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© 1999 Michael Rosenberg
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Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Rosenberg, Michael, 1954-

Bridge, Zia... and me

ISBN 978-1-55494-015-8

1. Rosenberg, Michael, 1954- . 2. Mahmood, Zia. 3. Bridge

players — United States — Biography. I. Title

GV1282.26.R67A3 1999 795.41’5’092 C98-932-696-9

Editor Karen McCallum

Cover and Interior design Olena S. Sullivan

Printed and bound in Canada

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 99
To Edgar Kaplan, who represented all that is
good and fair in the game of bridge. Through his
writing and our memory of his words, he lives on
as the most positive influence ever to touch the
game we love.
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, major thanks must go to my editor and proofread-

er, Karen McCallum. Thanks to her, I have advanced from
computer illiterate to computer idiot.
Over the years, I had noticed that, whenever I discov-
ered a mistake in analysis in The Bridge World, invariably, a
few months later, there would be a letter from John H.
Lindsey III pointing out said error (there were also letters
pointing out errors that I had missed). Therefore, I con-
ceived the idea of asking Mr. Lindsey to check the bridge
analysis in this book, and he agreed to do so. Particular
thanks to John Hathaway Lindsey III.
Special thanks to Zia, who was the inspiration for this
book, and for everything that fascinates me about the game
of bridge. He taught me so much about the game, and
revealed its beauty to me.
I would like to thank all of my other bridge mentors (in
temporal order) — Colin Weir, Brian Spears, Barnet
Shenkin, Victor Silverstone, Tony Priday, Ira Rubin,
Matthew Granovetter, Pamela Granovetter, Debbie
Rosenberg and Michael Kamil. All of these people talked at
length with me about the game and added to my knowl-
edge at various times during my playing career. Also,
thanks to Edgar Kaplan, whose writings were the source of
my knowledge regarding ethics in bridge.
I have tried to thank those responsible for contributing
hands as they come up in the book. I am unclear as to the
true origin of some of the hands. For example, after I had
completed this book, but before it was published, I read
Ottlik and Kelsey's Adventures in Card Play for the first
time. I noticed three or four hands that had the same
theme as hands in the ‘My Favorite Hands’ chapter. But I
had learned these hands from different sources in the mid-
70's, while that book was not published till the early 80's. I
only feel a little guilty since, when I wrote my book, I was
not aware that these hands had already appeared in a book.
As to the authenticity of all the hands in the book, I have
endeavored to be completely truthful. If I write that I wit-
nessed something which happened, then I did. If I write
that someone told me something happened, then that is all
I know about it.
I apologize to anyone whom I accidentally failed to
thank.
Finally, I would like to thank Debbie, who put up with
me during all the time it took me to complete this book.

Michael Rosenberg
 FOREWORD

As you read this book, you will find, as I have discovered

through some twenty-five years of friendship, that Michael
has the most fascinating mind for bridge you will ever
encounter.
It is a well known ‘secret’ in the expert community that,
if Rosenberg can’t solve it, the problem is too difficult! So
it is fair to warn you that this is not a book for the casual
reader. I advise you to fasten your seat belt, for the journey
will not be short — but it will be rewarding.
The scope will range enormously — he might intro-
duce you to an innocuous-looking combination such as:
Dummy
♠ 10 5
N
W E
S

Declarer
♠ KQ

How would you play 3NT on the lead of a spade? (Play the
ten to confuse West as to the location of the nine.)
Or he might be showing you one of his fifteen ‘gems’ —
frustratingly ingenious hands, many of which will give you
sleepless nights. Some are so difficult that, even after read-
ing the answer, I defy you to return to the book a week later
and solve them!
As you read his story, you will soon relate to the
author’s infectious love for the game. His views on ethics
are frank and outspoken — but he makes no excuses for
dealing in detail with this often-neglected subject, for it is
very dear to his heart.
All those who aspire to the top will not be able to do
without this book, but it will provide the most pleasure for
those who, like me, are happily addicted to the passion that
is bridge.
Anyone can win a world championship! At the expert
level today, the competition has become so fierce that there
is little to choose between the top players and teams. (Just
look at the results of the last ten years.) This truth makes
it all the more amazing that, at the 1998 World
Championships in Lille, there was one player with so great
a reputation that it would have created a bigger stir if he
had not won the gold medal, than he actually did by win-
ning.
That player was, of course, Michael Rosenberg. That
event was the World Par Contest, easily the most challeng-
ing event devised to date.
But, the label, ‘greatest technician of the game’ has a
sterile sound, which does injustice to the versatility of his
great talent.

Zia
 CONTENTS

AN OPENING WORD

1. MEETING ZIA 13

2. EARLY DAYS 31

3. AMERICA 41

4. MY FAVORITE HANDS 61

5. MAJOR REGRETS 105

6. HODGEPODGE 115

7. ETHICS 155

8. WORLD CHAMPIONSHIP 185

A FINAL WORD
 AN
OPENING
WORD

These are my ramblings about me and bridge: what I find

fascinating, what I find funny, and what I want to say. I
hope you enjoy reading about my thoughts and experi-
ences as much as I enjoyed reminiscing about them.
The author during play in the 1976 Sunday Times Pairs event, with
partner Barnet Shenkin. The opponents are Leon Tintner (France)
and Leon Yallouze (Egypt).
 c h a p t e r o n e

MEETING
ZIA
London, 1975

“Five spades.”
“Double.”
“Redouble!”
I was drawn by what Jack London (had he been a bridge
player) would have named ‘the call of the slam.’ True, five
spades redoubled was not a slam, but in some ways it was
better, so I walked over to the table to see what was hap-
pening. The first thing I observed was a good-looking,
dark-skinned young man — there was something unusual-
ly flamboyant about him.
The diamond ten had been led. Dummy was tabled, and this
is what I (and he) saw:

Meeting Zia 13
 Dummy
♠ 10 7 4 2
♥ A963
♦ 54
♣ A53

N
W E
S

Flamboyant Declarer
♠ AKQJ5
♥ 54
♦ KQJ72
♣ 6

East won the ♦A and returned the three. Without pausing

for a nanosecond, our hero inserted the seven. West ruffed,
but the hand was over. I was amazed, not only by the play
(he had played East to have made the error of not return-
ing a higher diamond) but also by the speed of execution.
Of course, I realized that the bidding (which I never dis-
covered) may have made the play obvious, but even so I
was impressed.
“Who is that?” I asked Steve, the club manager.
“Who? Oh, him — that’s Marmalade.”
“Who?” I persisted.
“Mar... er... Zia Mahmood. He’s from Pakistan. He’s
weird, but he can make some good plays.”

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

That evening, I played my first rubber with Zia. On the

first hand I held, as dealer:

14 Bridge, Zia... and me

 ♠ A ♥ 10 x x x ♦ 10 x x x ♣ Qxxx

I passed, LHO passed, and Zia opened 3♣. RHO doubled and
I, in my innocence, bid 5♣. After two passes RHO doubled
again, which concluded the bidding. As was customary,
declarer and dummy exchanged hands — Zia had a big smile
all over his face. I looked at his hand and saw a blur of small
cards, not more than four of which were clubs! The shock
prevented me from determining his exact hand — we were
playing for money! Meanwhile the club king had been led,
and Zia inspected the dummy studiously. After a moment, he
announced, “I’ll settle for one down.” There was no reaction.
“All right, two down.” The opponents were wavering. “Okay,
three down, but that’s my last offer.” They threw their cards in
and took +500.
My bridge ‘education’ had begun.
My classroom was Stefan’s Bridge Club, which was situat-
ed near Marble Arch in London (the club has since closed
down). I got the most important part of my bridge training
there, in one cramped, crowded, smoke-filled room, at the
top of a narrow flight of stairs. For a little over eighteen
months I played there almost every day from 2:00 p.m. until
midnight, and frequently later. The only exceptions I can
remember are the trips I took to play bridge in Philadelphia,
Vittel, New York, Juan-les-Pins and Copenhagen; the week-
long trip to Rome that I won in a bridge tournament; and the
day I went to see Hampton Court Palace (with Zia). I lived,
ate, drank and slept bridge, and Stefan’s was the perfect set-
ting for me.
When I first came to London, I was living in the house
of my friend Victor Silverstone. Victor had been part of
Scotland’s strongest partnership (with Willie Coyle), until
he moved to London. His house was in Bushy Heath,
about ten miles outside of London, and I stayed there with
Victor, his wife, Linda, and their four young children. They

Meeting Zia 15
 showed me great hospitality and made my life very easy. I
would come back in the early hours of the morning, or
sometimes not at all, but they never demurred, even
though it must have been somewhat disruptive having me
there. Eventually, I rented a flat close to the bridge club.

CHANGING THE RULES

Zia was my teacher — although he wasn’t aware of it. To
be sure, I taught him some things too, about technical
aspects of card-play, but I soon learned that technique was
relatively unimportant in the long run. Who you were
playing against was at least as important as what cards they
played. What mattered was making unmakable contracts
and breaking unbreakable ones. Zia didn’t play by what I
had thought of as the ‘rules.’ Take for example the follow-
ing layout:
Dummy
92
N
W E
J864 75
S

Declarer
A K Q 10 3
The ‘rules’ state that declarer makes four tricks and the
defense one; but if Zia knew (or even thought) that West
had length, he would unhesitatingly lead small from hand.
Of course, this meant that he would occasionally go down
in a cold contract (East having Jx), but it was simply a mat-
ter of probability. A side advantage of this philosophy was
that it was difficult to play and defend hands against him,
since you couldn’t rely on him playing a ‘normal’ card.
Here is another instructive situation which showed the

16 Bridge, Zia... and me

change in my thinking:
Dummy
10 5
N
W E
S

Declarer
AKQ6

B.Z.* (presuming that a 6-1 break is precluded by the bid-

ding, so that stiff jack is not a consideration), I would have
thought that the best chance for four tricks lay in finding
West with precisely 987; but now it was a question of
whether to lead small to the ten, or to hope that the ten
wasn’t covered. This might hinge more upon whom I was
playing against than anything else.

NOT THE BEST

Zia was not the only interesting player at Stefan’s — in fact,
thinking back, most of the regulars seemed like characters
out of Victor Mollo’s menagerie. Before I had played at the
club a week, I heard stories about one player (I’ll call him
‘Enzo’), whom Steve (the manager) had told me was clearly
the worst player in the world. One story, which appears in
Zia’s book Bridge My Way, tells of how Enzo defended seven
notrump doubled on lead with two aces and, of course,
failed to defeat it. Another tale went as follows: Enzo held

♠ xxx ♥ AKQxxxxx ♦ xx ♣ —

The bidding proceeded: 1♥ to Enzo’s left, double, 2♣.

* Before Zia

Meeting Zia 17
 Enzo chose to pass, and his LHO bid 2♥. Partner doubled
again and there the bidding rested. He led the heart ace
which, as you have no doubt noticed, was a tad precipitate
as it was not his lead. The club manager on duty was called
to the table to give a ruling. When his amusement had sub-
sided (upon discovering that Enzo was defending 2♥ dou-
bled without ever having made a bid), he explained declar-
er’s rights. Declarer then said to Enzo’s partner, “Lead a
trump.” So he led a spade.
This was what Enzo saw:
Dummy
N ♠ AQx
W E ♥ —
♦ xxxx
S
♣ 9xxxxx
Enzo
♠ xxx
♥ AKQxxxxx
♦ xx
♣ —
The opening spade lead ran to the jack, and declarer played
the heart jack. Enzo, simultaneously giggling and counting
on his fingers, ducked. Declarer now played the heart ten.
After more giggling and counting, Enzo figured that
declarer had to make another trick in this suit, so he
ducked again! Declarer now cashed the ace-king of dia-
monds, finessed the queen of spades and cashed the ace
before leading a third diamond from dummy. Declarer’s
full hand was:

♠ Jxx ♥ J 10 9 8 7 ♦ AK ♣Kxx

2♥ doubled made!
Although I heard each of these stories from more than
one source, I did not, could not, believe them. Would you?

18 Bridge, Zia... and me

 ♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Soon afterwards, Enzo came into the club and I had the
chance to observe him in action. This was an early hand:

Dummy
♠ xx
♥ xx
♦ KJx
♣ AKQxxx
Enzo
♠ Qxx N
♥ KQxx W E
♦ xxxx
S
♣ xx

I don’t remember the bidding, but the contract was 4♠ after

declarer had bid both majors. Enzo led a diamond, and the
trick continued king, ace, small. His partner returned the
ace and a small heart. Enzo won and shifted to... yes, you
guessed it — a trump! Declarer held:

♠ AKJxx ♥ J 10 x x x ♦ x ♣ J x,

and now made the hand. I began to wonder if those stories

were indeed true.
I remember once cutting Enzo and picking up a twen-
ty-count. Thoughtlessly, I said, ‘Stop, 2NT.’ (‘Stop’ is the
British equivalent of ‘Skip-bid, please wait.’) Of course,
Enzo passed with his seven-count. The sight of dummy
evoked a smile from my LHO, British international Robert
Sheehan — the only time I can recall him showing any
emotion at the table.
Another amazing, authentic, Enzo debacle:

Meeting Zia 19
 Dummy
♠ 9x
♥ xx
♦ AJ9
♣ K J 10 x x x
N
W E
S

Enzo
♠ Axxx
♥ AKQxx
♦ K4
♣ xx

Zia ? Me Enzo
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♥
pass 2♣ pass 2NT
pass 3♣ pass 3NT
dbl pass pass redbl
all pass

Zia led a spade to my jack, which our hero ducked. I played

the spade queen which Enzo ducked. Zia overtook with
the king and continued with the spade ten, which was
ducked (!) — dummy and I both pitched hearts. Zia, fig-
uring that Enzo couldn’t duck many more spades, shifted
to the three of diamonds. Enzo studied this with great
intensity, and the longer he thought, and the more he per-
spired, the clearer it became that it was vital to his well-
being to guess from which diamond Zia had led away.
Finally, he played the nine, and when I produced the ten he
was so agitated that he won the king and immediately shot
back the four. This was the full deal:

20 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy
♠ 9x
♥ xx
♦ AJ9
♣ K J 10 x x x
Zia Me
♠ K 10 8 x x N ♠ QJ
♥ J 10 x x W E ♥ xx
♦ 32
S
♦ Q 10 8 7 6 5
♣ Qx ♣ A9x
Enzo
♠ Axxx
♥ AKQxx
♦ K4
♣ xx

I won the queen and cleared diamonds. Enzo now com-

pleted the debacle by trying the club king, so the final tally
was -2800. Not bad for a hand which, on normal play,
would produce +1350 or +1750. Zia had doubled because,
in his thinking, he needed a reason not to double Enzo.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

If you play enough rubber bridge, you’ll see almost every-

thing. I remember being on lead against the simple auc-
tion 1NT-4♠. I led my singleton club trying for a ruff, and
got it at trick one. Another hand I heard about (but did not
see) produced a result of three notrump doubled making
with two overtricks, with 150 honors against.
(Think about it.)

Meeting Zia 21
 THE STYLE
Through Zia, I developed a ‘style’ of dummy play in which
the ability to make the contract was considered to be the
most pertinent factor. Thus, we would prefer to play a slam
which required guessing a queen to one which had a 65%
chance of success.
We hated to commit ourselves early in the hand — even
when it was clearly correct to do so. For example, if the
opponents led a suit in which dummy had KJxx and we
had Ax, we would never play the jack at trick one, even
though there are many hands where it is ‘necessary’ as a
discovery play. Our thinking was that we would ‘find’ the
queen anyway after playing low, either from RHO’s behav-
ior at trick one, or through other information gained later
in the hand. (This is one example of something we later
had to adjust when playing against ‘real’ players.)
Another aspect of ‘The Style’ concerned drawing
trumps. Most educators teach that you should draw
trumps unless you have a good reason not to do so. Zia
and I had the opposite philosophy. We preferred not to
touch trumps until we could control the hand regardless of
how they broke. (This applied more stringently to
partscore deals.) Even today, when the right play is obvi-
ously to draw trumps, it takes me a few extra seconds to
drag the card out of my hand.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Traditional wisdom says that notrump contracts are a race

to establish tricks. You play your best suit, and they play
theirs. Zia wisdom differed: if he sometimes played their
best suit, maybe they would attack his best suit. I have wit-
nessed this strategy succeed many times, even when it
should have been obvious to the defenders. An example of

22 Bridge, Zia... and me

this in action can be seen later in this book. Here is an
illustrative hand which I invented:

Dummy
♠ K J 10 6
♥ 752
♦ J 10 8
♣ 752

N
W E
S

Declarer
♠ AQ4
♥ KQJ9
♦ 752
♣ J 10 8

You open a weak notrump and play it there. West leads a

spade and you win the jack in dummy. Most people would
play a heart now, but you know that they will likely win the
first or second round and cash their minors. At match-
points, you might try to sneak one heart through and run
with five tricks, but at IMPs or rubber bridge you would
rather try to make the hand. Win the spade in dummy and
play a club toward the jack. This might succeed in either of
two ways. Firstly, East may rise and shift to a heart, and if
West has the ace you will probably make one notrump.
Secondly, if West wins the club, a heart shift from, say,
♥10xx, may look the most attractive from his viewpoint —
and again you may well make the contract.
Note that despite the fact that you have equal combined
holdings in the minors, it is clear to attack clubs; dummy’s
diamond holding can act as a deterrent. You should also
note that it is remotely possible that the club jack will win

Meeting Zia 23
 the trick, West ducking the ace and East playing low with
the king-queen. Probably your best shot now is a diamond,
creating total confusion. Strangely, West may now defeat a
hand that might have made had he won the club!

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Playing with a weak partner against Zia one afternoon at

Stefan’s, I recall a hand which had a unique feature. I, vul-
nerable against not, held:

♠ Qxxx ♥ KJxxx ♦ J ♣ J xx

He and my partner passed, and RHO opened 1♣. I passed,

Zia responded 1♦, partner bid 1♥ and RHO cuebid 2♥. I
began to ponder the best tactical bid. After about ten sec-
onds had elapsed, Zia turned impatiently toward me and
said, “It makes no difference.”
“What do you mean?” I asked, confused.
“Just do something,” he said.
I bid 4♥. He bid 4NT, followed by 6♦ which was cold.
(The Anti-Key-Card-Blackwood faction will be pleased to
know that he was missing an ace and the trump king, but
this did not discomfit him since the trump suit was
A1098xxx facing Qxxx.) He had been thinking that he was
bidding slam, and that I was never going to prolong the
rubber by sacrificing; so what I did was irrelevant (he was
right). Sure, people have told their opponents that “it
makes no difference” before, but not during the bidding.

THE DOCTOR IS IN
Another memorable character at Stefan’s was the late Dr.
Alan Manch. Besides being a good player, he had a con-
stant stream of dry wit which I found entertaining. He

24 Bridge, Zia... and me

would call Zia ‘twisted and perverted’, but I think he secret-
ly held a great respect for him.
The doctor once showed me the following suit-combi-
nation:
Dummy
J875
N
W E
S

Declarer
AQ96

“How do you play for three tricks?” he inquired.

“I know this one,” I answered. “Most people cash the
ace and try to guess who has king-ten fourth, but the right
play is small to the queen, followed by cashing the ace if it
loses. This pays off only to a bare king with West.”
“Correct. And what if you are in your hand with only
one entry to dummy?”
I took a few seconds and said, “The ace is still wrong. I
lead the queen, and subsequently play so that I lose only to
a bare king in either hand.”
“You’re too good,” he said, slightly crestfallen.
I comforted him with, “It’s a really nice combination.
I’m glad you taught it to me.”
Notice, however, that in the latter case, when playing
against opponents who always play the deuce when they
hold the three or the four or both (and always play the three
when holding the four), playing the ace is as good as the
queen, since only when opponents play the three and the
deuce do you have a guess.
In fact, most suit-combinations should not be played in
a vacuum — the opponents are part of the problem.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Meeting Zia 25
 Suit-combinations fascinated me, and continue to do
so. My favorite back then was:
Dummy
Q 10 8 7 6
N
W E
S

Declarer
A5

Looking for four tricks, you play the ace and everyone fol-
lows small — what now? It’s exactly even, you say. Why are
you wasting my time? I’ll come back to that.
Now suppose that, when you play the ace, it goes small,
small, nine. Small to the queen becomes the ‘percentage’
play since it gains against J9 and J9x, and loses only to K9x.
But wait a minute! This means that a smart RHO will play
the nine from K9x, but not from J9x. So maybe the ‘right’
play is small to the ten. And going back to the original
proposition, what can be inferred from RHO’s failure to
play the nine? Perhaps the queen is now the percentage
guess. And what if it goes ace, small, small, jack? Is that
king-jack doubleton? Jack-nine doubleton? J9x?

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

There were some terrible players at Stefan’s, but we did

have some really strong games. When the table consisted
of any four of Zia, myself, Sam Lev, Irving Rose, Rob
Sheehan and Martin Hoffman, I found the game even
more exciting than usual. As it happened, I was extremely
successful in strong games (I randomly held good cards). I
learned through Zia not to complain about bad luck.
Instead, when I lost, I would focus on my own shortcom-

26 Bridge, Zia... and me

ings. The only time I can recall Zia complaining was this:
after I had won eight consecutive rubbers in a strong game,
I cut Manch and said, “C’mon, Doctor. It’s your turn to
win a rubber.”
“It’s your turn to lose one, you mean,” said Zia with a
glare. (I won the rubber.)

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Two other interesting characters at Stefan’s were Sam Lev

and Martin Hoffman. Both were undisciplined bidders (a
plus at Stefan’s, where defenses were rarely top-notch),
brilliant card-players, lightning analysts (mostly accurate)
and complete result merchants. They were both hard on
their partners, and had great table presence.
I remember I sometimes baited Martin when I watched
or played at his table. During a hand, I would silently ana-
lyze the play of some contract other than the one that was
being declared. Then, after the hand, I would make a com-
ment such as, “Your side could have made two spades,” or,
“You can defeat four clubs.” I didn’t care that the contract
had actually been three notrump or four hearts. I had seen
something fascinating or tricky, and I taunted Martin with
it. He would invariably argue but, no matter how good he
was, he couldn’t out-analyze me when I had had time to
think about a position and he had not.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

In bidding, Zia and I were notably different. By nature, he

was an overbidder, and I an underbidder. Despite this con-
trast, one similarity which we shared was the childlike thrill
we got out of bidding small slams. Perhaps that’s why I

Meeting Zia 27
 adopted his phony cuebid weapon as part of my arsenal.
The purpose of a fake cuebid or trial bid was to prevent
that lead against a game or slam. Rubber bridge was the
perfect setting for this, since partner generally had no more
idea than the opponents of what was going on, and there-
fore nothing untoward was taking place (not that we knew
anything about ethics in those days). As some of the
smarter players caught on, you could mix it up a bit and
cuebid the suit you actually wanted led.
Of course, this strategy could easily backfire, and Zia
(or I) would be left looking silly. But it was a fundamental
law of ‘The Style’ that we did not care how we looked. How
many times have you said, or heard another player say, “I
felt he had that, but I couldn’t play for it because it was too
much against the odds”? Why not? How else can you ever
test the validity of your ‘feelings’?

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Zia was also more flamboyant on opening lead than I but,

although my initial reaction was scornful, I eventually
came to realize that there could be justification for ‘flashy’
leads. I once held, as West:

♠ AJ53 ♥ K 10 7 4 2 ♦ Q72 ♣ 5

The bidding was:

NORTH SOUTH
1♠
2♣ 3♠
4♦ 4♥
4♠ pass

As early as North’s 4♦ bid, I started planning my defense.

