain Following Flight Technology to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.4 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Noise Signature ... x x
9.1.2.6 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Thermal Signature ... x x x x
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to Counteract Crew Fatigue x x x x
9.1.3.2 Incorporate Radar Warning Receivers to Increase Situational Awareness x x x
9.1.3.5 Enhance Sensor Fusion to Improve the Situational Awareness for RPAS Operators x x x x
9.1.3.8 Increase RPA Operational Cruise and Top Speed ... x x x
9.1.4.3 Incorporate Automated Laser Warning Systems x x x
9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems x x x x
9.1.4.5 Incorporate Active Countermeasures Against Thermal Detection and Tracking x x x x
9.1.5.1 Consider Partial Component Redundancy x x x x
9.1.5.2 Minimize the Exposure of Critical System Components x x x x
9.1.5.3 Incorporate Passive Damage Suppression Measures x x x x
9.1.5.4 Incorporate Active Damage Suppression Components x x x x
9.1.5.5 Incorporate Reconfigurable Flight Control Systems x x x x
9.1.5.6 Develop Universal/Modular RPAS Assemblies ... x x x x
9.2.1.1 Equip RPA With High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles x
9.2.1.3 Consider Employment of Air-to-Air Weapons in Future Combat-RPAS x x
9.2.2.1 Integrate Payloads Internally Into the Airframe x x x
9.2.2.2 Consider Use of Micro-Munitions to Support Internal Payload Integration x x x
9.2.2.3 Incorporate Retractable Sensors x x x
9.2.3.1 Incorporate 360 Degree Field of View Optical Systems x x x
9.2.3.2 Improve Sensor Sensitivity and Angular Resolution x x
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal Weapons ... x x
9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Countermeasure Packages x x x x x
9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Compensate for Sensor Failures x x x x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x x x
9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified RPAS Personnel in Reserve x x x x
9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions ... x x x x x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements to Leapfrog and Handover Command x x x x
9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy in a Reasonable Timeframe x x x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 117
 Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.4.4.2 Use Proprietary Software and Hardware for the Core Functions of RPAS … x
9.5.1.2 Use On-Board Data Storage and Subsequent Analysis if Real Time ... x
9.5.1.3 Allow RPAS to be Operated from a Manned C2 Aircraft ... x
9.5.2.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques ... x
9.5.2.3 Use Frequency Hopping Techniques ... x
9.5.2.4 Reduce Radio Signal Strength to Lower RPAS Data Link Detectability x
9.5.2.5 Reduce Duty Cycles of Radio Transmissions to Lower RPAS Data Link Detectability x
9.5.3.1 Use Strong Encryption to Prevent Enemy Eavesdropping ... x x
9.5.3.2 Incorporate RPAS Transmitter-Receiver Authentication Processes ... x x
9.5.3.3 Maximize On-Board Data Processing and Data Compression ... x
9.5.4.1 Incorporate Larger Antennas with Increased Signal Power and Higher Focus ... x
9.5.4.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to Improve RPAS Data Link Persistence x
9.5.5.3 Increase Transmitter Power to Achieve Better RPAS Data Link Resistance ... x
9.5.5.4 Use On-Board Buffer Memory and Time-Shift Functionality ... x
9.5.5.5 Incorporate Additional Navigational Backup Systems ... x
9.6.2.1 Develop a Mobile Operations Concept of RPAS Ground Elements x x x
9.6.3.5 Consider Solar Powered Propulsion for RPAS ... x x x

118 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
ANNEX K
Long-Term Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability

Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of RPAS .. x x x x
9.1.2.3 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Radar Signature ... x x x
9.1.2.7 Limit RPAS Radio Transmissions to Avoid Detection ... x x x x
9.1.3.4 Consider Employment of Decoy RPA ... x x x
9.1.3.7 Consider RPAS Operations in the Stratosphere ... x x x x
9.1.4.1 Increase RPA Manoeuvrability x x x x
9.2.1.2 Incorporate Gunfire Detection Systems and Self-Protection Missiles x x
9.2.1.4 Reduce the Size of Active Jamming Systems to Introduce ECM Capabilities to RPAS x x x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x x
9.4.3.5 Improve Latency and Reliability Issues Associated with BLOS ... x x x x
9.4.3.6 Incorporate a Fully Automated RPA Launch And Recovery Capability … x x x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element ... x x x x x x
9.4.5.2 Isolate C2 Systems from Kinetic Weapons Payloads ... x
9.5.1.1 Incorporate Laser Communication Technology ... x
9.5.2.1 Increase the Level of Automation to Minimize RPAS Radio Transmissions x
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne Network ... x x x x x
9.5.5.2 Consider the Use of Stratospheric RPAS as Airborne Network Backbones ... x x
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance Requirements ... x x x
9.6.3.2 Introduce a RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability … x x x
9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Concept ... x x x
9.6.3.4 Consider Hypersonic Propulsion to Enable Intercontinental Employment x x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 119
 ANNEX L
Technical Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability

Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.9 Incorporate a Self-Destruct Mechanism to Deter Enemy Exploitation of the RPA x x x x
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of RPAS … x x x x
9.1.2.1 Incorporate Terrain Following Flight Technology to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.3 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Radar Signature … x x x
9.1.2.4 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Noise Signature … x x x
9.1.2.5 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Visual Signature … x x x x
9.1.2.6 Reduce the Remotely Piloted Aircraft’s Thermal Signature … x x x x
9.1.2.7 Limit RPAS Radio Transmissions to Avoid Detection … x x x x
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to Counteract Crew Fatigue x x x x
9.1.3.2 Incorporate Radar Warning Receivers to Increase Situational Awareness x x x
9.1.3.3 Install Identification, Friend or Foe Transponders x x x
9.1.3.4 Consider Employment of Decoy RPA … x x x
9.1.3.5 Enhance Sensor Fusion to Improve the Situational Awareness … x x x x
9.1.3.7 Consider RPAS Operations in the Stratosphere … x x x x
9.1.3.8 Increase RPA Operational Cruise and Top Speed … x x x
9.1.4.1 Increase RPA Manoeuvrability x x x x
9.1.4.3 Incorporate Automated Laser Warning Systems x x
9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems x x x x
9.1.4.5 Incorporate Active Countermeasures Against Thermal Detection … x x x x
9.1.5.1 Consider Partial Component Redundancy x x x x
9.1.5.2 Minimize the Exposure of Critical System Components x x x x
9.1.5.3 Incorporate Passive Damage Suppression Measures x x x x
9.1.5.4 Incorporate Active Damage Suppression Components x x x x
9.1.5.5 Incorporate Reconfigurable Flight Control Systems x x x x
9.1.5.6 Develop Universal/Modular RPAS Assemblies … x x x x
9.2.1.1 Equip RPA With High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles x
9.2.1.2 Incorporate Gunfire Detection Systems and Self-Protection Missiles x x
9.2.1.3 Consider Employment of Air-to-Air Weapons in Future Combat-RPAS x x
9.2.1.4 Reduce the Size of Active Jamming Systems … x x x x
9.2.2.1 Integrate Payloads Internally Into the Airframe x x x
9.2.2.2 Consider Use of Micro-Munitions to Support Internal Payload Integration x x x
9.2.2.3 Incorporate Retractable Sensors x x x
9.2.3.1 Incorporate 360 Degree Field of View Optical Systems x x x
9.2.3.2 Improve Sensor Sensitivity and Angular Resolution x x

