GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

MINISTRY OF RAILWAYS

An Introductory Handbook on
Communications Based Train Control
(CBTC)

End Users: Indian Railways Signal Engineers

CAMTECH/S/PROJ/2020-21/SP9/1.0
April 2021

INDIAN RAILWAYS
Centre for Advanced Maintenance Technology
Maharajpur, Gwalior (M.P.) Pin Code – 474 005
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Introductory Handbook on
Communications Based Train Control
(CBTC)
CAMTECH/S/PROJ/2020-21/SP9/1.0
April 2021
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Foreword

Conventional railway signalling is based on colour light signals and train

detection with the help of track circuits and axle counters. Although this
technology is suitable for detection and control of trains it is still not able to
utilize the section capacity to its full advantage. Over the last decade, railways
have seen a huge transition from conventional railway signalling systems to
modern signalling systems. As there are continuous improvements in
technology, we need to keep pace with the latest trends and keep ourselves
updated.

Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) is a modern communication-

based system that uses radio communication to transfer timely and accurate
train control information. CBTC is the choice of mass-transit railway operators
today, with over a hundred systems currently installed worldwide. In India also,
the CBTC technology is finding applications in Metro railways.

As CBTC is an upcoming technology, CAMTECH has issued this introductory

handbook for Signal & Telecommunication engineers to get them acquainted
with this and help them in implementing the system in the context of working
on Indian Railways.

I hope that this handbook will prove useful to S&T engineers of Indian
Railways in enhancing their knowledge. I wish them all the success.

CAMTECH Gwalior Jitendra Singh

Principal Executive Director
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Preface
Trains are mostly worked on Absolute Block system or Automatic Block
system over Indian Railways which have fixed length blocks. These systems
maintain unutilized space between two trains running in the same direction. To
utilize the track to its maximum capacity, modern communication based
systems are used in some countries. CBTC is one such modern, radio
communication-based signalling system which enables high resolution and real-
time train control information, which increases the line capacity by safely
reducing the distance (headway) between trains travelling on the same line, and
minimizes the numbers of trackside equipment. CBTC is being introduced on
Metro Railways in India. Each Metro is using different communication
technologies with different detection devices and interlocking, hence their
method of operation may vary slightly from one system to another.

CAMTECH has prepared this handbook to help S&T engineers in

understanding the concept of CBTC. A case study of Kolkata Metro is also
added to get a better idea of the subject.

We are sincerely thankful to Shri Susanta Sarkar, Chief Engineer (S&T),

Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., who helped us in preparing this
handbook. Since technological up-gradation and learning is a continuous
process, you may feel the need for some addition/modification in this handbook.
If so, please give your comments on email address [email protected]
or write to us at Indian Railways Centre for Advanced Maintenance
Technology, In front of Adityaz Hotel, Airport Road, Near DD Nagar,
Maharajpur, Gwalior (M.P.) 474005.

CAMTECH Gwalior Dinesh Kumar Kalame

Director (S&T)
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Table of Contents
Foreword................................................................................................................................................ iv
Preface ................................................................................................................................................... vi
Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................. viii
Issue of correction slips ......................................................................................................................... xi
Disclaimer.............................................................................................................................................. xii
Our Objective ....................................................................................................................................... xiii
CAMTECH Publications..........................................................................................................................xiv
Abbreviations ........................................................................................................................................ xv
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................................xvii
List of Tables .........................................................................................................................................xix
Terms & Definitions ...............................................................................................................................xx
Chapter I ................................................................................................................................................. 1
Control over movement of trains ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 1
1.2 Conventional methods of train control...................................................................................... 1
1.2.1 Absolute Block System .......................................................................................................... 2
1.2.2 Intermediate Block Signalling (IBS) System ........................................................................ 2
1.2.3 Automatic Block Signalling (ABS) System .......................................................................... 3
1.2.4 Cab Signalling ....................................................................................................................... 6
1.2.5 Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) System ............................................................................ 7
1.3 Need for a train control system utilizing maximum track space ............................................... 7
Chapter II ................................................................................................................................................ 9
Communications Based Train Control (CBTC)-A moving Block Signalling concept ........................... 9
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 CBTC System Design ............................................................................................................. 11
2.3 Control of train movement through CBTC ............................................................................. 18
2.3.1 Moving Block Principle ...................................................................................................... 18
2.3.2 Determination of train location in CBTC............................................................................ 20
2.3.3 Communication arrangements in CBTC ............................................................................. 21
2.3.4 Train Operation under CBTC ................................................................................................. 26
2.3.5 Interlocking as fallback system ............................................................................................... 27
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2.4 Train Operating Modes .......................................................................................................... 31

2.5 Performance requirements of CBTC as per IEEE 1474.1....................................................... 33
2.6 Functional Requirements of CBTC as per IEEE 1474.1......................................................... 35
2.6.1 ATP functions ...................................................................................................................... 35
2.6.2 ATO functions .................................................................................................................... 39
2.6.3 ATS functions ...................................................................................................................... 40
2.7 User Interface Requirements of CBTC as per IEEE 1474.2 ................................................... 41
2.7.1 Operations related user interface requirements –train-borne subsystems ............................ 41
2.7.2 Train-borne subsystems –inputs........................................................................................... 42
2.7.3 Operations related user interface requirements – non-train-borne subsystems .................... 43
2.7.4 Maintenance-related user interface requirements ............................................................... 44
Chapter III ............................................................................................................................................. 45
Applications of CBTC in Mass Transit................................................................................................. 45
3.1 Metro trains using CBTC technology ..................................................................................... 45
3.2 Metros with CBTC in India .................................................................................................... 46
3.3 India's first driverless train on Delhi Metro - A new beginning ............................................. 48
3.4 Comparison between parameters of Mainline Railway and Metro Railway ........................... 50
Annexure ........................................................................................................................................... 51
Metro Railways General Rules 2013 ................................................................................................ 51
& ....................................................................................................................................................... 51
Opening of Metro Railways for Public Carriage of Passengers Rules ............................................. 51
2013 .................................................................................................................................................. 51
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 57
4.2 Procedure for Safety Certification and Technical Clearance of Metro Systems by RDSO ...... 57
4.2.1 Submission and Scrutiny of Schedule of Dimensions (SOD) ............................................. 58
4.2.2 Submission and Scrutiny of documents .............................................................................. 58
4.2.3 Submission of Test Certificates / Reports ........................................................................... 60
4.2.4 Oscillation trials and issue of Speed Certificates ................................................................. 61
4.3 Maintenance and other Manuals ............................................................................................... 64
Annexure-E1 ..................................................................................................................................... 65
Annexure-E2 ..................................................................................................................................... 67
4.4 Flowcharts for Metro Certification Procedure .......................................................................... 68
Chapter IV............................................................................................................................................. 71
Kolkata East-West Metro Line 2 with CBTC Technology – A case study........................................... 71
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4.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 71

4.2 Signalling assets ....................................................................................................................... 72
4.3 Telecom Assets ...................................................................................................................... 78
4.4 Functioning of CBTC ............................................................................................................... 85
4.5 List of Signalling Assets at E-W Metro Corridor ................................................................... 85
4.6 List of Telecom Assets at E-W Metro Corridor ........................................................................ 87
4.7 Building Requirements ............................................................................................................... 89
References ............................................................................................................................................ 90
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Issue of correction slips

The correction slips to be issued in future for this report will be numbered as follows:

CAMTECH/S/PROJ/2020-21/SP9/1.0# XX date .......

Where “XX” is the serial number of the concerned correction slip (starting from 01
onwards).
CORRECTION SLIPS ISSUED

Sr. No. of Date of issue Page no. and Item Remarks

Correction No. modified
Slip
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Disclaimer

It is clarified that the information given in this handbook does not

supersede any existing provisions laid down in the Signal
Engineering Manual, Railway Board and RDSO publications. This
document is not statuary and instructions given are for the purpose
of guidance only. If at any point contradiction is observed, then
Signal Engineering Manual, Telecom Engineering Manual Railway
Board/RDSO guidelines may be referred or prevalent Zonal
Railways instructions may be followed.
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Our Objective

To upgrade Maintenance Technologies and Methodologies and achieve

improvement in Productivity and Performance of all Railway assets and
manpower which inter-alia would cover Reliability, Availability and
Utilisation.

If you have any suggestion & any specific comments, please write to us:
Contact person : Director (Signal & Telecommunication)
Postal Address : Centre for Advanced Maintenance Technology,
Maharajpur, Gwalior (M.P.) Pin Code – 474 005
Phone : 0751 - 2470185
Fax : 0751 – 2470841
Email : [email protected]
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CAMTECH Publications

CAMTECH is continuing its efforts in the documentation and up-gradation of information on

maintenance practices of Signalling & Telecom assets. Over the years a large number of
publications on Signalling & Telecom subjects have been prepared in the form of handbooks,
pocket books, pamphlets and video films. These publications have been uploaded on the
internet as well as railnet.
For downloading these publications
On Internet:
Visit www.rdso.indianrailways.gov.in
Go to Directorates → CAMTECH Gwalior → Other Important links → Publications for
download - S&T Engineering
or click on link
https://rdso.indianrailways.gov.in/view_section.jsp?lang=0&id=0,2,17,6313,6321,6326

On Railnet:
Visit RDSO website at 10.100.2.19
Go to Directorates → CAMTECH → Publications → S&T Engineering
Or click on the link
http://10.100.2.19/camtech/Publications/CAMTECH%20Publications%20Online/SntPub.htm

A limited number of publications in hard copy are also available in CAMTECH library which
can be got issued by deputing staff with official letter from controllong officer. The letter
should be addressed to Director (S&T), CAMTECH, Gwalior.
For any further information regarding publications please contact:
Director (S&T) – 0751-2470185 (O)(BSNL)
SSE/Signal - 7024141046 (CUG)
Or
Email at [email protected]
Or
FAX to 0751-2470841 (BSNL)
Or
Write at
Director (S&T)
Indian Railways Centre for Advanced Maintenance Technology,
In front of Hotel Adityaz, Airport Road, Maharajpur,
Gwalior (M.P.) 474005
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Abbreviations

Abbreviation Description
ABS Automatic Block Signalling
ACS Access Control System
AFTC Audio Frequency Track Circuit
ATC Automatic Train Control
ATO Automatic Train Operation
ATP Automatic Train Protection
ATS Automatic Train Supervision
BBRS Backbone Routers
BCC Backup Control Centre
BO Block Overlap
BTM Balise Transmission Module
BTS Base Tranceiver Station
CATC Continuous Automatic train control System
CBTC Communications Based Train Control
CC Carborne Controller
CCTV Closed Circuit Television
CBI Computer based Interlocking
CSS Customer Switching System
CRS Commissioner of Railway Safety
CTC Centralized Traffic Control
DBR Design Basis Report
DCS Data Communication System
DMRC Delhi Metro Rail Corporation
DPR Detailed Project Report
DSLD Double Sided Low Density
DTO Driverless Train Operation
EBD Emergency Braking Distance
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility
EMI Electromagnetic Induction
FSS First Stop Signal
FOTS Fibre Optics Transmission System
GE Gigabit Eathernet
GHZ Giga Hertz
GoA Grade of Operation
GPS Global Positioning System
IBS Intermediate Block Signalling
IEEE Institute of Electrical & Electronics Engineers
ISA Independent Safety Assessor
KMRCL Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
LMA Limit of Movement Authority
LSS Last Stop Signal
LTE Long Term Evolution
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MA Movement Authority
MCS Monitor & Control Software
MMI Man Machine Interface
MOR Ministry of Railways
MSO Multiple System Operators
NMS Network Management System
OBCU On Board Controller Unit
PAS Public Address System
PIDS Passenger Information Display System
OCC Operations Control Centre
PD Primary Digital
PSD Platform Screen Door
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
PSR Permanent Speed Restriction
PSC Central Control Panel
RDSO Research Designs & Standards Organisation
RPM Revolutions per minute
RS Rolling Stock
SCR Signal Control Room
SOD Standards of Dimension
SPAD Signal Passed at Danger
SSLD Single Sided Low Density
SSP Static Speed Profile
STM Synchronous Transport Module
STO Semi-Automatic Train Operation
TETRA Terrestrial Trunk Radio
TFTD Thin Film Transistor Display
TMS Train Management System
TOD Train Overview Display or Train Operator’s Display
TRS Tag Reader System
TSR Temporary Speed Restriction
TU Train Unit
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
UTHS Urban Transport & High Speed Directorate
UTO Unattended Train Operation
VOBC Vehicle On Board Controller
Wi-Fi Wireless Fidelity
ZC Zone Controller
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List of Figures
Figure 1: Absolute Block System ............................................................................................................. 2
Figure 2: Intermediate Block Signalling (IBS) System .............................................................................. 3
Figure 3: Automatic Block Signalling (ABS) System ................................................................................ 3
Figure 4: Safety distance or applying Emergency brakes in ABS system ................................................ 4
Figure 5: Artificial separation in ABS System .......................................................................................... 5
Figure 6: Multiple speed profiles in CAB Signalling ................................................................................. 6
Figure 7: Unutilized space in CAB Signalling ........................................................................................... 7
Figure 8:Static Speed Profile of a train.................................................................................................... 8
Figure 9:Dynamic Speed Profile of a train............................................................................................... 8
Figure 10: Block diagram of CBTC System Design ................................................................................. 12
Figure 11: Way Side Radio Unit............................................................................................................. 13
Figure 12 : Tag connected to track for location determination ............................................................ 13
Figure 13: Wayside Zonal Controller ..................................................................................................... 13
Figure 14: Antenna functions ................................................................................................................ 15
Figure 15 :Details of Analog circular display of TOD ............................................................................. 16
Figure16: TOD–Train operators Display -Train Stopped at a Station. No Departure Permitted with
Train & Platform Doors Open................................................................................................................ 16
Figure 17: Target Speed & Target Distance shown on TOD Departure Permitted with Train & Platform
Doors Closed.......................................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 18: Onboard CBTC Equipment .................................................................................................... 17
Figure 19 : Accelerator .......................................................................................................................... 18
Figure 20 : Tachometer ......................................................................................................................... 18
Figure 21 : Service braking curves for trains with different speeds ...................................................... 19
Figure 22 : Fix Block working................................................................................................................. 20
Figure 23 : Moving Block working ......................................................................................................... 20
Figure 24 : Train location determination through Balises or Beacons .................................................. 21
Figure 25 : Basic structure of communication in CBTC ......................................................................... 22
Figure 26 : Onboard components of CBTC ............................................................................................ 23
Figure 27 :Wayside components of CBTC.............................................................................................. 24
Figure 28 : CBTC System ........................................................................................................................ 26
Figure 29 : A Typical CBTC communication arrangement ..................................................................... 29
Figure 30 : A typical plan showing train borne and wayside subsystems of CBTC installation ............ 30
Figure 31 : Graph showing ATP profile for a train ................................................................................ 37
Figure 32: Platform doors closed .......................................................................................................... 40
Figure 33: Platform doors open ............................................................................................................ 40
Figure 34: Red Line Train of Delhi Metro .............................................................................................. 47
Figure 35 :View from inside of Driverless Delhi Metro cab ................................................................... 48
Figure 36 : Inside view of Driverless Delhi Metro cab ........................................................................... 48
Figure 37 : Kolkata East-West Metro Line 2 Route Map ....................................................................... 71
Figure 38: General diagram of CBTC System Architecture & associated interfaces ............................. 74
Figure 39: ZC Cabinet Front view .......................................................................................................... 75
Figure 40: FRONTAM Interfacing Architecture ..................................................................................... 76
Figure 41: Train Operator Display (TOD)............................................................................................... 77
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Figure 42: Operations menu for ATS operations ................................................................................... 77

Figure 43: Schedule Menu Bar for ATS operations................................................................................ 78
Figure 44 : DCS as a medium for CBTC & BBRS ..................................................................................... 79
Figure 45: Onboard CBTC Network ....................................................................................................... 81
Figure 46: Onboard BBRS Network for onboard CCTV interface........................................................... 82
Figure 47: Carborne Controller (CC) General Environment ................................................................... 83
Figure 48: Data Communication System (DCS) Architecture Phase I .................................................... 84
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List of Tables

Table 1: Levels of Automation 31

Table 2 : Typical parameters of CBTC 34
Table 3 : Particulars of some Metros using CBTC technology 45
Table 4 : List of Metros in India using CBTC Technology 46
Table 5 : Delhi Metro lines and routes 46
Table 6 : Comparative of Main line and Metro Railways 50
Table 7: Signalling Systems 67
Table 8:Telecommunication systems 67
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Terms & Definitions

1. Accelerator
The control used by the driver of a locomotive to regulate the speed is sometimes called
the accelerator.

2. Automatic Train Protection (ATP)

Automatic Train Protection (ATP) is a type of train protection system which continually
checks that the speed of a train is compatible with the permitted speed allowed by signalling,
including automatic stop at certain signal aspects. If it is not, ATP activates an emergency
brake to stop the train. In other words it provides Fail safe protection against over speed,
collision & other hazardous conditions through train detection, train separation &
interlocking. The main functions of ATP are:
 Detection and Prevention of SPAD
 Display of signal aspect, movement authority, target distance and speed.
 Continuous train control.
 Protection for Permanent and temporary speed restriction.

