SANTOS vs.

SANTOS 
366 SCRA 395 
 The petitioner ZENAIDA on the other hand denied the material
allegations in the complaint and that she further alleged that the
FACTS:
respondents’ right to reconveyance was already barred by
prescription and laches considering the fact that from the date of
sale from Rosa to Salvador up to his death, more or less twelve
(12) years had lapsed, and from his death up to the filing of the
 Petitioner Zenaida M. Santos is the widow of Salvador Santos
case for reconveyance, four (4) years has elapsed.
 Brother of widower-- private respondents Calixto, Alberto,
Antonio, all surnamed Santos and Rosa Santos-Carreon. 
 In other words, it took respondents about sixteen (16) years to
file the case. Moreover, petitioner argues that an action to annul
The spouses Jesus and Rosalia were the parents of the
a contract for lack of consideration prescribes in ten (10) years
respondents and the husband of the petitioner.
and even assuming that the cause of action has not prescribed,
 The spouses JESUS AND ROSALIA owned a parcel of registered
respondents are guilty of laches for their inaction for a long
land + a four-door apartment administered by Rosalia who
period of time. 
rented them out.

 On January 19, 1959, the spouses executed a deed of sale of the  RTC/CA Ruling
properties in favor of their children Salvador and Rosa.
The trial court decided in favor of private respondents in as
 Rosa in turn sold her share to Salvador on November 20, 1973, much as the deeds of sale were fictitious, the action to assail the
which resulted in the issuance of new TCT. Despite the transfer same does not prescribe. 
of the property to Salvador, Rosalia continued to lease and
receive rentals from the apartment units.  Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision. It held that the subject deeds of sale did not confer
On January 9, 1985, Salvador died, followed by Rosalia who died upon Salvador the ownership over the subject property, because
the following month. Shortly after, petitioner Zenaida, claiming even after the sale, the original vendors remained in dominion,
to be Salvador’s heir, demanded the rent from Antonio control, and possession thereof. 
Hombrebueno, a tenant of Rosalia.
ISSUE: Whether or not the cause of action of the respondents
 When the latter refused to pay, Zenaida filed an ejectment suit had prescribed and/or barred by laches. 
against him with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, which
eventually decided in Zenaida’s favor.  RULING: No, the cause of action by the respondents had not
prescribed nor is it barred by laches. 
 Arguments:
First, the right to file an action for the reconveyance of the
subject property to the estate of Rosalia has not prescribed since
On January 5, 1989, private respondent instituted an action for
deeds of sale were simulated and fictitious.
reconveyance of property with preliminary injunction against
petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where they
The complaint amounts to a declaration of nullity of a
alleged that the two deeds of sale were simulated for lack of
void contract, which is imprescriptible. Hence, respondents’
consideration.
 cause of action has not prescribed.  These requisite proofs we find present in this case. As admitted by
petitioner, despite the sale, Jesus and Rosalia continued to possess
Second, neither is their action barred by laches. and administer the property and enjoy its fruits by leasing it to third
persons.10 
The elements of laches are:
Both Rosa and Salvador did not exercise any right of ownership over
it.11 Before the second deed of sale to transfer her share over the
1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom
property was executed by Rosa, Salvador still sought she permission of
he claims, giving rise to the situation of which the complainant his mother.12 Further, after Salvador registered the property in
seeks a remedy; his name, he surrendered the title to his mother. 13 These are
clear indications that ownership still remained with the original
2) delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant owners. In Serrano vs. CA, 139 SCRA 179, 189 (1985), we held that
having knowledge or notice of the defendant’s conduct as having the continued collection of rentals from the tenants by the seller of
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; realty after execution of alleged deed of sale is contrary to the notion
of ownership.
3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right in which he bases his Petitioner argues that Salvador, in allowing her mother to use the
suit; and property even after the sale, did so out of respect for her and out of
generosity, a factual matter beyond the province of this
Court.14 Significantly, in Alcos vs. IAC 162 SCRA 823, 837 (1988), we
4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
noted that the buyer's immediate possession and occupation of the
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
property corroborated the truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of
These elements must all be proved positively. The lapse of four sale. Conversely, the vendor's continued possession of the property
(4) years is not an unreasonable delay sufficient to bar makes dubious the contract of sale between the parties.
respondent’s action. Moreover, the fourth (4th) element is
lacking in this case. The concept of laches is not concerned with On the second issue, is a sale through a public instrument tantamount
the lapse of time but only with the effect of unreasonable lapse. to delivery of the thing sold?
The alleged sixteen (16) years of respondents’ inaction has no
adverse effect on the petitioner to make respondents guilty of ZENAIDA in her memorandum invokes Article 1477 15 of the Civil Code
laches. which provides that ownership of the thing sold is transferred to the
vendee upon its actual or constructive delivery.

WON Jesus and Rosalia still owned the property even if already sold to Article 1498, in turn, provides that when the sale is made through a
Salvador because the spouses continued to pay the realty taxes and public instrument, its execution is equivalent to the delivery of the
possess the property. She argues that tax declarations are not thing subject of the contract. Petitioner avers that applying said
conclusive evidence of ownership when not supported by evidence. provisions to the case, Salvador became the owner of the subject
She avers that Salvador allowed his mother to possess the property property by virtue of the two deeds of sale executed in his favor.
out of respect to her in accordance with Filipino values.
Nowhere in the Civil Code, however, does it provide that
It is true that neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for execution of a deed of sale is a conclusive presumption of
taxation purposes constitute sufficient proof of ownership. They must delivery of possession.
be supported by other effective proofs.9 
The Code merely said that the execution shall be equivalent to
delivery. The presumption can be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence.16 Presumptive delivery can be negated by
the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land
sold.17

In Danguilan vs. IAC, 168 SCRA 22, 32 (1988), we held that for the
execution of a public instrument to effect tradition, the purchaser must
be placed in control of the thing sold. When there is no impediment to
prevent the thing sold from converting to tenancy of the purchaser by
the sole will of the vendor, symbolic delivery through the execution of
a public instrument is sufficient. But if, notwithstanding the execution
of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy nor make use of it himself or through another in his
name, then delivery has not been effected.

As found by both the trial and appellate courts and amply supported
by the evidence on record, Salvador was never placed in control of the
property. The original sellers retained their control and possession.
Therefore, there was no real transfer of ownership.

Moreover, in Norkis Distributors, Inc. vs. CA, 193 SCRA 694, 698-699

In the instant case, although the spouses Jesus and Rosalia

On the third issue, petitioner argues that from the date of the sale
from Rosa to Salvador on November 20, 1973, up to his death on
January 9, 1985, more or less twelve years had lapsed, and from his
death up to the filing of the case for reconveyance in the court a
quo on January 5, 1989, four years had lapsed. In other words, it took
respondents about sixteen years to file the case below. Petitioner
argues that an action to annul a contract for lack of consideration
prescribes in ten years and even assuming that the cause of action has
not prescribed, respondents are guilty of laches for their inaction for a
long period of time.