28 Bridge, Zia... and me

Clearly, I had two trump tricks, but it would be nice if I
could score a third trump by ruffing a club. I could lead a
club and try to find partner’s entry after winning the spade
ace. That entry could not be in diamonds, not only
because partner didn’t double 4♦, but also because, with
the opponents trying for slam, there was no room for him
to hold a king. No, it would have to be the heart queen.
But if I led a club, won the spade ace, and shifted to the
heart king, declarer might see what was happening and
duck. This was the full deal:
Dummy
♠ 96
♥ J953
♦ AK5
♣ AJ86
Me
♠ AJ53 N ♠ 7
♥ K 10 7 4 2 W E ♥ Q6
♦ Q72 ♦ 10 9 8 4 3
S
♣ 5 ♣ 10 9 4 3 2

♠ K Q 10 8 4 2
♥ A8
♦ J6
♣ KQ7

I led the heart king. Declarer won, crossed to a diamond,

and played a spade. I won, shifted to a club, and set the
game. (Declarer could have made the hand by ducking the
heart at trick one, but who would do that?) B.Z., such a
lead would not have even occurred to me.
At that time in my career, I had no trepidation in play-
ing my feelings: that was one of my strengths. But, despite
all I had learned from Zia, I was more aware than ever of
how much more there was to discover.

Meeting Zia 29
 c h a p t e r t w o

EARLY
DAYS
Glasgow, 1970

What about life before Stefan’s?

I don’t remember exactly how I learned bridge — there
were two introductions. In 1970, when I was sixteen, my
father signed up for bridge lessons and bought a bridge
book for beginners. He dropped out after a couple of
lessons and never read the book. I found the book and
read it. At about the same time my high school started a
bridge club which I joined.
I had been playing chess seriously, but was becoming
frustrated over my lack of improvement. I had represent-
ed Scotland in the Students’ (under-27) Team Olympiads
in East Germany (1969) and Israel (1970), and was soon to

Early Days 31
 compete in the (individual) World Junior Chess
Championships in Greece. Having shown great promise
earlier (I had beaten the Scottish Champion at age thir-
teen), I felt I was stagnating. I welcomed the chance to
explore a new game.
Soon after I started playing, someone (sorry, I don’t
remember who) gave me a copy of Bridge in the Menagerie
by Victor Mollo. I stayed up all night reading it. Aside
from loving the characterizations, I found the bridge posi-
tions so exciting and so beautiful that I was ‘gone’ on bridge
forever. It is still one of my favorite books — I can recite
many passages from it, and other Menagerie books. One of
my ‘Hog’ favorites goes something like this:
“What a way to present a problem,” snorted the
Hideous Hog, disgustedly crumpling up someone’s news-
paper. “South to make four spades against best defense!
What sort of South, I ask you, allows East-West to put up
the best defense?”
“But...” began Oscar the Owl.
“Nonsense,” interrupted the Hog. “If East-West put
up the best defense, it can only mean that South doesn’t
know his business. So why should anyone care how this
ignoramus sets about taking ten tricks?”
I played a lot of bridge hands in those early days, some
of them by myself. I also played all-night sessions at the
weekend with Brian Spears (my best friend), Jack
Silverstone and others. Both Brian and Jack represented
Scotland, after I had emigrated to America. I once played
thirty-six hours straight, and then slept for twenty-one
hours — all a part of my (bridge) education.

VARSITY DAYS
In 1971, I went to Glasgow University, purportedly to study
Law. Unfortunately (?), I found the Bridge Room and prac-

32 Bridge, Zia... and me

tically lived in it. I met my first serious mentor there —
Colin Weir. Colin also seemed to reside in the Bridge
Room. He was on the fringe of the Scottish team, and I
believe he did play for Scotland at some point. He taught
me a lot, none of which I can specifically now remember.
Maybe I would disagree now with much of what he said,
but maybe not. I remember him as being sensible and
unopinionated. (This set him aside from most of
Scotland’s other top players.)
While I was learning the game and trying to put my
‘advanced’ theoretical knowledge into practice, I had the
occasional ‘accident.’ I remember once, after I had been
playing in the Bridge Room for several months, I was
defending three notrump and partner led a heart. Declarer
(Doug somebody) won the lead, and I could not tell if our
hearts were running. Doug now led the jack of spades
towards dummy’s ♠AK109xx and ran it. I, with ♠Qx,
ducked smoothly. Doug heaved a sigh of relief, played a
spade to the ace and ended up making overtricks. Of
course, we had four cashing heart tricks. While he was
running the spades the following conversation took place.
PARTNER: Nice duck, partner. You should give up bridge.
ME: (to Doug) How could you play a spade to the ace?
DOUG: It was 100%.
ME: What are you talking about? Why couldn’t I have a
singleton, and my partner have queen to four (queen-
fourth to Americans)?
DOUG: There are only thirteen spades in the deck.
ME: You had two spades, dummy had six, I could have had
one...
DOUG: Dummy had seven!
ME: (Fierce blush)
My partner in this misadventure was Gerald Haase, with
whom I formed my first serious partnership. He and I
were selected to compete in the Scottish Trials (either 1972
or 1973 — I don’t remember which), amidst considerable

Early Days 33
 concern that we weren’t ready. (I was nineteen, and had
been playing for less than three years.) We finished second,
silencing our critics, and went on to represent Scotland in
the Camrose trophy, the annual tournament between
Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland. We played
against Northern Ireland (we won) and England (we tied).
I recall one of our hands from the Rayne Cup (a
Scottish team event), reported by ex-international Albert
Benjamin, where he called me brilliant. I held as West:
♠ Axx ♥ xxx ♦ xxxx ♣ xxx

The bidding, by one of Scotland's best pairs, playing

Precision:
NORTH SOUTH
1♣1
2♣2 3♣3
3♠4 4♠5
5♣6 6♣
pass
1. 16+ hcp.
2. 5+ clubs, 8+ HCP.
3. Asking in clubs.
4. Five-card clubs headed by
two of top three honors.
5. Asking in spades.
6. Second-round control.

I couldn’t have scripted it better — I led a low spade; Haase

smartly held the queen over the ♠KJ, and the contract went
one down. Of course, there was nothing ‘brilliant’ about it;
in fact, it was pathetically obvious. If I had known the term
then, I would have described this hand as a ‘gimme.’
I recall giving Benjamin a hand for the newspaper. This
was the crucial suit:

34 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy
A97x
N
N
Me Gerald
W
W E
E
KJx xx
S
S

Declarer
Q 10 8 x
I was West, playing with Gerald in the Junior Camrose
tournament, and this was the trump suit. Declarer led a
plain suit from dummy and ruffed with the ten; I over-
ruffed with the king. Subsequently, declarer cashed the ace
and finessed the eight. The contract was 4♣ and this held
declarer to ten tricks, but when I gave Benjamin the hand I
told him the contract was five clubs, and that my defense
had defeated it. A little while after the article was printed I
ran into Benjamin, who looked somewhat upset.
“You did a terrible thing,” he said.
“What do you mean?” I asked, knowing full well, and
feeling as guilty as sin.
“That five clubs contract you defeated,” he said.
“Look!” And he showed me a letter.
“Dear Mr. Benjamin,” it ran, “I refer to your column
of... I have no doubt that you think this is very amusing,
but I do not. To overruff with the king when you hold the
jack (with the queen as yet unplayed) is one of the most
unethical plays I have ever seen. That you should reward
this player with an accolade instead of recommending his
suspension, is shocking. Yours, etc.” Ah well, you can’t
please everybody.
♠ ♥ ♦ ♣
It was about this time that I read about the Grosvenor
Gambit. The idea struck me as amusing, and I looked for

Early Days 35
 opportunities to employ this apparently pointless strategy
at the table. I was playing with Gerald in a Scottish Cup
match against a team that included Hugh Kelsey and Tom
Culbertson. Culbertson was declaring three notrump, and
his diamonds were ♦Q10x in hand facing ♦A98x in
dummy. He ran the queen, losing to my king. Before he
attacked the suit again, I discarded a diamond. Then he
ran the ten losing to my now singleton jack. When he dis-
covered what I had done, he muttered something about
‘kids these days.’
A few hands later, Culbertson was declaring 5♠. I won
Gerald’s lead and shifted to the heart ten into dummy’s
♥AKxxx. Tom, who had started with ♥Jxxx, thought about
this and played low, winning in dummy. He now eliminat-
ed the minors and threw partner in. Gerald exited with the
♥9. Tom knew that Gerald, holding ♥Q9x could have beat-
en the hand simply by giving a ruff-and-discard, but the
earlier Grosvenor was preying on his mind. Had I really
shifted to a heart from Q10 doubleton? After muttering
some more about what these kids were doing to him, he
went up and dropped my queen, spoiling the story. A pity.
♠ ♥ ♦ ♣
My next partnership was with Barnet Shenkin, a young
Glasgow player with whom I played fairly successfully for
about five years, until I moved to the U.S. in 1978. Our
most notable successes were the Sunday Times Pairs and
the Gold Cup (a Knockout Teams event roughly equivalent
to the Spingold in prestige). We played for Scotland in the
Camrose Trophy on numerous occasions, and won it at
least twice. The first time I played for Britain I was 21 years
old; Barnet and I represented Great Britain in the
Common Market Championships in Vittel in 1975 when
we finished third. We also played for Britain in the
European Championships in Copenhagen in 1977.
And now an opening lead problem. You hold as West:

36 Bridge, Zia... and me

 ♠ Q 10 6 4 ♥ 10 7 5 3 ♦ 42 ♣ 863
The bidding:
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♣ 2♦ 2♥
pass 3♦ pass 3♥
pass 4♣ pass 4♦
pass 4♠ pass 4NT
pass 5♠1 pass 5NT
pass 7♣ pass 7♥
pass 7NT all pass
1. Two key cards plus the heart queen.

It looks as if North has solid clubs, and South very good

hearts plus the diamond ace. It might well be necessary to
attack declarer’s entry before he can unblock the (you
hope) stiff queen of hearts. So you lead a diamond. At
least it’s partner’s suit. The full deal:
Dummy
♠ AK5
♥ Q
♦ 10 8 5
♣ AKQJ74
You
♠ Q 10 6 4 N ♠ J973
♥ 10 7 5 3 W E ♥ 6
♦ 42 ♦ KQJ976
♣ 863 S ♣ 10 9

♠ 82
♥ AKJ9842
♦ A3
♣ 52

Declarer wins the diamond and runs clubs. You must make
three discards, and therefore cannot control spades. Then
after the run of the three top hearts, South will have made

Early Days 37
 six discards, and therefore will need to throw all his dia-
monds to retain spades.
Hope you led the correct diamond!
I played a hand very much like this at the 1998 Summer
Nationals in Chicago. West actually held ♦102, and led the
ten: but since he had only three hearts it was irrelevant.
Why do I bring up this hand now? Because it remind-
ed me of one that I defended almost twenty-five years
before. Playing with Barnet in the Scottish Trials, I was on
lead against some contract with four-two doubleton in
partner’s suit. Others in my situation led the four, and
declarer, holding ace-three doubleton now made the hand
on a simple squeeze against partner. I, however, led the
deuce and defeated the contract.
Am I that good? Not really. Barnet and I had the agree-
ment to lead low from a doubleton in partner’s suit!
Our results did not suffer when I moved to London to
play rubber bridge for a living — if anything, we were a
stronger pair. Our partnership effectively ended when I left
Britain.
I returned to Scotland in August, 1978 (after I had
moved to America), to play for Britain in the European
Junior Championships in Stirling, partnering Richard
Benstead. Since Barnet was over the age limit, I played for
Scotland with Richard in the Junior Camrose, which
Scotland won. We went on to win the European Junior
Championship too.

38 Bridge, Zia... and me

 c h a p t e r t h r e e

AMERICA

New York, 1978

In February of 1978, I moved to America, intending to sur-

vive by playing bridge and backgammon in the New York
City clubs. Zia had not yet moved to New York, but had
begun making sporadic invasions into the Chicago-style
game at the Cavendish Club. It took both of us a while to
acclimate to the American style of bidding and play. I was
not accustomed to feeling uncomfortable at the table, but
it was so different from Britain that instead of feeling I
knew everything that was happening, as I had at Stefan’s, I
now felt that I knew next to nothing.
I also found that I did not enjoy discussing the game as

America 41
 much as I had in the U.K.. This was not due to my unfa-
miliarity, but rather to the focus of the American players.
In Britain, when someone said, “I have a hand for you,”
it was invariably a hand to play or defend; but here, it was
a hand to bid. The attention was all on bidding, and I was
only interested in the play. I didn’t know if card-play was
more important, but I knew I wanted it to be. I felt that
you could figure out the clearly correct play much of the
time, but you could hardly ever be certain of the right bid.

THE BEAST
It wasn’t until 1984 that I began to appreciate and under-
stand bidding. Then I started to play regularly against Ira
Rubin (a.k.a. ‘The Beast’). Until then, I had inwardly felt
some measure of scorn for players who believed that they
always knew the right bid — and here was one of the most
opinionated persons I had ever encountered. Yet, there was
a nagging ring of truth that forced me to listen to him —
that, and the fact that he talked a lot.
Of course, Ira’s four-card major system evoked memo-
ries of Britain (although his style was as dissimilar from
British as it could possibly be). I began playing his basic
system in a few tournaments, partnering Matthew and
Pamela Granovetter and, for the first time, I found that I
enjoyed the bidding.
And... I became interested in the bidding.

THOUGHTS ON BIDDING

(Finally, I had some!)

What is the purpose of bidding? To arrive at the best
contract, yes. But what is the best contract? The one that
will produce the best result on average — in practice.

42 Bridge, Zia... and me

 When the bidding is over, you should then be sorry
about every piece of accurate information you have pro-
vided — only the opponents can benefit now. It’s so much
more difficult to defend with less information — or worse
yet, with misleading information.
To this end, I was already aware of phony cuebids and
game tries, and I knew about psychic bids, but it had never
occurred to me that you could begin your constructive
auctions with the intention of gaining an advantage in the
play. A prime example of this is the decision about which
minor to open with 4-4. Those players who always open
with the same suit are adding an ‘element of ease’ to their
opponents’ leads and subsequent defense. By varying intel-
ligently, you can make life more difficult for them without
hurting yourself appreciably.
I have never disclosed to anyone, not even to Zia, all of
my rules governing which minor I open, but the factors
involved are: a) ability to handle the auction; b) position;
c) vulnerability; d) lead-inhibiting; e) lead-directional; f)
strength of the opposition; g) the other table(s).
I like to combine varying the minor-suit opening with
rebidding notrump on balanced hands — even if it means
bypassing four-card majors (partner can always check
back). This idea is not part of Ira’s methods, although his
four-card major opening style almost precludes a balanced
hand when opener rebids one-of-a-major. And, I don’t do
it with every hand — only those where my distribution or
honor dispersion makes it feel right.
The benefit of this approach can plainly be seen in the
auction
NORTH SOUTH
1♣ 1♦
1NT 3NT
pass

In old standard, opener can have only four distributions:

America 43
 3-3-3-4, 3-3-2-5, 3-2-3-5, or 2-3-3-5. Playing my way,
there are thirteen possible distributions. Yes, the opponents
know that dummy has no four-card major, but that is of far
less importance than knowing which four-card major
declarer has, or that he has none. This idea could even be
extended to opening the three-card suit with 4-3. Zia has
even opened 1♣ in third chair with five diamonds and
three clubs!
Another advantage of this style is the negative inference
which arises when partner rebids one of a major — you
now know many hands that he can’t have. True, the oppo-
nents have this information also, but I believe that is less
important on this auction. On the 1NT (rebid) - 3NT auc-
tions the hidden information hurts only the opponents.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Ira’s system can pose unfamiliar problems for the oppo-

nents, in that he can open, or rather, he relishes opening 1♠
on ♠5432 (weaker holdings not permitted). The ‘standard’
five-card major structure is excellent for constructive auc-
tions, but it frequently makes the defenders’ lives patheti-
cally easy.
Even a convention such as Stayman, which most players
view as essential, seems to me to be of doubtful value on
balanced hands. Most of the time you will not uncover a
fit (especially when you only have one major), and when
you do your result may not be superior. When you don’t
find a fit you have given the opposition information about
your hand, and more importantly about your partner’s —
information which may be crucial. In addition, you have
given them a chance to double — or not double —
Stayman for the lead (admittedly, this double is so abused
that it sometimes works to your advantage). Are you sure

44 Bridge, Zia... and me

it’s all worth the trouble?
On the first deal of the final of the 1992 World
Olympiad in Salsamaggiore, Italy, I held:
♠ 10 x x ♥ KQxxx ♦ K 10 ♣ 10 x x

My partner, Seymon Deutsch, opened a 15-17 1NT. I

decided to force to game, and our methods did not allow
me to offer a choice of games — I could play 4♥ whenever
he had three hearts or, with Stayman, whenever he had
four. Most players would attempt to do one of these, but I
couldn’t imagine a more perfect set of circumstances in
which to put my theory into practice. It looked so much
like a nine-trick hand to me. I envisioned my RHO lead-
ing a heart from ♥J9xx into Seymon’s ace-ten doubleton.
Perhaps he would make three notrump, while the other
room would transfer to hearts and go down in two
notrump! Confidently I bid 3NT. This backfired horribly
when partner held:
♠AKx ♥ Axxx ♦ Axxx ♣ xx

Worse still, opening leader had ♣KQJxx. I guess I’m stub-

born, because I would do the same again. Note that, if one
of partner’s diamonds had been a club, then three notrump
would have been best. There were many hands he could
have held that would have made me a hero — instead I was
the goat.

HURTING THE ‘BAD GUYS’

One area of the game where you can ‘hurt’ your opponents
is with eccentric penalty doubles. A recurring situation is:
the opponents reach three notrump with a long suit after
your side has opened the bidding. It is pointless to double
them when you know they are going down unless either a)

America 45
 you think they may stay there, or b) you can also penalize
the runout. However, it makes a good deal of sense to dou-
ble when you think they are making three notrump. If they
stay, your result might not be much worse (if the contract
is unusual), but if you scare them out you show a huge
gain.
I also see a strange advantage in doubling trump con-
tracts with poor intermediates. If I double LHO’s 4♠ con-
tract with ♠AQ10x, he may finesse and hold me to one
trick. If I double with ♠AQxx, maybe he finesses into part-
ner’s stiff ten, loses control and three trump tricks. If I
don’t double, I do better with ♠AQ10x and worse with
♠AQxx. That’s what I mean by ‘hurting’ your opponents.
Similarly, when the bidding goes 1♥-(3♦)-dbl-(pass), I
feel more comfortable passing with Axx(x) than with
A10x(x). (So I’m weird — what else is new?)
Yet another idea which has occurred to me is this: dur-
ing a competitive auction, if I feel fairly certain that my side
is eventually going to land in a particular contract, I give
thought to getting there slowly (usually by passing as
opposed to just blasting game). For example: the bidding
goes three passes to you, and you open 1♠ at favorable vul-
nerability. Partner raises to 2♠ and RHO doubles. Now,
instead of bidding 4♠, you pass. It is most unlikely that
your opponents, both passed hands, can exchange infor-
mation that will result in a successful five-level action.
However, it is very possible that you will gain information
by allowing your LHO to bid — information that may help
you make 4♠. There are recurring opportunities for this
tactic.
Having said all this, I cannot honestly say that I have a
strong opinion that ‘my way’ is better. I only know that I
like it. And even if I’m only breaking even, I prefer to
exchange some bidding accuracy for improved results in
card-play. The only reason I have to think that I am gain-
ing something is my personal experience, and I find that

46 Bridge, Zia... and me

biases built on people’s personal experience are generally
unreliable.

OPINIONS
Speaking of bias, I regard it as a major block to learning.
All the great bidding theorists seem to me to have difficul-
ty separating opinion from truth.
Some experts believe five-card major openings are the
only way. Others think that four-card majors are clearly
superior. Or take, for example, the controversy between
proponents of sound and light opening bids. Each side will
cite numerous examples where their style gains. They can’t
both be right, so whom should you believe? Personally, I
prefer the sound style — which is consistent with my gen-
eral philosophy, since light openings generally make it
tougher for the opponents (and partner!) in the bidding,
while sound ones make it harder for them in the play (since
you are in the auction less when they declare). My experi-
ence (there it goes again) is that opening light on balanced
hands vulnerable, or opening light 4-4-4-1 hands, is a los-
ing proposition. Other light openings break about even.
The answer to the question, “Whom should one
believe?” is nobody. It seems clear to me that more bad
results are caused by partners not being on the same wave-
length than by any inherent inferiority of system.
Therefore, the most important thing to do is to agree with
your partner about what hands you will open. What you
actually decide is relatively unimportant.

MY PARTNER (ZIA)
In 1989, I decided that I needed to make some money play-
ing bridge, so I went to Zia and asked him what he thought

America 47
 I should do. He was happy to play with me in the
Nationals, but he was certain that nobody was going to hire
us unless we won something. With hopes of doing so, we
played in the 1989 Reisinger on a team with Sam Lev, Mark
Molson, and Chris Compton — and fortunately we won.
Due to Zia and Molson, our team was ‘poisoned’, so we
could not compete in the U.S. international team trials.
But Zia and I had made our mark. We were hired imme-
diately, and in the next four National knockouts we won
one and lost in the final twice.
Our partnership had several problems. In the begin-
ning I was rusty — I had played little competitive bridge
between 1981 and 1989. Because Zia expected better from
me, he frequently became frustrated. Since we were
friends, and because we had always said whatever we want-
ed to one another in the days when we played money
bridge, Zia made no effort to control his feelings. This did
not bother me, but it probably gave the opposition confi-
dence. We did not play frequently in tournaments togeth-
er, and our system was a hodgepodge of different things we
had discussed over the previous fourteen years. Eventually,
we started writing things down, but it was a long time
before we knew what we were doing. Our major problem
was, and still is, that we try too hard for perfection. When
we play with other partners, we are practical players; with
each other, we try to cover too many possibilities.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

For the first eighteen months I was low on confidence.

Then I realized something which turned it around for me.
I had been reading about, and watching, the best players in
the country, and they all made numerous errors. I could
win, not because of how well I played, but because of how

48 Bridge, Zia... and me

badly they played! Even Zia, whom I regarded as the best
player, was ‘hopeless’. I felt much better. I wasn’t scared
anymore.
This hand is from the 1992 Cap Gemini tournament in
Holland.
Zia
♠ K86
♥ K2
♦ K 10 9 3
♣ A864
Leufkens Westra
♠ 10 7 N ♠ 43
♥ Q9765 W E ♥ A 10 4
♦ QJ64 S
♦ A8752
♣ Q9 ♣ J32
Me
♠ AQJ952
♥ J83
♦ —
♣ K 10 7 5

Leufkens Zia Westra Me

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♣ 1♦ 1♠
2♦ dbl1 pass 3♦
pass 3NT pass 4♣
pass 4♠ all pass

1. Support double

West led the diamond queen, covered and ruffed. The con-
tract was in no real danger even if clubs were 4-1 since I
could play loser-on-loser. (I could play the ♦10, throwing a
club, and later pitch a second club on the ♦9, which would

America 49
 ♠
Zia
K86
now be good.) I
♥ K2 decided that East
♦ K 10 9 3
♣ A864 probably had the
♠ 10 7 N ♠ 43 heart ace, so I ran
♥ Q9765 ♥ A 10 4
♦ QJ64
W E
♦ A8752 the jack. When
♣ Q9 S ♣ J32
Leufkens failed to
Me
♠ AQJ952 cover that was an
♥J83
♦ — overtrick. We won
♣ K 10 7 5
the event by two
IMPs and, by a
strange quirk of fate, if I had not stolen this trick
Leufkens-Westra would have won the event. I was happy
about this hand, not because it helped us to win, but
because it meant that I was no longer scared to do what I
thought was right, even if I risked looking foolish.
I love Chinese finesses, and I feel that they are fre-
quently indicated as the ‘percentage’ play. Most experts
won’t even consider them unless they are certain no other
play can succeed.