120 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
 Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x x
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal Weapons … x x
9.2.3.5 Consider Implementation of Extended Range Air-to-Ground Weaponry x
9.2.4.1 Incorporate Adaptive Spectral Filters … x
9.2.4.2 Incorporate Highly Automated Countermeasure Packages x x x x x
9.2.5.1 Consider Payload Redundancy to Compensate for Sensor Failures x x x x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x x x
9.3.4.1 Protect the Work Areas of RPAS Personnel x x x
9.4.2.2 Reduce Radio Transmissions to Impede Locating the GCS … x x x x x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements … x x x x
9.4.3.5 Improve Latency and Reliability Issues Associated with BLOS … x x x x
9.4.3.6 Incorporate a Fully Automated RPA Launch And Recovery Capability … x x x x
9.4.4.1 Improve Computer Security Techniques and Policies … x
9.4.4.2 Use Proprietary Software and Hardware for the Core Functions of RPAS … x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element … x x x x x x
9.4.5.2 Isolate C2 Systems from Kinetic Weapons Payloads … x
9.5.1.1 Incorporate Laser Communication Technology … x
9.5.1.2 Use On-Board Data Storage and Subsequent Analysis … x
9.5.1.3 Allow RPAS to be Operated from a Manned C2 Aircraft … x
9.5.2.1 Increase the Level of Automation to Minimize RPAS Radio Transmissions x
9.5.2.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to Lower the Probability of Intercept … x
9.5.2.3 Use Frequency Hopping Techniques … x
9.5.2.4 Reduce Radio Signal Strength to Lower RPAS Data Link Detectability x
9.5.2.5 Reduce Duty Cycles of Radio Transmissions … x
9.5.3.1 Use Strong Encryption to Prevent Enemy Eavesdropping … x x
9.5.3.2 Incorporate RPAS Transmitter-Receiver Authentication Processes … x x
9.5.3.3 Maximize On-Board Data Processing and Data Compression … x
9.5.4.1 Incorporate Larger Antennas with Increased Signal Power and Higher Focus … x
9.5.4.2 Use Frequency Spreading Techniques to Improve RPAS Data Link Persistence x
9.5.5.1 Establish a ‘Routing-Enabled’ Airborne Network … x x x x x
9.5.5.2 Consider the Use of Stratospheric RPAS as Airborne Network Backbones … x x
9.5.5.3 Increase Transmitter Power to Achieve Better RPAS Data Link Resistance … x
9.5.5.4 Use On-Board Buffer Memory and Time-Shift Functionality … x
9.5.5.5 Incorporate Additional Navigational Backup Systems … x
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance Requirements … x x x
9.6.3.2 Introduce a RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability … x x x
9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Concept … x x x
9.6.3.4 Consider Hypersonic Propulsion to Enable Intercontinental Employment x x x
9.6.3.5 Consider Solar Powered Propulsion for RPAS … x x x
9.6.5.1 Consider Installing Armour on Mobile RPAS Support Element Components x x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 121
 ANNEX M
Operational Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability

Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.1 Ensure Crew Rotations are Properly Scheduled x x x x
9.1.1.3 Use Proper Mission Planning Techniques to Avoid Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x x
9.1.1.4 Employ Sensor Capabilities to Detect Surface-/ Air-Based Threats x x x x
9.1.1.5 Properly Weaponize the RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x x x
9.1.1.6 Consider Visual and Aural Thresholds in Mission Planning x x x
9.1.1.7 Control Image / Video Resolution Requirements … x x x
9.1.1.8 Escort RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.1.10 Consider Stratospheric Employment of RPAS … x x x x
9.1.2.1 Incorporate Terrain Following Flight Technology to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.2.2 Conduct Low Level Flights to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.3.4 Consider Employment of Decoy RPA to Distract from High Value … x x x
9.1.3.6 Increase Operating Altitude to Avoid Engagement … x x
9.2.1.1 Equip RPA With High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles x
9.2.1.3 Consider Employment of Air-to-Air Weapons in Future Combat-RPAS x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x x
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal Weapons … x x
9.2.3.5 Consider Implementation of Extended Range Air-to-Ground Weaponry x
9.3.1.1 Protect Identities of RPAS Personnel x
9.3.1.3 Raise the Media’s Awareness of Asymmetric Threats … x
9.3.1.4 Consider RPAS Personnel’s Family Environment … x
9.3.1.5 Establish Close Cooperation with Civilian Authorities x
9.3.2.1 Prohibit Proliferation of Commercial Satellite Imagery of RPAS Installations x x x x
9.3.2.2 Prohibit Wearing Name Tags, Badges or Uniforms Outside Military Compounds x
9.3.4.1 Protect the Work Areas of RPAS Personnel x x x
9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified RPAS Personnel in Reserve x x x x
9.4.1.1 Consider Pre-Emptive Cyber-Attack Operations … x
9.4.1.2 Apply NATO Class II Security Area Restrictions … x
9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away from the GCS … x x x x
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the GCS x x x x
9.4.2.4 Remove Signs Indicating the Operational GCS Location … x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements … x x x x
9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy in a Reasonable Timeframe x x x x
9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the GCS and Permit It … x x x x
9.4.3.4 Consider the Use of Decoy SATCOM Antennas to Mislead the Adversary x x x x