3. Automatic Train Operation (ATO)

Automatic train operation (ATO) is an operational safety enhancement device used to
help automate the operation of trains. The degree of automation is indicated by the Grade of
Automation (GoA), up to GoA level 4 (where the train is automatically controlled without
any staff on board). On most systems, there is a driver present to mitigate risks associated
with failures or emergencies. The primary functions performed by ATO are:
 Automatic speed regulation
 Automatic station stopping
 Train and platform door control

4. Automatic Train Supervision (ATS)

Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) is responsible for monitoring and controlling the train
system to ensure that it conforms to an intended schedule and traffic pattern in order to
optimize railway operations and service reliability. ATS helps to avoid or reduce damage
resulting from system abnormalities and equipment malfunctions by performing the
following tasks:
 Supervision of train status,
 Automatic routing selection,
 Adjustment of train operations during failures/unusual incidents
 Automatic schedule creation,
 Automatic operations logging,
 Statistics and report generation,
 Automatic system status monitoring,
 Coordination of personnel scheduling for train management.

5. Automatic Train Control (ATC)

The ATC system ensures the following key safety functions; safe train separation, prevention
of over-speed derailments, fail safe train detection, broken rail detection, interlocking rules
enforcement, hazard response and work zone protection. The overall ATC system is the

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combination of Automatic Train Protection (ATP), Automatic Train Operation (ATO), and
Automatic Train Supervision (ATS).

6. Cab signalling
Cab Signalling is a railway safety system that communicates track status and condition
information to the cab, crew compartment or driver's compartment of
a locomotive, railcar or multiple unit. The information is continually updated giving an easy
to read display to the train driver or engine driver.

7. Data communication equipment

It communicates data, commands, indications and alarms between ATC subsystems and
locations. This consists of connected networks of wireless, fiber optic, and hardwired
electronic equipment.

8. Direction of movement of loco

This is the direction of the train as per Loco cab control e.g. Forward or Reverse or Neutral.

9. Dynamic speed profile

The speed-distance curve which a train shall follow without violating the static train speed
profile till the end of movement authority. This curve depends on the braking characteristics
of the train and the train length.

10. Dwell time

In transportation, dwell time or terminal dwell time refers to the time a vehicle such as a
public transit bus or train spends at a scheduled stop without moving. Dwell time is one
common measure of efficiency in public transport, with shorter dwell times being universally
desirable.

11. Emergency brake

It is fail-safe, open-loop braking to a complete stop, maximum stopping distance is assured,
brake is irreversible. It involes shutting off power and full application of brakes without any
loss of time.

12. Driverless Train Operation, DTO

In Driverless Train operation (DTO) Starting and stopping are automated, but train attendant
operates the doors and drives the train in case of emergencies.

13. Emergency braking distance

Emergency braking distance is the distance travelled by train before coming to a stop by sudden
application of brake at one stretch.

15. Grade of Automation (GoA)

The list of automated train systems is ordered in descending order of the degree of
automation. It uses the Grade of Automation (GoA) classifications specified by the standard
IEC 62290‐1. This list focuses heavily on trains in the classical sense used for large-scale
railways for passengers and freight :

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Grade of
Train operation Description
automation
GoA 0 On-sight Similar to a tram running in street traffic
A train driver controls starting and stopping, operation of
GoA 1 Manual
doors and handling of emergencies or sudden diversions.
Starting and stopping are automated, but a driver operates
Semi-automatic
GoA 2 the doors, drives the train if needed and handles
(STO)
emergencies. Many ATO systems are GoA 2.
Starting and stopping are automated, but a train attendant
GoA 3 Driverless (DTO) operates the doors and drives the train in case of
emergencies.
Starting and stopping, operation of doors and handling of
Unattended train
GoA 4 emergencies are all fully automated without any on-train
operation (UTO)
staff. All stations must have platform screen doors.

16. Headway
Headway is the distance between vehicles in a transit system measured in time. The precise
definition varies depending on the application, but for railways or mass transit system it is
most commonly measured as the time taken from the tip (front end) of one vehicle to the tip
of the next one behind it. A "shorter" headway signifies closer spacing between the vehicles.

17. Mass Transit System

Mass transit system refers to public shared transportation, such as trains, buses, ferries etc
that can commute a larger number of passengers from origin to destination on a no-reserved
basis and in lesser time. It can also be termed as Public Transport.

18. Movement Authority

The distance upto which the train is permitted to travel without danger.

19. Moving Block Signalling

In railway signalling, a moving block is a signalling block system where the blocks are
defined in real time by computers as safe zones around each train. This requires both
knowledge of the exact location and speed of all trains at any given time, and continual
communication between the central signalling system and the train's cab signalling system.
Moving block allows trains to run closer together, while maintaining required safety margins,
thereby increasing the line's overall capacity.

20. On-board Equipment

This subsystem consists of a combination of vital and non-vital equipment located on the
passenger train-sets and maintenance vehicles. Vital equipment is used to fulfil the ATP
functions; non vital equipment is used to fulfil all non ATP functions such as ATO and
displays. The equipment includes processors, firmware, software and electronics, operator
displays, operator panel, data radios and antennas, transponder/balise antennas, code pick-up
antennas, network components, GPS receiver and antennas, tachometers and other sensors.

21. Permanent Speed Restriction (PSR)

For various reasons, although mainly because of track geometry (curvature, etc.), it is
necessary to limit the speed at which trains may travel over certain sections of the railway.

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These places are subject to what are termed 'permanent speed restrictions' (PSRs). In some
instances, different speeds are specified for specific types of trains.

22. Semi-automatic Operation Mode (STO)

In STO mode, Starting and stopping are automated, but a driver operates the doors, drives the
train if needed and handles emergencies.

23. Service brake

Service brake is a non-emergency brake application–which is reversible. It involves only the
shutting off the power and the gradual application of brakes.

24. Service braking distance

It is the distance required to stop the train running at the maximum permissible speed of the
line, at such a rate of deceleration that the passengers do not suffer discomfort or alarm.

25. SPAD
SPAD stands for 'Signal Passed at Danger' and occurs when a train passes a signal in the 'on'
(Red) position without authority.

26. Static speed profile

The Static Speed Profile (SSP) is a description of the fixed speed restrictions at a resolution
of 5 Kmph for a part of track sent from trackside to train.

27. Tachometer
A tachometer is an instrument measuring the rotation speed of a shaft or disk, as in a motor
or other machine. The device usually displays the revolutions per minute (RPM) on a
calibrated analogue dial or digital display.

28. Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR)

The object of a TSR is to reduce the speed of Rail Traffic to ensure safe passage over a
Section of Track when the Track is not safe for Normal Speed. A TSR is applied by a
Maintenance Representative of concerned department such as Engg. or S&T. A TSR
overrides any existing higher speed.

29. Transponder Tags or Beacons

Transponder tags or beacons are the devices installed along the track to provide coarse
position of the vehicle in a section.

22. UTO mode

In Unattended train operation (UTO) mode, the starting and stopping, operation of doors and
handling of emergencies are all fully automated without any on-train staff. Train movement is
regulated by the Operations Control Centres (OCC) and not by manual train operators.

23. Wayside Equipment

This equipment consists of mainly vital equipment located in housings/location box/Relay
huts along the right of way (track) including station equipment rooms, train control
equipment houses, and signal equipment cases and cabinets.

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Chapter I
Control over movement of trains
1.1 Introduction
There are broadly two types of controls which were conceptualized:

(i) Time interval method

In this method the trains running in the same direction will be dispatched at a fixed time
interval in succession. The spacing should be such that if a train stops, then, the following
train driver can stop short of the preceding train. Thus by having a time interval between
trains, a certain amount of control can be achieved. But it is not practicable due to following
drawbacks:

(a) Different types of trains like, Express/Mail, passenger, high-speed freight and low speed
freight shunting trains are running etc.
(b) The speed of all the trains are not same
(c) The terrain of the country is not same everywhere
(d) The brake power, hauling capacity, load of train is not same for all trains; and
(e) The stopping places of all trains are not the same.

Hence, it is not possible to control the movement of trains under the "Time interval
method". A better method of control is called the "Space Interval Method" is adopted.

(ii) Space interval method

In this method the length of track is divided into sections called "Blocks". The entry of a train
into the ‘block’ is controlled in such a way that only when it is free, a train can be allowed to
enter it. This means that between two consecutive trains, there is a definite space interval. To
control the entry of train into the space interval or block a track side "Signal" is required. The
signals are provided at entry and exit points of the block. So, with the two controlling points
and intercommunication, it is possible to control the entry of a train into a block only when it
is vacant.

1.2 Conventional methods of train control

Under space interval method, for safe running of trains, different methods are adopted to
control the train movement between two given points, say between two stations, mainly to
ensure that no more than one train is permitted in to the block section at a time. There are
following systems of train working which are mainly adopted over Indian Railways:

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1.2.1 Absolute Block System

 This is the most widely used system on Indian Railways.
 The space between two stations is termed as block section. (typically 6 km or more)
 Entry into the block section is controlled through human agencies in the form of station
masters at two stations.
 Train is allowed to leave a station only when block section is free of any train and line
clear is obtained from station in advance.
 Conditions for line clear are:
(i). On double line, the line must be clear upto First Stop Signal (FSS) plus an adequate
distance known as Block Overlap (BO).

(ii). On single line, the line must be clear of trains running in the same direction upto First
Stop Signal (FSS) plus an adequate distance or Block Overlap (BO), and is clear of
trains running in opposite direction.

 If we assume the system of working to be multiple aspect colour light signalling, the
adequate distance or Block Overlap (BO) is taken as 180 metres.

Figure 1: Absolute Block System

Limitations of Absolute Block System

Although there is space for more trains in the block section, only one train can be dealt in
each direction at a time
.
Where the Absolute Block Section is long (say 12 -14 km) and frequency of trains is more, a
system known as Intermediate Block Signalling (IBS) system is provided.

1.2.2 Intermediate Block Signalling (IBS) System

IBS is an arrangement made on a Double Line Section for increasing the Section Capacity by
splitting of a long Block Section into two Sections namely ‘Rear Section’ and ‘Advance
Section’ by installing an IB Signal at the point of bifurcation of that running Line with
respect to the nominated direction of traffic.

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Figure 2: Intermediate Block Signalling (IBS) System

Limitations of IBS system

Maximum two Trains can be dealt on a lengthy Double Line Block section on each
nominated running line by adopting IBS system.

A more better system in which more than two trains can be dealt is called Automatic Block
System.

1.2.3 Automatic Block Signalling (ABS) System

 In this system the line between two stations is provided with Continuous Track Circuits
or Axle Counters.

 The line between two stations is divided into a series of sections known as "Automatic
Block Signalling Section".

 The length of these Automatic Block Signalling sections is normally equal to the braking
distance as per the maximum speed permitted in the section.

 Entry into each automatic block signalling section is protected by a colour light Multiple
Aspect Stop Signal.

Figure 3: Automatic Block Signalling (ABS) System

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Above Figure 3 illustrates the working of Automatic Block System.

Track Circuits or Axle Counters should control the aspects of the Signal such that:

 It cannot display the `OFF' aspect unless the line is clear not only upto the next stop
signal but also for an adequate distance beyond it. The adequate distance referred above
is termed as overlap and shall not be less than 120 meters.
 For Signal 1 to assume Yellow - line must be clear for one block and one overlap.

 For Signal 1 to assume Green- line must be clear for two blocks and one overlap.

In other words, minimum one block and overlap must be clear for allowing a train into the
block section.

Limitations of ABS System

Although in Automatic Block Signalling System there is better utilization of section capacity
as compared to the earlier two systems as more trains can be dealt, but full capacity
utilization is still not done as shown in the following Figures.

Figure 4: Safety distance or applying Emergency brakes in ABS system

From the above Fig.No.4 it can be seen that, with Train B occupying Block 3, if Train A
passes Signal No.2 at danger travelling at 100 Kmph and if it requires 1 Km to stop by
applying emergency brakes, the block separating Train A from Train B must be at least 1 Km
long to satisfy the safety requirement.

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Figure 5: Artificial separation in ABS System

Assuming each block section of 1 Km length, From Fig. above it can be seen that as Train B
clears overlap distance beyond Signal 3, Train A will be granted a permissive aspect of
Signal No.2. But even if Train B moves further towards Signal No. 4, Train A cannot be
granted permissive aspect of Signal No.3 until Train B clears overlap distance beyond Signal
No. 4.

Instead, an artificial separation is created between Train A and B, even though Train A can move
closer at slow speed and still maintain a safe braking distance. As Train B moves further within
block 3, the artificial separation grows.

To summarize we can say that:

 The trains can be closer together, but the fixed blocks prevent Train A from moving.
 If a train is travelling at lower speed say 60 Kmph, it must adhere to the block separation
designed for a particular speed say 100 Kmph.
 Due to static design, the signalling system cannot adjust the safety distance to the speed of the
trains.
 For a high traffic density section, number of trains that can pass through the system is not
optimal.