DEBBIE
Another learning milestone occurred when I met my wife,
Debbie (then Debbie Zuckerberg — she won the World
Junior Teams Championship at Ann Arbor in 1991). She
made me see how much nonsense there was in the way I ,
and most other experts, thought about certain bidding sit-
uations. For example, we discussed help suit game tries.
She asked me to name all the holdings on which I might
make such a bid. Then she asked me to identify all the
holdings which I considered ‘good’ or ‘okay to accept’
opposite a help suit game try. I now realized that it was
unreasonable to make a help suit game try on both A108x
and 8xxx, and then expect partner to know how to evalu-

50 Bridge, Zia... and me

ate Q9x. The real answer is, firstly, to play the re-raise as a
game try rather than as preemptive (so that the help suit
game tries can remain pure), and secondly, to limit the pos-
sible holdings for a help suit game try to those which need
a doubleton or less opposite. This, and other examples,
taught me to work harder to weed out the rubbish from
both my own and others’ thoughts about bidding.
Debbie also taught me not to rush into taking control
in slam auctions — something of which both Zia and I
were frequently guilty. It was possible to have a sensible
auction stopping at five-of-a-major, with slam not being
reached because each player was aware that the other had
failed to take control and, therefore, could not have enough
for slam. (Having said this, it is a greater error not to take
control when one has the right hand for it. Failing to do so
is to invite disaster.)

TEMPERAMENT
So now I had acquired ability and confidence, but there
was still one major area in which I was shockingly defi-
cient. As I have said, there were usually fireworks when I
played with Zia, and this detracted from my ability to
focus. Worse still, I spent time at the table brooding over
my errors on previous hands, or just simply analyzing
them (the hands, not the errors). It was crucial to my
improving my game that I stopped, or at least greatly
reduced, this habit. One person was largely responsible for
my being able to improve my focus — Bob Hamman.
I first played with Hamman in a pairs game in the 1991
Fall Nationals; I played again with him in the Blue Ribbon
Pairs in 1993, which we won. What struck me most about
him was his ability to focus on the hand he was playing.
Nothing fazed him — he gave 100% until the last card was

America 51
 played. It didn’t take a genius to see how much this quali-
ty was worth, so I tried to be the same. I remember during
one session of the Blues: on the second board I made a
sick/lazy bid and, as a result, we missed a laydown grand.
In the past, I would have felt disgusted, and that would
have been likely to affect my play; but I resolved to be
tough, and played fine for the rest of the session. That felt
so good I was almost glad I had made the sick bid!
Playing in the 1995 Spingold quarter-final, I had a total
mind-loss on one hand. The very next deal:
Zia
♠ A 10 7 3
♥ J4
♦ A 10 3
♣ A532

N
W E
S

Me
♠ Q9852
♥ 76
♦ K94
♣ Q J 10

North-South vul.

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♥ dbl 4♥ 4♠
all pass

West won the first two tricks with the king and queen of
hearts. East, who appeared to have the ace, asked for a dia-
mond shift, and West duly led the diamond eight to trick
three. What now?

52 Bridge, Zia... and me

 West obviously had both black kings, so holding my
black-suit losers to one was no problem. My diamond
loser could go on the fourth club if that suit broke 3-3; if
not, I would need an endplay. Also, there was the slight
hope of picking up trumps.
Suddenly, I saw the perfect line — one which maxi-
mized both my legitimate and my deceptive chances.
Playing low from dummy, I won East’s ♦J with my king.
Then I led the ♣Q which was covered by the king and ace.
Returning to the ♣J, I now led the ♠Q, again covered by the
king and ace (no jack). Next, I led a club from dummy. If
clubs had been 3-3, I could now have conceded a trump
and claimed. Also, if East had ruffed with an original hold-
ing of ♠Jx, he would have been endplayed. In fact, East dis-
carded after protracted thought. I decided that he did not
have the ♠J and, therefore, did not attempt to endplay him.
West appeared to be 2-5-2-4, so I crossed to the diamond
ace, ruffed the fourth club, and conceded a trump, end-
playing West. The full deal:

Dummy
♠ A 10 7 3
♥ J4
♦ A 10 3
♣ A532

♠ KJ N ♠ 64
♥ KQ952 W E ♥ A 10 8 3
♦ 85
S
♦ QJ762
♣ K976 ♣ 84
Me
♠ Q9852
♥ 76
♦ K94
♣ Q J 10

America 53
 Yes, East made the losing play, but he didn’t have a lock.
I might have held, for example, the spade jack instead of
the nine, and a low club instead of the ten. Then ruffing
would have been fatal. Probably, East should have gone
right, but the important aspect for me of this hand was my
ability to focus, immediately after a mind-loss.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Another interesting thing I noticed when I partnered

Hamman was that he never asked me why I had done what
I did — never. On one hand from the 1994 World Pairs in
Albuquerque, we were defending three notrump and I led
a club. Dummy had ♣A8x and played small. Hamman fol-
lowed with his singleton ten, and declarer won the queen.
I won the diamond at trick two and, in perfect tempo,
played the club king. Declarer’s clubs were ♣QJ9x, so this
was not a great success (although it did not actually cost a
trick on the hand). Nothing was said (of course), but I
could see Bob looking a little confused.
Later that night, we were sitting around in Nick
Nickell’s suite, and Hamman suddenly said to Nickell,
“Michael made a great play today.” He then proceeded to
describe what had taken place on this hand. Nick thought
for a few seconds and naturally asked me, “Why did you do
that?” This was the situation from my viewpoint:
Dummy
♣A82
N
N
Me
W E
♣K7543 W E
S
S

54 Bridge, Zia... and me

I had led the ♣4, and the trick went ♣2, ♣10, ♣Q. I won
trick two and had one more entry. In playing the ♣K now,
I hoped that partner had the jack, and that declarer would
duck — after all, he would think that I had the jack. Mean-
while, playing a low club would be ineffective if partner
had jack-ten doubleton, since declarer would duck. I also
knew that, if declarer had the jack, I was losing nothing
(unless he had four), since he was marked with the nine.
So I played the king. I was able to do this in tempo, because
I had been in a similar situation before:

Dummy
♣A92
N
N
Me
W E
♣Q87543 W E
S
S

Defending three notrump, I had led the ♣5, and the trick
had gone ♣2, ♣10, ♣K. I won some later trick and played
the club queen. Declarer naturally ducked, and the con-
tract was defeated.
What impressed me was that Hamman, instead of ask-
ing me why I had done it, or assuming that I was mad, had
figured it out. He never asked me to explain anything. I
guess he has so much confidence in himself that he knows
he can figure out his partner’s reasoning — and if it does-
n’t make sense he concludes that his partner made a mis-
take. I admire that.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

One of my biggest thrills was winning the 1996 Vanderbilt.

In the final we (myself, Zia, Seymon Deutsch, Chip Martel

America 55
 and Lew Stansby) beat the dreaded Nickell team (Nickell-
Freeman, Meckstroth-Rodwell, Hamman-Wolff) which
had won the previous three Spingolds (defeating me twice
in the finals and once in the semis), the previous three
Reisingers, and the 1995 Bermuda Bowl. One of my great-
est moments occurred during the third quarter:
Zia
♠ 10 7 5
♥ AKQJ5
♦ Q63
♣ 10 7

N
W E
S

Me
♠ QJ42
♥ 9
♦ K8
♣ AKJ963

North-South vul.

Wolff Zia Hamman Me

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
pass 1♣
pass 1♥ pass 1♠
pass 2♦1 dbl 3♣
pass 3♥ pass 3NT
all pass

1. Fourth-suit forcing to game

56 Bridge, Zia... and me

Wolff led the diamond jack. It looked like it would be a
fairly quick hand — if the club queen was right, I would
probably make five or six; if it was wrong, I would proba-
bly go down three or four.
Once I won the diamond, should I cash the club ace
before testing hearts? This would be correct if I had five
heart tricks, but wrong if I had only four. Since I was
assuming that East had four clubs, and he seemed to have
at least five diamonds (and West had not overcalled 1♠), it
was clear that I could not count on five heart tricks.
Therefore, it would be wrong to cash the ♣A.
Was there any point in ducking the diamond? Only if
diamonds were 6-2, and East had no entry. If the oppo-
nents cleared diamonds I would still go down one, losing
two spades, two diamonds and a club; but that was a lot
better than down four vulnerable.
Was there any downside to ducking? Apart from possi-
ble overtrick IMPs, only jack-ten doubleton in West with
no entry in East — I would blow the contract in that case.
It seemed worth the risk — especially so because either
opponent might panic if East had no entry.
So, I let the jack win. Wolff started thinking, and the
more he thought, the more I became convinced that he
would not play another diamond. Eventually, he emerged
with the heart eight. Now it was my turn to trance. I
should have played a diamond now, assuming that West
had everything, and I would almost certainly make even if
he had five hearts. However, I actually cashed hearts (they
broke) pitching a spade and three clubs. Wolff, who start-
ed with four hearts, pitched a spade on the fifth. Now I led
a spade to the queen. Wolff won, and was stuck. Whatever
he did, either the queen of diamonds would become my
ninth trick, or he would be endplayed.
The full deal:

America 57
 Dummy
♠ 10 7 5
♥ AKQJ5
♦ Q63
♣ 10 7
Wolff Hamman
♠ AK96 N ♠ 83
♥ 10 8 6 2 W E ♥ 743
♦ J5
S
♦ A 10 9 7 4 2
♣ Q52 ♣ 84
Me
♠ QJ42
♥ 9
♦ K8
♣ AKJ963

In the endgame, if Wolff cashed the other high spade, I

would unblock the jack. If he then continued spades to
knock out dummy’s entry, I would cash the club ace-king,
and play the diamond king, forcing Hamman to concede
the ninth trick.
However, that was not my great moment.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

A few hands later, I played 4♥ with a trump suit of

♥Q932 facing ♥AJ65. I guessed to play a heart to the ace
dropping Hamman’s stiff king offside, thus gaining a game
swing.
However, that was not my great moment.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

58 Bridge, Zia... and me

 On the next deal the tray came through the screen
showing that Zia had opened 1NT. And Hamman ‘over-
called’ 1♠ — yes, one spade! He was so shaken by the
events of this quarter that he had momentarily lost focus
and had not seen the opening bid.
That was my great moment.

America 59
 c h a p t e r f o u r

MY FAVORITE
HANDS

The following fifteen hands hold a special fascination for

me. Each of them contains something which thrilled me at
the time, and many of them continue to do so. I suggest
that you take your time with them.
In fairness, you should know that they are not all ‘real’
problems. I define a real problem as one which, when you
have solved it, you know you have solved it, and the solu-
tion is satisfying. (This is as opposed to real-life problems,
which often have no ‘answer’ at all.)
Hold out on turning to the solutions (which can be
found after all the hands) for as long as you can bear it!

Favorite Hands 61
 1. Tricky Squeeze

Dummy
♠ 10 3 2
♥ A42
♦ Q432
♣ 10 3 2

N
W E
S

You
♠ AQJ
♥ KQ3
♦ AK
♣ AQJ54

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

2♣
3♠ pass1 pass 6NT
all pass

1. Shows values

West leads the ♥J. Plan the play.

To Answer

Favorite Hands 63
 2. The Vow

Dummy
♠ Q962
♥ A
♦ Q9
♣ K98542

N
W E
S

You
♠ A3
♥ J852
♦ A K J 10 7 6 3
♣ —

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

2♦1 pass 2♥ 3NT
pass 4♣ pass 5♦
pass 6♦ dbl all pass

1. Weak 2-bid in hearts or spades.

West leads the ♣J. Plan the play.

To Answer

64 Bridge, Zia... and me

 3. The Curse

Dummy
♠ J942
♥ A72
♦ A4
♣ A652

N
W E
S

You
♠ K
♥ QJ863
♦ J972
♣ K73

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♣ dbl 1♥
1♠ 2♥ pass 3♦
pass 4♥ all pass

West leads the ♠5 (fourth best). East wins and

returns the ♥4. Plan the play.

To Answer

Favorite Hands 65
 4. Red Herrings

Dummy
♠ AQ92
♥ AJ92
♦ A 10 7 3
♣ 2

N
W E
S

You
♠ K 10 7 6
♥ K 10
♦ KQ5
♣ AKQJ

7NT by South. West leads the ♣10. Plan the play.

To Answer

66 Bridge, Zia... and me

 5. Spot Check

Dummy
♠ J32
♥ K
♦ AJ742
♣ AQ83

N
W E
S

You
♠ 10 5 4
♥ AJ742
♦ K
♣ K742

3NT by South. West, who passed originally, leads

the ace, king, queen and a fourth spade, and then
shifts to a heart. How do you plan to take nine
tricks? (You discard a red card from each hand.)

To Answer

Favorite Hands 67
 6. Smartest Kid on the Block

Dummy
♠ 972 N
♥ J5 W E Zia
♦ K 10 2
S
♣ A K 10 4 2
You
♠ KJ5
♥ Q7643
♦ 753
♣ J5

WEST EAST
1♥
2♣ 2NT
3NT pass

You lead the ♥4, dummy plays the ♥5, partner the
♥K, and declarer the ♥A. Declarer, who happens
to be none other than Zia Mahmood, crosses to
the ♣A and plays a spade. Partner wins the ♠A and
returns the ♥8, Zia following with the deuce. Plan
the defense.

To Answer

68 Bridge, Zia... and me

 7. Magic Trick

Dummy
♠ Q3
♥ K2
♦ A864
♣ AK753

N
W E
S

You
♠ AJ7542
♥ AQ63
♦ 7
♣ 84

A wheel comes off in the bidding and you arrive at

7♠. West leads the ♦Q. What chance is there to
make this contract?

To Answer

Favorite Hands 69
 8. Blind Spot

Dummy
♠ 10 9 8
♥ K
♦ QJ54
♣ K9863

N
W E
S

You
♠ AK
♥ A Q 10 6 5 2
♦ 872
♣ J 10

North-South vul.

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♠ pass 2♠ 3♥
pass 4♥ dbl all pass

West leads the ♦K, East playing the ♦3. West

switches to the ♠3. Plan the play.

To Answer

70 Bridge, Zia... and me

 9. ...And Thou Shalt Receive

Dummy
♠ AQ54
♥ QJ2
♦ A93
♣ A93
You
N ♠ KJ732
W E ♥ K5
S
♦ K52
♣ 752

NORTH SOUTH
2♥
4♥ pass

Partner leads the ♠6. Declarer plays low from

dummy. Plan the defense.

To Answer

Favorite Hands 71
 10. In the Zone

Dummy
♠ K842
♥ J53
♦ A863
♣ 94

N
W E
S

You
♠ 97
♥ A K 10 9 6 2
♦ 9
♣ A 10 7 3

NORTH SOUTH
1♥
2♥ 4♥
pass

Playing rubber bridge, and feeling ‘in the zone’,

you bid an exuberant 4♥. After all, you do have the
♦9. West leads the ♥4. Can you play in the zone,
too?
To Answer

72 Bridge, Zia... and me

 11. Information

Dummy
♠ K 10 2
♥ A64
♦ QJ9
♣ 7642

N
W E
S

You
♠ AQ9863
♥ Q 10 2
♦ A53
♣ K
Neither vul.

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♠
pass 2♠ pass pass
3♥ 3♠ 4♣ 4♠
dbl all pass

Playing rubber bridge against Zia on your left, you

take an unusual position. You pass 2♠ smoothly,
knowing that Zia would rather settle down and get
married than pass out this auction. Then, when
partner shows a maximum, you bid game, hoping
that the extra knowledge will prove useful. Zia
leads the ♣10. East wins the ace and returns the
♥8. Plan the play.
To Answer

Favorite Hands 73
 12. Singular Opportunity

Dummy
♠ A5
♥ A94
♦ A 10 9 5 4
♣ A94

N
W E
S

You
♠ 92
♥ KQ762
♦ 8732
♣ Q5

East-West vul.

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♠ dbl pass 3♥
4♣ 4♥ all pass

West leads the ♠K. Plan the play.

To Answer

74 Bridge, Zia... and me

 13. Countdown

Dummy
♠ AQ2
♥ AQ2
♦ 765
♣ KJ97

N
W E
S

You
♠ J53
♥ J53
♦ A43
♣ A Q 10 8

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♦ pass
pass dbl pass 2NT
pass 3NT all pass

West leads the ♦8, East playing the ♦9. Plan the play.

To Answer

Favorite Hands 75
 14. See-Saw

Dummy
♠ K42
♥ AQ53
♦ 5432
♣ 64

N
W E
S

You
♠ A Q J 10 9
♥ KJ
♦ 6
♣ AKQ53

After West opens the bidding 4♦, you arrive in 6♠.

West leads the ♦K. East wins the ace (perforce)
and switches to a trump, on which West discards a
diamond. The fortunate diamond position has
allowed you to survive the bad trump break. How
do you continue?
To Answer

76 Bridge, Zia... and me

 15. Mystery

Dummy
♠ Q5432
♥ 742
♦ 53
♣ A85

N
W E
S

You
♠ AJ7
♥ A K Q J 10 3
♦ 4
♣ KQ7

The defenders lead two rounds of diamonds

against your inferior 6♥ contract. What are your
chances of making twelve tricks?

To Answer

Favorite Hands 77
 1. Tricky Squeeze — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ 10 3 2
♥ A42
♦ Q432
♣ 10 3 2

♠ K987654 N ♠ —
♥ J 10 W E ♥ 98765
♦ 765
S
♦ J 10 9 8
♣ 6 ♣ K987
You
♠ AQJ
♥ KQ3
♦ AK
♣ AQJ54

This looks to be a simple hand — at first. Clearly, the club

finesse is required and, equally clearly, there will be no
difficulty if clubs break 3-2. If East has four or five clubs he
will be squeezed, providing that he has at least four dia-
monds; and if he has fewer, the contract is unlikely to be
made in practice. So, what’s the problem? The problem is
that East will unguard diamonds and declarer will be sub-
jected to a one-suit suicide squeeze on the fourth diamond!
He will be unable to discard a low or middle club without
conceding a trick to East.
The trick, strangely, is to ‘lose’ one of your tricks.
Carefully win the ♥K, cash the ♦AK and play the ♠AQ.
West wins (if he doesn’t, you simply concede a club) and
returns the ♥10. Win the ace, unblocking the queen, and
cash the ♦Q, jettisoning the ♠J. Follow with the ♠10, and
now East is squeezed in three suits! He can never pitch a
club or declarer discards his heart and claims. He does best

78 Bridge, Zia... and me

to throw a diamond, but now the thirteenth diamond
forces him to part with his last heart. Now declarer finess-
es the club and, crossing back to the ‘carefully’ preserved
♥4, repeats the club finesse to make twelve tricks.
I solved this par hand in 1977 when it was given to me
as a single-dummy problem. About twelve years later it
was presented to me as a double-dummy problem by
Vinny Bartone, but with all the small cards shown as x’s.
After about a minute I recognized the problem and said to
him, “Ask whoever gave you this problem if dummy’s
hearts are ♥A42.”
“Why?” he asked.
“Just do it,” I said. A little later, Vinny came to me and
said, “You’re right, but how did you know? What possible
difference can it make?”

Favorite Hands 79
 2. The Vow — Solution
Back to Question
Shenkin
♠ Q962
♥ A
♦ Q9
♣ K98542
Flint Rose
♠ 10 7 5 N ♠ KJ84
♥ KQ9763 W E ♥ 10 4
♦ 4
S
♦ 852
♣ J 10 6 ♣ AQ73
Me
♠ A3
♥ J852
♦ A K J 10 7 6 3
♣ —
I played this hand in the 1976 British Trials against Jeremy
Flint and Irving Rose, two of the greatest players ever to
hail from Great Britain.
After a few minutes thought, I decided on the following
plan: ruff the opening lead, heart to the ace, ruff three
more clubs while ruffing two hearts, and play all the
trumps. This was the position I hoped for when I played
the last trump:
Shenkin
♠ Q9
♥ —
♦ —
♣ K9
Flint Rose
♠ Kx N ♠
♥ KQ W E ♥ Immaterial
♦ — ♦
♣ — S ♣
Me
♠ A3
♥ J
♦ J
♣ —

80 Bridge, Zia... and me

When I played the last trump, Flint would be forced to dis-
card a heart and could now be endplayed. I had the feeling
that Rose was more likely to hold the spade king because of
his double, but what could I do? Beyond playing him for
three clubs and 2-2 diamonds, I couldn’t make the hand if
he had the king of spades, and that seemed like too much
to play for. However, the cards were distributed as in the
full-hand diagram above, so down I went.
As I was walking disconsolately away from the table,
Martin Hoffman came running up to me.
“Six diamonds was laydown,” he said. “All you have to
do is play the hand in the order that you did, but ruff the
four clubs with higher diamonds. Then, three rounds of
diamonds endplays East.”
Of course, you can see that East can foil this plan by
retaining the deuce of diamonds, but that would not be an
easy defense to find at the table, even for Irving Rose. And
West might have held the bare deuce. If I had held the
deuce, it would have been a perfect hand and I would have
bungled it!
I felt crushed. I prided myself on seeing par hand posi-
tions such as this and, despite several minutes thought, had
missed it completely. I made a vow to myself that the next
time the opportunity for this type of play arose, I would
spot it.

Favorite Hands 81
 3. The Curse — Solution
Hamman Back to Question
♠ J942
♥ A72
♦ A4
♣ A652
Deas
♠ 10 8 6 5 3 N ♠ AQ7
♥ K5 W E ♥ 10 9 4
♦ 863
S
♦ K Q 10 5
♣ J 10 8 ♣ Q94
Me
♠ K
♥ QJ863
♦ J972
♣ K73

Playing in the 1991 Bridge Today All-Star Individual with

Bob Hamman, I reached a very pushy 4♥ contract. When
East, Lynn Deas, returned a heart I was caught in a
quandary. It was dollars-to-doughnuts that she had the
king on the bidding, but I couldn’t see how I was going to
make the hand if she did (I needed her to have AQx in
spades and only three hearts, so she rated to have at least
four diamonds for her takeout double; thus KQx in dia-
monds was impossible). However, not wanting to go down
extras, and hoping that I was missing something (or that
they would somehow misdefend), I played the queen and
was soon down one. Obviously, had I played low I would
have made the hand (ruff a spade, duck a diamond, etc.).
I was mad at myself because I knew that, given my
analysis, I should have played low. After the session I was
determined to discover if playing the queen could ever be
right. After much thought I came up with this scenario:

82 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Hamman
♠ J942
♥ A72
♦ A4
♣ A652
Deas
♠ 10 8 6 5 3 N ♠ AQ7
♥ 10 5 W E ♥ K94
♦ K8 ♦ Q 10 6 5 3
♣ J 10 8 4 S ♣ Q9
Me
♠ K
♥QJ863
♦ J972
♣ K73

Win the heart queen and play the nine of diamonds (an
avoidance play). East wins and returns a club (best). (If
East plays another low heart, win the jack, draw trumps,
ruff a spade, diamond ace, ruff a spade, and concede a dia-
mond, pitching your club loser on the spade jack.) Now,
club ace, spade ruff, heart ace, spade ruff, club king, dia-
mond ace, leaves:

Dummy
♠ J
♥ 7
♦ —
♣ 65
Deas
♠ 10 8 N ♠ —
♥ — W E ♥ K
♦ — ♦ Q65
♣ J 10 S ♣ —
Me
♠ —
♥ J
♦ J7
♣ 7

When the spade jack is played from dummy East is fin-

ished. If she ruffs, she is endplayed; if she discards, I pitch
a club and elope with two ruffs.
So which hand is more likely? I don’t know, but this is
certainly more aesthetically pleasing. In any event, I was
delighted to have proved that my play was not ‘nullo’ —
and to have demonstrated once again that the ‘Curse of
Scotland’ is the most important card in the deck.