122 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
 Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.4.4.1 Improve Computer Security Techniques and Policies … x
9.4.4.4 Shelter Stationary GCS Equipment from Kinetic Effects x x x
9.4.5.1 Establish a Redundant RPAS Control Element … x x x x x x
9.5.1.2 Use On-Board Data Storage and Subsequent Analysis … x
9.5.1.3 Allow RPAS to be Operated from a Manned C2 Aircraft … x
9.5.3.1 Use Strong Encryption to Prevent Enemy Eavesdropping … x x
9.5.3.2 Incorporate RPAS Transmitter-Receiver Authentication Processes … x x
9.5.5.2 Consider the Use of Stratospheric RPAS as Airborne Network Backbones … x x
9.6.2.1 Develop a Mobile Operations Concept of RPAS Ground Elements x x x
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance Requirements … x x x
9.6.2.3 Camouflage and Disperse RPAS Ground Elements … x x x
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Enemy Predictions on Future Actions x x x x
9.6.3.2 Introduce a RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability … x x x
9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Concept … x x x
9.6.4.1 Shelter RPAS Support Element Workspaces from Kinetic Effects … x x x x

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 123
 ANNEX N
Education & Training Recommendations to Improve RPAS Survivability

Asymmetric Force

Overall Criticality
Adversary RPAS
Combat Aircraft

Cyber Warfare
MANPADS
SSBM
SBAD

ASAT

EW
Recommendation Chapter
9.1.1.2 Sustain Properly Trained Crews at All Times x x x x
9.1.1.8 Escort RPA to Suppress Surface-/Air-Based Threats x x x
9.1.2.2 Conduct Low Level Flights to Avoid Radar Detection x x x
9.1.3.1 Keep RPAS Pilots/ Operators Focused to Counteract Crew Fatigue x x x x
9.1.3.2 Incorporate Radar Warning Receivers to Increase Situational Awareness x x x
9.1.4.2 Incorporate Aerial Combat Training for RPAS Operators x x x x
9.1.4.3 Incorporate Automated Laser Warning Systems x x
9.1.4.4 Incorporate Missile Warning Systems x x x x
9.2.1.3 Consider Employment of Air-to-Air Weapons in Future Combat-RPAS x x
9.2.3.1 Incorporate 360 Degree Field of View Optical Systems x x x
9.2.3.3 Consider Micro/Mini Scout-RPA as Payload of HALE/MALE RPAS x x x x x
9.2.3.4 Consider Armament with Non-Lethal Weapons … x x
9.2.5.2 Consider Emergency Release of Payloads to Avoid Cascading Damage x x x x x
9.3.1.1 Protect Identities of RPAS Personnel x
9.3.1.2 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Awareness for Dealing with Social Media … x
9.3.1.3 Raise the Media’s Awareness of Asymmetric Threats … x
9.3.2.2 Prohibit Wearing Name Tags, Badges or Uniforms Outside Military Compounds x
9.3.5.1 Establish Sufficient Quantities of Qualified RPAS Personnel in Reserve x x x x
9.4.1.2 Apply NATO Class II Security Area Restrictions … x
9.4.2.1 Locate Satellite Ground Terminals Away from the GCS … x x x x
9.4.2.3 Choose an Inconspicuous Location for the GCS x x x x
9.4.3.1 Enable Deployable RPAS Control Elements … x x x x
9.4.3.2 Enable Stationary RPAS MCEs to Redeploy in a Reasonable Timeframe x x x x
9.4.3.3 Locate SATCOM Antennas Away from the GCS and Permit It … x x x x
9.4.4.1 Improve Computer Security Techniques and Policies … x
9.4.4.3 Raise RPAS Personnel’s Cyber-Awareness … x
9.5.1.3 Allow RPAS to be Operated from a Manned C2 Aircraft … x
9.5.5.4 Use On-Board Buffer Memory and Time-Shift Functionality … x
9.5.5.5 Incorporate Additional Navigational Backup Systems … x
9.6.2.1 Develop a Mobile Operations Concept of RPAS Ground Elements x x x
9.6.2.2 Reduce RPA Launch and Landing Distance Requirements … x x x
9.6.2.3 Camouflage and Disperse RPAS Ground Elements … x x x
9.6.3.1 Avoid Observable Routines to Deny Enemy Predictions on Future Actions x x x x
9.6.3.2 Introduce a RPAS Air-to-Air Refuelling Capability … x x x
9.6.3.3 Develop an Air-to-Air Rearmament Concept … x x x