Another system of fixed block signalling is CAB Signalling which is explained below:

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1.2.4 Cab Signalling

This is an enhanced fixed block signalling system. In this system:

 Trackside signals are usually not used.

 Track circuits are used to determine the location of the train.
 The speed and distance to go are displayed on the Train Overview Display (TOD) inside
the cab and enforced by the on board Automatic Train Protection (ATP).
 CAB signalling allows for multiple speed profiles within the same block, which means it
has the capability to allow a train to move at multiple speeds within a block.
 CAB signalling does not alter the fixed block/conventional signalling concept.
 The driver will receive an indication on the Train Overview Display (TOD) when there is
a speed transition.
 Allows the train to travel at higher speeds with smaller blocks.
 Reduces the headway between trains, increasing the capacity.

Figure 6: Multiple speed profiles in CAB Signalling

Limitations of CAB Signalling

CAB signalling allows for smaller blocks, and therefore a marginal increase in capacity but it
has similar limitations as that of previously discussed signalling systems as shown in Figure
7 below.

There is an artificial separation as train 9 moves away from signal C.

Train 8 will not be given a permissive aspect until train 9 has exited block 3.

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Figure 7: Unutilized space in CAB Signalling

1.2.5 Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) System

In this system, Centralized Operation of Signalling Systems for a large section encompassing
multiple interlocked stations and Real time Monitoring of Train Traffic is possible.
CTC operator of particular territory can operate all the signals, points, routes of any station of
his territory from CTC.

Limitations of CTC System

This system is particularly suitable on single line section where the pattern of traffic is such
that trains follow one another in quick succession during certain parts of the day.

1.3 Need for a train control system utilizing maximum track space
From the preceding sections it is obvious that the block length determines:

 Safety i.e. how far apart the trains will be kept from each other
 Capacity i.e how many trains can pass through the system
 Capacity is affected by the separation between trains.
 Each signaling system has it’s own characteristic that affects train separation.
 In conventional systems mentioned above, the block design is based on the line speed i.e.
single speed profile.
 The block design does not allow for multiple speed profiles within the same block.
 The track is not utilized to it maximum capacity.
 It can be seen in the earlier mentioned systems that Static speed profile cannot adjust
safety distance as per different train speeds.

 Increasing the block size increases the margin for safety but reduces capacity.

 Reducing the block size decreases the margin for safety but increases capacity

Challenge for signal engineers is to calculate the block length for maximum capacity while
ensuring safety.

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Figure 8:Static Speed Profile of a train

There is requirement of a system based on continues real-time update of signal aspect or

‘Movement Authority (MA)’ which suits to the requirements of operations in countries like
India.

With study of dynamic speed profile and braking characteristics of trains in the section and
use of communication technology a system is developed in which it is able to stop the train
before signal at Red itself, at the same time reducing the headway between successive trains.

Figure 9:Dynamic Speed Profile of a train

An introduction to one such system known as Communication Based Train Control (CBTC) is given
in next chapter.

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Chapter II
Communications Based Train Control
(CBTC)-A moving Block Signalling concept
2.1 Introduction
Communications-based train control (CBTC) is a railway signalling system that makes
use of the telecommunications between the train and track equipment for the traffic
management and infrastructure control. By means of the CBTC systems, the exact position of
a train is known more accurately than with the traditional signalling systems. This results in a
more efficient and safe way to manage the railway traffic. Metros (and other railway systems)
are able to improve headways while maintaining or even improving safety.

A CBTC system is a "continuous, automatic train control (ATC) system utilizing high-
resolution train location determination, independent from track circuits; continuous, high-
capacity, bidirectional train-to-wayside data communications; and train borne and
wayside processors capable of implementing automatic train protection (ATP) functions,
as well as optional automatic train operation (ATO) and automatic train supervision
(ATS) functions," as defined in the IEEE 1474 standard. Based on operational needs CBTC
can be categorized:.
 Only ATP functions without ATO or ATS.
 ATP and partial ATO and / or ATS functions.
 CBTC can be only train control system or may be used in conjunction with other
auxiliary wayside systems.

In the modern CBTC systems the trains continuously calculate and communicate their status
via radio to the wayside equipment distributed along the line. This status includes, among
other parameters, the exact position, speed, travel direction and braking distance. This
information allows calculation of the area potentially occupied by the train on the track. It
also enables the wayside equipment to define the points on the line that must never be passed
by the other trains on the same track. These points are communicated to make the trains
automatically and continuously adjust their speed while maintaining the safety and comfort
(jerk) requirements. So, the trains continuously receive information regarding the distance to
the preceding train and are then able to adjust their safety distance accordingly.

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Key features of CBTC

 Trackside signals are not used.
 Track circuits are not used.
 Higher precision in Train location determination - independent of track circuits
 Continuous data communication between train & wayside.
 Position is determined by a two way communication between the wayside and train:
 Train transmits its position.
 Wayside transmits a target point.
 The separation between two trains is not enforced by physical track circuit blocks, but a
dynamic calculation by following train.

 There is no artificial separation between trains, only the bare minimum separation
required to maintain the safety distance between trains.

 Safety distance is no longer a static entity enforced by fixed blocks but an adjustable
distance based on a real time calculation of the train speed.
 If the train is travelling at a high speed the safety distance is long and shrinks as the train
slows.

 Unlike Conventional signalling system where block length is fixed, CBTC works on
Moving Block concept in which the block length is continuously adjusted as per the
changing speed of preceding train.

 Implements continuous Automatic Train Protection (ATP), Automatic Train Operation

(ATO) & Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) with wayside & train-borne processors by
processing train status & control data.

 CBTC signalling extracts the maximum capacity per track design.

 The maximum number of trains can run through the system.

Processes of operation
CBTC works in following stages:

 High precision train location detection without track circuits, by train-borne system.
 Transmission of train location & other train status data to wayside
controller/equipment.
 Wayside controller generates limit of Movement Authority (MA).
 Transmission of MA to train-borne system.
 Determination and enforcement of ATP profile by train-borne equipment
 Implementation of MA by train-borne system.

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 Communication of commands from wayside to external interlocking and status from

external interlocking to wayside.
 Communicating data from one wayside controller to other wayside controller.
 Communication between multiple sets of train-borne equipment within a train.

Benefits of CBTC
(1). CBTC makes effective use of infrastructure in following ways:
 Allows trains at closer headways.
 Greater precision and control of trains is possible.
 Provides continuous safe train separation & over speed protection.
 Utilizes the track in the most efficient manner while ensuring safety.

(2). CBTC requires less maintenance cost due to:

 Driverless system (or upgradable to driverless) to reduce operating costs;
 Less wayside equipment
 Improved reliability
 Real time diagnostic data

2.2 CBTC System Design

As per IEEE 1474.3, CBTC System consists of four major sub-systems:

1. ATS equipment
2. Wayside equipment
3. Train-borne equipment
4. Data communication equipment
The block diagram of CBTC System is given on next page

(1) ATS equipment

 ATS equipment is installed at central location & wayside.

 It shall perform the functions of identifying, tracking & displaying trains.
 It provides manual & auto route setting capabilities.
 It regulates train movements to maintain operating schedule.

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Figure 10: Block diagram of CBTC System Design

(2) Wayside equipment

 It consists of network of processor based wayside controllers installed at central/wayside
locations.
 Interfaces with train-borne equipment, external interlockings & ATS equipment.
 It shall perform MA setting based on tracking of CBTC/ non-CBTC trains.
 ATP, ATO & ATS functions reside in Wayside equipment.
 It includes track based equipment necessary to provide unique absolute positioning
reference to train-borne equipment such as balise.

Balise
The ground-based balise is a passive device that is energized by a passing train, and then
communicates with the BTM (Balise transmission module) attached on the train via
telegram messages to update the train of its location. Balises are installed along the track at
suitable locations and are used to obtain absolute position of vehicles, along a guideway.

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Way side Radio Unit (WRU)

The WRUs are interconnected in a ring topology and this
ring is coupled to the un-trusted backbone ring via inter-
ring switches that run a ring coupling redundancy protocol.
The layout is designed to provide overlap between WRUs
in terms of coverage, such that the failure of a single radio
does not cause any degradation in performance. WRUs are
strategically placed at certain intervals, so that at any point
on the guideway the MRUs ar capable of communicating
with at least two WRUs. This design ensures that full
coverage is maintained even in such cases as failure of
every alternate WRU, failure of an optic fiber cable and
failure of power supply.
Figure 11: Way Side
Radio Unit

Figure 12 : Tag connected to track for

location determination
Figure 13: Wayside Zonal
Controller

Zone Controller
The wayside zone Controller receives information from onboard controller installed on the
vehicle, determines a train location map (location of all trains on the line) and sends a
Movement Authority Limit (MAL) to each train. The total number of ZCs depends on the
configuration of the line and the number of trains subject to their supervision.

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(3) Train-borne equipment

The train borne equipment interfaces to train sub-systems, wayside equipment & ATS
equipment. It is responsible for CBTC train location determination, enforcement of speed &
MA limits, other train-borne ATP & ATO functions.

It consists of following modules:

(i). Vehicle On Board Controller (VOBC)

(ii). Mobile Radio Unit (MRU)
(iii). Antennas
(iv). Train Operator Display (TOD)
(v). Associated speed measurement & location determination sensors:
 Transponder Interrogator Unit (TIU)
 Proximity Sensor
 Speed Sensors
 Accelerometers

On Board Controller (OBC)

It consists of processor-based controller known as On Board Controller (OBC). Each train
consists of 2 OBCs installed one at each end, in a hot standby configuration ensuring high
level of availability. It is the core on-board component of the vital train control. Allows
driverless train operation by implementing Automatic Train Protection (ATP) and Automatic
Train Operation (ATO) functionality including safe train automatic or manually driven
movement, driverless turn back and accurate station stopping, Automatic door operation and
protection. In its operation, the OBC uses transponder tags (which provide train relocation
reference), which are installed along the running tracks

Mobile Radio Unit (MRU)

The Mobile radio Unit is a CBTC component used to provide an interface from OBC to the
ZC and the ATS. There is one MRU located at each end of the train. Each unit is individually
addressable on the network. The MRU consists of Mobile Radio, Network Switch and
Security Device. MRUs are installed at both ends of the train to maintain communication
with the wayside. In case of failure of one of the radios or loss of radio signal to a Way Side
Radio unit at one of the train, the system is fully functional by maintaining communication
with a way side using one radio unit.

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Antennas
On board high-gain patch antennas look outwards from the front and rear of the vehicle and
receive from only that section of the guideway directly ahead of, or directly behind, the train.
Two such antennas are used at each end (i.e. four such antennas per vehicle) in order to
provide propagation path diversity at that end. The MRU at each end determines which
antenna of the two is providing best link at any time.

Figure 14: Antenna functions

Train Operator Display (TOD)

The primary function of the TOD is to allow the train operator to read the status of various
CBTC subsystems and other information such as
 Distance to the next stopping point
 Maximum Permitted Speed
 Actual speed
 New Target speed.
 Door status
 Door control mode information
 Train operating mode information
 Fault information (For example, Train loses position, “Closed & Locked” status of the
doors unavailable; Train loses communication with the ATS or ZC etc.)
There is one TOD installed in each cab of the train.

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Figure16: TOD–Train
operators Display -Train
Stopped at a Station. No
Departure Permitted with
Train & Platform Doors
Open

Figure 17: Target Speed &

Target Distance shown on
TOD Departure Permitted
with Train & Platform
Doors Closed

Figure 15 :Details of Analog

circular display of TOD

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Transponder Interrogator Unit (TIU)

There is one TIU per OBC unit.
The TIU is used to read transponders located along the track and provide the system with
information used to determine the position of trains in the system. This TIU system consists
of four fundamental components:
Interrogator, RF Module, Antenna & Transponder

Speed Sensors
There are two speed sensors per OBC unit and both are required for operation. Each speed
sensor channel generates two output streams which are out of phase by 90 degrees. The two
output steams provide the number of pulses per wheel revolution. The frequency of the pulses
is proportional to the angular speed of the train wheels. Output from the speed sensor channel
is used as input to Peripheral Processor Units within the OBC for detection of zero velocity,
and determination of train speed, travelled distance and travel direction.

Proximity Sensors
One proximity sensor is provided per OBC unit. The proximity sensor is used to detect the
wayside installed proximity plate. The proximity sensor provides positive confirmation to
OBC that the train is properly aligned at a station, pseudo station, storage lane.

Accelerometers
There are two accelerometers per OBC unit and both are required for operation. As the
accelerometers are mounted on the car body, the accelerometer indicators are used to measure
the acceleration in conjunction with speed sensors to measure train speed and travelled
distance.

Figure 18: Onboard CBTC Equipment

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Figure 19 : Accelerator

Figure 20 : Tachometer

(4) Data communication equipment

The Data Communications System (DCS) is a broadband communication system that
provides bi-directional, reliable and secured exchange of vital data from on-board controller
to wayside. It is located at central, wayside location & on-board trains. It shall perform bi-
directional data communication & intra train communication. It shall not perform any non
vital CBTC functions.

2.3 Control of train movement through CBTC

In the following paragraphs the details about the working of a CBTC system are explained
like concept of moving block, means for determination of exact location of train and how
communication among various subsystems is established for control of train movement.

2.3.1 Moving Block Principle

The CBTC system uses the moving block principle in which the safe separation behind the
preceding train is dynamically calculated based on the maximum operating speeds, braking
curves and locations of trains on the alignment. Because of the high resolution of position
reporting, a following train may safely close up within a safe braking distance from the last
verified position of the rear of a preceding train, based on the present actual speed. The safety

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distance moves with the train, hence the name moving block. The graph shown below shows
braking curves of three different trains when service brakes are applied according to their
respective speeds and location of preceding train :

Figure 21 : Service braking curves for trains with different speeds

The reduced train separation, safe braking distance and greater capacity (throughput and
inter- station run times) are accomplished in a moving block system by using data
communication with an on-board controller (i.e. not using wayside signal protection). The
safe braking distance is a distance between the commanded stopping point of the following
train and the confirmed position of the rear of the preceding train. This distance is selected to
allow for a series of worst case conditions to exist and still ensure that safe separation is
maintained.

Vital supervision of safe train separation is implemented by providing information on the

maximum allowable train speed and the current stopping point to the on-board subsystem.
The communication is updated cyclically to ensure that continuous updates are available to
the train. The train therefore can safely within the envelope defined by the maximum
commanded velocity, the confirmed stopping point, the braking curve and track grading.

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Figure 22 : Fix Block working

Figure 23 : Moving Block working

Figure 22 shows the total occupancy of the leading Train 1 in a fix block system by including
the whole Block 1 on which the train is located (This is shown by blue line). This is due to
the fact that it is impossible for the system to know exactly where the train actually is within
Block 1. Therefore, the fixed block system only allows the following Train 2 to move up to
the last unoccupied border of Block 2.
In a moving block system as shown in Figure 23, the train position and its braking curve is
continuously calculated by the trains, and then communicated via radio to the wayside
equipment. Thus, the wayside equipment is able to establish protected areas, each one called
Movement Authority (MA), up to the nearest obstacle (in the figure the rear of the Train 1).