Favorite Hands 83
 4. Red Herrings — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ AQ92
♥ AJ92
♦ A 10 7 3
♣ 2

♠ 5 N ♠ J843
♥ 86543 W E ♥ Q7
♦ 84
S
♦ J962
♣ 10 9 7 5 3 ♣ 864
You
♠ K 10 7 6
♥ K 10
♦ KQ5
♣ AKQJ

At first glance it feels as if there should be a sure-trick solu-

tion to this hand. Perhaps the most natural attempt is to
play a spade to the ace and another to the king, the princi-
ple being that you claim unless West shows out; and if he
does you make on a double squeeze, unless East controls
diamonds as well as spades. However, even in this case, you
can still fall back on the heart finesse which is now well
over 50% — pretty good, huh? That must all add up to a
more than 95% line. But you can do better!
My preferred order for the 100% play is to win the first
four tricks with aces. Then, cash the king and queen of dia-
monds and run the clubs discarding three hearts from
dummy, leaving the position at the top of the next page.

84 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy
♠ Q92
♥ —
♦ 10
♣ —

N
W E
S

You
♠ K 10 7
♥ K
♦ —
♣ —

Now lead the heart king discarding the diamond ten —

it doesn’t matter who has what — and we are basically
down to two possibilities. If anyone is still holding the dia-
mond jack (or a club) he cannot also have the remaining
spades. If East discarded the diamond jack at trick ten he
must have three spades left.
The apparent ‘extra chances’ given by the ♥J10 and the
♦10 were a mirage.

Favorite Hands 85
 5. Spot Check — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ J32
♥ K
♦ AJ742
♣ AQ83
N
W E
S

You
♠ 10 5 4
♥ AJ742
♦ K
♣ K742

No normal squeeze can operate with these cards due to lack of

communication. East must hold at least one red queen, since
West passed originally. He will hold both queens about one
third of the time. The obvious hope is to find someone with Qx
in a red suit — about 17%. However, you can improve your
chances to about ‘31% minus’ (one sixth of the remainder,
minus the chance that East is extremely alert).
Win the heart and lead the eight of clubs to the king. Cash
the diamond king and the heart ace, pitching a diamond. Cross
to the ace and queen of clubs and cash the diamond ace, pitch-
Dummy
ing a heart (see left).
♠ — When the ♣ 3 is
♥ —
♦ J played, which queen
♣ 3
should East hold on
N ♠ — to? Only if he has
Immaterial W E ♥ Q
S
♦ Q been watching very
♣ —
carefully will this be
You
♠ — anything other than
♥ J
♦ — a guess.
♣ ?

86 Bridge, Zia... and me

6. Smartest Kid on the Block — Solution
Back to Question
♠ AQ63
♥ K8
♦ 864
♣ Q873
Dummy Zia
♠ 972 N ♠ 10 8 4
♥ J5 W E ♥ A 10 9 2
♦ K 10 2 ♦ AQJ9
S
♣ A K 10 4 2 ♣ 96
Me
♠ KJ5
♥ Q7643
♦ 753
♣ J5
As soon as Zia played a spade from dummy it was clear to me
that he was wide open in spades. He hoped that we would con-
tinue hearts, and he would make three tricks there plus six or
seven in the minors. Did he really think this could work against
me? I won the ♥Q and, giving him a look which mingled con-
tempt with pity, I banged down the ♠K ready to cash out.
Unfortunately, the actual deal was not quite as diagrammed
above — the play to this trick went seven, three, queen. Oh no!
I had failed to realize the necessity of unblocking the ♠J earlier!
Zia’s actual hand:
♠ Q4 ♥ A 10 9 2 ♦ AQJ94 ♣ 96

This was not a fair problem, since the fatal mistake was present-
ed as a fait accompli. However, to present it as ‘what do you play
under the spade ace?’ would make it too easy. Would you have
found the winning defense? Award yourself eleven out of ten if
you thought of it before seeing the ‘solution’.

Favorite Hands 87
 7. Magic Trick — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ Q3
♥ K2
♦ A864
♣ AK753

♠ 10 9 6 N ♠ K8
♥ J85 W E ♥ 10 9 7 4
♦ Q J 10 2
S
♦ K953
♣ Q 10 2 ♣ J96
Me
♠ AJ7542
♥ AQ63
♦ 7
♣ 84

This is not so much a difficult play problem as it is an

astonishing hand. If you tried to sneak the spade queen
through because this hand ‘can’t be made any other way’,
you had better think again. Win the diamond ace and ruff
a diamond. Use the ace and king of clubs to ruff two more
diamonds, cross to the heart king and ruff a club. Cash the
ace and queen of hearts leaving:
Dummy
♠ Q3
♥ —
♦ —
♣ 7

♠ 10 9 6 N ♠ K8
♥ — W E ♥ 10
♦ — ♦ —
♣ — S ♣ —
You
♠ AJ
♥ 6
♦ —
♣ —

88 Bridge, Zia... and me

Now lead the heart and a ‘sure’ trump trick disappears —
ruff with the ♠Q, and finesse the jack coming back.. When
I first saw this hand I was amazed. I knew about the Devil’s
Coup, but this seemed to contravene the natural laws of
physics. Even a trump lead makes no difference — the
trump trick simply evaporates in a two-card ending
instead.
It only takes one hand such as this to start me wonder-
ing how many more “unmakable” hands can be made.

Favorite Hands 89
 8. Blind Spot — Solution
Dummy Back to Question
♠ 10 9 8
♥ K
♦ QJ54
♣ K9863
Lev
♠ Q7632 N ♠ J54
♥ 7 W E ♥ J9843
♦ A K 10 9 6
S
♦ 3
♣ Q5 ♣ A742
Me
♠ AK
♥ A Q 10 6 5 2
♦ 872
♣ J 10

This hand occurred in a money IMPs game in New York in

1992. Winning the spade, I led a heart to the king, returned to
a spade, and cashed the ♥A getting the bad news. I now led the
♣10 and West played low (had West covered, East could win and
return a club for two down). East, Sam Lev, ducked the first
club, won the second and returned a spade. Now I was able to
ruff and endplay East in trumps for down one.
That night I realized something about this hand was both-
ering me. What if I had cashed the spade before crossing to the
♥K? Then I could have ruffed a spade before cashing a high
trump and sneaking through the ♣10, thus depriving Lev of an
exit card after he won the second club. He would be forced to
exit a trump and now ten, queen, and another trump would
endplay him to make four! The only defense would be for him
to unblock in trumps, letting me win all the trumps, but allow-
ing West to take the last two tricks with the ♦A and a spade.
But wait! I could lead the ♥5 to the king and ruff a spade
with the ♥6 and — oh no, my vow! Do I have to wait another
sixteen years for a chance to cure this particular blind spot?

90 Bridge, Zia... and me

9. ...And Thou Shalt Receive — Solution
Dummy
Back to Question
♠ AQ54
♥ QJ2
♦ A93
♣ A93
You
♠ 6 N ♠ KJ732
♥ 64 W E ♥ K5
♦ J 10 7 6 4
S
♦ K52
♣ K J 10 6 4 ♣ 752
Lev
♠ 10 9 8
♥ A 10 9 8 7 3
♦ Q8
♣ Q8

If you thought this was one of those hands where you should
win the spade king to deceive declarer and talk him out of the
trump finesse — I’m sorry, but declarer would know that your
partner’s lead was not from ♠J7632. Instead, you must give
partner a spade ruff and take two more tricks in the minors. It
won’t matter that a diamond return by West after the spade ruff
sets up the queen, because declarer cannot afford to duck it, else
he loses another ruff.
So, East won the spade jack and returned the seven, suit-
preference. West ruffed and returned a diamond but declarer,
Sam Lev, rose with the ace, drew two trumps, crossed to the club
ace, and reeled off the trumps leaving the position on the next
page.

Favorite Hands 91
 Dummy
♠ AQ
♥ —
♦ 9
♣ —

♠ — N ♠ K3
♥ — W E ♥ —
♦ J ♦ K
♣ KJ S ♣ —
Lev
♠ 8
♥ —
♦ Q
♣ Q

Reading the position correctly, Lev exited with a diamond,

endplaying East.
It struck me as interesting that, if East had asked for a
club return instead of a diamond after the spade ruff, then
Lev would probably have gone down. In fact, the more I
thought about it, the more I realized that East should have
asked for a club. If declarer has no queens it doesn’t mat-
ter and, if he has one queen, you will at least break even,
since he will inevitably play for the strip squeeze.
And, you may score a huge gain if his minors are, e.g.,
♦ Qx ♣Jx, because he may still try to throw you in with a
club (assuming that your partner cooperates and returns a
low club). Furthermore, you will also gain when declarer’s
minors are ♦xx ♣QJ, or ♦x ♣Q10x, since he will almost cer-
tainly go wrong. Of course, it goes without saying that the
quicker you can figure out to ask for a club, the more situ-
ations there are where you are likely to gain.

92 Bridge, Zia... and me

10. In the Zone — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ K842
♥ J53
♦ A863
♣ 94

♠ Q 10 6 3 N ♠ AJ5
♥ 874 W E ♥ Q
♦ KJ4
S
♦ Q 10 7 5 2
♣ KJ6 ♣ Q852
Me
♠ 97
♥ A K 10 9 6 2
♦ 9
♣ A 10 7 3

This hand was a pleasurable experience for me — one of

those rare moments when I felt I had done something
good.
At trick two I crossed to the diamond ace and ruffed a
diamond (the key play), and then played a low club. If East
had held three clubs to two honors, plus a stiff heart, I
would have been cold; but West won the club jack and
returned a second trump, on which East naturally (but
fatally) discarded a diamond.
Winning in dummy, I ruffed another diamond, played
the ace of clubs and ruffed a club, and ruffed dummy’s last
diamond leaving the position illustrated on the next page.

Favorite Hands 93
 Dummy
♠ K842
♥ —
♦ —
♣ —

♠ Q 10 6 N ♠ AJ5
♥ 7 W E ♥ —
♦ — ♦ —
♣ — S ♣ Q
Me
♠ 97
♥ K
♦ —
♣ 10

After drawing the last trump I played a club to East, who

now regretted having parted with his ‘useless’ diamond.
Do you think you would have found a spade pitch with the
East hand? Then I would probably still choose to play the
hand the same way, gaining when East has 4-1-4-4 with the
spade ace, but going down in a ‘cooler’ when East has 5-1-
3-4 with no spade ace. The former is a more likely mathe-
matical possibility.

94 Bridge, Zia... and me

11. Information — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ K 10 2
♥ A64
♦ QJ9
♣ 7642
Zia
♠ 74 N ♠ J5
♥ KJ9753 W E ♥ 8
♦ K62
S
♦ 10 8 7 4
♣ 10 3 ♣ AQJ985
Me
♠ AQ9863
♥ Q 10 2
♦ A53
♣ K

This hand took place in a rubber bridge game in 1989 in

New York. On the bidding, I felt sure that Zia held the dia-
mond king. I covered with the ten of hearts and took Zia’s
jack with the ace. I ruffed a club with the spade eight,
cashed the ace and king of trumps, and ruffed another
club. Then, since it looked as if Zia was 2-6-3-2, I tried a
low diamond. Zia laughed as he put up the king and exit-
ed with a diamond, saying, “You can’t endplay me.” True,
but I could (and did) endplay his partner with the fourth
round of clubs.
This was a fairly simple hand, but I liked that I saw the
end position from the beginning, while the rest of the table
didn’t see it until it happened.

Favorite Hands 95
 12. Singular Opportunity — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ A5
♥ A94
♦ A 10 9 5 4
♣ A94

♠ KQJ864 N ♠ 10 7 3
♥ 8 W E ♥ J 10 5 3
♦ K
S
♦ QJ6
♣ K J 10 7 2 ♣ 863
Me
♠ 92
♥ KQ762
♦ 8732
♣ Q5

I played this hand in the 1976 Sunday Times Invitational,

in London. I let the ♠K hold and won the spade continua-
tion. I played the ♥A and, noting happily the fall of the
eight, ran the nine. When West pitched a spade, I paused.
Clearly West was 6-5, at least, to bid this way vulnera-
ble; and if he wasn’t 6-1-1-5, I had no chance. The danger
now was that East would win the first diamond and shoot
through a club before I had time to establish the fifth dia-
mond for a discard. Therefore, I needed West to hold the
bare ♦K so that I could lose the first diamond to him. I
then realized that drawing further trumps would afford
West the opportunity to disgorge the offending monarch.
Therefore, at trick four, I led a low diamond from dummy
and was fortunate to find the existing distribution.
Immediately after the hand, I was aware that I had bun-
gled the play. By playing trumps first I had unnecessarily

96 Bridge, Zia... and me

given West one chance to discard that king. Precisely the
same reasoning that I used at trick four could, and should,
have been used at trick two — a low diamond at once was
the correct play. If West won and persisted with a third
spade, I could ruff in hand discarding a club from dummy.
Then, heart to the ace, ♥9 covered, diamond to the ace,
finesse the ♥7, and draw the last trump discarding
dummy’s other low club. Finally, concede a diamond to
East who cannot have any spades left, and must, therefore,
concede the last three tricks to the dummy.

Favorite Hands 97
 13. Countdown — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ AQ2
♥ AQ2
♦ 765
♣ KJ97

♠ 9 864 N ♠ K 10 7
♥ 9 86 W E ♥ K 10 7 4
♦ 8 2
S
♦ K Q J 10 9
♣ 6 543 ♣ 2
You
♠ J53
♥ J53
♦ A43
♣ A Q 10 8

Over the years, I have had a good deal of fun giving this par
hand to various experts. Typically, their answers take the
following course: after a little thought they say, “I duck the
first diamond, win the second, and cash four clubs. What
does East come down to?”
“Kx in both majors and three diamonds,” I answer.
“Then I throw East in with a diamond.”
“Okay,” I reply, “East cashes two more diamonds. What
do you pitch from both hands?”
“Well, I... no... hmm... I can discard the queen of... hmm
... no. Wait a minute, I cash only three clubs before end-
playing East.”
“Okay, so what are your pitches?”
“I throw... a club and... a spade from dummy and a...
spade and a heart from hand.”

98 Bridge, Zia... and me

 “Then East exits a spade and you must lose a heart.”
“I guess that’s right... wait a minute, now I’ve got it. I
cash only two clubs before throwing East in. Now I can dis-
card two clubs from dummy and a low card in each major
from hand.”
“East returns from a Kxx major suit after cashing his
diamonds.”
“Okay, so I win the jack and cash two more clubs
squeezing East in the majors.”
“The squeeze will not operate because your
communication is blocked.”
“There is only a single chance to make this hand,” I
quickly say before the expert can ‘solve’ the problem. Duck
the first diamond, win the second and cash one club.
Throw East in, discarding two clubs from dummy (leaving
a fluid position) and a low card in each major from hand
(East cannot help himself by not cashing his diamonds).
Win the jack of whichever major East returns and cross to
the other ace (a Vienna Coup) leaving, for example:

Overtake the Dummy

♠ AQ
club king and cash ♥ Q2
♦ —
the remaining ♣ K
clubs throwing ♠ 98 N ♠ K 10
hearts from ♥ 98
♦ —
W E ♥
♦
K 10 7
—
dummy — East is ♣ 6 S ♣ —

caught in a major- You

♠ 5
suit squeeze. ♥ J
♦ —
“I knew it was ♣ A Q 10

something like
that, I almost got it .”
“Yes, you nearly had it the third time.”

Favorite Hands 99
 14. See-Saw — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ K42
♥ AQ53
♦ 5432
♣ 64

N
W E
S

You
♠ A Q J 10 9
♥ KJ
♦ 6
♣ AKQ53
Astute observers will have noticed there are no opposing
cards in the diagrammed solution. That is because there is
no appropriate East-West distribution for this sure-trick
par problem (assuming 7-1 diamonds).
Since East has six cards in the pointed suits he cannot
control both hearts and clubs. Therefore the hand must be
makable by squeezing West between diamonds and a
rounded suit. But which one? If you draw trumps and
unfortunately guess to cash the suit which West holds, the
squeeze will not operate. Meanwhile, it would also be nice
if we could safely ruff a club in dummy.
The solution is as follows: since West has seven dia-
monds he cannot also hold seven hearts. Therefore, it must
be safe to cash one heart. In the (unlikely) event that West
shows out, cash the heart jack, cross to the spade king,
pitch two clubs on the ace-queen of hearts, draw trumps
and claim. If West follows to one heart he can no longer

100 Bridge, Zia... and me

hold six clubs, so it must be safe to cash one of those. If
West shows out, ruff a club in dummy, draw trumps, and
discard the other club loser on a heart. If West follows to
one club, East must have at least one more heart, so play a
second heart. Getting the idea? If West shows out, cross to
the spade king etc., and if West follows, play the king of
clubs. If West shows out, cash the club queen and crossruff.
If West follows, ruff a club high, draw trumps and claim
(clubs must have broken no worse than 4-2).
So you see, this was not a squeeze hand, but a counting
hand. This elegant ‘see-saw’ position was first shown to me
in 1975 by Victor Silverstone.

Favorite Hands 101

 15. Mystery — Solution
Back to Question
Dummy
♠ Q5432
♥ 742
♦ 53
♣ A85

♠ K N ♠ 10 9 8 6
♥ 98 W E ♥ 65
♦ K Q 10 7 6 2
S
♦ AJ98
♣ J942 ♣ 10 6 3
Declarer
♠ AJ7
♥ A K Q J 10 3
♦ 4
♣ KQ7

It seems that the only chance is to find East with the sin-
gleton or doubleton spade king but, in fact, at trick one,
you can claim against a singleton king with West also.
How?
This hand was played in a high-stakes rubber bridge
game in London against Howard Cohen. The singleton
king was indeed offside (otherwise this hand would prob-
ably have been forgotten forever), and declarer duly went
down; but later that night he figured out how he should
have made the hand.
The solution is as follows: ruff the diamond and play
five rounds of hearts discarding two spades from dummy.
Cash three clubs ending in dummy to leave this (apparent-
ly) simple end-position:

102 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy Now lead a small spade from dummy
♠ Q54 and, if East never discarded a spade, take
♥ —
♦ — the normal finesse. But, if East did throw
♣ — a spade, play a spade to the ace. Why?
N Because East would never throw a
W E
S
spade(s) to come down to Kx. So, if he
Declarer
pitches one, the only chance is that he
♠ AJ7 was forced to pitch one, as he would have
♥ —
♦ —
been on the actual layout.
♣ — Yes, I know that East could defeat you
an extra trick by discarding down to Kx;
but firstly, he wouldn’t, and secondly, who cares? In fact, it
is precisely because you are certain to go down two if the
spade king is wrong, that you would never play the hand
this way — unless you saw the reason to do so.
This is my favorite hand of all time (so far!). I failed to
solve it when I was given it as a problem and nobody I have
ever presented it to has solved it. Some experts have failed
to solve it when I have presented it a second time (after a
suitable time lapse). One world champion failed to solve it
three times over a ten-year period. Unfortunately, the hand
has appeared in print before (The Bridge World), and has
been substantially publicized by me, so it may not have
been new to you.
As a practical matter, one should be
Dummy aware of this analogous situation. If you
A J 10 x reach a four-card ending and West has dis-
N
carded from this suit, consider whether he
W E
S
was being helpful, or was forced to discard
one from xxxxx.
Declarer
Kx

Favorite Hands 103

 c h a p t e r f i v e

MAJOR
REGRETS

IF ONLY...

The following four hands are those which I found, over the
years, to be the most upsetting — for widely differing rea-
sons. Three of them cost, or played a big part in costing, a
major event.
The mistakes which bother me the most are always
those which come as a result of my overly pessimistic out-
look. That pessimism is sometimes about the lie of the
opposing cards, and other times just a mistrust of my own
feelings, i.e., thinking that whatever I do will be wrong. It
is certainly not necessarily correct to go against one’s own
nature, but it is vitally important to be cognizant of it.
See whether you can do better than I did.

Major Regrets 105

 Hand 1. You hold
♠ K 7 2 ♥ A Q 8 4 2 ♦ Q 10 7 2 ♣ J
LHO opens a Precision 2♣, with everybody vulnerable. After
two passes you balance with a double, and LHO redoubles.
Partner bids 2♠ and RHO bids 2NT. LHO raises to 3NT which
partner doubles, ending the auction. What do you lead?
Answer
Hand 2. You hold
♠ 7 5 ♥ 9 8 2 ♦ K 10 8 6 5 2 ♣ Q 9
RHO opens 1♥, and rebids 4♥ over LHO’s 1♠ response. LHO
cue-bids 5♣, and RHO’s 6♥ bid concludes the auction. What is
your lead? Answer

Hand 3. Dummy
♠ K93
♥ 6
♦ AJ82
♣ A Q 10 6 4

N
W E
S

You
♠ AJ
♥ AJ82
♦ K9753
♣ 75

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♣ 1♥ 2♦
pass 3♥ pass 3♠
pass 4♦ pass 4NT
pass 5♥ dbl 6♦
all pass
West leads the ♥9 (doubleton at most). Plan the play.
Answer

106 Bridge, Zia... and me

Hand 4. Dummy
♠ 864
♥ K53
♦ 2
♣ A J 10 7 6 3

N
W E
S

You
♠ —
♥ A J 10 8 6 2
♦ A J 10 9 4 3
♣ 8

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♥
1♠ 2♠ 4♠ 6♥
pass1 pass pass

1. After some hesitation

West leads the club king. Plan the play.

Answer

Major Regrets 107

 Hand 1. Back to Question
Dummy
♠ A53
♥ K93
♦ —
♣ AQ87642
Me
♠ K72 N ♠ J864
♥ AQ842 W E ♥ J6
♦ Q 10 7 2
S
♦ K953
♣ J ♣ K93

Declarer
♠ Q 10 9
♥ 10 7 5
♦ AJ864
♣ 10 5

This hand occurred during the late stages of the British

Trials for the 1976 World Team Olympiad. Had I led a
heart (as I believe I should have) my team would have won
— and I would have gone to Monte Carlo. Even a diamond
lead would have sufficed, providing that partner holds up
till the third club, since dummy can now be strip-squeezed
and thrown in with a spade. On a heart lead, declarer
would have to play almost double-dummy, just to go two
down. I led a spade, and declarer wound up with an over-
trick. And I wound up back in Glasgow.

108 Bridge, Zia... and me

Hand 2. Back to Question
Dummy
♠ AJ964
♥ 753
♦ 93
♣ A74
Me Shenkin
♠ 75 N ♠ K83
♥ 982 W E ♥ 4
♦ K 10 8 6 5 2
S
♦ QJ74
♣ Q9 ♣ K8652
Declarer
♠ Q 10 2
♥ A K Q J 10 6
♦ A
♣ J 10 3

This was the penultimate deal which I played in the 1978

Cavendish Invitational. Barnet Shenkin and I were leading
entering the final session, but things had been a little rocky
for us — we needed to beat this hand to win the event.
Barnet had not doubled 5♣, but I knew that declarer
was prepared for a diamond lead. It felt as if I had to
attack, but neither minor looked promising. For a dia-
mond to work, I needed Barnet to have the ♦Q and neither
opponent to have a singleton. For a club to be successful,
partner needed the ♣K, but he hadn’t doubled 5♣. Perhaps
that was because he had the ♦Q with fewer diamonds, and
did not want to steer me away from a diamond lead if I had
the ♦K and declarer had a stiff club. Still, although I felt a
club was more likely to work, I hated the idea of leading a
club after partner’s non-double, and finding that it was
wrong. So, I led a diamond... and we came second.