124 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
ANNEX O
Acronyms and Abbreviations

AAA Anti-Aircraft-Artillery CEP Circular Error Probable

AAR Air-to-Air Refuelling CIA Central Intelligence Agency

ACE Allied Command Europe C-IED Counter Improvised Explosive

Device
AD Air Defence
COCO Contractor Owned - Contractor
AFB Air Force Base Operated

AGM Air-to-Ground Missile COMSATCOM Commercial Satellite

Communications
AOO Area of Operations
COTS Commercial-off-the-Shelf
ASAT Anti-Satellite
COY Company
AWACS Airborne Early Warning and Control
System CRPA Controlled Radiation Pattern
Antenna
BDE Brigade
dB Decibel
BLOS Beyond Line of Sight
dBSM Decibel Relative to One Square
BN Battalion Meter

BVR Beyond Visual Range DEW Directed-Energy Weapons

C2 Command and Control DSCS Defence Satellite Communications

System
C3I Command, Control, Communica-
tions, Intelligence EA Electronic Attack

C4 Command, Control, Communica- ECM Electronic Counter Measures

tions, Computer
EHF Extremely High Frequency
CAP Combat Air Patrol
EMP Electromagnetic Pulse
CCIR Commander’s Critical Information
Requirements EO/IR Electro-Optical/Infrared

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 125
 ESM Electronic Support Measures IR Infrared

EW Electronic Warfare IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile

FLIR Forward Looking Infrared IRSL Infrared Signature Level

FMV Full-Motion Video IRST Infrared Search and Track

FPCON Force Protection Conditions ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance
FSR Field Service Representatives
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munitions
ft feet
JFC Joint Force Commander
GCS Ground Control Station
KEW Kinetic-Energy Weapons
GEO Geostationary Orbit
kts knots
GHz Gigaherz
LEO Low Earth Orbit
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
LGB Laser-Guided Bomb
GPS Global Positioning System
LoAC Law of Armed Conflict
GRD Ground Resolved Distance
LOS Line of Sight
HALE High Altitude Long Endurance
LRU Launch and Recovery Unit
HARM High-Speed-Anti-Radiation-Missile
MALE Medium Altitude
HUD Head-Up Display Long Endurance

IADS Integrated Air Defence System MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence System

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile MCE Mission Control Element

IED Improvised Explosive Device MEO Medium Earth Orbit

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electron- MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

ics Engineers
MWS Missile Warning System
IFF Identification, Friend or Foe
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
IHL International Humanitarian Law
NIIRS National Interpretability
INS Inertial Navigation System Rating Scale

126 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014
OAF Operation Allied Force RSO Remote Split Operation

ODF Operation Deliberate Force RWR Radar Warning Receiver

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom SAF Small Arms Fire

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom SAM Surface-to-Air Missile

OUP Operation Unified Protector SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar

OSI Open Systems Interconnection SATCOM Satellite Communication

PED Processing, Exploitation and SBAD Surface-Based Air Defence

Dissemination
SEAD Suppression of Enemy
PGM Precision-Guided Munitions Air Defence

PL Platoon SECT Section

PPSL Predator Primary SHORAD Short-Range Air Defence

Satellite Link
SOF Special Operations Forces
PTSD Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
SQDN Squadron
RCS Radar Cross Section
SRBM Short-Range Ballistic Missile
REGT Regiment
SSBM Surface-to-Surface
ROA Remotely Operated Aircraft Ballistic Munitions

ROVER Remotely Operated Video En- SWaP Size, Weight and Power
hanced Receiver
TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
RPA Remotely Piloted Aircraft
UA Unmanned Aircraft
RPAS Remotely Piloted
Aircraft System(s) UAS Unmanned Aircraft System(s)

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenade UV Ultraviolet

JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014 127
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130 JAPCC | Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in Contested Environments | September 2014