2.3.2 Determination of train location in CBTC

The main feature which differentiates a CBTC system from conventional signalling is the
ability to determine the location of a train independent of track circuits. Typically this is done
using balises or beacons installed along the track. The balises/beacons provide the train borne
unit with a course position. The tachometers installed on the axles provide the fine position.

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Figure 24 : Train location determination through Balises or Beacons

From Figure 24 above, as the train crosses balise/beacon B, the train borne unit is aware that
it is located at the 200 meter mark (coarse position). As the train moves away, the
tachometers will count how far the train has moved (fine position). Taking the coarse and fine
position together, the train borne unit will be able to determine that the centre of the train is
located 247.5m away from the zero reference point. This is a simplified description (for
illustration purposes) of how a CBTC system determines the location of a train.

2.3.3 Communication arrangements in CBTC

(i) Basic structure of communication
Once the train is able to accurately determine its location, this information must be relayed to
the wayside unit in a timely fashion. In CBTC system, access points are installed along the
track. As the train comes within range of an access point, the train borne radio will lock onto
its signal and disconnect from the previous access point.

The basic structure of the existing CBTC system is shown in Figure 25. It mainly includes
Data Communication system (DCS), Automatic Train Supervision (ATS) system, Computer
based Interlocking (CI), Zone Controller (ZC), and processor based On-Board
Controller/Computer (OBC). CBTC uses a combination of Wireless communication and
trackside backbone network (using fibre optic cables) for two way communication among
Way-side, OBC and ZC. During the train operation, ATS issues train-related driving plans to
ZC through the backbone network. Then, the ZC establishes a movement authority (MA)
based on the position report of all the travelling trains and the condition of the trackside
controller and then transmits the MA to each train. The OBC on each train controls the
operation of the train based on the received MA.

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Figure 25 : Basic structure of communication in CBTC

(ii) Types of Communication networks in CBTC

CBTC communication network consists of the following three integrated networks:
(a). Train onboard network (Intra-Train)
(b). Train-to-trackside radio network
(c). Trackside backbone network (Way-side to way-side)
The train onboard network and the trackside backbone network use Ethernet, while the train-
to-trackside radio network generally uses Wi-Fi.

(iii) Components used in communication

Following are the major components of a CBTC system which take part in two way
communication network that connect the train and the way side.
(A) Onboard components
These comprise the following components:
(a) Vehicle On-Board Controller/Computer (OBC)
The onboard equipment includes On-Board Controller/Computer (OBC), sometimes also
called Car-borne Controller or Onboard Control Unit (OBCU). This system is
responsible for sending train control information to the wayside on periodic basis. It
either includes, or works together with, the onboard ATP and ATO subsystems.

(b) Onboard ATP and ATO

The ATP and ATO subsystems are part of the onboard ATC functionality. ATP controls
safety-related functions and ATO controls the actual train.

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Figure 26 : Onboard components of CBTC

(c) Data Communication System (DCS)

Another critical onboard component is Data Communication System (DCS). DCS is
typically a combination of software and hardware, including radios and antennas, and is
responsible for the radio communication between the train and the wayside. DCS can
either be a completely independent system or integrated into OBC. If independent, the
computer system running DCS is also frequently referred to as a Train Unit (TU).

(B) Wayside components

Figure 27 illustrates typical wayside components of a CBTC system. A Zone Controller
(ZC), or Wayside Controller, is responsible for controlling a particular zone in the
railway network. Dividing the wayside network into multiple, independent zones, such
that each zone comprises its own wayside infrastructure, improves availability even if
one or more zones experience failures. The fundamental function of a ZC is to maintain
safe train separation in its zone. A ZC also typically includes the wayside ATP and ATO
subsystems.

The ATP subsystem of a ZC manages all the communication with the trains in its zone. It
is also this subsystem that calculates the movement authority for every train in its zone.
A Computer-based Interlocking (CI) system is either included as an independent system
or as a part of the ATP subsystem. CI controls the trackside equipment such as point
machines and signals, and is responsible for setting routes for trains. The ATO
subsystem provides all the trains in its zone with their destination as well as dwell times .
Independent from the ZC is the automatic train supervision (ATS) system, which is
responsible for monitoring and scheduling the traffic through ATS Control Centre.

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(C) Trackside components

Trackside generally contains the components located either on or close to the tracks, and
is considered a part of the wayside. Trackside is divided into multiple Wi-Fi cells, each
served by one Access Point (AP). Figure 27 uses the green and red colours to
differentiate the APs’ radio coverage areas.

Figure 27 :Wayside components of CBTC

APs are either deployed on one side of the track or both, in alternating fashion. Trains
communicate to the APs through a radio connection. This constitutes a typical CBTC
train-to-trackside radio network. APs are in turn connected to the wayside components
through the trackside backbone network.

(iv) The role of radio communication in CBTC

Radio communication is generally unreliable. Designing a reliable train control system over
an unreliable radio link is a challenging task. In conventional signalling systems, the distance
between trains following each other is large, as seen in Figure 22. Thus a certain number of
communication errors for communication technologies used in conventional systems can be
tolerated. However, in CBTC, headways are very short, which means in the event of a
communication failure, a train may not receive the location of the train in front of it in time.
In this situation, a typical approach in CBTC systems is to apply emergency brakes and then
drive it in manual mode. In the worst case, this could trigger a chain-reaction with all the
following trains stopping. The timeout interval before emergency brakes are applied varies
from project to project, depending on multiple factors, including the frequency of CBTC

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control messages. Compared to the conventional train control systems, in CBTC, the
responsibility of determining a train’s location has been moved from the track circuit to the
train itself. This train-centric location determination results in lower certainty. Previously, the
train location was determined by the wayside (with the help of a track circuit), independent of
the train. The fail-safe design of track circuits meant a failure was interpreted as a train
presence. However, in CBTC, the wayside depends on the train to get the location
information, which in turn depends on the radio communication. The failure of the radio
communication link, therefore, is highly critical for a functional CBTC system. Radio
communication failures lead to transmission errors and a large handover latency, resulting in
packet delays and losses

For these reasons, CBTC systems normally allocate a fixed "protection margin" in the
calculation of their safe braking distance. Additionally, CBTC systems normally employ a
conventional train detection method as a fallback, for location determination in the event of a
radio communication failure, as well as for non-CBTC trains operating concurrently with
CBTC trains .This is also a requirement of the IEEE CBTC standard.

Alternative radio communication technologies

As discussed above, the modern CBTC systems use continuous and high capacity radio
communication between the train and the wayside infrastructure to transmit train control
information. The high resolution and highly accurate train location enables the "moving
block" operation. The result is short headways and increased line capacity. A typical headway
in CBTC systems is of the order of 90 seconds. Furthermore, it enables advanced features
such as driverless and unattended train operations.
LTE has recently been in focus as an alternative technology for CBTC. The high capacity and
large coverage it offers, as well as its potentially long life span, makes it a worthwhile
alternative to Wi-Fi for CBTC. LTE’s high capacity ensures it can support additional
features such as voice communication, passenger Internet, live CCTV video streaming, and
Passenger Information Systems.

Use of Leaky waveguide in tunnels

A leaky waveguide is a coaxial cable with periodic openings in its shielding to allow radio
signals leak out or in, thus acting as a continuous antenna. Leaky waveguide is also known as
leaky feeder, leaky cable, or radiating cable. A leaky feeder communication system consists
of a cable run along tunnels which emits and receives radio waves, functioning as an

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extended antenna. The leaky feeder system is used for underground mobile communication
in mass transit railways.

2.3.4 Train Operation under CBTC

On a section equipped with CBTC, the line is usually divided into areas or regions, each area
under the control of a Zone Controller (computer) and each with its own radio transmission
system.
The primary train detection is provided by the continuous vehicle position reporting via
bidirectional radio link between train and the zone controller. The transponder tags or
beacons installed along the track along with the tachometers installed on the axles determine
the location of a train. The Onboard Controller (OBC) equipment uses information from the
transponder receiver and tacho-generator to calculate its own location and transmits this via
its Mobile Radio Unit (MRU) to the trackside Zone Controller (ZC). Each train transmits its
identity, location, direction and speed to the Way Side Radio Unit (WRU) installed near
track and connected to the Zone Controller (ZC) through backbone network (OFC). The ZC
unit uses the received information to generate train control information that is sent back to the
onboard ATC equipment of the following train via the same route. The trains then use this
control information received from the central system about the route status, the type of the
route set, and the train location information, to determine how far they are able to travel, what
is known as the “limit of movement authority” (LMA). The LMA is calculated based on the
important information like, Gradient profile, Train door response information and Rolling
stock parameters etc. The trains then operate in accordance with this information.

Figure 28 : CBTC System

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The Train will share the location of train via WRUs with Zone controller and control the
speed with respect to movement authority.

Onboard system continuously checks that the speed of a train is compatible with the
permitted speed allowed by signalling, including automatic stop at certain signal aspects. If it
is not, ATP activates an emergency brake to stop the train.

The Operation Control Centre (OCC) supervises the overall train running and provides
automatic train supervision (ATS) functions. Trains are given a line assignment by OCC
under operating time table. Each line assignment defines a train’s station stopping points,
terminal stations and routes to be followed. Each route is composed of a sequence of point
settings for a train to reach its destination.

2.3.5 Interlocking as fallback system

Interlocking system is the part of CBTC system to control the wayside equipment and,
maintain the interlocking principle for train operation. When needed as an independent
subsystem (for instance as a fallback system), the signal interlocking will be in charge of the
vital control of the trackside gears such as points or signals, as well as other related
functionality. A fallback system takes over some or all of the signalling functions if there is a
problem with the CBTC system, or if it is necessary to handle an unequipped (non-CBTC)
train.
There are two possible approaches to fallback when it is applied to a CBTC system:

Without separate interlocking

When train loses communication with Zone controller, the latest data is retained by onboard
computer of following train. The onboard computer increases the buffer zone for the failed
train compared to the movement while it is communicating with ZC to ensure safe breaking
and stopping of train.
Secondary train detection with separate interlocking
To provide a fallback signalling system in case there is a failure of the CBTC Zone
Controller, the CBTC system is provided with a separate fixed block interlocking. Trains can
then continue to operate under traditional block signalling, although the line will have much
diminished capacity in most cases. This model comprises a secondary train detection system
(as above, using axle counters or track circuits), line side signals and separate interlocking.

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Figure 29 : A Typical CBTC communication arrangement

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Figure 30 : A typical plan showing train borne and wayside subsystems of CBTC installation

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2.4 Train Operating Modes

(i) Modes of operation as per grades of automation
Table 1: Levels of Automation
Grades of Train Operation Starting Stopping Door Closure Operation in
automation Train Train event of
Disruption
GoA1 ATP with Driver Driver Driver Driver Driver
GoA2 ATP & ATO Automatic Automatic Driver Driver
with Driver
GoA3 Driver-less Automatic Automatic Train Attendant Train Attendant
GoA4 UTO Automatic Automatic Automatic Automatic

(ii) Normal train operating modes in CBTC territory

For CBTC equipped trains - Normal working with full protection of ATP.

For Non-CBTC-equipped trains - Under protection of auxiliary wayside system or operating

procedures.

(iii) Failure mode train operation in CBTC territory

CBTC shall continue to provide ATP in case of failure through
 Functional elements of CBTC or
 An auxiliary wayside system or
 Combination of both

(a) If trains are affected in one area of control

For example, failure of data communication or wayside equipment –trains can be run with
train operator, and
 With protection of auxiliary wayside system or
 Through adherence of operating procedure or
 Combination of both.
ATP functions of Train borne CBTC equipment shall continue to function.

(b) If one train is affected in any area of control

For example, Train borne CBTC equipment failure –train can be run with train operator, and

 With protection of auxiliary wayside system or

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 With train speed limited by propulsion system or

 Through adherence of operating procedure or
 Combination of all the above
ATP functions of Train borne CBTC & wayside CBTC equipment shall continue to
function.
(iv) CBTC train operating modes in non-CBTC territory
 Train borne equipment shall cater for transition into CBTC territory.

 CBTC equipment may perform ATP functions like –limiting train speed and / or providing
zero speed detection.

 CBTC of the train borne equipment can be integrated with local system of non CBTC
territory –but it shall be indicated separately

(v) Failure mode train operations in non-CBTC territory

 It has minimal impact
 Failure may be indicated to train operator
(vi) Entering / exiting CBTC territory
(a) Entering into CBTC territory
 CBTC system shall decide the limits of CBTC zone based on its primary detection. It shall
perform verification checks by reading tags before entering CBTC territory.

 There is no need to stop while entering the territory.

 Failure results are to be displayed to ATS operator & train operator.

(b) Exiting CBTC territory

 CBTC system may provide visual indication to train operator for time and/or distance until
train exits CBTC territory.

 There is no need to stop while entering the territory.

If CBTC knows the new control system, it may display the same.

(vii) Train configurations

CBTC is Capable of supporting a variety of train configurations:
 Fixed length unidirectional trains –one or more units
 Fixed length bidirectional trains –one or more units
 Variable length unidirectional trains
 Variable length bidirectional trains
Note: CBTC–Shall support mixed fleet of trains, with different performance characteristics

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2.5 Performance requirements of CBTC as per IEEE 1474.1

There are two types of headways

Un-interfered: All trains are allowed to move at maximum permitted speed. It provides
minimum trip time for given set of station occupation times.

Interfered: Train speed profile is affected by train ahead. Headways may be reduced at the
cost of increased trip time.

(i) Design headways outside the control of CBTC

1. Track alignment & gradients
2. Civil speed limits
3. Train acceleration & braking rates
4. Station dwell times
5. Terminal track configurations
6. Driver reaction times

(ii) CBTC factors contributing to achievable headways

Location–Accuracy of end of train locations, resolution of movement authority limits &

frequency at which location reports and MA are updated.

Speed–Accuracy & resolution.

Communication delays –between wayside & train .

CBTC equipment reaction times

–time taken to decide new MA after receiving location update.
–time taken to get new MA limits.
–time to determine new ATP profile following MA update.

CBTC system performance limitations – For example: maximum trains that can be
processed by CBTC within a given area of
control.

CBTC automatic speed regulation algorithm

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Table 2 : Typical parameters of CBTC

Sr. Parameter Typical range

No.
1 Maximum trains processed by one wayside 10 to 40
controller
2 Resolution of measured train location –for ATP +/- 0.25 to 6.25m

3 Accuracy of measured train location – for ATP +/- 5 to 10m

4 Accuracy of measured train location for +/- 0.25m

programmed station stop –without platform edge
doors –for ATO
5 Accuracy of measured train location for +/- 0.05m
programmed station stop –with platform edge doors
–for ATO
6 Resolution of train movement authority limits +/- 0.25 to 6.25m

7 Resolution of train speed measurement for ATP +/- 0.5 to 2Km/h

8 Accuracy of train speed measurement for ATP +/- 3 Km/h

9 Resolution of train speed commands –for ATP +/- 0.5 to 5 Km/h

10 Train to way side message communication delays 0.5 to 2sec

11 Way side to train message communication delays 0.5 to 2sec

12 Wayside CBTC equipment reaction times 0.07 to 1 sec

13 Train borne CBTC equipment reaction times 0.07 to 0.75sec

14 Rollback detection criteria 0.5 to 2 m

15 Zero speed detection criteria Less than 1 to 3

km/h for 2 sec

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2.6 Functional Requirements of CBTC as per IEEE 1474.1

The functional requirements of CBTC are as given below:

 CBTC shall provide ATP, ATO & ATS functions.