Major Regrets 109

 Hand 3. Back to Question
Zia
♠ K93
♥ 6
♦ AJ82
♣ A Q 10 6 4
Meyers Schulle
♠ Q8654 N ♠ 10 7 2
♥ 95 W E ♥ K Q 10 7 4 3
♦ 10 6
S
♦ Q4
♣ J983 ♣ K2
Me
♠ AJ
♥ AJ82
♦ K9753
♣ 75

I played this hand against Jill Meyers and Kay Schulle in an

early round of the 1990 Vanderbilt. I felt that I would have
no problem if I picked up the diamonds; but if I mis-
guessed them I would need a black-suit finesse plus some
care in the timing, since the bidding made it very likely that
East had the ♣K. Yet it was the bidding that made me think
that the spade finesse was due to fail. I knew that I, as East,
would never double 5♥ holding the ♠Q, knowing that
dummy had a stiff heart. Therefore, I felt that the ‘right’
play was to lead the ♠J planning to run it! This would be
legitimately successful if East had ♠10x, and would also win
when West failed to cover. I wasn’t worried about what Zia,
my partner, would say (he heartily approves of all such
swindles); but I thought my teammates might not under-
stand if this play failed. So I finessed the second round of
diamonds and went down one. I deeply regret not knowing
if the swindle would have worked.

110 Bridge, Zia... and me

Hand 4. Back to Question
Dummy
♠ 864
♥ K53
♦ 2
♣ A J 10 7 6 3

♠ K Q 10 5 2 N ♠ AJ973
♥ 9 W E ♥ Q74
♦ Q6
S
♦ K875
♣ KQ942 ♣ 5
Me
♠ —
♥ A J 10 8 6 2
♦ A J 10 9 4 3
♣ 8

This was the first hand of the final quarter of the 1991
Vanderbilt final in Atlantic City. I won the club ace, played
to the diamond ace, and ruffed a diamond. Now what? It
looked as if I needed either to bring in the hearts for no
losers, or to find diamonds 3-3. The percentage play
seemed to be to play the heart king and, if the queen did
not fall, ruff something to hand and lead a diamond, still
surviving if West started with doubletons in both red suits.
All this was being watched on Vugraph, and everyone
could see that if I just ruffed a club at trick four, I would
gain the information that would lead me to the winning
line, i.e., finessing the heart.
This was also the correct ‘at the table’ line. Why?
Because West had thought for an hour over 6♥, obviously
considering a sacrifice; therefore, heart shortness was very
likely. Instead of using his huddle, I blocked it out, unwill-
ing to finesse through the 4♠ bidder. And the lead made

Major Regrets 111

 me feel that diamonds were almost certainly 4-2, since
West might have led a diamond with ♦KQx. Anyway, if he
had the king-queen of both minors, a singleton heart
became even more likely.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

An interesting sidelight is that once East shows out on the

second club, you could lead a diamond planning, if West
follows, to ruff with the king. Then finesse the heart eight,
West obviously being 5-0-3-5. Perhaps this would have
been right if West had thought for two hours over 6♥.
Making this hand would not, by itself, have been
enough to win the match; but I feel that the psychological
difference would probably have been enough to swing it.

112 Bridge, Zia... and me

 c h a p t e r s i x

HODGE
PODGE

This chapter is a collection of random material that didn’t fit

neatly anywhere else. There are some instructive hands, some
humorous stories, and my thoughts on a number of aspects of
bridge and the way we play it. Let’s start off with some hands
that illustrate differing approaches to selecting a line of play
by declarer.

POTPOURRI
Some hands do not lend themselves to ‘normal’ analysis.
Sometimes you just have to look for a likely road to success
without considering probability or technique. This exam-
ple is from an IMPs-for-money game in New York, circa
1992:

Hodgepodge 115
 Dummy
♠ 97
♥ AJ83
♦ A652
♣ 10 8 3

N
W E
S

Me
♠ A Q 10 8 3
♥ 652
♦ 4
♣ AJ52

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♦ 1♠
pass 1NT 2♦ pass
pass 2♠ all pass

West led the diamond ten. As I went through the various

‘normal’ lines in my head, nothing satisfied me. After a
minute, I hit upon a method of enlisting the opposition’s
help. I ducked the first diamond and won the second,
pitching a club. Then I passed the spade seven. West won
the jack and duly switched to a club. It was now a simple
matter to cross to the ace of hearts, pick up the spades, and
set up my eighth trick in clubs.
The East hand:

♠ K2 ♥ K9 ♦ KQJ873 ♣ K94

Now, I’m not saying that no other line could lead to suc-
cess, but I do believe that no other line is as likely to work,
even against good opposition. Even if East gives suit-pref-

116 Bridge, Zia... and me

erence at trick two, how does he know what he wants?
How will West figure out a subtle signal? It certainly won’t
be easy.
The only thing against me was the time it took me to
find the play. Probably, it would be winning bridge to
begin every hand you declare by looking for a line such as
this — one which is just going to work — before thinking
about the best technical play.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

A definite weakness of mine is the desire I have to demon-

strate to myself that I know what is happening. This
occasionally causes me to make ‘nullo’ plays:

Dummy
♠ Q 10 7 5 2
♥ K 10
♦ J965
♣ 74
Me
♠ 9 N
♥ AQ63 W E
♦ Q 10 7 3
S
♣ K 10 8 5

NORTH SOUTH
2NT
3♥1 4♣
4♥2 4♠
pass
1. Transfer
2. Re-transfer

Hodgepodge 117
 Dummy
♠ Q 10 7 5 2
♥ K 10
♦ J965
♣ 74
Me
♠ 9 N
♥ AQ63 W E
♦ Q 10 7 3
S
♣ K 10 8 5

Trick 1: ♠9, ♠10, ♠3, ♠8

Trick 2: ♣4, ♣6, ♣Q, ♣K
Trick 3: ♥A, ♥10, ♥9, ♥4
Trick 4: ♥3, ♥K,♥ 2, ♥5
Trick 5: ♠2, ♠4, ♠J, ?

The obvious pitch was a heart, since partner’s carding sug-

gested that that would be safe. However, I satisfied myself,
after some thought, that my fourth diamond could have no
relevance. Therefore, in accordance with my desire to be
different, I pitched a diamond. Declarer cashed the dia-
mond ace, ruffed the jack of hearts in dummy (with me,
typically, not covering), and led a diamond. As my partner
thought on this trick I realized what I had perpetrated. Do
you see it? Declarer’s hand was obviously:

♠ AJ8 ♥ J54 ♦ AKxx ♣ AQJ

Dummy Partner had to

♠ Q7
♥ — pitch on this trick,
♦ —
♣ — and then declarer
Me
♠ — N ♠ K6 would cash the
♥ Q ♥ —
♦ —
W E
♦ — clubs and exit with
♣ S ♣
x —
a diamond. I
Declarer
♠ A would be on lead in
♥ —
♦ x
a two-card ending
♣ — (see left), forced to

118 Bridge, Zia... and me

smother my partner’s king of spades. I had never seen a
smother play at the table before, and have never believed
any report I ever read of one. Fortunately(?) for me,
declarer, who was not ‘into the hand’, cashed the spade ace
and conceded down one.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Accurate handling of suit-combinations sometimes

requires intricate analysis:

Dummy
♠ A6
♥ K432
♦ KQ6
♣ AK73

N
W E
S

You
♠ 8532
♥ A 10 9 7 5
♦ A4
♣ J6

Matchpoints

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♣ pass 1♥
2♠ 3♠ pass 4♦
pass 4♥ all pass

West leads the spade king. Think before reading on.

Hodgepodge 119
 Dummy
♠ A6
♥ K432
♦ KQ6
♣ AK73

N
W E
S

You
♠ 8532
♥ A 10 9 7 5
♦ A4
♣ J6
The contract is clearly in no danger — the major issue is
five or six. The only complication is that 4-0 trumps puts
five in jeopardy. The solution is to cross to the diamond
ace and lead the ten of hearts. If West follows, go up with
the king and continue normally, but if West shows out you
must duck. Win the return, finesse the heart seven, and
concede a spade. Later, ruff a spade with the heart king,
finesse the heart nine, and pitch the other spade on the dia-
mond. Five made — the only way it should be made.
I must admit to altering this hand. It was originally
presented to me by my wife, Debbie, with the spade ace in
South’s hand, and with South’s hearts being ♥A10987. This
meant that declarer, winning the opening lead and playing
a ‘small’ heart, could ‘fall into’ the correct line. With my
alteration, the winning play will be found only by someone
who knows why.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

120 Bridge, Zia... and me

Sometimes the reason a hand should be made is far from
obvious, even at double-dummy. The following hand
played by Zia in a National pairs game is a case in point:
Dummy
♠ AQ63
♥ 875
♦ K42
♣ J73

N
W E
S

Zia
♠ KJ87542
♥ K 10
♦ A75
♣ 8

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH

1♠
dbl 2NT1 3♥ 4♠
all pass

1. Limit raise

West led the ace of clubs and continued with the king, East
playing the five and then the six (low-high discouraging).
Zia ruffed, and immediately led a diamond, hoping that
West would fail to unblock. West, however, played the jack;
so Zia drew trumps (West had both missing trumps), elim-
inated clubs, and exited in diamonds — in the forlorn hope
that West had started with ♦QJ10 alone, or any five.
These were the four hands:

Hodgepodge 121
 Dummy
♠ AQ63
♥ 875
♦ K42
♣ J73

♠ 10 9 N ♠ —
♥ A632 W E ♥ QJ94
♦ J 10
S
♦ Q9863
♣ AKQ42 ♣ 10 9 6 5
Zia
♠ KJ87542
♥ K 10
♦ A75
♣ 8

Obviously, the hand could have been made by throwing

West in with a club, but I sympathized with Zia since it
seemed unnatural to play the takeout doubler for a dou-
bleton diamond. It was only later, when I looked at the
hand record, that I realized the significance of the spot
cards.
If East had the club queen, he would surely encourage
with his highest spot. Therefore, East did not hold the club
queen. That being the case, East was likely to have four
clubs, not only because he might have discouraged with a
lower spot, but also because most people do not usually go
around playing middle cards from five small. Now that
West is known to have five clubs, and subsequently shows
up with two spades, he is quite likely to have two dia-
monds. And thus (as usual?), the winning line is the logi-
cal one.

122 Bridge, Zia... and me

 SUIT-COMBINATIONS
It sometimes seems to me that the most important rule for
defenders in handling suit-combinations is
Always play the nine unless you must
For example:
Dummy
Q 10 6 2
N
N
W
W E
E
AJ9 743
S
S

Declarer
K85

When declarer leads low, West must play the jack to give
the defense a chance for two tricks.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Dummy
A642
N
N
W
W E
E
Q9 K53
S
S

Declarer
J 10 8 7

When declarer leads the ten, West needs to play the queen

Hodgepodge 123
 smoothly, and South should go wrong. This may look risky
— what if declarer has the king? Well, if a six-card suit in
the hidden hand is possible, the risk is very real (bare king);
but, if not, then it is probable that, either declarer doesn’t
have the king, or that he is intending to finesse through you
anyway. It is unlikely that the ten will be played to the ace,
since you may hold Q9xx. Yes, I know game theory is
involved here, but most players simply aren’t willing to
look that foolish. Certainly, if declarer were known to hold
only four, I would deem the risk infinitesimal.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Dummy
A 10 7 5 2
N
W E
S

Declarer
K83

The problem here is to take four tricks while keeping East

off lead. Attempting to lead to the eight will fail if East has
J9x and inserts the nine, West unblocking the queen. The
answer is to lead towards the ace, ducking if West plays the
queen. If not, duck the nine on the way back.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

124 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy
A K 10 8 x
N
N
Me
W
W E
E
J9x
S
S

Declarer in three notrump, with plenty of entries, led

towards dummy in this suit, in which he was known to
have fewer than three cards. This was an exception to the
‘nine’ rule. Instinctively, I played the jack and declarer, who
started with a singleton, misguessed and played me for
QJx. Probably, he should have guessed right, but at least I
had given him a chance to go wrong.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Dummy
A2
N
N
W
W E
E
94 QJ63
S
S

Declarer
K 10 8 7 5

When dummy plays the ace, you must play the nine. Here,
declarer should still guess right in theory, but in practice
will likely play you for J9 or Q9.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Hodgepodge 125
 Those were all pretty old hat, but here is a little-known
wrinkle:

Dummy
K8
N
N Me
W
W E
E QJ63
S
S

This position arose in the 1995 Macallan Pairs, and I was

East. Declarer was known to have ace-fifth in this suit and,
fortunately, he took a long time at trick one, so I was able
to figure out this position at the table.
Clearly, I did not want to split if declarer had A109xx or
A97xx and, also clearly, partner needed to play the nine
from 9x. But, if partner played the nine from 97 and I did-
n’t split, this would be a disaster, since declarer would have
no choice but to stick in the ten. Similarly, if partner
played the seven from 7x and I did split, that wouldn’t be
too good either. Therefore, partner must only play the
seven from 97 or 107, the nine from 9x (not 97), and the x
from 7x.
I found it staggering that there could exist such a com-
bination where it was fatal to play the seven from 7x. In
fact, if you switch the six and the seven, you will see that the
same thing is true of 6x.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

126 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy
A52
N
W E
S

Declarer
K 10 8 7 6

This combination is not well-known, even though it

appeared in The Bridge World. The correct technical play
for four tricks is to lead low from the ace, intending to play
low. If East plays an honor you can claim four tricks
(except on a 5-0 break, when there is no chance anyway). If
East plays the nine, insert the ten — this loses only to sin-
gleton nine in either hand. As a practical matter, you may
want to go up king when East plays the nine. Would you
know to play the nine from QJ9x? You should, if you just
follow the golden rule.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Here is an interesting and little-known combination:

Dummy
QJ83
N
W E
S

Declarer
A94

Hodgepodge 127
 Dummy The contract is notrump, you need three
QJ83
tricks, and dummy has no entry. How
N would you proceed? Analysis shows that
W E
the best play is low to the eight, planning
S
to run the queen if the eight wins, and to
Declarer cash the ace if East wins the ten. This
A94
succeeds (apparently) whenever West has
the ten and East has the king, or whenev-
er the king is doubleton. But this is not so — East can duck
with 10xxx! (Also, West can play the 10 with K10-double-
ton.) Steve Sion claims to have ducked with ten-fourth at
the table. I find this a little difficult to believe (probably
envy), but I’m impressed that he even thought of it.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Debbie and I were going over some hands from a regional

in Rye, New York, in which she had played in 1998, and we
came upon the following:

♠ AK9874
♥ Q974
♦ 83
♣ A

♠ Q3 N ♠ J2
♥ AJ3 ♥ K862
W E
♦ A K 10 9 6 ♦ Q52
♣ 10 9 2 S ♣ K875
Debbie
♠ 10 6 5
♥ 10 5
♦ J74
♣ QJ643

128 Bridge, Zia... and me

 “What happened on this board?” I asked.
“Nothing — boring hand,” answered Debbie. “We did-
n’t compete to 3♠ over 3♦.”
“Would you have made 3♠? No, I guess not. The eight
of hearts stands up.”
“Okay, next hand,” said Debbie.
“Wait a minute,” I mused. “The defense leads three
rounds of diamonds, and declarer ruffs and draws trumps.
What if you now lead a heart to the five? West is forced to
win the jack, and now you make a heart trick by force.”
“Did I say this hand was boring?” said Debbie, smiling.
“But wait, if East puts in the six he foils the declarer.
Now the eight comes back into play.”
“I guess this is a bad hand for upside-down,” Debbie
remarked.
Thinking more about this combination the next day, I
realized the flaw of a heart to the five. Declarer would be
relinquishing the legitimate chance of West’s having the
♥A8x or ♥K8x. After playing small to the ten, declarer
could eventually pin the eight.
However, this thought brought about another point of
interest. If the ten loses to the ♥A or ♥K, declarer can
apparently play the ♥Q or ♥9 with the same effect. Not so!
If declarer plays the ♥Q and it goes ♥K, ♥5, ♥8, she would
now need to guess whether West started with ♥AJ8 or
♥A8x. No, declarer must play the nine on the second
round, to discover the whereabouts of the jack. If West
played the ace from ♥AJx, that was a Grosvenor.
My thoughts on this hand give you an idea of how my
(strange) mind works.

Hodgepodge 129
 FALSECARDING
Not much has been written on this subject — perhaps
because it is too random. I would like to deal with one par-
ticular aspect: which card should declarer play from
equals?
Many of the basic rules are well-known, but it really
surprises me how often expert declarers hurt themselves by
violating simple precepts. For example, if RHO leads
through you, and you don’t play your highest from equals,
RHO will ‘know’ that you have the other equal (since his
partner failed to win the trick with it). Obviously, there
may be occasions when one is only (or primarily) involved
with LHO, but I have seen experts make life easy for their
opponents time and again with this type of error.
Another common error occurs when LHO leads,
dummy has nothing relevant, and RHO wins the trick;
usually, you should not drop the highest from equals, as
this often gives maximum information to the opposition.
With three touching cards it is frequently correct to play
the middle one as in the following layout:
Dummy
K963
N
W E
S

Declarer
Q J 10

West leads the deuce in a suit contract, and East wins the
ace. You happen to know that the lead is a singleton (either
from the bidding or from the opponents’ carding meth-
ods).

130 Bridge, Zia... and me

 If you play the queen or the ten, East will know also, as
the lead could not be from QJ2 or J102. But if you play the
jack, you can keep an element of doubt in East’s mind —
Q102 is possible.
Of course, there are times when you want to give the
opponents information. A well-known piece of chicanery
is, when playing notrump, to win the opening lead with the
queen from king-queen doubleton facing two or three
small. LHO knows that you have the king and may, there-
fore, shift upon gaining the lead. Of course, your opponent
may wonder why you are being so generous, and figure out
to lay down the ace.
That brings to mind a more subtle form of trickery —
winning the queen from king-queen-third. Now, LHO
might decide to bang down that ace and drop your deuce
— it all depends upon the opponents.
Some falsecards are mandatory. In other situations, it is
important that you falsecard frequently and randomly,
both as declarer and defender. Otherwise, you make your-
self a little too easy to play against.

BIDDING SYSTEM AND STYLE

I believe that Bob Hamman once said, “System is 3% of the
game.” (I once asked him if he really said it, and he
answered, “Why so much?”)
I have no idea how true this statement is, but I feel more
or less the same way. However, I would put it a little dif-
ferently. I would say that the choice of basic system, con-
ventions and gadgets is relatively unimportant. I do regard
agreements as being of primary importance. The more sit-
uations in which you and your partner are attuned to the
same wavelength, the better equipped you will be to handle
different possibilities. To do this requires definition more

Hodgepodge 131
 than artificiality.
Take Key Card Blackwood (Edgar Kaplan would have
said, “Please.”). In the hands of the perfect partnership, I
believe this can be a useful, well-nigh invaluable tool.
However, unless you are prepared to spend many hours
discussing the various problems involved, you’re probably
better off without it, since it is extremely accident-prone.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

I feel that the proliferation of conventions nowadays is not

good for the game — for a couple of reasons. Firstly, I
believe that it makes the game less marketable in terms of
attracting both new players and media coverage. Secondly,
I think that so much artificiality makes it difficult to devel-
op the good (conventional?!) judgment that stems from
natural bidding.
As for bidding style, arguments rage as to who is ‘right’.
Sound or light openings? Light or solid preempts? Four-
or five-card majors? Limit or forcing style? Weak or strong
notrump? And on, and on. Can it be that one group of
experts is correct in these arguments, and the other just
plain wrong?
I believe that the important thing is for each player to
play the style which creates the most comfort for his own
partnership. This is most likely to produce the best deci-
sions in judgment and card-play.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

I have not had much to say about bidding because I feel

that talking about the subject is analogous to talking about

132 Bridge, Zia... and me

religion. One can talk and argue and talk and argue, but
neither side will be persuaded to change, except perhaps on
rare occasions.
There is, however, one aspect of bidding which I believe
it is necessary to master if one is to be a true expert: play-
ing the hand during the bidding.
This is most commonly applied in slam-bidding.
Except for quantitatively bid slams (which occur when one
partner has bid notrump), you should invariably ‘play’ the
slam before bidding it. That is to say, you give partner the
hand or hands you think are most consistent with the bid-
ding to date, and check to be sure that slam is good on bal-
ance.
This principle can be extended to the game level.
Whenever one of your choices involves a final decision, try
giving partner three hands: the best hand he might have,
the worst hand, and an average hand (I learned this from
Zia). This should give you a good idea of whether to
accept, invite, or pass.
Applying this technique will sometimes lead to a con-
tract that might not otherwise have been considered, e.g.,
you hold:

♠ KJ853 ♥ K4 ♦ AK ♣ J 10 9 4

Partner opens 2♠ (weak — but sound), and RHO overcalls

3♥. Many players would bid 4♠ without thought; but give
partner a normal hand and you see that three notrump is
worthy of consideration, if not completely clear-cut.
Furthermore, ‘playing’ the hand in this way will
improve your declarer play, since you will be more focused
in general, and more prepared in particular, on each hand
you declare.

Hodgepodge 133
 PSYCHIC BIDDING
Can psyching be a percentage action? Should it even be
legal within the game of bridge? I would answer ‘yes, prob-
ably’ to the first question, and a resounding ‘yes’ to the sec-
ond.
The question of whether psyching is advisable is almost
purely subjective. Ira Rubin once told me, “I only psyche
against players who are better than I am — I haven’t psy-
ched yet.” However, there are certain situations where psy-
ches are almost commonplace, for example, over takeout
doubles or game tries. The most successful psyches occur
where the psycher is in total control of the auction, but is
playing in a new partnership. Then partner will not know
enough about the psycher’s tendencies to alert the oppo-
nents.
True experts are aware of situations where their oppo-
nent has a ‘free’ psyche, and will think accordingly. I
believe that, if the overall level of play were higher, there
would be more reason for a deep analysis of the subject.
The way everyone plays right now, all you need to do to
win, even against the world’s best, is to play sound bridge.
Once upon a time, I dabbled in psyches — mostly at
rubber bridge where I felt less responsibility to my partner.
Later in my career I conceived the idea of psyching a strong
notrump in first seat at favorable vulnerability. The condi-
tions I preferred were IMPs scoring, with the opponents
playing a double as some sort of artificial bid. I presumed
that any hand valued below 15-17 would be opened 1NT,
regardless of distribution. I analyzed hundreds of hands
using this scenario, and the psyche scored a huge net prof-
it. The analysis uncovered occasional disasters (I never
exposed the psyche by passing a forcing bid, and I assumed
that partner never ‘read’ the psyche), and many small loss-
es (down four or five against a part-score was not uncom-

134 Bridge, Zia... and me

mon); but these were more than counterbalanced by fre-
quent game swings, either because the opponents were
talked out of their game (slam?), or because a no-play
game was allowed to make due to confusion. The ideal sit-
uation was for each opponent to hold a balanced opening
bid or better, and for them to defend one notrump or three
notrump while they were cold for three notrump (or
slam!). Even if they came into the bidding, analysis showed
that it would be difficult for them to achieve a par result.
Indeed, some partnerships have an agreement that they
‘never’ bid game against a strong notrump.
I experimented a couple of times with mixed success.
Then I decided to back my judgment and, in the finals of
the 1992 World Championship in Salsamaggiore, I opened
1NT with a balanced seven-count. The result? My partner,
Seymon Deutsch, raised to 3NT with 10 points. Vugraph
commentators were certain that there was some reporting
error, since I was considered a ‘straight’ player. Only
Debbie, who was in the audience, knew the truth.
The opponents’ defense was understandably poor, and
I emerged with eight tricks. In the other room, my team-
mates also took eight tricks in notrump for +120 and a
gain of 2 IMPs. I remember that Hamman told me I was
crazy, and maybe he was right, but it was great theater and,
I then believed, winning bridge.
Subsequent to that time, analysis of more hands pro-
duced less favorable results for the psyche, so I scrapped
the idea. I never had a chance to make this psyche with Zia
because we play a weak notrump non-vulnerable.
Probably, I’ll never get involved in something like that
again.