 ATP–failsafe function –overrides ATO & ATS.
 ATO –Operates functions –otherwise operated by train operator.
 ATS –Provides system status information, means to monitor and override automatic control.
 Bidirectional data communication to support ATP, ATO & ATS – in tunnels, tubes, cuts,
elevated structures & at gates.
 Speed to support defined performance requirements.
 Data link includes –protocol structure to support safe, timely & secure delivery of train
control messages.

2.6.1 ATP functions

ATP functions shall cover following:

(i) Train location & speed determination

 Train location (both front & rear of the train), Speed & Direction of each train.
 Resolution & accuracy parameters
 Automatic CBTC train detection.
 Compensation for measurement inaccuracies like slipping of wheel, sliding of wheel, wheel
wear.
 Secondary Train location determination like detection of occupancy by CBTC train, failed /
non-CBTC trains.

(ii) Safe train separation

 Safe train separation for all trains –CBTC, failed/ non-CBTC.

 Movement Authority of a CBTC train following a failed / non-CBTC train is limited to the
boundary of track occupied by failed / non-CBTC train.
OR
To the route entry point of the route occupied by failed / non-CBTC train.

Movement Authority limit is decided up on following restrictions:

 Rear of CBTC equipped train ahead.
 Boundary of track section –occupied by failed / non-CBTC train.
 End of track.
 Entrance to an interlocking –when route not locked.
 Boundary of a track section –with opposite traffic direction established.

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 Boundary of blocked track.

 Entrance to a route –detected not safe for train movement.
 Entrance to a highway grade crossing–when warning devices.
 Operation not confirmed.
CBTC safe train separation function shall support abnormal movements like coupling &
uncoupling of trains in designated areas, manual operation of train.

(iii) ATP Profile

Calculation of ATP profile is derived from:
Fixed ATP data –Permanent Speed Restriction (PSR)
Variable ATP data –Temporary Speed Restriction (TSR) & Movement Authority (MA) limit.
ATP profile calculated as above is enforced or safe train separation.

(a) Over speed protection & brake assurance

CBTC system shall
 Support multiple safe braking models to accommodate different train acceleration/
braking rates.

 Ensure correct safe braking model is applied for a given train at a given location.

(b) Safe Speed

Speed of train is considered safe when:
 PSR is within ATP speed profile
 TSR is within ATP speed profile
 PSR for the class / configuration of the train
 Speed restriction is imposed on the train in case of train-borne failure
 Maximum speed that allows safe stop prior to MA or meet PSR / TSR

(c) Automatic brake application

 The type of brake application is specified by the user. In case service brake is applied by
CBTC, the achieved brake rate shall be monitored by CBTC. If the brake rate is not
achieved within a time frame, CBTC shall apply emergency brake.

 Emergency brake system shall bring the train to stop within assured distance.

 Reset facility to enable resuming operation –as per user requirement.

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 If train speed exceeds ATP profile speed after reset –emergency brakes are applied
again.

 Local manual by pass can be provided.

 A safe braking model shall include appropriate allowances for reaction times of brake
assurance function.

Figure 31 : Graph showing ATP profile for a train

(d) Rollback protection

 CBTC compares Actual train travel direction with travel direction as per MA.

 If the distance travelled against MA direction is more than Rollback tolerance,

Emergency brakes are applied.

 Rollback tolerance –0.5 to 2 meters

(e) End of track protection

Applicable where buffer stops are provided or terminals. It is part of over speed protection
feature.

(f) Protection of parting trains

 CBTC shall be able to detect and protect parting trains.

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 CBTC shall support coupling & uncoupling of trains and shall automatically update the
length of the new train.

(g) Zero speed detection

As per 5.10 of IEEE Std. 1475-1999, Less than 1 to 3 Kmph for 2 sec.

(iv) Door opening control protection interlocks

For trains are operated with crews, it is part of ATP (if User requires).
For trains are operated without crews, it is mandatory to be part of ATP.
(a) Conditions to be satisfied to enable opening of doors
 Train is properly aligned at stopping point.
 There is platform on the proposed opening side.
 Zero speed is detected.
 The train is constrained against motion.
 Selective door opening –shall be possible if train length is more than PF length.
 Local bypass facility for failure recovery.

(b) Departure interlocks

 For trains without crews – Mandatory, For trains with crews - Optional.
 It shall prevent a stationery train from moving unless all doors are closed & locked.
 Local manual bypass –optional

(c) Route interlocking

 CBTC system shall provide all route interlocking functions equivalent to conventional
interlocking.

 Route locking shall remain in effect until the train is proven clear by CBTC, subsequently
or through operating procedure, or through combination of both.

 If there is loss of point indication, CBTC shall pullback the movement authority to the
entrance of interlocking and shall initiate an immediate brake if the train is within braking
distance.

 Traffic direction reversal within a section of track shall not be possible, unless conditions
are safe for all trains in and outside the section.

 CBTC shall not grant MAs to trains to blocked tracks through switches in other than
required position and enforcing restricted speeds.

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 CBTC may interface to an auxiliary wayside system for the purpose of Broken rail
detection.

 When Approach warning devices of gate are controlled by CBTC & movement is based
on their status, appropriate warnings are given depending on the status of train, road
signals and road signage.

 CBTC system shall prevent MA to a type of train into a route not safe for that type of
train –due to electrical, mechanical, civil or other predefined conditions.

2.6.2 ATO functions

(i) Automatic speed regulation
 Train speed shall be within ATP over speed limits.

 Starting, stopping & speed regulation by CBTC shall be within passenger comfort limits
as specified by the user for example speed, acceleration, deceleration & jerk rates.

 CBTC shall support multiple ATO speeds, acceleration and service brake rates as per the
operator or ATS.

(ii) Platform berthing control

 When the platform length is approximately equal to the train length, CBTC system shall
allow a train to enter platform only if there is sufficient room to fully accommodate the train.

 CBTC shall permit Multiple stopping on a lengthier platform even when another train is
berthing a portion of platform.

 If platform length is shorter than train, selective door opening control protection as per ATP
applies.

(iii) Door control

 CBTC shall be able to automatically control train doors & platform edge doors.

 Train doors and platform edge doors opening shall be matching while closing & opening.

 It shall be possible to manually disable a set of train & Platform edge doors without
affecting others.

 Amount of time doors are opened at a station is decided by ATS and implemented by ATO.

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Figure 32: Platform doors closed Figure 33: Platform doors open

2.6.3 ATS functions

(i) General
 CBTC interfacing with ATS is optional.
 The ATS features of CBTC shall be integrated with conventional ATS & non-ATS functions
to have a single consistent user interface.
(ii) ATS User Interface
ATS functions need not be implemented in fail safe manner, but hazard analysis has to be done
for the possibility of
 Safety related commands not being executed when initiated by ATS user.
 CBTC system executing safety related commands that were not initiated by ATS.
 Incorrect information being displayed by the CBTC system to the ATS user.
(iii) CBTC train identification & train tracking
 For each CBTC-equipped train in CBTC territory a train identification shall be assigned.
 ATS system shall be able to automatically track and maintain records of, display on the ATS
interface, train schedule etc.
 Train location is displayed based on front & rear locations of the train.
 Variation in train length to be displayed proportionately.

(iv) Train routing

ATS shall be able to manually or automatically route CBTC equipped trains for example proper
merging & diverging of trains at junction, turn back of trains, re routing of trains in case of
disruptions.
(v) Automatic Train regulation
 Schedule regulation is done by Automatic dispatch function based on train identity, location,
scheduled and actual headways between trains, service strategies.

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 Headway regulation is done by dwell time variance, running time between stations.
 Train regulation to facilitate transfer between local & express trains, merging point between
different lines.
 Station stop functions such as Stop train at next station, Hold train at station, Skip station
stop, Door control inhibit.
(vi) Fault reporting
CBTC fault reporting
 ATS user interface display shall indicate failures, out of tolerance conditions.
 Alarms to be categorised & prioritized into critical& non-critical alarms.
 Critical alarms are to be acknowledged.
(vii) Train fault reporting
 Train borne CBTC equipment.
 Interfaces to train borne sub-systems.

2.7 User Interface Requirements of CBTC as per IEEE 1474.2

2.7.1 Operations related user interface requirements –train-borne subsystems

(i) Train-borne subsystems - Mandatory display data
 Train operating mode
 CBTC operational status
 Current CBTC determined speed
 Current max authorised CBTC speed
 Over-speed condition alarm

(ii) Train-borne subsystems – Optional display data

 Fixed territory related information
 Train type
 Train run identity / train destination
 Train location and /or track designation.
 Train length
 Reason for MA limit
 Target speed
 Speed profile to an approaching MA limit

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 Distance to an approaching MA limit

 Required brake rate to an approaching MA limit
 Time to a penalty brake application
 Penalty over speed alarm
 Train route through interlockings
 Train regulation information
 Unscheduled train stops
 Train properly aligned at a station designated stopping point
 Station management related info –train to skip next station, door status
 Level crossing status
 Train parting
 Fault report –related information
 Text messages
 Time & date

2.7.2 Train-borne subsystems –inputs

(i) Mandatory user info inputs
 Operating mode selection
 Over- speed alarm condition acknowledgement

(ii) Optional user info inputs

 User login parameters
 Train type
 Train length
 Crew identification

(iii) Mandatory Audible Alarms

Over-speed condition

(iv) Optional Audible Alarms

 Penalty over-speed condition

 Transitions into and out of CBTC territory

 Detected parting

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 Approaching work zone

 Train length conflicting –manually entered & detected by CBTC

2.7.3 Operations related user interface requirements – non-train-borne subsystems

(i) Mandatory display

 Fixed territory related information like track plan, location of stations, gates
 Train status related info –train attributes, location etc
 Train movement authority / routing info
 Information related to restricted train operations –work zone etc.
(ii) Optional display
 Fixed alignment related info –permanent SRs
 Train status related info –train attributes, location etc
 Train movement authority / routing info
 Information related to restricted train operations –work zone, CBTC failed trains etc.
 CBTC max authorised speed
 Service performance related information
 ATP profile violations Table of Contents

 Failures & out of tolerance conditions

 Status of elements of auxiliary wayside system

(iii) Mandatory user inputs

 Inputs to request & cancel routes, limit MA.

 Inputs to establish & remove work zones, block track sections / switches & establish TSR.

(iv) Optional user inputs

 Inputs to modify schedules / trips of one train, a group of trains.

 2.Inputs to adjust the train service braking profiles for CBTC equipped trains for example
wet rail condition.

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2.7.4 Maintenance-related user interface requirements

(i) General
 Failures resulting in punctuality loss of train.
 Failures resulting in no performance loss but affects loss of specific CBTC functionality.
 Failure resulting in no performance loss [may be due to redundancy].

(ii) Display data

 Graphical representation of CBTC system configuration.
 Listing the current status of sub-system –component.
 Time stamped failure log.
 Physical location of failed CBTC sub-system.
 Early warning failures –out of tolerance conditions.

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Chapter III
Applications of CBTC in Mass Transit

3.1 Metro trains using CBTC technology

Metro trains come under the category of Mass Transit system. Some of the top world's busiest
metros in terms of annual passenger rides utilise a CBTC system. CBTC technology has been
(and is being) successfully implemented for a variety of applications .They range from some
implementations with short track, limited numbers of vehicles and few operating modes, to
complex overlays on existing railway networks carrying more than a million passengers each day
and with more than 100 trains. Following is a list of few metros of different countries using
CBTC technologies provided by various firms :
Table 3 : Particulars of some Metros using CBTC technology
Sr. Location/ Lines/System Supplier Solution Level of
No. Country Automation
1 London Jubilee line Thales SelTrac STO
Underground
2 New York IRT Flushing Line Thales SelTrac STO
City Subway BMT Canarsie Siemens Trainguard MT CBTC STO
Line
3 Singapore North East Line Alstom Urbalis UTO
MRT
4 Hungary Budapest Metro Siemens Trainguard MT CBTC UTO
M4
5 Brazil Sao Paulo Metro Bombardier CITYFLO 650 UTO
6 Beijing 15 Nippon Signal SPARCS ATO
Subway
7 Ankara Metro M1 Ansaldo STS CBTC STO
8 Riyadh Metro L4,L5 & L6 Alstom Urbalis ATO
9 Delhi Metro Line 8 Nippon Signal SPARCS UTO
10 Madrid Metro 1,6 Bombardier CITYFLO 650 STO
11 Paris Métro 1 Siemens Trainguard MT CBTC DTO

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3.2 Metros with CBTC in India

Following is the list of Metros in India using CBTC technology:

Table 4 : List of Metros in India using CBTC Technology

Sr. No. Metro Technology/Solution
1 Hyderabad Thales SelTrac
2 Lucknow Alstom Urbalis
3 Kochi
4 Mumbai
5 Jaipur
6 Ahmedabad Nippon Signal SPARCS
7 Delhi
8 Mumbai Ansaldo STS CBTC
9 Kolkata
10 Delhi Bombardier CITYFLO 650
11 Nagpur Westinghouse by Siemens
12 Pune
13 Bangalore 1 Distance to go
14 Chennai

Table 5 : Delhi Metro lines and routes

Sr. Line Station From Station To Distance Total no.
No. of stations
1 Line 1 (Red line) Dilshad Shaheed Sthal 34.7 km 29
Garden
2 Line 2 (Yellow Samaypur HUDA city 48.8 km 37
line) Badli centre
3 Line 3 (Blue line) Dwarka Noida City 49.93 km 44
Sector 9 Centre
4 Line 4 (Blue line) Yamuna Bank Anand Vihar 8.74 km 8
5 Line 5 (Green line) Inderlok City Park 29.64 km 23
6 Line 6 (Voilet line) Kashmere Raja Nahar 47 km 32
Gate Singh
7 Line 7 (Pink line) Majlis Park Mayur Vihar 58.59 Km 38
Pocket I
8 Line 8 (Magenta Botanical Janakpuri 38 km 25
line) Garden West
9 Line 9 (Grey line) Dwarka Najafgarh 4.29 Km 3
10 Airport Express line New Delhi Dwarka Sector 23 Km 6
(Orange line) railway 21
station

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Figure 34: Red Line Train of Delhi Metro

Control of drivers over train operations in existing Delhi Metro lines

Even now, trains are mostly remotely controlled from the command rooms of the DMRC known
as Operations Control Centre (OCC), from where teams of engineers track and monitor in real
time train movement across the DMRC network. The OCCs are akin to air traffic control towers
equipped with large display walls and communication technology. DMRC has three OCCs,
including two inside the metro headquarters and one at Shastri Park. But the level of control that
the drivers or train operators have over trains vary from line to line.

On Line 1 or the Red Line and Line 3/4 or the Blue Line drivers are in complete control of trains,
starting from speed, opening and closing of doors. The target speed is however decided by the
Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system, which means drivers cannot run trains above a certain
limit. The remaining corridors, including Line 8 for now, are covered by the Automatic Train
Operation (ATO) mode. Under this mode, drivers only press the departure command after
closing doors at every platform. But the ATO mode is occasionally switched off even on these
lines and drivers are made to run trains manually so that they remain prepared to intervene in
case of emergencies.

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3.3 India's first driverless train on Delhi Metro - A new beginning

The country's first-ever fully automated, driverless train operations was flagged off on the 37 km
long Delhi Metro Magenta Line connecting Janakpuri West to Botanical Garden on Monday,
December 28. Honourable Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the first such driverless
train at Jasola Vihar-Shaheen Bagh Metro station of Delhi Metro Magenta Line via video
conference. According to the metro operator Delhi Metro Rail Corporation (DMRC), with the
commencement of the fully automated driverless trains operations (DTO), India has now
joined the league of seven percent of countries in the world having this facility in their metro
networks which are capable of operating without drivers.

Figure 35 :View from inside of Driverless Delhi Metro cab

Figure 36 : Inside view of Driverless Delhi Metro cab

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Benefits
 The fully automated trains will reduce human intervention in operations and offer more
reliability and safety for the commuters. The system also brings more flexibility to train
operations.

 As a result, the number of trains in service can be regulated based on the demand
dynamically without any dependence on the availability of the crew.

 Since these trains operate on communication-based train control Signalling system, they
can be run with a headway as high as 90 seconds to offer more carrying capacity.

 The driverless train operation's higher level of diagnostic features will help move from the
conventional time-based maintenance to condition-based maintenance.

 The system will also reduce maintenance downtime of the Delhi Metro trains.

 The driverless trains will be fully automated which will require minimum human
intervention and will eliminate the possibilities of human errors.

Changes in operating procedure on Magenta Line after introduction of driverless train

On Magenta line metro have switched from ATP and ATO, to Driverless Train Operation (DTO)
mode. In this mode, trains can be controlled entirely from the three command centres of the
DMRC, without any human intervention. The Communication Based Train Control (CBTC)
signalling technology also makes it possible to monitor and troubleshoot every aspect of train
operations remotely. Manual intervention is required only in cases of hardware replacement. At
the command centres, posts of information controllers have been created to handle the passenger
information system, crowd monitoring. Rolling stock controllers will monitor train equipment in
real-time, download faults and other events captured by CCTVs and assist traffic controllers in
executing commands remotely. All station controllers will also have access to on board CCTV
feed.

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3.4 Comparison between parameters of Mainline Railway and Metro Railway

Table 6 : Comparative of Main line and Metro Railways

Sr. Parameter Mainline Railway Metro Railway

No.
1 Average speed 50 to 75 Kmph 30 to 35 Kmph
2 Headway 5 to 7 Minutes 90 to 180 seconds
3 Inter station 6 to 10 Km 0.8 to 1,5 Kms
distance
4 Braking distance 800 m to 1.5 Km About 250 m
5 Station yard Generally complex Simple yard
layouts layout
6 Signal clearance Typical 30 seconds to Typical 3 to 5
3 minutes seconds
7 Stoppage time at 2 to 5 minutes 20 to 30 seconds
stations
8 Distance between In Absolute Block - 25 to 30 m
two trains 6 to 10 Km
In Automatic Block -
1 to 1,5 Km

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Annexure
Metro Railways General Rules 2013
&
Opening of Metro Railways for Public
Carriage of Passengers Rules
2013

Link:
http://indianrailways.gov.in/railwayboard/uploads/directorate/Works_planning_Dte/METRO%20ACT%2
0%26%20RULES/METRO%20RULES/MR_General_Rules_Public_Carriage_Passengers_Rules_2013_0.pdf

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Chapter IV
Safety Certification and Technical Clearance
of Metro Systems by RDSO
4.1 Introduction
As per Amendment to Metro Railway (Operation and Maintenance) Act 2009, Indian Railways
have been unambiguously given the responsibility of technical planning and safety of Metro
Systems being implemented in India.
The procedure and the various steps to be taken for safety certification and technical clearance of
Metro Systems being implemented in India are documented in the manual (Procedure for Safety
Certification and Technical Clearance of Metro Systems, December 2015) issued by Urban
Transport & High Speed Directorate (UTHS), Research Designs & Standards Organisation
(RDSO), Manak Nagar, Lucknow – 226 011.
The role of Ministry of Railways (RDSO) in principle is to accord approvals of broad technology
as chosen and proposed by the metro railway administrations in the following areas:
(i). Schedule of Dimensions
(ii). Design Basis Report
(iii). Track structure
(iv). Oscillation trials of rolling stock as required
(v). Issue of Speed Certificate
(vi). Technology for signalling
(vii). Technology for traction
(viii). Rules for opening of the metro railway and General Rules

4.2 Procedure for Safety Certification and Technical Clearance of Metro Systems
by RDSO
The brief overview of the procedure for Safety certification and technical Clearance of Metro
Systems is given in the following paragraphs.

The detailed procedure with department wise annexures can be accessed through following link:

https://rdso.indianrailways.gov.in/view_section.jsp?lang=0&id=0,2,980,5970,6208,6210

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Brief overview of the procedure

The complete exercise of Safety Certification and Technical Clearance for commissioning a
Metro System for passenger service is broadly divided into the following parts:
1. Submission and Scrutiny of Schedule of Dimensions (SOD)
2. Submission and Scrutiny of technical documents like specifications, design and test
certificates.
3. Tests of selected sub-systems.
4. Oscillation trials and issue of speed certificates.
As part of the process a copy of the Detailed Project Report (DPR) approved by Ministry of
Railways and Ministry of Urban Development may be sent to RDSO.
The Metro administration shall submit the required documents to Executive Director Works
(Planning) Railway Board, and also send a copy of the same to Executive Director, Urban
Transport and High Speed Directorate, RDSO, Manak Nagar, Lucknow. UTHS directorate will
co-ordinate within RDSO and with the Metros for scrutiny of documents and certification of
Metro. These steps have been explained in detail in the following paragraphs:

4.2.1 Submission and Scrutiny of Schedule of Dimensions (SOD)

[Expected Time for examination and clearance of SOD - Three months]
Initially Metro Administration is required to submit its SOD for approval. It should comprise of
general alignment and clearances, rolling stock dimensions, kinematic envelope and structure
gauge, clearances at stations and platforms, type of electric traction and clearances from live
parts. If a Metro is being extended, then fresh SOD will not be required to be approved.

4.2.2 Submission and Scrutiny of documents

[Expected Time for scrutiny of documents –six weeks]
Metro Administration is required to submit documents, duly approved by Metro Administration
as per annexures mentioned below. Sub-system wise break up of these documents is as follows:

Rolling Stock(Mechanical Part): as per AnnexureA

Rolling Stock (Electrical Part): as per AnnexureB

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Track: The following documents are required

(a). Compliance of Standards for Track Structure and salient feature of Track Structure adopted
by Metro Railways (Annexure C1)
(b). Compliance to Performance criteria of Fastening System for ballastless track on Metro
Railways/MRTS and salient feature of Fastening System adopted by Metro Railway
(Annexure C2).

Traction Installation and Power Supply : as per Annexure D1 andD2

Bridges and Structures

(a). A copy of Design Basis Report (DBR) for viaduct and other bridges duly approved by the
metro authorities is required to be submitted prior to taking up design work by the
Consultant. This shall require approval of Ministry of Railways before start of physical
work.
(b). It should include load model, provisions of various Codes and Manuals to be followed with
preference (Justification should also be furnished if other than IRS Code are proposed to be
followed), type of construction material etc.

Notes:
 A Model DBR has been prepared by RDSO/ MoR and same has been uploaded on RDSO
website. Metros should refer it for preparing their DBR.
 RDSO has prepared guidelines for carrying out RSI studies and same has been uploaded on
RDSO website. This may be referred for doing RSI studies.

Signalling
(a). Documents are required for various sub-systems duly approved by Metro authorities as per
Annexure E1.
(b). A Broad description of the systems in line with already approved system of Metro
Signalling System and & telecommunications system is available at Annexure E2. For
Technical clearance, minimum provisions to be adopted for Signalling systems &
telecommunications systems are outlined in this annexure. Deviations, if any, shall be
pointed out clearly.

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4.2.3 Submission of Test Certificates / Reports

The following test certificates are required to be submitted to RDSO for record before conducting
oscillation trial:

Rolling Stock –Mechanical

(i). Type test of coupler
(ii). Type test of brake system
(iii). Type test of wheels and axles
(iv). Prototype test of Bogie frame
(v). Endurance test of Bearing
(vi). Compliance certificate for crashworthiness standard
[Expected Time in scrutiny and examination of these certificates – four weeks]

Rolling Stock– Electrical

Dynamometer car test certificate giving starting and rolling resistance of the Prototype Rolling
Stock and verifying the “tractive effort-speed” and “regenerative braking effort/speed”
characteristics; along with methodology of acquisition of data and calculation method. If
Dynamometer car test is not being conducted for the rolling stock, then test results by
manufacturer for similar test done earlier to be provided.
[Expected Time in scrutiny and examination of these certificates – four weeks]

The following test certificates are required to be submitted to RDSO for record before
commissioning of the corridor.
Signal and Telecommunication: Completion report of Integrated Testing and Commissioning
Tests with their results for Signalling/Train Control Systems and Tele Communication Systems.

Rolling Stock– Electrical: EMC/EMI compatibility test report to be submitted before

commissioning of the corridor.

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4.2.4 Oscillation trials and issue of Speed Certificates

(A) The following types of speed certificates are issued by RDSO.
(i). Speed certificate for conducting oscillation trials of the rolling stock by RDSO to ascertain
its maximum speed potential. (Test methodology and criteria for the test are enclosed as
Annexure F1& F2 respectively).
[Expected Time in issuing this certificate – two weeks]
(ii). Speed certificate for conducting Emergency Braking Distance trial for the complete train
formation intended to be operated. (Test methodology is enclosed as Annexure G1 and
parameters required are at AnnexureG2).
[Expected Time in issuing this certificate – two weeks]
(iii). Speed certificate for conducting COUPLER FORCE, CONTROLLABILITY or any other
special trial. Coupler force trials shall be necessary for sections having sustained up
gradient steeper than 1 in 100. Controllability trials shall be necessary for sections having
sustained gradient steeper than 1 in 100. (Test methodology for coupler and controllability
are enclosed as Annexure H and Annexure I respectively).
NOTE:
These trials may be dispensed with by RDSO, if Metro Authorities submit adequate details
of design calculations and Type test reports of couplers and brake system certifying their
suitability for use in the worst operating conditions, which shall also include failure of
ATP/CBTC.
[Expected Time in issuing this certificate – two weeks]
(iv) Provisional speed certificate for operation and regular use of new design of rolling stock
without conduct of detailed oscillation trials. The provisional maximum permissible speed
for new design of rolling stock will be determined on the basis of design features and data,
and where appropriate also on a comparison of the performance of similar design of stock
already in service, generally in line with Policy Circular no. 6 issued by Railway Board.
(v) Interim speed certificate for operation and regular use of rolling stock at the maximum
permissible speed as determined in oscillation trials and based on norms set by Criteria
Committee of RDSO (Annexure F2) and in EBD trials.
(vi) Final speed certificate for operation and regular use of rolling stock at the maximum
permissible speed based on norms set by Criteria Committee of RDSO (Annexure F2),

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after conduct of oscillation trials over rundown track with worn wheel profile, as soon as
available, and with instrumented measuring wheel wherever required.
[Expected Time in issuing this certificate – two weeks]

(B) Prior sanction of CRS for conducting trials

(a). In cases where metro line is yet to be opened for public carriage of passengers, prior
sanction of CRS will not be needed for conducting Oscillation, EBD, coupler forces and
other such trials of coaches, mentioned in Para 4.2.4 (A) (i), (ii) & (iii). After issue of
speed certificate by RDSO for such trial, the concerned Metro will submit the documents
already prescribed to RDSO.
(b). However, prior sanction of CRS will continue to be mandatory for conducting all the trials
mentioned in Para 4.2.4 (A) (i), (ii) & (iii)., where the Metro line has already been opened
for public carriage of passengers and a new design of Rolling Stock is to be tested or where
speed of an existing rolling stock is to be increased. Requisite papers and certificates will
need to be submitted by concerned Metros to CRS for this purpose.

For oscillation trial and speed certificate of metro rolling stock as described above, the concerned
metro corporation shall apply to Executive Director (Urban Transport & High Speed), Research
Designs and Standards Organization, Manak Nagar, Lucknow226011.

(C) Application for oscillation trial and special trials

Application for getting oscillation trial done shall be accompanied by the following documents:
(i). Performance report of the existing operation.
(ii). Full details of the rake composition & section on which trial is proposed.
(iii). Joint Safety certificate issued by concerned Metro
(iv). Track certificate issued by concerned Metro.
(v). Bridge Certificate issued by concerned Metro
(vi). After issue of Speed Certificate, CRS sanction for conducting the trial, if necessary in
terms of Para 4.2.4 (B)
(vii). An Indemnity Bond by the concerned Metro administration indemnifying RDSO / Indian
Railways for damages if any, caused by any accidents/casualties during such trials.
(viii). Any other certificate required as per CRS sanction, if necessary in terms of Para 4.2.4 (B).

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Application for getting special trials done shall be accompanied by:

(i). Joint Safety certificate issued by concerned Metro
(ii). Track certificate issued by concerned Metro
(iii). Bridge Certificate issued by concerned Metro
(iv). After issue of Speed Certificate, CRS sanction for conducting the trial, if necessary in
terms of Para 4.2.4 (B)
(v). An Indemnity Bond by the concerned Metro administration indemnifying RDSO / Indian
Railways for damages if any, caused by any accidents/casualties during such trials.
(vi). Any other certificate required as per CRS sanction, if necessary in terms of Para 4.2.4 (B).

Apart from above, details indicated in annexures G1 and G2 for Emergency /Service Braking
Distance trials, in annexure H for Coupler Force trial and in annexure I for Controllability
trial, following documents will also be required:
In addition to the above mentioned documents, any other detail required by RDSO after due
examination of the case, shall be intimated to the concerned metro.
[Expected Time in conducting oscillation trial by RDSO – four weeks. Additional 2 weeks for
EBD trial and 2 weeks for coupler force trial if needed.]

(D) Issue of Provisional/Interim Speed Certificate

For issuing of Provisional / Interim Speed Certificate, following shall be required:
(i). Approved Schedule of dimensions (SOD) and condonation letter from Railway Board for
infringements/deviations, if any, from approved Schedule of dimensions (SOD).
(ii). Approval of Track Structure and Fastening System as per Annexure C1 & C2 and
condonation letter from Railway Board for deviations, if any, from approved Track
Structure and Fastening System
(iii). Approved Design Basis Report. iv. In principal approval of Traction System as per
Annexure –D1/D2 v. Complete design details pertaining to vehicle dynamics along with
drawings of the rolling stock – As per Annexure A & B
(iv). Report of Vehicle dynamics simulation done including Vertical acceleration values, Lateral
acceleration values, Vertical Ride Quality, Lateral Ride Quality, Vertical force, Max.
Lateral force, Derailment Coefficient (Lateral force/ Instantaneous wheel load.)