Hodgepodge 135
 THE LAWS
I have never felt comfortable with enforcing the ‘letter of
the law’ as regards revokes, leads and calls out of turn, and
penalty cards. Zia and I do not allow ourselves to profit
from mechanical errors. Assuming that we feel we have not
been damaged by the potential unauthorized information,
we prefer to let our opponents take them back. (I do not
in any way expect my opponents to do the same if I com-
mit such an infraction. I would retract my error if my
opponent asked me to do so, but I would never suggest it
myself.)
I think that the rules ought to be that the penalties for
mechanical infractions are not automatic, but adjudicated
on a case-by-case basis. Leading out of the wrong hand, for
which (strangely) there is no penalty, should be subject to
the same standards. “But,” you might object, “all this could
lead to more complications.” It might, but I feel that it
would be a more equitable rule and, after all, these infrac-
tions do not occur all that frequently. The only problem I
can foresee is the possibility that the ‘laxer’ rules might lead
to more revokes, etc., but I do not think that likely. (And
we can cross that bridge when we come to it.)
As lenient as I am about revokes, I am strict about
claims and concessions. The rules are stringent here, as I
believe they should be. The player who claims, unlike one
who revokes, is consciously attempting to get what he
believes he is entitled to (at least I assume so), and will fre-
quently get an incorrect concession from the opponents. To
counterbalance this, false claims, when caught, should be
penalized to the fullest possible extent.
A simple example: declarer in a grand slam has a
trump suit of AKxx in dummy and J10xxxx in hand. After
winning a side-suit opening lead, declarer claims. Clearly,
he makes if trumps are 2-1 and goes down if RHO has Qxx.

136 Bridge, Zia... and me

But what if LHO has Qxx? Declarer would ‘obviously’
make on the marked finesse, assuming a return to hand
would not be ruffed or overruffed. But, the ruling should
be down one. Why?
Because the basis for declarer’s claim might have been
simply that he thought he had eleven trumps and would,
therefore, have just cashed the other high trump.

THE ‘LAW’
The following article was written tongue-in-cheek at about
the same time as Larry’s book, To Bid or Not to Bid, was
published. I thought my article could lead to an entertain-
ing discourse about the ‘Law of Total Tricks’, but Larry sur-
prised me by preferring that I not publish it. So I didn’t —
until now. Sorry, Larry.
I do believe that the ‘Law’ is a valuable tool but, at least
for an expert, it should be an extension to (not a replace-
ment for) good bidding judgment.

LARRY COHEN IN NETHERLAND

He looked around feeling dizzy. Suddenly he noticed a

small figure with a red face and little horns, seated at a
desk.
“You are Larry Cohen, the bridge player from Florida,”
said the little devil, more for the benefit of the reader than
for any other reason...
“Yes,” said Larry, although he realized he was being spo-
ken to informatively, not interrogatively.
“Welcome,” said the figure.
“Wait a minute,” said Larry, glancing around and notic-

Hodgepodge 137
 ing the generally fiery surroundings. “There must be some
mistake. I’m in the wrong place. I didn’t even know I was
dead! I lived a good life, I shouldn’t be here. I never inten-
tionally broke the law.”
“Making bad laws is no better than breaking good
ones.”
“Is that it? But I was right, I’m sure of it. You must give
me a chance to prove the Law’s validity.”
In the twinkling of an eye, Larry found himself in
another room seated at a card table with three females
dressed all in black. “Which... I mean, who are you?” asked
Larry.
“We’re the Brew Team.”
Larry suddenly discovered he was holding cards. He
looked and saw:

♠ AK985 ♥ 9865 ♦ 8 ♣ 854

The bidding, without the use of boxes, proceeded:

Witch 1 Witch 2 Witch 3 Larry
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
2♦ pass
2NT pass 3♦ pass
pass dbl pass 3♠
4♦ pass pass ?

“What’s the vulnerability?” asked Larry.

“Shut up and bid,” said Witch No. 3, rather illogically.
Apparently, he would have to make a decision without
further information. What did the Law say? Well, there
were probably at least nineteen combined trumps on aver-
age, and twenty was far from unlikely. There also might be
a double fit if Witch No. 2 had good hearts. Therefore, bid-
ding seemed indicated. Larry bid 4♥ to be flexible, and his

138 Bridge, Zia... and me

partner corrected to 4♠. West led the club king, and
dummy produced:

♠ Q 10 7 3 ♥ AKQ ♦ 74 ♣ Q J 10 3

East signaled with the nine and the defense took the first
four tricks. Well, thought Larry, if spades are 3-1 and
hearts break 4-2 (i.e., if East is 1-4-6-2 or 3-2-6-2), then
the Law works perfectly, since 4♦ makes. This was the full
deal:

Witch 2
♠ Q 10 7 3
♥ AKQ
♦ 74
♣ Q J 10 3
Witch 1 Witch 3
♠ J2 N ♠ 64
♥ J74 W E ♥ 10 3 2
♦ QJ65
S
♦ A K 10 9 3 2
♣ AK72 ♣ 96
Larry
♠ AK985
♥ 9865
♦ 8
♣ 854

“Nineteen trumps! Seventeen tricks!” screeched the witch-

es in unison.
“But... ,” began Larry.
“Shut up,” said Witch No. 3.
Larry discovered that he was holding cards again. He
looked and saw that he had exactly the same hand he’d just
held. To the surprise of no one, (including you), the bid-

Hodgepodge 139
 ding proceeded exactly as it had before. Larry was clear-
headed enough to realize that, if he changed his bid, they
would change the deal. So he bid 4♥ again, and there fol-
lowed an exact repetition of the events above, except that
this time West doubled.
“You don’t learn from your mistakes, do you?” sneered
Witch No.1.
“But why did you double this time?” asked Larry.
“Because I do,” answered Witch No. 1.
For the third time, Larry was looking at his 5-4-1-3
seven-count and, for the third time, 4♦ came round to him.
By now, he figured that there was no escaping his destiny.
Anyway, maybe it was wrong to bid. Partner had pushed
the opponents, and there was no real double fit. So, he
passed and led the spade king. This was the full deal:

Witch 2
♠ Q 10 7 3
♥ AKQ
♦ 74
♣ Q J 10 3
Witch 1 Witch 3
♠ 2 N ♠ J64
♥ J 10 7 4 2 W E ♥ 3
♦ QJ65
S
♦ A K 10 9 3 2
♣ AK7 ♣ 962
Larry
♠ AK985
♥ 9865
♦ 8
♣ 854

Due to the heart position, even a club lead could not pre-
vent eleven tricks in diamonds. Also, of course, 4♠ was

140 Bridge, Zia... and me

cold.
“Nineteen trumps! Twenty-one tricks!” screeched the
witches.
“But... ,” began Larry.
“Shut up,” said Witch No. 3, who appeared to have a
limited vocabulary.
“Yes,” said Witch No. 2, “with the same North-South
hands there was a four-trick difference in the number of
total tricks. You say it can always be off by one, but the
truth is, it can be off by two or more with no valid expla-
nation. Sound and logical judgment can be used in lieu of
your Law, except at high levels where your Law does not
work efficiently anyway. The only real use for your Law is
in avoiding total aberrations.”
Larry sighed. He knew there was no escape. All he
could do was wait for the three words he needed to hear
that would save him from his fate.
“Wake up, Larry.”

MASTERPOINTS
Speaking as someone who doesn’t have an abundance of
them, I think masterpoints are a joke.
They cannot be used as a testament to a player’s
strength, but only to his or her longevity — a new system
is needed. In this computerized age it should not be too
difficult to set up a system similar to the ‘Elo’ ranking in
chess. The significant factors are importance of event,
timeliness of event, strength of opponents, strength of
partner (and teammates), and result. This would give play-
ers a current ranking that would have some actual rele-
vance.
The old system can still be maintained for those who
want it.

Hodgepodge 141
 WOMEN’S BRIDGE
There is rampant sexism in bridge. Women are generally
regarded as inferior to men as bridge players. Almost all
players (male and female) would feel more confident play-
ing against a woman whom they have never seen before
than they would against a man. In mixed pairs, many play-
ers plan strategies and make choices based purely on the
sex of a particular opponent. Why is this?
I believe that there is basically no reason why a player’s
sex should define his or her ability. My reasoning is this: I
look at all the world’s best players and see no common
characteristic. There are aggressives, conservatives, analyt-
icals, instinctuals, bashers, scientists, toughies, easies, etc. If
there is a fundamental difference between the sexes as
regards brain power, I do not see any logic in extending
that to the game of bridge.
Why is it then that if you asked the most highly regard-
ed players in the world to list their top twenty players, none
of them would name a woman? (I could probably have
safely picked a higher number.)
One major factor is women’s bridge. At one time,
almost all competitive players were men. When more
females entered the game, instead of competing against the
best they frequently played among themselves. The best
way to improve is to compete against better players. Just
think of all the women’s events that have been held in the
last thirty years. Now imagine that all of those females had,
instead, competed in an open forum. Once all the players
were assimilated, is it not likely that some of the current
world’s best would be female?
Another factor is perception. Imagine that a female
today were actually one of the world’s top ten players. Are
you certain that anyone would know it? It is extremely dif-
ficult to compare the individual talent of bridge players;

142 Bridge, Zia... and me

but it seems to be easy for people to look at an open team
containing a female and say, “They won even with a
woman.” Or (after they lost), “They had a woman on their
team.” This sort of attitude can become self-realizing.
When players are considering prospective partners or
teammates, I believe gender is a factor — some people will
simply never want to play with a female, nor want one on
their team. A male can be insulted by saying that he ‘plays
like a girl.’ A female can be ‘complimented’ by saying that
she ‘plays well for a woman.’ The simple phrase (common-
ly used) ‘woman bridge player’ is a negative classification.
People will call a female a ‘top woman bridge player’ or ‘one
of the best woman players in the world,’ without having
any idea that it could be anything other than a high com-
pliment.
In case you haven’t guessed it yet, I am against women’s
bridge. While it might be nice to win a world champi-
onship, or to be hired to play professionally, I don’t believe
there is any more justification for separating people in this
way than in having tournaments for, say, people with
brown hair, with big noses, or weighing over 200 lb.
Probably, if someone were to bring a lawsuit against the
ACBL, it would be the end of women’s events.
I guess there could be an ‘A’ and a ‘B’ event if there were
a demand for it. But, the current method hinders women’s
ability to improve the quality of their play. Yes, they have a
choice, but the lure of women’s bridge with its champi-
onships and financial opportunity is naturally irresistible
to most of the country’s top female players.
Of course, I realize that it would be unpopular and
impractical to terminate women’s bridge. Obviously, these
events produce a substantial amount of revenue for the
various organizing bodies. Therefore, all I can do is rec-
ommend that females who are serious about being the best
they can be shun them and compete only in open events.

Hodgepodge 143
 JUNIOR BRIDGE
Just in case my views on women’s bridge lead you to believe
that I am against everything other than totally open bridge,
let me correct that impression. I wholeheartedly approve
of events constructed for junior players. I’m not sure
exactly how to justify this. It just feels ‘right’ to me — just
as women’s bridge feels ‘wrong’. I think it is good that
young players experience the excitement and pressure of
competing for (say) a world championship. Also, it high-
lights, for everyone to see, some of the stars of tomorrow.
I’m less sure about seniors’ bridge, but I guess I don’t see
that it is doing any harm.

PROFESSIONAL BRIDGE
I don’t have much to say on this subject. Obviously, the
game would be ‘purer’ if there were no professionalism or
money involved, but there would also be less incentive.
Many players would not be able to devote the time they do
to studying and playing the game if they did not play pro-
fessionally. The only way out of the current client-profes-
sional situation would be through...

SPONSORSHIP
There is some sponsorship in bridge, but not much. Of
course, I’m now talking about sponsors who do not intend
to compete themselves. How can we hope to attract wide-
spread sponsorship? As things now stand we have no
chance. Bridge is not marketable because the basics are
complicated. If a non-player were to turn on the TV and
watch bridge, he or she would not be able to understand

144 Bridge, Zia... and me

what was happening. And even those who know the rules
would be mystified watching most modern expert compe-
tition, due to the phenomenal amount of artificiality that
exists today. Perhaps it would be beneficial for the future
promotion of the game if the authorities clamped down
and enforced some type of unified or universal system.

SYSTEMS
I know many people would be horrified by the idea of a
universal system, but it would not bother me. Personally, I
think bridge is more enjoyable when the game revolves
around bidding judgment and card-play, rather than sys-
temic understanding (especially destructive systemic
understanding). I would prefer that any convention which
currently requires a prepared written defense be made ille-
gal. This would simplify the game. The booklets prepared
by the ACBL and WBF are good, but the whole idea is con-
trived. Let’s attack the disease rather than the symptom —
that’s the way I see it.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Speaking of the WBF, it took about forty hours of work to

prepare the WBF convention card for Zia and myself to
compete in the 1997 Bermuda Bowl in Tunisia. I found
this particularly irritating because I know that the cards are
rarely even looked at during a match. It would be far sim-
pler to require that each pair lodge its system notes with the
organizing body (which notes can be referred to in appeals
cases if necessary), and to merely call for an outline of the
basic structure on the convention card. The ACBL card is,
along these lines, much more appropriate, with the excep-

Hodgepodge 145
 tion that there should be a separate card comprehensively
defining all carding agreements. (This is important infor-
mation which is often hidden.)

SPECIAL CONTESTS
Bridge in the form of bidding contests is not real bridge.
Magazines usually have bidding contests such as The Bridge
World’s ‘Challenge the Champs’. I am sorry to have to
reveal this (actually, that’s a lie — I’m not in the least bit
sorry), but the whole thing is really a sham. The players
who participate in these contests are often not monitored
and, even when they are, they are permitted to retract and
change bids. Since the hands are not randomly selected (in
fact, they are often submitted with emphasis on a particu-
lar facet), one should not bid the same way as one would in
real bridge. Here are a few ‘rules’ which I have compiled for
bidding contests:
1) Whenever you hold Qx, count it as 0 HCP, except
when partner bids the suit naturally (then count it as
4 HCP).
2) Whenever you have game values and an 8-card
major fit:
a) With flat shape, stop in a partial.
b) With distribution, play slam or 3NT.
3) In every set, look for the combined 27+ HCP hand
that does not produce game.
4) In every set, look for the 4-3 fit that makes a grand
(with the ‘better’ fit having no play).
5) Never open 2NT.
6) On competitive hands, always have ‘pure’ values.
7) Passing the hand out can never yield the top score.

146 Bridge, Zia... and me

All this does not mean that it is useless to bid these hands
for practice. It’s only useless if you care about your score.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Contests which involve card-play are another kettle of fish.

Double-dummy hands, for example, can be fascinating,
and can even be educational, since they often show you
what the cards can do. While the problems and solutions
are often too unrealistic for practical application, situations
do arise, usually after a competitive auction, where both
declarer and defender(s) are playing double-dummy, or
close to it. Working on double-dummy problems can
sharpen your ability to imagine unusual possibilities.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

A close relative of the double-dummy problem is the play-

or-defend problem. I was interested when I noticed a pat-
tern — always play, never defend. I think the reason is that
declarer, who has more assets (usually several more), has
more weapons. No matter what the defense can do, he
usually has another string to his bow. Early in 1998, Phil
Martin gave me this play-or-defend problem1:

1. I asked Phil for the source of the hand, and he told me that he had seen it in an arti-
cle by Eddie Kantar in a 1955 copy of The Bridge World.

Hodgepodge 147
 Dummy
♠ 763
♥ J8
♦ AKQ65
♣ 10 7 3

♠ QJ9 N ♠ K 10 8 5 4
♥ 64 W E ♥ 952
♦ J 10 8 7
S
♦ 94
♣ Q864 ♣ K95
Declarer
♠ A2
♥ A K Q 10 7 3
♦ 32
♣ AJ2

“You and your friend walk into a rubber bridge club and
kibitz a ten-cent game that is just starting up,” Phil began.
“You both watch North-South bid to 6♥, and West leads
the spade queen. Just as dummy is being tabled, both
South and West get urgent telephone calls and need to
leave the club. You and your friend are asked to fill in. Your
friend offers you the choice of sitting South or West. What
do you do?”
“Now that you’ve finished your silly preamble, do you
mind if I work on the problem,” I replied caustically.
Since there was no clear route to twelve tricks, it was
obvious to me from the start that it had to be right to be
declarer. I could see there was only one chance — a
squeeze against West. Ducking the lead didn’t seem right,
so I tried winning the first spade and running trumps.
West could throw a club and a spade, but on the fifth heart
he would need to throw his last spade, in order to hold
three clubs. Dummy pitches two spades and a diamond.

148 Bridge, Zia... and me

Now on the last trump West must pitch a club, and dummy
pitches a diamond. Now I can cross to a diamond and lead
the club ten, making two club tricks while keeping East off
lead (if East covers, win and play a low club). Too easy.
What’s the problem?
Then I spotted the flaw. On the fifth trump West did
not need to pitch his last spade — he could pitch a club
safely. If I led a low club the defense could cash a spade,
and if I took my pitch I couldn’t force a second club trick.
I went over and over it, but couldn’t make any headway.
I retraced my steps and tried ducking the first spade.
Winning the second spade, I ran trumps. After five rounds
West would have to come down to a stiff club. If he instead
pitched his last spade, the sixth trump would force him to
unguard clubs. Now the run of the diamonds would
squeeze East in the black suits. After West is reduced to
stiffs in the blacks, the sixth trump finishes him. If he
pitches a spade East will be squeezed, and if he pitches the
club queen I can take a finesse. In other words, a guard
squeeze. What’s wrong with that?
Well, West didn’t need to continue spades at trick two.
A club switch would break up the guard squeeze, and West
would obviously switch to the queen of clubs to avoid
being squeezed in the minors. After that, declarer was
clearly dead.
I worked on the problem a little longer, because this did
not seem intricate enough to justify Phil’s giving me this
problem. Eventually, I conceded and went to talk to Phil.
“I give up,” I told him. “I know it’s right to play but I
can’t figure out how to make it.”
“So you choose to defend?” asked Phil with a sneaky
smile.
“Not willingly, but yes,” I said.
“At ten cents a point?” asked Phil a little too eagerly.
“No way,” I stated. “The jack of spades ain’t gonna

Hodgepodge 149
 squirt no cider in my ear.”
“Pretend, then,” said Phil.
“Okay. I defend.”
“I duck the opening lead,” said Phil.
“I shift to the club queen,” I countered.
“You owe me five dollars,” said Phil.
“Why? You’re minus.”
“I may be down, but I’m not minus. Remember the
form of scoring? I have 100 honors!”
Maybe that preamble wasn’t so silly, after all.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Par contests, while apparently more true to real bridge, suf-

fer from the same flaw as bidding contests — non-random
selection. In a way, it is even worse, because you know
there is an answer at which you can logically arrive. Having
said that, I must admit that I love par hands and hope one
day to participate in a par contest.* One of the reasons I
sometimes take too much time at the table is that I’m look-
ing for the ‘answer’ — but none exists.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Bidding problems presented to a panel, such as The Bridge

World’s ‘Master Solvers’ Club’, are entertaining and educa-
tional. I have learned much from reading the experts’ com-
ments. I would like to see more of ‘giving the other hand’
as a problem a few months later (or the same hand a few
years later). Often, in presenting the comments by the
*After this book was completed, I did actually compete in the Jean Besse Par Contest at the
1998 World Championships in Lille, France. I won the gold medal. I have also written a
series of articles about the contest for BRIDGE TODAY magazine.

150 Bridge, Zia... and me

same players at a later date, an expert is exposed as being
full of nonsense. In fact, until we can ‘clone’ human beings,
we will never discover the ‘truth’.
Imagine a team of four Al Roths against a team of four
Ira Rubins. Perhaps we would finally discover who (if any-
one) is full of it.

HUMOR
Before entering the driest chapter of the book (ethics), I would
like to relate two stories which I find amusing.

The first took place at one of Edgar Kaplan’s home IMP

games. During the first match, Edgar’s teammates allowed
a game to be made because the opening leader, holding
♣KQJx, led his partner’s suit instead. Edgar’s comment
was, “When God gives you the KQJ of a suit, he is telling
you what to lead.”
In the second match, Edgar was partnered by Brad
Moss, who told me this story. The opponents were bidding
towards slam, and Edgar doubled a 5♣ cuebid. They
reached 6♥ and Brad (naturally) held ♦KQJx. He led a
high diamond and the contract made, whereas a club lead
would have defeated it. Brad was embarrassed and apolo-
getic. “I should have led a club,” he said.
“You shouldn’t feel too bad.” said Edgar comfortingly.
“It was a guess. God told you to lead something, and I told
you to lead something else. You guessed wrong, that’s all.”

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

The second story concerns a partnership of brothers,

whom I shall call Bob and Jim. A long time ago, soon after

Hodgepodge 151
 they started playing, Jim noticed a disturbing trend. When
he opened, say, 1♠, Bob, holding a nine or ten-count,
would bid “TWO SPADES” in ringing tones. However,
when he held a five or six-count he would bid “two spades”
in a quiet voice.
“This has got to stop,” Jim told his brother, when he
explained the situation. “It’s unethical.”
“I promise it won’t happen again,” said Bob. “I’m sorry,
I really wasn’t aware I was doing it.”
“If you do it again, I’ll punish you,” said Jim.
The next time they played together was a regional in
New York, and Jim arrived barely on time. Bob and his
opponents were waiting to play. On the first hand, Jim
opened 1♠ and Bob bid “TWO SPADES” in a loud voice.
Jim was very upset that Bob had ignored their conversation
and vowed to teach him a lesson. He had a sound game try
and passed, fully expecting to miss game and get a poor
score. Bob tabled a five-count and eight tricks proved to be
the limit of the hand. Jim was now almost apoplectic.
“That’s the most despicable thing I’ve ever seen,” he
yelled. “How could you take advantage of our conversation
like that? Have you no shame?”
He continued ranting in this vein until he was forced to
breathe. Bob, who had sat stoically through his brother’s
whole tirade, turned calmly to the man on his right and
said...
“Would you mind repeating what you said to me before
my brother came to the table?”
“Oh, not at all,” replied the man. “I told you that my
wife is a little hard of hearing, so could you please raise
your voice when you bid?”

152 Bridge, Zia... and me

 c h a p t e r s e v e n

ETHICS

WARNING

The following chapter is abstruse, and is likely to

lead to extreme confusion and/or boredom. It should
be skipped except by those interested in the purity of
the game.

Ethics 155
 1992 REVISITED
I’d like to begin this chapter by reprinting an article I wrote
for Bridge Today in early 1992. It has been slightly altered
for inclusion in this book, in order to spare my editor any
feelings of nausea arising from my grammar, syntax and
punctuation.