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After receiving speed certificate for passenger carrying rolling stock, Metro administration shall
apply for sanction for the same to the Railway Board/MoR through Commissioner of Railway
Safety of the Circle in whose jurisdiction the Metro falls, as per the provision stipulated in
“Opening of Metro Railway for Public Carriage of Passenger Rules, 2013” with latest
amendment.
For existing rolling stocks, where there is a case of design modification or speed enhancement,
as defined in “Opening of Metro Railway for Public Carriage of Passenger Rules, 2013”, with
latest amendment, the same procedure, as described above, shall be followed.

Condonation
Any deviation from the standards prescribed by and acceptable to MOR, either pointed out by
MOR/RDSO or brought to the notice of MOR/RDSO by the Metro, will be required to be
condoned by MOR. For any such condonation Metro will submit detailed justification each case
wise well in advance.
Any infringement or deviation to approved SOD will also require condonation from MOR.
However, the case is to be processed as under:
(i). By Metro through approval of concerned CRS to Railway Board in case of fixed
installations.
(ii). By Metro through RDSO and CCRS in case of infringements to SOD by Rolling Stock.

4.3 Maintenance and other Manuals

Before commencement of commercial services, Metro Administrations should ensure that all the
following manuals are in place:
(a). Operations Manual
(b). Safety Manual
(c). Disaster Management Manual
(d). Maintenance Manuals of various sub-systems

The concerned technical Director-in-charge should approve and authenticate 4.3 (a) to (c) of the
above listed manuals for use. The maintenance manuals mentioned in 4.3(d) above, are to be
submitted by the concerned technical Director-in-charge after authentication, to RDSO for
approval. Manuals mentioned at 4.3 (d) above, should be got approved from RDSO within Six
months of commercial operations.

The expected time stipulated is tentative and does not include the time taken by Metros in
providing any clarification asked by RDSO.

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Annexure-E1
Following Documents are required for various sub-systems of signalling, duly approved by
Metro authorities at appropriate stage.
1. Independent Safety Assessor's **assessment of vital signalling equipment like CBI, ATP,
track detection system etc. (all the items being used for vital functions shall be covered).
Regarding ATO & ATS if provided ISA** certification shall be done to required safety level
as decided by metro.
2. Submission of the following:
(a). Relevant system details as may be necessary to give full particulars of principle of
Operations and safety features incorporated for CBI, ATP, Track Vehicle Detection
etc. Including ATO/ ATS, if provided.
(b). Report of EMI/EMC interface with rolling stock/traction, as applicable for track
Detection, on-board and other related equipments.
(c). Typical schematic of earthing/ bonding of signalling equipment.
Final comments of RDSO regarding technical planning and safety shall be forwarded
to Metro within 28 days, after the receipt of final sets of documents.
3. Verification and validation and certification by the ISA** of adherence to SIL-4 process
from design to testing and commissioning stages of signalling system, including application
data of vital equipment for the Signalling system. This shall include hazard analysis, its
mitigation and acceptance of the same by competent authority for the concerned Metro
Railway.
Note:
(i). Documents listed in Sr. No. (1) & (2) shall not be required in case there is an extension
to an existing fine incorporating no new type of signalling equipment.
(ii). Also documents listed in Sr. No. (1) & (2) shall not be required-if an equipment
having same hardware and software version and approved earlier by Railway board is
already in use on any Metro in India, however, safety and operational performance
shall be submitted by Metro authorities for the equipment from user of metro/railways
who are using the same equipment.
(iii). ** “Independent Safety Assessors (ISAs):

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(a). After RDSO notifies a panel of approved ISAs, Metro Rail authorities shall select
an ISA from the approved panel for their Metro systems.
(b). Till such time RDSO forms the panel of approved ISAs, Metro Railways shall
submit the credentials of ISAs identified /appointed by them to RDSO for
scrutiny.”

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Annexure-E2
Provisions to be adopted for Signalling & Telecommunications systems
It may be noted that the given criteria is based upon systems already adopted by the existing
Indian Metros. However, in case Metro Authorities are adopting a new technology, then the
same shall be advised and in principle concurrence of RDSO should be obtained in principle.

Table 7: Signalling Systems

Sr. Description Minimum requirement
No.
1 Type of Signalling Cab Signalling, CATC (ATP, ATO,
ATS). ATP and ATS are essential,
ATO is optional.
2 Back up Signalling Line side (CLS) at entry and exit at
all interlocked stations.
3 Interlocking EI with built-in block working
facilities
4 Train control system CATC(ATP, ATS, ATO optional)
5 Type of Track Circuits Coded Audio Frequency Track
Circuits (AFTC)
6 Point machine
7 (i) For Main Line (i)Non-Trailable high thrust, high
performance point machine
8 (ii) For Depot (ii)Trailable high thrust, high
performance point machine
9 Redundancy in cab equipment for ATP 1+1(hot standby)
(Cab Sig.)

Table 8:Telecommunication systems

Sr. Description Minimum requirement
No.
1 Tele communication Integrated system with OFC, Train
Radio, CCTV, Centralized clocks,
PA system, with the additional
provision that Train Display Boards
at stations should also be integrated
in the system. Regarding Train
Radio system, it should be fully
digital and duplex system, the
standards may be chosen based on
techno-economic considerations.
2 Positive Train Identification Provided with interface between
ATS and Train Radio

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4.4 Flowcharts for Metro Certification Procedure

Flowchart 1

Flowchart 2

Flo
wc

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hart 3

Flowchart 4

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Flowchart 5

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Chapter IV
Kolkata East-West Metro Line 2 with CBTC
Technology – A case study

4.1 Introduction
The proposed Kolkata East West Metro Line 2 is a rapid transit line of the Kolkata Metro in the
Indian state of West Bengal. It has a total 16.034 Km stretch from Sector V (SVSA) station to
Howrah Maidan (HWMM) Station. From Sector V (SVSA) station to Salt Lake Stadium
(SSSA) for a span of 5.94 Km, 6 stations are elevated. From Phoolbagan (PBGB) station to
Howrah Maidan (HWMM) station for a span of 10.094 Km, 6 stations are underground. This
project will connect Kolkata with Howrah by an underwater Metro line, below the Hooghly
river.

Figure 37 : Kolkata East-West Metro Line 2 Route Map

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Status as on 23.02.2021
 Phase-I A, Sector V (SVSA) to Salt Lake Stadium (SSSA), Length 5.305 Km : Commercial
run started on 14.02.2020
 Phase I B, Salt Lake Stadium (SSSA) to Phoolbagan (PBGB), Length 3.708 Km :
Commercial run started from 05.10.2020
 Till date 7 Nos. station have been commissioned. 6 Nos. in elevated section and 1 No.
underground. Total length 9.013 Km.
 Phase-II yet to be commissioned from Phoolbagan (PBGB) to Howrah Maidan (HWMM),
Length 7.021 KM. 5 stations which are underground, yet to be commissioned.

Salient features
 Kolkata East -West Metro Line 2 is a state of art Communication Based Train Control
(CBTC) System.
 This system is based on the Moving Block System (Refer Chapter II) of M/S Hitachi make
with design headway of 120 sec. and operational headway of 150 sec.
 Currently it is running in Automatic Train Protection (ATP) mode, i.e. GOA1 (Grade of
Automation). Testing of Automatic Train Protection (ATO) is in progress. At the end of
Phase 2, i.e. when section will be extended up to Howrah Maidan, it will achieve ATO, i.e.
GOA2.
 The Automatic Train Control (ATC) System ensures the safe passage of trains and
optimises line operation. ATC guarantees signal safety and high reliability at the same time.
CBTC System will comprise of:
Automatic Train Operation (ATO)
Automatic Train Protection (ATP)
Automatic Train supervision (ATS)

4.2 Signalling assets

The signalling system provided in EW Metro is a radio based signalling system which will
conform to European Standards (CENELAC). It has following features:

 It will ensure prevention of collisions by enforcement of safe train separation.

 The system is being designed to maintain the operation headway of 2.5 minutes.
 Automatic operation of the trains between stations, automatic stopping of trains at platform
and automatic opening of train door and platform screen door (PSD) on the appropriate
platform.
 Entire train movement can be monitored in real-time and controlled from the operation
control centre (OCC) at Central Park Depot & back up control centre at Howrah station.

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Using the Tetra Train Radio, the train operator can be contacted from the control centre at
any time.

 CBTC Based Signalling system will allow Automatic Train Operation with minimal
intervention from the train operator.
 On-time arrival and departure of trains with the help of Automatic Train Supervision (ATS)
feature. Real time Passenger information support system at the stations is provided.

CBTC Subsystem Architecture

The Core CBTC subsystem consists of:

(1) Wayside equipment (orange in Figure 38 below), including the following:

 The FRONTAM, which interfaces with the Automatic Train Supervision (ATS),
 The Zone Controller (ZC) & Transponder Tags.

(2) Onboard equipment (blue in Figure 38 below), including the following:

 The Train Operator Display (TOD).
 The Carborne Controller (CC).

These equipments communicate among themselves through a Data Communication System

(DCS) (green in Figure 38 below).

The DCS is separated into fixed installations (Wayside DCS) and mobile installations on board
(Carborne DCS):
 The Wayside DCS is an interface with CBTC wayside equipment i.e. the FRONTAM,
the Zone Controller (ZC) and the Interlocking (IXL). It supports the potential connection
with various other wayside equipment which do not have an active role within the CBTC
system such as Axle counter, Platform Screen Door (PSD).

 The Carborne DCS is an interface with CBTC on board equipment i.e. Carborne
Controller (CC).

The core CBTC system is interfaced with the following external systems (yellow in Figure
below):
(i). The Platform Screen Controller (PSC) which manages Platform Screen Door (PSD)
(ii). The ATS, for the supervision and the control of the core CBTC system
(iii). The Tag Reader Systems (TRS)
(iv). Bi BTM, bi antennas configuration: two TRS per CC, each of them made of
(v). one BTM + one Antenna + wires
(vi). The Rolling Stock (RS) including the Train Management System (TMS)
(vii). The onboard Passenger Information System (PIS)

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Figure 38: General diagram of CBTC System Architecture & associated interfaces

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Zone Controller (ZC)

The Zone Controller receives information from the Computer Based Interlocking (CBI) (all vital
information from track side inputs) and Carborne Controllers (CCs) (location of trains),
determines a train location map (location of all trains on the line) and sends a Movement
Authority Limit (MAL) to each train. The total number of ZCs depends on the configuration of
the line and the number of trains subject to their supervision.
The zone controller (ZC) is based on 2oo3 architecture and thus is resistant to a single failure.
The ZC also implements automatic reboot at board level in case of board failure. Assuming that
the board that has failed is able to reboot, the ZC can recover full operation without human
Intervention.

Figure 39: ZC Cabinet Front view

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FRONTAM (FTM)
FRONTAM includes mainly two functions - interface management with ATS, called
FRONTAL, and maintenance management for Core CBTC System. Installed in the central
control room, it is a single unit including devices such as servers and workstations.
 As shown in figure, FRONTAM interfaces with ATS, CC, ZC and IXL through Ethernet
connections on DCS using UDP/IP Protocol.
 The main role of the FRONTAM is to centralize the communication between the ATS and
the CBTC (e.g. CC and ZC) through the DCS network. It also acts as a database server for
the track data.
 It Archives records of CBTC statuses and events.

Figure 40: FRONTAM Interfacing Architecture

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Carborne Controller (CC)

The CC supervises and controls the train movement, through its ATO/TMS interface and triggers
an Emergency braking intervention when the safety situation requires it.

The KMRCL project trains have a Bi-CC configuration. The CCs are located at each end of the
train in the cabin and each CC manages one cab. Each CC has its own peripheral equipment.

The Mobile Radio (MR) is the carborne radio device for relaying data between carborne
equipment (e.g. ATP and ATO) and wayside equipment. Local communications between the
Carbone Controllers are transmitted through the onboard wired network.

Figure 41: Train Operator Display (TOD)

Figure 42: Operations menu for ATS operations

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Figure 43: Schedule Menu Bar for ATS operations

4.3 Telecom Assets

Close Circuit Television (CCTV)
The system consists of IP based cameras and motorized IP PTZ CCTV cameras, video
management units and video recording units placed at different locations to ensure the
redundancy, robustness and stability of the system. Its main purpose is to monitor the boarding
and detraining of passengers at platform levels in all stations.

CCTV system installed here has the following video analytic features:- Trip wire, Unidentified
object detection, falling on the track etc. CCTV camera installed here are Honeywell make,
Switches by Alcatel and Servers by HP.

Backbone Routers (BBRS)

The BBRS/DCS system will transmit the video streams from the on-board CCTV cameras to the
stations & OCC over the FOTS(GE) network. The On-board cameras server at the stations &
OCC will receive the video stream which can be accessed through the client application installed
in the ground CCTV MMI.

Data Communications System (DCS)

The Data Communications System (DCS) is a broadband communication system that provides
bi-directional, reliable and secured exchange of vital data from on-board CBTC and non-vital
data which is collected from BBRS to OCC. To ensure high availability level required for CBTC
and BBRS, DCS will operate in two parallel networks. At network level, there shall be two

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networks (Alpha (α) and Beta (β)) which instead of operating in redundant manner will operate
in parallel to each other. Unlicensed frequency bands 2.4 GHZ and 5.8 GHZ is used.

Figure 44 : DCS as a medium for CBTC & BBRS

DCS system is Hirschman make and the product is Beldan make.

Passenger Information Display System (PIDS)

The Passenger Information Display System (PIDS) shall be the primary means of visual
communications with Passengers at Station Concourses and Platforms for the notification of
scheduled Train arrivals / departures and for operational, normal and emergency including
evacuation message displays to Passengers. The PIDS shall have Control equipment located in
the Equipment Rooms of each Station, the OCC and BCC. The servers are HP make, TFTD
monitors are LG make (Industrial Grade), Software is Nusyn make.

Public Address System (PAS)

Public Address System is the primary means of audio communication with passengers at each
Station, Concourses, Entry / Exits, Up Platform, Down Platform, staff areas including Office
Rooms and staff toilets.

Access Control System (ACS)

Access Control System is installed at the entry/exit doors of Signal Control Room (SCR),
Telecom equipment rooms etc. to generate alarm in case of unauthorised Access. ACS is
Honeywell make.

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Telephone Exchange
Omni PCX enterprise (OXE) Exchange is installed at East-West Metro. It is provided on the
FOTS backbone. It is interfaced with PAS, CSS, MCS, PSTN etc. It is Alcatel make.
Fibre Optic trnasmission system/Gigabit ethernet FOTS/GE
It is the communication backbone for all the telecom subsystems like
PIDS,PAS,CCTV,ACS,MCS,EXCHANGE,TETRA,CSS etc.
STM- Tejas [OCC –STM 16, Station- STM 4], PD Mux -Vertive.

Terrestrial Trunk Radio (TETRA)

It is provided for Communication between OCC and loco pilot, maintenance staffs, Station
Master, traffic supervisor etc in both elevated and tunnel section.
In the OCC/CER there is MSO,BTS,NMS,MMI etc. and at stations- BTS, leaky cables are used
in Tunnel sections.
Motorola make.IBS is Celcom make.

Master Clock System (MCS)

This is the Master clock system integrated with all other sub-systems for timing synchronization.
Mobatime make.

Central Supervising System (CSS)

Central supervising System is designed to monitor the Telecom Subsystem equipment that
include FOTS, Telephone, Radio(Tetra), BBRS/DCS, PAS, PIDS, CCTV, MCS, ACS and UPS
system. It is Athenta make.

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Figure 45: Onboard CBTC Network

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Figure 46: Onboard BBRS Network for onboard CCTV interface

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Figure 47: Carborne Controller (CC) General Environment

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Figure 48: Data Communication System (DCS) Architecture Phase I

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4.4 Functioning of CBTC

CBTC system determines the location of a train through transponder tags installed along the
track. During the train operation, the Zonal Controller (ZC) receives information from the Computer
Based Interlocking (CBI) and Carborrne Controllers (CC) and determines a train location map. Then, the
ZC establishes a Movement Authority (MA) based on the position report of all the travelling
trains and the condition of the trackside controller and then transmits the Movement Authority
(MA) to each train. The CC on each train controls the operation of the train based on the
received MA.

The boarding and detraining of passengers at platform levels is monitored through IP based
CCTV cameras inslalled in all stations.
Vital data from on-board CBTC and non-vital data from Backbone Routers (BBRS) to Operation
Control Centre (OCC) will be exchanged through Data Communication System (DCS).
Communication between OCC and loco pilot, maintenance staffs, Station Master, traffic
supervisor etc is done through TETRA network.

The visual communications to the passengers are provided through Passenger Information
Display System (PIDS) which have control equipments in Equipment Rooms of each Station, as
well as Operation Control Centre (OCC) and Backup Control Centre (BCC).
Audio communication with passengers at each Station is made through public address system.

4.5 List of Signalling Assets at E-W Metro Corridor

(A) Signals
Sr. Description Total
No. Nos.
1 Main Signal Mainline (3 aspect) 23
2 Main Signal Mainline (2 aspect) 2
3 Main Signal Mainline (1 aspect) 3
4 Main Signal Depot (2 aspect) 4
5 Main Signal Depot (1 aspect) 2
6 Shunt Signal Depot 30

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(B) Point Machines (Vossloh make)

Sr. Description Total
No. Nos.
1 Point Machine at Depot (trailable type) 28
2 Point Machine at Depot (Non-trailable type) 4
3 Point Machine at Mainline (Non-trailable type 19

(C) Axle Counters (Frauscher make)

Sr. Description Total
No. Nos.
1 Detection Point (Mainline + Depot) 128
2 Axle counter rack (mainline + depot) 9

(D) UPS (Vertiv make 3 phase online UPS (1+1) with load sharing basis)
Sr. Description Total Nos.
No.
1 For OCC 2X 160KVA
2 For Depot 2X 120KVA
3 For Interlocked Stn. (point zone) 2X 80KVA
4 For Non-interlocked Stn. (non-point zone) 2X 60KVA

(E) Electronic Interlocking (MICROLOK Hot standby configuration with

CC 3.20 executive version)
Sr. Description Total
No. Nos.
1 Microlok rack mainline 13
2 Microlok rack depot 6

(F) Platform Screen Door (PSD)

Sr. Description Total
No. Nos.
1 Platform Screen Door 24
2 Emergency Exit Door 25
3 Maintenance Service Door 2

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4.6 List of Telecom Assets at E-W Metro Corridor

Station: Sector V (SVSA)
Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-37
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor-15
2.DSLD -4
3.SSLD -6
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-184 2.Projector 20w-95
ACS 7
MCS 1. 8 Digital
2. 3 Analog

Station: Karunamoyeee (KESA)

Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-37
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor-11
2.DSLD -4
3.SSLD -6
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-55 2.Projector 20w-59
ACS 7
MCS 1. 8 Digital
2. 3 Analog

Station: Central Park (CPSA)

Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-33
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor- 15
2.DSLD -4
3.SSLD -5
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-54 2.Projector 20w-74
ACS 6
MCS 1. 8 Digital
2. 3 Analog

Station: City Centre (CCSC)

Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-33
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor-11
2.DSLD -4
3.SSLD -6
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-55 2.Projector Table
20w-68of Contents
ACS 7

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Telephone
MCS 1. 8 Digital
2. 3 Analog

Station: Bengal Chemical (BCSD)

Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-35
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor-11
2.DSLD -4
3.SSLD -6
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-32 2.Projector 20w-59
ACS 6
Telephone
MCS 1.8 Digital
2.3 Analog

Station: Salt Lake Stadium (SSSA)

Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-35
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor-11
2.DSLD -4
3.SSLD -6
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-72 2.Projector 20w-57
ACS 6
MCS 1. 8 Digital
2. 3 Analog

Station: Phool Bagan (PBGB)

Gear Description
CCTV 1.Camera-48
PIDS 1.LCD Monitor-7
2.DSLD -2
3.SSLD -6
PAS 1.Ceilling 6w-88 2.Projector 20w-41
ACS 7
MCS 7

CCTV CLOCK
Admin 11 33
yard 12 13
Work shop 16

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4.7 Building Requirements

At OCC
OCC (Operational Control Centre) Room with Video display and all workstations.

Central Equipment Room

Containing FOTS, DCS, GE, MSO, PIDS, PAS, ATS, ZC, Frontam cabinets and NMS of DCS,
Tetra, PIDS, PAS, CCTV, ACS, MCS etc.

Signalling Equipment Room for Depot

Containing Microlok racks,EN racks,VI Racks, PD1, PD2 racks etc.

Power Room
Containing 3 Phase UPS with standby and battery set.

Stations
Signalling Equipment Room, Telecom Equipment Room,UPS Room, Station Control Room etc.

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References

 Presentation slides on "Conventional Vs CABS Vs CBTC Signalling & their impact to

capacity" by Mr. Naeem M. Ali - Director & Principal Consultant, CBTC Solutions Inc.,
Toronto, Canada

 Radio communication for Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC): A tutorial and

Survey - by Mr. Jahanzeb Farooq, Member, IEEE, and Mr. José Soler, Member, IEEE
published in IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials in year 2017. (Downloaded
from orbit.dtu.dk).

 Procedure for Safety Certification and Technical Clearance of Metro Systems, December
2015 issued by Urban Transport & High Speed Directorate, RDSO, Lucknow

 Information on Kolkata East-West Metro Line 2 by Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation

Ltd., Kolkata.

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 KMRC Metro OCC (Operational Control Centre) located at Central Park Depot
Signalling and Train Control System Architecture Block Diagram KMRC-21001-03-2
Training Room
Training
Server

ATP-ATO Simulator Trainer

Microlok

21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"

Color Laser
Printer
Network Switch Central Park Depot DCC (Depot
Offline Playback Operational
Signalling Display ATP-ATO Simulator Trainee #1
Management Planning Centre Control Center Room)
Video
Overview Overview Overview Overview Overview Overview Controller
Display #1 Display #2 Display #3 Display #4 Display #5 Display #6 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
21.5"
70" 70" 70" 70" 70" 70"
Overview Overview
Overview Overview Overview Overview Overview Overview Overview
Plotter Display #1 Display #2
Display #7 Display #8 Display #9 Display #10 Display #11 Display #12 Display #13
70" 70"
70" 70" 70" 70" 70" 70" 70"
ATP-ATO Simulator Trainee #2
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" BCC at Howrah Station
13xHDMI Output Firewall α and β
Technician Depot Controller #1 Depot Controller #2
Traffic Controller #1 * 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
Workstation Traffic Controller #1 *
Driver Simulator Driver Simulator Driver Simulator 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Trainee #1 Trainee #2 Trainer 21.5"
Color Laser 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
21.5"
ATS Video Printer
Controller *
Chief Controller UPS Monitoring Chief Controller TEST TRACK Control
Maintenance WS Control Work Maintenance
WS Outdoor Signaling (Depot Signal Equipment Room) Station Station
Traffic Controller #2 * 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Traffic Controller #2 * 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
Model Room
Offline Playback 21.5"
21.5" 21.5"
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Color Laser 21.5"
21.5" Management 21.5"
21.5" Depot Monitoring Printers Second Monitor will not be
WS supplied by ASTS
Rolling Stock Controller 21.5" Rolling Stock Controller
Time Table Time Table Time Table Time Table Depot Local LAN “A”
21.5"
Traffic Controller Traffic Controller 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Management Management Traffic Controller Traffic Controller 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Management Management
VDU #1 Depot Local LAN “B”
Depot Monitoring VDU #2 Online Offline VDU #1 VDU #2 Online Offline
Crew Controller
WS 21.5" SMR ATP/ATO ROOM PPO ROOM
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" FronTam Work Technician WORKSHOP WORKSHOP
Signalling Maintenance Firewall Signalling Maintenance Firewall IVDU #1 IVDU #2 Station 3 Work Station
21.5" 21.5"
Controller α and β Controller α and β
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5"
21.5"
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Color Laser Color Laser
Printer Printer

OCC Local LAN “A” DCS DCS

BCC Local LAN “A”
Central Central

Depot CBI (Including TT)

AS Net α AS Net β DCS
OCC Local LAN “B” Rack Rack
BCC Local LAN “B”
Manager1 Manager2

DCS Direct
Connection
Application

`
DCS DCS
between Microlok
Microlok
Central Central OCC & BCC DCS DCS Servers
21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" 21.5" Rack Rack Central Central App &
App & 21.5" Firewall α Manager Manager Firewall α
Rack Rack 21.5"
SAN Firewall β 1 2
Firewall β
Manager1 Manager2 SAN Comm
Comm Color Laser
Server
Server Printer A/C-EV

FrontAm 1 Database Maintenance Work Station #1 Maintenance Software Technician FrontAm 1 Maintenance Fire Fighting Indoor Signaling Database FrontAm 2 FrontAm 2 SER
Server OCC-CER Team #1 Development WS Workstation Workstation Room Operator Model Room Workstation BCC-CER
Server

DCS Backbone A

DCS Backbone B

“Small
“Small “Small “Small “Small “Small “Small Rings” “Small “Small
Rings” Rings” “Small “Small “Small Rings” Rings” Rings”
Rings” Rings” Rings”
Rings” Rings” Rings”
AP
AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP AP
AP AP AP AP AP
AP α β
α β α β α β α α β α β α β α β
β α β α β
α β

DCS SER SCR

SER SER SER SER SER SER SER SER SER SER SER
DCS DCS SCR DCS SCR DCS DCS SCR
21. DCS DCS
ZC2 21.
DCS 21. DCS DCS SCR DCS
5" 21. 21.
AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net
5"
AS Net AS Net
5"
5"
AS Net
5"
AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net E/W AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net AS Net
α β ATS WS / LATSS α β α β α β α β M/L α β α β ZC1
α β
ATS WS / LATSS ATS WS / LATSS α β α β α β ATS WS / LATSS α β ATS WS / LATSS
Non- Interlocking Station

Non- Interlocking Station

Non- Interlocking Station

Non- Interlocking Station

E/W

Non- Interlocking Station

Non- Interlocking Station

Non- Interlocking Station

21.
5" and 21.
5"
21.
5" 21. 21.
M/L 5"
Interlocking Station (CBI)

5"

Interlocking Station (CBI)

Depot
Interlocking Station (CBI)

Interlocking Station (CBI)

Interlocking Station (CBI)
IVDU
SCR SCR SCR TT IVDU IVDU IVDU
21.
SCR SCR SCR IVDU
SCR
CCR 5"
21.
5"
21.
5" CCR
21.
5"
21.
5"
21.
5"
21.
CCR
5"
21.
5" ` 21.
21.
5"
5"
ATS WS ATS WS ATS WS ATS WS ATS WS ATS WS ATS WS
CREW CTL WS CREW CTL WS
Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok
CREW CTL WS
Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok Microlok
Microlok 21.
5"
Microlok 21. Microlok Microlok 21.
Microlok Microlok Microlok 21.
5" 5"
Microlok 21.
5" Microlok 5"

MAINT WS / LATSS MAINT WS / LATSS MAINT WS / LATSS

MAINT WS / LATSS MAINT WS / LATSS
21. 21.
21.
5" 5" 21. 21.
5"
5" 5"

TECH WS A/C- EV A/C- EV A/C- EV TECH WS A/C- EV TECH WS

A/C- EV A/C- EV
A/C-EV SMR A/C-EV A/C-EV TECH WS A/C- EV TECH WS
CARD CARD CARD SMR CARD SMR CARD A/C-EV SMR A/C-EV SMR
CARD CARD

PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD PSD

PSD PSD PSD

FIELD DEVICES FIELD DEVICES FIELD DEVICES FIELD DEVICES FIELD DEVICES
New Mahakaran
Howrah Station

Bengal Chemical
(Underground)

Salt lake Stadium

(Underground)

(Underground)

Salt Lake Sector V

Howrah Maidan

(Underground)
(Underground)

(Underground)

Karunamoyee
Phoolbagan
Esplanade

City Centre
(Elevated)

(Elevated)

Central Park

(Elevated)
(Elevated)

(Elevated)
(Elevated)
Sealdah

SCR, SMR, CCR workstations will have redundant connectivity with α,β network of DCS

Access Access Access Access

DCS Backbone A Point α 1 Point β 1 Point α n Point α n
DCS Backbone B

Air-Gap

Mobile Mobile
Radio α Radio β

CBTC Train CBTC Train

Ethernet CC CC
Ethernet

CBTC Beacon CBTC Beacon CBTC Beacon

#01 #02 #nn

Axle Counter Cardfile

Axle Counter Cardfile EVALUATOR & I/O CARD
EVALUATOR CARD

Architecture For CBI Stations

Architecture For Non CBI Stations

AXLE Counter Configuration “FRAUSCHER”

Contractor: Employer’s Representative: Employer: KMRC METRO RAIL PROJECT

CBTC SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation Kolkata Metro Rail Corporation (KMRC-21001-04-2)
Ansaldo STS Consortium Page 1 of 1
 Quality Policy

“We at RDSO Lucknow are committed to maintain and update

transparent standards of services to develop safe, modern and cost

effective railway technology complying with statutory and regulatory

requirements, through excellence in research, designs and standards by

setting quality objectives, commitment to satisfy applicable requirements

and continual improvements of the quality management system to cater

to growing needs, demand and expectations of passenger and freight

traffic on the railways through periodic review of quality management

systems to achieve continual improvement and customer appreciation. It

is communicated and applied within the organization and making it

available to all the relevant interested parties.”

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 INDIAN RAILWAYS
Centre for Advanced Maintenance Technology
Maharajpur, Gwalior (M.P.) Pin Code – 474 005