ETHICS FOR ADVANCED PLAYERS

How important are ethics to the game of bridge? To my mind they

are crucial. If the foundation of bridge is not completely ‘clean’, then
the entire game is tainted.
The sad truth is that every player is guilty of some ethical misde-
meanors, i.e., those of which the player is unaware (when he is aware,
it’s a felony). Once information has been transmitted, a player’s judg-
ment is affected. You cannot truthfully say, “I was always going to
make that bid anyway,” because you cannot know what you would
have done. This claim is invalid even if you made your decision prior
to partner’s huddle, for two reasons: first, you may be unaware of how
much the onset of the huddle crystallized the decision for you; sec-
ond, and more important, haven’t you ever changed your mind?
People sometimes come to me saying, “I have an ethical problem
for you,” and my answer is, “You’ve already ruined it.” The situation
should always be presented as a straightforward problem with no
huddle. Even then, there is a major difficulty. Many errors occur
because the player at the table says to himself, “It doesn’t matter what
I do.” When a hand is presented as a problem, whether or not the
responder suspects that it may be an ethical problem, he knows there
is a relevant decision to be made, and this must affect his judgment.
Strangely, this can work against players who are trying to justify a
questionable call. Whenever I poll a hand where partner has made a
penalty double, the expert almost invariably passes. His reasoning,
conscious or otherwise, goes as follows: “He (the poller) probably
doubled. I am not going to be the (only) one to pull the double and
miss an 1100 penalty like his idiot partner did. If they can make it, I
can always say I would never have doubled with that hand.”
Thus a ‘right’ answer is assured. The same type of bias (in reverse)

156 Bridge, Zia... and me

works itself on Directors and Committee members. The temptation
to think, “I would never have let the opponents go +930 on this hand,”
is great. Of course, the good adjudicators are already aware of this
tendency, whereas, I believe, the majority of players are unaware of the
shift in their judgment when answering ethical problems.

SHORT HUDDLES
One of the most pervasive ethical problems that should be faced is the
two-second huddle. It frequently conveys information to partner
(intentionally or otherwise), and is extremely difficult to police. One
of the most common examples is this:
OPENER RESPONDER
1♣ 1♠
2♠1
1. After a short huddle
The short huddle shows three-card support.
A short huddle followed by a preference tends to show a double-
ton, while a bid in tempo shows three.
In competitive auctions, the short huddle followed by a pass can
be used as a weapon, either showing a desire to compete, for example:
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♦ 1♠ 2♦ 2♠
pass

or showing doubt about the current contract, for example:

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1NT dbl 2♣ dbl
pass
Even if the existence of these minuscule huddles is conceded, it is
unlikely that a favorable ruling could ever be obtained by the non-
offenders. In most cases they won’t even bother to call the Director.

FLEXIBLE BIDS
An old bone of contention among experts revolves around the fol-
lowing question: is it better to explore carefully for the best contract
by describing your hand, or is it better to take a quick stab at a final
contract? The bashers believe that what they lose in science they more

Ethics 157
 than recover in opponents’ errors due to lack of information. The
flexible bidders (or flexers) either do not agree with this, or feel more
comfortable with the type of results they achieve.
It has been my experience that bashers are more successful than
flexers, or at least more successful than I think they ‘should’ be. The
major reason for this, I believe, is that bashers will be faithful to their
style as long as partner is bidding in tempo, but after partner huddles,
bashers become flexers. This means that when partner has a classic
hand for his bidding the basher immediately bids the best contract
giving away no unnecessary information, but when partner has a
slightly flawed bid, the basher can check out alternatives by flexing.
For example, Ben the Basher holds:
♠ A 10 8 x x ♥ xx ♦ AQx ♣ AQx
and partner opens one club. Ben responds one spade and partner,
after some consideration, rebids one notrump. Without the huddle
Ben would have bid 3NT straight-away in order that the defenders
might not be given any unnecessary information. However, after
partner’s informative huddle, Ben checks back with 2♣, reasonably
enough, and partner bids 2♥. Recognizing the most likely meaning
behind the huddle, Ben flexes with three clubs, natural and forcing.
Partner bids three hearts, Ben bids 3NT. Partner bids four clubs, Ben
bids four diamonds and partner bids six clubs.
Partner’s hand was:
♠ Q ♥ AKxx ♦ Kxx ♣ KJxxx
This was a well-bid hand, and if you believe a Committee could
change this result you may be right; but there are countless hands
such as this one where Ben will either gain or not lose.
Here is another situation:
OPENER RESPONDER
1NT 2♥1
2♠ 3NT

1. Transfer

Normally, this is merely a choice-of-games sequence, but responder

may have a hand that only has slam possibilities if partner has at least
three spades. Opener usually passes or bids 4♠ at this point, but he
may also cuebid. Felix the flexer will cuebid, whenever he has a max-

158 Bridge, Zia... and me

imum hand, in light of his already having failed to pre-accept over 2♥.
Of course, the disadvantage of the cuebid is that it may help the oppo-
nents’ defense when partner, as expected, signs off. Therefore, Ben the
Basher will only think of cuebidding when partner has huddled
before bidding 3NT. It is true that an ethical partner would have
planned his auction by thinking before he bid 2♥, but if Ben is alert it
will come to the same result. Yet again, it’s a case of ‘heads I win, tails
you lose’ for Ben.
Flexers tend to remain faithful to their style and don’t take advan-
tage of partner’s in-tempo bidding. They have no realistic recourse to
the Director when the bashers flex. After all, they don’t bash on every
hand, just on the ones that look right to them — and who can rule on
that?

FORCING BIDS
I once watched a world-famous expert at rubber bridge hold:
♠ 10 x x ♥ K 10 x x x ♦ xxxx ♣ x
His partner, also an expert, opened 1♣. He responded one heart, and
his partner jumped to two spades, whereupon he passed. As he left
the table I whispered to him, “Do you know you were unethical on
this hand?”
“What are you talking about?” he said. “Nobody huddled.”
“Exactly my point,” I replied. “What would you have done if part-
ner had huddled before bidding 2♠?”
He thought about this and confessed that he would probably have
rebid two notrump, hoping to hear 3♥, which he would raise to 4♥.
Obviously this doesn’t feel right, but what can be done? If you
call the Director after the hypothetical huddle example above, you
might be told that a player has every right to bid after partner has
forced. If you call the Director after the no-huddle example you
might be laughed out of the building.
Even if the huddle came before the 1♣ opening, it would proba-
bly be ‘right’ to keep the bidding alive — partner might be 5-5 in the
blacks with a near 2♣ opening and 4♠ might be cold. This case would
be even more difficult to adjudicate.

FORCING PASSES
I remember reading about a case in which the Director was called

Ethics 159
 after a huddle followed by a forcing pass. His ruling, in effect, was that
the forcing pass conveyed a message of uncertainty and the huddle
said the same thing. Therefore no unauthorized information was in
existence. Since I don’t wish to offend, I won’t print my one-word
reaction to this ruling. However, there seems to me to be a world of
difference in this situation between an in-tempo pass (“I don’t really
want to do anything”) and a huddle-pass (“I really want to do some-
thing”).
A further problem can arise if partner, after the in-tempo pass,
‘takes a view’ and passes. No complaint can reasonably be made, even
if the opponents admit that the pass is forcing, because no unautho-
rized information has been transmitted. The huddle-pass transforms
the pass into a 100% forcing situation. Tough, huh?

DEFENSIVE CARDING

Some of the most egregious ethical improprieties occur during the

play. However, the issues are so complicated, and sometimes so sub-
tle, that often no one at the table realizes that anything untoward has
happened. Let’s look at a fairly simple situation:
Dummy
♠ 64
N
N
♠ K85 W
W E
E ♠ Q 10 9 7 2
S
S

Declarer
♠ AJ3
East gains the lead in a notrump contract and shifts to the spade ten,
on which everyone plays small. East continues with the spade seven,
on which South, after some thought, plays the spade ace. West, after
a long thought, unblocks the spade king East regains the lead, cashes
the spade queen and the defense triumphs. But what if West had
played that king smoothly? Perhaps East would have played him for
a doubleton and tried an alternate defense.
Another position:

160 Bridge, Zia... and me

 Dummy
♠ KQJ6
N
N
You
W
W E
E
♠ 52
S
S

Declarer, who has opened 1NT, leads the spade three. You follow with
the spade five, dummy plays the spade king, and partner mulls over
the situation. What could be more natural now than for you, while
partner considers, to plan your defense. Of course, you suddenly have
no problem piecing together declarer’s high cards. Indeed, after part-
ner ducks, you may now even be able to make a fine play, such as
ducking a king when declarer leads low from dummy to his queen in
another suit.
Another example: you lead against three notrump and partner
wins a later trick and starts thinking. Obviously, partner is not long
in your suit — so... now you can quite possibly calculate declarer’s
distribution. (Incidentally, if partner returns your suit after huddling,
it usually means he has a doubleton.) This sort of inference is a recur-
ring ethical problem.
I found the following hand instructive:
Dummy
♠ J5
♥ Q73
♦ 74
♣ KQJ854

♠ K 10 9 N
♥ A854 W E
♦ A963
♣ 10 9 S

NORTH SOUTH
1♦
3♣1 3NT
pass

1. Invitational

Ethics 161
 Dummy In a major matchpoint
♠ J5
♥ Q73
event, West, a world-
♦ 74 famous expert, led the
♣ KQJ854
♠10 to the ♠J, ♠Q, and
♠ K 10 9 N
♠2. East returned the
♥ A854 W E
♦ A963
S
♠4 — ♠3, ♠K, ♠5, and
♣ 10 9
West continued with
the ♠9 — ♦4, ♠6, ♠A.
Declarer led the ♣2 — ♣9, ♣K, ♣3 (upside-down signaling), then the
♦7 — ♦5, ♦K, ♦A. West now played the ♥A — ♥3, ♥10, ♥K, and
paused for thought. Eventually deciding that either declarer had tried
to steal a diamond trick or it made no difference, he returned a dia-
mond. Declarer’s hand was:
♠ A732 ♥ KJ ♦ K Q J 10 8 2 ♣ 2
and he got out for down one (switch the ♥7 and ♥8 and he would
have made it by squeezing East). Obviously, a club shift at trick seven
would have set the contract two tricks; and this was clearly the correct
defense — for two reasons. Firstly, if South had held the ♣A, he
would have opened 1NT. Secondly, if declarer were trying to steal a
trick, he would have attacked hearts, not diamonds, missing the
queen.
What is my purpose in showing this hand? My point is that East
ducked the club smoothly. Had he huddled before ducking, I have no
doubt that West would have hit upon the winning defense. Had the
declarer then claimed that he was damaged, he would have been told
that this West did not require any extraneous help to get this obvious
situation right. Further attempts to pursue the situation would prob-
ably have resulted in South being told not to make frivolous protests.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

How many times have you heard a player on defense say, “I’m not
thinking about this trick. I’m thinking about the whole hand.” This
normally means that the player does not wish to be caught thinking
on some subsequent trick. Aside from the fact that this stratagem is a
little disingenuous, there are several flaws to it. Firstly, information
may be given to partner. Secondly, I’ve noticed that the player some-

162 Bridge, Zia... and me

times is actually thinking about this trick but doesn’t want to admit it.
Finally, in my opinion, declarer has a right to know on which trick you
have a problem — I believe speedy thought should be rewarded.
Then, of course, there are the pairs who ‘always think before play-
ing to the first trick’, except when they don’t. Strangely enough, they
usually forget to think when they want partner to continue with the
‘obvious’ defense. This brings us to the subject of signaling.

SIGNALS
When partner is winning a trick you often need to signal to tell him
how to continue. Frequently, it is not clear which signal to give, so you
play your card after deliberation. Now partner finds the winning
defense and you congratulate each other after the hand. It feels very
wrong to me that the tempo of the signal becomes part of the signal-
ing method itself. I don’t even want to mention (well, maybe I do)
players who emphasize their clear-cut signals by huddling before
making them — everyone knows that’s wrong. But the case of the
unclear signal may be just as bad, if not worse.
Take, for example, the Smith Echo. It may be really difficult to
know quickly if you want partner to continue or switch. But, by
thinking about this signal, you dramatically increase the probability
of partner’s knowing the winning defense. He will never go wrong
when you have given him the ‘winning’ signal, and when you haven’t
he may be able to use bridge logic to figure it out. Meanwhile, had
your signal been in tempo, partner was much more likely to have fol-
lowed it blindly without thought.
Personally, I refuse to think before making a signal. I must admit
this has cost me many tricks over the years, either because I made the
wrong signal or because partner misread my ambiguous signal, or
because he didn’t even realize I was signaling. In fact, partner has
sometimes tried to give me a ruff in the suit, which I doubt would
have happened if I had considered my signal more carefully. For me,
all this is counterbalanced by knowing that when my partner does the
right thing, I feel completely clean about it.

SOLUTIONS
The first solution to some of the ethical problems I’ve cited is direct-
ed at the officials. It should be a matter of absolute routine for the
Director to rule in favor of the non-offending side. The onus to

Ethics 163
 appeal should always be on the huddlers. The only situation in which
the Director should rule for the offending side is one where he feels
certain that an appeal by the non-offenders would be frivolous. Also,
it should be a grave decision for the appeals Committee to rule in
favor of the offenders. Only in this way can a message be sent
throughout the bridge world.
Completely solving the problem of short huddles is not practical,
but there are certain things one can do to alleviate the problem. One
is to take two to three seconds over every call, thus removing any
inferences from fast actions. Another good idea is sometimes to plan
your auction, huddling over the obvious action but preparing your
next bid. If the timing of your huddles is somewhat random, it is dif-
ficult for partner to derive any advantage from them. The biggest
crime in this area is to find yourself short-huddling when you want
partner to bid, and fast-passing or fast-signing-off when you want
him to pass. There is really no answer to the problem of flexible bids
after huddles, except for each player to be guided by his own con-
science. When partner bids quickly, consider allowing for the hands
you ‘know’ he can’t have. When he bids slowly, consider the advan-
tages of being unscientific.
Regarding forcing bids, I believe every pair’s convention card
should state whether they are allowed to pass forcing bids. If the
answer is ‘no’, then any violation would require extreme justification
(i.e., if a player psyched an opening bid, he could pass the response).
If the answer is (more commonly) ‘yes’, then bidding over a slow forc-
ing bid would call for careful scrutiny. Similarly, every pair should
have its forcing-pass agreements as clearly defined as possible on its
card. Any situation not so defined could be deemed non-forcing by a
Director or a Committee.
When partner huddles on defense, consider if it could be logical
to play him for what he can’t have. If so, you should play for just that.
While partner is huddling (for example, thinking about ducking an
ace), your only thoughts and plans, until partner actually plays his
ace, should be made under the assumption that partner does not have
the ace.
Thinking about which card to play on a future trick should be
illegal, with two exceptions: being on lead, and the first trick. My sug-
gestion for handling the tempo at trick one is as follows: the four
players should jointly decide upon the length of time declarer should
take before playing to the first trick (probably between ten and thirty

164 Bridge, Zia... and me

seconds), with the highest number determining the tempo for that
table. After tabling his hand, the dummy (or the opening leader)
should wait for the agreed-upon period of time and then announce,
“Play.” Thereafter, any thought before playing a card must pertain to
that card. Perhaps declarer should be allowed to play before the
agreed time has elapsed if he wishes, but then the next player should
have the right to play his card at any time up to the moment when
dummy calls, “Play.”
Thinking about a signal should be illegal. If your signaling meth-
ods frequently require you to huddle, perhaps they are too complicat-
ed.
Don’t panic — nobody’s going to go for this anyway. However, I
am seriously suggesting that you try signaling only in normal tempo.

SUMMARY
Huddling is like ringing an alarm bell inside partner’s head. It
behooves us to attempt to overcompensate after partner’s huddle in
order to atone for all of the occasions of which we are unaware. If you
never find yourself in the situation of making a bid or play which you
‘know’ to be the losing action, you cannot be an actively ethical play-
er. Instead of attempting to rationalize your taking the winning
action, try to justify the case for the losing action.
Why should you do these things when those around you do not?
Only because we must start somewhere, and the only person
whose ethics you can truly improve is you, yourself. If we don’t do
this, we shall never be able to elevate this game which enthralls us to
the level it deserves.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Re-reading the above a few years later, I was surprised to

find that I still agreed with myself (unanimously). This
was written when I was relatively green in these matters —
I had yet to discuss them with other experts.
It is probably impossible for the game to be totally
‘pure’, no matter what rules are imposed or policies are fol-
lowed. There will always be some players who will make a
conscious effort to ensure that their tempo and demeanor

Ethics 165
 reveal nothing to partner, while others would be quite
happy if their partner made a winning decision based par-
tially on a slight quickness or slowness or expression. Also,
there will be some players who are careful that their oppo-
nents have all the information to which they are entitled,
while others will need to be prompted with the right ques-
tions to reveal the same data.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

I believe it is important to make it clear that a call for the

Director, or an appeal to a Committee, is not an accusation.
Some of the areas involved are very complicated, even for
those well-versed in matters of ethical impropriety. Those
who are inexperienced and do not ‘know better’ should
never be made to feel that they have acted improperly or
unethically. Each situation must be clearly and patiently
explained — education without acrimony is the goal.
Many people are intent upon discouraging people from
calling the Director and appealing to Committees. They
feel that the game would be better with fewer such occur-
rences, and that the appellants should be considered as
‘suspect’ as their opponents.
I do not feel that it is important for the appellants to be
regarded as suspects. This may be appropriate some time
down the road, but for the moment every case is an educa-
tion, and we need all the education we can get.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

To make the total picture regarding ethics and the Laws

more clear, the following are my comments on a few relat-
ed subjects.

166 Bridge, Zia... and me

 GUIDELINES FOR COMMITTEES

A) BREAKS IN TEMPO

One thing I look for when making a ruling on a huddle is

this: was the (winning) action taken as a result of the hud-
dle? Some other adjudicators seem more concerned with
whether the action was suggested by the huddle.
At one of the Nationals, a player held something like

♠ Q 10 x x ♥ x ♦ xx ♣ AJ9xxx

and heard the bidding go (3♥)-3NT-(pass). The 3NT bid

was made after a protracted huddle. This player leapt to
6♣, which was the winning action. Some experts felt that
the 6♣ bid was neither suggested nor made more attractive
by the huddle — it was just a ridiculous stab, and therefore
should be allowed. I considered, based on the Committee
report, that the huddle induced the 6♣ bid and, therefore,
would have ruled that the player could not profit from it.
There was, and is, also the question of whether the
opponents should get redress or keep their bad score (pre-
suming it is possible to assign separate scores). Some
believe that if, for example, 6♣ in the previous example was
a 2% contract, then it is simply the ‘rub of the green’. My
philosophy, however, is that you should never do worse
than you would have done against ethical opponents. So,
whatever I take from A, I give to B (with an exception
which I will discuss later). I believe both that this is equi-
table, and that it will create more general good feeling.
Being unethical should be equivalent to taking a 0% play
— like taking a finesse through a player who can’t have that
card.
In fact, if I believe that a player has taken an action with
the intention of taking advantage of partner’s break in

Ethics 167
 tempo, I would rule against that player even if the action
taken was contra-indicated. I believe that it is important to
educate players to attempt to ignore breaks in tempo. On
the other hand, if an action was taken with the intention of
‘losing’, and it happens to work, I would let that score
stand. This might be a tough call — any doubt should be
decided in favor of the non-offenders.
If there is no clear indication of what the break sug-
gests, and I do not believe that the player was bidding (or
passing) because of the tempo break, I would rule ‘no
penalty’. Obviously, the player’s knowledge of the particu-
lar partner plays a large role here. After a while, in a regu-
lar partnership, you get to know what certain little things
are most likely to mean.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

I also believe, contrary to the majority, that one can rule

differently for different standards of players. For example,
the bidding goes (4♥)-pass after break in tempo-(pass).
Now, there are some hands where I would allow an expert
to double or bid 4♠ (if I feel that they would have done so
anyway), whereas I would not allow a Flight B or Flight C
player to bid if I feel that they would have been likely to
pass out 4♥ but for the huddle.
On the other hand, there are many situations where an
expert will be held to a higher standard and will ‘lose’. My
focus is always, “Did the break in tempo affect the result in
this case?” I believe that we can only achieve justice by
dealing with situations on a case-by-case basis. Everything
else is a guideline.
♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Not all breaks in tempo are equal. Some huddles (or quick
calls) are ‘bad’ — either because they describe one’s hand

168 Bridge, Zia... and me

to partner, or because they are likely to create a problem for
partner. My current definition of a ‘bad’ huddle is one
where partner is still ‘involved’ and:

a) The player breaking tempo has not promised any val-

ues prior to the hesitation, and now passes; OR

b) The player breaking tempo defines his or her hand by

the tempo-break, i.e., minimum, maximum, extra
length, slam interest, no slam interest, doubt when plac-
ing the final contract (frequently three notrump), lack of
doubt when placing the final contract (also frequently
three notrump), etc. OR

c) (Generally ‘bad’) The partnership is ‘regular’. This

means that each partner is more likely to be aware of
personal predilections (for example, thinking before
making an invitational bid — partner tends to have a
bare invitation, or tends to have almost the values for
game). Knowledge and experience of your partner can
unfairly give you a clue as to which is more likely.

I feel that it is likely that there are other tempo-break situa-

tions which should be defined as ‘bad’. I know that there
are other non-tempo-break situations which should be so
defined. For example, not correcting partner’s mistaken
explanation is a ‘bad’ infraction. Correcting at an inappro-
priate time is less ‘bad’. The obvious solution is to have a
list which Committee members can use for reference.
Understanding which huddles are ‘bad’ and which are ‘less
bad’ should help to create more uniformity in decisions.

B) AVERAGING THE SCORE

In a knockout match, many Committees resolve what they

believe are difficult issues by averaging the score. An exam-

Ethics 169
 ple of this is as follows: the Committee determines that the
final contract would have been four spades by a vulnerable
North-South, but for some infraction. The four-spade
contract depends upon a random two-way guess for a side
queen. The Committee would take the IMP score for plus
620 and the IMP score for minus 100 and would average
them.
While this seems fair on the surface, the problem is that
rulings such as this spread into every other case, and sud-
denly every Committee decision becomes a Solomonic
one. Even when there is obviously no damage, the proce-
dural penalty is used to ensure that nobody (everybody)
goes away happy (unhappy).
I do not approve of averaging the score. Instead, I pre-
fer to settle upon one result, with all reasonable doubt
being decided in favor of the non-offending side. While in
certain cases this is extremely harsh on the side committing
the infraction, it is necessary to send a consistent message
to players, Directors and Committees. A consistently harsh
approach by Committees should encourage players both to
avoid breaks in tempo and to take no advantage of part-
ner’s tempo.
At most forms of scoring, other than knockout, it is
possible to assign ‘split’ scores, i.e., give a different score to
each pair. I generally disapprove of this practice since I feel
that it is important that one does not receive a score inferi-
or to that which one would, or might, have received against
opponents who had not committed the infraction.
Once it is determined that the damage came as a result
of the infraction, and was not simply subsequent to it, I
would simply settle upon a single result, in favor of the
non-offending side. The only case where I would feel that
assigning split scores is justified would be one where the
non-offending side has committed an egregious error (see
next section).

170 Bridge, Zia... and me

C) ANALYZING THE HAND

In analyzing what would have happened on a deal had

there been no infraction, Committees should:
a) Assume that the non-offenders would have taken the
winning view (especially when the infraction was fla-
grant);
b) Never assume that the offenders would have taken
the winning view.
In analyzing what might have happened, I give the widest
possible latitude to the non-offending side. To consider a
mistake by the non-offending side egregious, the error has
to be a total and unreasonable mind-loss by that player’s
standards. Even a 0% play by an expert may not be an egre-
gious error — if the play appeared reasonable at the time.
A revoke by any player is an egregious error.
Committees are far too likely to assign split scores
based on subsequent ‘errors’ by the non-offenders. They
fall into the trap of saying to themselves, “I would never
have done that.” The truth is that we all make mistakes,
including big ones. The thing to remember is that the
position was reached only because an opponent commit-
ted an infraction.
I would give somewhat less latitude to the non-offend-
ing side if the opponents’ infraction was ‘innocent’, for
example, a player giving misinformation as a result of hav-
ing forgotten a partnership agreement.

D) PROCEDURAL PENALTIES

Another policy I abhor is the ‘procedural penalty’. I have

two major objections: firstly, procedural penalties are
inappropriate because bridge events should be scored
based upon bridge results — either those which were
achieved at the table or those which at least might have

Ethics 171
 been achieved at the table; secondly, procedural penalties
are not assessed uniformly.
When something ‘goes wrong’ at the table, but there is
clearly no damage, then the Director is usually not called,
and a procedural penalty is not even at issue. However,
when there might have been damage from a similar infrac-
tion, and the Director is called, the case may or may not go
to Committee. And a penalty may or may not ultimately
be assessed by the Committee. Those pairs against whom
no Director was called receive an unfair advantage. And
even those cases which do go to committee are not handled
uniformly. In fact, Committees have tended to assess pro-
cedural penalties almost randomly.
I believe that the current theory laid down by adherents
of these penalties is that they should be awarded when, a)
there has been an infraction but no damage, or b) there has
been a flagrant violation of ethical or behavioral standards.
Neither case is justification for a score adjustment. If the
infraction was accidental or due to inexperience, and no
damage occurred, there is no reason for a penalty. If, on
the other hand, the violation was deliberate and serious,
this should call for disciplinary action.
Now let’s discuss some new ways to win IMPs. Firstly,
always quiz your opponents to death — you might discov-
er a failure to alert or you may elicit a mistaken explana-
tion. For example, in a case from one of the Nationals a
Committee gave half-an-IMP to East-West because South
did not alert a gambling 3NT opening. I’ll say it for the
thousandth time. If there is damage, give redress. No dam-
age, no penalty.
The other new IMP-winning strategy is to put your
opponents’ convention cards under a microscope. If they
are not identical (or at least fraternal), you might be able to
have your opponents charged with a one-quarter board
penalty. This worked for a pair in the 1996 Nationals in

172 Bridge, Zia... and me

San Francisco (Case No. 18, which should have been
deemed a frivolous appeal).
Until we get rid of these nonsensical procedural penal-
ties, there will never be uniformity of rulings. In every case
where a penalty is levied, a better solution exists.
The nature of the game is such that it must be partly
self-policing, at least for the subtleties. For the rest, our
best hope is the education of players as to their ethical
obligations.

E) FLAGRANT FOUL

What should be done about blatant ethical improprieties?

Currently, Committees tend to assign procedural penalties.
A better method would involve a system of censuring
offenders, and suspending them if they continue to abuse
the game in this way.

F) FRIVOLOUS APPEALS

One policy which should become extinct is the $50 deposit

for appeals at national and international events.* The pol-
icy is intended to deter appeals lacking merit, but it is obvi-
ously unfair, since $50 could be a substantial sum to some,
but almost meaningless to others. Fining players for frivo-
lous appeals by deducting matchpoints or victory points is
unfair, for the same reasons that procedural penalties are
unfair.
Generally, I do not believe that we want to deter people
from appealing to a Committee. If the same player engages
in repeated frivolous appeals, this should be a matter for
disciplinary action.
*The ACBL did rescind the $50 deposit policy in 1997. They substituted a penalty point sys-
tem which could lead to suspension for recurring appeals without merit. While this is an
improvement, I feel that in our current state of confusion and disagreement over what is
‘correct’, few appeals have no merit.

Ethics 173
 Some people object to the way I blithely talk about the
‘non-offenders’. They say that the complainers are sus-
pects, just as much as those committing infractions. As I
stated earlier, we haven’t yet reached the stage where this
should be considered. At the moment, we should welcome
each appeal as an opportunity to further the education of
the bridge community as regards ethical matters.
Obviously, if the complaint has no merit, there is no need
to award anything unjustifiable, nor indeed to adjust the
score at all.

G) APPEALS WRITE-UPS

Committee write-ups have greatly improved since the

National Appeals Committee Decisions books have been
published. These books are invaluable, and represent an
irreplaceable summary of what is happening in the appeals
process.
In breaks-of-tempo cases it is vital that the length of the
hesitation be recorded. Of course, the protagonists often
disagree, but even then, the information is useful.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

The truth is that the Committee is in a much better posi-

tion to make a ruling than someone hearing the ‘facts’ later.
So let’s arm Committees with guidelines and information
in order to produce just decisions.

SCREENS
At the highest level of play, screens are normally used. This
solves many of the ethical problems that arise, although a

174 Bridge, Zia... and me

few minor new ones are created.
An example of a ‘solved’ problem occurs when partner
makes an almost ‘impossible’ bid. For example, you raise
1NT to 2NT (natural) and partner rebids 3♣. If partner,
without screens, had alerted your 2NT bid you would now
be forced to pass. With screens, you can (if you believe
there has been a misunderstanding) bid 3NT with no fear
of reprisal. You are taking a risk, and have no unauthorized
information.
Screen etiquette is important; if not adhered to, much
of the good accomplished by the screen is nullified.
Slapping bids down, talking, or even writing in a loud
scratchy manner should all be verboten.
The player who bids first should have sole control of the
tray. He can (and should) slow down the tempo, if he feels
it appropriate to do so. The player who is second to bid
should control tempo thus: he should pick out the bidding
card he intends to use and show it to his screen-mate, but
should not actually place it on the tray until he is ready to
have it pushed under the screen. I suggest a ten-second
limit for a ‘screen huddle’.

ALERTING
The alert procedure seems to drive everyone nuts — with
complete justification.
There are no good answers to some of the problems.
Maybe it would be better to have no alerts — just auto-
matic explanations of every bid. This would do away with
the problem of a question by the non-alerting side giving
unauthorized information to partner, but would give more
unauthorized information to the partner of the player
alerting than a simple ‘Alert’.
For example, if you think that your bid shows a mini-

Ethics 175
 mum, but partner thinks it shows a maximum, an ‘Alert’
will not help you evade a misunderstanding, but an expla-
nation from partner may do so (unless you are ethical).
An amusing incident occurred when my teammates
Bobby Levin and Peter Weichsel had the following auction:
Oppt. Weichsel Oppt. Levin
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♦
pass 1♠ 2♣ 2♥
4♣ 4♥ 4♠ 5♦
all pass

Levin played his RHO for a lot of black cards, and lost
some finesse to him. At the conclusion of play, the oppo-
nents informed him that 4♣ was Blackwood, and 4♠
showed two aces! Had he known this he would have made
the hand. But the opponents were quite correct under the
rules in force at that time, both in not alerting the
Blackwood bid, and in not explaining it until no unautho-
rized information could be transmitted (i.e., after play had
ceased). So North-South had no redress.
Perhaps there are no universal answers to the problems
connected with the alert procedure but, at least at the top
levels, the majority of them disappear (along with the eth-
ical problems) with the use of screens.

SKIP-BID WARNINGS
Skip-bid warnings are a help in the area of tempo. The
rules on how to use the ‘Stop’ card have frequently
changed. I believe that the best method is this: the player
making the skip-bid puts out the ‘Stop’ card and, slowly
and silently, counts to ten. Then the card should be
removed. The next player should study his cards until the

176 Bridge, Zia... and me

‘Stop’ card has been removed; then (one hopes) he should
bid. If he uses more time then his partner has unautho-
rized information.
It is important to be consistent both in using skip-bid
warnings and in pausing after them. Of course, when an
opponent is ‘never’ going to bid it is less important — for
example, in this auction:
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♠ pass 2♠
pass 4♠
although I would still use it. There are many such instances
where people think it irrelevant and, therefore, don’t use it
— or they ignore their opponent’s use of the skip-bid
warning and bid immediately. However, they are often
quite wrong — the most common case being the simple
1NT-3NT auction. True, it rarely matters, but it is nice to
have the option of considering a double (or a bid) without
worrying about passing unauthorized information.
On the other hand, some auctions ‘need’ a skip-bid
warning, even though they may not be skip-bids, for exam-
ple:
WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♠ dbl pass
?
The same applies to many other competitive auctions,
especially those at high levels. And, I know that Zia
believes a ‘to play’ redouble should be accompanied by a
skip-bid warning.
The problem is in defining to which auctions this ‘skip-
bid warning’ should apply. One solution could be a
mandatory two-or-three-second pause before every call,
but it is doubtful if such a requirement would be adhered
to any more than the current skip-bid warning system is
observed today.

Ethics 177
 UNAUTHORIZED INFORMATION

The sort of unauthorized information gained from a fail-

ure to alert can often lead to what I call ‘Jump-to-Game
Syndrome’. JTGS occurs when a player fears that he and his
partner are on different wavelengths.
For example, a player responds Drury (fit) and partner
doesn’t alert — it is amazing how frequently that player’s
next bid is a jump to four-of-partner’s-major. And it is
usually an unethical call. A player in this situation must
bid as if partner had alerted 2♣; and it especially behooves
him to make every effort to cooperate in a slam auction if
opener’s rebid over ‘Drury’ might have suggested a slam.
For example, if opener ‘raises’ to 3♣ after Drury (having
failed to alert), responder should ‘raise’ to 4♣ if he has four
or more clubs. Opener may bid 5♣ at this point (whatev-
er that means), bypassing four-of-the-major, or he may
even cuebid (if his ‘raise’ to 3♣ was forcing). In either
event it is likely that slam ‘should’ be reached by an ethical
pair.

MISINFORMATION ?
Some players give away too much information. The oppo-
nents are entitled to know your agreements. Agreements
can be explicit or implicit, and they include partnership
experience and knowledge of your specific partner.
Agreements do not include what you think a bid means nor
what you ‘take’ a bid to mean. Also, if you ‘know’ what
partner’s bid means, purely because of the hand you hold,
you should not reveal this information. For example, you
hold:
♠ K 10 8 7 ♥ 10 9 x ♦ — ♣ J 10 8 x x x

178 Bridge, Zia... and me

LHO opens 2NT and partner bids 3♣. You are playing
together for the first time, and your only discussion was
“Landy.” Obviously, your hand leads you to suspect
majors. You should alert 3♣ (because you know something
your opponents do not), but if asked you should say, “We
agreed to play Landy, but we didn’t specifically discuss it
over 2NT.” This is the same answer you should give if your
hand were:
♠ Q J 10 x x x ♥ J 10 x x x ♦ xx ♣ —
and you had a sneaking suspicion that partner held clubs.
This should hold true whether or not it appears to be
advantageous to your side to give all the correct informa-
tion.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

There is great disagreement as to the appropriate course of

action when partner misdescribes your agreement (either
by commission or omission), but happens to describe your
hand accurately . Many feel it is self-serving (and unethi-
cal) to correct partner in this type of situation. I strongly
disagree.
To give a comprehensive example, say that partner
opens 1♦, playing a four-card major system, and you
respond 1NT, which partner raises to 3NT. It so happens
that your agreement is that you can respond 1NT with one
or two four-card majors. Upon making the final pass, LHO
asks partner, “Can your partner have a four-card major?”
Partner, momentarily forgetting, answers, “No.”
Obviously, you should correct partner’s explanation if you
have a major.
But what should you do if you don’t have one? Many
would say nothing, thinking that it would be self-serving to

Ethics 179
 correct partner. But, what if LHO now leads a spade, let-
ting three notrump make when, had he been in possession
of the correct information, he would have led a club and set
the contract? Isn’t it ridiculous that the opponents are
doing worse because you (on the pretext of helping them)
and your partner (by omission) misinformed them?
No, you should correct partner’s explanation regardless
of your hand. Your opponents are entitled to know your
agreements and to make their decisions based upon that
knowledge. You should simply say, “That’s not our agree-
ment — I can have one or two four-card majors.” You
should not need to add, “Although I’m not saying that I
have one.” That should be understood.
What happens when, in the above situation, LHO does
not ask any question, as most would not? (This is why I
used this example instead of the more normal situation —
a 1NT response to 1♥, playing Flannery. In that case, many
experts would think to ask whether responder could have a
four-card spade suit.) Again, obviously, you should volun-
teer the information if you have a four-card major. And
again, you should volunteer the correct information even if
you don’t have a major. This may seem slimy, but there is
nothing slimy about it. As long as it is clear in everyone’s
mind that you should always give the opponents complete
and accurate disclosure, there is no question of damage.
The reason that this issue has represented a problem is
that so many people believe that, if an ethical opponent
volunteers information, it must be describing his actual
hand. The game needs to be rid of this notion. If it were
universally accepted that you always give correct informa-
tion about your agreements, this problem would vanish.
The third problem that could occur is: your agreement
is that 1NT does deny a four-card major, but you surpris-
ingly violated your agreement and you have one (or two).
LHO asks, and your idiot partner says that you can have a

180 Bridge, Zia... and me

major. Here, you should not correct partner’s explanation.
You were trying to deceive your opponents, but your part-
ner got in the way. Tough luck.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

One policy which is becoming more prevalent is for

Directors to call players who have received misinformation
away from the table and ask them if they would have taken
some other action in different circumstances. I disapprove
of doing this for two reasons. Firstly, it doesn’t take a
genius to realize that it is in his or her best interests to say,
“Yes, I would, or might, have done something different.”
Secondly, and more importantly, the Director cannot put
the player back into the exact position which would have
existed without the infraction. Therefore, the player may
not realize that he or she might have taken some different
action. In other words, the player may not realize or
understand that damage has occurred.
I think it is certainly okay to continue the practice of
the Director asking a player at the table if they wish to
change their last call. Opportunity can restore equity. In
fact, maybe we could go one step further and back up the
auction to the point of the misinformation. This could
lead to the complication of unauthorized information
from the infraction and everything subsequent to the
transgression, but it might restore equity in some cases. At
the very least, the idea deserves consideration.

♠ ♥ ♦ ♣

Ethics 181
 SUMMARY
The following summarizes my suggestions for solutions to
the problems I’ve raised in this last chapter.

PLAYER’S OBLIGATIONS

a) Never make “bullet” calls or plays. Try to keep an

even tempo during the auction, and to show consistent
interest in your cards.
b) Avoid, as much as possible, hesitating when your
action will indicate the nature of your thought.
c) Use no mannerisms or gestures.
d) Describe your agreements as clearly and completely
as possible.
e) Correct, immediately, any failure by yourself to give
correct information, unless your discovery of such fail-
ure comes from unauthorized information from part-
ner.
f) Correct any misinformation given by partner as
soon as the hand is over (or the bidding is over and
your side is declaring).

DIRECTOR’S OBLIGATIONS:

a) Rule in favor of the side that did not commit the

infraction, unless you feel certain that an appeal by
them would be frivolous.
b) Rule a legitimate score, not average plus and average
minus. If in doubt, assign the maximum score that you
believe the non-offenders might reasonably have
achieved.

182 Bridge, Zia... and me

 c) Do not necessarily trust a player’s analysis — even if
such analysis is against that player’s own self-interest.

COMMITTEE’S OBLIGATIONS

a) Never ‘decide’ a case until you hear from both sides.

b) View self-serving statements with skepticism.
c) Determine all the facts, especially regarding the
length of breaks in tempo.
d) Always rule a legitimate bridge score. Analyze the
hand, giving the benefit of any doubt to the non-
offenders, especially if the offense was ‘bad’.
e) Explain your ruling clearly, completely and patient-
ly to both sides. Be especially patient with the ‘losing’
side — do your best to ensure they understand the
issues involved. Explain in an appropriate manner for
their level of play.
f) In the case of a flagrant offense, make sure that the
incident is properly recorded.
g) If there is a write-up of the Committee hearing,
ensure that the report is clear, thorough and accurate.

Ethics 183
 c h a p t e r e i g h t

WORLD
CHAMPIONSHIP
Albuquerque, 1994

A massive entry — about 200 teams — competed for the

1994 Rosenblum trophy. My team was DEUTSCH (Kasle,
Martel-Stansby, Bates-Rosenberg). Zia was not yet eligible
to compete for the U.S., so I played with Roger Bates, and
sometimes with Seymon Deutsch.
The round-robin did not go smoothly for us and, com-
ing into the final day, we were all but eliminated. We need-
ed to finish with three near blitzes (25 VPs) to have any
chance. In the first match, against an Icelandic team, I
played with Deutsch. We did well, other than the one hand
where Seymon decided to make a wildly undisciplined bid
(and that’s being kind), in the hope that the opponents

World Championship 185

 would do something even crazier. They didn’t, and we
went for 800 on a part-score deal. We won the match, but
scored only 22 VPs. Seymon predicted that his crazy bid
would cost us qualification for the knockout stage. Then
he flew home to Laredo.
Bates and I played the last two matches with Chip
Martel and Lew Stansby. We now needed two blitzes to
have any chance — and we got them. This, along with
some fortunate (for us) results in the other matches,
allowed us to finish tied for fifth in our group. We won the
tie-breaker for the fifth spot, but only four teams from
each group were guaranteed qualification. A few fifth-
place teams had a chance to qualify ‘at large’, and we were
fortunate to be one of the ones who had a shot. But we
ended up in a three-way tie for the last qualifying spot, and
still had to compete in a playoff. Sometime during this
prolonged tie-breaking, I called Seymon to tell him we
were still alive and kicking. He made plans to return to
Albuquerque.
We breezed through the playoff, and all the rounds of
the knockout — until the final. It was difficult not to get
caught up in the ‘destiny syndrome’, and to continue to
play solid bridge; but Martel and Stansby were like rocks,
playing throughout. Roger Bates was also in excellent
form.
In the final, we played against a strong Polish quartet
(Gawrys-Lasocki, Balicki-Zmudminski). The match was
close throughout, but when it was over we had won the
Rosenblum.
I would like to be able to report an interesting hand
from the final, but I do not remember any that I feel are
worth including in this book. Instead, here’s a hand from
the World Pairs which followed the Rosenblum that year.
I was playing with Hamman; we were leading the event
going into the final session, and this deal was played in one

186 Bridge, Zia... and me

of the later rounds. It was quite possibly the most incom-
petently declared hand in the history of the event (and
maybe I shouldn’t put any limits on it).

Hamman
♠ K 10
♥ AKxx
♦ x
♣ AKJxxx

N
W E
S

Me
♠ QJ9753
♥ x
♦ A K 10 x x
♣ x

Beneficiary 1 Hamman Beneficiary 2 Me

WEST NORTH EAST SOUTH
1♠
2♥ 3♣ pass 3♦
pass 3♥ pass 3♠
pass 4♣ pass 4♦
pass 5♠ all pass

Here is my list of excuses:

a) I was tired after playing the Rosenblum (not much of
an excuse — everyone else competing in the pairs had
also played in the Rosenblum, and I had had a session off
every day).
b) I had to be up at 7 a.m. to play a 42-board session
starting at about 8 a.m. (see parenthetical comment in
(a), above).

World Championship 187

 Hamman
♠ K 10
c) I am not a
♥ AKxx morning person
♦ x
♣ AKJxxx and felt that being
N forced to play
W E
bridge before 11
S
a.m. was cruel,
Me
♠ QJ9753 before 10 a.m. in-
♥ x
♦ A K 10 x x human, and before
♣ x
9 a.m. grounds for a
lawsuit.
d) I have an ulcer and caffeine is bad for me.

The auction leads to excuse (e); we had already missed a

slam and a grand slam during the final session, and I was
upset to see that we had missed yet another cold slam.
West led the club queen. I could see twelve tricks if the
defense didn’t make life too difficult, so I quickly won the
club and called for the spade king. This held the trick, West
playing the eight. What was that? A falsecard from ♠A8x?
Not likely. More likely was that it was ♠A8 doubleton, since
West must have the spade ace for his vulnerable overcall.
My play from here seemed irrelevant. In my soporific
state I chose to play a diamond. I don’t remember whether
I was planning to cash the king or not (probably not), but
I soon decided that the diamond play had been a mistake
(the most accurate thought I had on the hand), and that I
should play hearts first in case West had started with seven
of them. When all followed to the ♥AK (I pitched a dia-
mond), I had to play from dummy. A high club was safe if
West had ♠A8 doubleton; but what if he had been false-
carding? No, I’d better ruff a diamond and at least guaran-
tee that I would make five. Since I had played that dia-
mond earlier, I was forced to get off dummy with a heart.
East pitched a diamond, but that wasn’t too worrying.
Since West had six hearts, at least one club and at least two

188 Bridge, Zia... and me

spades, he could hardly have five diamonds.
So I ‘cashed’ the ♦AK of diamonds. East ruffed and
played ace and another spade. Two down in 5♠. Not bad
for a ‘cold’ slam. The full deal (as well as I can remember):

Hamman
♠ K 10
♥ AKxx
♦ x
♣ AKJxxx
Beneficiary 1 Beneficiary 2
♠ 8 N ♠ A642
♥ Q J 10 x x x W E ♥ xx
♦ QJxxx S
♦ xx
♣ Q ♣ 10 x x x x
Me
♠ QJ9753
♥ x
♦ A K 10 x x
♣ x

I’m still not sure what is the best play at matchpoints.

Perhaps ♥AK immediately, then ♦AK and ruff a diamond,
playing on crossruff lines. However, on this layout I didn’t
need to find anything close to the best play to make twelve
tricks. And I had made nine!
We finished second by a very narrow margin, thus
avoiding my becoming the first player to win both the
Rosenblum and the World Pairs in the same year.
If I had bid six spades (and made it) we would have
won. If I had made twelve tricks in five spades, we would
have won. If I had made eleven tricks in five spades we
would have won.
Down one would not have been quite enough.

World Championship 189

 THE EPILOGUE
Sitting in a restaurant with Hamman after the event, I was
brooding about my bridge shortcomings in general, and
the 5♠ hand in particular. Then Bob asked me the fateful
question:
“Did he save a low spade?”
For a second I didn’t know what he was talking about.
But I guess I must have woken up somewhat, because it
suddenly hit me. Oh, no! I had done it again! Or rather
— not done it again! If I had ruffed that heart with the
seven of spades and East had carelessly ruffed the diamond
with the four, I could underplay (and I’d certainly proved
my ability to do that) the six and force East to concede the
rest for down one. Going back further into the hand, once
East ‘erred’ by playing the spade deuce, I could have always
reached this position by retaining the three.
After having butchered the hand so badly, the opportu-
nity was still there to do something really good.
And what about Hamman? After watching his partner
murder the play and lose the event, he was still able to put
his finger on a fascinating aspect of the hand. Not only a
great player, but also a true ‘student’ of the game. If I ever
grow up, I want to have his attitude.

190 Bridge, Zia... and me

 A FINAL
WORD

That's all I want to write about. There are many other

things I might have added, and many other hands I might
have included. Some of them didn't seem quite good
enough, some of them I couldn't be bothered rewriting,
and some of them I remembered too late. I doubt if I'll
ever write another book, but maybe an article or three...

World Championship 191

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INTERMEDIATE/ADVANCED

n this book, one of the world’s top bridge players chronicles his career
I from his earliest games in Glasgow to becoming a world champion.
Rosenberg and the flamboyant Zia Mahmood, who also now lives in the
USA, are one of the world’s best partnerships. Here we learn how they
first met and started playing together. There are fascinating and funny
anecdotes from Rosenberg’s bridge career, his fifteen all-time favorite
hands, and many tips and ideas that will help you improve your own
game. Finally, he discusses many of the thorny issues that plague
today’s tournament bridge scene, and offers his own ideas on how to
solve them.

"As you read this book, you will find that Michael
has the most fascinating mind for bridge you will
ever encounter."
— Zia Mahmood

MICHAEL ROSENBERG is a stock options trader when he is not

playing bridge. He won gold medals in the World Teams
Championship in 1994 and in the World Individual Par Contest in
1998, and has won nine North American Championship titles as
well as a number of prestigious international pairs competitions.
He is still the youngest player ever to win the British Gold Cup. He
was born in Glasgow, Scotland, and now lives in New Rochelle,
NY, with his wife, Debbie, and his son, Kevin.

MASTER POINT PRESS